TRONOX MANAGEMENT PTY LTD -v- COKIC [2026] WASC 154

[2026] WASC 154 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : TRONOX MANAGEMENT PTY LTD -v- COKIC [No 2] [2026] WASC 154 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 30 MARCH 2026 DELIVERED : 29 APRIL 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1030 of 2026 BETWEEN : TRONOX MANAGEMENT PTY LTD Plaintiff AND ALEXANDER COKIC Defendant Catchwords: Employment - Alleged breaches of contract by defendant employee - Retention of plaintiff employer's property and information - Publication on LinkedIn platform by defendant employee of the plaintiff employer's confidential information - Further claims brought in tort, equity and under statute - Permanent injunctive relief sought - Turns on own facts Practice and procedure - Application by plaintiff employer for summary judgment pursuant to O 14 r 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Application expressly confined to the contractual claims - Whether there is a triable issue or some other reason there should be a trial of the action -- 1 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 2 Evidence - Where plaintiff adduces evidence in support of application for summary judgment on information and belief - Scope of O 14 r 2(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Whistleblower provisions - Where defendant employee relies on the protections of and immunity provisions in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) and Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Where disclosure in question is widely undertaken on LinkedIn platform - Whether disclosure on LinkedIn platform is disclosure to a 'journalist' Employee record provisions - Where defendant employee relies on provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) by way of defence to contractual breaches Employment - Where defendant employee relies on the 'moral rights' clause in employment contract by way of defence to contractual breaches Practice and procedure - Second application by defendant for judge to recuse himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias - Indigenous family background of presiding judge - Whether rational connection between indigenous background, the lands of the Wajarri Yamaji people, and the issues arising in the action Practice and procedure - Whether to restrict access to documents filed in the action - Operation of O 67B r 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Whether to suppress reporting of evidentiary matters in the proceeding - Principles of open justice Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 183, pt 9.4AAA Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), s 154, s 155 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 155 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 363 Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth), reg 3.32 to 3.42 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA), s 3, s 5, s 6, s 7A, s 13, s 17 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 14, O 67B Result: The plaintiff's application for summary judgment is granted with judgment to be -- 2 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 3 entered in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the pleaded claims at [13] to [19] of the statement of claim, and as to the permanent injunctive relief sought. Further orders and outcomes set out at [207] - [211] of these reasons and Attachment C. Category: B Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff : K de Kerloy SC and D E Grondal Defendant : In Person Solicitors: Plaintiff : Grondal Bruining Defendant : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Albrecht v Australian Taxation Office [2015] WASC 246 Austshim Resources NL v Collinson [2001] WASC 350 AW v Rayney [No 4] [2012] WASCA 117 Bank of Western Australia v Stein & Anor [2005] WASC 43 Birch Investments Pty Ltd v Kiap Khee Lim [1988] WASC 194 Cockburn Cement Limited v The Minister for Environment [2019] WASC 9 David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden's Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan s/o Velayutham [1980] AC 331 Exchequer Australia Pty Ltd v Leopardi [2021] WASC 340 Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited [1983] HCA 25; (1983) 154 CLR 87 Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASCA 27 Gerovich v Gerovich [2018] WASC 153 Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 Hadouken Pty Ltd v D Comm Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 330 HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153 JL Young Manufacturing Co Ltd [1900] 2 Ch 753 Kolichis v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2014] WASCA 76 Miles v Bull [1969] 1 QB 258 -- 3 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 4 Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148 NRW Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 107 Ogbonna v Qantas Airways Ltd [No 2] [2020] WASC 359 Phillips v Mineral Resources Development Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 138 Pisano v South Metropolitan Health Service [2023] WASCA 80 Rajski v Scitec Corp Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSWCA, 16 June 1986) Song v South Beach Management Pty Ltd as trustee for the South Beach Two Development Trust [No 4] [2023] WASC 298 Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Clark [2014] WADC 153 TK v Australian Red Cross Society (1989) 1 WAR 335 Tobin v Dodd & Ors [2004] WASCA 288 Tronox Management Pty Ltd v Cokic [2026] WASC 63 Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57; (1993) 177 CLR 598 Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson [2017] WASC 106 XY v WA Country Health Service [No 2] [2016] WASC 245 Zaghloul v Bayly [2021] WASCA 125 -- 4 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 5 Table of Contents Overview .................................................................................................................................... 7 Factual and procedural background ...................................................................................... 8 The defendant has been unrepresented at all times ............................................................ 10 The pleaded claims and allegations....................................................................................... 13 Breach of cl 15.4 ................................................................................................................... 14 Breach of cl 18.3.1 ................................................................................................................ 15 Breach of cl 18.3.3 ................................................................................................................ 16 Claim for conversion ............................................................................................................ 16 Claim for breach of confidence ............................................................................................ 16 Claim for breach of s 183 of the Corporations Act .............................................................. 17 Claim for injurious falsehood ............................................................................................... 17 Pleaded relief ........................................................................................................................ 17 The Summary Judgment Application .................................................................................. 18 The application and the supporting materials ....................................................................... 18 The application for summary judgment is confined ............................................................. 19 Rules of the court and relevant principles ............................................................................ 19 The required analysis ............................................................................................................ 24 An examination of the affidavit evidence............................................................................. 25 The defendant's employment with the plaintiff ................................................................ 25 The plaintiff's contract management system .................................................................... 26 The defendant's conduct in sending information to his private email addresses .............. 26 The defendant's conduct in publishing information on LinkedIn ..................................... 28 The nature of the information retained and published by the defendant .......................... 33 Conclusions on the affidavit evidence .............................................................................. 34 Disposition ............................................................................................................................ 38 Whether breach of cl 15.4 established? ............................................................................ 38 Whether breach of cl 18.3.1 established? ......................................................................... 39 Whether breach of cl 18.3.3 established? ......................................................................... 40 The protections under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2023 (WA) ............................. 41 The protections under the Corporations Act..................................................................... 43 The protections under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ...................................................... 44 Whether the defendant had moral rights to the information? ........................................... 45 Conclusion on summary judgment application ................................................................ 45 Disposition – whether injunctive relief is appropriate? ........................................................ 47 -- 5 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 6 The Second Recusal Application ........................................................................................... 49 The Restricted Access Application........................................................................................ 52 The Suppression Application................................................................................................. 55 Conclusion and orders ........................................................................................................... 57 Addendum - hearing on 29 April 2026 ................................................................................. 57 ATTACHMENT A Extracts from the Employment Contract ........................................... 59 ATTACHMENT B Confidential Attachment ...................................................................... 63 ATTACHMENT C Orders made on 29 April 2026 ............................................................ 69 -- 6 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 7 LUNDBERG J: Overview 1 These reasons concern several applications which were heard by the court on 30 March 2026. 2 First, the plaintiff to the action filed an application for summary judgement on 23 January 2026, pursuant to Order 14 r 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) (the Summary Judgment Application).1 The hearing on 30 March 2026 was scheduled primarily to hear this particular application. The plaintiff sought summary judgment only in respect of its contractual claims and the consequential injunctive relief. 3 Second, a recusal application was initiated by the defendant (the Second Recusal Application).2 This is the second recusal application, noting that, on 5 March 2026, the court dismissed the defendant's first recusal application, for the reasons which were published on 6 March 2026. Further, within the defendant's supplementary submissions filed after the hearing on 30 March 2026, additional bases for recusal were advanced by the defendant. 4 Third, the plaintiff brought an application to restrict access to documents filed in the proceeding, pursuant to O 67B r 5 RSC (the Restricted Access Application).3 5 Fourth, the plaintiff made an application for suppression of the reporting of evidentiary matters dealt with in the proceedings (the Suppression Application).4 Both the Restricted Access Application and the Suppression Application are based on the asserted confidential nature of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff (and the defendant) in connection with the Summary Judgment Application, as well as broader matters directed to the interests of justice. 6 I will address the Summary Judgment Application first in these reasons, and then explain my reasoning for making the orders in respect of the other applications. At the outset, it is convenient to summarise the factual background to the proceedings. 1 Plaintiff's chamber summons for summary judgment dated 23 January 2026. 2 Defendant's document entitled 'Application for recusal of Justice Michael Lundberg' dated 25 March 2026. 3 Plaintiff's chamber summons dated 23 January 2026, amended by minute dated 11 February 2026. 4 Plaintiff's minute of proposed orders for a limited in camera hearing dated 11 February 2026. -- 7 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 8 Factual and procedural background 7 The plaintiff is a company incorporated in Western Australia which conducts operations for the mining and processing of mineral sands at sites to the north of Perth, and manufactures titanium dioxide pigment at its Kwinana Pigment Plant.5 It is uncontroversial that the ultimate holding company of the plaintiff is Tronox Holdings plc, which is headquartered in the United States and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 8 It is not in dispute that the defendant is a former employee of the plaintiff having initially been employed by the plaintiff, from 27 November 2020, in the role of 'Contracts Specialist', and later in the role of 'Senior Contracts Specialist Energy & Compliance'. A copy of his signed employment contract has been adduced in evidence on the Summary Judgment Application (the Employment Contract).6 The relevant terms of the Employment Contract are extracted in Attachment A to these reasons. The Employment Contract was governed by the laws of Western Australia. 9 It is common ground that the defendant's employment was terminated by the plaintiff on 15 August 2024.7 Following the termination of his employment, the defendant made several work-related claims against the plaintiff including a worker's compensation claim in the WorkCover WA jurisdiction and an unfair dismissal claim in the Fair Work Commission.8 10 The present action is focused on a dispute these parties, with the plaintiff relying on the conduct of the defendant during his employment as well as his post-termination conduct. It is alleged by the plaintiff that, during his employment, the defendant forwarded confidential information to his private email addresses, that he retained the plaintiff's property following the termination of his employment, and following his departure he made several posts on the internet using an account on the well-known platform, LinkedIn. Those posts included information and attached documents which are said by the plaintiff to be its property, and confidential to the plaintiff. 5 First Williams Affidavit [9], [10] and [12]. 6 First Williams Affidavit [13] and Attachment CAW-2. 7 First Williams Affidavit [21]. 8 First Williams Affidavit [23], [27]and [35]. -- 8 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 9 11 The conduct in respect of which the plaintiff complains, in terms of the publications on LinkedIn, is alleged to have occurred between around 4 November 2024 and 22 December 2025. Earlier, between March and April 2024, the plaintiff alleges the defendant forwarded documents and information to his private email accounts whilst he was employed with the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserts, in broad terms, that upon the termination of the defendant's employment, he failed to return the property of the plaintiff which was in his control or possession. 12 This conduct ultimately culminated in a decision by the plaintiff to initiate this proceeding on 9 January 2026. This followed some months of correspondence involving the plaintiff's solicitors and the defendant, as well as communications with an Arbitrator in the WorkCover WA proceedings, as a result of which the defendant was ordered to remove his LinkedIn posts, among other matters. The plaintiff sought urgent interlocutory injunctive relief in this court, which was granted on an ex parte basis by Justice Cobby on 13 January 2026. 13 In his oral reasons delivered at the time, his Honour identified deficiencies in the plaintiff's case, including a concern as to the delay in bringing the proceedings. Ultimately, his Honour explained why the injunctive relief sought should nonetheless be made:9 [1] It is sufficient for present purposes to proceed on the basis that the plaintiff has an arguable claim for breach of contract in that it was a term of the defendant's contract of employment that all confidential information as defined in that contract could not be copied, passed on or divulged by the defendant. That obligation was subject to certain exceptions which on the evidence before me would appear to be inapplicable in this case. The contract defines the term confidential information in terms far wider than information which would ordinarily attract an equitable obligation of confidence. … [2] I'm satisfied that there is evidence that the defendant has published information which, at least according to his contractual obligations, he should have returned to the plaintiff and which, by implication at least, he should not have published by way of LinkedIn or any other way. I am also satisfied that, unless restrained by order of this court, the likelihood is that the defendant, who has, on the evidence, disobeyed orders of an arbitrator in WorkCover proceedings between the defendant and 9 ts 22 - 23. I have inserted paragraph numbers for ease of reference. -- 9 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 10 the plaintiff regarding the publication of information, is likely to do so again. [3] In the particular circumstances of this case, although I am satisfied there has been substantial delay by the plaintiff in seeking to enforce its rights, that does not militate against the grant of injunctive relief, short of such orders, to prevent the defendant further publishing the information in his hands, destroying that information or copying it, at least until the defendant has an opportunity to be heard in relation to the matter. [4] In my view, the balance of convenience, even having regard to the plaintiff's delay and its forensic decision not to disclose all of the evidence in its support of its case at this point, justifies the grant of injunctive relief designed to prevent the further publication of the plaintiff's information, and the destruction or copying of that information. 14 On 16 January 2026, orders were made to programme further steps in the action, including for the filing of a statement of claim and any summary judgment application on behalf of the plaintiff. In accordance with the orders, the plaintiff filed its statement of claim10 and a summary judgment application on 23 January 2026, and the application was listed for hearing on 30 March 2026. The defendant has been unrepresented at all times 15 The defendant is a sophisticated person with employment experience in the role of a 'contract manager'. It may therefore reasonably be inferred he is better equipped than many litigants in this court to comprehend the nature of the allegations being presented, and to represent himself in proceedings such as these. 16 That said, at all times during the course of this proceeding the defendant has been unrepresented by solicitors and due allowance for this must be given. Additionally, the defendant has presented evidence of medical conditions upon which he has relied to seek time accommodations from the court, as well as the opportunity to present additional written material in lieu of detailed oral submissions. 17 It is generally accepted that the court should approach matters involving litigants in person with a degree of flexibility beyond that 10 As to which, see the amended writ of summons dated 23 January 2026 (Amended Writ) and the statement of claim dated 23 January 2026 (SOC). -- 10 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 11 which would be applied were the person to be legally represented.11 In many of those cases, the particular circumstances concerned poorly expressed or unstructured pleadings, which might not reveal a viable cause of action. The point is broader than this, of course, and extends to ensuring that an unrepresented litigant is not improperly deprived of the opportunity of presenting their case at trial.12 The need for flexibility is particularly acute where the opposing party is seeking to secure judgment without a trial or to peremptorily terminate the litigation. 18 Recognising that the defendant has been unrepresented, and recognising that the plaintiff is seeking summary judgment of its contractual claims without a trial of the action, several specific steps have been taken to ameliorate the difficulties the defendant has faced in responding to these claims. 19 First, the defendant was given more than two months' notice of the hearing of the summary judgment application. Allied to this, the timetable ordered by Justice Cobby was extended by orders made on 5 March 2026, to permit the defendant further time to file material in opposition to the Summary Judgment Application or to vary the injunctions which had been put in place. The timetable was further extended by orders made on 12 March 2026. 20 Second, during the course of the hearing on 30 March 2026, the court proposed that there be breaks in the hearing of at least 10 minutes each hour and allowed the defendant to make submissions while seated. Prior to the hearing, the court also provided the parties with a timetable setting out an allocation of time between the parties, which was marked as being 'draft and provisional'. 21 Third, at the hearing on 30 March 2026, and in response to a request from the defendant, orders were made to permit the defendant to file supplementary responsive submissions by 1 April 2026 in lieu of presenting substantive oral submissions at the hearing. 22 Fourth, in considering the defendant's responses to the summary judgment application, and the presentation of his affidavit material, it has 11 See, for example, Tobin v Dodd & Ors [2004] WASCA 288 [16] - [18] (E M Heenan J, Murray J agreeing), [69] - [70] (Le Miere J); Boase v Axis International Management Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASC 334 [57] (Beech J); Albrecht v Australian Taxation Office [2015] WASC 246 [22] - [23] (Pritchard J); Ogbonna v Qantas Airways Ltd [No 2] [2020] WASC 359 [6] - [7] (Le Miere J); and Zaghloul v Bayly [2021] WASCA 125 [81] - [82] (Murphy, Mitchell and Vaughan JJA). 12 As explained by E M Heenan J in Tobin v Dodd & Ors [14]. -- 11 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 12 been necessary to allow for the lack of precision in that material and for the court to give additional consideration to the contentions which the defendant might seek to raise, had he been legally represented. 23 In effect, the court has had to assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of the defendant which may have been 'obfuscated by [his] own advocacy', employing the phrase used by the High Court some 30 years ago in Neill v Nott.13 This is a particularly apposite phrase in the present case given the volume and impenetrability of much of the material prepared and filed by the defendant. 24 That said, the advice and assistance which the defendant should receive from the court must be limited to that which is necessary to diminish, so far as is possible, the 'disadvantage which he…will ordinarily suffer when faced by a lawyer, and to prevent destruction from the traps which our adversary procedure offers to the unwary and untutored', being the observation of Samuels J in Rajski v Scitec Corp Pty Ltd.14 A similar point was made by Mahoney JA in that case (at 27), as follows: Where a party appears in person, he will ordinarily be at a disadvantage. That does not mean that the court will give to the other party less than he is entitled to. Nor will it confer upon the party in person advantages which, if he were represented, he would not have. But the court will, I think, be careful to examine what is put to it by a party in person to ensure that he has not, because of the lack of legal skill, failed to claim rights or to put forward arguments which otherwise he might have done. 25 A useful summary of the leniency required from a court, and the limitations upon that leniency, is provided in the joint reasons of Newnes JA and Murphy J in Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd as follows:15 It must be alert to the possibility that beneath inadequately expressed and often irrelevant material there may lurk an arguable case. And some leniency may be required in relation to compliance with the rules. But in the end the allowances that can be made for a litigant in person are necessarily limited, both as a matter of fairness to the other party, who must be adequately informed of the case they have to meet, and because 13 Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148, 150 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), cited by Beech J in the context of summary disposal of litigation in Boase v Axis International Management Pty Ltd [No 2]. 14 Rajski v Scitec Corp Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSWCA, 16 June 1986). 15 Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 [10] (Newnes JA and Murphy J). -- 12 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 13 the provision of acceptable grounds of appeal is fundamental to the exercise of the appellate function by the court. 26 The short point made in the foregoing authorities is that the scales are not to be tipped too far in favour of an unrepresented litigant, to the prejudice of a represented opponent.16 I have borne these statements in mind in approaching the plaintiff's application and the defendant's response to it. The pleaded claims and allegations 27 The SOC presents several claims against the defendant, namely: (a) breaches of contract, being breaches of cl 15.4, cl 18.3.1 and cl 18.3.3 of the Employment Contract; (b) tortious conversion; (c) breaches of the equitable duty of confidence; (d) breaches of s 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act); and (e) tortious injurious falsehood. 28 In broad terms, the plaintiff's claims against the defendant concern allegations that, both during and after his employment, he breached his contractual duties to the plaintiff under the Employment Contract. He did so by wrongfully retaining, using and disclosing confidential documents and information in respect of the plaintiff or its business, which were not in the public domain and which came to the defendant's notice or were generated by him in the course of his employment with the plaintiff. The plaintiff refers to this material as the 'Property' in the Summary Judgment Application. 29 The plaintiff says it is aware of some of the 'Property' which the defendant retained, used or has disclosed, which it refers to as the 'Confidential Information', which it has summarised in the schedules attached to its submissions. However, the plaintiff says it cannot be 16 A point which is identified in an extra-curial speech given by Justice Nicholson of the Federal Court of Australia: Nicholson, Robert, Can Courts Cope With Self-Represented Litigants? Visiting Judicial Fellow Public Lecture, September 2003 [2005] FlinJlLawRfm 7; (2005) 8(2) The Flinders Journal of Law Reform 139, 143 -144. -- 13 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 14 certain that these schedules are a complete record of the 'Property' that has been retained, used or disclosed by the defendant. 30 I will briefly set out the individual claims advanced by the plaintiff. Breach of cl 15.4 31 First, the plaintiff pleads a breach by the defendant of cl 15.4 of his Employment Contract, which is the obligation to return to the plaintiff any property of the plaintiff upon the termination of the defendant's employment. The contractual term is pleaded at [6(a)] of the SOC, and the factual circumstances of the breach are pleaded at [7] to [12]. 32 At [9] of the SOC, it is pleaded that the failure to return all of the plaintiff's property is to be inferred from the fact that, after his employment was terminated, the defendant published various matters on LinkedIn which included, for example: (a) internal emails concerning the acquisition of materials from a third party supplier, which were disclosed on 4 and 14 November 2024; (b) internal emails concerning personnel issues, which were published on 18 June 2025; (c) internal emails concerning the plaintiff's contractual arrangements with one of its long-term suppliers including specific details regarding the negotiation of the contract; (d) documents which summarised certain provisions of a contract between the plaintiff and one of its suppliers and the contract's key performance indicators, which were published on 7 October 2025 and 22 December 2025; and (e) internal emails which include minutes of two meetings between the plaintiff and one of its long-term suppliers, which were published on 21 December 2025. 33 At [10] of the SOC, it is alleged that the defendant also failed to return certain specific items of property, including: (a) a document entitled 'Tronox - Contract Accounting Evaluation Checklist'; -- 14 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 15 (b) a document entitled 'contract execution request' dated 19 March 2024; (c) five emails (sent by the defendant from his 'Tronox Management' email account to his personal Gmail account on 22 March 2024) which attached a document styled as an 'Activities Discussion output' and a document styled as a communication protocol; (d) six emails (sent by the defendant from his 'Tronox Management' email account to his personal Gmail account on 2 April 2024), being emails which the defendant had sent to other employees of the plaintiff at various times and which in part concerned commercial issues arising under the plaintiff's agreement with one of its suppliers. One of the emails, dated 28 March 2024, attaches seven internal emails; (e) six emails (sent by the defendant from his 'Tronox Management' email account to his personal Gmail account on 14 April 2024) which attached several documents; and (f) an email (sent by the defendant from his 'Tronox Management' email account to his personal Gmail account on 16 April 2024) which attached approximately 11 internal Tronox Management emails relating to a product trial being conducted by the plaintiff. 34 At [13] of the SOC, it is pleaded that: [13] By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 7 to 12 above, the defendant breached and continues to breach the contractual obligation pleaded in paragraph 6(a). Breach of cl 18.3.1 35 Second, the plaintiff pleads a breach by the defendant of cl 18.3.1 of his Employment Contract, which is the obligation to take all reasonable steps and necessary precautions to maintain the secrecy of, and prevent unauthorised disclosure of or access to, all 'Confidential Information' as defined. The contractual term is pleaded at [6(e)(i)] of the SOC, and the factual circumstances of the breach are pleaded at [9]. 36 The plaintiff pleads at SOC [14] that, in disclosing and publishing the identified 'Property' on his LinkedIn account, the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps and necessary precautions to maintain the secrecy of, and prevent the unauthorised disclosure of Confidential -- 15 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 16 Information in breach of cl 18.3.1. The disclosures are pleaded to have occurred on various dates, namely 4 November 2024, 14 November 2024, 18 June 2025, 7 October 2025, 21 December 2025 and 22 December 2025 (SOC at [9]). Breach of cl 18.3.3 37 Third, the plaintiff pleads a breach by the defendant of cl 18.3.3 of his Employment Contract, which is the obligation to provide any assistance reasonably required by the plaintiff in relation to any proceedings the plaintiff may take or threaten to take, against any person in relation to unauthorised use or disclosure of 'Confidential Information'. 38 The contractual term is pleaded at [6(e)(ii)] of the SOC, and the factual circumstances of the breach are pleaded at [15] to [17]. The factual circumstances centre on the requests made to the defendant by the plaintiff's solicitors in November 2024. At [15] of the SOC, it is alleged that: [15] By letter dated 20 November 2024 from Hall & Wilcox, who represent the plaintiff in relation to other matters, to the defendant, the plaintiff demanded, in effect, that the defendant cease disclosure and publication of the Property, return the Property to the plaintiff and delete the Property from any of defendant's hardware or digital storage devices in order to avoid the plaintiff taking legal proceedings against the defendant. Claim for conversion 39 Fourth, at [20] of the SOC, the plaintiff pleads that the defendant has wrongfully failed and refused to deliver up the plaintiff's property to the plaintiff and has thereby converted the same to his own use and wrongly deprived the plaintiff thereof by reason whereof the plaintiff has suffered loss and damage. Claim for breach of confidence 40 Fifth, at [21] to [23] of the SOC, the plaintiff pleads a claim for breach of the equitable duty of confidence, based on the alleged disclosure and publication pleaded at [9] of the SOC. The plaintiff pleads that the defendant had threatened to further misuse its property and points to evidence that the defendant continued to publish the plaintiff's property on LinkedIn even after orders were made by this court to prevent that. -- 16 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 17 Claim for breach of s 183 of the Corporations Act 41 Sixth, the plaintiff pleads a claim in reliance on s 183(1) of the Corporations Act. That provision states that a person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation, must not improperly use the information to either gain an advantage for themselves or someone else, or to cause detriment to the corporation. 42 The plaintiff alleges, at [24] of the SOC, that the defendant received information, being the property of the plaintiff, because he had been an employee of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleges, at [25], that the defendant used that information either to advantage himself or cause detriment to the plaintiff, for the purposes of proceedings before WorkCover WA, proceedings in the Fair Work Commission, and proceedings in the Industrial Magistrates Court of Western Australia. Claim for injurious falsehood 43 Seventh, and finally, the plaintiff pleads a claim for tortious injurious falsehood against the defendant, at [28] to [31] of the SOC. The plaintiff alleges that, after the termination of his employment, the defendant published false statements on LinkedIn concerning the plaintiff. Pleaded relief 44 The plaintiff seeks mandatory injunctive relief compelling the defendant to deliver up its property, including to deliver up his computer and other electronic storage devices to a nominated computer expert, as well as a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to remove or delete the content he has posted on LinkedIn.17 45 The plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from using, disclosing or publishing the property of the plaintiff, or from publishing or disclosing the court documents filed in these proceedings.18 46 The plaintiff also seeks damage or compensation for breach of the defendant's contractual duties, for conversion, for breach of confidence, 17 SOC, prayer for relief [1(a)], [1(b)] and [1(c)]. 18 SOC, prayer for relief [2]. -- 17 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 18 and for the contravention of s 183 of the Corporations Act, under s 1317H of that statute, together with interest.19 The Summary Judgment Application The application and the supporting materials 47 The plaintiff seeks summary judgment in respect of part of its claim against the defendant, being those parts of its claim concerning the defendant's alleged breaches of his contractual duties owed under his Employment Contract, and the consequential injunctive relief. 48 The affidavit is supported by two affidavits affirmed by Ms Christine Williams, the general counsel and company secretary of the plaintiff. The affidavits were affirmed on 12 January 2026 and 23 January 2026, and I will refer to them as the First Williams Affidavit and the Second Williams Affidavit respectively. The defendant relied upon his affidavit sworn on 16 March 2026 (Cokic Affidavit). 49 The affidavit material filed by both the parties is extensive. The First Williams Affidavit is 542 pages in length. The Second Williams Affidavit is 241 pages in length. The body of the Cokic Affidavit is 87 pages in length and refers to some 59 attachments, and is 1,321 pages in overall length. The Cokic Affidavit refers to numerous additional documents which are not attached to the affidavit. 50 In the First Williams Affidavit, Ms Williams deposes to the conduct of the defendant which is relied upon to ground the contractual breach claims, and the broader history of the matter, including the posts made by the defendant on his LinkedIn account. In the Second Williams Affidavit, Ms Williams deposes to the information of the plaintiff which is said to have been emailed by the defendant to his personal email addresses, and explains the confidential nature of that information. 51 The Cokic Affidavit is wide-ranging in its scope and contains numerous irrelevant and serious allegations against a number of persons. At its core, the affidavit reveals that the defendant maintains a strong aversion towards, and distrust of, the plaintiff and its personnel bordering on the vitriolic. Indeed, very few persons who have entered the orbit of the defendant have escaped his criticisms, as a review of the affidavit readily demonstrates. 19 SOC, prayer for relief [3] and [4]. -- 18 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 19 52 I have also received submissions filed by the plaintiff dated 19 March 2026 (PS1) and the defendant's submissions in opposition dated 25 March 2026 (DS1). I received the further submissions filed by the parties following the hearing, being the defendant's submissions dated 1 April 2026 (DS2) and the plaintiff's reply submissions dated 2 April 2026 (PS2). The application for summary judgment is confined 53 As noted above, summary judgment is not sought by the plaintiff with respect to the claims described at [39] to [43] above – it is confined to the contractual claims. Further, as explained by senior counsel at the hearing on 30 March 2026, in the event the summary judgment application succeeds, the plaintiff does not intend to press the balance of its claims against the defendant, including the claim for damages and compensation, and the plaintiff would discontinue the residue of the proceedings.20 54 This further point is a significant one. It would, in my view, tell against a grant of summary judgment in this case if the plaintiff had sought to maintain these additional claims, which are based on the same or similar factual circumstances, and seek to ventilate those additional claims at a subsequent trial. There would be strong case management considerations pointing against an award of summary judgment for only part of the claim in those circumstances, alternatively it might be strongly asserted by the defendant that this constituted 'some other reason' to refrain from entering summary judgment.21 Rules of the court and relevant principles 55 The plaintiff brings this application pursuant to O 14 r 1(1) RSC, which provides: 1 . When plaintiff may apply for summary judgment (1) Where in an action to which this Order applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance, the plaintiff may, on the ground that that defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part except as to the amount of any damages claimed, within 20 ts 13 (30 March 2026); Second Williams Affidavit [86]. 21 Song v South Beach Management Pty Ltd as trustee for the South Beach Two Development Trust [No 4] [2023] WASC 298 [120] - [122] (Seaward J). -- 19 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 20 21 days after appearance or at any later time by leave of the Court, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant. 56 The manner in which such an application is made, and the form of the supporting affidavit, are dealt with by O 14 r 2 RSC: 2. Application under r. 1, how to make (1) An application under rule 1 shall be made by summons supported by an affidavit verifying the facts on which the claim or the part of the claim to which the application relates is based, and stating that in the deponent’s belief there is no defence to that claim or part thereof, as the case may be, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed. (2) Unless the Court otherwise directs, an affidavit for the purposes of this rule may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof. (3) The summons and a copy of the affidavit in support and of any exhibits therein referred to shall be served on the defendant not less than 7 days before the return day of the summons. 57 Pursuant to O 14 r 3(1) RSC, judgment may be given for the plaintiff on an application under rule 1, unless there is a triable issue or for some other reasons there ought be a trial of the action: 3 . Judgment may be given for plaintiff (1) On the hearing of an application under rule 1 unless the Court dismisses the application, or the defendant satisfies the Court with respect to the claim, or the part of the claim, to which the application relates that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried, or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant on that claim or part thereof as may be just, having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed. 58 The relevant principles for the determination of a summary judgment application such as the present application are well established. The principles were summarised by the Court of Appeal in NRW Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd22 and more 22 NRW Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 107 [54]. -- 20 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 21 recently in Pisano v South Metropolitan Health Service.23 I respectfully adopt the Court of Appeal's recitation of the principles, which are also largely set out in the plaintiff's submissions.24 It is sufficient to outline the following matters for present purposes. 59 First, the jurisdiction of the court to award summary judgment should be exercised with great care and is not be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried. The court should refuse leave to defend and grant summary judgment where the facts which are established are conclusive such that it is possible to say, without doubt, that there is no question to be tried: Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited.25 60 Second, a plaintiff who applies for summary judgment bears the onus of persuading the court that the claim is a good one and that there is no defence. If the plaintiff's affidavit in support of the application makes out a prima facie case, an evidentiary burden will pass to the defendant to show that there is a defence to the action. However, the overall legal burden remains with the plaintiff to persuade the court that the relief should be granted: Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson.26 The plaintiff in the present case accepts that the legal burden rests upon it. 61 Third, the question whether a claim is so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed may require extensive argument. Summary judgment is not to be confined to cases where it is apparent at a glance that the claim is untenable: NRW Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd.27 62 Fourth, notice of a proposed defence or notice of the actual defence, will not disqualify a plaintiff from asserting the belief that there is no defence to the claim: Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson. Whilst leave to defend ought to be given where there is a counterclaim that could be raised as an equitable set off, a counterclaim merely amounting to a cross-action does not provide a defence to the plaintiff's 23 Pisano v South Metropolitan Health Service [2023] WASCA 80 [52] - [54]. See, further, the relatively recent summary of the principles by Whitby J in Hadouken Pty Ltd v D Comm Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 330 [17] - [21]. 24 PS1 [10]. 25 Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited [1983] HCA 25; (1983) 154 CLR 87, 99. 26 Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson [2017] WASC 106 [102]. 27 NRW Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [54] (Murphy JA). -- 21 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 22 claim so as to prevent the award of summary judgment: Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2].28 63 Fifth, where a party's defence to the claim depends on propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. The court should be careful not to risk stifling the development of the law by summarily rejecting a defence if there is a reasonable possibility that the law is developing. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law where existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained: Spencer v The Commonwealth.29 64 Sixth, if there is a conflict of evidence on the affidavits, the court should approach the application for summary judgment on the assumption that the facts set out in the affidavits relied upon by the party resisting the application (in the present case, the defendant) will ultimately be accepted at trial: Webster v Lampard.30 65 Seventh, however the court is 'not bound to accept uncritically, as raising a factual dispute calling for further investigation, every statement in an affidavit however inherently improbable in itself or equivocal, lacking in precision or inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the deponent': Pisano v South Metropolitan Health Service.31 It may be necessary to subject the evidence which is adduced to proper scrutiny. This principle is relevant to the determination of the Summary Judgment Application given the inclusion of numerous assertions in the Cokic Affidavit which require some critical analysis. 66 There is an additional point to be made, allied to the sixth and seventh points above, as to the type of evidence which is permitted on a summary judgment application. I have mentioned the terms of O 14 r 2(2) RSC, which permits a supporting affidavit to contain statements of information or belief. A defendant's opposing affidavits may similarly contain such statements: O 14 r 4(2) RSC. The following additional 28 Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASCA 27. See also HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153 [89]. 29 Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 [25]. 30 Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57; (1993) 177 CLR 598, 604, 608, 611, 614. See also Gerovich v Gerovich [2018] WASC 153 [32] and Hadouken Pty Ltd v D Comm Infrastructure [21]. 31 Pisano v South Metropolitan Health Service [52(5)]. See also Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan s/o Velayutham [1980] AC 331, 341. -- 22 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 23 points are summarised in the Red Book, which I take to be orthodox statements of law: (a) The affidavit must be read as a whole and may in substance contain the sources and grounds of statements of information and belief without the express use of a verbal formula.32 (b) Where there is a provision in an affidavit relying on a statement of information and belief which does not state the source of the information or belief, that provision is irregular and therefore inadmissible as evidence.33 (c) The object of identifying the source of information is to give the other party the opportunity to follow up the issue, if necessary, with the identified source. In circumstances where copies of the material documents are produced and exhibited, then — subject to any issue in relation to the authenticity of the documents in question — the purpose of the rule is satisfied.34 (d) If primary direct evidence is readily available to a party, it is preferable that such evidence be placed before the court rather than information and belief.35 In certain circumstances where doubt is cast upon what is said in an affidavit, the weight given to statements of information and belief may be affected by the fact that primary evidence, although available, was not tendered.36 (e) However, in the absence of an order that O 14 r 2(2) RSC not apply, there is no limitation on the right of a party to rely on affidavits filed in relation to a summary judgment application on statements of information and belief.37 67 The above principles must be applied by the court in resolving the plaintiff's application and I will proceed on that basis. 32 Kolichis v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2014] WASCA 76 [11]. 33 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Clark [2014] WADC 153 [28]; JL Young Manufacturing Co Ltd [1900] 2 Ch 753, 754; Phillips v Mineral Resources Development Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 138, 145. 34 Bank of Western Australia v Stein & Anor [2005] WASC 43 [31]. 35 Birch Investments Pty Ltd v Kiap Khee Lim [1988] WASC 194. 36 Austshim Resources NL v Collinson [2001] WASC 350 [13] (Austshim Resources). 37 Austshim Resources [13]. -- 23 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 24 The required analysis 68 Having regard to the terms of O 14 RSC and the relevant principles I have outlined, the necessary task for the court to undertake on the Summary Judgment Application is to assess whether the plaintiff has positively demonstrated the contractual breaches it has pleaded, and to assess whether there is any real question to be tried or some other reason there ought be a trial of these claims, including by reference to the specific defences and arguments raised by the defendant. 69 The defendant has identified numerous points which he contends constitute triable issues in the action or which otherwise justify a refusal of the Summary Judgment Application.38 70 For example, the defendant criticises the absence of any formal forensic report in the materials filed by the plaintiff and submits the plaintiff 'has not filed evidence that the Defendant copied, passed or divulged the Plaintiff's Confidential Information to another person'.39 The defendant also refers to the statutory discretion of the court to exclude evidence obtained improperly and unlawfully by the plaintiff, and appears to submit that evidence of the electronic searches conducted by the plaintiff should be excluded.40 Further, the defendant submits that the court cannot be satisfied that several of the documents adduced by the plaintiff are 'in fact original and unmodified emails'.41 71 This analysis should first commence with an examination of the primary evidence which emerges from the affidavit evidence adduced by the parties on the application. Following that examination, it will be necessary to summarise the factual findings which can be made on the application, then turn to consider whether summary judgment should be granted in respect of the three asserted breaches of contract and the claim for permanent injunctive relief. 72 To preserve the confidentiality of the plaintiff's information, I have set out any material asserted to be confidential in Attachment B to these reasons, which is a confidential attachment which will be redacted before publication. 38 DS2 [6] - [19]. 39 DS2 [2]. 40 DS2 pg 1 and [12]. The defendant expressly refers to s 155 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) but it may be inferred the reference was intended to be to s 154 and s 155 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA). 41 DS2 [12]. -- 24 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 25 An examination of the affidavit evidence 73 I accept the plaintiff has demonstrated the matters which are set out below, either because they are admitted on the evidence, or because they have not been contradicted or challenged by the defendant and I am satisfied the plaintiff has established these particular matters having regard to the affidavit evidence tendered. Where there is a dispute on the evidentiary materials, I have specifically discussed that dispute. 74 I should also observe that the plaintiff has filed an affidavit for the purposes of satisfying the requirement in O 14 r 2(1) RSC in which Ms Williams has deposed that the plaintiff verily believes the defendant has no defence to 'the claim for that part of the plaintiff's claim which relates to the breach of the Contract and the injunctive relief and other orders sought'42 in the Summary Judgment Application. The defendant's employment with the plaintiff 75 The defendant was employed by the plaintiff from 27 November 2020 until 15 August 2024, at which point his employment was terminated.43 The defendant was initially employed as a Contracts Specialist and then promoted to Senior Contracts Specialist – Energy & Compliance in September 2022.44 76 The defendant was absent from the workplace during the period from 15 April 2024 to 8 August 2024.45 77 During his employment with the plaintiff, the defendant was responsible for managing its energy-related contracts, including for electricity, natural gas and cogeneration, and high value contracts for the procurement of direct materials.46 78 The defendant was issued with a laptop and phone as part of his employment with the plaintiff. These items were returned by the defendant when he left the plaintiff's employment.47 42 Second Williams Affidavit [87]. 43 First Williams Affidavit [13], [21]. 44 First Williams Affidavit [13]. 45 First Williams Affidavit [20]. 46 First Williams Affidavit [14]. 47 First Williams Affidavit [15], [22]. -- 25 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 26 The plaintiff's contract management system 79 The plaintiff, and other companies within the same group, use a single, cloud-based contract management system called 'Coupa' to control and track company expenditure and to store documents. The plaintiff uses a single local network drive to store all contract related documentation including the contracts and supporting information.48 80 During the course of his employment, the defendant had full access to Coupa, to the local network drive, and to highly sensitive confidential material of the plaintiff.49 The defendant's conduct in sending information to his private email addresses 81 Ms Williams has deposed, in the First Williams Affidavit and the Second Williams Affidavit, to the conduct on the part of the defendant by which he sent internal plaintiff emails and information of the plaintiff to his private email addresses (being both Gmail and iiNet email addresses). The defendant did so by either directly sending emails to those addresses, or by blind copying his communications to those addresses.50 82 The details of the emails forwarded by the defendant are found in the Second Williams Affidavit, at [15] – [70], in which Mr Williams explains the content of five specific emails and the attachments to those emails. Mr Williams has attached the emails to her affidavit. It is not possible to say, on the face of the emails, that they were sent, or blind copied, to the private email addresses of the defendant. However, Ms Williams has expressed her views in this regard on the basis of a forensic review of the records of the plaintiff which was undertaken by Mr Jon Seet, an Infrastructure Architect employed by the plaintiff. The term 'infrastructure' in Mr Seet's job title appears to be a reference to the infrastructure of 'information technology systems' within the plaintiff's organisation. 83 Some explanation about this review is required, given the defendant's submissions. 48 First Williams Affidavit [17], [18]. 49 First Williams Affidavit [19]. 50 First Williams Affidavit [49(a)] and Second Williams Affidavit [15]. -- 26 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 27 84 The court has not been provided with any formal document prepared by Mr Seet, or any affidavit from Mr Seet, to verify the review he undertook. This is a point emphasised by the defendant in opposition to the Summary Judgment Application. Ms Williams has deposed to the circumstances of the review in the First Williams Affidavit. In my view, given the principles to which I have earlier referred and the terms of O 14 r 4(2) RSC, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to adduce a report from Mr Seet, if one existed, nor was it necessary for Mr Seet to file an affidavit deposing to his findings. That step may have enhanced the cogency of the Summary Judgment Application, but it is not an essential step on an application such as the present. 85 In essence, Mr Seet informed Ms Williams that he reviewed the sites and mailboxes held by the plaintiff using a Microsoft program referred to as 'Microsoft Purview'. As part of the review, he searched for emails sent to the known private email addresses of the defendant from 1 January 2024 until January 2026. 86 Mr Seet's review identified several emails within the mailboxes controlled by the plaintiff which had been sent by the defendant to his private email addresses, either by directly sending them to those addresses or through blind copies.51 In particular, Mr Seet found that between 1 January 2024 and 14 April 2024, the defendant 'had a practice' of sending documents and information from his work email address to his private email addresses (being both Gmail and iiNet email addresses). The scope of the review undertaken by Mr Seet was later extended by the plaintiff, to include the period from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023.52 87 Further, Ms Williams has deposed that, on the basis of the review conducted by Mr Seet, between 1 January 2024 and 15 August 2024, the defendant send around 19 emails from his work email address to his personal email addresses, which attached emails or documents, most of which Ms Williams has deposed were the property of the plaintiff. 88 Ms Williams has deposed that:53 A number of the emails and documents contain commercially sensitive information concerning Tronox Management's contractual relationship with third parties and business generally, which are the property of 51 First Williams Affidavit [49]. 52 Second Williams Affidavit [17]. 53 First Williams Affidavit [49(b)]. -- 27 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 28 Tronox Management, are not in the public domain and which Mr Cokic was not permitted to retain following the termination of his employment, and which he was required to return. 89 Further, Ms Williams went further at that point and deposed that:54 I do not identify in this affidavit the specific documents which I believe Mr Cokic has taken from Tronox Management so as to avoid drawing Mr Cokic's attention to those documents and increasing the risk of their publication. 90 Ms Williams has specifically identified five emails which the defendant sent to his personal email addresses, at [25] to [70] of the Second Williams Affidavit. In summary, those emails are as follows: (a) an email from the defendant to Ms Williams dated 22 March 2024 (which is Attachment CAW-25); (b) an email from the defendant to himself sent on 2 April 2024, with no content, but to which five further emails were attached (which are collectively found in Attachment CAW-26); (c) an email from the defendant to himself sent on 14 April 2024 at 1.15pm attaching an earlier email dated 11 October 2022 (which is Attachment CAW-27); (d) an email from the defendant to himself sent on 14 April 2024 at 2.49pm, with no content, but to which six documents were attached (which are collectively found in Attachment CAW-28); and (e) an email from the defendant to others within the plaintiff sent on 16 April 2024, blind copied to himself, to which 10 other emails were attached (which are collectively found in Attachment CAW-29). The defendant's conduct in publishing information on LinkedIn 91 Turning then to the evidence as to the asserted publication of the plaintiff's documents and information by the defendant, the plaintiff has adduced evidence that the defendant filed copies of the plaintiff's internal emails (concerning the acquisition of materials from a third party supplier) in the course of the proceedings which the defendant 54 First Williams Affidavit [50]. -- 28 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 29 commenced against the plaintiff in the Fair Work Commission.55 As to this material, Ms Williams has deposed that:56 The emails and attachments are the property of Tronox Management and could only have been obtained by Mr Cokic because of his employment with the company. Given the nature of the emails, I do not believe the emails were in the public domain before Mr Cokic published them. Tronox Management did not give him permission to keep, use or disclose this material after his employment was terminated. Mr Cokic was required to return the emails and documents to Tronox Management upon his termination. 92 Commencing on or around 20 November 2024, the solicitors for the plaintiff communicated with the defendant regarding his use of the plaintiff's documents and information.57 In that letter, the plaintiff's solicitors asserted that: 2.5 In particular, the Company is aware that on 4 November 2024 and 14 November 2024 you provided information and documents to the Fair Work Commission which are Company property and contain Confidential Information as defined in your Employment Contract. 2.6 The Company is currently carrying out further enquires, including monitoring your social media activity, to determine the full extent of your actions. However, on the information currently to hand, the Company reasonably believes that you have failed to return Company property as required and that you intend to use its Confidential Information in breach of your legal obligations to the Company including the Confidentiality Obligations under the Employment Agreement. 93 The letter included the following demands, among others: 4.1 The Company requires you to immediately cease engaging in the conduct set out in this letter, as well as any other conduct in breach of your ongoing obligations owed to the Company. The Company also requires you to immediately return all Company property and permanently delete any Confidential Information from any hardware or digital storage devices that you own or control (including computers, laptops, personal devices, personal storage accounts or devices). 55 First Williams Affidavit [27]. 56 First Williams Affidavit [27]. 57 First Williams Affidavit [28], Attachment CAW-04. -- 29 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 30 4.2 The Company takes the protection of its Confidential Information very seriously. The Company will continue to closely monitor your conduct and reserves the right to take whatever action it considers appropriate to protect its legitimate business interests. 4.3 This may include the Company commencing legal proceedings against you, without further notice, to obtain: (a) an injunction to stop you from engaging in conduct in breach of your obligations to the Company including the Confidentiality Obligations; (b) an order requiring you to immediately deliver any and all of the Company's property and information (including its Confidential Information) that remains in your possession, custody or power; (c) orders for an account of profits or award of damages to the extent that the Company suffers any financial loss due to your actions in breach of your obligations owed to the Company; (d) an order that you pay the Company's legal costs, which are likely to be significant. 4.4 For abundant clarity, we remind you that, despite your employment with the Company having ceased on 15 August 2024 any and all use of the Company's Confidential Information subsequent to that date will amount to a breach of your obligations owed to the Company. 94 The defendant responded to the solicitor's letter, on 21 November 2024, and indicated in part that he believed any confidentiality obligations did not apply to the documents of the plaintiff which were created before the defendant's employment with the plaintiff commenced.58 I pause to note that that is not a correct statement of the legal position. 95 Ms Williams deposes that, to the best of her knowledge and her review of the defendant's LinkedIn profile, she believes that the defendant's activity of publishing posts concerning the plaintiff (or its related entities) reduced at this point, until around April 2025.59 It is at this point, that is, in April 2025, that the evidence discloses an increase 58 First Williams Affidavit [29], Attachment CAW-05. 59 First Williams Affidavit [30]. -- 30 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 31 in the frequency of posts on the defendant's LinkedIn account concerning the plaintiff. Ms Williams' deposes that:60 In April 2025, Mr Cokic published several posts to his LinkedIn profile concerning Tronox (April 2025 LinkedIn Publications), including derogatory commentary about its employees. While the posts attached documents which were publicly available, I have attached the April 2025 LinkedIn Publications to provide the Court with context because on 10 April 2025, Tronox Holding's then solicitors, Hall & Wilcox, sent a letter to Mr Cokic about the posts. 96 The defendant did not remove the posts referred to by Ms Williams, notwithstanding the letter from the plaintiff's solicitors.61 97 Subsequently, in mid-June 2025, the defendant published a series of further posts on LinkedIn which attached copies of court documents which had been filed by the defendant against the plaintiff, together with internal emails from the plaintiff concerning personnel issues.62 Ms Williams deposes that:63 Importantly, one of the emails attached a handover memorandum which identified issues arising in relation to Tronox Management counterparties. The emails and attachments are the property of Tronox Management and could only have been obtained by Mr Cokic because of his employment with the company. Given the nature of the emails, I do not believe the emails were in the public domain before Mr Cokic published them. Tronox Management did not give him permission to keep, use or disclose this material after his employment was terminated. Mr Cokic was required to return the emails and documents to Tronox Management upon his termination. 98 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application in the WorkCover WA proceedings concerning the defendant's publication of documents which had been filed by the parties in those proceedings. The plaintiff sought orders to restrain further publication.64 Orders were duly made by the appointed Arbitrator on 30 June 2025 requiring the defendant to remove the publications. The orders provided as follows:65 The employer's interlocutory application (sealed on 25 June 2025) is granted and the following orders are issued: 60 First Williams Affidavit [31]. 61 First Williams Affidavit [32]. 62 First Williams Affidavit [33], Attachment CAW-08. 63 First Williams Affidavit [33]. 64 First Williams Affidavit [34]. 65 First Williams Affidavit, Attachment CAW-10. -- 31 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 32 1. By 5.00pm on 30 June 2025, the worker remove from LinkedIn any and all posts disclosing or referring to materials filed in these proceedings, including but not limited to the Tronox Kwinana Health and Hygiene Risk Assessment 2020 - 2025, the Feedback Letters, and any accompanying commentary relating to those documents. 2. That the worker be restrained from disclosing, inspecting, or publishing any documents filed in these proceedings, save as required for the conduct of the matter. 3. That the worker be directed not to republish, refer to, or comment on any documents filed in these proceedings in any public forum, including but not limited to social media. 4. The worker is reminded of his obligation to maintain the confidentiality of material disclosed in the course of the proceedings, and to use such material solely for the purposes of the arbitration. 99 Ms Williams deposes that the defendant did not comply with these orders and instead continued to publish documents filed in, and emails sent in relation to, the proceedings in WorkCover WA. He published those documents and emails on LinkedIn on 20 and 21 August 2025.66 100 This led to further proceedings before the Arbitrator, in which the plaintiff asserted breaches of the orders on the part of the defendant. This led to reasons being published by the Arbitrator on 3 September 2025, which included the following matters: The employer submits that 'these posts demonstrate a sustained pattern of disregard for the Orders of 30 June 2025. The worker continues to publish and comment upon documents filed in these proceedings in a public forum, in contravention of Orders 1 - 4. This conduct has placed, and continues to place, material from the proceedings into the public domain and poses an ongoing risk to the fair and proper administration of the arbitration'. I agree with this submission. My provisional view, based on the employer's correspondence and attached materials, is that the worker has breached my Orders issued on 30 June 2025. I remind the worker that failure to comply with a decision of a dispute resolution authority is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of $15,000 pursuant to s 385 of the Act. Section 303 of the Act 66 First Williams Affidavit [35]. -- 32 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 33 defines 'decision' as including an order and s 5 of the Act defines 'dispute resolution authority' as including an arbitrator. I encourage the worker to immediately take steps to comply with my Orders. If the employer alleges any continuing or further breaches of the Orders, it should lodge evidence in admissible form (ie: witness statement with annexures) for consideration pursuant to s 390 of the Act for referral to the CEO of WorkCover for investigation. 101 Ms Williams deposes to further publications by the defendant on LinkedIn of the plaintiff's documents, on 6 August 2025, on 7 October 2025, on 19 December 2025, on 21 December 2025, on 22 December 2025 (on several occasions).67 102 In the midst of these further publications, the plaintiff applied to WorkCover WA, on 11 December 2025, to have the proceedings dismissed having regard to the conduct of the defendant in publishing documents which were filed in the proceeding. The plaintiff made a submission to WorkCover WA that:68 2.1 The Respondent brings this application as a result of the Applicant's repeated failure to comply with the Orders of 30 June 2025 restraining the publication of documents filed in these Proceedings, and his broader public conduct, and conduct in these proceedings before the Arbitrator, that is incompatible with the fair, efficient and private nature of statutory arbitration. 2.2 Notwithstanding the clear terms of the Orders, the Applicant has continued to publish confidential material and commentary on his publicly accessible LinkedIn profile and has expressly indicated an intention to persist in doing so. 2.3 As a consequence, the Respondent is unable to file further evidence or call witnesses without exposing that material to a real and immediate risk of public dissemination or misuse, defeating the purpose of the protective Orders and undermining the Integrity and fairness of the Arbitration. 103 The plaintiff ultimately sought an order, pursuant to s 339 (1)(c) of the governing legislation, that the proceedings be dismissed. The nature of the information retained and published by the defendant 104 Returning to the above mentioned publications, the evidence discloses the nature of the documents published by the defendant. In 67 First Williams Affidavit [37] - [45]. 68 First Williams Affidavit, Attachment CAW-15. -- 33 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 34 summary, the material published consisted of internal emails and contractual documents from the plaintiff, being commercially sensitive and confidential. Some examples will suffice, which I have included within Attachment B to these reasons. 105 As further explained below, I accept that the documents and emails published by the defendant in these instances were not in the public domain before the defendant published them. Further, I accept that the defendant only had access to these documents and emails as a result of his employment with the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not give the defendant permission to keep, use, or disclose the documents after his employment was terminated. Further, I accept that the defendant was required to return these documents to the plaintiff when his employment was terminated. 106 Having regard to the foregoing evidence, the submissions advanced by the plaintiff, set out below, should be accepted: [19] Between 4 November 2024 and 22 December 2025, Mr Cokic published various LinkedIn posts on his LinkedIn account: … These publications disclosed or were derived from internal Tronox management documents and communications, including commercially sensitive and confidential information, which was not publicly available before being published on LinkedIn and which Mr Cokic could only have accessed through his employment with Tronox Management. The disclosed documents and information were 'Confidential Information' under cl 18.2 of the Employment Contract. Schedule 1 to these submissions identifies the confidential information that, to Tronox Management's knowledge, Mr Cokic has disclosed on LinkedIn. … [21] The continued possession and use and publication of the Tronox Property by Mr Cokic has been undertaken without Tronox Management's authority, permission, agreement, prior knowledge or consent. Mr Cokic continued to publish Tronox's Confidential Information on LinkedIn, despite being requested not to do so. Conclusions on the affidavit evidence 107 Within the Cokic Affidavit, the defendant details a number of criticisms of the plaintiff and its personnel, including Ms Williams, as well as its solicitors. The defendant also levels allegations against members of the WA Police Force for their serious misconduct, attacks -- 34 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 35 members of the judiciary across several jurisdictions, outlines his grounds for opposing the plaintiff's application, and seeks an order for compensation against the plaintiff. 108 The defendant identifies in his affidavit several alleged breaches of the criminal law by the plaintiff, as well as breaches of employment and taxation legislation, and transgressions of the energy regulatory regime. It is unnecessary in these reasons to detail these allegations and criticisms, as I consider they are simply irrelevant to the matters to be decided by the court, and are unsubstantiated. In many respects, the affidavit draws together the personal views of the defendant about the plaintiff and its personnel, and makes submissions about the plaintiff's affidavit material. 109 To the extent there is material within the Cokic Affidavit which is relevant to the present applications, it has been necessary to carefully review the affidavit to identify that material, and to then consider how that material is to be properly understood. 110 It is notable that the defendant places reliance in his affidavit on the whistleblower immunity provisions, a point which I will address in due course. This is notable because, as the plaintiff submits, there is at least a degree of tension between the defendant's resistance to the contractual breach claims and his insistence that he was entitled to make the disclosures by reason of the whistleblower provisions. The latter contention (reliance on the whistleblower provisions) tends to assume that the former contention (breaches of the person's employment contract) has been established. Although not stated by the defendant, I will assume that the reliance on the immunity provisions is asserted by him in the alternative. 111 On the analysis of the affidavit evidence as a whole, and having regard to the submissions made by both parties as to the adequacy of this evidence, I consider the plaintiff has successfully demonstrated the following matters on the balance of probabilities. 112 First, the defendant took steps on multiple occasions between January and August 2024 to send emails to his private email addresses, which contained or attached information which was the property of the plaintiff, which included commercially sensitive information which was not in the public domain. In reaching this assessment, I regard it as relevant that the defendant has not expressly denied this conduct in the -- 35 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 36 affidavits he has filed. I recognise the defendant is unrepresented and some leeway should be given to him in assessing the precision of his affidavit material. But this is a significant omission on his part nonetheless. In any event, there is material in the defendant's own affidavit which reveals that he had retained documents which were the property of the plaintiff upon his departure from the plaintiff.69 113 There is material in the affidavits of Ms Williams, both in terms of the evidence on information and belief as to the review undertaken by Mr Seet, but also evidence of the particular emails sent by the defendant to his private email addresses, which support the above factual conclusion. The affidavit evidence in this respect includes the emails pleaded at [10] of the SOC as well as the checklist document pleaded at [10(a)] of the SOC.70 I have identified the documents in Attachment B to these reasons. 114 Second, the documents and information which the defendant forwarded to his private email addresses was information which the defendant could only have obtained or accessed by reason of his employment with the plaintiff. 115 Third, the defendant took steps on multiple occasions in 2024 and 2025, to publish a series of posts on his LinkedIn account containing documents and information which was the property of the plaintiff, which included commercially sensitive information which was not in the public domain. Ms Williams' verifies these matters in her affidavits. Again, it is significant that the defendant has not expressly denied this conduct. 116 The affidavit evidence relied upon by the plaintiff includes the emails pleaded at [9] of the SOC. I have identified the specific documents in Attachment B to these reasons. 117 Fourth, the documents and information which the defendant published was information which the defendant could only have obtained or access by reason of his employment with the plaintiff. 69 Cokic Affidavit [121] - [124] and [126] - [127], although the defendant says the material was illegally obtained from him by an illegal search warrant, and Attachment A43 which is a document prepared by the defendant in July 2025 in support of his workers' compensation claim, which is entitled 'Damaging Acts – Performance Management and Dismissal'. 70 Second Williams Affidavit [53]. -- 36 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 37 118 Fifth, the documents and information published by the defendant on his LinkedIn account, as I have indicated above, included commercially sensitive information. In this regard, I place reliance on the evidence of Ms Williams at [71] – [85] of the Second Williams Affidavit concerning the nature and quality of the information disclosed by the defendant as to the plaintiff's contractual arrangements with its counterparties, each of which contains express and broadly worded confidentiality provisions.71 The information publicly disclosed by the defendant has extended to contract negotiations, contract management issues, key contractual provisions, internal evaluations of the contracts by the plaintiff's personnel, mechanisms for price adjustment, supply issues, discounts, monthly reports concerning supply under the contracts, quantities of products and their prices.72 119 It was not necessary for the parties to enter into a separate or specific confidentiality agreement, as described in cl 18.6. The field of operation of such a separate agreement is narrower than the broader obligations in cl 18, focused on 'technical processes' which might need specific confidentiality protection. 120 I reject the contention advanced by the defendant that the above information was already in the public domain, including that the material was publicly available because the defendant had annexed the information to affidavits or documents he filed in the Fair Work Commission, the Federal Court of Australia or some other court or tribunal. There is no credible basis for this contention and the affidavit evidence of Ms Williams points strongly in favour of the opposite conclusion. The defendant has not identified any publicly available source of the 'Confidential Information' prior to its publication by him. The submission of the plaintiff in this regard must be accepted.73 121 Sixth, there is evidence that the defendant has retained certain documents which are the property of the plaintiff, which he had forwarded to this private email addresses, but which he has not yet published on his LinkedIn account or otherwise.74 122 Seventh, I reject as fanciful the suggestion by the defendant that the review undertaken by Mr Seet, which is referred to in the affidavits of Ms Williams, was 'never conducted, does not exist and has been 71 Second Williams Affidavit, Attachments CAW-30, CAW-31, and CAW-32. 72 Second Williams Affidavit [25] - [86]. 73 PS1 [45] - [46]. 74 Second Williams Affidavit [80]. -- 37 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 38 fabricated into existence'.75 There is simply no factual basis for that suggestion, which is purely speculative. There is no basis to conclude, even at the level of arguability, that the review in question has been fabricated, nor that the plaintiff has filed 'unoriginal and modified evidence'.76 123 Eighth, the defendant's reliance on the statutory exclusion provision in the Criminal Investigation Act 2004 (WA) is misplaced and can be rejected. Further, there are several assertions made by the defendant that evidence has been illegally or unlawfully obtained by the plaintiff and its personnel. There is no basis for these assertions at a factual level, even at the level of arguability.77 124 In light of these findings, I will turn to consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated the pleaded breaches of the Employment Contract, and then assess whether there are any triable issues or some other reasons which provide a basis to resist the grant of summary judgment in respect of the contractual claims. Disposition Whether breach of cl 15.4 established? 125 Clause 15.4 of the Employment Contract required the defendant, upon the termination of his employment, to return to the plaintiff any property of the plaintiff in his control and possession. This expressly extended to any files, records, papers, correspondence, computers and telephones in his control or possession. 126 In order to demonstrate a breach of cl 15.4, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that this material was confidential. It is sufficient, in order to establish the pleaded breach, that the plaintiff demonstrate the defendant retained the information in question. 127 In my view, given the findings set out above, there is a cogent basis to conclude that the defendant retained the property of the plaintiff upon the termination of his employment. I have identified the relevant documents in Attachment B to these reasons. In particular, it is evident that he had, during the course of his employment, emailed documents and information of the plaintiff to his private email addresses. It is then 75 DS2 [10]. 76 DS2 [7] and DS [19]. 77 Cokic Affidavit [120] - [127], [129] - [139], for example. -- 38 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 39 evident, from the various occasions on which the defendant published documents during the WorkCover WA and Fair Work proceedings and to his LinkedIn account, that the defendant had the plaintiff's documents in his possession, including after the cessation of his employment. 128 I am satisfied that the plaintiff has demonstrated this is so, and that the pleaded breach of cl 15.4 of the Employment Contract has been made out. Whether breach of cl 18.3.1 established? 129 Clause 18.3.1 of the Employment Contract required the defendant to take all reasonable steps and necessary precautions to maintain the secrecy of, and prevent unauthorised disclosure of or access to, all Confidential Information. 130 The breaches of this contractual provision pleaded by the plaintiff are found on the defendant's disclosures of the plaintiff's information on his LinkedIn account. As summarised in Attachment B to these reasons, I have found that the defendant published various documents of the plaintiff on his LinkedIn account on 4 November 2024, 14 November 2024, 18 June 2025, 7 October 2025, 21 December 2025 and 22 December 2025, being the pleaded dates. 131 I have found that these documents contained information which was 'Confidential Information' as defined in the Employment Contract. In particular, the information was information concerning the plaintiff's business which was not in the public domain before the defendant made a disclosure of it, and which had come to the defendant's notice in the course of his employment. The definition in the Employment Contract is rather wide in its terms. 132 The defendant breached his contractual obligation by engaging in conduct which disclosed the information on a public-facing internet account. Not only did he not take steps or precautions to maintain the secrecy of the information, he deliberately disclosed the information in a public setting or in a setting in which numerous third parties could access the information. That is antithetical to the contractual obligation to which he agreed, in cl 18.3.1, when he executed the Employment Contract with the plaintiff. 133 I am satisfied that the plaintiff has demonstrated the pleaded breach of cl 18.3.1 of the Employment Contract. -- 39 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 40 Whether breach of cl 18.3.3 established? 134 Clause 18.3.3 of his Employment Contract required the defendant to provide any assistance reasonably required by the plaintiff in relation to any proceedings the plaintiff may take or threaten to take, against any person in relation to unauthorised use or disclosure of Confidential Information. 135 Provisions such as this are more typically directed to requiring the employee to provide assistance to the employer with respect to actual or threatened proceedings against another person, where there has been unauthorised use or disclosure of the protected information. In the present case, the plaintiff pleads that the breach is based on the defendant's failure to cooperate or assist with respect to the plaintiff's threatened proceedings against the defendant himself.78 I have referred earlier in these reasons to the correspondence from the plaintiff's solicitors to the defendant sent on 20 November 2024 requiring that he cease the publication of the plaintiff's documents and return the property to the plaintiff. 136 Is the pleaded provision engaged in these circumstances? 137 The express terms of cl 18.3.3 are widely drafted, referring to 'any assistance reasonably required'. The broad connecting words 'in relation to' are used in the clause. The types of proceedings are also identified in broad terms, being 'any proceedings…against any person'. 138 The alleged breach of cl 18.3.3 was not given much attention in the course of the Summary Judgment Application, particularly as the breaches of cl 15.4 and cl 18.3.1 were at the forefront of the plaintiff's claim. That said, the breach of cl 18.3.3 was plainly pressed by the plaintiff and summary judgment was sought in respect of this breach. 139 Whilst I initially harboured some doubt that the terms of cl 18.3.3 were engaged in the factual circumstances pleaded, I am ultimately persuaded that the wide language of cl 18.3.3 is capable of capturing the conduct of the defendant which is pleaded in this case. The conduct may be characterised as a refusal on the part of the defendant to cooperate in the face of a clear request from the plaintiff's agent, which was issued as a precursor to potential legal proceedings against the defendant. The provision extends to such a circumstance. 78 SOC [15] - [18]. -- 40 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 41 140 I am thus satisfied that the plaintiff has demonstrated the pleaded breach of cl 18.3.3 of the Employment Contract. The protections under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2023 (WA) 141 The defendant has asserted that his disclosure of some of the confidential information by him was protected under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) (PID Act). I refer to [64] and [87] of the Cokic Affidavit in this regard, for example, although the defendant makes a number of references to the legislation in his material. 142 The regime contained within the PID Act is commonly referred to as providing 'whistleblower protection', although that is not a technical term and it is not used within the legislation. There are similar regimes operating in other States and Territories, and at the Federal level. 143 The long title to the PID Act states that it is an 'Act to facilitate the disclosure of public interest information, to provide protection for those who make disclosures and for those the subject of disclosures, and, in consequence, to amend various Acts, and for related purposes'. 144 Section 5 of the PID Act relevantly provides: 5. Appropriate disclosure of public interest information, making (1) Any person may make an appropriate disclosure of public interest information to a proper authority. (2) A person makes an appropriate disclosure of public interest information if, and only if, the person who makes the disclosure - (a) believes on reasonable grounds that the information is true; or (b) has no reasonable grounds on which to form a belief about the truth of the information but believes on reasonable grounds that the information may be true. 145 The terms 'public authority' and 'public interest information' are defined within s 3(1) of the PID Act. As s 5 indicates, the protection applies only to an 'appropriate' disclosure of 'public interest information', where that has been disclosed to a 'public authority'. -- 41 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 42 146 Where a person makes a disclosure under and in accordance with s 5 of the PID Act, that person 'incurs no civil or criminal liability for doing so': PID Act, s 13(a). A person can forfeit the immunity in certain circumstances: PID Act, s 17(1). 147 It is not necessary to explore the full extent or scope of the provisions in the PID Act, and the immunity provided for by that legislation, in order to resolve the present application. That is because, in this case, the disclosures made by the defendant and in respect of which the pleaded claims are directed, concern broad publications of information in an online setting. The disclosures were not made to any of the defined 'proper authorities', such as the Corruption and Crime Commission, the Auditor General, or the Parliamentary Commissioner. There are several other offices and persons defined in the legislation, none of which are relevant on the facts of this matter. 148 So, quite apart from the requirement for the defendant to demonstrate that he held the beliefs as described in s 5(2), and that the information was 'public interest information', the defendant cannot demonstrate and has not produced any evidence that he made the disclosures to a 'proper authority'. 149 There is a further specific ground in the PID Act which should be mentioned. Section 7A relates to disclosures to a 'journalist'. Section 7A provides: 7A. Disclosure of public interest information to journalist, when may be made (1) In this section - journalist means a person engaged in the profession or occupation of journalism in connection with the publication of information in a medium for the dissemination to the public or a section of the public of news and observations on news. (2) A person may make a disclosure to a journalist of substantially the same information that was the subject of a disclosure of public interest information that the person has already made under this Act if the proper authority to which the disclosure was made, or the person to whom a matter raised by the disclosure was referred under section 9(1)(b) - -- 42 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 43 (a) has refused to investigate, or has discontinued the investigation of, a matter raised by the disclosure; or (b) has not completed an investigation of a matter raised by the disclosure within the period ending 6 months after the disclosure was made; or (c) has completed an investigation of a matter raised by the disclosure but has not recommended the taking of action in respect of the matter; or (d) has not complied with section 10(1) or (4), if applicable, in relation to the disclosure. 150 The LinkedIn platform is a social media platform. The disclosures made by the defendant were thus not to a 'journalist' as defined. The disclosures were also not made in circumstances in which the information had already been disclosed to a 'proper authority' under the PID Act and where that proper authority had refused to investigate the matter, or where any of the other circumstances described in s 7A(2) can be said to exist. There is no sensible basis on which s 7A could be invoked by the defendant as a defence to the plaintiff's contractual claims. 151 I therefore consider there is no triable issue arising under the provisions of the PID Act. The plaintiff's submissions at PS1 [33] – [38] should be accepted. The protections under the Corporations Act 152 Similarly, there is no triable issue arising under the whistleblower protection provisions in the Corporations Act.79 Those provisions are found in pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act, which is headed 'Protection for Whistleblowers'. Where the disclosure is external to the relevant company, the disclosure must be to one of the identified recipients described within the legislation, such as to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, or to the person's solicitor if the disclosure is to obtain legal advice or representation under the whistleblower provisions. 79 Cokic Affidavit [140]. -- 43 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 44 153 Again, it is unnecessary to explore the full boundaries of this legislation, as the broad disclosures made by the defendant on his LinkedIn account could not, on any view, comply with the requirements for whistleblower protection under the Corporations Act. 154 I therefore consider there is no triable issue arising under the provisions of the Corporations Act. The plaintiff's submissions at PS1 [32] – [33] should be accepted. The protections under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) 155 The defendant also asserts that some of the confidential information, formed part of his employment record and was not confidential because he had a right to access them as part of that record. I understand the defendant relies on the provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) and the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) (FW Regulations) in this regard. I refer to the matters deposed to by the defendant in the Cokic Affidavit at [87]. 156 It is certainly the case that employers are required to keep 'employment records' for each employee under s 363 of the FW Act. Further, I accept that an employee is entitled to inspect and copy their 'employment record'. The FW Regulations specify the information which must be included in the 'employment record'. I refer to reg 3.32 to reg 3.42 of the FW Regulations. 157 The plaintiff submits that an 'employee record' does not extend to all internal emails which were sent or received by the employee in the course of the employee's employment, or to all internal emails relating to the employee's performance or performance management during the period of employment.80 That submission should be accepted. 158 Further, the plaintiff submits that none of the Confidential Information disclosed by the defendant amounts to an 'employee record' under the FW Regulations.81 That submission should also be accepted. 159 In my view, there is no triable issue arising under the provisions of the FW Act or the FW Regulations, which would operate to provide the defendant with any lawful defence to the pleaded conduct about which 80 PS1 [42]. 81 PS1 [42]. -- 44 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 45 the plaintiff complains in the SOC, in breach of the Employment Contract. Whether the defendant had moral rights to the information? 160 The defendant submits he has moral rights in respect of some of the Confidential Information, said to arise under cl 20 of the Employment Contract. I refer to the Cokic Affidavit at [88]. I have set out the terms of cl 20 in Attachment A to these reasons. 161 The concept of 'moral rights' as defined in the Employment Contract simply do not arise in respect of the plaintiff's internal emails, commercial contracts and related documents. Even if they existed, they would not provide the defendant with an entitlement to publish the documents and information in the wide public manner which I have found has occurred. 162 I accept the submission of the plaintiff that the documents in question are the property of the plaintiff by reason of cl 19.3 and cl 18.2 of the Employment Contract.82 163 There is thus no triable issue arising under cl 20 of the Employment Contract, which would operate to provide the defendant with any lawful defence to the pleaded conduct about which the plaintiff complains in the SOC, in breach of the Employment Contract. Conclusion on summary judgment application 164 The effect of the foregoing analysis is that I accept the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in support of the pleaded breaches by the defendant of his Employment Contract. Those are the breaches which are pleaded at [13] to [19] of the SOC, as to cl 15.4, cl 18.3.1 and cl 18.3.3 of the Employment Contract. 165 That having been done, the orthodox position is that an evidentiary burden falls on the defendant to show there is a defence to the pleaded breaches, while recognising that the overall legal burden remains with the plaintiff. 166 In my view, none of the bases on which the defendant has sought to oppose the Summary Judgment Application have been established by the defendant. I recognise the burden on the defendant in this regard is 82 PS1 [44]. -- 45 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 46 relatively low, and it is not necessary for the defendant to establish that he would ultimately succeed at trial. But the court must be satisfied there is at least a triable issue or some other reason the action should be determined at trial. I am not satisfied as to either of these matters in relation to the contractual claims pleaded by the plaintiff. As the plaintiff has correctly noted, there is no substantive question of law which requires determination by the court in this action, no interpretation of the Employment Contract which requires resolution, and none of the specific defences relied upon by the defendant can be characterised as arguable. 167 One of the difficulties in assessing this matter has been that the evidentiary material presented by the defendant, as well as his submissions, are wide-ranging and littered with unsubstantiated allegations which do not focus on the issues of relevance. I have given some leeway to the defendant in my analysis of his material, given he is unrepresented. That said, the court cannot improve the affidavit evidence or bolster the material which has been presented by the unrepresented litigant. The material must be taken on its face. Similarly, the court cannot simply 'cherry pick' certain aspects of the affidavit material without assessing those aspects in light of the material as a whole. 168 As noted above, I have also considered whether there are broader aspects of this action which might justify a refusal of the Summary Judgment Application, and favour a grant to the defendant of leave to defend. Order 14 r 3(1) RSC permits the court to refuse such an application for a claim or part of a claim if there 'ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part'. As explained in the authorities, even though the defendant may not be able to point to a specific issue which ought to be tried, he or she may be able to satisfy the court that the circumstances ought to be investigated.83 The words in question are 'very wide', a point made by Megarry J in Miles v Bull:84 These last words seem to me to be very wide. They also seem to me to have special significance where, as here, most or all of the relevant facts are under the control of the plaintiff, and the defendant would have to seek to elicit by discovery, interrogatories and cross examination those which will aid her. If the defendant cannot point to a specific issue which ought to be tried but nevertheless satisfies the court that there are circumstances that ought to be investigated, then I think that those 83 Exchequer Australia Pty Ltd v Leopardi [2021] WASC 340 [13] - [14] (Allanson J). 84 Miles v Bull [1969] 1 QB 258, 265 (Megarry J). -- 46 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 47 concluding words are invoked. There are cases when the plaintiff ought to be put to strict proof of his claim, and exposed to the full investigation possible at a trial; and in such cases it would, in my judgment, be wrong to enter summary judgment for the plaintiff. 169 The mere fact the defendant has levelled serious allegations at the plaintiff and its personnel, as well as others, and has sought the protection of the PID Act and the related provisions in the Corporations Act, is not sufficient to invoke these 'very wide' words, in my view. It would be necessary for the defendant to demonstrate more than this. By way of example only, the defendant might seek to demonstrate that there are reasonably arguable contentions as to the conduct of the other parties, and that there are matters which require genuine investigation at a full trial, following the provision of discovery by the plaintiff, which would then permit the defendant to be in a position to defend the allegations. Further, if the defendant had arguable bases to contend that the documents relied on by the plaintiff were a sham or fabricated. There are other examples referred to in the Red Book at [14.3.3]. None of these matters exist in the present circumstances. 170 I therefore consider the plaintiff has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment in respect of the breaches of the Employment Contract it has pleaded, and the defendant should not have leave to defend these aspects of the action. I will turn now to the relief sought by the plaintiff. Disposition – whether injunctive relief is appropriate? 171 Given the conclusions I have reached above, I accept that damages would not be an adequate remedy in respect of the pleaded breaches of the Employment Contract on the part of the defendant, nor to provide protection to the plaintiff from apprehended future use and disclosure by the defendant of the plaintiff's 'Property'. 172 The past conduct of the defendant, as evidenced on the present applications, is that he has demonstrated a propensity to widely publish information concerning the plaintiff, including its 'Confidential Information', and to persist in that conduct even when admonished by a tribunal. There is a high risk the defendant will continue to persist with this conduct. 173 I also accept the plaintiff's submission in this regard that future disclosures of the plaintiff's 'Confidential Information' by the defendant would likely cause significant damage to the plaintiff. Particular -- 47 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 48 examples of the damage likely to flow from this conduct includes the potential for the plaintiff to be exposed to claims from its contract counterparties for breaches of contract (including breaches of the contractual confidentiality provisions in its contracts), as well as prejudice arising from the availability of commercially sensitive information to the competitors of the plaintiff. 174 The plaintiff submits that injunctive relief is also necessary to protect its 'Property', including the 'Confidential Information', as it cannot be sure whether the defendant has possession or control of further confidential information. I accept that risk has been demonstrated on the evidence. It is appropriate to protect the 'Confidential Information' of the plaintiff (and to preserve its confidential nature) to the extent possible through the imposition of restraints on the defendant. 175 Accordingly, I consider that injunctive relief as sought by the plaintiff is appropriate in the circumstances. In substance, that relief extends to the following matters:85 (a) delivering up to the plaintiff any hard copies of its property in the defendant's possession or control; (b) enabling a computer expert nominated by the plaintiff to examine and permanently delete any of its property from the defendant's other electronic information storage device; (c) removing or deleting any content previously published by the defendant to the LinkedIn platform which refers to, contains or is derived from the 'Property' or refers to the plaintiff or the particular supplied identified by the plaintiff; (d) verifying on affidavit that the defendant has complied with the orders, and identifying all 'Property' that he retained after his employment and whether he has provided any 'Property' (or copies of that 'Property') to any other person or third party and, if so, to whom; and (e) permanently restraining the defendant from using, disclosing, publishing any 'Confidential Information' of the plaintiff or any court documents filed in the present proceedings. 85 Chamber summons dated 23 January 2026, pars 1 to 3; SOC, prayer for relief 1 and 2. -- 48 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 49 The Second Recusal Application 176 On 5 March 2026, the court dismissed the defendant's first recusal application, for the reasons which were published on 6 March: Tronox Management Pty Ltd v Cokic.86 177 Since then, the defendant has raised further grounds in support of his contention that I should recuse myself from hearing this matter, and also that one of my court associates should be excluded from any involvement in the matter. These further challenges are detailed in the submissions filed by the defendant on 25 March 2026 entitled 'Recusal of Lundberg J' (Folio 41) and in the supplementary submissions filed by the defendant following the hearing, referred to above as DS2 (Folio 47). The defendant also sought in his submissions to further challenge the court's decision to dismiss the first recusal application, but I can put those matters to one side. 178 In summary, the defendant raises the following matters, each of which I have either rejected already, or which I now reject. 179 First, the defendant refers to my Indigenous ancestry. He notes that my mother's family are Wajarri Yamaji people,87 originating in the Murchison and Gascoyne regions of Western Australia. The submissions advanced by the defendant are vague and difficult to follow. The defendant submits that it is not uncommon for local communities to either be:88 …disgruntled by the damage to their communities by major mining companies or protective of the major mining companies for the small amounts of money that can be funnelled back to the community as a form of bribery and paying for favours for their silence and ultimate acceptance of the environmental vandalism to their sacred land. 180 The defendant then says my connection to the Wajarri Yamaji people is problematic given that the plaintiff and other mining companies 'have been using their mining waste residues for the purposes of earthworks materials', and refers to a particular company, with whom the defendant previously worked for, or together with. The defendant rather vaguely refers to this particular company as having operated in the Yamaji region of the State. 86 Tronox Management Pty Ltd v Cokic [2026] WASC 63. 87 Sometimes spelled as Wajarri Yamatji. 88 Defendant's recusal submissions [18] (Folio 41). -- 49 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 50 181 The defendant then attempts to connect my family background and the native title determination in respect of the Wajarri Yamaji people to the environmental liabilities of the plaintiff.89 In short, the defendant says my people 'were [somehow] dudded' through all of this.90 182 This is the first occasion in my judicial career that my Indigenous heritage has been deployed as a basis for my recusal. There is no basis to the defendant's contention that my background creates a reasonable apprehension of bias on my part. I rejected it at the commencement of the hearing on 30 March 2026, after briefly hearing from the defendant and counsel for the plaintiff. As I indicated at the hearing, the defendant had identified nothing which might cause me to decide this case other than on its legal and factual merits, and there was simply no rational or logical connection between my Indigenous background and, as the authorities describe it, the feared deviation from the course of deciding this case on the merits.91 183 Second, the defendant contended that one of my court associates should be recused, to the extent that is possible, or perhaps that I should recuse myself given her background. The defendant noted that the associate had previously worked at a particular law firm in Perth.92 The defendant then referred to a particular solicitor at that law firm in respect of whom the defendant had made a formal complaint to the Legal Practice Board. 184 I must say, it is very difficult to understand precisely how that would have any impact on my hearing the matter, or the court's associate being involved in the matter. No specific conduct on the part of the associate in question, or matters within her knowledge, have been identified by the defendant in support of this application. At the hearing on 30 March 2026, I indicated this point was tenuous in the extreme and concluded there was simply no basis on the materials to justify the defendant's concern. I reached the view that the concern could safely be rejected.93 185 Third, in his written submissions,94 the defendant developed a point concerning drug and alcohol testing and fitness-for-work mental health check requirements for judicial officers. Although the point was not 89 ts 72 (30 March 2026). 90 ts 72 (30 March 2026). 91 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 [6] - [8]. 92 Defendant's recusal submissions [21] - [29] (Folio 41). 93 ts 74 (30 March 2026). 94 Defendant's recusal submissions [30] - [35] (Folio 41). -- 50 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 51 developed orally by the defendant at the hearing, I addressed this issue at the outset of the hearing on 30 March 2026. I concluded the matters raised were spurious. The defendant also made gratuitous attacks in his submissions on an unnamed magistrate and made a scandalous reference to a particular lawyer in Perth who is now deceased. To the extent to which these points were pressed by the defendant in any way that was relevant to the recusal application, and it was difficult to see how they were at all connected in any rational manner, I formed the view that they could confidently be rejected. 186 Accordingly, I ordered that the defendant's second application for my recusal be dismissed and reserved the costs of the application. 187 Fourth, in his supplementary submissions dated 1 April 2026, the defendant raised a further basis for my recusal. The defendant submitted that, at the hearing on 30 March 2026, I displayed conduct which showed that I was not being impartial in presiding over the matter. The defendant submitted that suppression orders and restricted document orders were:95 …being broadly applied without any actual investigation into the Plaintiff’s claims and the transcript for hearing 30 March 2026 will reflect reasoning being the courts time and resources to investigate in detail is outweighed by the interests of justice. 188 I have addressed below the bases for the orders made on 30 March 2026. The defendant's concerns as to the breadth of the orders, even if those concerns are accepted, does not justify his conclusion that a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the substantive questions I am required to decide in the proceedings. Put simply, the orders made by the court were made on the application of the plaintiff in order to preserve the confidentiality of the plaintiff's information. The orders made by the court were appropriate in the circumstances. 189 Accordingly, in addition to dismissing the defendant's application that I should recuse myself as contained in his submissions entitled 'Recusal of Lundberg J' (Folio 41), I reject the further contentions for my recusal as contained in the defendant's supplementary submissions. 95 DS2 [20]. -- 51 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 52 The Restricted Access Application 190 By application dated 11 February 2026, the plaintiff sought orders to restrict access to the Second Williams Affidavit. The application was enlarged over time as further documents were filed by the parties in this action. The parties filed submissions on the restricted access application (Folio 25 and Folio 28). The defendant also addressed these issues in the Cokic Affidavit at [141] – [144]. The defendant appeared to oppose the restricted access application, at least in part.96 191 The plaintiff's application was determined at the hearing on 30 March 2026, having been adjourned by the orders of the court made on 5 March 2026.97 192 The application was made pursuant to O 67B r 5 RSC, which provides as follows: (1) The Court may make an order under this rule - (a) on its own initiative; or (b) on the application of any person. (2) An application for an order made under subrule (3) must do the following - (a) state the grounds for the application; (b) identify the information, record or thing to which the order should apply; (c) state the person, or class of persons, whose access to the information, record or thing should be restricted by the order; (d) state any conditions that should apply if the Court were to give access to the information, record or thing; (e) state the period for which the order should apply. (3) The Court may make an order that restricts access to information or a record or other thing if it considers - (a) that the information, record or thing is the subject of a pending claim that it is privileged or confidential; or 96 ts 82 (30 March 2026). 97 Orders made on 5 March 2026 [5]. -- 52 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 53 (b) that the information, record or thing is privileged or confidential; or (c) that in the interests of justice, access to the information, record or thing should be restricted. (4) An order made under subrule (3) must include the reasons for it and sufficient information to identify clearly - (a) the information, record or thing to which the order applies; and (b) the person, or class of persons, whose access to the information, record or thing is restricted by the order; and (c) any conditions that will apply if access to the information, record or thing were to be given by the Court; and (d) the period during which the order applies. (5) The Court may at any time, by order, amend or cancel an order made under subrule (3). (6) If an application is made for an order made under subrule (3) in respect of information or a record or other thing, access to the information, record or thing is taken to be unavailable to all but the Court and the applicant until the application is decided. 193 At the hearing, I acceded to the application, gave brief reasons indicating I would provide written reasons in due course,98 and made the following orders: 1. Pursuant to O 67B r 5(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), access to the following documents be restricted to all persons except the court, the parties to these proceedings and their legal practitioners and counsel, on the basis that each of the documents contains information which is confidential, or contains information to which access should be restricted in the interests of justice: (a) the affidavit of Christine Anne Williams affirmed on 23 January 2026, including its attachments (the Second Williams Affidavit), being Folio 19; 98 ts 83 (30 March 2026). -- 53 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 54 (b) the submissions filed by the defendant on 13 February 2026, being Folio 28; (c) the affidavit of Alexander Jordan Cokic sworn 16 March 2026 including its attachments (the Cokic Affidavit), being Folios 34, 35 and 37; (d) the submissions filed by the plaintiff on 19 March 2026, being Folio 38; (e) the submissions filed by the defendant on 25 March 2026, headed 'Application for immediate dismissal and orders as to compensation', being Folio 40; and (f) the submissions filed by the defendant on 25 March 2026, headed 'Application for recusal of Justice Michael Lundberg', being Folio 41. 2. The restrictions in order 1 above will apply until 11.59pm on the day on which the court determines and makes dispositive orders in respect of the plaintiff's application for summary judgment dated 23 January 2026. 3. Until further order, any application for access to any information or record of these proceedings pursuant to O 67B r 11, is to be referred to the managing judge and will be decided on notice to the plaintiff’s solicitors and the defendant. 4. The costs of the restricted access application be in the cause. 5. There be liberty for either party to apply on 24 hours' notice 194 My reasoning for making the above orders is as follows. 195 First, the purpose of O 67B r 5 RSC is to enable a person who wishes to restrict access to the court record to make application to that end. The court may make an order that restricts access to information, or a record, or other thing, if it considers, inter alia, that the information, record or thing is privileged or confidential, or that in the interests of justice, access to the information, record or thing should be restricted.99 196 Second, O 67B r 5 RSC does not require that an applicant for such orders demonstrate that the relevant information has commercial value. An order could extend to discussions, correspondence and consultation 99 Cockburn Cement Limited v The Minister for Environment [2019] WASC 9 (Allanson J) (Cockburn Cement). -- 54 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 55 that occurred in confidence.100 Further, the grounds in O 67B r 5(3) RSC are alternatives - if the information is confidential, the applicant does not also need to show that an order restricting access is in the interests of justice.101 197 Third, each of the documents which are the subject of the orders contain, to varying degrees, information which is confidential to the plaintiff. The submission advanced by the plaintiff in its submissions dated 11 February 2026 should be accepted. 198 Fourth, in the alternative, each of the documents which are the subject of the orders and which were filed by the defendant contain allegations of a serious nature which are not relevant to the applications before the court. It is in the interests of justice that access to these documents be restricted to persons who are the parties to the present proceedings, and not be more widely accessible. 199 Fifth, the information within these documents which attracts the operation of O 67B r 5 RSC is not readily compartmentalised in portions or sections of the documents. The information, particularly within the documents prepared by the defendant, is pervasive across those documents. It was therefore not practical to narrow down the scope of the orders to restrict access to portions of the material. The Suppression Application 200 At the hearing on 30 March 2026, senior counsel for the plaintiff sought orders to have the hearing 'in camera'.102 The prospect of that order being sought was identified in the plaintiff's submissions dated 11 February 2026 (Folio 25). 201 The order was sought given the need to discuss the evidence in the affidavits sworn by Ms Williams, it being submitted that it would be impracticable to attempt to speak in veiled or general terms, particularly in circumstances in which the defendant was unrepresented.103 Further, it was submitted that a hearing in open court would pose a significant risk that the relief sought by the plaintiff in the proceedings would be 100 Cockburn Cement [22]. 101 Cockburn Cement [18]. 102 ts 87 (30 March 2026). 103 Plaintiff's submissions dated 11 February 2026 [24]. -- 55 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 56 rendered nugatory because the information which it seeks to be kept confidential would no longer be confidential.104 202 The starting point in considering any application to restrict the presence of persons in court is to recognise the fundamental importance of the principle of open justice. It must be accepted as a matter of the common law that justice ought not be administered behind closed doors, and court proceedings must be exposed in their entirety to the cathartic glare of publicity.105 The natural and ordinary process which follows when proceedings are commenced in this court is that the course of those proceedings is a matter of public record, and interlocutory and final hearings are conducted in open court. 203 There can be exceptions from the principle of open justice, and the court has power to make an 'in camera' order, to exclude the public from proceedings.106 The circumstances in which the court will depart from the fundamental principle of the public administration of justice need to be very exceptional.107 A balancing process is called for.108 204 The circumstances of the present case justified the making of an interim suppression order to prohibit publication of the proceedings on 30 March 2026 and to restrict access to the hearing to the parties, the court staff, and to the defendant's identified support person.109 That order was appropriate given the force of the submissions made by the plaintiff, and the importance of protecting the confidential information of the plaintiff which lies at the heart of these proceedings.110 Additionally, the hearing was likely to include references to serious and untested allegations made by the defendant against a range of parties. There is a public interest in ensuring that such allegations, made about persons who are not parties to the proceedings, and which are not relevant to the determination of the proceedings, are not publicly disclosed beyond the proceedings themselves. 205 There are competing interests here – in ensuring that the proceedings before this court are ventilated in open and allowing allegations of impropriety to be exposed to scrutiny. However, I do not 104 Plaintiff's submissions dated 11 February 2026 [25]. 105 David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden's Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294, 300 (Street CJ). 106 TK v Australian Red Cross Society (1989) 1 WAR 335, 336 (Malcolm CJ); AW v Rayney [No 4] [2012] WASCA 117 [29] - [34]. 107 TK v Australian Red Cross Society (336 - 337). 108 XY v WA Country Health Service [No 2] [2016] WASC 245. 109 Orders made on 30 March 2026 (Folio 45). 110 ts 91 - 91 (30 March 2026). -- 56 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 57 assess there as being much in the way of a competing interest in relation to the public disclosure of the plaintiff's confidential information. In the present case, the competing interests carry little weight given the fanciful and speculative nature of the numerous allegations made by the defendant. There is simply an overall lack of evidentiary support for the defendant's assertions. The balancing of interests falls heavily in favour of the plaintiff's application. 206 I accordingly made an interim suppression order at the hearing on 30 March 2026. Conclusion and orders 207 For the foregoing reasons, the court will order that the summary judgment application be granted and that judgment be entered in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the contractual claims pleaded at [13] – [19] of the SOC. I will hear from the parties as to the precise form of the injunctive relief which should be granted. 208 The foregoing reasons also explain why on 30 March 2026 I dismissed the defendant's second recusal application. I will order that the defendant's further recusal applications be dismissed as well. 209 Finally, the foregoing reasons explain why I granted the plaintiff's restricted access application and the application for a suppression order. I will hear from the parties further as to the continuance of these orders. 210 I will hear from the parties as to the appropriate costs orders which should be made, consequent upon the above orders. Addendum - hearing on 29 April 2026 211 I heard from senior counsel for the plaintiff and from the defendant at the hearing on 29 April 2026. The defendant opposed several of the orders proposed by the plaintiff including the orders as to costs and as to discontinuance of the balance of the action. I gave short oral reasons at that hearing for making the final orders, including as to costs. The final orders are now set out in Attachment C to these reasons (with a redaction made to order 2(c) to mask the name of the contractual counterparty). 212 Finally, I note that following provision of these reasons to the parties, the defendant requested, in effect, that the entirety of the reasons be suppressed, alternatively that he be provided with 28 days to review -- 57 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 58 these reasons.111 As I have indicated in these reasons, there are particular matters arising in this case which have justified the making of specific suppression orders and restricted access orders, as sought by the plaintiff. There is no warrant in this case, however, for suppressing the entirety of these reasons. The bases advanced by the defendant in his email do not justify such a course, particularly having regard to the principles of open justice to which I have referred at [202] of these reasons. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. IR Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg 29 APRIL 2026 111 Email from the defendant on 29 April 2026. -- 58 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 59 ATTACHMENT A Extracts from the Employment Contract 15. Termination of Employment 15.1. If you are not on probation, the Contract of Employment may be terminated at any time by either party giving the other party four (4) weeks' written. 15.2. The Employer may elect at its sole discretion to pay you in lieu of the applicable notice period. When payment in lieu of notice is made, your employment terminates when the Employer advises you of termination. The Employer may also at it sole discretion, not require you to attend at your work location during the notice period. 15.3. The Employer has the right to dismiss you without notice for serious misconduct, 'Serious misconduct' includes but is not limited to: 15.3.1. Wilful or deliberate behaviour that is inconsistent with the continuation of employment; 15.3.2. Theft, fraud, assault or other unlawful behaviour in the course of employment; 15.3.3. Consumption or being in possession of intoxicating liquor or drugs whilst on any Tronox site or being under the influence of any intoxicating liquor or drugs whilst on any Tronox site; 15.3.4. Refusing to carry out lawful and reasonable instructions; 15.3.5. Conduct that causes imminent and /or serious risk to the health and safety of any person including a breach of the Tronox Life Rules; and 15.3.6. Conduct that may cause imminent and/or serious risk to the reputation, viability or profitability of Tronox. 15.3.7. Where you are dismissed for serious misconduct you are only entitled to payment for time worked up to your dismissal. 15.4. Upon termination you will return to the Employer any property (including but not limited to files, records, papers, correspondence, computers and telephone) in your control or possession. Final payment of monies owed to you may be delayed until the Employer is satisfied that all of Its property has been returned in a satisfactory condition (where applicable). 16. Fitness for Work [Not relevant] -- 59 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 60 17. Confidential Information 17.1 'Confidential Information' includes, but is not limited to, any information in respect of Tronox, or Tronox' business (including, but not limited to, any idea, concept, process or know how) which is not in the public domain (other than as a result of a breach of confidence) which: 17.1.1. comes to your notice in the course of your employment; or 17.1.2. is generated by you in the course of performing your duties. 18. Disclosure of Information 18.1. You are required to observe all Tronox requirements regarding security and the protection of property and equipment. 18.2. All Confidential Information which you receive, or have access to as a result of your employment, remains the property of the Employer and cannot be copied, passed, or divulged, to another person unless: 18.2.1. required by law; 18.2.2. made as part of the proper performance of your duties; or 18.2.3. expressly authorised by the Employer 18.3 You must: 18.3.1. take all reasonable and necessary precautions to maintain the secrecy of, and prevent unauthorized disclosure of or access to, all Confidential Information; 18.3.2. immediately notify the Employer of any suspected or actual unauthorized use or disclosure of Confidential Information, and 18.3.3. (without limiting any other rights of the Employer), provide any assistance reasonably required by the Employer in relation to any proceedings Tronox may take, or threaten to take, against any person in relation to any unauthorised use or disclosure of Confidential Information. 18.4. To avoid doubt, this clause 18 is not intended to limit any duty of fidelity implied into your Contract of Employment. 18.5. Your obligations under this clause 18 continue after your employment ends. 18.6. Confidentiality Agreement Prior to your commencement, you will be required to enter into a Confidentiality Agreement in relation to any technical process related to the -- 60 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 61 Employer, particularly those covering inventions and the Employer LLC Corporation pigment plant technology. 19. Intellectual Property 19.1. 'Employment Intellectual Property' means all Intellectual Property Rights in any invention, artwork, software, protocol, goods, methodology or process, information, know-how, document, material or other thing created or generated by you (whether alone or with other persons) In the course of, in connection with or arising out of your employment with the Employer, whether or not created: 19.1.1. before the Contract of Employment is signed; 19.1.2. using, to any extent, any of Tronox's property, computer systems or resources or any Confidential Information; and/or 19.1.3. outside working hours or outside the workplace. 19.2. 'Intellectual Property Rights' means all intellectual property rights (whether or not those rights are registered and whether or not they are capable of registration) including, without limitation: 19.2.1. trade marks (whether registered or common law trade marks), patents, designs, copyright, the right to have confidential information kept confidential and any corresponding property rights under the laws of any relevant jurisdiction; and 19.2.2. any application or right to apply for registration of any of those rights. 19.3. The Employer owns all Employment Intellectual Property. 19.4. In order to give effect to the ownership referred to in paragraph 19.3, you assign to the Employer all of the Employment Intellectual Property with effect from the date of its creation (including by way of assignment of future Intellectual Property Rights). 19.5. You must do all things, including execution of documents, reasonably necessary to enable the Employer to perfect, record or evidence its ownership of any Employment Intellectual Property, to obtain registration or other statutory protection of any Employment Intellectual Property, or to exercise, protect and defend its rights as owner of the Employment Intellectual Property. 19.6. You must inform the Employer of: 19.6.1. all Employment Intellectual Property; and -- 61 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 62 19.6.2. any information that you have in your possession that the Employer may reasonably require to exercise its rights as owner of any Employment Intellectual Property, promptly after the creation of the relevant Employment Intellectual Property or any later request by the Employer. 20. Moral Rights 20.1. 'Moral Rights' means the right of attribution of authorship, the right not to have authorship falsely attributed and the right of integrity of authorship, as defined in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and any equivalent or similar rights which are capable or protection in any other relevant jurisdiction. 20.2. If you have Moral Rights in any Intellectual Property, you: 20.2.1. irrevocably and unconditionally consent to any act or omission by the Employer, or any of its associated entities, or any of their successors, licensees or assignees in respect of that Intellectual Property, including acts or omissions which would otherwise infringe those Moral Rights; 20.2.2. agree that your consent is a genuine consent for the purposes of Part 9 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and has not been induced by duress or any false or misleading statement; and 20.2.3. must, on the reasonable request of the Employer, do all things, including executing any documents, reasonably requested by the Employer to enjoy the full benefit of the consent under this clause 20, including providing your written consent to any specific act or omission by the Employer, any of its associated entities or any of its successors, licensees or assignees in respect of that Intellectual Property. -- 62 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 63 ATTACHMENT B Confidential Attachment The information contained in this attachment is drawn from the affidavit evidence of Ms Williams, namely the First Williams Affidavit and the Second Williams Affidavit. The entirety of the information described in the third column of this attachment will be redacted to preserve the plaintiff's confidentiality. No. Date Description of Information or Document Court's finding as to whether information retained and/or disclosed by the defendant 1 11 April 2024 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant on both 4 November 2024 and 14 November 2024 by filing copies in the Fair Work Proceedings. -- 63 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 64 No. Date Description of Information or Document Court's finding as to whether information retained and/or disclosed by the defendant 2 22 Mar 2024 Retained by the defendant. 3 2 Apr 2024 Retained by the defendant. 4 14 Apr 2024 Retained by the defendant. -- 64 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 65 No. Date Description of Information or Document Court's finding as to whether information retained and/or disclosed by the defendant 5 16 Apr 2024 Retained by the defendant. 6 18 June 2025 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant by posting on his LinkedIn account on 18 June 2025 and by filing copies in the Fair Work Proceedings. -- 65 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 66 No. Date Description of Information or Document Court's finding as to whether information retained and/or disclosed by the defendant 7 6 Aug 2025 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant by posting on his LinkedIn account on 6 August 2025. 8 7 Oct 2025 22 Dec 2025 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant by posting on his LinkedIn account on 7 October 2025 and 22 December 2025. -- 66 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 67 No. Date Description of Information or Document Court's finding as to whether information retained and/or disclosed by the defendant 9 21 Dec 2025 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant by posting on his LinkedIn account on 21 December 2025. 10 22 Dec 2025 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant by posting on his LinkedIn account on 22 December 2025. -- 67 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 68 No. Date Description of Information or Document Court's finding as to whether information retained and/or disclosed by the defendant 11 22 Dec 2025 Retained by the defendant. Disclosed by the defendant by posting on his LinkedIn account on 22 December 2025. -- 68 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 69 ATTACHMENT C Orders made on 29 April 2026 -- 69 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 70 -- 70 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 71 -- 71 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 72 -- 72 of 73 -- [2026] WASC 154 Page 73 -- 73 of 73 --