JONES -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 148

[2026] WASC 148 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL CITATION : JONES -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 148 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 23 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 23 APRIL 2026 FILE NO/S : SJA 1056 of 2025 BETWEEN : WILLIAM JONES Appellant AND WA POLICE Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: For File No : SJA 1056 of 2025 Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE B TYERS File Number : PE 15762/2025 - PE 15765/2025 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against convictions and sentence - Offences under the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) and Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) - Offences of driving a motor vehicle without authorisation, failure to comply with a requirement to provide a preliminary breath sample, and failing -- 1 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 Page 2 to provide personal details when directed - Grounds of challenge irrational, fanciful and absurd - Use of 'pseudo-law' concepts - Turns on own facts Criminal law - Sentencing - Obligation to enquire as to means of offender to pay a fine - Scope of s 53(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) Legislation: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 39, s 40 Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA), s 32 Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA), reg 47, reg 48 Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 10, s 49, s 67A Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 53 Result: The appellant's applications to adduce additional evidence allowed only to the extent of [20], [21] and [22] of, and Exhibits 2 and 5 to, the appellant's affidavit sworn 17 March 2026, and are otherwise dismissed. Leave to appeal on all grounds refused and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to be assessed. Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In Person Respondent : C Madondo Solicitors: Appellant : In Person Respondent : State Solicitor's Office Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Bank of Queensland v Fahy [2025] WASC 180 Dragon v WA Police [2024] WASC 147 Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187 Michelmore v Brown [No 5] [2025] WASC 152 -- 2 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 Page 3 Reynolds v Nicholson [2026] WASC 15 Reynolds v WA Police [2025] WASC 104 -- 3 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 Page 4 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 Factual background..................................................................................................................... 5 The appeal to this court .............................................................................................................. 6 The challenge to the convictions recorded by the Magistrate .................................................... 7 The challenge to the sentences imposed by the Magistrate ...................................................... 10 Conclusion and orders .............................................................................................................. 14 -- 4 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 5 LUNDBERG J: Introduction 1 The appellant has appealed to this court against the convictions recorded by the Magistrate following a trial, and against the sentences imposed by that Magistrate. The appeal is brought pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CAA).1 2 I heard the appeal this morning. The appellant was unrepresented on appeal, and had similarly been unrepresented before the Magistrate. At the conclusion of the appeal, I made the orders set out at [48] below, in effect refusing leave to appeal on all grounds and dismissing the appeal. I indicated I would publish my reasons in due course. These are my reasons. Factual background 3 During the late morning of 5 March 2025, the appellant was observed by police officers riding a Yamaha motorcycle in Osborne Park. The appellant was stopped and detained by the officers, it having been ascertained he was not authorised to drive that class of motor vehicle. 4 The appellant held a C class drivers licence and restricted motorcycle learner's permit (the latter being referred to as an 'RE licence'). As he held a learner's permit, the appellant was required to display 'L plates' and to be accompanied by an instructor. He was neither displaying 'L plates', nor was he accompanied by an instructor at the time he was stopped. 5 The subsequent interchanges between the appellant and the officers were captured on a body-worn camera. The footage shows the appellant being asked for his personal details and being asked to provide a preliminary breath sample. The appellant declined both and resorted to what is often described as 'pseudo-law' responses. The appellant was charged with four offences, one of which was later discontinued. 6 The appellant pleaded not guilty and the charges proceeded to a trial before a Magistrate on 26 June 2025. The appellant was unrepresented at the trial. The hearing was relatively short, with the appellant maintaining his 'pseudo-law' attitude during the trial. The 1 Notice of appeal dated 21 July 2025. -- 5 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 6 arresting officer gave evidence and there was no cross-examination. The Magistrate delivered ex tempore reasons in which he found two of the charges proven to the criminal standard, and acquitted the appellant on the remaining charge. 7 The first charge was driving a motor vehicle on a road without authorisation contrary to s 49(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RTA). The Magistrate found the offence to be established and recorded a conviction. The appellant was fined $300 for this offence and ordered to pay costs in the sum of $300. The Magistrate approached the matter on the basis this was a subsequent offence. Indeed, the appellant had numerous prior convictions for the same offence. 8 The second charge was failing to comply with a requirement to provide a preliminary breath sample contrary to s 67A(1) of the RTA. The Magistrate found the offence to be established and recorded a conviction. The appellant was fined $1,300 in respect of this offence, and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for six months, to be reduced by any period during which the appellant was disqualified by any roadside disqualification notice for the offence. 9 The offence under s 67A(1) was deemed to be a subsequent offence under s 67A(3)(b), by operation of s 67A(4) of the RTA. That is because the appellant had previous convictions of the kind required to be treated as prior offences for this purpose. Specifically, he had four prior convictions for offences under s 64(1) of the RTA, between 2005 and 2008, being offences of driving a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of or above 0.08%. 10 Finally, the appellant was charged with failing to provide personal details when directed, contrary to the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) (the Authorisation Act). The Magistrate acquitted the appellant on this charge. The appeal to this court 11 The appellant's grounds of appeal are widely drafted and mostly nonsensical. The stated grounds are error of both law and fact, miscarriage of justice, acted without jurisdiction, procedural matter, no evidence and/or insufficient evidence, acting oppressively and interested, breach of the peace, and trespass, battery, bondage, slavery. -- 6 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 7 12 It appears from the notice of appeal that the appellant wishes to challenge the convictions and the sentences imposed, as well as the discontinuance of one charge and the acquittal on the charge under the Authorisation Act. I will shortly deal with the challenge to the convictions and the sentences, but there are some matters which I should address in advance. 13 The first matter concerns the challenges against the charge which was discontinued and the charge on which the appellant was acquitted. These matters can be readily addressed. As the respondent correctly submits, a decision to discontinue a charge is not an appealable decision and, further, as there is no appeal by the respondent against the acquittal, the circumstances of that matter are irrelevant to the determination of this appeal. 14 The second matter concerns the appellant's applications to adduce additional evidence on the appeal.2 The court has power to admit further evidence.3 The power is wide. The court must otherwise decide an appeal on the evidence that was before the lower court.4 15 The respondent opposes the applications to adduce additional evidence, other than to accept that three specific documents may be received as evidence on appeal.5 The other material is irrelevant, inadmissible, does not bear on the grounds of challenge, and consists largely of nonsensical references to 'pseudo-law' concepts. I will address the three specific documents when dealing with the appeal against sentence. The challenge to the convictions recorded by the Magistrate 16 Turning then to the appeal against the two convictions recorded by the Magistrate, I have reviewed each of the documents filed by the appellant in apparent support of those grounds. The appellant has filed several documents in the period since this appeal was initiated in July 2025. Not one of those documents contains a sensible basis to challenge the convictions recorded at first instance, much less a legitimate basis to seek leave to appeal against those decisions. 17 As the respondent correctly submits, the appellant's submissions are 'irrational, fanciful and/or absurd' and simply fail to identify any 2 Applications to adduce additional evidence dated 11 September 2025 and 17 March 2026. 3 CAA, s 40(1)(e). 4 CAA, s 39. 5 RS [63]. -- 7 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 8 aspect of the Magistrate's findings or reasoning that is said to engage the stated grounds of appeal.6 18 The evidence led at the trial, which was summarised by the Magistrate in his reasons, provided ample support for the convictions which were recorded. I refer here to the evidence of Senior Constable Makin and the body-worn camera footage.7 As I have noted above, the appellant did not give evidence at trial.8 Further, the appellant did not challenge any evidence presented by the prosecution and he did not raise a positive defence to the charges against him. Rather, the appellant asserted that he held an 'international licence', although that assertion was unsupported by evidence and would not have been a defence at law in any event. 19 As to the charge under s 49(1)(a) of the RTA, the evidence demonstrated the appellant was driving other than in accordance with the permit he was holding.9 The Magistrate found accordingly. The Magistrate further found the officer had lawful authority to require a preliminary breath test from the appellant, and it is plain the appellant made no effort and indeed refused to provide a sample. The appellant had no lawful defence to the charge and, in particular, there was no basis for a 'substantial reason' defence under s 67A(5) of the RTA.10 20 In my view, no error of law or fact has been demonstrated by the appellant which could justify setting aside the convictions. I recognise the appellant is unrepresented and so some leeway must be afforded to him in considering his submissions and his challenge to the convictions. Doing the best one can to sift through the material filed by the appellant, I do not consider there has been any demonstrated miscarriage of justice or any proper basis to sustain an assertion that the convictions were unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence. Each element of the two charges was demonstrated by the uncontradicted evidence adduced at trial, and the Magistrate found accordingly.11 6 RS [12]. 7 ts 19 - 26 (26 June 2025). 8 ts 27 (26 June 2025). 9 I refer to the further statutory provisions which underpin the charge, being s 10 of the RTA and reg 47(3)(a) and reg 48 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA), referred to at RS [17] - [23]. 10 Section 67A(5) of the RTA provides that: 'It is a defence to a prosecution for an offence against this section if the accused satisfies the court that there was some substantial reason for the accused’s failure to comply other than a desire to avoid providing information that might be used as evidence'. 11 ts 34 - 37 (26 June 2025). -- 8 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 9 21 It is worthy of note that the Magistrate displayed a high degree of patience with the appellant at trial, notwithstanding the appellant's repeated insistence that the court had no jurisdiction and that he did not consent to the proceedings. Indeed, the Magistrate allowed a short adjournment of the proceedings before the trial commenced, to afford the appellant an opportunity to reflect on his recalcitrant attitude. 22 Following that adjournment, and before the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate made the following statement:12 HIS HONOUR: All right. So, Mr Jones, one of the reasons I just adjourned is to give you an opportunity to digest what I've told you because my worry is that, potentially, at least, you may not have a defence other than to suggest that the court doesn't have jurisdiction, and I've advised you that that won't work, that that's not going to result in an acquittal, and you don't appear to want to be part of this process, so that's why I adjourned, to let you have a think about that. So what are you wanting to do? As I have said, these charges need to be resolved one way or another. They don't just go away. 23 The appellant replied as follows:13 ACCUSED: With respect, sir, you can do as you please, but I have no interest in these proceedings whatsoever. Any judgments that are made where I have not consented and have not consented to the entire procedure, I guess the prosecutor is liable for those charges, for whatever they are. I am not the trustee. I'm here as beneficiary and grantor of the estate I don't have the liability, so you can do whatever you like. Are we done, sir? 24 The Magistrate also provided an explanation, in plain language, of the nature and course of the proceedings before the prosecutor made his opening statement.14 The appellant nonetheless maintained a disrespectful and dismissive approach throughout the proceedings below, and on this appeal. 25 The appellant is an adherent of what is commonly described as 'pseudo-law' and the so-called 'strawman theory'. This particular theory posits a supposed duality between a person's physical and non-physical legal identity and asserts that governmental authority over the physical person exists only where a 'contract' is said to link the two.15 12 ts 12 (26 June 2025). 13 ts 12 (26 June 2025). 14 ts 13 - 16 (26 June 2025). 15 RS [29]. -- 9 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 10 26 As explained by Vandongen J in Kelly v Fiander,16 such theories have been repeatedly rejected by Australian courts. Regrettably, by responding to civil or criminal legal claims using this 'pseudo-law' approach, litigants tend to obscure rather than elucidate their position. 27 The appellant's continued use of 'pseudo-law' in his affidavit material and his submissions on appeal to this court is more than unhelpful. It should not need to be said that 'pseudo-law' is not law. 28 However, a restatement of that basal proposition is more than warranted in the present case. The appellant has regurgitated, in his sworn affidavit and his filed submissions, copious references to matters he has presumably obtained from a source or sources on the internet. I do not propose to recount in these reasons the material relied upon by the appellant because it is, objectively, nonsense. I will disregard all of this material in determining the appeal. 29 It should be reiterated that the enthusiastic approach adopted by 'pseudo-law' adherents and 'sovereign citizens', in the face of repeated judicial exhortations to abandon this conduct,17 is a matter of considerable seriousness. It is wasteful of the already scarce court and public resources, adds to the costs of litigation, drains police resources, and contributes to the erosion of confidence in courts and the administration of justice generally. 30 Accordingly, leave to appeal against the convictions recorded by the Magistrate must be refused. The challenge to the sentences imposed by the Magistrate 31 The transcript of the proceedings indicates that the Magistrate enquired of the appellant, on two occasions during the sentencing process, whether he wished to say anything about his 'personal circumstances' or 'personal background'.18 32 The appellant's response to both enquiries was nonsensical. Instead, the appellant maintained that he had done 'no wrong', rejected the jurisdiction of the court, and made reference to irrelevant statutory provisions. The appellant thus provided the Magistrate with no meaningful statement in mitigation. 16 Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187 [10] - [13]. 17 See, for example, Reynolds v Nicholson [2026] WASC 15; Bank of Queensland v Fahy [2025] WASC 180; Michelmore v Brown [No 5] [2025] WASC 152; and Reynolds v WA Police [2025] WASC 104. 18 ts 39 (26 June 2025). -- 10 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 11 33 The Magistrate proceeded to fine the appellant $300 for the breach of s 49(1) of the RTA, which was 50% of the maximum fine for a subsequent offence (being $600 or 12 penalty units). The appellant had 10 prior convictions for offences under that provision, committed between 2005 and 2016. 34 The Magistrate then fined the appellant $1,300 for the breach of s 67A(4) of the RTA, coupled with the mandatory disqualification of six months. The available financial penalty was a fine between $900 and $2,100 (that is, between 18 and 42 penalty units). So, the fine imposed by the Magistrate was towards the lower end of the available range. 35 The appellant's notice of appeal does not identify the nature of the challenge to the sentences imposed by the Magistrate. I have treated the challenge as being, in effect, that the fines were manifestly excessive. I consider the appellant's broad challenge to the sentences imposed are simply without merit. The fines imposed by the Magistrate cannot be said to be manifestly excessive when the circumstances of the commission of the offences, the appellant's attitude to the proceedings, and the appellant's prior record are considered. There is one point arising from the respondent's submissions on which I should comment, concerning s 53(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act). 36 The respondent appeared to concede in his submissions that the Magistrate did not expressly enquire as to the factors identified in s 53(1) before imposing the fines, although it was not a full-throated concession by any means. 37 Section 53 provides: 53. Considerations when imposing fine (1) Subject to Division 1 of Part 2, if a court decides to fine an offender then, in deciding the amount of the fine the court must, as far as is practicable, take into account — (a) the means of the offender; and (b) the extent to which payment of the fine will burden the offender. (2) A court may fine an offender even though it has been unable to find out about the matters in subsection (1). -- 11 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 12 (3) A court must not fine an offender if satisfied that after paying compensation to the victim in accordance with a compensation order under Part 16, the offender will be unable to pay the fine within a reasonable time. 38 Counsel for the respondent has properly drawn the court's attention to the comprehensive analysis of the above provision which was undertaken by Forrester J in Dragon v WA Police.19 In that matter, while not seeking to define the limits of the phrase 'as far as is practicable', her Honour held that:20 However, where no such information is proffered, whether by counsel or a self-represented litigant, in my view a magistrate presiding over a sentencing proceeding who decides that a fine is the appropriate disposition is obliged to enquire, as far as is practicable, as to the factors set out in s 53(1) and to take them into account before setting the amount of the fine. 39 In Dragon v WA Police, the Magistrate was found on appeal to have failed to enquire, as far as was practicable, as to the means of the offender and the extent to which payment of the fine would burden him.21 The offender in that matter was represented by counsel at first instance. Nonetheless, the court found on appeal that the failure on the part of the Magistrate to make any relevant enquiries amounted to an error. 40 The present case is quite different, in my view, and Dragon v WA Police may safely be distinguished on the facts. 41 As I have noted above, the Magistrate in the present matter afforded the appellant two opportunities during the sentencing process to proffer relevant information. I do not accept, in those circumstances, that the Magistrate failed to make the appropriate enquiries as required by s 53 of the Sentencing Act. In particular: (a) where the offender is displaying a blatantly dismissive attitude to the proceedings; (b) where the offender considers that his consent is required for the court to exercise criminal jurisdiction; and 19 Dragon v WA Police [2024] WASC 147. 20 Dragon v WA Police [90]. 21 Dragon v WA Police [91]. -- 12 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 13 (c) where the offender fails to meaningfully engage with the presiding judicial officer in any respect having been given the opportunity to do so, little more can be expected from the sentencing court than was undertaken in this case. 42 The foregoing matters are all relevant to an analysis as to whether a sentencing court has, as far as is practicable, taken into account the factors in s 53(1) before imposing a fine. 43 Accordingly, in my view, it cannot be said that the Magistrate failed to take into account, as far as was practicable, a mandatory sentencing consideration under s 53 of the Sentencing Act. Having afforded the appellant the opportunity to address the court and been unable to find out about the matters identified in s 53(1) of the Sentencing Act, the Magistrate was entitled to proceed to impose fines, as is expressly contemplated by s 53(2). 44 For its part, given the apparent concession to which I have referred, the respondent invited the appellant to file an application to adduce further evidence addressing his financial position. The appellant filed an application on 17 March 2026 in response. The supporting affidavit annexes several documents, but there are three in particular, being the documents to which I have earlier referred, in respect of which I should make some comment. The documents are:22 (a) a resignation letter dated 30 May 2025; (b) an amended property settlement statement dated 17 November 2025 in the amount of $10,000; and (c) two bank receipts totalling $6,297.22. 45 The material was not well explained in the supporting affidavit. I accordingly invited the appellant to provide a further explanation during the appeal. That explanation was not particularly illuminating. I can see that the appellant had resigned from his employment prior to the date on which he was sentenced, and was therefore I assume unemployed, and subsequent to the sentencing he appears to have sold a property in a regional location for a modest sum. However, little more can be gleaned from the appellant's affidavit and his explanation at the hearing, as to his financial position. 22 Appellant's affidavit sworn 17 March 2026 [20] - [22] and Exhibits 2 and 5. -- 13 of 14 -- [2026] WASC 148 LUNDBERG J Page 14 46 Even if I accepted that the Magistrate erred in failing to make proper enquiries for the purposes of s 53(1) of the Sentencing Act, and I do not accept that, in my view the additional material adduced by the appellant would not provide a basis to conclude that the fines imposed by the Magistrate represented an unreasonable burden on the appellant such that they could be described as disproportionate to the seriousness of the offences. 47 On my assessment, no error has been demonstrated in respect of the sentencing process at first instance, whether in respect of s 53(1) of the Sentencing Act or otherwise. Further, neither of the sentences has been demonstrated to be unreasonable or plainly unjust, in my view, even if the additional material to which I have referred is considered. Conclusion and orders 48 At the conclusion of the hearing I accordingly made the following orders: 1. The appellant's application for leave to adduce additional evidence be allowed only to the extent of pars 20, 21 and 22 of, and Exhibits 2 and 5 to, the affidavit sworn by the appellant on 17 March 2026, and the applications to adduce additional evidence otherwise be dismissed. 2. Leave to appeal in respect of all grounds of appeal be refused. 3. The appeal be dismissed. 4. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to be assessed. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. IR Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg 23 APRIL 2026 -- 14 of 14 --