CARDEN -v- CITY OF WANNEROO [2026] WASCA 56

[2026] WASCA 56 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : CARDEN -v- CITY OF WANNEROO [2026] WASCA 56 CORAM : THOMSON P VAUGHAN JA ARCHER JA HEARD : 15 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 15 APRIL 2026 PUBLISHED : 24 APRIL 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 79 of 2025 BETWEEN : CILLA LOUISE CARDEN Appellant AND CITY OF WANNEROO Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : COBBY J File Number : SJA 1019 of 2024 -- 1 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 Page 2 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against decision of a single judge, dismissing appeal from conviction in Magistrates Court - Appellant convicted in her absence under s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) - Appellant chose not to attend - Contents of documents misrepresented - Irrelevant allegations - No error by single judge Legislation: Nil Result: Application for an extension of time within which to appeal refused Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In Person Respondent : T L Beckett Solicitors: Appellant : In Person Respondent : McLeods Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Hunter v City of Joondalup [2015] WASC 444; (2015) 257 A Crim R 299 Mocilac v City of Fremantle [2014] WASC 56; (2014) 199 LGERA 405 -- 2 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 3 REASONS OF THE COURT: Overview 1 In 2021, the appellant was charged with an offence against the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA). She was notified that the Magistrates Court would hear the charge on 5 November 2021. The appellant chose not to attend the hearing, later saying that she did not attend because it was a 'vexatious, specious, ridiculous claim', and because she did not have enough time and thought it was a joke.1 2 On the hearing date, the appellant was convicted in her absence, under s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). She was fined $2,500 and ordered to pay costs of $1,409.70. 3 Well over two years later, on 2 February 2024, the appellant filed an application to set aside the conviction under s 71(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. On 1 March 2024, a different magistrate dismissed that application. 4 On 26 March 2024, the appellant sought leave to appeal against the decision to refuse to set aside the conviction. The learned primary judge, Cobby J, correctly observed that an appeal does not lie from such a decision. However, as the appellant was (and is) unrepresented, his Honour treated her application as an application for leave to appeal against the conviction (and an application for an extension of time within which to appeal). His Honour concluded that there was no merit in any of the appellant's grounds of appeal, and therefore refused to extend the time within which to appeal. 5 On 1 July 2025, the appellant sought leave to appeal against Cobby J's decision, and an extension of time within which to appeal. 6 The appeal was listed on 15 April 2026 to consider the application for leave to appeal. After considering the appellant's case, and hearing the parties' oral submissions, we were satisfied that there was no merit in any of the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal. Accordingly, we made orders refusing leave to appeal, refusing to extend the time within which to appeal, and dismissing the appeal. We said that we would provide written reasons for those orders as soon as practicable. These are our reasons for the court's orders made 15 April 2026. 1 Transcript, City of Wanneroo v Carden, Magistrates Court, 1 March 2024, 6, 21. -- 3 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 4 The conviction 7 The appellant was convicted of failing to comply with a direction given under s 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act to remove a screen on her property within the time specified, contrary to s 214(7) of the Act. 8 Under s 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, if the Magistrates Court is satisfied that the accused has been served under Part 3 of the Act2 with the prosecution notice containing the charge and a court hearing notice, or an approved notice, notifying the accused of that date, the court may hear and determine a charge in the accused's absence or adjourn the charge. By s 55(1), s 55 applies if the prosecutor appears and the accused does not and the accused has not pleaded guilty to the charge. 9 The appellant does not contend that the magistrate did not have the power to convict her in her absence, but submits that the magistrate should not have convicted her and should have instead adjourned the hearing. 10 Subsection 55(4) provides: (4) If under subsection (2) or section 51(8)(a) the court decides to hear and determine the charge in the accused's absence and the prosecution notice is signed by a person who in the notice purports to be a person acting under section 20(3),3 the court - (a) must presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary - (i) that the prosecution notice was signed by a person who was acting under section 20(3); and (ii) that the person had the authority to sign the prosecution notice; and 2 Which deals with prosecutions in courts of summary jurisdiction. 3 Section 20(3) provides that a prosecution may only be commenced by, among others, an authorised person in relation to the offence. As will be seen, there is no merit in the appellant's contentions as to the validity of the prosecution notice. -- 4 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 5 (b) may take as proved any allegation in the prosecution notice containing the charge that was served on the accused. (emphasis added) 11 The prosecution notice relevantly stated: [Between] 1 May 2021 and 1 September 2021, [the appellant] [f]ailed to comply with a direction given to her under Section 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 within the time specified in the direction, contrary to Section 214(7) of the Planning and Development Act 2005. 12 Therefore, the magistrate was entitled to take as proved that the appellant failed to comply with a direction given to her under s 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act within the time specified in the direction, contrary to s 214(7) of the Act. 13 Subsection 55(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act relevantly4 provides: (5) If under subsection (4) the court convicts the accused - (a) the prosecutor must state aloud to the court the material facts of the charge; and … (c) in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court must take as proved any facts so stated. (emphasis added) 14 The prosecutor stated the following facts to the court (emphasis added):5 BECKETT, MR: … The facts are as follows: the accused is an owner of the property at [appellant's property address], Girrawheen. The property is located in a residential area. On 26 March 2019, the city began to receive complaints in relation to the erection of unauthorised screening at the property. On 29 March 2019, city officers conducted a site inspection of the property and observed screening adjacent to the 4 Section 55(5)(b), which provides that s 129(4) applies, is irrelevant. Section 129(4) provides that, if the accused has been served with a written statement of the material facts, the facts stated aloud must be those in the written statement that was last served. There was no suggestion that the appellant had been served with a written statement of material facts. 5 Transcript, City of Wanneroo v Carden, Magistrates Court, 5 November 2021, 2 - 3. -- 5 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 6 neighbouring lot at [neighbouring property address]. The screening constitutes development under the city's district planning scheme number 2. The screening has been erected without the city's requisite planning approval. Since this time, the city has made repeated attempts to resolve the issue directly with the accused without formal proceedings. On 12 March 2020, the city sent a letter to the accused requiring her to cease the unauthorised development at the property or to obtain retrospective planning approval within 28 days. The letter advised that a failure to do so may result in a direction notice or formal proceedings. The accused emailed the city on 31 March 2020 asking for the city to review the requirement for removal of the screening or retrospective approval. The accused claimed that she had a verbal agreement with the neighbours at the adjacent property to keep the screening. On 22 April 2020, the city wrote to the accused again as the property had not been brought into compliance. The letter advised the accused of her requirement to cease the unauthorised development at the property or to obtain retrospective planning approval. The letter required compliance by the accused within 14 days being 6 May 2020. Despite these attempts, the city failed to bring the property into compliance. The city then served a formal direction on 19 May 2020 requiring the accused to remove the screening by 19 July 2020. The time for compliance was extended by the city due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since that time, despite repeated attempts by the city to obtain compliance, the screening remains in place. Your Honour, I've got photographs of the screening - - - HIS HONOUR: Yes. BECKETT, MR: - - - at the property. It's fair to say the city accepts this is not high-end offending in terms of the scale or the seriousness of planning offences. That's the screening that's described. HIS HONOUR: This bit over here? BECKETT, MR: That's the bit. Yes, your Honour. So the issue really is the fact that it has been there for several years now, despite complaints, despite formal directions and despite many warnings and extensions of time for compliance. (emphasis added) The grounds of appeal 15 Many of the grounds of appeal do not allege errors by the learned primary judge. However, as the appellant is unrepresented, we will -- 6 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 7 assume, favourably to the appellant, that whenever a ground does not allege an error of the primary judge, the ground intends to allege that the primary judge erred in failing to find the alleged error. 16 Further, as there is some overlap in the grounds of appeal and the particulars to those grounds, it is convenient to deal with some of the grounds by topic, rather than by number. Was proof required of a valid direction? (part of ground 1) 17 The appellant asserts that the prosecution had failed to prove there was a direction to remove the screen (see ground 1 particular 1, on which particular 2 depends). 18 This assertion is misconceived. The appellant was convicted under s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act. There did not need to be proof of a valid direction. The magistrate was required to accept, as was said in the statement of facts reproduced at [14] above, that '[t]he city then served a formal direction on 19 May 2020 requiring the accused to remove the screening by 19 July 2020. The time for compliance was extended by the city due to the COVID-19 pandemic'. Also, in convicting the appellant, the magistrate was entitled to accept, and clearly did accept, the allegation in the prosecution notice that the appellant had failed to comply with the direction within the time specified, contrary to s 214(7) of the Planning and Development Act. 19 There is no merit in this allegation. Was the prosecution time-barred by the Building Act 2011 (WA)? (part of ground 3) 20 The appellant contends that the prosecution was time-barred under the Building Act 2011 (WA) (ground 3 and particular 3.1). The appellant was not convicted of a charge under the Building Act. 21 There is no merit in this allegation. Was the prosecution time-barred by the Criminal Procedure Act? (part of ground 3) 22 The appellant also contends that the prosecution was time-barred under the Criminal Procedure Act (ground 3 and particulars 3.2 - 3.4). -- 7 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 8 23 The appellant contends that the 12-month limitation period under the Criminal Procedure Act 'ran from the Respondent's formal allegation of the offence in March 2019 (or, at the latest, March 2011)'. 24 It did not. The offence was failing to comply with the direction. As noted by the learned primary judge, the offence was a continuing offence.6 25 The appellant relies on Mocilac v City of Fremantle.7 That case is not a limitation case, and is not relevant. 26 There is no merit in this allegation. Was there an abuse of process? (ground 2) 27 By ground 2, the appellant alleges: UNREASONABLE VERDICT AND AN ABUSE OF PROCESS The conviction constitutes an abuse of the court's process and is unreasonable[.] The prosecution was initiated in bad faith on a vexatious basis, pursued despite the Respondent's knowledge of its legal impossibility, and corrupted by reliance on fabricated evidence, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair[.] Nature of Error: Error of law; Abuse of Process Relevant Paragraphs of Primary Decision: [l], [4], [27] - [32], [35], [60], and throughout[.] Basis for Miscarriage of Justice: The Learned Primary Judge failed to recognise or remedy a sustained abuse of process that compromised the trial's fundamental fairness, resulting in an unreasonable conviction and a miscarriage of justice[.] Particulars, 1. The prosecution reactivated a formally closed complaint (29 May 2019) (Part 1.8 Ex 1) for an improper purpose, following a malicious neighbour dispute 2. The Respondent prosecuted while possessing internal legal advice stating retrospective approval 'cannot be pursued' (Part 1.8 Ex 2), demonstrating a conscious disregard for the legal untenability of its case 6 See s 71 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). And see Hunter v City of Joondalup [2015] WASC 444; (2015) 257 A Crim R 299, which discusses similar issues in the context of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA). 7 Mocilac v City of Fremantle [2014] WASC 56; (2014) 199 LGERA 405. -- 8 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 9 3. The Respondent's case relied on a fabricated 'apply for retrospective approval' and 'direction to remove,' which exists only in an altered version of a 12 March 2020 email (Part 1.8 Ex 11 ), not in the original communication (Part 2.5 Anx 15) 4. The Learned Primary Judge failed to engage with exculpatory evidence proving bad faith, including an admission the screen was 'exempt' (Part 1.8 Ex 7), and relied on unproven assertions 28 There is no merit in this ground. 29 First, there is no evidence that the City had an improper purpose. 30 Second, as to particular 2.1, the appellant submitted that '[t]he Respondent's officer formally closed the complaint regarding the screen on 29 May 2019 (Part 1.8, Exhibit 1)'. This misrepresents the email of 29 May 2019.8 The complaint that was closed by the email of 29 May 2019 was a complaint by the appellant about the City's handling of the matter. In that same email, the City told her 'However Compliance will need to continue to review this matter to ensure that the screening complies with all legislation and local laws'. 31 Third, as to particular 2.2, it is irrelevant that the City did not have the power to require her to seek retrospective approval. The appellant was not prosecuted for failing to seek retrospective approval. 32 Fourth, as to particular 2.3, the respondent's case did not rely on any direction in March 2020. The charge was that the appellant had failed to comply with a direction issued on 19 May 2020. 33 Fifth, the appellant's assertion in particular 2.4 that the respondent had admitted the screen was 'exempt' has no merit, as explained in the next section. 34 Sixth, in oral submissions, the appellant referred to other documents, mis-stating their contents. 35 The appellant referred to an email dated 10 March 2020, which was exhibit 2 in the primary proceedings. The appellant referred to the first paragraph of that email, in which it was said 'Based on the legal advice we recently received, we will not be able to pursue a retrospective building approval for the screening as it appears to have been there since before 2012.' The appellant asserted that this proved 8 The email is described in the appellant's case, in 'Part 1.8 Exhibit Index List' as 'Exhibit 1: Email from City's Danielle Hewett to Appellant (29 May 2019)'. -- 9 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 10 that the screen was exempt from the need to get approval. The email continued: I believe that planning approval would still be required as there is no limitation to how long it has been there. On this basis I think that we will need to contact Cilla Carden to advise that we have concluded our investigation into retrospective DA [development approval] & BA [building approval] requirements and that a DA will still need to be submitted. 36 The appellant contended that in this paragraph the writer was expressing an opinion that was contrary to the legal advice. 37 Plainly, and contrary to the appellant's contention, the email does not say that the screen is exempt from all approval, and nor is the writer seeming to express an opinion that was contrary to the legal advice. In this email, and in others, the City correctly distinguishes between development approval and building approval. 38 The appellant also referred to an email dated 2 April 2020, which was exhibit 1 in the primary proceedings. The appellant asserted that, in the last paragraphs of that email, the writer had converted the City's allegation from a complaint about a screen to a complaint about a wall. In the email, the writer said that 'neighbour agreements only apply to dividing fences. Given that this is a separate screen fence/wall any such agreement does not matter'. Later in the email, the writer refers to 'other privacy screens in the area', and concludes with 'In summary, the City has previously considered your argument about the screen wall and explored alternative avenues. Unfortunately we are now at a point where you will need to respond to the letter that Di Andrew has issued you and submit an application or remove the screening'. Alleged admissions by the respondent (grounds 3 and 5) 39 The appellant asserts that the respondent made various admissions (ground 3 and ground 5). 40 First, the appellant contends that '[t]he Respondent's counsel admitted the direction was to "cease development or obtain retrospective approval" (Part 2.1, Transcripts, pg 2 pr 8)'. The prosecutor did not say that. On that page,9 the prosecutor said it was a direction to remove the screening. In any event, what matters is what 9 In the appellant's case, in 'Part 1.7 Draft Appeal Book Index', 'Part 2.1' is described as the Magistrates Court transcript of 5 November 2021. -- 10 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 11 the direction required the appellant to do, not how it was characterised by the prosecutor. 41 Second, the appellant submitted that the learned primary judge erroneously found that there was no admissible evidence that the respondent had informed the appellant that approval was not required. The appellant submitted that this finding was 'directly contradicted by the Piggott letter (Part 1.8 Ex 7), adduced in this appeal, which is a direct admission from the prosecuting officer that the "boundary screen doesn't require retrospective approval"' (original emphasis). 42 The document the appellant calls 'the Piggott letter (Part 1.8 Ex 7)' is a letter dated 30 October 2020.10 The letter does not say that the "boundary screen doesn't require retrospective approval". In the third paragraph, the letter says: Your boundary screening constitutes development under the City's District Planning Scheme No 2 (DPS2) and it requires retrospective planning approval should you wish to retain it. The City does not require the submission of a retrospective building application as the boundary screening was constructed prior to the inception of the Building Act in April 2012. 43 Third, the appellant alleges that the primary judge 'failed to engage with the Respondent's own admission that the "boundary screen is exempt" (Part 1.8 Ex 3), which directly contradicted the lawfulness of the prosecution's direction (Part 2.1 Transcripts p 1 pr 8).'11 44 The document the appellant calls 'Part 1.8 Ex 3' is an email dated 12 March 2020.12 This does not contain a statement that the 'boundary screen is exempt'. It said the appellant would require retrospective approval if she wanted to retain it. 45 In oral submissions about this document, the appellant referred to a statement in the email in which it was said 'In December 2019 the City received legal advice which clarified that retrospective building application for unauthorised structures built before April 2012 (the inception of the Building Act) was optional'. The appellant asserted 10 This is described in the appellant's case, in 'Part 1.8 Exhibit Index List' as 'Exhibit 7: Letter from Matthew Piggott to Appellant (30 Oct 2020).' And see the Affidavit of Cilla Louise Carden dated 8 December 2025, 8 (Annexure C - Exhibit CLC-7). 11 This is described in the appellant's case, in 'Part 1.7 Draft Appeal Book Index' as the Magistrates Court transcript of 5 November 2021. 12 This is described in the appellant's case, in 'Part 1.8 Exhibit Index List' as 'Exhibit 3: Email from Steven Patten to Appellant (12 March 2020)'. See also the affidavit the appellant filed in her application to set aside the conviction in JO 9235 of 2021 dated 2 Feb 2024, 21. -- 11 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 12 that this shows that the City told her it was optional, and she chose not to take up that option. This submission is unsustainable in view of what followed this passage: In short, the City could not enforce that an application be submitted, only suggest that one is. However, although the City is restricted to enforcing the submission of a retrospective building application to anything constructed post April 2012, there are no such restrictions should a structure require planning approval. What this means in relation to your screening is that we will shortly be issuing a letter outlining the requirement to submit a Development Application (planning application). Unfortunately the screening constitutes development under the City's District Planning Scheme No: 2 (DPS2) and will require retrospective approval should you wish to retain it. 46 In any event, each allegation is immaterial. The learned primary judge assumed, favourably to the appellant, that the respondent had told her the screen did not require development approval,13 and considered whether, as a result, the respondent was estopped.14 Proper construction of 'development' and 'structure' (ground 4) 47 By ground 4, the appellant alleges the primary judge misconstrued the meaning of 'development' and 'structure' in the Planning and Development Act. 48 There is no merit in this contention. The learned primary judge's construction was correct, for the reasons his Honour gave. 49 We further note that the appellant contended that the screen was a temporary structure. There is no evidence of this. From the material put forward by the appellant, it appears to have been in place for 16 years. Was Cobby J dismissive of the appellant's arguments? (ground 5) 50 By ground 5, the appellant alleges that the primary judge denied her 'procedural fairness by dismissing her case with pejorative labels ("pseudo-legal") without substantively engaging with compelling exculpatory evidence, including the Respondent's own admissions, which fundamentally undermined the prosecution'. 13 Primary reasons [27]. 14 Primary reasons [66] - [72]. -- 12 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 13 51 We have already dealt with the appellant's submissions in relation to the alleged admissions. 52 In particular 5.3, the appellant contends that the primary judge failed to engage with sworn evidence from the installer confirming the screen had been installed in 2010, which, says the appellant, was central to the limitation defence. The installation date was not relevant to the limitation period for an offence of not complying with a direction to remove the screen (and in any event, the installation date was not in issue15). The offence was a continuing one, continuing until the appellant removed the screen. 53 Particular 5.4 alleges that the primary judge found that the screen was a structure despite the respondent's admission that it could not prove that the screen was attached to the fence. It did not need to be attached to the fence to be a structure (and the primary judge did not find that it was attached to the fence). 54 Particular 5.5 alleges that the primary judge 'at [18] - [22] dismissed the Appellant's case globally as ''pseudolegal propositions... devoid of merit" without distinguishing between unmeritorious arguments and the credible, admissible evidence identified above' (original emphasis). 55 The 'evidence' referred to by the appellant was not relevant. 56 Further, the learned primary judge clearly distinguished between the pseudo-legal arguments and the other arguments.16 57 There is no merit in ground 5. Was the conviction a nullity due to defects in the process? (ground 6) 58 By ground 6, the appellant alleges that the conviction was a nullity due to alleged defects in the prosecution notice17 and with service. 59 There is no merit in this ground. 15 See primary reasons [29], [35]. 16 See primary reasons [26]. 17 The appellant attached a copy of what she said was the prosecution notice to an email to the court on 21 October 2025 at 9:25am, subject line: CACR 79 of 2025 - Verification of Transcripts, Exhibits, and Statutory Declaration. Attachment called '8. SJA1019 2024 Prosecution Notice (28.03.2024)'. -- 13 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 14 60 The appellant asserts by particular 6.1.2 that the prosecution was attributed in the transcript to 'WA Police'. This could not, and does not, affect the validity of the prosecution notice. 61 In particular 6.2, the appellant asserts she was denied natural justice because the court hearing notice was not served by post, but was simply placed in her letterbox. There is no evidence of this (and this appears to be contradicted by the envelope which she seeks to adduce in the appeal, which has two stamps on it, and a printed notation that appears to include the date of 15 October 2021). In any event, even if the notice was simply placed in her letterbox, this would not support the appellant's contention that she was denied natural justice. The appellant admits receiving the notice on 29 October 2021, so she knew about the hearing. She simply chose not to attend, later saying that she did not attend because it was a 'vexatious, specious, ridiculous claim', and because she did not have enough time and thought it was a joke. 62 By particular 6.4, the appellant asserts that the 'Court hearing notice is without servicer details as required under CPA s 33(3), Schedule 2 cl 3(10).' This is a reference to the requirement that a person serving a document under cl 3 must record the service information in a service certificate. There is no evidence that this was not done. In any event, even if it was not done, it caused no injustice. Again, the appellant knew about the hearing, but simply chose not to attend. 63 Other assertions made by the appellant under this ground were of no merit for the reasons given by the learned primary judge at [74] - [107]. 64 In particular 6.5, the appellant asserts that each of the matters she raised about the validity of the prosecution notice and the service requirements were mandatory statutory preconditions. Even if some of them were preconditions, there is no evidence that any requirements were breached. Should the magistrate have adjourned the hearing? (ground 7) 65 By ground 7, the appellant alleges that the magistrate should have adjourned the hearing, and that, in failing to do so, the magistrate was 'disregarding compelling evidence of medical incapacity'. -- 14 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 15 66 The medical certificate18 produced by the appellant certified that she was unfit from 24 January 2019 to 2 August 2019. The hearing was on 5 November 2021. 67 There is therefore no merit in this allegation. 68 The appellant also complains about the conduct of the respondent after her conviction, in seeking to enforce the costs order. The respondent's conduct after the conviction is irrelevant. An application for leave to appeal against a conviction in the Magistrates Court may be brought on the grounds that the magistrate made an error, acted without jurisdiction, or imposed an inadequate or excessive sentence, or that there has been a miscarriage of justice.19 The respondent's conduct after the conviction has no bearing on any of these grounds. Did the primary judge make factual errors? (ground 8) 69 By ground 8, the appellant alleges that the primary judge's judgment 'is vitiated by material inaccuracies concerning foundational facts'. 70 First, the appellant notes that, in a version of the primary judge's reasons, the year of the conviction was inaccurately recorded as 2011, instead of 2021. The date of conviction was not material to the merits of the appeal (and in any event was corrected). 71 Second, the appellant asserts that the primary judge found that the complaint originated in 2010, when the evidence establishes that the relevant complaint was made in 2019. His Honour did not find that the complaint was made in 2010. 72 There is no merit in ground 8. Application to adduce additional evidence 73 By an application filed 8 December 2025, the appellant seeks to adduce new evidence on the appeal. This application was adjourned to the hearing of the appeal. Nevertheless, we have considered whether any of the proposed evidence could have a bearing on the merits of any of the grounds of appeal. 74 The appellant seeks to adduce five documents. 18 This is described in the appellant's case, in 'Part 1.8 Exhibit Index List' as 'Exhibit 18: Medical Certificate (Aug 2019)'. It was Exhibit 4 in the primary proceedings. 19 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 8. -- 15 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 56 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 16 75 First, the email of 29 May 2019, which the appellant incorrectly describes as 'confirming the complaint regarding the boundary screen was "now closed"'. We dealt with this email in dealing with the appellant's assertion that there was an abuse of process. The email does not assist the appellant. 76 Second, a letter from a lawyer acting for the respondent dated 6 March 2024 in relation to costs recovery. As explained when dealing with ground 7, this is not relevant. 77 Third, the letter dated 30 October 2020. As we explained when dealing with the appellant's allegations of admissions by the respondent, the appellant misrepresents its content. The letter does not assist the appellant. 78 Fourth, an extract from a version of the primary judge's reasons before some typographical errors as to the date of conviction were corrected. As explained when dealing with ground 8, this is not relevant. 79 Fifth, an unmarked envelope. This is said to be the envelope which contained the court hearing notice and a copy of the prosecution notice. As we explained when dealing with ground 6, the appellant got notice of the court hearing, prior to the hearing, but chose not to attend. The envelope is not relevant. Conclusion 80 There was no merit in any of the appellant's grounds of appeal. None of the grounds of appeal had a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Accordingly, leave to appeal on each of the grounds of appeal was refused. We also refused to extend the time within which to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Costs followed the event. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. NC Associate to the Hon Justice Archer 24 APRIL 2026 -- 16 of 16 --