SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WA -v- CHEEMA [2026] WASC 159
[2026] WASC 159
Page 1
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WA -v- CHEEMA [2026]
WASC 159
CORAM : PALMER J
HEARD : 26 MARCH 2026
DELIVERED : 30 APRIL 2026
FILE NO/S : GDA 22 of 2025
BETWEEN : SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WA
Appellant
AND
JASKIRAN KAUR CHEEMA
First Respondent
RAJINDER SINGH BASSI
Second Respondent
PUSHPINDER SINGH
Third Respondent
RANI KAUR SAMRA
Fourth Respondent
BALJIT KAUR SIDHU
Fifth Respondent
DALJIT KAUR DHILLON
Sixth Respondent
PARAMJIT KAUR TUR
Seventh Respondent
ROWINDERJEET KAUR
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[2026] WASC 159
Page 2
Eighth Respondent
FILE NO/S : GDA 23 of 2025
BETWEEN : SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
INC.
Appellant
AND
DEVRAJ SINGH
First Respondent
LAKHBIR SINGH SIDHU
Second Respondent
DIDAR SINGH CHEEMA
Third Respondent
AMRITPAL SINGH
Fourth Respondent
FILE NO/S : GDA 24 of 2025
BETWEEN : SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
INC.
Appellant
AND
AMARJIT SINGH PABLA
Respondent
FILE NO/S : GDA 25 of 2025
BETWEEN : SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WA
Appellant
AND
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BALDEV SINGH BAGGA
First Respondent
LAKHBIR SINGH SIDHU
Second Respondent
DIDAR SINGH CHEEMA
Third Respondent
AMRITPAL SINGH
Fourth Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Coram : MR E CADE (MEMBER)
Citation : CHEEMA AND SIKH ASSOCIATION OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2025] WASAT 126
File Number : CC 137 of 2025
CC 138 of 2025
CC 139 of 2025
CC 154 of 2025
Catchwords:
Appeal from a decision of the State Administrative Tribunal - Leave to appeal
required - Whether the respondents had standing as expelled members of the
Association - Proper construction of s 182 of the Associations Incorporation Act
2015 (WA) - Whether the State Administrative Tribunal had jurisdiction - Turns
on its own facts
Legislation:
Association and Co-operatives Legislation Amendment Act 20-25 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)
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Result:
GDA 22 of 2025
Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed
GDA 23 of 2025
Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed
GDA 24 of 2025
Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed
GDA 25 of 2025
Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
GDA 22 of 2025
Counsel:
Appellant : Mr A Sidhu
First Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Second Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Third Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Fourth Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Fifth Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Sixth Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Seventh Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Eighth Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Solicitors:
Appellant : Rekhraj Legal
First Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Second Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Third Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Fourth Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Fifth Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Sixth Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Seventh Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Eighth Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
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[2026] WASC 159
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GDA 23 of 2025
Counsel:
Appellant : A Sidhu
First Respondent : PG McGowan
Second Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Third Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Fourth Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Solicitors:
Appellant : Rekhraj Legal
First Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Second Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Third Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Fourth Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
GDA 24 of 2025
Counsel:
Appellant : Mr A Sidhu
Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Solicitors:
Appellant : Rekhraj Legal
Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
GDA 25 of 2025
Counsel:
Appellant : Mr A Sidhu
First Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Second Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Third Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
Fourth Respondent : Mr P G McGowan
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[2026] WASC 159
Page 6
Solicitors:
Appellant : Rekhraj Legal
First Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Second Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Third Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Fourth Respondent : Equitas Lawyers
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Bejawn v The Sikh Association of Western Australia [2023] WASC 152
Kavanagh and The Pine Valley Pistol Club [2020] WASAT 11
Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Rayney [2017] WASCA 78; (2017)
51 WAR 142
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33
WAR 361
Secretary to the Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls [1999] VSCA 117;
[1999] 3 VR 331
Smith and Murray Districts Carriage Driving Club Inc [2021] WASAT 44
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[2026] WASC 159
PALMER J
Page 7
PALMER J:
Introduction
1 In these four appeals, the appellant association, the Sikh
Association of Western Australia (the Association), seeks to appeal
decisions made by Member E Cade in the State Administrative Tribunal
(Tribunal) to allow four applications made under s 182(1) of the
Associations Incorporation Act 2015 (WA) (Associations Incorporation
Act).
2 All of the applications sought to challenge the legality of actions
taken by the Executive Committee of the Association.
3 Three applications were brought by groups of applicants whom the
Association's Executive Committee had purported to expel. The
applicants claimed that the Executive Committee's attempts to expel
them were legally ineffective and they remained members.
4 The fourth application was brought by a member who had been
issued with a 'show cause' notice. He was also expelled the week after
he filed his application with the Tribunal. He disputed the validity of
the show cause notice and his subsequent expulsion.
5 The four applications were heard together and a single set of
reasons given: Cheema and Sikh Association of Western Australia
[2025] WASAT 126 (Primary Reasons).
6 Ultimately, the applications turned upon the proper construction of
the Association's rules (the Constitution of the Sikh Association of
Western Australia Inc. (SAWA) [2018 Edition] (the Constitution)) and
whether the Executive Committee had complied with them. The
Tribunal concluded that the Constitution had not been followed and that
none of the members had been expelled.
7 The four appeals before me were heard together.
8 Three of the appeals concerned applications by applicants who the
Executive Committee had purported to expel before they filed their
application.1 The principal issue in those appeals was whether the
applicants had standing to apply to the Tribunal (the Standing
1 GDA 22 of 2025, GDA 23 of 2025 and GDA 25 of 2025 (Standing Appeals).
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PALMER J
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Appeals). The same grounds of appeal were advanced for all three
appeals and they were dealt with together.
9 The fourth appeal concerned the member (Mr Pabla) who the
Executive Council purported to expel after he had filed his application
(the Pabla Appeal).2 That appeal raised different issues and was dealt
with separately.
10 The Association requires leave to appeal. For the reasons that
follow, I will refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal.
Why the Association requires leave to appeal and when it will be given
11 Section 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)
(the SAT Act) confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to hear an
appeal from a decision of the Tribunal on a question of law, but only if
the court grants leave to appeal.
12 In Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board,3 the Court of
Appeal said that the power to grant leave is conferred in general terms
and leave should be granted if, in all of the circumstances, it is in the
interests of justice that there should be a grant of leave.
13 While the ultimate issue is whether the grant of leave is in the
interests of justice, Buss JA (as his Honour then was) in Paridis stated
that in considering whether to grant leave, regard should be had to the
guidelines articulated by the court in Secretary to the Department of
Premier and Cabinet v Hulls.4 In Hulls, Phillips JA said:5
When leave is sought to appeal … it will be necessary for the applicant
to identify a question of law which is relevant to the granting of the
relief sought on appeal. The importance of the question, either generally
or to the would-be appellant in the particular case, will probably be
relevant. The applicant must show that there is a real or significant
argument to be put on that question of law at least to this extent: that
there is sufficient doubt about it to justify the grant of leave. Moreover,
it may have to be shown that to allow the error to go uncorrected would
impose substantial injustice, although, where the order below is final,
that injustice will often be more readily discernible.
2 GDA 24 of 2025 (Pabla Appeal).
3 Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361 [16] (Buss JA,
Wheeler & Pullin JJA agreeing) (Paridis).
4 Secretary to the Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls [1999] VSCA 117; [1999] 3 VR 331 (Hulls).
5 Hulls [16] (Phillips JA, Tadgell & Batt JJA agreeing). These principles were also applied in Legal
Profession Complaints Committee v Rayney [2017] WASCA 78; (2017) 51 WAR 142 [87] - [88].
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14 This approach has been regularly followed by this court. It is the
approach I will adopt.
How the Tribunal determined its jurisdiction
15 Given that the Standing Appeals challenge the Tribunal's
jurisdiction, it is useful to begin by saying something about how the
Tribunal went about determining its jurisdiction.
16 The Tribunal acknowledged the challenge to its jurisdiction from
the outset. The Primary Reasons commenced with an introduction in
which the Tribunal summarised the Association's position as being as
follows:6
In broad terms, [the Association] asserts that each of the applicants have
been properly expelled in accordance with the Constitution and that any
dispute they may have had with the Association as to their expulsion
has been finally resolved in accordance with its rules. The [Association]
says that as a consequence each applicant is no longer a member of the
Association and so cannot bring to the Tribunal an application under s
182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act]. Accordingly, [the
Association] seeks orders from the Tribunal dismissing each of the
applications.
17 The Tribunal then set out the relevant factual background.7
18 The Tribunal's summary of the factual background included a
reference to earlier litigation in this court before Seaward J (as her
Honour then was) in which the president of the Association sought
declaratory relief regarding the legal effectiveness of actions taken by
the Executive Committee to remove him. Justice Seaward determined
that the president had not been removed because the Constitution had
not been followed.8
19 The Tribunal explained that the applicants (in the matters the
subject of the present appeals) believed they had been expelled because
they had earlier voted to expel the president and they would be unlikely
to vote in favour of the reimbursement of his legal costs of the
proceedings before Seaward J. The Tribunal noted that these
allegations were disputed by the Association.9
6 Primary Reasons, [6].
7 Primary Reasons, [8] - [20].
8 Bejawn v The Sikh Association of Western Australia [2023] WASC 152.
9 Primary Reasons, [21] - [22].
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20 The Tribunal noted that the Association's position was that the
Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act because the Association had done everything
required of it under the Constitution with the consequence that the
applicants were no longer members.10
21 Paragraphs [27] and [28] of the Primary Reasons were titled
'Jurisdiction'. Those paragraphs provided as follows:
Jurisdiction
[27] The enabling Act under which these applications are brought is
the [Associations Incorporation Act], in this case, s 182 of the
[Associations Incorporation Act]. An application under s 182 of
the [Associations Incorporation Act] is within the original
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Section 182 is in the following
terms:
(1) If a dispute cannot be resolved under the procedure
provided for as required by Schedule 1 Division 1
item 18 –
(a) the incorporated association concerned; or
(b) a member of the association involved in the
dispute; or
(c) a former member expelled from the
association involved in the dispute,
may make an application to the State Administrative
Tribunal to have the dispute determined by that
Tribunal.
(1A) An application by a former member must be made
within 6 months of the expulsion of the person from the
incorporated association.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the State
Administrative Tribunal from exercising its powers to
refer the dispute, or any aspect of it, for mediation.
(3) In a proceeding under subsection (1), the State
Administrative Tribunal may make orders giving such
relief as the Tribunal considers appropriate, including
one or more of the following orders –
10 Primary Reasons [25] - [26].
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(a) an order giving directions for the observance
of the rules of the incorporated association by
any person who has an obligation to observe
those rules;
(b) an order declaring and enforcing the rights and
obligations of members or former members of
the incorporated association between
themselves;
(c) an order declaring and enforcing the rights and
obligations between the incorporated
association and any member, members, former
member or former members of the association.
[28] The limits of the jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal by s 182
of the [Associations Incorporation Act] is discussed by Senior
Member Aitken in Kavanagh and Pine Valley Pistol Club
Incorporated [2020] WASAT 11 (Kavanagh No. 1):
86. However, in the Tribunal's view, an application can be
made under s 182(1) of the [Associations Incorporation
Act] if an incorporated association contends that the
membership of a person who has been a member of the
incorporated association has ceased, but that person
disputes that their membership has ceased because they
contend that the incorporated association has not
complied with its rules. In that situation, it will be
necessary for the Tribunal to determine the issue of
whether the rules (properly construed) have been
complied with before the Tribunal can determine
whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the dispute
under s 182(1) of the [Associations Incorporation Act].
If the Tribunal determines that the incorporated
association did not comply with its rules and that the
membership of the person has not ceased then it can
make a declaration under s 182(3)(c) of the
[Associations Incorporation Act] declaring that the
person is still a member of the incorporated association
and that the decision to terminate their membership is
void and of no effect. That being the case, the person
will, in fact, have been a current member of the
incorporated association when they make the
application under s 182(1) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act].
…
90. Section 182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act]
does not give the Tribunal jurisdiction to deal with the
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merits of whether a person's membership of an
incorporated association should have been terminated;
it only gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to determine
whether an incorporated association has complied with
its rules in making a decision to terminate the
membership.
22 The Tribunal then turned to consider the principles applicable to
the proper construction of the rules of an incorporated association,11
before turning to consider the Constitution and its proper
construction.12
23 The Tribunal then proceeded to consider each of the applications
by applying the proper construction of the Constitution to the facts as it
had found them. As I have mentioned, the Tribunal concluded that
each of the applicants remained members of the Association.13
The proposed grounds of appeal in the Standing Appeals
24 There are seven proposed grounds of appeal in the Standing
Appeals:
Ground 1 — Jurisdictional Error: Tribunal erred in treating
expelled persons as 'members' contrary to the
Constitution of the Respondent Associations [sic] for
the following reasons:
The Tribunal erred in law by finding that the Respondents were still
'members' because the Appellant Association's rules were not followed.
The Appellant's Constitution provides that expulsions take effect
immediately (rule 8.2.e)
Accordingly, at the time the Respondents lodged their application, they
had ceased to be members of the Appellant Association as a matter of
constitutional fact, regardless as to whether the expulsions were later
alleged to be procedurally defective.
The Tribunal's finding that membership continued notwithstanding the
immediate expulsion rule, was legally incorrect and made in excess of
jurisdiction.
Ground 2 — Standing under s 182(1) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act] is a jurisdictional fact that must
11 Primary Reasons [29] - [30].
12 Primary Reasons [31] - [37].
13 Primary Reasons [38] - [197].
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be assessed at the time of filing for the following
reasons:
Section 182(1) of the [Associations Incorporation Act] requires that an
applicant is a 'member' of the Appellant Association when an
application is brought before [the Tribunal].
Because the Constitution of the Appellant Association states that
expulsions are to take effect immediately, the Respondents were not
members at the time of filing and therefore lacked standing.
The Tribunal erred in law by construing 'member' in s 182(1) to include
persons who have been expelled, on the basis that the expulsion was
later found to be procedurally flawed under the rules of the association.
Standing under s 182(1) of the [Associations Incorporation Act] is a
threshold jurisdictional fact.
The Tribunal was required to determine this issue before any
consideration of the validity of the expulsions was entertained.
The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to make the
correct finding on this jurisdictional fact.
Ground 3 — Tribunal impermissibly confined itself to examining
the merits to establish standing before the question of
jurisdiction was addressed for the following reasons:
The Tribunal reasoned that the Respondents were still members of the
[A]ssociation because in its view, the rules of the Association were not
followed.
This in effect reverses the statutory order of inquiry because:
a) The Tribunal may only examine the validity of an expulsion if
the applicant has standing.
b) The Tribunal cannot determine standing by reference to its own
findings on merits.
The Tribunal exceeded its authority under s 182(1) and s 182(3) of the
[Associations Incorporation Act] by making orders based on a review of
the expulsions in order to manufacture standing which was then
erroneously used to rescind the expulsions.
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Ground 4 — Error of Law: Misconstruction of the term 'member'
for the purposes of s 182(1) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act] for the following reasons:
The Tribunal adopted an erroneous construction of the term 'member'
by treating persons who have been immediately expelled as persons
who remain members, until [the Tribunal] decides otherwise.
Nothing in s 182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act] supports the
concept of a 'suspended membership pending [the Tribunal's] review'.
Membership is a status defined by the rules of the Appellant
Association which provide that expulsion is effective immediately.
The Tribunal's contrary interpretation is an error of law affecting
jurisdiction.
Ground 5 — Tribunal failed to consider the effect of the 2025
amendments to s 182 of the [Associations
Incorporation Act] adequately or at all, for the
following reasons:
The amendments to s 182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act]
commenced before the Tribunal delivered its decision and were cited in
that decision. Therefore, these amendments must have been in the
knowledge and/or contemplation of the Member when deciding.
The amendments to s 182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act]
dispensed with an ambiguity which may have existed in the pre-
amended s 182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act] by clarifying
that expelled members are now permitted to bring applications to [the
Tribunal] under this section, within 6 months of the expulsion, implying
they were not permitted to do so before the amendments.
These amendments clearly confirm, expressly or by implication, that
expelled members, prior to the amendments, did not have standing to
bring a [Tribunal] application challenging the expulsion.
The amendments to s 182 of the [Associations Incorporation Act] do
not have retrospective application and are therefore irrelevant to the
Respondent's applications, apart from clarifying the obvious lack of
standing of expelled members prior to those amendments.
Ground 6 — Decision of the Tribunal is legally unreasonable
and/or illogical for the following reasons:
The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the Respondent
applicants 'remained members' of the Appellant Association is both
unreasonable and illogical because it:
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a) Contradicts the express rule in the Appellants Constitution that
expulsions take immediate effect.
b) Disregards the fact of those expulsions.
c) Rests entirely on a merits conclusion reached without
jurisdiction and; [sic]
d) Allows a person to regain 'membership' through a circular
reasoning process - only members may apply to [the Tribunal]
but you are now members because you applied despite the fact
that you were not members when you made the application.
Ground 7 — Consequential Excess of Jurisdiction: Rescinding
expulsion orders void.
Because the Respondent applicants had no standing ab initio, to bring
the [Tribunal] application, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider
the merits involved in the expulsion process or whether the rules of the
Appellant Association had been followed in doing so.
Alternatively, the orders and declarations made by the Tribunal were
unreasonable and made on an incorrect legal basis.
Why the Association maintained the Standing Appeals have merit
25 The Association's submissions addressed the grounds of appeal
together without identifying which submissions related to which
ground.14
26 Three key themes emerged from the submissions.
27 First, the Association contended that s 182(1) of the Associations
Incorporation Act (as it stood at the relevant time) did not give standing
to expelled members. It argued that as the members who brought the
relevant application had already been expelled, the Tribunal lacked
jurisdiction.15 It was contended that any relief needed to be sought
from the Supreme Court.16
28 The Association submitted that properly construed, s 182 of the
Associations Incorporation Act did not permit someone who was not a
member to make an application.17
14 Appellant's Amended Submissions dated 16 March 2026 (Applicable in GDA 22 of 2025, GDA 23 of 2025
and GDA 25 of 2025) (the Standing Appeal Submissions).
15 Standing Appeal Submissions [4], [82] - [84].
16 Standing Appeal Submissions [27] - [29].
17 Standing Appeal Submissions [82] - [84].
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29 The Association referred to the decision of Senior Member Aitken
in Kavanagh and The Pine Valley Pistol Club,18 referred to by the
Tribunal in the Primary Reasons. The Association acknowledged that
in Kavanagh, Senior Member Aitken concluded that under s 182 of the
Associations Incorporation Act (as it stood prior to its amendment) a
person who disputes that their membership had ceased had standing to
make an application. It noted, however, that Kavanagh concerned
members whose memberships had not been renewed, rather than
expelled members.19
30 The Association contended that neither Kavanagh, nor any of the
other cases that had followed it, had to consider whether expelled
members have standing.20
31 The Association referred to various passages in Kavanagh which
considered the proper construction of s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act, and to Senior Member Aitken's conclusion that
former members of an association have no standing.21
32 The Association contended that amendments made to s 182 of the
Associations Incorporation Act after Kavanagh was decided confirm
that former members have no standing.22 The Association referred to
the amendments in the following terms (with the amendments
underlined):23
(1) If a dispute cannot be resolved under the procedure provided for
as required by Schedule 1 Division 1 item 18 –
(a) the incorporated association concerned; or
(b) a member of the association involved in the dispute; or
(c) a former member expelled from the association
involved in the dispute,
may make an application to the State Administrative Tribunal to
have the dispute determined by that Tribunal.
(1A) An application by a former member must be made within 6
months of the expulsion of the person from the incorporated
association.
18 Kavanagh and The Pine Valley Pistol Club [2020] WASAT 11 (Kavanagh).
19 Standing Appeal Submissions [45] - [48].
20 Standing Appeal Submissions [44] - [45].
21 Standing Appeal Submissions [49] - [59].
22 Standing Appeal Submissions [27] - [29].
23 Standing Appeal Submissions [5] - [15] and [19] - [20].
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(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the State Administrative
Tribunal from exercising its powers to refer the dispute, or any
aspect of it, for mediation.
(3) In a proceeding under subsection (1), the State Administrative
Tribunal may make orders giving such relief as the Tribunal
considers appropriate, including one or more of the following
orders –
(a) an order giving directions for the observance of the
rules of the incorporated association by any person who
has an obligation to observe those rules;
(b) an order declaring and enforcing the rights and
obligations of members or former members of the
incorporated association between themselves;
(c) an order declaring and enforcing the rights and
obligations between the incorporated association and
any member, members, former member or former
members of the association.
33 The Association also referred to the explanatory memorandum to
the Bill which introduced the amendments which it said stated:24
the Associations Incorporation Act does not currently provide for a
former member of an association who has been expelled to make an
application to the State Administrative Tribunal for resolution of an
expulsion decision. The Bill will make provisions for this additional
avenue for dispute resolution, which will ensure disputes are more
effectively resolved and procedural fairness is afforded.
34 The Association argued that the applicants before the Tribunal did
not raise any issues concerning the procedure relating to the decision
making process under the Constitution and that the Tribunal lacked
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the dispute.25
35 The Association also relied upon rule 8.2e of the Constitution that
provided that a decision of the Executive Committee to suspend a
member's membership, or to expel the member, takes effect
immediately.26
36 Secondly, the Association contended that the Tribunal failed to
determine its jurisdiction but instead proceeded to determine the matter
24 Standing Appeal Submissions [14].
25 Standing Appeal Submissions [64] - [67].
26 Standing Appeal Submissions [61] - [63].
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on the merits. It was argued that this involved an inversion of the
process.27
37 The Association referred to the challenge that it made to the
applicants' standing before the Tribunal and maintained that that
challenge was not determined.28
38 The Association noted that paragraph [27] of the Primary Reasons
quoted the Associations Incorporation Act as it stood after its
amendment. It contended that the Tribunal's consideration of standing
was limited to paragraphs [27] and [28] of the Primary Reasons.29
39 The Association also referred to passages in Kavanagh which
suggest that jurisdiction might turn upon consideration of whether a
member had ceased to be a member.30
40 Thirdly, the Association maintained that if the Tribunal had
jurisdiction, its jurisdiction was limited to determining whether the
rules and procedures available for internal dispute resolution were
insufficient to enable a dispute to be resolved. It was argued that this
was the limit of the jurisdiction conferred by s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act.31
Why leave to appeal will be refused in the Standing Appeals
41 The Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to that conferred by s 182 of
the Associations Incorporation Act.
42 The hearing before the Tribunal took place between 5 and
12 August 2025. Section 182 of the Associations Incorporation Act
was amended on 22 August 2025. The amendment was effected by
s 27 of the Association and Co-operatives Legislation Amendment Act
2025 (WA).
43 In the absence of some clear statement to the contrary, an Act will
be assumed not to have retrospective effect.32 Neither s 27 of the
amending Act, nor s 182 of the Associations Incorporation Act, stated
that the amendments to s 182 of the Associations Incorporation Act had
retrospective effect.
27 Standing Appeal Submissions [30] - [42], [76] - [81], [85] - [98].
28 Standing Appeal Submissions [22] - [26].
29 Standing Appeal Submissions [74].
30 Standing Appeal Submissions [49] - [59].
31 Standing Appeal Submissions [103].
32 D C Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 10th ed, LexisNexis, Australia, 2024 [10.5].
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44 The Primary Reasons were delivered on 11 November 2025. As I
have mentioned, paragraph [27] of the Primary Reasons quotes s 182 of
the Associations Incorporation Act in its amended terms. Prior to its
amendment, s 182 of the Associations Incorporation Act provided as
follows:33
182 Jurisdiction of SAT in respect of disputes
(1) If a dispute cannot be resolved under the procedure
provided for as required by Schedule 1 Division 1 item
18 –
(a) the incorporated association concerned; or
(b) a member of the association involved in the
dispute; or
may make an application to the State Administrative
Tribunal to have the dispute determined by that
Tribunal.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the State
Administrative Tribunal from exercising its powers to
refer the dispute, or any aspect of it, for mediation.
(3) In a proceeding under subsection (1), the State
Administrative Tribunal may make orders giving such
relief as the Tribunal considers appropriate, including
one or more of the following orders –
(a) an order giving directions for the observance
of the rules of the incorporated association by
any person who has an obligation to observe
those rules;
(b) an order declaring and enforcing the rights and
obligations of members or former members of
the incorporated association between
themselves;
(c) an order declaring and enforcing the rights and
obligations between the incorporated
association and any member, members of the
association.
45 While it might be accepted that s 182 in its former terms does not
confer jurisdiction on someone other than a member to make an
33 Standing Appeal Submissions [5] - [15] and [19] - [20].
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application, it does not necessarily follow that the applicants lacked
standing to apply to the Tribunal. The applicants disputed their
expulsion. If they were right and they had not been expelled, then they
were still members.
46 The question of whether the applicant had standing to make an
application under s 182 was therefore bound up with the question of
whether they remained members. If they were, the Tribunal had
jurisdiction. If they were not, it did not.
47 This is the essence of the conclusion reached by Senior Member
Aitken in Kavanagh. The Senior Member explained the position as
follows:34
In the Tribunal's view, the proper construction and legal meaning of the
words 'a member of the association involved in the dispute' in
s 182(1)(b) of the [Associations Incorporation Act], by reference to the
text and read in context, is that they refer to a person who is a current
member of an incorporated association at the time that they make an
application to the Tribunal under s 182(1) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act].
Applying the principles of statutory construction referred to in [29]
above, the Tribunal cannot find any legislative intention in the
[Associations Incorporation Act] that a former member of an
incorporated association should be entitled to any relief under s 182 of
the [Associations Incorporation Act], if their membership has ceased in
accordance with the rules of the incorporated association (as properly
interpreted).
However, in the Tribunal's view, an application can be made under
s 182(1) of the [Associations Incorporation Act] if an incorporated
association contends that the membership of a person who has been a
member of the incorporated association has ceased, but that person
disputes that their membership has ceased because they contend that the
incorporated association has not complied with its rules. In that
situation, it will be necessary for the Tribunal to determine the issue of
whether the rules (properly construed) have been complied with before
the Tribunal can determine whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the
dispute under s 182(1) of the [Associations Incorporation Act]. If the
Tribunal determines that the incorporated association did not comply
with its rules and that the membership of the person has not ceased then
it can make a declaration under s 182(3)(c) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act] declaring that the person is still a member of the
incorporated association and that the decision to terminate their
membership is void and of no effect. That being the case, the person
34 Kavanagh [84] - [87] and [89].
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will, in fact, have been a current member of the incorporated
association when they make the application under s 182(1) of the
[Associations Incorporation Act].
That was the situation in Peskett, in which the Tribunal found that the
respondent, which was an incorporated association, had not validly
terminated the applicant's membership…
On the other hand, … if the Tribunal determines that an incorporated
association did comply with its rules and the membership of the person
concerned has ceased then it can dismiss the application on the basis
that it does not have jurisdiction under s 182(1) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act] to deal with it.
48 I consider that this approach to the Tribunal's jurisdiction (under
the former provisions) is correct.
49 The Association argued that the amendments to the Associations
Incorporation Act to permit 'former members' to apply under s 182
reveal that in its original terms, the Associations Incorporation Act
conferred no standing on former members to apply. This may be
correct, but the submission misses the point. If the applicants were still
members, they were not 'former' members.
50 The Association also contends that the Tribunal failed to
determine its jurisdiction. It argued that jurisdiction was only
addressed in the two paragraphs of the Primary Reasons headed
'Jurisdiction',35 and that the Tribunal failed to address the Association's
challenge to the applicants' standing at all.
51 In my view, this reading of the Primary Reasons misreads the
reasons. The two paragraphs headed 'Jurisdiction' identify the
approach that the Tribunal adopted to the determination of its
jurisdiction. The paragraphs do not express any conclusions about
jurisdiction.
52 In paragraph [28], the Tribunal refers to and adopts the approach
to jurisdiction suggested by Senior Member Aitken in Kavanagh. The
Tribunal understood that its jurisdiction depended on whether or not the
various applicants were still members. The balance of the Primary
Reasons can be seen to address whether they still were. In the result,
the Tribunal determined that they were all still members. The
consequence was that the Tribunal had jurisdiction in relation to all of
the applications.
35 Primary Reasons [27] - [28].
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53 The Tribunal's determination that the applicants remained
members turned upon the Tribunal's construction of the Constitution.
No challenge was made to that construction.
54 It is true that paragraph [27] quotes the amended version of s 182
of the Associations Incorporation Act. This is unfortunate but I do not
consider that it resulted in any error of law because the Tribunal
adopted and applied the approach in Kavanagh (which was the correct
approach under the Associations Incorporation Act in its original
terms). There is nothing in the Primary Reasons to suggest that the
Tribunal attached significance to the amendments made to the terms of
the Associations Incorporation Act.
55 The Association also sought to rely upon rule 8.2e of the
Constitution. It does not seem to me that consideration of that rule
advances matters. Rule 8.2e provides that an expulsion takes
immediate effect. But if the members were never expelled there was
nothing to take effect.
56 The rule does not extend so far as saying that the Executive
Committee is the only body with jurisdiction to determine whether a
person has been expelled. Whether such a rule could exclude the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal might be doubted anyway.
57 The Association also contended that the Tribunal's jurisdiction
was limited to determining whether the rules and procedures available
for internal dispute resolution were insufficient.
58 That the Tribunal's jurisdiction is not so limited is evident from the
express terms of s 182(3) of the Associations Incorporation Act. That
section provides that in a proceeding under subsection (1), the Tribunal
'may make orders giving such relief as the Tribunal considers
appropriate'. Section 182(3)(c) expressly provides that this includes an
order declaring and enforcing the rights and obligations between the
incorporated association and any member.
59 The Tribunal made orders declaring that the applicants had not
been expelled and that they remained members of the Association. It
was expressly empowered to give such declaratory relief by s 182(3)(c).
60 The Tribunal also made an order 'rescinding' the expulsions. What
was intended by this order is a little unclear. Given that the Tribunal
found that the members had not been expelled, there was nothing to
rescind.
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61 It may be that the order was intended to require the Association to
amend its records to record the correct position. If so, the order was
potentially an order to enforce the rights of the applicants and the
obligations of the Association that the Tribunal was empowered to
make under s 182(3)(c).
62 In any event, given that the applicants had not been expelled, even
if the making of an order 'rescinding' their expulsion involved an error,
such an error could not have caused any substantial injustice. The
applicants were, after all, members and the order simply confirmed this.
How the Tribunal dealt with Mr Pabla's application
63 The Tribunal dealt with Mr Pabla's application after it had dealt
with the other applications the subject of the Standing Appeals.36
64 The Tribunal referred to rule 8 of the Constitution and set out its
terms. The expulsion of members was dealt with in rule 8.2 which
relevantly provides:37
8.2 Suspension and Termination/Expulsion
a. The committee may decide to suspend a member's
membership or to expel a member from the Association
if -
i. the member contravenes any of these rules; or
ii. the member acts detrimentally to the interests
of the Association.
b. The secretary must give the member written notice of
the proposed suspension or expulsion at least 28 days
before the committee meeting at which the proposal is
to be considered by the committee.
c. The notice given to the member must state –
i. when and where the committee meeting is to
be held; and
ii. the grounds on which the proposed suspension
or expulsion is based; and
iii. that the member, or the member's
representative, may attend the meeting and
36 Primary Reasons [179] - [195].
37 Primary Reasons [34].
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will be given a reasonable opportunity to make
written or oral (or both written and oral)
submissions to the committee about the
proposed suspension or expulsion;
d. At the committee meeting, the committee must –
i. give the member, or the member's
representative, a reasonable opportunity to
make written or oral (or both written and oral)
submissions to the committee about the
proposed suspension or expulsion; and
ii. give due consideration to any submissions so
made; and
iii. decide –
(i) whether or not to suspend the
member's membership and, if the
decision is to suspend the
membership, the period of
suspension; or
(ii) whether or not to expel the member
from the Association.
e. A decision of the committee to suspend the member's
membership or to expel the member from the
Association takes immediate effect.
f. The committee must give the member written notice of
the committee's decision, and the reasons for the
decision, within 7 days after the committee meeting at
which the decision is made.
65 The Tribunal noted that Mr Pabla contended that the grounds set
out in the notice were not grounds that alleged a contravention of the
Constitution or acts detrimental to the interests of the Association.38
66 The Tribunal considered that the notice was problematical because
it seemed to reverse the requirements of rule 8.2(a). It considered that
(except in relation to Mr Pabla's election as secretary of another body)
rather than setting out alleged contraventions of the Constitution, the
notice required Mr Pabla to provide evidence that he had not
contravened the Constitution, without stating which rules it was
concerned with. The Tribunal considered that rather than setting out
38 Primary Reasons [183].
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acts detrimental to the interests of the Association, the notice required
Mr Pabla to provide evidence that he had acted in the best interests of
the Association.39
67 After reviewing the relevant rules of the Constitution, the Tribunal
concluded that Mr Pabla's election as secretary of another body could
not constitute a breach of the Constitution.40
68 The Tribunal concluded that the notice was therefore invalid
because it failed to allege a contravention of the Constitution.41
69 The Tribunal then concluded that Mr Pabla had not been expelled
from the Association under the procedure provided for in the
Constitution and that he remained a life member.42 It made the
following orders to give effect to its conclusions:
(a) an order that the expulsion of Mr Pabla was rescinded;
(b) a declaration that Mr Pabla had not been lawfully expelled as a
member of the Association; and
(c) a declaration that Mr Pabla remained a member of the
Association. 43
The proposed grounds of appeal in the Pabla Appeal
70 The proposed grounds of the Pabla Appeal were as follows:
Ground 1 — Jurisdictional error: excess of the limits of s 182(1) of
the [Associations Incorporation Act]
The Tribunal erred in law by determining matters outside the
jurisdiction conferred by s 182(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act
2015 (WA).
The only issue raised by the application was for relief in the form of an
order concerning the validity of a show cause notice. No dispute
relating to the Respondent's subsequent expulsion was placed before the
Tribunal. By determining the validity of the expulsion and rescinding it,
the Tribunal dealt with matters not constituting a 'dispute' referred to it
under s 182(1).
39 Primary Reasons [184].
40 Primary Reasons [185] - [191].
41 Primary Reasons [192] - [193].
42 Primary Reasons [196].
43 Primary Reasons [197].
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Ground 2 — Error of law: impermissible merits review of
disciplinary Processes
The Tribunal erred in law by purporting to assess the merits,
sufficiency, and content of the Association's internal show cause notice
issued to the Respondent. Section 182(1) of the [Associations
Incorporation Act] does not confer a general merits-review function on
the Tribunal. It requires only a determination as to whether a dispute
exists and whether it cannot be resolved under the rules. The Tribunal
exceeded its statutory function by engaging in review of the substance
of the Association's disciplinary procedures, especially the contents of
the show cause notice issued to the Respondent.
Ground 3 — Error of law: granting relief not sought
The Tribunal erred in law by granting remedies neither sought by the
Respondent nor incidental to the relief claimed.
The Respondent did not seek any order rescinding his expulsion or
declarations that he has not been lawfully expelled or that he remains a
member of the Association. The Tribunal lacked power to determine
issues or grant relief outside the application.
Ground 4 — Denial of procedural fairness
The Tribunal denied the Association procedural fairness by determining
the validity of the Respondent's expulsion, and ordering it to be
rescinded, without this issue being raised, without giving notice that this
issue would be considered and without affording the Association an
opportunity to rebut them.
Ground 5 — Materiality of errors
Each of the errors in Grounds 1–4 was material. The order rescinding
the expulsion and the associated declarations made was the operative or
substantive relief granted in the proceeding and would not have been
made had the Tribunal confined itself to the actual relief sought in the
application and had acted within jurisdiction.
Why the Association maintained the Pabla Appeal had merit
71 Again, the Association's submissions addressed the grounds of
appeal together without identifying which submissions related to which
ground.44
44 Appellant's Amended Submissions dated 16 March 2026 applicable in GDA 24 of 2025 (the Pabla
Submissions).
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72 The Association alleged that the Tribunal:
(a) granted substantive relief that was neither sought by the
applicant nor available under s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act; and
(b) impermissibly engaged in a merits-based determination of the
Association's disciplinary process, rather than confining itself to
the limited supervisory task contemplated by s 182 as far as
resolutions of disputes under the Constitution are concerned.45
73 The Association argued that s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act is procedural and supervisory, does not provide for a
merits appeal, and confers no general remedial power on the Tribunal
to remake the Association's decisions.46
74 It was submitted that at its highest, the Associations Incorporation
Act allows the Tribunal to determine whether an association had
complied with the Associations Incorporation Act and its Constitution
in making a decision but it was argued that the Tribunal does not have
an express statutory power under s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act to either set aside, rescind, or substitute its own
decision for an association's disciplinary decision.47
75 The Association argued that s 182 of the Associations
Incorporation Act does not confer a reinstatement or recission power. It
was argued that recission is a substantive merits remedy, not a
supervisory declaration.48
76 The Association argued that although Mr Pabla had not sought
such relief, the Tribunal ordered recission of the expulsion, his
reinstatement as a member, and a declaration of his ongoing
membership. It was contended that this involved a substitution of the
Tribunal's decision for that of the Association.49
77 The Association argued that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction
by granting relief outside that sought by the parties. It was contended
45 Pabla Submissions [1].
46 Pabla Submissions [2].
47 Pabla Submissions [3] - [4].
48 Pabla Submissions [28].
49 Pabla Submissions [30] - [31].
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that the Association was denied procedural fairness because it was not
permitted to address reinstatement-type outcomes.50
78 The Association submitted that the structure and language of s 182
of the Associations Incorporation Act indicate an intention to permit
declaratory and supervisory outcomes, leaving any further
consequences to be addressed by the Association in accordance with its
Constitution. The Association argued that it was open to the Tribunal
to make an order that whatever dispute the applicant raised was to be
addressed by the internal dispute resolution process as this had not been
exhausted.51
79 The Association contended that the Tribunal's jurisdiction was
limited to:
(a) determining whether the show cause notice complied with the
Constitution;
(b) making a declaration to that effect; or
(c) declining to determine matters that had become hypothetical or
overtaken by events.52
80 The Association argued that the orders made determined
substantive rights and outcomes.53
81 The Association contended that the Tribunal's reasons reveal that
it undertook an evaluative assessment of the adequacy, fairness and
sufficiency of the content of the show cause notice. It was argued that
the Tribunal:
(a) attempted to assess the nature of the allegations made against
the applicant without evaluating or conducting a thorough
forensic examination of those allegations;
(b) evaluated the content without appreciating the nature of the
allegations made;
(c) decided that the allegations made by the Association did not
breach the Constitution;
50 Pabla Submissions [32] - [33].
51 Pabla Submissions [34].
52 Pabla Submissions [47].
53 Pabla Submissions [35].
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(d) failed to appreciate that the nature of the allegations also
indicated conduct detrimental to the Association; and
(e) drew conclusions that effectively substituted its own view as to
how the show-cause notice ought to have been drafted and how
the disciplinary process ought to have been conducted.54
82 The Association argued that such an analysis is characteristic of a
merits review, rather than a limited supervisory inquiry.55
83 The Association submitted that even if the contents of the show
cause notice were determined to be less than satisfactory, this did not
authorise the Tribunal to determine the ultimate outcome of the
disciplinary process. It was argued that a finding of non-compliance
would permit a declaration to that effect, remitting it back to the
Association and leaving it to the Association to determine how to
proceed consistently with its Constitution.56
84 The Association contended that Mr Pabla wanted the Tribunal to
make a declaration that the show cause notice was invalid and order
that the matter be redirected back to the Association for further process
under the rules. It contended, however, this would still be a merits-
based decision that is not permitted.57
85 The Association referred to a passage in Kavanagh where Senior
Member Aitken observed that the Tribunal only had jurisdiction to
determine whether the rules had been complied with and it was not
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the merits of whether a
person should be a member. Reference was also made to the decision
in Smith and Murray Districts Carriage Driving Club Inc.58
86 The Association noted that there were no allegations that it had
breached any of the rules of the Association in issuing the show cause
notice in question. It was argued that the notice was issued in
compliance with rules 8.2(b) and 8.2(c) of the Constitution. 59
87 The Association argued that the Tribunal could not treat the later
expulsion as if it were automatically infected with invalidity and
therefore capable of being undone by the Tribunal itself. It was
54 Pabla Submissions [36].
55 Pabla Submissions [37].
56 Pabla Submissions [38].
57 Pabla Submissions [39].
58 Smith and Murray Districts Carriage Driving Club Inc [2021] WASAT 44 [20]. Pabla Submissions [40].
59 Pabla Submissions [45].
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contended that there was no 'relation back doctrine' in s 182 and that the
Tribunal assumed a power to control future conduct of the Association.
The Association described this as a 'serious judicial leap'. 60
Why leave to appeal will be refused in the Pabla Appeal
88 Ground 1 contends that the only issue raised by the application
was whether the show caused notice was valid. Ground 3 suggests that
the Tribunal granted a remedy not sought by Mr Pabla.
89 It is correct that when Mr Pabla filed his application with the
Tribunal on 5 March 2025, the only relief sought was an order that the
show cause notice issued to him was invalid.61 At that stage he was
still a member of the Association.
90 The following week, on 13 March 2025, the Association purported
to expel him, relying on amongst other things, what the Association
claimed was Mr Pabla's failure to properly address the matters raised by
the show cause notice.62
91 On 31 March 2025, the Association filed an interim application in
the Tribunal seeking an order dismissing Mr Pabla's application.63 The
application raised various challenges to the Tribunal's jurisdiction. One
of these was that Mr Pabla lacked standing unless it was determined
that he had not been expelled under the Constitution.64
92 On 2 April 2025, Mr Pabla filed submissions before the Tribunal
responding to the interim application. Those submissions addressed the
arguments raised by the Association, including arguing that Mr Pabla's
purported expulsion did not negate the Tribunal's jurisdiction.65
93 Paragraph 33 of Mr Pabla's submissions expressly referred to and
invoked Senior Member Aitken's reasoning in Kavanagh. That
paragraph included the following:66
(a) the principle which arises from Kavanagh at [86] is that the
purported expulsion of a member of an association is no
60 Pabla Submissions [48] - [51].
61 Hearing Book for application made in the State Administrative Tribunal for matter CC 154 of 2025 -
Pabla v The Sikh Association of Western Australia (Applicable in GDA 24 of 2025), page 512 (Hearing
Book).
62 Hearing Book, pages 502 - 504.
63 Hearing Book, pages 500 - 509.
64 Hearing Book, page 509 [41], [49] and [53(d)].
65 Hearing Book, pages 489 - 496.
66 Hearing Book, pages 495 - 496.
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obstacle to the Tribunal's jurisdiction in circumstances where the
resolution of the dispute before the Tribunal involves a
determination of whether that member's membership has ceased;
(b) [Mr Pabla]’s expulsion was premised on the show-cause notice
issued to him dated 19 December 2024, the validity of which is
the subject matter of [Mr Pabla]'s application;
(c) it therefore follows that if the show-cause notice is invalid then
[Mr Pabla]’s expulsion must be invalid; and
(d) on application of Kavanagh the application can proceed because
if [Mr Pabla] is correct and the show-cause notice is invalid,
then the expulsion falls away and it would be appropriate for the
Tribunal to make a declaration that [Mr Pabla]’s membership
has not ceased.
94 On 5 April 2025, a hearing took place before Senior Member
O'Sullivan in the Tribunal. The Association did not press its interim
application and instead orders were made programming the matter
through to a hearing.67 The orders made that day included orders that
the parties file statements of issues, facts and contentions.68
95 Paragraph 1 of Mr Pabla's statement of issues, facts and
contentions (the Pabla SIFIC) identified six issues for the Tribunal to
determine. The first issue identified was whether the Tribunal had
jurisdiction. The sixth issue was whether a declaration should be made
that the Association's decision to issue a show cause notice to Mr Pabla
and to expel him were void and of no effect so that he was still a
member.69
96 The Pabla SIFIC then addressed each of these issues in turn.
It concluded: 70
A declaration that the show-cause notice issued to [Mr Pabla], and by
extension the purported expulsion of [Mr Pabla] in reliance thereon, is
void and of no effect, and that [Mr Pabla] is still a member of [the
Association], determines a question which is more than abstract or
hypothetical as it has direct consequences as to the rights enjoyed by
[Mr Pabla] as a member of [the Association].
The answer to Issue 6 is yes, and a declaration should be made that the
show-cause notice issued to [Mr Pabla], and by extension the purported
67 Hearing Book, pages 4795 - 4807.
68 Hearing Book, pages 483 - 484.
69 Hearing Book, page 458.
70 Hearing Book, page 477.
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expulsion of [Mr Pabla] in reliance thereon, is void and of no effect,
and [Mr Pabla] is still a member of [the Association].
Such a declaration adequately deals with the jurisdictional requirement
that the application be brought by a member or members of the
concerned association, notwithstanding [the Association's] contentions
that [Mr Pabla] was expelled from [the Association] (further to [the
Association's] contentions in relation to Issue 1).
97 The Association's statement of issues, facts and contentions (the
Association's SIFIC) contended that only the first issue identified in
the Pabla SIFIC was before the Tribunal. It argued that the balance of
the issues raised were beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The
Association's SIFIC did however address each of the issues raised by
the Pabla SIFIC, albeit this was said to be without prejudice to the
Association's jurisdictional objection.71
98 With regard to issue 6, the Association's SIFIC disputed the
Tribunal's jurisdiction to make the orders sought. It also maintained
that Mr Pabla lacked the standing to make the application because he
was no longer a member of the Association.72
99 In my view, there is no merit to the Association's contentions that
the Tribunal decided an issue that was not before it.
100 While it is the case that the expulsion occurred after Mr Pabla filed
his application, the proceedings in the Tribunal were conducted on the
basis that the expulsion was a matter that could be addressed in those
proceedings.
101 The Association relied upon it to challenge the Tribunal's
jurisdiction, arguing that Mr Pabla's expulsion meant that he lacked
standing. As was the case with the Standing Appeals, the determination
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction became bound up with the validity of the
purported expulsion.
102 In response, Mr Pabla sought declaratory relief that he was still a
member.
103 It may be that the proceedings lacked a degree of procedural
formality. Mr Pabla did not file an amended application seeking to
expand the relief he sought or a fresh application (which could have
71 Hearing Book, page 286.
72 Hearing Book, pages 294 - 295.
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been heard at the same time). Nor did the Tribunal require him to do
so.
104 It is not apparent to me that any lack of formality resulted in an
error of law, however. The Tribunal was obliged to act without
formality. Section 9 of the SAT Act provides that one of the main
objectives of the Tribunal is to act as speedily and with as little
formality and technicality as is practicable, and to minimise the costs to
parties.
105 Further, even if there was some procedural irregularity, it does not
seem to me that that irregularity caused any substantial prejudice. The
Association had the opportunity to address any procedural or
substantive points before the Tribunal and did so.
106 Nor does it seem to me that there is any merit in the Association's
assertions that it was denied procedural fairness. The Association was
afforded the opportunity to respond to Mr Pabla's claim for declaratory
relief and in fact did so in the Association's SIFIC.
107 To the extent that the Association's proposed grounds concern the
order made to 'rescind' the expulsion, I do not consider that the making
of that order caused the Association any substantial prejudice. Given
that the Tribunal found that Mr Pabla was never expelled, there was no
expulsion to rescind. As he was a member, the order did no more than
reflect the true position.
108 The final ground of appeal asserts that the Tribunal engaged in a
'merits review'.
109 I had difficulty following some of the submissions made by the
Association.
110 To some extent the submissions failed to acknowledge the scope
of the powers given to the Tribunal by s 182(3) of the Associations
Incorporation Act. As I have already discussed, it seems to me that
s 182(3) gave the Tribunal the jurisdiction to grant the relief that it did.
111 The submissions also seemed to misapprehend the exercise
undertaken by the Tribunal and what is meant by the term 'merits
review'. In my view, the Tribunal engaged in a process of construing
the Constitution and then reviewing the notice given to Mr Pabla to
determine whether it complied with the Constitution. The Tribunal
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concluded that the notice did not comply with the Constitution and was
therefore invalid.
112 It does not seem to me that the Tribunal reviewed the decision
made by the Executive Committee to issue the notice to determine the
'correct and preferable' decision, as if it were exercising the (merits)
review jurisdiction that the Tribunal may have in other areas.
Conclusion
113 For these reasons, I do not consider that any of the proposed
grounds of appeal have sufficient merit to grant leave to appeal. I will
therefore refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the appeals.
114 My preliminary view is that costs should follow the event and that
the Association should pay the respondents' costs to be taxed if not
agreed. I will hear from the parties if any party seeks any different
costs order.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of
the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
CN
Associate to the Honourable Justice Palmer
30 APRIL 2026
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