RE MGW; EX PARTE MGW [2026] WASC 153

[2026] WASC 153 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : RE MGW; EX PARTE MGW [2026] WASC 153 CORAM : BYDDER J HEARD : 10 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 10 APRIL 2026 PUBLISHED : 28 APRIL 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 2379 of 2025 MATTER : IN THE MATTER OF MGW EX PARTE MGW Applicant Catchwords: Vexatious litigant proceedings - Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) - Application for order under s 4 - Turns on own facts Legislation: Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) Result: Application dismissed Category: B -- 1 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 Page 2 Representation: Counsel: Applicant : In Person Solicitors: Applicant : In Person Cases referred to in decision: Attorney General (WA) v Lashansky [No 2] [2015] WASC 417 Attorney General v Michael [2005] WASC 203 Granich Partners v Yap [2003] WASC 206 Medical Board of Australia v Nugawela [2026] WASC 64 Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v H [2017] WASC 20 St John of God Health Care Inc v Kezic [No 2] [2017] WASC 265 -- 2 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 3 BYDDER J: Introduction 1 By originating motion filed on 1 December 2025, the applicant (MGW) seeks leave to apply for an order under s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (Act) on the grounds that: the respondent has engaged in persistent, repetitive, and meritless litigation and complaints over a prolonged period, causing ongoing harassment, hardship, and misuse of court processes as set out in the supporting affidavit. 2 MGW contends that since 2020 the respondent has commenced nine proceedings against her in this court or in the Magistrates Court and that she has also had to commence a proceeding against the respondent in response to a caveat filed by him. The proceedings on which MGW relies are, without reference to their file numbers: (a) a minor claim in the Magistrates Court; (b) civil claim 1 in the Supreme Court (which was commenced by MGW in response to a caveat lodged by the respondent); (c) civil claim 2 in the Supreme Court; (d) civil claims 3 and 4 in the Supreme Court; (e) general claim 1 in the Magistrates Court; (f) civil claim 5 in the Supreme Court; (g) general claim 2 in the Magistrates Court; (h) general claim 3 in the Magistrates Court; and (i) general claim 4 in the Magistrates Court. 3 MGW relies on three affidavits which depose to the circumstances surrounding these proceedings and in the case of the second and third affidavits, attach court documents relating to the proceedings. The first affidavit was sworn 10 October 2025 and filed 1 December 2025. The second and third affidavits were sworn and filed on 25 March 2026 and 7 April 2026 respectively. 4 On 10 April 2026, I dismissed the application for leave and gave brief oral reasons for doing so, but said that I would publish my -- 3 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 4 detailed written reasons later. These are my reasons for dismissing the application for leave. The law as it applies to the application for leave The Act 5 Section 4 of the Act provides: (1) If a Court is satisfied that — (a) a person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings (whether before or after the commencement of this Act); or (b) it is likely that the person will institute or conduct vexatious proceedings, the Court may make either or both of the following orders — (c) an order staying any proceedings, either as to the whole or part of the proceedings, that have been instituted by that person; (d) an order prohibiting that person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, without the leave of a court or tribunal, as the case requires under section 6(1). (2) An order under subsection (1) may be made by the Court on its own motion or on the application of — (a) the Attorney General; or (b) the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court or the Principal Registrar of the District Court; or (c) with the leave of the Court — (i) a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings; or (ii) a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter. (3) The Court must not make an order under subsection (1) — (a) staying any proceedings that have been instituted by a person, either as to the whole or part of the proceedings; or -- 4 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 5 (b) prohibiting a person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, without hearing that person or giving that person an opportunity of being heard. 6 The term 'vexatious proceedings' is defined by s 3 of the Act as follows: vexatious proceedings means proceedings — (a) which are an abuse of the process of a court or a tribunal; or (b) instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for any other wrongful purpose; or (c) instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; or (d) conducted in a manner so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve any other wrongful purpose. 7 The term 'proceedings' is also defined by s 3 of the Act in this way: proceedings includes — (a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial, or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court, including a court of summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal; and (b) any proceedings, including interlocutory proceedings, taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court, including a court of summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal; and (c) an appeal from a decision or determination, whether or not a final decision or determination, of a court, including a court of summary jurisdiction, or a tribunal. Determining whether proceedings are vexatious proceedings 8 The effect of these definitions is, as EM Heenan J observed in Granich Partners v Yap, that:1 all forms of originating proceedings, any interlocutory proceedings or step taken in the course of a cause, matter, action, suit, etc and any appeal, from any decision or determination whether final or interlocutory 1 Granich Partners v Yap [2003] WASC 206 (Granich) [28]. -- 5 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 6 are proceedings for the purposes of the Act. They will be vexatious if they are actively or intentionally instituted or pursued by the litigant for any of the identified or other wrongful purposes, so making the subjective intention of the litigant a material factor. However, proceedings will also be vexatious by an objective standard, if they constitute an abuse of the process of the court or are brought or pursued without a reasonable grounds [sic] or they are conducted in a manner set out in subpar (d) of the definition [of 'vexatious proceedings']. Hence, proceedings may be vexatious if they have any of these objective characteristics regardless of the personal intention, motive or state of mind of the litigant. 9 In Medical Board of Australia v Nugawela,2 Gething J recently summarised the guidance provided by case law on determining whether proceedings are vexatious proceedings: (a) whilst it is not possible to exhaustively define what will constitute an abuse of process, at least one of three characteristics will generally be present, namely: (1) a court's processes being invoked for an illegitimate or collateral purpose; (2) the use of a court's procedures being unjustifiably oppressive to a party; or (3) the use of a court's procedures bringing the administration of justice into disrepute; (b) a clear case of an abuse of process and of vexatious proceedings is where there are further or collateral attempts to challenge a final decision of a court binding on the party attempting the challenge; (c) in determining whether proceedings were instituted without a reasonable ground, it is necessary to have regard to the whole of the claim brought by a party; (d) a proceeding will not be characterised as having been made without reasonable ground merely because of errors in pleading and form, especially so where the litigant is self-represented; (e) the judgment as to whether a proceeding was pursued without reasonable ground is a matter of degree and judgment and depends upon all of the circumstances of the case; and 2 Medical Board of Australia v Nugawela [2026] WASC 64 (Nugawela) [210] (footnotes omitted). -- 6 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 7 (f) a proceeding instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds may include claims with unintelligible pleadings, appeals from striking out pleadings, misconceived or hopeless appeals, appeals which lack any legal basis and the institution of applications or proceedings which have absolutely no prospect of success. 10 As Gething J noted,3 the overall effect of the proceedings is also relevant to determining whether the proceedings are vexatious proceedings. In St John of God Health Care Inc v Kezic [No 2]4 Pritchard J said:5 In determining whether proceedings may properly be characterised as vexatious proceedings, it is also relevant to consider the effect of the proceedings overall, particularly where the same persons have been parties to numerous different actions. The pursuit of proceedings without reasonable ground, when that conduct is repeated, may become seriously and unfairly burdensome, and the repetition of such conduct may permit an inference of wrongful purpose to more readily be drawn. MGW requires leave 11 MGW cannot apply for an order under s 4(1)(c) or (d) of the Act (restriction order) as of right, but requires the court's leave to do so. 12 The distinction between those who can apply as of right and those who require leave lies in the former being presumed to act in the public interest,6 while the latter are presumed to be acting to protect their own interests.7 The requirement for leave in the latter case enables the court to ensure that an application for a restriction order is not used as an instrument of oppression or as a tactical exercise between adversaries.8 13 As EM Heenan J explained in Granich,9 if leave is sought to apply for a restriction order, [t]he court will only consider the exercise of this jurisdiction if it is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for doing so and there is sufficient reason to embark on an enquiry over whether or not the procedures and opportunities of litigation are being abused, or misused, in such a way that an intolerable burden is placed upon the time, 3 Nugawela [211]. 4 St John of God Health Care Inc v Kezic [No 2] [2017] WASC 265 (Kezic). 5 Kezic [35]. Pritchard J cited Attorney General (WA) v Lashansky [No 2] [2015] WASC 417 [37] (Allanson J) as authority for this proposition. 6 Granich [33] (EM Heenan J). 7 Granich [31] (EM Heenan J). 8 Granich [31] (EM Heenan J). 9 Granich [31]. -- 7 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 8 resources and procedures of the court. This is an area where relief should be given not merely because another private litigant is being inconvenienced or harassed but also because important public resources of time and attention of the court are being, or may be, diverted by inappropriate claims, to the disadvantage not only of the court but to other litigants whose causes may be delayed by the time needed to deal with vexatious proceedings. 14 His Honour went on to explain that a person should be granted leave: if it is shown that the applicant is seeking the statutory relief primarily for the alleviation of an unjustifiable or exceptional burden which the litigation brought or pursued by the respondent has caused and not just as an additional means of preventing that applicant from having to answer before the courts at the suit of a person seeking to obtain relief at law from some real or imagined wrong, even if it should turn out that the claimant's case will probably fail. In other words, this is not a remedy intended or available to achieve a stay or to prevent the institution of the ordinary run of litigation rather, it is an extreme remedy reserved for instances where quite hopeless claims are brought, or persisted with, to a degree which causes substantial disruption for the target of the claims and for the administration of justice.10 If the proceedings are vexatious proceedings, the court has a discretion to make a restriction order 15 The court cannot make a restriction order unless it is satisfied of either or both of the matters set out in s 4(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. If the court is satisfied of either or both of those matters, it has a discretion to make a restriction order.11 16 In Attorney General v Michael,12 Le Miere J identified matters that must be taken into account in exercising that discretion. The right of an individual to commence proceedings to enforce or defend his rights is one of the fundamental rights in a free society. The rule of law requires that ordinarily a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. To limit this right represents a major restriction on the liberty of the individual for which there must be a proper and adequate justification. The effect of an order made under s 4(1)(d) of the Act does not remove the right to issue proceedings entirely. A person against whom such an order has been 10 Granich [34], cited with approval in Kezic [39] (Pritchard J). 11 Nugawela [212] (Gething J). 12 Attorney General v Michael [2005] WASC 203 [143] - [144]. As Gething J noted in Nugawela [212] (footnote 219), this passage in Le Miere J's judgment was cited with approval in Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v H [2017] WASC 20 [48] (Banks-Smith J). -- 8 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 9 made still has access to the courts. However, he is required to take an additional step in the process by obtaining the permission of the court prior to any claims being issued. Nevertheless, the making of an order under s 4(1) of the Act restricts the rights of the person against whom such an order has been made and for that reason the powers conferred by the section must be exercised with caution. At the same time, the court must have regard to the purpose of the Act. The institution or conduct of unmeritorious litigation will have an emotional and financial impact on the other parties to the litigation. Innocent parties may be dragged through the courts for a decision made at the end of a long legal road that the claim never had any legal merit in the first place. The vindicated party frequently has no practical opportunity to recoup even court assessed costs, let alone actual out of pocket costs. And there is no redress for the loss of time and the aggravation of futile legal proceedings. The Act is intended to provide protection to a person who may be the target of vexatious litigation. Furthermore, the time of the court is unreasonably occupied in dealing with vexatious litigation. Not only are the resources of the court wasted in dealing with such litigation but other more worthy litigation is delayed. The proceedings on which MGW relies Minor case claim in the Magistrates Court 17 In February 2020, the respondent commenced a minor case claim against MGW in the Magistrates Court's civil jurisdiction. 18 The respondent claimed a fixed monetary sum plus court fees. He alleged that the sum represented the amount yet to be repaid by MGW from a loan he made to her, which was to be repaid by payment of bills such as rates and utilities and transfers to his account when requested. 19 MGW lodged a defence to the claim in March 2020, in which she said that the money the respondent provided to her was not a loan and in any event had been repaid in full, save for an administration fee charged under a verbal agreement between MGW and the respondent. 20 The claim was ultimately resolved by consent in May 2020. MGW agreed to pay the respondent a small amount to settle the claim.13 13 MGW's affidavit sworn 7 April 2026, annexure WG-C1. In her affidavit sworn 10 October 2025 at [8], MGW deposes that she paid the respondent the small amount as a gesture of goodwill to end the dispute. -- 9 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 10 Civil claim 1 in the Supreme Court 21 MGW commenced these proceedings against the respondent in March 2020 as the respondent had lodged a caveat on a property that formed part of their late mother's estate.14 22 By a document filed in the court in April 2020, the respondent asked that the caveat remain in place to allow him to make an application under the Family Provision Act 1972 (WA). After hearing MGW and the respondent in May 2020, this court ordered that the caveat be removed. Civil claim 2 in the Supreme Court 23 In August 2020, the respondent commenced a claim by originating summons against MGW under the Family Provision Act. Properly understood, the claim was against MGW as executor of her late mother's estate. 24 The respondent requested that his late mother's estate be divided in accordance with paragraph 4 of her will, such that his sister would be paid a fixed amount and the remainder would be divided between MGW and the respondent, with MGW receiving 70 per cent and the respondent receiving 30 per cent.15 25 MGW filed a defence to the claim in September 2020. Orders were made in October 2020 with a view to the claim being mediated. However, the respondent discontinued the claim in November 2020. Civil claims 3 and 4 in the Supreme Court 26 In October 2021, the respondent attempted to commence a claim by originating summons which appeared to challenge the grant of probate issued to MGW in 2020 and to prove a handwritten document as a will in solemn form (civil claim 3). The respondent was informed by the court that proceedings of that kind were a probate action which must be commenced by writ. 27 In November 2021, the respondent attempted to file a writ commencing a probate action (civil claim 4). However, the writ was not accepted for filing because the respondent alleged in the indorsement of claim that MGW had engaged in fraudulent behaviour in respect of her application for probate, by intentionally not entering a handwritten 14 MGW's affidavit sworn 25 March 2026 at [6]. 15 Originating summons filed in CIV 1858/2020 [3]. -- 10 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 11 document recording their late mother's intentions into probate. Such an allegation cannot be made on a writ. 28 The respondent subsequently requested a refund for his applications in both matters so that he could seek legal advice before submitting a further application. The respondent informed the Principal Registrar by email that he could not afford to have a third application rejected. General claim 1 in the Magistrates Court 29 In April 2022, the respondent lodged a claim against MGW for a fixed sum, which he alleged was the amount that he would have been paid under his late mother's will if MGW 'had not committed fraud by not admitting into probate the will of [their late mother] dated [15 June 2011].'16 30 MGW applied for summary dismissal of the respondent's claim. In September 2022, the respondent's claim was dismissed. The Magistrates Court's order recorded the reason for dismissing the claim as follows:17 The Claimants claim is dismissed pursuant to s18(1) or, alternately, s17(1) and (2) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 on the basis that the claim falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court, per s6(1)(a)(iii) as it is not a claim for a sum of money being "the whole or a part of the amount of the distributive share under an intestacy or of a legacy under a will". The Claim requires the Court to challenge the legitimacy of the current Supreme Court order for probate. Only the Supreme Court can invalidate an existing order for probate. Civil claim 5 in the Supreme Court 31 In May 2023, the respondent commenced proceedings by writ seeking revocation of the grant of probate to MGW in respect of their late mother's will dated 2 June 2011 and instead admitting their late mother's will dated 15 June 2011 into probate in solemn form, as altered by a handwritten note to take effect as a codicil (handwritten note). 32 MGW's and the respondent's sister (the sister) was initially a party to the claim but her claim was dismissed in June 2025 after the sister 16 MGW's affidavit sworn 7 April 2026, Annexure WG-C2. 17 MGW's affidavit sworn 7 April 2026, Annexure WG-C2. -- 11 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 12 informed the court that she no longer wished to participate in the proceedings. 33 Subject to the effect of the handwritten note, the will dated 15 June 2011 was materially identical to the will dated 2 June 2011. The effect of those wills (unaffected by the handwritten note) was that after their late mother's debts had been paid, a fixed sum should be distributed to the sister and the balance of the estate should be distributed to MGW. 34 The proceedings were ultimately heard by Solomon J in June 2025, who in September 2025 dismissed the respondent's applications to revoke the grant of probate to MGW and admit the later will and codicil to probate in solemn form. In doing so, Solomon J recorded his Honour's view in the reasons at [32] that the respondent's evidence: was plainly coloured by his antipathy towards [MGW]. His approach was more concerned with portraying [MGW] as a villain than with historical accuracy. 35 I will return to the respondent's antipathy towards MGW later in these reasons. 36 I also note Solomon J's findings in the reasons at [72] - [75] that first, MGW applied for probate honestly and was not aware of the handwritten note until after probate had been granted to MGW and second, the respondent was aware of the existence of the handwritten note no later than March 2021 and that by 21 May 2021 MGW had paid out the gifts required by the will admitted to probate. General claim 2 in the Magistrates Court 37 In August 2025, the respondent commenced a claim against MGW's former husband alleging that both MGW and her former husband had engaged in fraud, contrary to s 409 of the Criminal Code (WA), to facilitate elder financial abuse against MGW's and respondent's late mother in relation to a mortgage over property held in part by their late mother. 38 The claim was for a fixed sum, inclusive of interest. -- 12 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 13 39 In September 2025, the Magistrates Court dismissed the respondent's claim with no order as to costs, as the respondent had failed to file a statement of claim.18 General claim 3 in the Magistrates Court 40 In October 2025, the respondent commenced another claim against MGW's former husband in essentially the same terms as his claim in general claim 2. 41 MGW's former husband lodged his statement of defence to the claim. In that statement, he alleged that amongst other matters the respondent was refiling substantially identical claims that had previously been dismissed. 42 In January 2026, the respondent was granted leave to lodge and serve an amended claim joining MGW as the second defendant to the respondent's claim. By no later than 23 February 2026, the respondent had lodged an amended claim joining MGW. 43 In an affidavit affirmed by the respondent in March 2026, the respondent said at paragraph 8 that he 'does not request the amount claimed to be paid directly to himself as this has no basis but rather the amount claimed be returned to the Estate of [his late mother] as it was fraudulently obtained.'19 44 Later in March 2026, the Magistrates Court struck out the respondent's claim on the basis that the respondent did not have standing to bring any claim on behalf of his late mother's estate. General claim 4 in the Magistrates Court 45 The respondent commenced this claim on 29 January 2026 against both MGW and her former husband. 46 It was refused by the Magistrates Court because it was identical to general claim 3, which was then on foot in the Magistrates Court. However, it appears from an email sent by the Magistrates Court to MGW on 6 February 2026 that this new claim was commenced by the respondent by mistake, as he had been told to amend his claim in general claim 3 to add MGW as a second defendant to that claim, rather than commence a new claim. 18 MGW's affidavit sworn 25 March 2026 at [19]. 19 MGW's affidavit sworn 7 April 2026, annexure WG-C4. -- 13 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 14 47 As I have noted, by no later than 23 February 2026 the respondent had amended his claim to add MGW as a second defendant in general claim 3. Surrounding circumstances 48 I have referred above to the respondent's antipathy towards MGW, identified by Solomon J in determining civil claim 5. 49 MGW deposes that the respondent's antipathy towards her is reflected in other conduct of the respondent. 50 MGW deposes that [o]n or about January 2022, while I was walking my dog near my home, the Respondent, who was driving his vehicle, mounted the kerb and drove directly toward me. He then turned his vehicle around, returned, and again drove toward me as I attempted to cross the road. I had no communication or interaction with him at the time, and the incident was entirely unprovoked. The Respondent was subsequently charged and convicted in relation to this incident and received a suspended sentence of six months and ten days. After the expiry of that suspended sentence, in or around May 2023, the Respondent commenced Supreme Court proceedings [civil claim 5] against me, resuming his pattern of litigation immediately following his criminal conviction. I include this information to demonstrate that the Respondent's hostility and misuse of legal processes have continued even after criminal conviction and the existence of a restraining order, forming part of a persistent pattern of intimidation and vexatious conduct.20 51 MGW's reference to a restraining order is to a family violence restraining order binding the respondent and protecting MGW. The order was first made in January 2022 for two years and another order was made in January 2024 for a term of five years.21 52 MGW also deposes that the respondent made complaints against her to Western Australia Police alleging that MGW had concealed a will or had committed fraud. She further deposes that on 15 August 20 MGW's affidavit sworn 10 October 2025 at [13] - [17]. 21 MGW's affidavit sworn 25 March 2026 at [25]. -- 14 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 15 2022 Western Australia Police informed her that no offences of fraud had been committed and no charges would be laid.22 The effect of the proceedings on MGW 53 MGW deposes that the proceedings have caused her financial loss, stress and disruption to her personal life and to her search for work. They have also required her to spend considerable time locating court records, responding to repeated filings and preparing defences to allegations which had already been found to be baseless.23 54 In her affidavit sworn 25 March 2026 at [26] - [30], MGW deposes that [t]he repeated proceedings commenced by the [respondent] have required me, over a period of more than 5 years, to attend numerous hearings and conferences, both in person and by video link, and to spend considerable time preparing to respond to litigation and other claims (including dealing with duplicate claims or issues that have been determined previously). Following the events involving the [respondent's] use of his car … I commenced the undertaking of counselling to assist me in coping with the [respondent] and his behaviour. I have experienced significant and prolonged anxiety, pressure and stress in dealing with several and it seems unending claims and proceedings that the [respondent] has commenced against me. I have found myself to be apprehensive particularly as to how the [respondent] would react to decisions of the Courts in proceedings which he had commenced against me if his claims were denied. I say that this prolonged stress has materially affected my well-being and contributed to the breakdown of my marriage in May 2024. The repeated court proceedings have also affected my ability to maintain stable employment. I have recently obtained full-time work, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for me to take time away from my employment to attend further hearings and respond to proceedings concerning the same underlying issues that had been dealt with previously. 22 MGW's affidavit sworn 10 October 2025 at [18] - [20]. See also MGW's affidavit sworn 25 March 2026 at [14] - [15]. 23 MGW's affidavit sworn 10 October 2025 at [27] - [29]. -- 15 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 16 Disposition Were any of the proceedings vexatious? 55 Having considered MGW's affidavits and her submissions, in my opinion the ten proceedings between MGW and the respondent fall to be assessed in three groups. The first group 56 The first group is comprised solely by the minor claim. On the evidence, I am not satisfied that the respondent's claim in these proceedings constituted vexatious proceedings. 57 I described the nature of the claim above at [18] - [20]. There was agreement between MGW and the respondent that the money in question had been transferred to MGW, but the terms on which that had occurred and the extent to which the money had been returned to the respondent were in dispute. The dispute does not appear on the evidence to have related to their late mother's estate or to involve any allegation of fraud. The dispute was ultimately resolved by consent. The second group 58 The second group comprises civil claims 1 to 5 and general claim 1. On the evidence, I am not satisfied that these proceedings constituted vexatious proceedings. 59 Each of those proceedings relate in some way to the estate of MGW's and the respondent's late mother and were commenced before Solomon J determined civil claim 5 in MGW's favour. 60 While there are six proceedings in the group, that number is inflated by the respondent's: (a) taking of an unnecessary step to pursue his claim by lodging a caveat, which caused MGW to commence civil claim 1 in order to have the caveat removed; (b) commencing a Family Provision Act claim when it is likely that he did so before (on Solomon J's findings in civil claim 5) he had become aware of the handwritten note that would form the basis of his later proceedings in this group (civil claim 2); (c) failing to correctly commence a probate action in this court (civil claims 3 and 4); and -- 16 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 17 (d) attempting to pursue his claim inconsistently with this court's grant of probate in the Magistrates Court, which did not have jurisdiction to determine such a claim (general claim 1). 61 I am not satisfied that the six proceedings to which I refer in the preceding paragraph were vexatious proceedings. Instead, they appear to have been either proceedings commenced before the respondent was aware that he may have had a basis for a probate action rather than a Family Provision Act claim (civil claims 1 and 2) or unsuccessful attempts to commence a probate action in the correct court (general claim 1) or at all (civil claims 3 and 4). 62 As Gething J noted in Nugawela,24 a proceeding will not be characterised as having been made without reasonable ground merely because of errors in pleading and form, especially so where the litigant is self-represented. 63 I am also not satisfied that civil claim 5 constituted vexatious proceedings. Those proceedings went to trial and involved consideration of, among other matters, the relevance to the grant of probate by this court to MGW of the handwritten note. Solomon J accepted in his Honour's reasons at [67] - [68] that the handwritten note had been made by MGW's and the respondent's late mother. That the respondent was unsuccessful in civil claim 5 does not make those proceedings vexatious proceedings. The third group 64 The third group comprises general claims 2, 3 and 4. 65 While there are three proceedings in this group they make essentially the same claim. Once again, the number of proceedings is inflated by the respondent's missteps - in this group, to complete a procedural step (general claim 2) and to take the correct step to add MGW as a second defendant to his claim (general claim 4). 66 Nevertheless, the proceedings in the third group may well constitute vexatious proceedings. While the respondent makes an allegation against MGW (in relation to a mortgage) which does not appear to have been raised in the proceedings in the first and second groups, these proceedings arguably challenge Solomon J's findings in civil claim 5 that (among other matters) MGW applied for probate 24 Nugawela [210]. -- 17 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 18 honestly and that by 21 May 2021 MGW had paid out the gifts required by the will admitted to probate. 67 Further, having regard to the surrounding circumstances set out above at [48] - [52], it may be that these proceedings were not commenced by the respondent in good faith, but rather because of his antipathy towards MGW. 68 As the respondent was not heard in this matter, because I dismissed the application for leave to apply for a restriction order, I make no finding as to whether the proceedings in the third group constituted vexatious proceedings. Instead, for the purpose of determining the application for leave I have assumed without finding that the proceedings in the third group constituted vexatious proceedings. If the third proceedings were vexatious, I would not have exercised my discretion to make a restriction order 69 As I have noted, the proceedings in the third group were terminated by the Magistrates Court. Most relevantly, general claim 3 was struck out because the respondent did not have standing to bring any claim on behalf of his late mother's estate. The processes of the Magistrates Court were therefore effective in disposing of the respondent's claim and protecting the important public resources of the courts. 70 For the reasons I have given, at most only the proceedings in the third group were vexatious proceedings. The proceedings in the first and second groups were not vexatious proceedings. While I accept and acknowledge the effect that these proceedings have had on MGW, as set out above at [53] - [54], at least for the most part they have been caused by proceedings that were not vexatious. 71 I have set out the principles which I must apply in determining whether to grant leave to make an application for a restriction order under s 4 of the Act above at [11] - [14]. I have also referred to matters which must be considered in exercising the discretion to make a restriction order above at [16]. 72 Having regard to those principles and matters, in my opinion the stage has not been reached where it is appropriate to grant what EM Heenan J described in Granich as 'an extreme remedy reserved for instances where quite hopeless claims are brought, or persisted with, to -- 18 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 19 a degree which causes substantial disruption for the target of the claims and for the administration of justice'.25 73 However, if the respondent commences further proceedings against MGW, especially in relation to matters going to their late mother's estate, the stage may well be reached where it is appropriate to grant the extreme remedy of a restriction order in some form against the respondent. Given the cumulative impact on MGW of the proceedings brought by the respondent or required by his conduct, together with the antipathy which the respondent has displayed against MGW, I acknowledge the possibility that this stage may be reached quickly. 74 Of course, it is not appropriate to predict when that stage would be reached and, if it were to be reached, the kind of restriction order that would be appropriate. That would depend on the evidence led in support of a further application for leave and the applicable principles26 and, as I have said, the respondent has not yet been heard. If leave were granted to MGW, s 4(3) of the Act requires that the respondent be given an opportunity to be heard before any restriction order could be made against him. 75 It is appropriate instead to emphasise that the dismissal of the application for leave to make an application for a restriction order under s 4 of the Act on this occasion does not preclude MGW from making another application for leave if the respondent commences further proceedings against her. 25 Granich [34]. 26 As to those principles as they relate to the kind of restriction order that may be made, see Granich [35] (EM Heenan J) and Kezic [40] (Pritchard J). -- 19 of 20 -- [2026] WASC 153 BYDDER J Page 20 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. ST Associate to the Honourable Justice Bydder 28 APRIL 2026 -- 20 of 20 --