CC -v- LB [2026] WADC 63

[2026] WADC 63 [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 1 JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL LOCATION : PERTH CITATION : CC -v- LB [2026] WADC 63 CORAM : JEYAMOHAN DCJ HEARD : 17 - 21 NOVEMBER 2025 (AND SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED 5 & 10 DECEMBER 2025) DELIVERED : 3 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 2017 of 2024 BETWEEN : CC Plaintiff AND LB Defendant Catchwords: Torts - Assault and battery - Causation - Assessment of damages Legislation: Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) Criminal Code (WA) Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Evidence Act 1906 (WA) Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) -- 1 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 2 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) Result: Judgment for the plaintiff Damages assessed Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff : Ms B E Rogers Defendant : In person Solicitors: Plaintiff : Trewin Norman & Co Defendant : Not applicable Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Bennett v Minister for Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408 Bennett v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 70 BGC Residential Pty Ltd v Fairwater Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 268 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 Carter v Walker [2010] VSCA 340; (2010) 32 VR 1 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 Fitter v Veal (1796) 12 Mod Rep 542; (1796) 88 ER 1506 Hodges v Hicks [2025] WASCA 190 Houlahan v Pitchen [2009] WASCA 104 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 Law v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 M R & R C Smith Pty Ltd t/as Ultra Tune (Osborne Park) v Wyatt [No 2] [2012] WASCA 110 Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501 -- 2 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 3 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1 Meissner v The Queen [1995] HCA 41; (1995) 184 CLR 132 Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365 Montemaggiori v Wilson [2011] WASCA 177 Ormerod v Court [2012] WADC 33 Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118 Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77 Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 Quine v Keerasawat [2014] WADC 150; (2014) 87 SR (WA) 17 R v Hill [1979] VR 311 Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2022] WASCA 44 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL [1994] HCA 4; (1994) 179 CLR 332 Setton v Eves [2006] WASCA 3 Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563 Shorey v PT Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 1104; (2003) 197 ALR 410 Smargiassi Nominees Pty Ltd v Shire of Collie [2021] WASCA 107 Van der Velde v Halloran [2011] WASCA 252 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 Winiarczyk v Tsirigotis [2011] WASCA 97 ZYX (pseudonym initials) v Cable [No 5] [2023] WADC 61 -- 3 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 4 Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 7 Procedural background ........................................................................................................... 8 Defendant as a litigant-in-person ............................................................................................ 9 Findings of criminal conduct - Standard and onus of proof .............................................. 11 Findings in this action .......................................................................................................... 15 Criminal proceedings and conviction ................................................................................... 15 The offence and the enforcement ......................................................................................... 19 Prior conviction and civil proceedings ................................................................................. 19 Fine payable to the plaintiff .................................................................................................. 21 Legal basis of the action ......................................................................................................... 22 Witnesses and evidence .......................................................................................................... 23 The plaintiff's evidence .......................................................................................................... 23 Relationship with the defendant ........................................................................................... 24 The Incident on 23 September 2021 ..................................................................................... 25 Events on reaching the plaintiff's home............................................................................ 28 Police attend the plaintiff's home ..................................................................................... 29 Findings of credibility: The plaintiff ................................................................................ 29 The defendant's evidence ....................................................................................................... 30 Relationship with the plaintiff .............................................................................................. 30 The Incident on 23 September 2021 ..................................................................................... 30 Events on reaching the plaintiff's home............................................................................ 32 Police attend the defendant's home....................................................................................... 32 Findings of credibility: The defendant ............................................................................. 33 The lay evidence ...................................................................................................................... 34 Evidence of RC ..................................................................................................................... 34 Findings of credibility: RC ............................................................................................... 35 Evidence of Constable Patrick .............................................................................................. 35 Findings of credibility: Constable Patrick ........................................................................ 36 Battery - The law .................................................................................................................. 37 Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff has established that the defendant's actions on 23 September 2021 constituted assault and battery ............................................................ 38 Factual findings concerning the Incident on 23 September 2021 ........................................ 39 The plaintiff's education and employment history ............................................................... 41 The effect of the plaintiff's marriage breakdown on the plaintiff's health ............................ 42 Consultation with medical practitioner post Incident ........................................................... 43 -- 4 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 5 Plaintiff's health and medical condition post Incident .......................................................... 44 Plaintiff's work capacity following the Incident ................................................................... 48 Relationship with the defendant post the Incident................................................................ 50 The plaintiff's health and condition ...................................................................................... 50 Dr Pyne's evidence ............................................................................................................... 50 Dr Pyne's background ....................................................................................................... 50 First consultation with Dr Pyne ........................................................................................ 51 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition ................................................................ 51 Future medical treatment .................................................................................................. 53 Future work capacity ........................................................................................................ 54 Dr Crooke's evidence ............................................................................................................ 54 Dr Crooke's background ................................................................................................... 54 The plaintiff's pre-Incident medical condition ................................................................. 55 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition ................................................................ 56 Future medical treatments ................................................................................................ 60 Future work capacity ........................................................................................................ 60 Dr Priestly's evidence ........................................................................................................... 61 The plaintiff's pre-Incident medical condition ................................................................. 61 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition ................................................................ 62 Future medical treatment .................................................................................................. 69 Work capacity ................................................................................................................... 70 Ms Scallan's evidence ........................................................................................................... 70 The plaintiff's pre-Incident medical condition ................................................................. 71 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical conditions .............................................................. 72 Past medical treatment ...................................................................................................... 80 Future medical treatment .................................................................................................. 81 Past work capacity ............................................................................................................ 81 Future work capacity ........................................................................................................ 82 Dr Terace's evidence............................................................................................................. 84 Consultation with the plaintiff .......................................................................................... 85 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition ................................................................ 86 Past medical treatment ...................................................................................................... 87 Future medical treatment .................................................................................................. 87 Past work capacity ............................................................................................................ 90 Future work capacity ........................................................................................................ 92 Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff suffered the injuries and symptoms alleged to have arisen from the assault and battery .................................................................................................. 95 -- 5 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 6 Findings concerning the onset of symptoms after the Incident ............................................ 97 Issue 3: Whether the extent of the plaintiff's reported injuries and symptoms is attributable to the assault and battery said to have occurred ............................................ 98 Causation .............................................................................................................................. 98 Findings as to the plaintiff's current symptoms .................................................................. 105 Issue 4: What is the appropriate assessment for damages? ............................................. 106 Past special damages .......................................................................................................... 106 The plaintiff's case .......................................................................................................... 106 The defendant's case ....................................................................................................... 107 Findings and assessment ................................................................................................. 107 Interest on past loss and expenditure .............................................................................. 108 Future medical expenses ..................................................................................................... 108 The plaintiff's case .......................................................................................................... 108 The defendant's case ....................................................................................................... 109 Findings and assessment ................................................................................................. 110 Summary......................................................................................................................... 114 Future economic loss .......................................................................................................... 115 The plaintiff's case .......................................................................................................... 115 The defendant's case ....................................................................................................... 117 Whether the plaintiff's parameters of employment have been materially reduced ........ 117 Assessment ..................................................................................................................... 120 General damages................................................................................................................. 125 Assessment ..................................................................................................................... 126 Issue 5: What quantum is the plaintiff entitled to? ........................................................... 129 Conclusion and orders ......................................................................................................... 129 -- 6 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 7 JEYAMOHAN DCJ: Introduction 1 On the evening of 23 September 2021, the plaintiff, CC, alleges that she was subject to an assault and battery perpetrated by the defendant, LB, when walking back from the Cornerstone Hotel through Brampton Park in the suburb of Butler to the plaintiff's home (Incident).1 The plaintiff and the defendant were in an intimate relationship at the time. 2 The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant seeking damages for psychiatric injury and physical injuries she claims to have sustained as a result of the alleged Incident. 3 The defendant has admitted to having pushed the plaintiff to the chest causing her to fall to the ground but denies that the plaintiff has suffered personal injury and damage and therefore puts in issue causation and the quantum of any loss suffered, and points to a range of other life events and stressors experienced by the plaintiff before and after the Incident as being the cause or contributors to the plaintiff's psychiatric symptoms and any loss suffered. The defendant's case is that the plaintiff's distress arose as a result of a 'broken heart' immediately following the ending of their relationship on 9 June 2023 the 'magic date' rather than the Incident itself. 4 From the pleadings and submissions filed, the following issues arise for determination: 1. Whether the plaintiff has established that the defendant's actions on 23 September 2021 constituted assault and battery? (Issue 1). 2. Whether the plaintiff suffered the injuries and symptoms alleged to have arisen from the assault and battery? (Issue 2). 3. Whether the extent of the plaintiff's reported injuries and symptoms is attributable to the assault and battery said to have occurred? (Issue 3). 4. What is the appropriate assessment for damages? (Issue 4). 5. What quantum of damages is the plaintiff entitled to? (Issue 5). 1 Statement of Claim dated 15 April 2024 (SoC), par 2. -- 7 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 8 5 The action was listed for a five-day trial on 17 December 2025 to 21 December 2025 and proceeded to hearing before me. Both parties filed written closing submissions on 5 December 2025 (defendant) and 10 December 2025 (plaintiff) respectively. 6 For the reasons that follow, I have found that the plaintiff has made good her allegations against the defendant. As a result, I find that the plaintiff has suffered injury and harm and is entitled to an award of damages, although not as to the entirety of the amount sought. Procedural background 7 The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the defendant by writ of summons and SoC dated 15 April 2024. The defendant was a litigant-in-person at the time of filing the memorandum of appearance on 23 April 2024, and the defence on 6 May 2024. 8 Some six months later, a notice of change of representation was filed on 5 December 2024 and the defendant was legally represented for a short period between then and up until 13 May 2025. During this period relevantly: (a) the defendant's then solicitors arranged for an independent medical review of the plaintiff to be carried out by Dr Lawrence Terace, consultant psychiatrist, on 13 March 2025; and (b) the parties attended a pre-trial conference on 6 May 2025. 9 The matter proceeded to a listing conference on 28 July 2025, and a further listing conference on 1 September 2025, by which time the defendant returned to being a litigant-in-person. During that period, the parties attended to discovery and subpoenas to produce documents. 10 At the listing conference on 1 September 2025, amongst other things, the action was listed for a five-day trial and a directions hearing before a judge of the court in chambers on 6 October 2025. 11 By minute of proposed amended statement of claim filed 5 November 2025, the plaintiff sought to amend her claim and to plead that the assault and battery alleged to have been perpetrated by the defendant saying words to the effect 'I'm going to rape you, I'm going to fuck you in the arse, I'm going to kill you' and included claims for exemplary and aggravated damages. The plaintiff's application was heard and dismissed by the court on 6 November 2025. -- 8 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 9 12 Accordingly, the plaintiff did not plead, nor did the trial proceed upon, any claim for aggravated or exemplary damages. Defendant as a litigant-in-person 13 The defendant is a litigant-in-person. Before the trial commenced, the defendant was provided with a copy of the court's publication titled 'Procedure Guide for Self-Represented Litigants for General Civil Claims', a copy of which he informed the court he had available to him 'months ago'.2 14 Because the defendant appeared as a litigant-in-person, at the commencement of trial, and throughout the course of the trial, I further informed the defendant about the trial procedure including in respect of the following: (a) opening and closing addresses; (b) the onus on each respective party with respect to proving the facts; (c) the function of pleading and the giving of evidence including evidence-in-chief; and (d) cross-examination and the rule in Browne v Dunn;3 and the rule in Jones v Dunkell.4 15 The defendant had difficulty in giving his evidence and in cross-examining witnesses. That is not unusual for a litigant-in-person. In cross-examination, the defendant often lapsed into a conversational style approach with asking questions of certain witnesses, particularly the plaintiff and RC, the plaintiff's daughter. 16 I was appreciative of the approach taken by the plaintiff's counsel who, on occasion, permitted me to assist the defendant to properly formulate his questions in respect of the matters in issue, and was restrained in her approach to taking objections. Counsel's approach permitted the trial to be conducted efficiently but also allowed the defendant to present his case as well as possible in the circumstances. 2 ts 38. 3 Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67. 4 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. -- 9 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 10 The pleadings 17 The plaintiff in the SoC pleads, amongst other things, as follows: … 2. On 23 September 2021 at Brampton Park, Butler in the State of Western Australia, the defendant without warning and in the absence of the plaintiff's consent, caused assault and battery to the plaintiff by: 2.1 Pulling the plaintiff's hair on more than one occasion; 2.2 Pushing the plaintiff to the chest causing the plaintiff to fall to the ground; 2.3 Dragging the plaintiff by the arm; 2.4 Grabbing the plaintiff around her neck and throat and thereafter throwing the plaintiff to the ground. 3. By reason of the assault and battery pleaded in paragraph 2, the plaintiff has suffered personal injury, loss and damage. PARTICULARS OF INJURY, LOSS AND DAMAGE 3.1. Psychological injury namely post traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression and emotional distress. 3.2. Soft tissue injuries to the neck and back with abrasions and headaches. 4. The plaintiff's psychiatric injury and physical injuries as pleaded in paragraph 3 herein was caused by the assault and battery committed upon her by the defendant and by his trespass to the plaintiff's person. PARTICULARS The defendant assaulted the plaintiff and committed trespass to her person in that he: 4.1 Pulled the plaintiff's hair; 4.2 Pushed the plaintiff to the chest causing the plaintiff to fall to the ground. 4.3 Dragged the plaintiff by the arm; 4.4 Grabbed the plaintiff around her neck and threw the plaintiff to the ground; -- 10 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 11 4.5 Failed to have any or adequate regard for the plaintiff's safety; and 4.6 Thereby committed trespass to the plaintiff's person. 18 The plaintiff claims damages against the defendant as a result of the assault and battery alleged. 19 In response, the defendant by his defence filed 6 May 2024, amongst other things, pleads at par 1 that save as to admit pushing the plaintiff to the chest causing the plaintiff to fall to the ground (ie par 2.2 of the SoC), the defendant does not admit the allegations of fact in pars 1 and 2 of the SoC. 20 The defendant denies the allegations in par 3 of the SoC. Save as to admit the allegation in par 4.2, the defendant does not admit the allegations in pars 4 - 10 of the SoC. Findings of criminal conduct - Standard and onus of proof 21 When in a civil proceeding a question arises whether a crime has been committed, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities but, having regard to the principles explained in Briginshaw v Briginshaw,5 weight is given to the presumption of innocence and exactness of proof is required. 22 Regard must be had to the dicta of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw:6 … Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters 'reasonable satisfaction' should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent judgment if the question was whether some act had been done 5 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 6 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (361) - (363). -- 11 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 12 involving grave moral delinquency. … This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil issue may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probability. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained. 23 As to the evidence of the facts alleged before being so satisfied, Herron DCJ in ZYX v Cable7 summarised the position at law, which I respectfully adopt here:8 16 Weir v Tomkinson was an appeal from a decision of the District Court awarding damages to the respondent with respect to his claims for trespass to the person (battery), false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Ground 1 of the notice of appeal, in reliance on Briginshaw v Briginshaw, argued that because of: (a) the very serious nature of the allegations made by the respondent (plaintiff); (b) the inherent unlikelihood of the defendant (appellant) having committed a crime; and (c) the gravity of the consequences flowing from the plaintiff's allegations, the trial judge failed to have regard to the need for there to be clear and cogent proof of the allegations. Kennedy J (Wallwork & Murray JJ agreeing) by reference to Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd explained the relevant principles as follows: In Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170, at 171, Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ, having cited the passage from Briginshaw regarding the consideration of the seriousness of an allegation, commented: 'There are, however, circumstances in which generalisations about the need for clear and cogent evidence to prove matters of the gravity of fraud or crime are, even when understood as not directed to the standard of proof, likely to be unhelpful and even misleading.' 7 ZYX (pseudonym initials) v Cable [No 5] [2023] WADC 61 (ZYX v Cable). 8 ZYX v Cable [16] - [17]. -- 12 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 13 They observed that, in that case, it was so, and at 172, they went on to say: 'When an issue falls for determination on the balance of probabilities and the determination depends on a choice between competing and mutually inconsistent allegations of fraudulent conduct, generalisations about the need for clear and cogent proof are likely to be at best unhelpful and at worst misleading. If such generalisations were to affect the proof required of the party bearing the onus of proving the issue, the issue would be determined not on the balance of probabilities but by an unbalanced standard. The most that can validly be said in such a case is that the trial Judge should be conscious of the gravity of the allegations made on both sides when reaching his or her conclusion. Ultimately, however, it remains incumbent upon the trial Judge to determine the issue by reference to the balance of probabilities.' Their Honours, having commented that the trial Judge dealt with the matter on the balance of probabilities, and that he was correct in doing so, continued: 'The judgment contains no express reference to any requirement of clear, cogent or strict proof. However, in a context where the issue in the case had effectively resolved itself into which of Karajan (acting through the personal respondents) and Neat Holdings (acting through Mr Gundill) had been guilty of deliberate falsification of its records of takings, the omission of any such reference neither involves nor indicates error on his Honour's part. To the contrary, the particular circumstances of the present case and for the reasons which we have given, any such reference would have been unhelpful.' 17 Kennedy J held there was nothing in the trial judge's reasons for decision to indicate that he was unaware of the seriousness of the competing allegations and had not erred. (footnotes omitted) -- 13 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 14 24 I acknowledge the seriousness of the allegations made by the plaintiff against the defendant in this case. Assaults occurring in the context of intimate or domestic relationships are treated by the court as particularly serious. Such offending involves a significant breach of trust and heightened vulnerability and is a profound violation of the trust and security that ought to characterise intimate partnerships. The administration of justice requires that conduct of this kind be addressed with appropriate gravity. 25 The plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant committed an offence. The plaintiff, in these proceedings alleges that the defendant caused assault and battery to her by: (a) pulling the plaintiff's hair on more than one occasion; (b) pushing the plaintiff to the chest causing her to fall to the ground; (c) dragging the plaintiff by the arm and grabbing the plaintiff around her neck and throat; and (d) thereafter throwing the plaintiff to the ground. 26 In deciding whether a crime has been committed I should feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence and such a conclusion should not be reached without the exercise of caution and unless the evidence survives careful scrutiny and appears precise and not loose and inexact.9 I should not draw an inference adverse to the defendant unless I accept that the circumstances give rise to a reasonable and definite inference, not merely to conflicting inferences of equal degree of probability, the defendant committed a criminal offence.10 27 Having properly had regard to the above considerations, in the circumstances of this case, I should not make a finding that the defendant caused assault and battery to the plaintiff in the manner pleaded unless I feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence and I should not reach such a conclusion without having carefully scrutinised the evidence which appears to be precise and not loose and inexact. 9 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (361) - (363), (368). 10 Quine v Keerasawat [2014] WADC 150; (2014) 87 SR (WA) 17 [70]. -- 14 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 15 Findings in this action 28 The plaintiff bore the onus of proving her claims to the civil standard, that is, on the balance of probabilities. Where, in these reasons, I state that I am satisfied as to the existence of a fact, I should be understood to mean that I am satisfied to that standard. Criminal proceedings and conviction 29 It is necessary to say something about the defendant's criminal conviction. By prosecution notice dated 15 November 2021,11 the defendant was charged and convicted pursuant to s 313(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Criminal Code) of common assault in circumstances of aggravation, the details of which are stated as follows: Date or period 23 September 2021 Place Butler Details of alleged offence unlawfully assaulted [CC] in circumstances of aggravation, namely [CC] was his girlfriend at the time, they have been seeing each other for approximately 6 months. 30 The defendant was legally represented by duty counsel at the hearing of the criminal proceedings in the Joondalup Magistrates Court on 15 November 2021 in respect of the charge the subject of the Prosecution Notice. The defendant was present at that hearing.12 31 The following was put to the learned magistrate by counsel for the prosecution at the hearing of the matter:13 WILLIAMS, MR: Thank you, your Honour. The accused and the victim have been in a relationship for approximately six months. On Thursday 23 September 2021 at about 7.30pm, the accused and the victim were at Brampton Park in Butler. The accused and the victim had just left The Cornerstone Ale House in Butler, and they had an alcoholic beverage. Whilst walking along Brompton Park, Butler, the accused assaulted the victim by pushing the victim to the chest, causing her to fall down onto the ground. 11 Exhibit 105, Magistrates Court of Western Australia Prosecution Notice Charge No. JO 9143/2021 (Prosecution Notice). 12 Exhibit 103, Magistrates Court of Western Australia Transcript of Proceedings JO 9143 of 2021 dated 15 November 2021 (MC ts), 2. 13 Exhibit 103, MC ts 3. -- 15 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 16 The accused had grabbed the victim around the collar area and thrown her to the ground. The victim has lost control of herself - wet herself, sorry, your Honour, out of fear. On arrival at the victim's home, the victim walked into her daughter's bedroom, telling her daughter to call the police. The accused has entered the house. The daughter of the victim has approached the accused, telling him to leave, which he did. Police attended the victim's home address and took photographs of the injuries sustained. On the 26th - sorry, police attended the accused home and issued a 72-hour police order. On 26 September 2021, the victim attended Clarkson Police Station and provided a statement. On 16 October 2021, the accused attended the Clarkson Police Station, was arrested, and participated in a record of interview and made admissions to pushing the victim. The accused was charged. The explanation, 'I just pushed her. I don't really remember'. No record at all, your Honour. … 32 Counsel for the defendant informed the learned magistrate that:14 PARKER, MR: Your Honour, those facts are accepted in full. I believe the first set of facts, when they were read, may have given the indication that [LB] had followed [his] partner into the house, but they're actually together going into the house together. It's just a minor point to clarify, your Honour. Other than that, the substantive facts of the matter are accepted in full. [LB] and his partner had been drinking for a few hours, and he consumed about four to five pints of alcohol. He does not remember a lot, your Honour, but he does remember pushing his partner to the ground, and although he can't remember other aspects of the assault, your Honour, what he said, which was quite telling, and I've got the comment, is that, 'If [CC]said it, she wouldn't lie. I don't think she would'. So he's accepting that, even though he can't remember everything, that any observations made by her as to the circumstances of the assault, are correct. Matters in mitigation, your Honour, as follows. There's been a plea of guilty to this matter at the very first opportunity. There's been full admissions to the offence, to the extent that he was able to remember them, our Honour. So he hasn't been able to recall the whole incident. What he could recall he admitted, and what he can't recall he accepts that the victim is a witness of truth. 14 Exhibit 103, MC ts 4 - ts 5; Exhibit 42. -- 16 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 17 He's independently remorseful of his guilty plea, your Honour. When I asked him about the circumstances of the offence, his words were that, 'I'm gutted,' and he got quite emotional recalling the incident. It should be pointed out, your Honour, that bail conditions were not put in place until a month after this incident, and I'm instructed that the victim of the offence was keen to have the charges against his withdrawn. Now that's not a matter for her to decide, but in my submission, it's relevant because it may have been, in the end, a matter that might have been difficult to prosecute in those circumstances. But notwithstanding that, [LB] has admitted, and continued to maintain, his plea of guilty today, your Honour. So the parties were in legitimate contact after the expiration of the police order that was initially imposed, but bail conditions were imposed at a later date. … In my submission, your Honour, notwithstanding that it's a serious offence, that all of those factors lead to the conclusion that the court could deal with this matter by way of admittedly a substantial fine, and that would be the application today. There's also an application for a spent conviction order, your Honour, and the basis of that application is as follows. The court could come to the conclusion, because of the absence of a record, and because he's been here for 12 years, that he's a person of prior good character. Can the court be satisfied that he's unlikely to re-offend? Well that sort of application is necessarily speculative, however, he did indicate to me that he's given the drink away, and he hasn't been consuming alcohol as a result of this incident, your Honour. So that's encouraging as well. … 33 The learned magistrate, in reaching his determination and sentencing the defendant, observed:15 HIS HONOUR: … [LB] pleads guilty to the one charge before the court. The background circumstances set out exchanges between myself and counsel, and I also incorporate the material facts that were read by the police prosecutor into my sentencing remarks. A plea of guilty has been entered at the first reasonable opportunity, so pursuant to section 9AA of the Sentencing Act, (indistinct) a discount of 25 per cent. [LB] comes before the court, critically and importantly, for his subsequent application, and also in relation to sentence, with no criminal record whatsoever. 15 Exhibit 103, MC ts 6 - ts 7. -- 17 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 18 This was an act of domestic violence … There are issues of general deterrence at play in relation to these matters, and the courts and the community are becoming increasingly aware that this behaviour is obnoxious and, without sounding too old-fashioned, but I say what I say without regret, is that there is no excuse, and there will never be an excuse for a man to be violent towards a woman, and [LB] doesn't back away from that. PARKER, MR: No. And, your Honour, I actually made notes that he said that. HIS HONOUR: Yes. PARKER, MR: Because we talked about the various circumstances of the offence, and he was just plain to say, again, using perhaps a more old-fashioned approach, said, 'You should never hit a woman, regardless of the circumstances.' HIS HONOUR: It seems somewhat trite, but I think it's still valid, and I haven't heard any reasonable argument against it, to be frank. The incident itself, clearly affected by alcohol, both parties were drinking heavily for an extended period, walking together, and he's pushed her, and she fell to the ground. Grabbed her around her collar and then pushed to the ground again, as I understand and, unfortunately, a very unfortunate aspect of this is that she wet herself. 34 In ordering that the fine be payable by the offender (the defendant) to the victim of the crime (the plaintiff), the learned magistrate said:16 PARKER, MR: … In the end, [LB] elected to resolve the matters today and, frankly, I was comfortable with that situation, based on the circumstances of the offence, and in the absence of a record, that the matters could perhaps just be finalised today, and that's what decision was made. Of course, your Honour can still sentence, if you consider that appropriate. HIS HONOUR: I could make the fine payable to the victim, couldn't I? PARKER, MR: Of course. HIS HONOUR: I think that might be the appropriate disposition. Taking into account all the circumstances, and on a rare occasion such as this, and increasingly so, I am of the view that a fine is appropriate. Now, any level of fine shouldn't be assessed on, say, some sort of evaluation of, well, how could an incident such as this equate to a fine, and then make a separate calculation, well why is it only this much when it should be this much. 16 Exhibit 103, MC ts 8. -- 18 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 19 It's an imprecise measure, and inappropriate one. But in all the circumstances, I am satisfied a fine is appropriate. As I say, it is a rare sentencing discretion, an exercise in sentencing discretion to pull upon a fine for these matters, but it could not be said to be at the highest end of offences of this nature. It is an aggravated common assault. I've referenced the law in relation to sentencing for these matters, specifically in relation to Bropho v Hall. There are no tariffs for these offences because of the wide variety of circumstances that give rise to these offences. But I do believe that, insofar as money can achieve anything in this context, which may well be limited, it is appropriate to make any fine payable to the victim. That fine will be $2500. It is payable to [CC], the victim. The offence and the enforcement 35 Section 313 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for a person to unlawfully assault another. If the offence is committed in circumstances of aggravation or in circumstances of racial aggravation, a person is liable to imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $36,000. 36 The offence created by s 313 of the Criminal Code is a simple offence: s 67 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act). The procedure for prosecuting and dealing with offences is set out in the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (CPA).17 37 The jurisdiction of a magistrate to hear and determine a charge alleging a simple offence is conferred by s 9 and s 11 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA). The procedure on a charge of a simple offence is set out in div 5 of the CPA. 38 Following the hearing of the criminal proceedings in the Joondalup Magistrates Court on 15 November 2021 the defendant was charged and convicted following a plea of guilty pursuant to s 313(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of common assault in circumstances of aggravation and fined $2,500, with the fine being payable to the plaintiff, and received a spent conviction.18 Prior conviction and civil proceedings 39 As to the legal effect of the defendant's conviction on 15 November 2021, I make the following observations. 17 See s 67(3) of the Interpretation Act. 18 Exhibit 104, Magistrates Court of Western Australia Notice of Conviction dated 15 November 2021. -- 19 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 20 40 First, a plea of guilty involves an admission of each of the elements of the offence,19 including all of the essential facts necessary to constitute the offence.20 41 Secondly, a conviction is admissible evidence and once proved is prima facie evidence that the person did commit the offence of which he or she was found guilty, leaving to the person so convicted to establish to the contrary if they can. In Bennett v The State of Western Australia21 Martin CJ, said that the decision in Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint22 regarding the admissibility of a conviction as evidence of the facts giving rise to that conviction has been consistently followed in this jurisdiction.23 42 Thirdly, the fact of a conviction may be proved by the mechanism provided for under s 47 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).24 The material facts comprising the elements of the offence the subject of the conviction may be proved by tendering the relevant part of the record of the earlier proceeding. Proof of the fact of the conviction may also constitute some evidence of those material facts.25 Here, the defendant has not adduced any evidence to rebut the presumption in s 47(6) of the Evidence Act that a conviction is presumed not to have been appealed against or quashed or set aside until the contrary is shown. The transcript of the earlier proceedings before the Magistrates Court, and of the conviction, is part of the evidence before this court having been tendered.26 43 For completeness I observe that in Smargiassi Nominees Pty Ltd v Shire of Collie,27 the Court of Appeal said:28 … It is accepted that the principle of incontrovertibility applies in the case of a prior conviction. The principle precludes a person, in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, from impugning his or her earlier conviction. Moreover, in this State there is some support for the proposition that, in the case of a judgment of conviction, the fact of 19 Meissner v The Queen [1995] HCA 41; (1995) 184 CLR 132, 157 (Dawson J) and Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501, 510 (Dawson & McHugh JJ). 20 Law v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 [27] (Buss JA, with McLure & Pullin JJA agreeing); R v Hill [1979] VR 311, 312 (Young CJ, Menhennitt & Crockett JJ). 21 Bennett v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 70 (Bennett). 22 Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365. 23 Bennett [64]. 24 Bennett [52], [131], [139]. 25 Bennett [132]. 26 Exhibits 103 and 104. 27 Smargiassi Nominees Pty Ltd v Shire of Collie [2021] WASCA 107 (Smargiassi). 28 Smargiassi [52]. -- 20 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 21 the conviction and the material facts comprising the elements of the offence the subject of the conviction are matters that are incontrovertible between an accused and the State. (footnotes omitted) 44 There is no suggestion that the defendant in these proceedings has sought to impugn his earlier conviction although the defendant maintains that he is only able to remember some aspects of the events on the evening of 23 September 2021. Fine payable to the plaintiff 45 At the conclusion of the hearing of the criminal proceedings, the defendant was fined $2,500 by the learned magistrate with the fine being payable to the plaintiff.29 46 I am mindful that the defendant, who is a litigant-in-person, referred to the 'fine' and to having already been to court 'for this'.30 47 For completeness I now turn to the effect of the fine in the context of the plaintiff's civil claim for damages. 48 The Magistrates Court Act expressly confers criminal jurisdiction on a magistrate to hear and determine a charge. Section 67(3) of the Interpretation Act provides that the procedure for 'prosecuting and dealing' with offences is set out in the CPA. The fine was imposed by the learned magistrate in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction, and through the operation of pt 4 of the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) (FPINE Act) as a consequence of the criminal conviction recorded against the defendant. 49 Part 4 of the FPINE Act is concerned with 'offenders' who have been the subject of fines imposed by a court in criminal proceedings and establishes a regime for the payment, registration and enforcement of 'fines', being monetary penalties imposed on an offender by a court in criminal proceedings for an offence, with some inclusions and some exceptions stated within the legislation.31 The term 'offender' is defined in the FPINE Act to mean 'a person found guilty of an offence, whether after a plea of guilty or otherwise'.32 29 Exhibit 104, Magistrates Court of Western Australia Notice of Conviction dated 15 November 2021. 30 ts 104. 31 See s 28(1) of the FPINE Act. 32 Section 28(1) of the FPINE Act. -- 21 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 22 50 The regime in pt 4 includes various enforcement provisions, including the issuing of an enforceable registered fine if a notice of intention to enforce has been issued under s 42 in relation to the fine; and the due date specified in that notice has passed.33 51 In the present matter, it is important to recall that there is no dispute that the fine of $2,500 was paid by the defendant and received by the plaintiff. As to how the money was applied is the subject of some difference. The plaintiff says that she received the cheque for $2,500 and once the cheque had cleared, she gave that amount in cash back to the defendant as a lump sum.34 The defendant says that the money was not returned to him in full, but that the parties used $500 towards a trip together down south.35 52 The fact that the learned magistrate imposed a fine of $2,500, and directed that sum to be paid to the plaintiff, does not operate as a bar to the plaintiff's ability to pursue a claim for civil damages in this court. Nor can it be said to be subject to the 'once and for all' general rule of damages.36 However, payment of the fine by the defendant will be factored in any award of damages. Matters as to how the plaintiff says she applied the monies received as a result of the defendant's payment of the fine does not cause me to alter this view. Legal basis of the action 53 The plaintiff submits that the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) (CLA) does not apply to the present case. 54 For s 3A of the CLA to be engaged, the court must first be satisfied that the damages relating to the personal injury claimed was caused by an unlawful intentional act that is done with an intention to cause personal injury to a person. Should s 3A be engaged, the plaintiff's claim for damages is to be assessed having regard to normal common law principles without regard to the restrictions and limitations imposed by the CLA. 33 Section 43(1) of the FPINE Act. 34 ts 142. 35 ts 578. 36 Fitter v Veal (1796) 12 Mod Rep 542; (1796) 88 ER 1506. -- 22 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 23 Witnesses and evidence 55 The plaintiff gave evidence herself. She also called the following witnesses: 1. RC, the plaintiff's daughter. 2. First Class Constable Robin Lindsay Patrick (Constable Patrick); one of the police officers who responded to a domestic incident at the plaintiff's house the night of the alleged Incident on 23 September 2021. 3. Dr Jackson Pyne, the general practitioner the plaintiff saw 24 September 2021. 4. Dr Graham Keith Crooke, the plaintiff's usual general practitioner. 5. Dr Leanne Nicole Priestly, a consultant psychiatrist who is the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist. 6. Dr Shona Sarah Scallan, the plaintiff's usual psychologist. 7. Dr Terace, consultant psychiatrist, who undertook an independent medical examination of the plaintiff on 13 March 2025 at the request of the defendant's former solicitors. 56 Each of the medical practitioners was qualified by counsel as being appropriately qualified to provide the expert opinions which are before the court in this case. The plaintiff tendered various documents into evidence. 57 The defendant gave evidence himself an also tendered documents in his case. The defendant elected not to call any witnesses. The plaintiff's evidence 58 The plaintiff gave evidence that she is now aged 52, was born in 1973 in the United Kingdom and is the youngest of seven children.37 Her parents separated when she was three, after which she was raised solely by her mother. From the age of 17, the plaintiff had a seven-year relationship with an older man, DW, with whom she had her first child, CW. She describes that relationship as not being an easy relationship, and it ended when CW was approximately 5 or 6 years old.38 37 ts 59. 38 ts 60 - ts 61. -- 23 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 24 59 The plaintiff in cross-examination confirmed that she had a brief marriage to a different individual that was over within two weeks.39 60 In late 1999, the plaintiff commenced a relationship with DC, whom she later married.40 Two children were born of that relationship, LC in 2001 and RC in 2005. The plaintiff recounts that she relocated from Blackburn to Aylesbury under pressure from DC, a move that required her to leave behind her family, friends, and support network.41 She also describes an incident early in the relationship in which DC reacted with significant anger toward CW, behaviour she described as scary.42 61 In 2011, the plaintiff and her husband, DC relocated from the United Kingdom to Western Australia with their children, LC and RC.43 According to the plaintiff, DC's anger was a recurring feature of the relationship, it did not involve physical violence.44 The marriage deteriorated over several years and ended in 2017, after which DC returned to the United Kingdom. The plaintiff remained in Western Australia with the children.45 Relationship with the defendant 62 The plaintiff met the defendant on 9 March 2021 during a pool inspection at his home. After the inspection, the defendant requested her telephone number and later contacted her. A romantic and intimate relationship progressed quickly.46 Within 20 days of their first meeting, the plaintiff introduced the defendant to her children on her birthday, a step she regarded as a big decision. The plaintiff says that she enjoyed the relationship with the defendant.47 When cross-examined, the plaintiff accepted that she was in love with the defendant and that she and the defendant had planned a life together.48 39 ts 61. 40 ts 61. 41 ts 62. 42 ts 63. 43 ts 63. 44 ts 69. 45 ts 71. 46 ts 74. 47 ts 75. 48 ts 158. -- 24 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 25 The Incident on 23 September 2021 63 The plaintiff's evidence is that on 23 September 2021, after finishing work, she was collected by the defendant they drove to the Ocean View Tavern where they had a sharing plate to eat and two or three drinks before going to the Cornerstone Hotel at roughly between 6.00 pm and 7.00 pm where they had another pint of lager.49 Whilst at the Cornerstone Hotel, the plaintiff kissed another woman at the defendant's urging.50 Shortly afterwards, the defendant insisted they leave.51 64 The plaintiff states that as they walked away from the hotel, she questioned the defendant's behaviour.52 The plaintiff describes walking into the park and walking around the lake where there is a wooden bridge. The plaintiff says that just before the wooden bridge the defendant pushed the plaintiff on her chest to the floor and she landed backwards and hit her head on the floor.53 The plaintiff says that as she got up, the defendant started dragging her across the wooden bridge by her hair. The plaintiff believes that is where she wet herself. The plaintiff describes the hair pulling as being incredibly painful and she was in shock. The plaintiff says:54 … After he stopped, I was just saying, 'I've wet myself, 'I've wet myself, oh my god. You're hurt' - 'You've hurt me', and I seemed to be saying this as we walked. There's a children's play park and a green, and I remember walking around the green, just - just saying, 'Oh my god, you've hurt me', you know? I don't remember any response from [LB] at that point. 65 The plaintiff says that it is difficult for her to remember but she was being dragged along by her hair and she thinks she went to the floor.55 The plaintiff continued walking around the path of the park with the defendant and remembers saying 'Oh my God, you've just attacked me' but does not remember what the defendant said to her during this time.56 49 ts 75 and ts 76. 50 ts 76. 51 ts 76. 52 ts 76. 53 ts 76. 54 ts 76 - ts 77; Exhibit 5; see also Exhibit 7. 55 ts 77; Exhibit 5; see also Exhibit 7. 56 ts 78. -- 25 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 26 66 The plaintiff says the defendant attacked her again as they got closer to the second small park, 'Grabbing me, dragging me to the floor by my hair - by my head and throwing me to the floor'.57 The plaintiff does not recall any conversation at that point and believes that she may have been in the park for maybe 10 - 15 minutes but she is unsure given her level of distress at the time.58 The plaintiff describes shouting for help, crying and sobbing and says that she was absolutely terrified.59 The plaintiff says as this was at around 8.00 pm in the evening there was no one around so nobody came to help her.60 67 The plaintiff describes the defendant continuing to attack her and throw her around by her hair (although the plaintiff cannot recall exactly how many times this occurred) until they reached Camborne Parkway when the plaintiff says the defendant grabbed her by her left arm and made her cross the road.61 68 The plaintiff describes the defendant throwing her car keys on the floor and taking the plaintiff's phone off her and threatening to throw the phone into the lake once they had crossed the road.62 The plaintiff says that she was confused that the defendant had wanted to walk this particular way:63 … Every single time we've walked that park, we go one way, and that's by the community centre. But this particular incident, he insisted we go the main road, for what that reason is, I have no idea. I was confused at that, why we would go in that way. But we went onto the main road and he forced me to hold his hand. 69 The plaintiff says that when they reached the main road at Kingsbridge Boulevard that the defendant forced her to hold his hand.64 The plaintiff says that the defendant made her walk down the path and was forceful saying 'Just do it'.65 The plaintiff describes the defendant's mood as being angry at the time and asking the plaintiff to stop crying and that she was of this view because of the tone of his voice.66 57 ts 78; Exhibit 5; see also Exhibit 7. 58 ts 78. 59 ts 78. 60 ts 78. 61 ts 79; Exhibit 5; see also Exhibit 7. 62 ts 79. 63 ts 79 - ts 80. 64 ts 80. 65 ts 80. 66 ts 80. -- 26 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 27 70 When asked whether there was any discussion as to why these events were happening, the plaintiff's evidence is that the defendant told her on the night that:67 … I remember him saying, but I don't know when it was, that he was angry because of the way I - myself and the girl had told him to go and buy the drink after the kids. Also he told me that his wife had been crying on the phone earlier wanting to make her - a go of their marriage, I don't know when he told me that, I just recall him saying it. … On that night. 71 The plaintiff says that as they were walking on the path:68 … So it's quite a long walk, it's a long path, I just remember him, you know, saying, 'I thought you was tough? I thought you was tough?' And then as we got towards the end of the road, across from the IGA shop, he suddenly grabbed me by the throat and dragged me down a small hill and said, 'I'm going to rape you, I'm going to fuck you in the arse, I'm going to kill you' and then just laughed and said, 'I'm only joking'. … So at that point we were standing up and he grabbed me by the throat, dragged me down the hill, I remember the words he said, I don't remember if I fell over, I think I might have fallen over again and then got back up and he just laughed and said he was joking and then we carried on walking, I have to say the whole time I was thinking, 'How am I going to get away? How am I going to get away?' I contemplated running, but I was too scared to run because I knew he'd catch me, I - I contemplated knocking on people's doors, but I just thought if they're not in then I'm in big trouble. … I - I - I didn't know what he was capable of, I - I - at least get my face kicked in, at worst kill me. 72 When asked specifically whether there was anything in particular that caused the plaintiff to think that may happen, the plaintiff said 'Yes, he threatened to kill me'.69 67 ts 80. 68 ts 81 - ts 82. 69 ts 82. -- 27 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 28 73 According to the plaintiff, by this stage, they were very close to the plaintiff's house and that they had been walking 30 - 45 minutes by this time travelling towards the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff says that she was trying to get away and asked the defendant to let her go and he would not. The plaintiff's evidence is that she said:70 … 'Let me go, I'm going to call the police.' I don't remember what he said. I didn't call the police, my daughter called the police, I was not capable of making a phone call at that point. Events on reaching the plaintiff's home 74 Having reached her home around 8.00 pm or 8.30 pm, the plaintiff's evidence is that the defendant walked in the front door and straight in her bedroom saying 'I'm staying the night'.71 The plaintiff continued straight on to her 16-year-old daughter's room, 'just thought I'd get there as quickly as possible and get her to call the police':72 … I asked her to call the police, [LB]'s attacked me. I have a very, very vague recollection of what happened at that point, I think I must have been having a panic attack, it's like a black-out. I think I remember a bit of a commotion, of [LB] coming to the room, but I can't remember really much after that point. … - - - I was crying, panicking, scared. … I think I was having a panic attack. That's the only way I can describe it, I think. My brain, my - my mind just went blank and, yeah, I was crying, scared. 75 The plaintiff says that the defendant approached her daughter's bedroom door, her daughter pushed him out and the defendant eventually left the home. 70 ts 82. 71 ts 83. 72 ts 83 - ts 84. -- 28 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 29 Police attend the plaintiff's home 76 The plaintiff says that after the defendant left her home, two Western Australia police officers attended, including Constable Patrick. The plaintiff's evidence is that she told them what had happened to her in the pub and the park and how scared she was.73 The officers questioned her about the Incident and photographed her neck and arm.74 The plaintiff describes her injuries by that point as:75 … a scratch on my neck. I had a bruise appearing on my arm, had lumps on my head. My head was really sore. I could feel the lumps starting to come up all over my head. … 77 My throat had a scratch on it from where he'd grabbed me around the throat. 78 The plaintiff provided a formal statement to police on 26 September 2021.76 The plaintiff in her evidence at trial, stated that the evidence she gave in that statement remains her evidence to the court.77 The statement was prepared by a police officer for the purposes of a police investigation. It was not prepared for the purposes of civil litigation. Findings of credibility: The plaintiff 79 The plaintiff impressed me as an honest witness. On the plaintiff's evidence, she consumed alcohol at two venues on the evening of 23 September 2021, the Ocean View Tavern and the Cornerstone Hotel. 80 The plaintiff's evidence, taken as a whole, presents a narrative of sustained and escalating violence by the defendant over the course of approximately 30 - 45 minutes as they walked from the Cornerstone Hotel through the adjoining parklands towards her home. Her description of the assaults is consistent in its essential features: (a) repeated grabbing of her hair; (b) being pushed to the chest; 73 ts 85. 74 ts 87; Exhibit 8. 75 ts 85. 76 Exhibit 9, Plaintiff's signed statement dated 26 September 2021. 77 ts 103. -- 29 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 30 (c) falling to the ground; and (d) grabbing of her arm. 81 In describing how she wet herself and was crying, I found the plaintiff's evidence to be frank in saying, in essence, how she reacted to the situation. The plaintiff's recollection of wetting herself, of crying, of shouting for help, and of being terrified is given in terms that I do not consider to be exaggerated or embellished. 82 The plaintiff's evidence contains natural gaps - she is unable to recall precisely how many times she was thrown to the ground, or the exact sequence of some events, for example how long they had been in the park before she was grabbed by the defendant and thrown to the floor.78 Those gaps are consistent with her evidence of being in shock and distress. They do not detract from the overall consistency of the allegations as a whole and I find the plaintiff's evidence about the Incident on 23 September 2021 to be honest and accurate. 83 Because I found the plaintiff's evidence on those matters to do with the 23 September 2021 to be honest and accurate, I have come to the view that the entirety of her evidence was honest, accurate and reliable, although I would have been free to accept some of the plaintiff's evidence and reject other aspects of it. There was nothing in any of the plaintiff's evidence or the way in which she gave it that would permit me to find that it was anything less than honest, accurate and reliable. The defendant's evidence Relationship with the plaintiff 84 The defendant does not shy away from the fact that he and the plaintiff were in a relationship at the relevant time. When cross-examined, the defendant's evidence is that he and the plaintiff were totally in love with each other.79 The Incident on 23 September 2021 85 The defendant says that he remembers being at the Cornerstone Hotel and leaving the hotel and crossing the road and entering Brampton Park.80 The defendant admits in his evidence to pushing the plaintiff to the chest.81 The defendant says that he 78 ts 78. 79 ts 543. 80 ts 540. 81 ts 541. -- 30 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 31 remembers the wooden bridge and the plaintiff falling on the ground and hitting her head on the grass.82 The defendant says that he does not remember grabbing the plaintiff by the hair or pulling her hair.83 In cross-examination, the defendant disagreed that he pulled the plaintiff's hair so hard that he dragged the plaintiff across the wooden bridge or that the plaintiff said to him in the park that he had hurt her or words to the effect 'You've just attacked me'.84 86 The defendant admits to having grabbed the plaintiff's left arm in the park but not to grabbing her hair or throwing the plaintiff to the floor.85 The defendant in his evidence disagrees that he had been attacking the plaintiff for almost 15 minutes, or that the plaintiff shouted for help and was crying.86 In cross-examination, the defendant disagreed that he continued to attack the plaintiff after Camborne Parkway or that he took her phone and car keys or that he grabbed the plaintiff's hand 'so tight that she couldn't let go'.87 The defendant says that they were still holding hands towards the end of the road near the IGA.88 87 The defendant accepts that he has used the phrase 'I'm going to rape you' but denies saying it (that night) in the park.89 The defendant's evidence is that he did not say to the plaintiff 'I'm going to fuck you in the arse' or 'I'm going to kill you'.90 The defendant disagrees that he was upset that night because his wife had called him but says that he does not know if she called him.91 The defendant disagrees that he attacked the plaintiff for over 30 minutes but accepts that they were in the park for 30 minutes when it normally takes 20 minutes.92 The defendant accepts that none of the things put to him in cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiff about the events on the night as alleged by the plaintiff are things that he can remember other than the things that he has admitted to expressly.93 82 ts 541. 83 ts 541. 84 ts 542. 85 ts 542 and ts 544. 86 ts 542. 87 ts 544 - ts 546. 88 ts 547. 89 ts 547 - ts 548. 90 ts 548. 91 ts 548. 92 ts 548. 93 ts 548 - ts 549. -- 31 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 32 88 The defendant says that he saw that the plaintiff had wet herself when they got back to the house, but does not know when the plaintiff wet herself.94 Events on reaching the plaintiff's home 89 The defendant accepts that when they got back to the house that the plaintiff was upset and that the plaintiff did not follow him to her bedroom.95 His evidence is that he thought that the plaintiff was 'going to get a drink or something' and he accepts that he found her in RC's room.96 90 As to the manner in which he entered RC's room, and the suggestion that he 'barged in' the defendant says:97 … Your Honour, there was two other people in the house. If there was any commotion, they would have come out, so I disagree, your Honour. 91 The defendant accepts that he saw the plaintiff crying in RC's bedroom and that he left the house that night but does not remember the RC had to push him out of her bedroom.98 Police attend the defendant's home 92 The defendant accepts that Constable Patrick came to his house that night about the Incident but the defendant's evidence is that he does not remember telling Constable Patrick about what happened but accepts telling the police that he had pushed the plaintiff and that they had had an argument.99 The defendant's evidence is that he did not tell the police about 'the other things' that he did because it did not happen but says that he told the police that he believed that the plaintiff had pushed him.100 93 When cross-examined about conversations had with the plaintiff shortly after the Incident, the defendant accepts that 'I'd be lying if I said I remember' when asked if the plaintiff had told him that he had said that he wanted to kill her.101 The defendant admits in cross-examination that he apologised to the plaintiff for the push and told her he loved her.102 94 ts 549. 95 ts 549. 96 ts 549. 97 ts 550. 98 ts 550. 99 ts 550 - ts 551. 100 ts 551. 101 ts 554 - ts 555. 102 ts 559. -- 32 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 33 94 The defendant participated in a police interview on 16 October 2021 and was charged with common assault.103 The defendant plead guilty to a charge of common assault of having unlawfully assaulted the plaintiff in circumstances of aggravation. The defendant in giving his evidence in this trial does not shy away from the matters put to the lower court but similarly says when asked if his counsel said anything in the Magistrates Court hearing on 15 November 2021 with which he disagreed on that day:104 … it was a long time ago. … I can't remember it. … It's horrible, going to court. … I don't remember it'. 95 The defendant says that he called the plaintiff at the conclusion of the 72-hour police order and they met each other in person following this.105 Findings of credibility: The defendant 96 I regard the defendant to have been honest in some aspects of his evidence. The defendant admits to a number of essential features about the events leading up to the circumstances of the alleged Incident. For example, being at the Cornerstone Hotel and leaving the hotel and crossing the road and entering Brampton Park; to then pushing the plaintiff to the chest and the plaintiff falling on the ground and hitting her head on the grass; and to grabbing the plaintiff's left arm in the park. However, a notable feature of the defendant's evidence is that his lapses in recollection and memory bear directly upon the plaintiff's allegations of the severity of the assault. This is despite the defendant's evidence that he is only able to remember some aspects of the events on the evening of 23 September 2021. This is a pattern exhibited by the defendant at various times when difficult or uncomfortable questions are put to him by counsel in cross-examination to do with the assault. 97 I am of course free to accept some of the defendant's evidence and reject other aspects of it. Accordingly, whilst I regard the defendant to have been honest in some limited aspects of his evidence, I do not accept the defendant's evidence in many important respects. In particular, I do not accept the defendant's evidence about the extent and severity of the assault on 23 September 2021, the effect of which is to create an impression of convenience rather than accuracy and I cannot find that evidence to have been truthful. 103 ts 551. 104 ts 572. 105 ts 552. -- 33 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 34 The lay evidence Evidence of RC 98 The plaintiff's daughter, RC was aged 16 at the time of the alleged Incident having been born in 2005 and was living with the plaintiff at the time.106 On the evening of 23 September 2021, she and her brother along with her brother's girlfriend were at home when the plaintiff returned probably before nine o'clock.107 RC described sitting on her bed in her bedroom when the plaintiff entered her room crying hysterically and shaking.108 She could see that the plaintiff had also wet herself and described in her evidence there being a big wet patch around her crotch area.109 99 RC said that while she was speaking to the plaintiff and asking her about what had happened, the defendant opened the door and entered her bedroom at which point she asked the defendant what had happened but also wanted the defendant to exit her room. RC said she shoved the defendant out of her bedroom door and closed it.110 Having comforted the plaintiff, she decided to check if the defendant was still in the house:111 … I grabbed a knife, just in case. I didn't know what might have happened. I went around to each door, like, the back door, the laundry door, and the front door, checked if they were locked and closed. 100 On finding the defendant out the front door, the next thing RC did after having locked the door was call the police. RC told the defendant that she was calling the police.112 The defendant remained for around 10 - 20 minutes before leaving.113 101 In cross-examination, RC accepted that she had never seen the defendant hit her mother.114 She also accepted that the plaintiff and the defendant had gone down south one weekend for a holiday.115 106 ts 60. 107 ts 203 - ts 204. 108 ts 204. 109 ts 204. 110 ts 205. 111 ts 205. 112 ts 205 - ts 206. 113 ts 205 - ts 206. 114 ts 206. 115 ts 206. -- 34 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 35 Findings of credibility: RC 102 I found RC's evidence compelling. She spoke in a clear, careful and considered way, talking about the events, not only in her home, but inside the door of her bedroom, involving her mother and the defendant on the evening of 23 September 2021. I readily accept her evidence that the matters about which she gave evidence occurred in the circumstances in which she said they occurred. 103 RC's evidence as to the happening of these events is supported by her evidence that she called the police shortly afterwards once she had taken steps to satisfy herself that the defendant was locked outside the family home. 104 There was nothing in any of RC's evidence or the way in which she gave it that would permit me to find that it was anything less than honest, accurate and reliable. Evidence of Constable Patrick 105 The evidence of Constable Patrick was that he had been called to a domestic incident at the address where he entered and spoke to a female who identified as CC.116 Constable Patrick described the female as being 'very, very distraught at the incident, and then she explained of - of what had occurred earlier on that evening'.117 Constable Patrick's evidence is that he prepared the Western Australia Police Incident Report and recorded the Incident as having been reported at 'When: 20.49'.118 Constable Patrick left the plaintiff's property approximately half an hour after that time.119 Constable Patrick confirmed that he did not locate any CCTV footage. 106 Constable Patrick confirmed that the police order was made at 10.14 pm on 23 September 2021 and that he served the police order on the defendant at his residential address at 10.24 pm.120 116 ts 211; Exhibit 6. 117 ts 210. 118 ts 212 - ts 213; Exhibit 35. 119 ts 213. 120 ts 214 - ts 215; Exhibit 36. -- 35 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 36 107 Constable Patrick says that he spoke with the plaintiff over the phone on 24 September 2021 and 25 September 2021 prior to the plaintiff attending the Clarkson Police Station on 26 September 2021 to provide a statement to him.121 Constable Patrick subsequently arrested and interviewed the defendant on 16 October 2021.122 Following the interview Constable Patrick set protective bail conditions and charged the defendant with aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm and common assault.123 The protective bail conditions included the following condition: 'Must not contact or attempt to contact [CC]'.124 108 In cross-examination, Constable Patrick confirmed that there was no CCTV footage or witnesses to the Incident that night. Constable Patrick accepts that on attending the police station, the defendant had told him that he did not remember what happened.125 109 During the course of cross-examination, the defendant sought to put to Constable Patrick hypothetical scenarios of what could have transpired had the defendant elected not to participate in the interview and/or had been represented by a lawyer at the time instead. Ultimately, this line of questioning invites speculation on the part of Constable Patrick as to whether this could have resulted in a different outcome with regards to the resulting charge.126 In any event, Constable Patrick said that 'And it's not just me. So there's - - - - - - multiple police that look at this'.127 Findings of credibility: Constable Patrick 110 I find Constable Patrick's evidence on to have been honest and accurate and consistent with contemporaneous documents, including those prepared by Constable Patrick in response to the Incident and as part of the police investigation undertaken as a result. Further, I find the evidence of Constable Patrick to be consistent with the evidence of the plaintiff herself. There was nothing in any of Constable Patrick's evidence or the way in which he gave it that would permit me to find that it was anything less than honest, accurate and reliable. 121 ts 218; Exhibit 37 and Exhibit 38. The plaintiff's witness statement is Exhibit 9 and an aerial map photograph of the park area where the alleged Incident occurred is Exhibit 7. 122 ts 223 - ts 224. 123 ts 228; Exhibit 41. 124 ts 228; Exhibit 41. 125 ts 231. 126 ts 232 - ts 233. 127 ts 233. -- 36 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 37 Battery - The law 111 The plaintiff advances in her pleadings a claim for battery. I follow and apply the legal principles as to what constitutes the tort of battery as explained by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Carter v Walker:128 215 … it is desirable to state what we understand the law with respect to battery otherwise to be in Australia: (1) it is a species of trespass to the person; (2) it is a so-called 'intentional' tort, but care needs to be taken in considering the intention which is relevant; (3) as a starting point, it involves the defendant doing an act which causes physical contact with the plaintiff; (4) the act must be voluntary, that is, directed by the defendant's conscious mind; (5) … the act must have a direct rather than a consequential impact upon the plaintiff (of this, more later); (6) it does not require that the defendant intend the plaintiff any harm, or that the plaintiff suffer harm in fact. It is actionable per se; (7) if the act is voluntary, and the defendant 'meant to do it' in the sense of meaning to contact the plaintiff, it will be relevantly intentional; (8) it may be that an act should also be considered intentional if it is substantially certain that the act will result in contact with the plaintiff; and perhaps also if the act is reckless with respect to contact with the plaintiff. … … (11) once battery is established, immediate harm and consequential damage are compensable. The boundary of entitlement is set by the conception of 'natural and probable consequence' (or 'result'). That appears to be a common control mechanism for intentional torts. … It is not a test of reasonable foreseeability, even though the two tests might yield the same result in some, or even many, cases. (footnotes omitted) 128 Carter v Walker [2010] VSCA 340; (2010) 32 VR 1 [215]. See also ZYX v Cable [229] - [231]. -- 37 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 38 112 The definition of battery in tort is very similar to the definition of an assault within the provisions of the Criminal Code.129 The defendant would not be liable in damages for battery if his action was justified on the ground that he was acting in self-defence.130 113 Where self-defence is raised, I must find that the behaviour of the plaintiff did cause in the defendant a reasonable apprehension of impending violence and that that apprehension was intentional on the part of the plaintiff. It therefore being essential that the defendant prove that intent on the part of the plaintiff. Such a finding would involve the drawing of an inference based upon the proven facts. In the present matter, although the defendant in his evidence says that he believed that the plaintiff had pushed him, no such defence is expressly pleaded and is not in any way meaningfully advanced.131 Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff has established that the defendant's actions on 23 September 2021 constituted assault and battery 114 It is uncontroversial that the plaintiff and the defendant continued in a relationship for a period of time after the Incident on 23 September 2021. The relationship continued in an 'on and off' capacity for a number of months following this.132 The phone records provided by the defendant indicate that numerous phone calls were made between the parties between the September 2021 and June 2023 however, they became increasingly sporadic as time went on.133 It is agreed by the parties that their relationship ended in June 2023.134 115 An attempt was made by the plaintiff to drop the charge against the defendant.135 It is unclear whether the plaintiff did this because the defendant asked her to, or whether the plaintiff volunteered it.136 In any event, the plaintiff was told by the police that as it was a domestic violence Incident under investigation, continuation of the charge was a matter for the police.137 129 Ormerod v Court [2012] WADC 33 (Ormerod) [73]. 130 Ormerod [75]. 131 ts 551. 132 ts 110. 133 Exhibit 106. 134 ts 133, ts 584. 135 Exhibit 37. 136 ts 140, ts 558 - ts 559. 137 Exhibit 37. -- 38 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 39 116 The fact that the plaintiff and defendant continued in a relationship, or that an attempt was made by the plaintiff to drop the charge against the defendant does not diminish or eradicate in any way, the allegations the subject of the claimed assault and battery advanced by the plaintiff. That is, the fact of the one does not cancel out the other. 117 For completeness and having had regard to the defendant, who is a litigant-in-person, I note that whilst not the subject of evidence, the defendant's 'case theory' for want of a better term, centres in part around his belief that the plaintiff is a hurt lover and is suing the defendant because he broke her heart. The defendant for example relies on an email from the plaintiff to Dr Terace's rooms sent 17 March 2025 in which the plaintiff refers to the defendant as the love of her life and the extent of her feelings of love to advance this view.138 Much is made of this line of questioning in the defendant's cross-examination of Dr Terace which I make mention of here in the context of the defendant's 'case theory' for want of a better term.139 Dr Terace's evidence was that the evidence did not change his opinion in principle.140 118 In addition, there is a hint, by the defendant, that the plaintiff may have been motivated to pursue an 'injury insurance claim' against the defendant.141 This is entirely speculative on the part of the defendant and certainly not the subject of any evidence and are matters that I disregard in their entirety. Factual findings concerning the Incident on 23 September 2021 119 The only witnesses of fact to the Incident on 23 September 2021 were the plaintiff and the defendant. I prefer the plaintiff's evidence and am satisfied to the requisite standard that the assault and battery perpetrated by the defendant occurred as the plaintiff described. This for the following reasons. 120 First, on the balance of probabilities, I find the plaintiff to be a credible witness and accept her evidence as to the circumstances of the Incident on 23 September 2021. The plaintiff's account of the defendant assaulting her - including pushing her to the ground, 138 ts 195; Exhibit 33. 139 ts 494 - ts 495. 140 ts 494 - ts 495. 141 ts 56. -- 39 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 40 dragging her by the hair, throwing her to the ground multiple times, threatening her and coercing her movements - is credible, consistent and reliable. 121 Second, the defendant has consistently admitted to pushing the plaintiff to the chest causing the plaintiff to fall to the ground; to there being some form of altercation between them the evening of 23 September 2021; that the plaintiff was upset when they got back that evening to the plaintiff's house; and that the plaintiff had wet herself. As to the balance of the violence alleged, the defendant does not admit these allegations but the defendant's own evidence is that he does not remember much of that evening. 122 Third, the defendant did not challenge the plaintiff's account of the defendant assaulting her. Where the defendant took the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff, it was for the purposes of verifying that the plaintiff had been in love with the defendant and that they had planned a life together. 123 Finally, I have had regard to the defendant's criminal conviction. 124 In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied as to, and make the following findings of fact in respect of the Incident on 23 September 2021: 1. On 23 September 2021, the plaintiff and the defendant consumed alcohol, first at the Ocean View Tavern sometime in the late afternoon and later in the evening at the Cornerstone Hotel. 2. The plaintiff and the defendant left the Cornerstone Hotel together, crossed the road, and entered Brampton Park. 3. That the plaintiff and the defendant had an argument. 4. In Brampton Park, the defendant assaulted the plaintiff by pushing her in the chest, causing her to fall to the ground and strike her head. The defendant further assaulted the plaintiff by grabbing her left arm, repeatedly grabbing her hair and grabbing her by the throat. 5. This violence occurred while the plaintiff and defendant walked from the Cornerstone Hotel, through adjoining parklands, toward the plaintiff's home over the course of approximately 30 - 45 minutes. -- 40 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 41 6. As a direct result of the defendant's violence, the plaintiff cried, shouted for help, involuntarily wet herself, and was terrified. 125 In all of the circumstances, and further to my findings in respect of the Incident, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established the defendant's actions on 23 September 2021 constituted assault and battery. 126 Further, while the defendant did not expressly advance any defence of lawful justification or consent of the person, in my view, any such defence falls away in any event having had regard my findings in respect of what occurred on 23 September 2021. 127 I make the following further findings based on the plaintiff's evidence. The plaintiff's education and employment history 128 The plaintiff completed her schooling in the United Kingdom at age 16 and thereafter worked in various roles including in a market store; taught aerobics classes; obtained an apprenticeship as a trainee chef.142 129 After arriving in Australia in 2011, the plaintiff spent six months as a bank teller with Westpac Bank (Westpac). The plaintiff left her role at Westpac and commenced a part-time role in customer service with the City of Joondalup on 27 February 2012, remaining for three years before moving into the role of swimming pool inspector in 2015 with the City of Joondalup. 130 As a swimming pool inspector, the plaintiff conducted safety inspections at private homes of pool fences, or the house, or both.143 She attended approximately six inspections per day on her own and was expected to enter properties unaccompanied when the home owners were not at home. The plaintiff says she coped with the role and did not really have problems in the role although people would get aggressive when she told them things they did not like.144 The plaintiff says this happened quite a lot and that she had been threatened several times.145 The plaintiff was able to cope with this at the time.146 142 ts 60. 143 ts 65; Exhibit 1; see also Exhibit 1A. 144 ts 65. 145 ts 65. 146 ts 65. -- 41 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 42 131 In 2020 the plaintiff undertook further study, completing a Certificate III in Community Services147 that year and a Certificate IV in Community Services148 in 2021, while continuing full-time employment as a swimming pool inspector.149 The plaintiff was unclear as to what specific roles these qualifications related to but says she would eventually have liked to have moved into a role helping people with domestic abuse in refuges, potentially as a receptionist, not a counsellor which required a degree qualification.150 The plaintiff was not sure what types of employment opportunities the Certificate III and Certificate IV qualifications opened up.151 132 The plaintiff intended to stay at the City of Joondalup initially and secure a role in community development. As the sole provider, the plaintiff could not leave her secure employment with the City of Joondalup lightly. 133 Since 9 December 2024, the plaintiff has been acting as a community transport officer and community development within the City of Joondalup, managing programs assisting elderly residents.152 She describes this work 'I love that role, yeah, I find it really good. Really enjoy it'.153 The effect of the plaintiff's marriage breakdown on the plaintiff's health 134 The plaintiff describes the final years of the marriage to DC as stressful, during which she sought counselling and, at times, medication. The plaintiff was left with significant financial burdens and she ultimately declared bankruptcy. The plaintiff says that once she had gotten through the process and secured a rental so that she and the children could have some normality, she was probably the happiest she had been in the past two decades.154 135 By 2018, the plaintiff describes her mental health as being very good.155 147 ts 73; Exhibit 3. 148 ts 73; Exhibit 4. 149 ts 72. 150 ts 73. 151 ts 73. 152 ts 68; Exhibit 2. 153 ts 68; Exhibit 2. 154 ts 71. 155 ts 71. -- 42 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 43 Consultation with medical practitioner post Incident 136 The day after the Incident, the plaintiff says that she was crying non-stop that day and was in a very stressed state. She went to a different doctor's surgery that she had been to in the past for a pre-arranged COVID vaccination. It was there that she saw Dr Pyne.156 137 The plaintiff says she had a long discussion with Dr Pyne who conducted an examination of her neck, head, jaw and ears and told him everything that had happened to her the night before about the assault. The plaintiff told Dr Pyne that 'this is not the first abusive relationship I've had, but I've never been violently assaulted before'.157 She was prescribed sleeping pills and Valium to calm her down.158 The plaintiff told Dr Pyne that she was on 25 milligrams of Valdoxan.159 In re-examination, the plaintiff says that she told Dr Pyne that she had the day off work, but that she cannot remember telling Dr Pyne at any stage that she had time off work because of the assault.160 138 When cross-examined, the plaintiff says that she went to the medical surgery for a pre-arranged COVID injection and when the nurse saw that the plaintiff was visibly upset, she arranged for the plaintiff to be seen by a doctor (ie Dr Pyne).161 The defendant cross-examined the plaintiff about 'a vicious attack' and went to ask whether the plaintiff needed stiches, an X-ray, 'anything in a sling', a plaster cast, a bandage or a band-aid.162 The plaintiff answered 'no' to all of these.163 139 The plaintiff went back to see Dr Pyne a week later and was given a mental health care plan by Dr Pyne who intended to refer the plaintiff to a psychologist.164 The plaintiff says she asked to be referred to Ms Scallan, a psychologist who knew the plaintiff's past history.165 156 ts 96 - ts 97. 157 ts 97. 158 ts 97. 159 ts 97. 160 ts 201. 161 ts 190. 162 ts 190. 163 ts 190. 164 ts 109. 165 ts 109. -- 43 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 44 140 The plaintiff saw Ms Scallan in respect of the Incident about a week after this. At that appointment, the plaintiff told Ms Scallan that she had gotten into a relationship with a married man, whom she believed was separated from his wife and explained to Ms Scallan about the assault and what she was going through at that time.166 The plaintiff described the following symptoms to Ms Scallan:167 … I was in a lot of distress at that point in time. I was trembling and shaking and crying. And constantly thinking about the assault. Plaintiff's health and medical condition post Incident 141 The plaintiff says that she consulted Dr Pyne and not Dr Crooke (her usual general practitioner) because Dr Pyne was aware of what had happened to her during the assault.168 The plaintiff says she returned to Dr Pyne in the period 2021 - 2023 'mainly to get mental healthcare plans and medication'.169 The plaintiff says she needed a mental health care plan every six months 'so Medicare can pay the psychologist'.170 142 The plaintiff was diagnosed with stage 1 breast cancer on 20 January 2022 and underwent a lumpectomy, a biopsy and 20 rounds of radiotherapy administered daily over a 4-week period in March and April 2022.171 The plaintiff says that both the diagnosis and treatment were stressful and financially stressful.172 The plaintiff says that she spoke to her psychologist about the stress and sought mental health treatment from Ms Scallan.173 The plaintiff says that she told Dr Crooke about the assault during one of the consultations for breast cancer.174 143 The plaintiff says that she was seeing Dr Crooke, her ordinary general practitioner, and later Dr Hilldich, a doctor she had seen in previous years, when Dr Crooke moved practices.175 166 ts 109. 167 ts 109 - ts 110. 168 ts 202. 169 ts 202. 170 ts 202. 171 ts 111 - ts 113. 172 ts 111. 173 ts 111 - ts 113. 174 ts 200. 175 ts 113. -- 44 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 45 144 The plaintiff says that she continued to seek treatment because she was having symptoms:176 … Lots of anxiety in my chest, heart palpitations, shakiness, flashbacks, nightmares, depression, anxiety. When you say flashbacks, what is in the - what is a flashback? --- Well, say I'm watching a program and a woman is getting dragged around by the hair, that's really triggering. That will take me back to getting my hair pulled. Sometimes when I'm at the hairdressers or having a massage, that will take me back to getting my hair pulled. 145 The plaintiff says that she had quite a few nightmare but one in particular was 'was when [LB] was dragging me along the floor in the park, and saying, "She's twice as good as you, she's twice as good as you," talking about his wife.'177 The plaintiff explained that:178 … And when I have these dreams, I - it takes me an hour or so to get back to sleep. And sometimes like the anxiety will stay with me all day, the day after. 146 The plaintiff says that she had a bursitis in her shoulder for which she underwent day surgery (keyhole) around October or November 2022.179 147 The plaintiff describes that at the end of 2022 her symptoms were:180 … They were really bad. Really bad. I - I was jumping at everything, absolutely everything. Just something out the corner of my eye, if someone walked into a room. It got embarrassing at work that if someone tapped me on the shoulder, I'd literally jump out of my seat. If someone came out of a lift, it - it was horrendous. I was - yeah, just not in a good place. 148 The plaintiff says that as time progressed she had been seeing her general practitioner and psychologist and then a psychiatrist, following a referral by Dr Crooke.181 The plaintiff explained: … I had tried everything holistically to help myself heal, calm my nervous system down. I was going to Breathwork. I was going to a sister circle every fortnight which consisted of meditation, breathwork 176 ts 113. 177 ts 114 - ts 115. 178 ts 114. 179 ts 114 - ts 115. 180 ts 114. 181 ts 114 - ts 115. -- 45 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 46 and talking, sharing. I was doing meditation classes on a Monday, and online on a Sunday. I was going to sound healing. I was already on 25 milligrams of Valdoxan. And I wasn't getting any better by that point. So yeah, I - I knew that I had to do something. And because I had been on antidepressants before, it was the last resort, but I know they were - they helped, so that's when I decided to go. 149 The plaintiff first saw Dr Priestly on 6 November 2023 who prescribed Pristiq.182 The plaintiff says that when she first started taking it, it made her feel worse - nauseas and anxious, but over time, it did really help her a lot.183 The plaintiff said:184 … My sleep improved, and the - I - I suffered with like constant thoughts about the assault, lies in the relationship, yeah. And I - it really helped with that constant chatter that was in my brain. It felt like - it felt like it was there 24/7, it felt like absolute torture. The moment I woke up, it was there to when I went to sleep, but unless I was occupied by something else, you know. It - it really helped with that - that thought, constant chitter chattering in my mind. It - like I said, it helped me with sleep. It - it did help me with the depression and the anxiety as well to a certain extent, but it also had negative effects on me. It made me gain weight, it gave me a sort of a fight effect. I didn't feel too depressed or too anxious, but I also didn't feel anything, like any joy or happiness. But it - it really got me out of some horrible mental health issues at the time. 150 The plaintiff stopped taking the medication in May 2025 because she gained quite a bit of weight.185 The plaintiff explained that she wanted to wean herself off it because of the weight gain and because she was feeling quite a bit better.186 This was not on the advice of Dr Priestly.187 However, the plaintiff would consider going back on the medication if she were to go to downhill. The plaintiff said:188 … And I am actually considering going back on it because I almost feel back to square one again now. 151 The plaintiff says that she most recently saw Dr Priestly in about October 2025 and is currently taking Valium (5 milligrams) every night and Valdoxan (50 milligrams) and that she takes Diazepam for sleep (because it relaxes her) and to calm her down at night.189 182 ts 116. 183 ts 116. 184 ts 116. 185 ts 117. 186 ts 117. 187 ts 117. 188 ts 117. 189 ts 117 - ts 118. -- 46 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 47 Whilst Dr Hilditch, the plaintiff's current general practitioner, will prescribe the anti-depressant medication, the plaintiff says that she will not prescribe the Valium (5 milligrams).190 152 The plaintiff says that she currently sees Ms Scallan about once a month.191 153 The plaintiff says that she saw Dr Terace in March 2025 for a 90-minute consultation during which time she told him her life history before eventually going onto the topic of the assault.192 The plaintiff says that everything that she said to Dr Terace was consistent with her evidence. The plaintiff says that during the consultation she forgot to tell Dr Terace about the bankruptcy; some stress with her daughter when she was a teenager; that she smoked on and off when stressed; and is addicted to Nicorette gum now.193 154 In cross-examination, the plaintiff was taken to email correspondence sent by the plaintiff to Dr Terace's rooms.194 The plaintiff accepts having written the email and says that she wrote to Dr Terace because she was having trouble sleeping through ruminating and that after the 90 minute interview, it was difficult for her to get 'everything out'.195 The plaintiff says that she wrote to Dr Terace to explain things she felt she 'hadn't gotten out in the interview'.196 155 The plaintiff was taken to invoices relating to various medical treatment expenses which the plaintiff confirmed is treatment she incurred as a consequence of the assault, and which she has claimed as well as private health insurance statements.197 In relation to Ms Scallan's invoices for the period 9 October 2021 to 1 November 2025, the plaintiff says that she was bulk-billed for the period 9 October 2021 to 28 July 2023 but from 11 August 2023 this was no longer the case.198 The plaintiff confirmed that she has not paid to Ms Scallan the amounts in the outstanding fee/gap column of her summary invoices.199 The plaintiff's evidence is that she has not paid this outstanding amount to Ms Scallan because of financial hardship but will pay this amount out of any compensation that she receives.200 190 ts 117 - ts 118. 191 ts 118. 192 ts 119. 193 ts 120. 194 ts 193. 195 ts 193. 196 ts 193. 197 ts 126 and ts 133. 198 ts 129; Exhibit 32. 199 ts 129; Exhibit 32. 200 ts 130; Exhibit 32. -- 47 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 48 Plaintiff's work capacity following the Incident 156 The plaintiff confirmed that she is still employed by the City of Joondalup and is presently in the role of acting community transport officer.201 157 The acting role is a maternity leave contract, at the conclusion of which the plaintiff returns to her role as a swimming pool inspector.202 The plaintiff says that 'the contract is a year', that 'the contract started in October 2024 but did not actually start (in the role) until 9 December'.203 The plaintiff says that she is currently acting in the role on a second contract, due to 'an extension of maternity leave' and it is a contract until 23 October 2026.204 The plaintiff explained that if the person on maternity leave 'decides she wants to come back, she can come back at any time as long as she gives notice'.205 158 However, the plaintiff's evidence is that whilst she has her role as a swimming pool inspector to return to at the conclusion of the acting role, and that she is expected to return to the role of swimming pool inspector, she does not intend to.206 As to the reasons why, the plaintiff says:207 … I want to look for a different job. If I don't - if I can't stay in this role, I want to look for a different role with less confrontation and aggression. Yep. 159 The plaintiff says that there is a difference in the rates of pay as between the roles, with the acting role attracting a higher rate of pay as a Level 5.2 position.208 The role of swimming pool inspector is a Level 4.4 position and has a lower rate of pay.209 The plaintiff says that she would apply for the acting role of community transport officer if that role was available to her substantively.210 201 ts 120 and ts 196. 202 ts 196. 203 ts 196 - ts 197. 204 ts 197 - ts 198; Exhibit 34. 205 ts 196. 206 ts 196. 207 ts 196. 208 ts 196. 209 ts 196. 210 ts 197. -- 48 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 49 160 The plaintiff says that since the assault, she took a second job on a casual basis at Optus Stadium as a suite attendant working game days.211 The plaintiff confirmed that both of those incomes are recorded in her income tax returns from the period 30 June 2017 to date.212 The plaintiff's income as it appears in her tax returns for this period can be summarised as follows: Year Taxable Income 2016/17 $61,977.00 2017/18 $64,385.00 2018/19 $69,188.00 2019/20 $72,329.00 2020/21 $74,790.00 2021/22 $72,387.00 2022/23 $72,636.00 2023/24 $84,018.00 2024/25 $88,578.00 161 The plaintiff says that her income has not substantially changed since the filing of her 2025 income tax return. The plaintiff also says that she had had a pay rise from the City of Joondalup.213 As a result, the plaintiff says that there is no need for her to work a second job anymore.214 162 In cross-examination, it was put to the plaintiff that Dr Pyne in his report dated 24 July 2023 said that there was no work restriction due to the Incident or resulting mental health issues.215 The plaintiff agreed that that was what Dr Pyne was aware of. 211 ts 120. 212 ts 121 - ts 122; Exhibits 10 - 18. 213 Exhibit 19. As a result of the City of Joondalup's pay rise there is a different rate of pay as at the end of 30 June 2024 to present. The plaintiff relies on Exhibit 19 as the rate indicative of her current pay. 214 ts 122. 215 ts 191 - ts 192; Exhibit 55. -- 49 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 50 Relationship with the defendant post the Incident 163 The plaintiff says that she resumed a relationship with the defendant for two months after the Incident and was then in a relationship on and off for two years with the defendant.216 During this time, the defendant appears to have continued to be in a relationship with his wife. It was put to the plaintiff in cross-examination by the defendant that she had looked over his fence into his property on one occasion in 2022.217 The plaintiff said that she did this to try 'catch him out' as she felt deceived in their relationship.218 164 Both the plaintiff and defendant referred to the 'Chemist Warehouse' encounter of June 2023. The defendant put to the plaintiff in cross-examination that the plaintiff was waiting for him outside the store however, the plaintiff denies this.219 The defendant submits that the parties engaged with each other romantically on this occasion and after which, the relationship ended.220 165 The plaintiff says the relationship 'properly' and 'finally' ended in June 2023 after the Chemist Warehouse encounter.221 The plaintiff says she is no longer in a relationship with the defendant and has not had contact with the defendant since that date.222 The plaintiff's health and condition Dr Pyne's evidence Dr Pyne's background 166 The plaintiff called Dr Pyne to give evidence. Dr Pyne is a general practitioner and obtained a Bachelor of Medicine and a Bachelor of Surgery from the University of Glasgow in the United Kingdom in 2004 and is qualified as a member of the Royal College of General Practitioners in the United Kingdom.223 167 When he moved to Australia in 2017, Dr Pyne's qualifications transferred with him. 216 ts 133. 217 ts 165. 218 ts 165. 219 ts 164. 220 ts 58. 221 ts 133. 222 ts 133. 223 ts 237. -- 50 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 51 First consultation with Dr Pyne 168 The plaintiff attended Dr Pyne in the course of his practice at the Connolly Drive Medical Centre for a COVID vaccine.224 The plaintiff was not a regular patient of Dr Pyne's:225 … during the time there I think our nurse that was helping us with the vaccine clinic recognised that she was in a bit of distress and so asked me to have a consultation with her. 169 Dr Pyne recalled that there had been an alleged Incident the night before with the plaintiff's partner that left the plaintiff with some physical bruises and she was shaken up mentally.226 Dr Pyne's notes of the plaintiff's consultation with him on 24 September 2021 record that the plaintiff had said that she had been assaulted by her boyfriend on the way home from the pub the night before that left her with some physical injuries.227 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition 170 Dr Pyne carried out a general examination of the plaintiff's injuries and documented that:228 … she had some general, like, just some general pains, some superficial abrasions around her neck, and she was a bit tender in her jaw, but otherwise the examination was generally okay. 171 Dr Pyne observed that the plaintiff was a bit upset and a bit distressed. Dr Pyne formed the following diagnosis:229 … Just that, yeah, there was some kind of minor injuries and, yeah, some kind of acute stress due to the incident. … … I gave her some short-term medications to help with the, kind of, the immediate aftermath of what had happened and just to help her in the coming few days, and I think I planned for her to come back and see me the following week to see how things were going and check and see if things had improved, and to kind of plan further management from there when she was hopefully feeling a little bit calmer. 224 ts 238. 225 ts 243. 226 ts 238. 227 ts 238 - ts 239; Exhibit 43. 228 ts 239. 229 ts 239 - ts 240. See also ts 241. -- 51 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 52 172 Dr Pyne prescribed some short term medications - Zoplicone, a short term sleeping tablet and a low dose of Diazepam (2 milligrams), a short term anti-anxiety medication, 'to help her in the coming few days' and planned for her to come back and see him the following week.230 On 30 September 2021, he saw the plaintiff again.231 Dr Pyne says that there were no real concerns with the physical injuries at that stage but he made a mental health treatment plan and referred the plaintiff to Ms Scallan, a psychologist she had previously seen.232 Dr Pyne's evidence is that he considered that the plaintiff needed a referral to a psychologist to help process what had happened and to help manage her mental health going forward.233 173 Dr Pyne evidence is that the plaintiff scored quite highly in both the depression and anxiety symptoms having completed a DASS-21 screening questionnaire but in terms of the overall picture he felt that it was more anxiety than depression.234 He does not recall receiving feedback from Ms Scallan in relation to the treatment specifically.235 The next consultation Dr Pyne had with the plaintiff was a follow up consultation on 24 January 2022 seeking a prescription of Diazepam and was given a short term prescription.236 Dr Pyne next saw the plaintiff on 11 February 2022, the main purpose of the consultation was in respect of a further mental health treatment plan.237 By this stage, the plaintiff had unfortunately had recent health issues having had a lumpectomy which were contributing to her mental health as well as other factors at home with regards to housing and work.238 Dr Pyne's evidence is that he was unable to say specifically that the assault no longer related to this mental health treatment plan.239 174 The final occasion on which Dr Pyne saw the plaintiff was 23 June 2023 for the purposes of reviewing her mental health. Dr Pyne's evidence is that he noted the plaintiff as having ongoing anxiety regarding her previous assault. On this occasion, Dr Pyne prescribed Proponal (10 milligrams), an alternative medication for the treatment for anxiety in addition to discussing the plaintiff's prescription of Valdoxan (25 milligrams), an anti-depressant, which the 230 ts 239 - ts 240. 231 Exhibit 44. 232 ts 241; Exhibit 46. 233 ts 242. 234 ts 243 - ts 247; Exhibit 46. 235 ts 246. 236 ts 248 - ts 250; Exhibit 47. 237 ts 253 - ts 256; Exhibits 48 and 49. 238 ts 253 - ts 256. 239 ts 258 - ts 259. -- 52 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 53 plaintiff was already on at that point.240 Dr Pyne's view was that the symptoms the plaintiff had been reported to him had not resolved and required ongoing management.241 Future medical treatment 175 Dr Pyne confirmed that he prepared a report in response to a report request from the plaintiff's solicitors dated 9 July 2023.242 Dr Pyne in his report dated 24 July 2023 said that the plaintiff first attended on 24 September 2021 and when she presented she had general aches, headache, scalp tenderness, superficial abrasions around her neck and right sided jaw tenderness.243 Dr Pyne attributed these injuries to the alleged assault the night before (23 September 2021), from her partner at the time.244 176 Dr Pyne said that there was no specific treatment required for the plaintiff's physical injuries - they healed quickly without intervention.245 However, he said that the plaintiff needed ongoing support relating to the stress and anxiety of the Incident and was given short term Zopiclone and Diazepam to assist with the anxiety and sleep disturbances secondary to the Incident.246 177 Dr Pyne in his report confirmed that the plaintiff returned on 30 September 2021 and her physical injuries were much improved at this time.247 However, a mental health treatment plan was completed to gain access to a psychologist (Ms Scallan) to help with the mental stress of the Incident and that the ongoing psychological support has been beneficial to the plaintiff to help process the Incident and deal with some other stress/health issues that were unrelated to the Incident.248 Dr Pyne in his report noted that the plaintiff has also continued to take Valdoxan (25 milligrams) at night to help with anxiety and was taking this prior to the original Incident and noted that the plaintiff was using Diazepam (2 milligrams) sparingly for anxiety also.249 240 ts 259 - ts 261; Exhibit 52. Note Dr Pyne had previously provided a further referral on 21 June 2022 for the plaintiff to continue to receive ongoing psychological treatment from Ms Scallan following a consultation. See Exhibits 50 and 51. 241 ts 260 - ts 262. 242 ts 266 - ts 268; Exhibit 54. 243 Exhibit 55, page 11; pars (a) and (b). 244 ts 269; Exhibit 55, page 11; par (c). 245 ts 269; Exhibit 55, page 11; par (d). 246 ts 270; Exhibit 55, page 11; par (d). 247 Exhibit 55, page 11; par (e). 248 ts 269; Exhibit 55, page 11; par (e). 249 ts 269; Exhibit 55, page 11; par (d). -- 53 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 54 178 Dr Pyne said that the plaintiff last attended on 23 June 2023 and reported that there was ongoing anxiety related to the Incident but the psychology and medication continued to help.250 179 Dr Pyne's view was that psychology and medication are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.251 As to the meaning of foreseeable future, Dr Pyne, in giving his evidence at trial, noted that the report was documented two year ago, said:252 … it was very difficult to predict when - when that was likely to - need to stop. So there was no - I - I wouldn't be able to predict how long that would be, but it would likely be something that could be - that - that potentially could be something that could be continued long term for potentially years afterwards … 180 Dr Pyne ultimately said that he could not provide an opinion when the psychological treatment and medication requirements will end.253 Future work capacity 181 Dr Pyne's view is that there has been no work restrictions due to the Incident or resulting mental health issues that he is aware of.254 Dr Pyne's evidence is that he was not aware of the plaintiff missing any time off work, and more specifically, that he had not given the plaintiff any medical certificates for any time off work throughout any of the time that she had come to see him.255 Dr Pyne's said that he was not aware if she had time off from her work noting that he was aware that she had seen another doctor somewhere else.256 Dr Crooke's evidence Dr Crooke's background 182 The plaintiff called Dr Crooke, her long time former general practitioner, to give evidence. He is a general practitioner and obtained a Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery from the University of Western Australia in 1984. 250 Exhibit 55, page 11; par (f). 251 ts 270; Exhibit 55, page 11; par (g). 252 ts 270. 253 ts 271. 254 ts 270. 255 ts 271. 256 ts 271. -- 54 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 55 183 For a period of time between 1986 - 2013, Dr Crooke pursued an alternative career in venture capital and business in the United States of America before returning to Perth, getting re-credentialled as a general practitioner and returning to practice since that time for a period of some 12 years.257 Dr Crooke previously worked as a general practitioner at the Jindalee Medical Centre until around July 2024 is as now at the Wembley Medical Centre.258 The plaintiff's pre-Incident medical condition 184 Dr Crooke said that he has known the plaintiff for about 10 or 11 years and started seeing her in 2014 shortly after restarting practice at Jindalee Medical Centre about 4 - 6 times a year for different things.259 Dr Crooke said that the plaintiff had made it clear to him that she had been unfortunate in that she had been in abusive relationships since her late teens - lots of emotional and some financial abuse and some physical abuse although he does not recall specific psychical abuse that she had consulted him about prior to the assault.260 185 Dr Crooke said that in terms of treatment he provided to the plaintiff prior to the assault, it went on over many years and was really in relation to developing her psychological awareness and building coping strategies and strengths. This treatment included drug and psychological treatment, some of which was done by him, but more so by others. The treatment was around addressing the plaintiff's anxiety around relationships and difficulties dealing with parenting issues, including difficulties with her daughter, RC, family issues, including trying to get her son settled in Australia, that caused her considerable stress in the context of her prior marriage which was 'certainly emotionally abusive' and the plaintiff was up and down.261 186 Dr Crooke said that he started seeing the plaintiff in 2014 and five years later, she was quite a bit better, less anxious and had sorted some of these family issues out:262 … But she bounced back from that, she got a job, she started supporting herself, she was independent. And she was feeling good about rebuilding her life after getting through all of these, you know, quite significant stressors. 257 ts 279 - ts 280. 258 ts 280. 259 ts 281 - ts 282 and ts 285. 260 ts 283. 261 ts 284 and ts 285. 262 ts 285. -- 55 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 56 187 Dr Crooke said that by 2019, 2020, the plaintiff was seeing him somewhat less frequently, was stable and was reasonably okay.263 Whilst she may have had some anxiety, she was in a position to be able to self-manage it.264 Dr Crooke said that in 2019 and 2020 he prescribed the plaintiff anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medication although he did not himself consider this unusual as 'almost half of the patients I see are on anti-depressants of one kind of another'.265 Of the medication prescribed, this included standard dose anti-depressant medication Valdoxan (25 milligram) and sleeping tablets.266 188 Dr Crooke's evidence is that people can have difficulty sleeping and it is not always to do with mental health, but it can be a symptom of mental health as well.267 Dr Crooke said that the plaintiff consulted him about various matters including health issues including psoriasis, hair loss, issues with her daughter RC, and that she was stressed and having low self-esteem.268 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition 189 Dr Crooke said that on the day of the assault, or the day after the assault, he was not available or not working.269 Dr Crooke first saw the plaintiff after the assault on 11 November 2021.270 On 4 February 2022, Dr Crooke prescribed the plaintiff 25 milligrams of Valdoxan and Diazepam for increased anxiety relating to the breast cancer diagnosis although Dr Crooke says he cannot recall if it was as a result of the assault as well.271 Dr Crooke recalls at this consultation, the plaintiff was ashamed about getting herself into another abusive relationship.272 190 Dr Crooke's next consultation with the plaintiff was a telehealth consultation on 12 April 2022 for the purpose of providing a Diazepam prescription for anxiety around her breast cancer diagnosis and the failed relationship and to help her sleep.273 Dr Crooke said that the next 263 ts 285. 264 ts 285. 265 ts 285. 266 ts 289 - ts 290. 267 ts 292 - ts 293. 268 ts 295 - ts 302. 269 ts 308 - ts 309. 270 ts 309. 271 ts 311 - ts 312. 272 ts 312. 273 ts 313. -- 56 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 57 mental health consultation he had with the plaintiff was on 13 February 2023 for the purposes of a mental health treatment plan.274 191 Dr Crooke's evidence is that the mental health plan was incorrectly dated 30 January 2020 as in preparing the document Dr Crooke copies the old version of the document:275 … I get the old one, I open it, I save it as a new one, the - the file name saves automatically, but this date doesn't update automatically to the current date. … I'm supposed to do that and sometimes I forget and I apologise for - for this. 192 For completeness, to the extent the defendant had any concern or lack of certainty that this document was generated from the Jindalee Medical Centre or was in some way not an authentic record of the mental health treatment plan Dr Crooke says he prepared on 13 February 2023, I am satisfied, having had regard to Dr Crooke's evidence and noting that the document in question includes references to breast cancer and assault that occurred after 30 January 2020, that there is nothing sinister about the document having in some way been altered or adjusted.276 Dr Crooke says that the mental health treatment plan of 13 February 2023 included a reference to Ms Scallan who is a clinical psychologist who has been looking after the plaintiff for many many years whom Dr Crooke considered to be the plaintiff's general regular psychologist.277 193 Dr Crooke confirmed he received a letter from the plaintiff's lawyer seeking information about the assault. Dr Crooke says that as he had not made detailed notes of these events, he needed to hear again from the plaintiff. At the consultation on 21 July 2023 (which was for this purpose), Dr Crooke says he made a notation to consider Sertraline an anti-depressant that is a bit stronger than Valdoxan that the plaintiff had been on previously because of stress and the symptoms the plaintiff was having at the time.278 Dr Crooke recorded in his notes that 'She gets PTSD and flashbacks'.279 Dr Crooke's assessment is 274 ts 314 - ts 315. 275 ts 315; Exhibit 65. There was a separate Mental Health Plan dated 30 January 2020 which is Exhibit 66 which is different to the document that appears at Exhibit 65. See ts 366. 276 ts 325 - ts 329. 277 ts 330. 278 ts 330 - ts 331. 279 ts 331. Dr Crooke's notes of his various consultations with the plaintiff appear at Exhibit 58. -- 57 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 58 based on his view although he accepts that in the case of the plaintiff he did not in fact go through the relevant assessment criteria before reaching his assessment.280 194 Dr Crooke says that he referred the plaintiff to a psychiatrist at the plaintiff's request because she 'feels stuck'.281 Dr Crooke says he thought it was a good idea as it had been two years since the assault and the plaintiff wasn't improving and was not recovering to a previous level of functioning.282 Dr Crooke says he referred the plaintiff to Dr Lisa Smith, a psychiatrist and confirmed that he was not aware if the plaintiff saw Dr Smith but that he did receive a letter back from Dr Smith's colleague at the same practice, Dr Priestly.283 195 Dr Crooke confirmed that he prepared a report dated 11 August 2023 in response to a report request from the plaintiff's solicitors dated 9 July 2023.284 Dr Crooke says that he continued to treat the plaintiff after the referral to the psychiatrist in 2023 and 2024. Dr Crooke prepared a mental health treatment plan for the plaintiff on 18 August 2023 and a referral to Ms Scallan for continuing sessions.285 196 Dr Crooke says that he continued to treat the plaintiff from after the referral to the psychiatrist although after about 2023 he was trying to wind down his time (at the Jindalee Medical Centre) and move to clinics closer to his home. Dr Crooke says he saw the plaintiff several more times in 2023 and 2024 and prepared mental health treatment plans for the plaintiff on 18 August 2023 and on 18 March 2024.286 Dr Crooke recalls being provided with a report from Dr Priestly. 197 It was put to Dr Crooke in cross-examination by the defendant, and accepted by Dr Crooke that he prescribed medication for the plaintiff's depression and anxiety.287 Dr Crooke was taken specifically to his prescription on 12 December 2019 and accepted that he recorded that the plaintiff had depression for many years on his report.288 Similarly, that Dr Crooke in cross-examination accepted that in his mental health treatment plan of 30 January 2020, he wrote 'on antidepressant, mostly appears unhappy and stressed' and on 280 ts 332. 281 ts 332. 282 ts 332. 283 ts 333. 284 ts 334 - ts 335; Exhibits 56 and 57. 285 ts 335 - ts 336; Exhibit 62 (see also Exhibit 61). 286 ts 335 - ts 336; Exhibit 64 (see also Exhibit 63). 287 ts 346. 288 ts 346. -- 58 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 59 11 May 2020, he wrote 'depression'.289 Dr Crooke confirmed that on 11 November 2021, he prepared a referral letter to a breast cancer surgeon and that it did not include any reference to the assault as it was about the breast cancer.290 198 Dr Crooke said when questioned by the defendant that on 4 February 2022, he wrote 'very stressed, worried about upcoming surgery plus … X-ray therapy, radiation therapy' and that there was nothing written about the assault.291 Similarly that in his notes dated 4 March 2022 and 21 April 2022, Dr Crooke noted 'lots of stress, breast cancer, lots of stress because she had to move house again' but there was no mention of the assault.292 Dr Crooke accepted that on 30 September 2022, he wrote about a lot of shoulder pain in the right shoulder but does not mention the assault.293 In a similar manner, the defendant cross-examined Dr Crooke about referral letters for the shoulder pain on 13 January 2023; to the breast surgeon on 5 May 2023 and for a skin lesion on 25 May 2023, none of which refer to the assault.294 Dr Crooke's evidence is that:295 … That is correct. Again, this is - the note is - just relates to what was done at that time. It doesn't mean that something else was not happening. 199 The line of questioning advanced by the defendant in cross-examination centres on the date from which the plaintiff refers to the assault in her consultations with Dr Crooke, namely, after the date on which Dr Crooke prepared his report dated 11 August 2023 in response to the request from the plaintiff's solicitors.296 A further line of questioning by the defendant, centred on whether there was in fact a consultation on 13 February 2023 between the plaintiff and Dr Crooke.297 The clear evidence of Dr Crooke is that there was. As to the confusion around the mental health plan produced as a result of that consultation being dated 30 January 2020, Dr Crooke's evidence is that the mental health plan was incorrectly dated 30 January 2020. Dr Crooke provided a similar explanation for the mental health plan dated 18 August 2023.298 289 ts 346 - ts 348. 290 ts 349; see Exhibit 67. 291 ts 350. 292 ts 350. 293 ts 351. 294 ts 350. 295 ts 350. 296 ts 352. See also ts 351 - ts 353. 297 ts 362. 298 ts 364. -- 59 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 60 200 As to any suggestion of tampering with the document(s), Dr Crooke's evidence is that:299 … there was no tampering with the document, in terms of taking a later document and making changes to an earlier document … 201 I was mindful that the defendant was unrepresented at the trial and therefore afforded the defendant a degree of leniency and latitude in the line of questioning advanced. The defendant was reminded of the rule in Browne v Dunn. Future medical treatments 202 Dr Crooke in his report dated 11 August 2023 gave evidence about the plaintiff's condition. That is, that his impression is that the plaintiff has improved in the two years since the assault but not by much.300 Dr Crooke's opinion is that whilst the plaintiff can function at work and hold down her job, she continues to feel lonely and because of the assault, worries that she will not be able to trust someone again and find a new, non-abusive relationship.301 As to the plaintiff's condition into the foreseeable future, Dr Crooke in his report says that this calls for speculation but says that he expects that the plaintiff's condition will continue, likely with small and slow improvement but possibly also setbacks.302 As to the likely treatment the plaintiff will require in to the foreseeable future, Dr Crooke says that this is somewhat speculative but that he expects that the plaintiff will continue to need anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medications, as well as supportive counselling for many years.303 Future work capacity 203 As noted above, Dr Crooke's opinion is that whilst the plaintiff can function at work and hold down her job, she continues to feel lonely and because of the assault, worries that she will not be able to trust someone against and find a new, non-abusive relationship.304 Dr Crooke's opinion is that his impression is that the plaintiff can continue to work.305 299 ts 365. 300 Exhibit 57, page 8, par (e). 301 Exhibit 57, page 8, par (e). 302 Exhibit 57, page 8, par (f). 303 Exhibit 57, page 8, par (g). 304 Exhibit 57, page 8, par (e). 305 Exhibit 57, page 8, par (h). -- 60 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 61 Dr Priestly's evidence 204 The plaintiff called Dr Priestly to give evidence. Dr Priestly is a consultant psychiatrist who obtained her Bachelor of Surgery and Medicine from the University of Western Australia. She is a fellow of the Royal College of Australian and New Zealand Psychiatrists and joined in around 2015 and specialises in general adult psychiatry.306 205 Dr Priestly considered herself to be the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist.307 The plaintiff's pre-Incident medical condition 206 Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff was referred to her by her general practitioner and that she saw the plaintiff on 6 November 2023.308 Dr Priestly's recollection of the plaintiff was:309 … So I recall a woman who was very anxious, very distressed, in the context of - of an assault that had happened several years beforehand. Yeah, but she was very, very anxious. 207 Dr Priestly referred to her handwritten notes of the consultation on 6 November 2023.310 Dr Priestly referred to the symptoms that the plaintiff described to her and the assault and the medication the plaintiff was taking. The plaintiff referenced that sleep had always been a bit of an issue for her, the emotional abuse within the relationship with her ex-husband back in 2016 but that she was working full-time at the time, studying community services, exercising and not seeing a psychologist at the time.311 208 Dr Priestly was cross-examined and accepted that the plaintiff had first consulted her two years after the assault, after June 2023.312 209 Dr Priestly referred to in detail, the plaintiff's pre-Incident personal and medical history noting the plaintiff's childhood, her level of education, her past relationships including her falling in love with a gangster at the age of 17 whom the plaintiff described as being 306 ts 372. 307 ts 409. 308 ts 375. 309 ts 376. 310 ts 377; Exhibit 68. 311 ts 377 - ts 378. 312 ts 409. -- 61 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 62 emotionally abusive to her, the plaintiff's ex-husband and her children, particularly her son from a previous relationship whom the plaintiff felt she had let down.313 Dr Priestly noted that the plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer in January 2022. 210 As to the plaintiff's history of medications, Dr Priestly noted that the plaintiff tried Escitalopram (20 milligrams) for treating the anxiety in 2015 and the plaintiff reported that this was really helpful in gaining resilience around her mental health.314 Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff reported having four really good years in her mental health, but she put on weight, 20 kg, which may have been a side effect of the medication.315 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition 211 Dr Priestly said that in relation to the assault, the plaintiff talked about how she had a relationship with a married man, the circumstances of the assault and her relationship with the defendant after this.316 Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff talked about what happened in the days, weeks, months after the actual assault where her partner at the time convinced her to come back:317 … She said she was still in love with him, wanted to drop the charges, but has some feelings of humiliation and shame around telling the kids - I'm presuming, around considering going back into the same relationship with him. … … So that was something that she talked about later, a sense of not feeling safe, living and working close to where - where he was. 212 In recalling the conversation with the plaintiff, Dr Priestly said:318 … Once again, it was from memory, what she'd - how she was describing how he was reacting, talking about the assault, or how she felt he - it was traumatic, but he then went on to minimise how traumatic it was for her. 313 ts 380 - ts 382. 314 ts 382 - ts 383. 315 ts 383. 316 ts 378 - ts 379. 317 ts 379 - ts 380. 318 ts 380. -- 62 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 63 213 On undertaking a brief mental state examination of the plaintiff, Dr Priestly observed:319 … I observed her to be anxious, but euthymic, which means that her mood was reactive, there were no signs of depression in the assessment, and I had no concerns about suicidal thoughts or homicidal thoughts. So my impression at the time was anxiety disorder not otherwise specified. This first page, which you don't have access to, reference - question mark, around PTSD. And on the back of that first assessment I deemed her anxiety to be trauma related, but that I hadn't actually got enough of the trauma symptoms at the time in the assessment to diagnose PTSD frankly. And so when you say trauma related, what trauma?---Yep. So the assault. 214 Dr Priestly came up with a treatment plan that included the plaintiff trialling another anti-depressant, Pristiq,320 and to stop the Valdoxan because that was not helping her anxiety, and to see the plaintiff again in four weeks' time.321 215 Following the initial consultation, Dr Priestly wrote to the plaintiff's general practitioner on 20 November 2023 in which she diagnosed the plaintiff as having 'an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified which has happened mainly in the context of trauma'.322 Dr Priestly said that in arriving at her diagnosis of the plaintiff's physical symptoms of anxiety, her objective observations were the level of distress that the plaintiff was experiencing when she was reporting the events and talking about her anxiety in the actual room, her poor sleep, intrusive thoughts and nightmares.323 Dr Priestly said that the physical symptoms include the plaintiff's constant heaviness in her chest, the shortness of breath, holding her breath a lot and being easily startled, which the plaintiff told her commenced in the aftermath of the assault.324 216 Dr Priestly said that in speaking to the plaintiff, her impression, from what the plaintiff was saying was that the plaintiff's mental health was pretty good and that this assault was the trigger for the anxiety 319 ts 383. 320 Also known as Desvenlafaxine; see ts 388. 321 ts 384. 322 ts 386; Exhibit 69. 323 ts 386; Exhibit 69. 324 ts 386; Exhibit 69. -- 63 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 64 symptoms.325 As to whether Dr Priestly was made aware of any other trauma in that consultation, Dr Priestly said: 326 … No, not - not that happened at the time. She was diagnosed with breast cancer, one year prior to my assessment, but the anxiety symptoms predated that, but there was nothing else going on in her life that she sort of volunteered to talk about that contributed to the anxiety symptoms that she continued to experience. 217 With respect to the other treatment the plaintiff had been engaged in, Dr Priestly mentioned that the plaintiff had tried Mirtazapine, Stillnox (for her sleep) and had also been Valdoxan which was not helping her symptoms.327 218 Dr Priestly said that she next saw the plaintiff on 5 December 2023 and prepared a report on that date.328 Dr Priestly described the plaintiff talking about mixed emotions, sadness and grief, around the ending of the relationship. Also some feelings of embarrassment and some guilt as well and that the plaintiff was still processing coming to terms with the end of the relationship.329 Dr Priestly said that she does not recall the assault being discussed on this occasion.330 Dr Priestly said that she did not have any change in her opinion as to the onset or cause of the anxiety symptoms at this consultation.331 In terms of treatment recommendations following this consultation, Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff had resumed Escitalopram rather than going on Pristiq because 'she'd previously been on escitalopram and has had a good response to it'. Dr Priestly said that she did not prescribe the Esitalopram, she presumes this was from her general practitioner but noted that the plaintiff was on 10 milligrams of Escitalopram at that point in time.332 Dr Priestly said that Escitalopram is an anti-depressant but that most of the anti-depressants are effective both for anxiety and depression.333 Dr Priestly confirmed that she did not consider that Escitalopram was an inappropriate treatment at the time and did not have cause to change it.334 325 ts 387. 326 ts 387. 327 ts 387. 328 ts 388 - ts 389; Exhibit 70. 329 ts 389; Exhibit 70. 330 ts 389. 331 ts 389. 332 ts 389. 333 ts 391. 334 ts 391. -- 64 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 65 219 Dr Priestly said that she next saw the plaintiff again on 9 January 2024 and prepared a report to the plaintiff's general practitioner.335 Whilst Dr Priestly noted in her report that the plaintiff had spiralled in negative cognition, she could not remember what she meant about this and could not indicate what anxiety symptoms the plaintiff had on this occasion, nor the content of the plaintiff's nightmares.336 Dr Priestly said however that she started to treat the plaintiff as if there was some more frank post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because of the intrusive thoughts and memories and nightmares and prescribed Prazosin to help with nightmares.337 Dr Priestly confirmed that there was no PTSD diagnosis in her 8 January 2024 report but noted that the treatment administered, by the plaintiff's psychologist, eye movement desensitisation reprocessing therapy (EMDR), is the evidence based treatment for PTSD.338 Dr Priestly herself did not prescribe the EMDR treatment but accepted that it was an appropriate treatment for the plaintiff at the time.339 Dr Priestly said that she increased the medication dose of Escitalopram to 15 milligrams because the plaintiff was still struggling with her anxiety symptoms.340 220 In the context of the 8 January 2024, Dr Priestly was cross-examined as to why she included in her reports the plaintiff reporting that she feared for her life, and that the defendant had caused lots of pain and suffering and the reference to the defendant's Facebook post(s).341 As to whether the plaintiff had told Dr Priestley that she and the defendant had continued in a relationship after the assault, Dr Priestly said that she had not been told in specific terms.342 Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff had mentioned her breast cancer.343 221 Dr Priestly next saw the plaintiff on 5 February 2024 and prepared a report following that consultation.344 Dr Priestly in her report noted that the plaintiff had improved in her anxiety and increased the Escitalopram to 20 milligrams but is still getting jumpy and startling 335 ts 391; Exhibit 71. 336 ts 391; Exhibit 71. 337 ts 392. 338 ts 393; Exhibit 71. 339 ts 394. 340 ts 394. 341 ts 408. 342 ts 409. 343 ts 408. 344 ts 394; Exhibit 72. -- 65 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 66 but slightly less in this as well.345 As to the reference to 'jumpy and startling', Dr Priestly said:346 … So I did reference that in the first assessment, that she had an exaggerated startle response, which is something that we see in people that have got acute anxiety or an anxiety disorder. It's a symptom … 222 Dr Priestly said that PTSD is the re-experiencing symptoms that is called the hyperarousal symptoms, which is the physical symptoms of anxiety.347 Dr Priestly in her report noted that the plaintiff had intense nightmares about LB and machetes the first night she increased her medication but confirmed that this was a nightmare and not something that actually happened to her.348 Dr Priestly noted in her 5 February 2024 'report some anxiety but less' as she had noticed (during the consultation) a settling of the plaintiff's symptoms - the way she presented in the room, noticing that her anxiety symptoms were starting to reduce in the room.349 As to the reasons for this, Dr Priestly said: … A combination, the medication, I thought, was starting to - to work, and this would be around the right time, anxiety often is high doses of medication to bring the symptoms under control. She'd been on the medication for a few months now, so it would sort of correspond with when we would expect people to start to respond to medications. She was also engaging in EMDR with her therapist, so it's possible that that was also starting to help her symptomatically as well. 223 Dr Priestly saw the plaintiff on 11 March 2024 and prepared a report to the plaintiff's then general practitioner (ie different to Dr Crooke).350 Dr Priestly noted in that report that:351 [CC] seen. Subjectively and objectively doing better. Appears less anxious about the legal matters around her ex and has altered emotional responses to him. Less guilty about pursuing him legally and identifying more with the anger of what he did and how it has impacted her. Has had a busy couple of months with life and begin her personal health recovery. Had to move rental and didn't get the job she applied for. Focussing on weight loss, has gained 20 kgs and giving up smoking. 345 ts 394; Exhibit 72. 346 ts 394. 347 ts 395. 348 ts 395; Exhibit 72. 349 ts 395; Exhibit 72. 350 ts 396; Exhibit 73. 351 Exhibit 73. -- 66 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 67 224 Dr Priestly said:352 … So [CC] was presenting as calmer with less of the - the - inner distress, both just in the way she represented herself, but also when she was talking about events, less emotional, less distressed and certainly less anxious. As I said, she was presenting a lot calmer at this point in time. 225 Dr Priestly noted that the plaintiff's dosage of Escitalopram had increased to 30 milligrams because she was still experiencing anxiety symptoms at the 20-milligram dose.353 Dr Priestly also prescribed small dose of Diazepam (5 milligram) to help with any breakthrough anxiety.354 Dr Priestly said the frequency of her consultations with the plaintiff changed from four weeks to six months from this point:355 … Because she was doing a lot better at that point in time, and she was still seeing her psychologist, we - you know, we sort of maxed - sort of had optimised the medication treatment. So we both agreed that she was - you know, she could sort of carry on, but obviously come back. So the treatment was doing what it needed to be doing at that point in time, well enough. 226 The next time Dr Priestly saw the plaintiff was on 8 August 2025 and prepared a letter to the general practitioner following that consultation.356 Dr Priestly's evidence is that she formed the diagnosis of PTSD as distinct from the anxiety disorder during the 12-month period that she saw the plaintiff in 2023 and 2024.357 Dr Priestly said that the initial trigger for the PTSD diagnosis was the assault, as the plaintiff described it, when Dr Priestly first saw her.358 Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff had re-engaged with her because there had been an increase in her anxiety in the context of this impending trial and that there were some other things going around that was also contributing to her anxiety.359 Dr Priestly said that the trial was one of those stressors but that there were some issues around both her children, difficult things that were happening in their lives at the time.360 Dr Priestly's evidence is that these other events were not triggers 352 ts 396; Exhibit 73. 353 ts 397. 354 ts 397. 355 ts 397. 356 ts 398; Exhibit 74. 357 ts 398; Exhibit 74. 358 ts 398. 359 ts 398 - ts 399. 360 ts 399. -- 67 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 68 sufficient for PTSD.361 Dr Priestly in her report noted that the plaintiff has shown improvement in her mental state since commencing Agomelatine, now stabilised on 50 milligrams daily.362 227 As to the plaintiff's diagnosis of PTSD, Dr Priestly said that a psychiatrist would formally have the expertise to diagnose PTSD although a general practitioner with a special interest in mental health can diagnose a PTSD.363 Dr Priestely said that a good psychologist will be able to form an opinion that a person is likely to have PSTD although it is a doctor that makes the assessment and diagnosis.364 Dr Priestly explained that a PTSD diagnosis:365 … It is - it's - it's an anxiety disorder related to a traumatic event, where someone is - hasn't been able to process the memories from that event. And it's almost like a - a loop forms in the brain, where the memories of that event keep playing out again and again and again. And their body has a - a - a physical response, a nervous system response, where - that resembles how they felt in that moment, when they feared for their life, their - their wellbeing, the life of someone else. And they're not able to move forward from that. But then, it can also be triggered by exposure to situations that remind either their body or their mind of that particular moment in time. … 228 In the context of the plaintiff, Dr Priestly explained that:366 … So conversations, which is certainly what I was seeing in - in the room with her when she was talking about it. I could see the - the flight [sic] or flight, the anxiety response that she was getting in the room with me when she was talking about the - the incident, the trauma, going to the - you know, the place where it happened, seeing a Facebook sort of post with the person in it or someone else who reminds them of the person. Yeah. … It's a - it's a particular type of - of anxiety that's related to a specific sort of situation. But it - it overlaps. All the anxiety disorders have overlapping symptoms. But it's specific in terms of the re-experiencing symptoms - - - and trigger - that would trigger it as a - as a - as an illness. 361 ts 399. 362 Agomelatine is Valdoxan, ts 399; Exhibit 74. 363 ts 400. 364 ts 400. 365 ts 401. 366 ts 401. -- 68 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 69 229 Dr Priestly said that in terms of capacity PTSD can be hugely debilitating and in the case of the plaintiff that she saw evidence of that.367 Dr Priestly said that the court case would be reasonable trigger 'because it's actually triggering the memories, the feelings, the - that - that remind that person of - of that moment in time and also the nature of the actual traumatic incident as well'.368 Dr Priestly said:369 … That - that is - is understandable why she developed these symptoms post an event like that, where she - she feared for her life as she reported it. 230 Dr Priestly said that she saw the plaintiff again on 13 October 2025 and prepared a report following that consultation.370 Dr Priestly reported that the plaintiff 'continues to experience significant stress and anxiety related to her upcoming legal trial regarding domestic violence. She has attended three 1.5-hour legal sessions providing comprehensive life history and recently viewed police body-worn camera footage related to the assault Incident'.371 Future medical treatment 231 In terms of the plaintiff's future treatment needs, Dr Priestly said that it would depend on how well or otherwise the plaintiff's symptoms settle going forward after this courtroom noting that the Agomelatine is doing a decent job in managing the plaintiff's symptoms.372 Dr Priestly said that she would review the plaintiff in the weeks and months post this court case finishing and it may be that the Agomelatine is keeping things at bay and she can move on with her life.373 Dr Priestly's evidence is that 'that would be the treatment'.374 232 From a psychological point of view, Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff could continue to receive some psychological treatment going forward but it would really depend on how her symptoms are in the months following.375 367 ts 401. 368 ts 402. 369 ts 402. 370 ts 402; Exhibit 75. 371 ts 402; Exhibit 75. 372 ts 403. 373 ts 403 - ts 404. 374 ts 404. 375 ts 404. -- 69 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 70 233 As to medication, Dr Priestly said that she could keep the plaintiff on Agomelatine for now, but if her symptoms of PTSD increased again, and the Agomelatine isn't holding her symptoms, that the plaintiff would need to move back onto the Escitalopram, but really 'it just depends'.376 Dr Priestly said that in terms of changing medication, it is something that her general practitioner could do if she has a good relationship with her general practitioner and the general practitioner feels comfortable managing mental health issues.377 234 Dr Priestly's opinion as to the plaintiff's future prognosis for the PTSD related to the trauma of the assault is good.378 Dr Priestly said:379 … For - for the PTSD related to the trauma, I - I - I think the prognosis is good. You know? She's - she's - previously when she's had her anxiety treatment she's - she's gone into near full recovery and has done really well. … … I was saying that she - she's - she's gone into very good recovery in the past when she's struggled with her mental health. Circumstances are different now, and the trigger was different. But she was doing okay. She was doing well enough to - to not see me for 12 months before this - this court hearing came into play again. So I - I think the - the prognosis is good for her to recover from the PTSD. Work capacity 235 Dr Priestly was asked by the plaintiff's counsel to assume that the plaintiff completed a Certificate III and IV in Community Services in 2020 and on this basis, questioned as to whether that changes any of the evidence Dr Priestly wished to give to the court.380 To which she replied 'No'.381 Ms Scallan's evidence 236 The plaintiff called Ms Scallan to give evidence. Ms Scallan is a registered clinical psychologist who obtained a Bachelor of Arts, Honours in Psychology in 1986 in South Africa.382 Ms Scallan subsequently obtained two Masters of Clinical Psychology, one in 1989 in South Africa and the other in Australia in 2009.383 376 ts 404. 377 ts 404. 378 ts 405. 379 ts 405. 380 ts 384. 381 ts 384. 382 ts 411; Exhibit 76. 383 ts 411. -- 70 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 71 237 Ms Scallan first worked as a psychologist in Australia in 2010 and as a clinical psychologist in 2013 having obtained her clinical endorsement when she did her second masters.384 Ms Scallan said that unlike a psychologist, a clinical psychologist focusses a lot more on assessments and diagnosis.385 238 Ms Scallan administered DASS-21 and DSM-5 tests on the plaintiff as part of her assessment of the plaintiff. 239 Ms Scallan explained that a DASS-21 assessment which is 'standardised psychological screening tool and it really assesses severity of symptoms, and the symptoms that it really looks at is depression, anxiety and stress' on the plaintiff on 1 October 2021.386 Ms Scallan said that 'The DASS looks at symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress'.387 Ms Scallan explained that a DSM-5 is 'a screening instrument that specifically screens for symptoms related to PTSD'.388 240 Ms Scallan confirmed that she prepared reports in response to a report request from the plaintiff's solicitors and based her opinions in her report on her consultation notes and consultations with the plaintiff.389 The plaintiff's pre-Incident medical condition 241 Ms Scallan had a pre-treating relationship with the plaintiff prior to the assault in 2021 which she recalls ended in early 2018.390 242 In her report dated December 2023, Ms Scallan indicated that the plaintiff had attended therapy with the current practice since July 2014 and had attended periodically until 2018.391 Ms Scallan said that the plaintiff was referred as 'she was struggling with family - family conflict, and family dynamics. So there was a lot of low mood, a lot of worry, a lot of stress around the family environment'.392 Ms Scallan said she did not form a diagnosis for the plaintiff during that period of time.393 384 ts 411. 385 ts 411; Exhibit 76. 386 ts 415 - ts 416; Exhibit 80 (pages 241 - 243 of document). 387 ts 423. 388 ts 423. 389 ts 437; Exhibit 96. 390 ts 417 - ts 418; Exhibit 80. 391 Exhibit 97, par 13.2. 392 ts 502. 393 ts 502. -- 71 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 72 243 In her report dated December 2023, Ms Scallan noted that the plaintiff's condition was in remission and that she had not attended therapy since January 2018 and there was a significant reduction in her symptoms.394 At her final session in 2018, Ms Scallan noted in her report that the plaintiff was assessed as functioning at a healthy level and reported and presented with normal levels of depression, anxiety and stress.395 244 A DASS-21 assessment that Ms Scallan administered to the plaintiff on 28 January 2018 indicated that the plaintiff was experiencing a normal level of depressive, anxiety and stress symptoms.396 Ms Scallan said that she did not undertake a PTSD checklist for January 2018 as the plaintiff was not experiencing those symptoms.397 245 Ms Scallan said that prior to 2021, she had not made a diagnosis of PTSD in the plaintiff.398 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical conditions 246 Ms Scallan said that she first learnt of the plaintiff's assault two or three days after the assault.399 Ms Scallan said:400 … She - she had seen a doctor and received a referral, and she obviously would have contacted the clinic and made an appointment. 247 As to this, Ms Scallan said that a patient needed to attend upon a general practitioner before coming to a psychologist because they required a referral.401 Ms Scallan explained that the referral can have a mental health plan attached and the psychologist is required under Medicare to confirm with the general practitioner that the client as started engaging with the psychologist.402 Ms Scallan said that she did not write a report to the plaintiff's general practitioner on every occasion she saw the plaintiff but did so once every time there was a mental health plan.403 In accordance with the procedure, Ms Scallan wrote to the plaintiff's respective general practitioners - Dr Pyne; Dr Crooke and Dr Hilditch between the period 8 October 2021 to 5 June 2025.404 394 Exhibit 97, par 13.2. 395 Exhibit 97, par 13.2. 396 ts 418. 397 ts 412. 398 ts 502. 399 ts 412. 400 ts 412. 401 ts 435. 402 ts 435. 403 ts 435. 404 ts 437; see Exhibits 82 - 95 (inclusive). -- 72 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 73 248 Ms Scallan's consultation notes with the plaintiff titled 'Clinical Progress Notes - Client C' were produced and is Exhibit 81. The consultation notes show that (following the Incident) the plaintiff, identified in the notes as 'Client C' by Ms Scallan, consulted Ms Scallan from the period 1 October 2021 through to 5 September 2025.405 Ms Scallan explained that her '… Usual practice is I take some basic notes and then type them out in the evening and put them into my - into my laptop'.406 249 In these consultation sessions, Ms Scallan said that in recording her notes:407 … So I listen, and then we go through strategies to try and manage those symptoms. So a lot of it is trying to - we - I describe the - the strategy, so something like a - a grinding technique. I model that to [CC]. I explain it to her. She would maybe rehearse that. And she would be encouraged to - to utilise those strategies going forward. 250 Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes dated 1 October 2021 record that the plaintiff presented with acute emotional distress following a recent assault'.408 As to this, Ms Scallan said:409 … So acute emotional distress will - [CC] presented as very tearful, very upset, find it almost quite difficult to - to explain without - without becoming very teary, had a lot of somatic symptoms, you know, a lot of breathlessness, teary, shaking, clearly not a calm picture. 251 As to when the symptoms commenced, Ms Scallan said:410 … She reported that she had been assaulted and - by a - a ex-partner - by a partner and she - and since then, she had been experiencing these symptoms. 252 Ms Scallan said that the plaintiff told her that she was experiencing intrusive and hypervigilance:411 … Intrusive thoughts are thoughts that she doesn't want to have in her head but keep coming back in her head, so intrusive thoughts would be of the assault, of the perpetrator of that assault, of her - of her surroundings, of her thoughts about her own safety. 405 ts 423; Exhibit 81. 406 ts 425. 407 ts 425. 408 ts 423; Exhibit 81. 409 ts 424. 410 ts 424. 411 ts 424; Exhibit 81. -- 73 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 74 … She said that she's constantly feeling as if she's anticipating something to go wrong. She's fearful that she'd come to face to face with a - the perpetrator. She is fearful about - about people intruding and her own safety being compromised. And the way we actually can - not only through her report but observation - very, very jumpy. You know, very unsettled and concerned about who's around her. 253 Ms Scallan said that she conducted assessments of the plaintiff when she first saw her after the assault.412 Ms Scallan explained that an assessment is a screening tool which is a self-report and that she definitely conducted the DASS assessment and recalls completing this checklist with the plaintiff.413 The plaintiff received the following scores in relation to the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 PCL-5:414 Total, 73, which is extremely severe. Re-experiencing, 20, extremely severe. Avoidant, 7, extremely severe. Negative activations, 24, extremely severe. Hyperarousal, 22, extremely severe. 254 Ms Scallan's notes recorded 'criteria met'.415 Ms Scallan said that the assessment lists the criteria for something like PTSD symptoms and that meets the criteria.416 The plaintiff's assessment recorded a total of 73 out of 80.417 Ms Scallan said that 'anything over 73 - over 53 is the client is more than likely experiencing these symptoms that they've reported'.418 255 In respect of her diagnosis having administered these tests, Ms Scallan said:419 … That [CC] was displaying symptoms consistent with PTSD. 256 Ms Scallan administered these tests more than once, and says that she repeated this testing 'Maybe once every three, four, five, six months'.420 Ms Scallan said that she would consider redoing the testing:421 … If I am concerned that - or if I believe that the symptoms have decreased, or are managed, I like to confirm that. Or if the client is presenting with an escalation, I might consider redoing it. 412 ts 413. 413 ts 413 - ts 414; Exhibit 80. 414 ts 414. 415 ts 414; Exhibit 80. 416 ts 414; Exhibit 80. 417 ts 414 - ts 415. 418 ts 415. 419 ts 416; Exhibit 80. 420 ts 416. 421 ts 416. -- 74 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 75 257 Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes of her next consultation with the plaintiff on 9 October 2021 record that the plaintiff reported 'panic episodes' which would be when the plaintiff suddenly 'becomes breathless, heartrate increasing, hypertension, inability to sit still, intrusive thoughts that she can't get rid of and certainly feeling her safety was severely compromised'.422 Ms Scallan in her notes of the consultation dated 9 October 2021 also observed emotional dysregulation.423 Ms Scallan said: 424 … Emotional dysregulation is when a - a client struggles to retain a sense of calm, so becomes very, very worked up very quickly and struggles to become - to calm herself. Gets into quite a heightened state quite quickly. 258 Ms Scallan noted that the plaintiff reported somatic anxiety symptoms including palpitations, sweating and shortness of breath.425 By 16 October 2021, Ms Scallan's notes record that the plaintiff 'continued to report high distress' and said that 'heightened distress is that the distress remains high and consistent at a - at a level of hyperarousal'.426 Ms Scallan also noted that the plaintiff presents as 'emotionally fragile' and said that it wouldn't take much to destabilise the plaintiff.427 In the context of risk, Ms Scallan said:428 … I think risk of her becoming totally - her - an escalation of her symptoms into that complete hyperarousal where there's intense panic and those symptoms really would overwhelm her. You could literally see - you know, almost - not hysterical, but a lot of teariness. You could see the breathlessness. You could see the scattered thought. Really struggling to regulate and calm her. 259 Ms Scallan's notes record the plaintiff having 'vivid nightmares'. Ms Scallan said:429 … Well, [CC] would - could - could tell me the details of the nightmares. It would often be related directly to the assault or about the assault or related to the assault. Running away, feeling as if someone has - the perpetrator has caught her, being assaulted again and her trying to escape. So those were often the content of those - those nightmares that she relayed. 422 ts 425; Exhibit 81. 423 ts 424; Exhibit 81. 424 ts 424; Exhibit 81. 425 ts 424; Exhibit 81. 426 ts 426; Exhibit 81. 427 ts 426; Exhibit 81. 428 ts 426; Exhibit 81. 429 ts 427; Exhibit 81. -- 75 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 76 260 Ms Scallan's opinion is that the nightmares would be related to the assault.430 261 Results from a PTSD checklist administered by Ms Scallan on 19 February 2022 found that the plaintiff's symptoms were 'still severe, extremely severe reexperiencing, severe avoidance, severe negative alteration, severe hyperarousal' and the PTSD criteria was still met.431 Ms Scallan said that the significance of the categories of assessment 'it really is about the intensity of the symptoms, and how they are impacting the client in daily functioning'.432 A DASS assessment Ms Scallan administered on the plaintiff on 19 February 2022 indicated extremely severe symptoms for depression, anxiety and stress.433 262 By July 2022, Ms Scallan's clinical consultation notes record 'external stressors'.434 As so this, Ms Scallan said:435 … [CC] was - was concerned about - about her living situation, there were sort of - she was worried about securing another rental, I think that might have been around that time, there was also - she had some stressors around one of the children, so those are the external stressors. 263 Ms Scallan in her clinical progress notes dated 24 July 2022, record her assessment of the plaintiff having 'PTSD symptoms'.436 As to whether there is a relationship between the external stressors and the PTSD symptoms, Ms Scallan said:437 … No. I think that the external stressors is really just around the mood fluctuation. The PTSD symptoms are quite - quite separate. 264 Ms Scallan explained the different treatment methods applied to assist the plaintiff with her symptoms, specifically EMDR, a neuropsychological therapy which Ms Scallan used to assist the plaintiff in processing traumatic memories and reducing the intensity of symptoms.438 Ms Scallan said that she is qualified to administer EMDR treatments having undergone training and obtaining her accreditation from the EMDR Association of Australia.439 430 ts 428. 431 ts 417; Exhibit 80. 432 ts 416. 433 ts 417; Exhibit 80. 434 ts 428; Exhibit 81. 435 ts 428; Exhibit 81. 436 ts 428; Exhibit 81. 437 ts 428; Exhibit 81. 438 ts 429. 439 ts 429. -- 76 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 77 265 Ms Scallan clinical progress notes dated 28 July 2023 record the plaintiff experiencing setbacks due to external stressors but remaining resilient.440 In terms of the plaintiff responding to treatment through the time she was being treated, Ms Scallan said:441 … [CC] was - she was very motivated to try and recover. She was engaged. She responded well. And certainly - she certainly tried to rehearse all of the strategies. You know? She would - she would - she would certainly practice those grinding and breathing techniques. She certainly would - would try and go to safe places. There's different techniques that we would give her. She certainly tried and rehearsed them. There - there was - there was sometimes some progress, and then I would see - I think, you know, we're getting somewhere, and then there would be a deterioration. 266 In her letter to Dr Crooke dated 13 August 2023, Ms Scallan suggests that consideration be given to referring the plaintiff to a psychiatrist for further assessment and management.442 267 In her report dated December 2023, Ms Scallan expressed the opinion that the plaintiff presents with symptoms of PTSD, anxiety and depression and emotional distress with the plaintiff's presentation of symptoms having been experienced within the context of a violent assault on 23 September 2023. Ms Scallan in her report expressed the view that 'The symptoms reported and [CC]'s presentation, support of a diagnosis of PTSD with co-morbid depression and anxiety'.443 268 Ms Scallan observed in her report that:444 It is the opinion of the current clinician that [CC], whilst eager and willing to recover a healthy level of functionality, she may have difficulty in terms of anxiety management which in turn impacts her functioning … Such symptoms would have an impact on [CC]'s social, family and work environments. The symptoms observed and reported during therapy, and the experienced level of severity place significant concerns on [CC]'s healthy functioning without support. She reported persistent hypervigilance at the second session an this appeared evidence in [CC]'s demeanour. Frequent relapses are not uncommon after such incidents that may be exacerbated by environmental triggers. In light of the sustained and intense nature of [CC]'s symptoms, a full recovery is unlikely. A partial recovery would be dependent on ongoing treatment and support in the future. 440 ts 431; Exhibit 81. 441 ts 432; Exhibit 81. 442 Exhibit 87. 443 Exhibit 97, par 4. 444 Exhibit 97, par 6. -- 77 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 78 269 Ms Scallan went on to indicate that the persistent and intense thoughts and feelings related to the assault in addition to nightmares, depression and sadness, a detachment from others, and consistent hypervigilance and anxiety, coupled with heightened emotional responses are symptoms which the plaintiff continues to experience, which has (amongst other things) had an impact on the plaintiff's employment and employment opportunities and general decision making abilities.445 Ms Scallan noted in her report dated December 2023 that:446 [CC] has experienced an increase and additional symptoms (to those experienced pre-assault) since the assault and they appear to have a significant impact on her social, work and familial functioning. Due to the sustained, intense and severe nature of her symptoms, [CC]'s functioning is no longer at a healthy or normal level and she requires ongoing support to manage activities for daily living. 270 Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes dated 22 September 2024 record the plaintiff on presentation having reported feeling 'the best in years', her assessment of the plaintiff's PTSD being in partial remission and noting, by way of summary 'C is functioning well with minimal symptoms'.447 As to this, Ms Scallan said that this is one of the consultations where she thought the plaintiff was making progress.448 271 Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes dated 19 October 2024 record the plaintiff continuing to report stability and functional recovery with improved sleep and high energy, her assessment of the plaintiff having minimal PTSD symptoms, strong resilience, noting by way of summary 'C shows sustained recovery'.449 272 Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes dated 2 November 2024 record the plaintiff reporting ongoing stability and 'expressed gratitude for therapy progress', her assessment of the plaintiff's PTSD having largely resolved, occasional mild anxiety by way of summary 'C demonstrates sustained recovery and readiness for reduced therapy frequency'.450 445 Exhibit 97, par 7. 446 Exhibit 97, par 13.3. 447 Exhibit 81. 448 ts 432. 449 Exhibit 81. 450 Exhibit 81. -- 78 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 79 273 However, Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes dated 21 January 2025 record:451 Presentation: [CC] presented with stable mood and anxiety linked to upcoming legal proceedings. She expressed fear about confronting her ex-partner in court. She reported less frequent intrusive images, hypervigilance, and sleep disturbance. She also reported better daily functioning attending work regularly and managing her weight/exercise better. However, reports decreased concentration and memory difficulties especially in work context. 274 Ms Scallan notes of 21 January 2025 notes that the session discussion focussed on anticipatory stress regarding the court process. Ms Scallan assessed the plaintiff's PTSD symptoms as having reduced.452 However, 'anxiety heightened due to court-related triggers, though functional capacity improved compared to prior years'.453 By way of summary, Ms Scallan recorded 'CC is functioning at a higher level but remains vulnerable to stressors linked to legal proceedings'.454 275 Results from a DASS Ms Scallan administered with the plaintiff on 21 January 2025 found that the plaintiff's symptoms 'Was still severe, significant distress in the severe range'.455 Ms Scallan said:456 … So depression is moderate. Anxiety is extremely severe. And stress is moderate. 276 Ms Scallan's clinical progress notes from 1 February 2025 through to 5 September 2025 record active PTSD symptoms with a theme of anticipatory anxiety related to the trial and the legal process although there is also the occasional mention of financial stress and family concerns.457 Ms Scallan said that she has seen the plaintiff since, at that time some two weeks prior to the giving of her evidence.458 277 As to her assessment of the plaintiff's current clinical presentation, Ms Scallan said in giving her evidence at trial:459 … I think that her PTSD symptoms have been retriggered as a result of, I presume, the stress. It's probably quite - it's stressful, I'm sure. And very anxious, very fearful, a lot of distress - a lot of hypervigilance 451 Exhibit 81. 452 Exhibit 81. 453 Exhibit 81. 454 Exhibit 81. 455 ts 418; Exhibit 80. 456 ts 418. 457 Exhibit 81. 458 ts 433. 459 ts 433. -- 79 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 80 around being here in this courtroom with the perpetrator. So I think - I - I - you know, that - that heightened anxiety. Lots of startled responses. Lots of teariness(?). So it retriggered a lot of the - the symptoms. 278 Ms Scallan said that her view remained that the plaintiff's PTSD was exacerbated by the legal stress.460 279 Ms Scallan in her report dated December 2023 said that she deferred opinion on medication to medical opinions.461 280 Ms Scallan was cross-examined about her report to Dr Crooke dated 2 June 2023 following an initial session under the plaintiff's current mental health plan.462 Ms Scallan accepted that in that report she did not mention the assault. It was put to Ms Scallan in cross-examination that she and the defendant had bumped into each other on 9 June 2023 and that her next report to Dr Crooke about the plaintiff's progress was on 13 August 2023 where the assault is mentioned.463 Ms Scallan (again) accepted that the earlier report to Dr Crooke did not mention the assault.464 Ms Scallan also confirmed that she was aware that the plaintiff had developed breast cancer just after the Incident in the park and that she mentioned her illness to Ms Scallan.465 Ms Scallan in cross-examination said that she knew that the plaintiff carried on seeing the defendant after the assault but did not 'know the time span'.466 281 Ms Scallan in cross-examination did not accept that she had met the defendant before, and not at the Mindarie boat ramp.467 Ms Scallan said that she has no recollection of having met the defendant previously.468 Past medical treatment 282 Ms Scallan indicated that the cost associated with the counselling sessions she provides to the plaintiff is 'on the $240 range', but says that she estimated the cost of consultations at $295 for a 60 minute consultation.469 Ms Scallan confirmed that the consultations she 460 ts 434. 461 ts 440. 462 ts 507 - ts 508; Exhibit 86. 463 ts 508; Exhibit 87. 464 ts 508; Exhibit 87. 465 ts 508. 466 ts 508. 467 ts 509. 468 ts 509. 469 ts 444. -- 80 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 81 had with the plaintiff up until 28 July 2023 was bulk-billed.470 Ms Scallan said that she used to bulk-bill most of her clients but that she now provides a fee and asks for a fee.471 Ms Scallan said that the plaintiff has an outstanding fee payable to her from 28 July 2023 which Ms Scallan said was not unusual for some of her clients because of financial difficulties or their private health having run out.472 Ms Scallan said that the 'arrangement is that they will pay when they can' but that 'clients are very clear, I cannot waive that account'.473 Future medical treatment 283 Ms Scallan in her February 2025 report expressed the opinion that in light of the sustained nature of the plaintiff's symptoms, continued psychological support would be beneficial in an endeavour to facilitate a level of functioning/partial recovery.474 Ms Scallan recommended ongoing treatment in the form of two sessions per month at a cost of $241 per session.475 Past work capacity 284 Ms Scallan in her report dated December 2023 noted:476 [CC] has been partially incapacitated but has returned to her usual occupation of a Pool Inspector due to personal financial circumstances. Since the assault, [CC] has struggled with her substantive position and in the Acting role of Community Development Project Officer and has not delivered at her full healthy capacity in terms of motivation and coping skills. During early 2023, [CC] came face to face with the aggressor and subsequently was partially incapacitated at work. 285 As to this, Ms Scallan said:477 … I think that Ms - [CC] really would not have the - the full capacity to be able to engage as a pool inspector due to her - her hyper-vigilance. A pool inspector is - I - is as I understand it, a very - it's a one man job and there is - there is a frequent interaction with household owners that can be quite unpleasant and conflictual and I think that at that - at that point in time, [CC] wouldn't have the capacity, wouldn't have the emotional resources to manage that. 470 ts 444 - ts 445. 471 ts 444. 472 ts 445. 473 ts 445. 474 Exhibit 99, page 22, par (g). 475 Exhibit 99, page 22, par (g). 476 ts 437; Exhibit 97, par 9. The plaintiff's evidence is that the acting role started in October 2024 but that she did not actually start until 9 December due to having her role as a swimming pool inspector covered before she left - see ts 197. 477 ts 438; Exhibit 97, par 9. -- 81 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 82 286 As to Ms Scallan's knowledge of the role of a swimming pool inspector and what a swimming pool inspector does, Ms Scallan said:478 … Well, [CC] would tell me what a pool inspector does. She goes, and then she inspects the pool and the fencing, and frequently would have to make recommendations to homeowners. 287 Although Ms Scallan does not think that this is recorded in her notes.479 Ms Scallan says that from the time of the plaintiff consulting her post the assault, to the date of the preparation of her December 2023, she in fact cannot remember exactly what the plaintiff was working as.480 Ms Scallan further clarified that in expressing her opinion in her report that the plaintiff had been partially incapacitated but had returned to her usual occupation of swimming pool inspector, Ms Scallan said:481 … I would say that her - her capacity to be fairly isolated and work alone, and to potentially come into contact with - with homeowners who could be quite aggrieved. 288 As to the acting role of community development police officer, Ms Scallan further clarified that in expressing her opinion in her report that the plaintiff did not seem to have capacity in terms of motivation and in terms of really coping with the demands of that role. Ms Scallan went onto say that in terms of motivation, she would say more generally the plaintiff's work rather than a capacity restriction specific to that role.482 Future work capacity 289 In response to a report request from the plaintiff's solicitors as to the plaintiff's capacity for work, Ms Scallan said:483 … She was in an acting capacity, and she would be engaging with community - it was a community engagement role, and trying to engage partners with the City of Joondalup to - for specific - specific populations, to engage them in - whether that would be a - you know, a - an initiative to - to include - for community involvement. 290 During the course of her examination-in-chief, Ms Scallan was shown a copy of the City of Joondalup's position description of the 478 ts 438. 479 ts 438. 480 ts 439. 481 ts 498; Exhibit 97, par 9. 482 ts 499; Exhibit 99. 483 ts 437; Exhibit 97, par 9. -- 82 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 83 role of the community transport officer.484 Ms Scallan in her evidence said that this was a document she had not seen before.485 However, Ms Scallan said that this role is distinct from the 2023 position that she referred to in her February 2023 report.486 Where Ms Scallan in her February 2025 report expressed the opinion that '[CC] may struggle with concentration, memory and decision-making, particularly in high-stress environments or when dealing with emotionally charged situations'.487 Ms Scallan said she formed this view based on the plaintiff's presentation and reporting 'those sorts of things'.488 291 Where Ms Scallan expressed the opinion in her February 2025 report that the plaintiff 'may experience flashbacks related to her PTSD, which can disrupt her workflow and require additional time for recovery',489 Ms Scallan said that this time for recovery 'could extend from 20 minutes to a day' but concluded:490 … But generally, you know, with the coping strategies that we would - that we had discussed, we would hope that she could perhaps take some time out and calm herself, regulate herself, and return to – to functioning. So I - I think you're - 20 minutes to a day?---Mm. Was that - - -?---Yes. 292 As to whether the plaintiff's anxiety may impair her work capacity, Ms Scallan said that it would depend on the intensity of that panic attack or emotional dysregulation but 'if she was able to manage some of that regulation and use some of the strategies, it might be that she could regulate quite quickly'.491 When asked if this would hours, or days or weeks or months, Ms Scallan said 'days' but ultimately said that 'it's almost quite difficult to put a time limit on it'.492 293 Ms Scallan's opinion is that working directly with vulnerable populations or in high-conflict situations may exacerbate the plaintiff's 484 Exhibit 3. 485 ts 499; Exhibit 3. 486 ts 500. 487 Exhibit 99, page 21. 488 ts 500. 489 Exhibit 99, page 21. 490 ts 500. 491 ts 501. 492 ts 501. -- 83 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 84 symptoms.493 Ms Scallan said that 'the risk of re-triggering and re-traumatising is quite significant' and identified administrative research of behind the scenes roles rather than front-line community engagement by way of alternative roles.494 As to this, Ms Scallan expressed the opinion that:495 … Because I think frontline community engagement pose - pose risks that [CC] could come into contact with - with vulnerable - a vulnerable population, or people that mirrored some of her own experiences, or they - they could be conflict ridden, and I think that [CC] would struggle to manage those. Dr Terace's evidence 294 The plaintiff called Dr Terace to give evidence. Dr Terace is a consultant psychiatrist and a doctor of medicine.496 Dr Terace was conferred a Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery in 1988 and admitted to the Fellowship of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists in 1994.497 Dr Terace has had some experience providing training to other psychiatrists and general practitioners in the past but has not been engaged in teaching for some years now.498 Dr Terace said that he is currently undertaking a role as a consultant forensic psychiatrist in principally civil matters but also occupational matters in respect to occupational capacity and rehabilitation.499 295 Dr Terace said that in his practice as a consultant forensic psychiatrist, the diagnosis of a psychiatric condition involves first, taking a history from the patient.500 Dr Terace said that psychiatrists have regard to the subjective history from the patient, medical documentation preferably from other practitioners, collateral history from close family members and explained that psychiatrists are reliant principally upon history and available documentation.501 Dr Terace said:502 … - so it's reasonable for a psychiatrist to formulate an opinion at a - a single consultation. In my experience, that takes between one and 1.5 hours, but I'm aware that some of my other colleagues are faster 493 ts 501; Exhibit 99. 494 ts 501; Exhibit 99. 495 ts 501; Exhibit 99. 496 ts 450. 497 ts 451; Exhibit 77. 498 ts 451. 499 ts 411; Exhibit 77. 500 ts 452. 501 ts 452 - ts 453. 502 ts 453. -- 84 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 85 and can do it in 45 minutes. And one of my favourite mentors, Trish(?), she taught me that a reasonable psychiatrist could produce a diagnosis within 45 minutes and then hone his diagnosis with time if necessary. 296 Dr Terace said that following on from that, he determines whether a particular patient meets a particular psychiatric diagnosis by applying 'the general principles of medicine, in - in which we seek to determine the history or a person's condition over time, in the context of their past psychiatric history, the personal history, social history and habits, including alcohol and substance use, and then examine any relevant physical factors that might be at play that might explain those psychiatric symptoms, knowing that we're limited with respect to the documentations available to us. But there are psychiatric symptoms which are frequently physical in origin, which are often important to exclude. But most importantly, we - we seek to examine the experiences of that person in the context of their history and, critically, try to understand what that person is describing'.503 Consultation with the plaintiff 297 Dr Terace said that by letter of instruction dated 27 February 2025 from the defendant's then solicitors, he was asked to conduct an assessment of the plaintiff and did so on 13 March 2025 which included the enclosures listed at pars (a) - (g) of that letter of instruction.504 Dr Terace said that he considered those records when forming his opinion and those enclosures included reports from Dr Priestly, Ms Scallan, Dr Crooke (with clinical notes), Dr Pyne (with clinical notes), medical records and mental health plans.505 Dr Terace said that his consultation time with the plaintiff was 1.5 hours - his usual practice of consultation time, following which he prepared a report dated 25 March 2025.506 503 ts 453. 504 ts 454 - ts 456; Exhibit 78. 505 ts 455; Exhibit 78. See also ts 495 - ts 496. 506 ts 456 - ts 457; Exhibit 79. -- 85 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 86 The plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition 298 Dr Terace said that his diagnosis in relation to the plaintiff is PTSD.507 Dr Terace in his report noted that 'The nature of psychiatry is that most psychiatric conditions are principally multifactorial involving multiple interacting processes. Most non-psychotic disorders are best conceived as consisting of predisposing, precipitating and propagating/perpetuating factors'.508 In addressing the issue of pre-disposition, Dr Terace in his report detailed the plaintiff's past history from childhood and the plaintiff's relationships including her relationship with the defendant. Dr Terace noted that 'turbulent relationships probably also contributed other emotional distress and her emotional burden'.509 Dr Terace said:510 … Predisposition is always relevant to psychiatry because the human mental state is by nature complex, so it's important to understand what factors increase the person's risk to psychopathology ... A past psychiatric history is relevant, and increases the risk to any further psychotic disorder, in this case [CC] described a past alcohol use disorder, and I was aware from reading documents that there were mentions of prior anxiety and depressive symptoms, and also in her own descriptions in the past psychiatric history. So those matters increased her risk to psychopathology. And a personal history of difficult circumstances, which can range from difficult perceptions to actual trauma(?) substantially increase the risk of psychopathology, including but not limited to post-traumatic stress disorder … … [CC] met criteria for the principal triad, which is reexperiencing of the trauma, heightened arousal, including anxiety about the trauma, and avoidance of - of the trauma. There's a fourth category which is about alterations in mood and cognition but it's fairly broad and nebulous and psychiatrists debate how well we - we can include that in the diagnosis, although it is included in the DSM-5 for (indistinct). But Dr Priestly and Ms Scallan might be in a better position to elaborate those particular symptoms, if they exist, because they have seen her more frequently than I have and for a greater duration. So my view was that if [CC] was assaulted as she alleged, then given the symptoms described, I would have described it as a post-traumatic stress disorder. But I accept that another diagnosis, as I noted in Dr Priestly's - at least one if not more of Dr Priestly's letters, certainly at least one, was an anxiety disorder otherwise not specified, I think, in the context of 507 ts 461. 508 Exhibit 79, page 18, par 3. 509 Exhibit 79, pages 18 - 19, par 3. 510 ts 472. -- 86 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 87 trauma, end quote. That's a reasonable diagnosis also. Because most post-traumatic disorders are anxiety disorders. And if we have doubt as to whether a person meets full criteria for a post-traumatic stress disorder, it's very reasonable to describe it as a trauma or stressor related disorder, specified or not specified, or an anxiety disorder otherwise not specified. But we would both agree that there is a recognised psychiatric condition here that warrants intervention - clinical intervention. And to us, that's probably more important that a precise diagnosis. 299 In the context specifically of Dr Terace's diagnosis of the plaintiff, Dr Terace explained that in drawing the link between the symptoms and the assault:511 … But assuming that the trauma occurred as it - as it was described, it would be reasonable in this case to describe the trauma as significantly, materially or substantially contributing to the subsequent symptoms which we opine are of post-traumatic stress disorder in this case. That's what makes it unique, and that's why it's important. However, as I - I'm certain I stated in the report, as an independent medical examiner and even as a psychiatrist, I'm not an arbiter of the truth. I wasn't a witness to the assault. It would be unreasonable for me to form assumptions about what actually occurred on that day. I had [CC]'s version of events which she courageously elaborated to me at the interview. I also reviewed her statement … 300 However, Dr Terace made it clear that his view is based on the assumption 'that the history is correct in formulating that that particular trauma was causative of the post-traumatic stress disorder but take the view that I cannot be the arbiter of the truth of the matter'.512 Past medical treatment 301 Dr Terace said that in relation to past treatment he considered the treatment the plaintiff had was reasonable.513 Future medical treatment 302 Dr Terace said that he 'would consider Dr Priestly to be the principal architect of the plaintiff's care and would respect her treatment decisions in that regard'.514 Dr Terace said:515 511 ts 465. 512 ts 466. 513 ts 467; Exhibit 79, page 26. 514 ts 467. 515 ts 467. -- 87 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 88 … I was simply asked as to what treatment I considered that she required but accept that ultimately a treating psychiatrist will be more precise and will amend treatment depending on clinical response, intolerance to side effects and - and - and - and - and - and so on. 303 In his report dated 25 March 2025, Dr Terace provided the following recommendations for ongoing treatment:516 [CC] will need to remain under the vigilance of her treating Psychiatrist. The treatment should be as determined by the treating Psychiatrist. I would estimate [CC] would require the support of her General Practitioner on a monthly basis for approximately 2 years, but the cost of these sessions are unknown to me. [CC] probably requires ongoing psychotherapy with her treating Psychologist on a fortnightly basis for approximately 24 to 36 sessions. The cost of those sessions would probably cost approximately $270 for a Clinical Psychologist. I note [CC] is currently consulting Psychiatrist, Dr Leanne Priestly, but she cannot afford the sessions. However, in my view, [CC] will require the care of a Psychiatrist probably on a monthly basis for 2 years at an approximate cost of $350 to $450 per half-hour session. … I note the current treatment with Escitalopram 20 mg mane. Of course, the treatment algorithm consisting of a step-by-step process of medication, should be determined by the treating Psychiatrist. I would estimate the cost of medications to approximate $50 per months for a minimum of 2 years. 304 Dr Terace said:517 … But the treatment also needs to be holistic, and I believe that a general practitioner is the most important health person - practitioner in a person's life that supervises both their physical and psychological treatment in all ways. So it's really important to involve the GP, 516 ts 467; Exhibit 79, page 27. 517 ts 467. -- 88 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 89 and that's why I recommended that [CC] consult her GP on a - on a - on a monthly basis. But I also understood that she needed to consult a clinical psychologist, and that would be reasonable treatment in these circumstances. Treatment in these circumstances would be pharmacological, being medication, and psychotherapeutic. And that psychotherapeutic treatment sometimes is undertaken by the psychiatrist, other times by a clinical psychologist. That's a matter for the psychiatrist and clinical psychologist to determine as to how that is delegated - - - 305 Dr Terace in his report noted that the prognosis of PTSD is that recovery is contingent on multiple factors including time and treatment.518 Dr Terace's opinion is that he is uncertain as to whether the plaintiff will achieve complete remission but said that her treating psychiatrist would be in a better position than he is to prognosticate based on the plaintiff's recovery over the past 12 months.519 306 Dr Terace said that the trial contributed to his opinion expressed in relation to the requirement for future treatment as at March 2025 (being the date of his report). Given the stresses associated with trial, Dr Tererace said that he would anticipate that the plaintiff would probably require another nine months to another year of treatment in addition to that he previously generated.520 However, Dr Terace said 'Dr Priestly is in a better position than I am to prognosticate her treatment requirements'.521 307 A number of assumptions were put to Dr Terace including that the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy following separation from her husband, that there was stress with her daughter when she was a teenager and the plaintiff was smoking again.522 As to these matters, Dr Terace said that they did not cause him to alter the opinion set out in his 25 March 2025 report but that the plaintiff being a smoker or non-smoker has implications for treatment but not his clinical diagnosis.523 518 Exhibit 79, page 28, par v. 519 ts 467 - ts 469; Exhibit 79, page 28. 520 ts 469. 521 ts 469. 522 ts 457 - ts 461. 523 ts 457 - ts 461; Exhibit 79, page 17, pars 1 and 2. -- 89 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 90 308 Dr Terace was cross-examined about whether he was aware that the plaintiff and defendant continued to see each other after the assault and taken to the plaintiff's email sent to Dr Terace's rooms dated 12 November 2025.524 Specifically, the plaintiff's feelings of hurt expressed in her email as follows: When you - when you asked me how me feel when [LB] prioritises his family over me, I said hurt. Yes, it hurts. I also felt like I'd been tossed aside like a piece of trash and felt worthless. 309 It was put to Dr Terace whether in his opinion, that the defendant had 'broke her heart'.525 Dr Terace said:526 … So my understanding was the relationship was a turbulent and complicated one. And there's nothing in this evidence that's inconsistent, except that [CC] recognised that when I asked her if she smoked, she said no, but she did start smoking again. But I don't consider that to be, in itself - people - the reality is, in psychiatric interviews, sometimes people misinterpret what I ask. Sometimes, I misinterpret what they say. You can go both ways. But on balance, I didn't consider it to change my diagnostic opinion. The only matter - difference would be it alluded me to the need for her to - practitioner to review the issue of her cigarette smoking at some point in the future. So the short answer to your question is - is - is no, the email doesn't change my opinion in principle. Past work capacity 310 Dr Terace in his report noted that the plaintiff is employed by the City of Joondalup with the Department for Community Development as a community transport officer full-time and has held this role in an acting position since December 2024. In his report, Dr Terace noted that prior to that time, the plaintiff was a swimming pool inspector for 10 years in a full-time capacity. Further, she also had a second position at Optus on an intermittent basis as a suite attendant on a casual basis during the Australian Football League season.527 Dr Terace said that he did not discuss the swimming pool inspector role with the plaintiff in his consultation.528 524 ts 493. 525 ts 494. 526 ts 494 - ts 495. 527 Exhibit 79, page 5. 528 ts 470. -- 90 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 91 311 Dr Terace was asked to assume that the role of a swimming pool inspector entails confrontation between persons.529 In this context, Dr Terace said that he would expect confrontations to pose a problem with respect to her capacity to be in that role.530 However, Dr Terace said:531 … I would need a full role description … for me to comment accurately with respect to any particular employment, as a general principle, if [CC] has experienced as assault, and is understandably fearful of assault, and in those circumstances it would not be unreasonable to expect her to be fearful of what might arise as a consequence of confrontations, with the ultimate expression of confrontation being violence in - in (indistinct) circumstances. It's difficult to be specific, as I said, not having examined her since that time, but I think her treating psychiatrist is probably in a better position than I to comment, but that's certainly a consideration in my view. 312 Dr Terace, whilst considering how someone may engage with a swimming pool inspector, was ultimately not in a position to reach a conclusion specifically in relation to the plaintiff working as a swimming pool inspector.532 However, Dr Terace said that with regards to the issue of swimming pool inspections, that it would be difficult for the plaintiff to deal with those kinds of confrontations.533 313 Dr Terace was provided with the plaintiff's trial bundle prior to trial.534 Included in that bundle was the City of Joondalup's position description specification for a swimming pool inspector, Dr Terace was asked to comment on the plaintiff's time management and organisation skills.535 Dr Terace said:536 … I didn't at that time because the question wasn't posed, and also because I understood that she was working fulltime. The other problem is that I don't have enough information about her actual performance in her role, and nor the transition or changes to her mental state since that time. But in examining her level of activity, which I did, and knowing that she was working fulltime, I considered the post-traumatic stress disorder not to have been severe or profound on the basis of the totality of the evidence. And one of the essential problems of course is that a psychiatric diagnosis does not in itself predict capacity or incapacity 529 ts 475. 530 ts 475. 531 ts 476. 532 ts 476. 533 ts 484. 534 ts 478. 535 ts 478. 536 ts 477; Exhibit 1A. -- 91 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 92 for work. One needs to look at the totality of the - the symptoms and the circumstances at any point in time. And not having been asked the question, it wasn't an issue I considered at the time. 314 In the context of the plaintiff's symptoms and work, having been taken by counsel to some documents, including Ms Scallan clinical notes of 5 September 2025, Dr Terace said:537 … And the potential problem, Ms Rogers, is that psychotic disorders don't predict occupational capacity as of themselves, so one needs a lot more information than that. And not having examined Ms Scallan(?) recently, it's difficult for me to give an opinion. 315 Dr Terace was then taken specifically to the last report of Dr Priestly dated 13 October 2025.538 Having considered that report (which postdates Dr Terace's report of 25 March 2025), Dr Terace said:539 … Dr Priestly doesn't comment on deterioration or occupational capacity, but my impression is that the claimant probably would have been substantially distressed at this time, particularly noting that she described sleep disruption with nightmares, particularly at 1 am. But the degree of that, and how - and what capacity it affected her employment is not clear to me, I'm sorry, Ms Rogers. - ?- - - Understandably she's written to the general practitioner with a summary of her treatment - - - but hasn't been asked to address the issue of occupational capacity, so it might be Dr Priestly would be in a better position that I am to opine how her condition affects her capacity in the present. Future work capacity 316 As to employment roles generally, Dr Terace said:540 … It's difficult for me to speculate because of the restrictions with respect to the information that I have and don't have at this point in time. … She may not be fit for employments that require safety critical or risk critical duties, principally, recurrent driving, the handling of dangerous machinery or handling of dangerous chemicals because of the physical manifestations of anxiety, the reexperiencing symptoms, the subject of 537 ts 482. 538 ts 483 - ts 484. 539 ts 484. 540 ts 476. -- 92 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 93 (indistinct) and the daytime fatigue which was described, those things would place her or others at risk in those circumstances. So I would probably not want to see her in those particular roles, such as, for example, as an - as an Uber driver or a position that required recurrent driving as part of employment - on - I'd be fearful about her level of risk in those circumstances. 317 Dr Terace's view is that assuming the plaintiff's mental state has not changed or has deteriorated with her engaging in safety critical duties, 'recurrent driving and the confrontations I - I think would be problematic for her on the basis of what I viewed'.541 318 Dr Terace was shown the plaintiff's Certificate III in Community Services issued 2020542 and Certificate IV in Community Services issued 2021.543 Noting that the modules for those certificates include 'alcohol and other drugs' in the context of working with people with mental health issues, providing first aid, Dr Terace's opinion is that it would be difficult for the plaintiff to engage in that kind of employment.544 Dr Terace said:545 … Given the - the risks of distress - visible evidence of distress in those persons and the risks of confrontations, which are high in those persons, I would not consider her a suitable candidate for those kind of roles. 319 As to the plaintiff's role as a community transport officer which Dr Terace understood the plaintiff had commenced in December 2024, Dr Terace, having considered the City of Joondalup's position description546 for that role prefaced his response as to the plaintiff's capacity to complete this employment role by saying that he had not examined the plaintiff. Dr Terace said:547 … I don't know her current mental state. But if I assumed that her mental state was as at the time that I examined her and has deteriorated, which is my impression from reviewing the report of Dr Priestly and Ms Scallan, then there are some red flags which concern me which may be problematic. So she may be incapable at some points in the future, although it's difficult for me to qualify or quantify the frequencies and duration of that possible incapacity. 541 ts 484. 542 Exhibit 3. 543 Exhibit 4. 544 ts 485. 545 ts 487. 546 Exhibit 2. 547 ts 485. -- 93 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 94 320 The 'red flags' identified by Dr Terace included the maintenance of the buses; home visits to determine eligibility; liaising with family members' next of kin regarding potentially sensitive matters relating to the client; to drive the bus when volunteers are not available; and undertaking daily inspection procedures.548 Dr Terace said:549 There are potential - there's a potential here for problems, given the nature of her symptoms, such that if she's not experienced areas - difficulties in those areas, it's certainly possible they may, or will, arise in the future, given the nature of her symptoms … 321 Ultimately, Dr Terace said that there is a high likelihood of risk that the plaintiff may be incapable of those roles in the future but that he could not specific the frequency or duration of any relating incapacity based on the information he had.550 322 Dr Terace said that those restrictions would be transferable to any other role and he would probably recommend caution, a high level of prudence.551 Dr Terace said:552 … - I would probably require - I certainly would require the opinion of the treating psychiatrist, the treating psychologist and the general practitioner, with respect to a number of issues, to assure me that she has the personal and occupational stability to engage in those roles. But without that information, I would not consider her fit for those roles because I have to be - I would need to be reasonably certain or at least consider it highly - most probable that she'd be safe in those circumstances. And given the information you provided me, all factors being equal, I would not at this time. 323 Dr Terace said that:553 … I'm raising conjecture and possibilities because, at this time, I don't have sufficient evidence to opine that it is most - more likely than not that she either has problems in those roles or will have problems in those roles. … But they are red flags that concern me…and cause me to be - to be prudent, and - and - sorry - to request prudence and vigilance with respect to her occupational capacity if asked that question. 548 ts 485. 549 ts 488. 550 ts 488 - ts 489. 551 ts 489. 552 ts 489. 553 ts 490. -- 94 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 95 And it's true those questions were put to me at the time. But I still don't have enough information at this time. 324 Dr Terace ultimately said that:554 … I honestly believe that Dr Priestly would be in a better position at this time than I - - - I see?--- - - - to formulate that opinion. But I am concerned about those issues and raise to them to attention - for the court's attention. … I'm sorry. I can't offer a more definitive opinion on that. Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff suffered the injuries and symptoms alleged to have arisen from the assault and battery 325 I have already set out above my findings of fact that amounted to the relevant conduct carried out by the defendant. I am satisfied on the evidence of the plaintiff that on 23 September 2021 the defendant assaulted the plaintiff by pushing her in the chest, causing her to fall to the ground and strike her head on the ground. The defendant further assaulted the plaintiff by grabbing her left arm, repeatedly grabbing her hair and grabbing her by the throat and that this Incident occurred while the plaintiff and defendant walked from the Cornerstone Hotel, through adjoining parklands, toward the plaintiff's home over the course of approximately 30 - 45 minutes. 326 The plaintiff's evidence as to the onset of symptoms after the Incident on 23 September 2021 may be summarised in the following terms: (a) during the assault she was scratched on the neck and throat; (b) immediately after the assault, she suffered bruising to her arm; (c) immediately after the assault, she felt pain and soreness to her head and felt lumps all over her head; (d) during and immediately after the assault, she was in a lot of distress, she was crying, had wet herself and was in a state of stress and shock; (e) the plaintiff saw Dr Pyne the day after the Incident and was prescribed sleeping pills and anxiety medication to calm her down; 554 ts 490. -- 95 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 96 (f) the plaintiff went back to see Dr Pyne a week later and was given a mental health care plan by Dr Pyne who also referred the plaintiff to a psychologist, Ms Scallan, at the plaintiff's request; and (g) the plaintiff saw Ms Scallan about a week after this and continued to feel distressed as a result of the assault and was trembling, shaking and crying. 327 The plaintiff's evidence as to the onset of symptoms set out above was not challenged in cross-examination. Her evidence is consistent with the contemporaneous notes of Dr Pyne who saw the plaintiff the day after the Incident, and not materially inconsistent with what she told the doctors who reviewed her. 328 I accept the evidence of Dr Pyne, the general practitioner who treated the plaintiff on 24 September 2021, the day after the Incident. Dr Pyne's notes and his clinical examination revealed superficial abrasions around the plaintiff's neck, generalised pain, and tenderness in the jaw. He observed that the plaintiff was visibly upset and distressed. I accept that evidence. It is consistent with the plaintiff's account. 329 Dr Pyne diagnosed minor physical injuries and acute stress arising from the Incident. He prescribed short-term medications - Zopiclone for sleep disturbance and a low dose of Diazepam for acute anxiety - to assist the plaintiff in the immediate aftermath. I find that this treatment was directed to the immediate consequences of the alleged assault. 330 The plaintiff returned to Dr Pyne on 30 September 2021. By that time, the physical injuries had largely resolved. However, the plaintiff continued to exhibit significant psychological symptoms. She completed a DASS-21 screening questionnaire, scoring highly in both depression and anxiety domains. Dr Pyne considered the overall presentation to be more consistent with anxiety symptoms than depression. 331 In light of these symptoms, Dr Pyne prepared a mental health treatment plan and referred the plaintiff to psychologist Ms Scallan, whom the plaintiff had previously consulted. He considered that the plaintiff required psychological support to process the Incident and manage her ongoing mental health symptoms. I accept that evidence. -- 96 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 97 332 The plaintiff's first consultation with Ms Scallan following the Incident occurred on 1 October 2021. The plaintiff reported that the symptoms commenced after the assault by her partner and included intrusive thoughts and hypervigilance. I accept this evidence. It is consistent with the contemporaneous notes and with the plaintiff's presentation to her GP. 333 Ms Scallan conducted a PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 PCL-5 assessment of the plaintiff who received a total score of 73/80, which Ms Scallan described as 'extremely severe'. Ms Scallan's notes recorded 'criteria met' for PTSD. I accept that this assessment supports a diagnosis of PTSD at that time. 334 Whilst Dr Crooke was the plaintiff's long-term general practitioner at the time of the Incident, the plaintiff saw Dr Pyne and not Dr Crooke as her general practitioner in respect of the assault. The plaintiff's evidence is consistent with Dr Pyne's in that the plaintiff had attended the clinic Dr Pyne was working at the day after the assault to attend a pre-arranged vaccination appointment and was then seen by Dr Pyne because the plaintiff was distressed about the assault. 335 On my review of Dr Crooke's clinical notes of 11 November 2021, and of his subsequent consultation with the plaintiff on 4 February 2022, it is clear that Dr Crooke was not treating the plaintiff expressly for the assault, and no reference is made to the assault in Dr Crooke's notes at the time. However, I note that it was Dr Crooke who ultimately referred the plaintiff to a psychiatrist, at the plaintiff's request, which is how the plaintiff ultimately came to be reviewed and treated by Dr Priestly. 336 While I accept that the plaintiff continued to consult with Dr Crooke whilst consulting with Dr Pyne, I find that the primary purpose of the plaintiff's consultations with Dr Crooke were in respect of matters to do with the plaintiff's health generally, and specifically, following the plaintiff's breast cancer diagnosis. Findings concerning the onset of symptoms after the Incident 337 Having considered the whole of the evidence, I find as follows: 1. The plaintiff sustained minor physical injuries as a result of the Incident. -- 97 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 98 2. The plaintiff exhibited acute psychological distress immediately following the Incident caused by the defendant's assault of the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff was treated by Dr Pyne for her injuries and symptoms following the Incident. 4. The plaintiff's physical injuries had largely resolved by 30 September 2021, approximately one week after the Incident. 5. The plaintiff continued to exhibit significant psychological symptoms and scored highly in both depression and anxiety domains in a DASS-21 screening questionnaire. 6. Dr Pyne considered the plaintiff's psychological symptoms to be more consistent with anxiety symptoms than depression. 7. Dr Pyne prepared a mental health treatment plan as a result and referred the plaintiff to Ms Scallan. 8. The plaintiff presented to Ms Scallan on 1 October 2021 with acute emotional distress directly attributable to the assault. 9. Psychological assessments conducted by Ms Scallan demonstrate extremely severe PTSD symptoms on 1 October 2021. Issue 3: Whether the extent of the plaintiff's reported injuries and symptoms is attributable to the assault and battery said to have occurred Causation 338 A further issue in dispute concerns whether the symptoms experienced by the plaintiff were caused by the Incident as opposed to her condition having arisen from other causes. The plaintiff contends that they were. 339 In this case, the defendant called no medical evidence of his own. The defendant denies the plaintiff's medical treatment, any ongoing physical injury and argues that any psychological or psychiatric harm and injury alleged by the plaintiff are due to matters unrelated to the Incident. The defendant in effect argues the plaintiff has not discharged the onus of establishing this and points to a range of other life events and stressors experienced by the plaintiff before and after the Incident as being the cause or contributors to the plaintiff's psychiatric conditions and any loss suffered. -- 98 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 99 340 Where a defendant seeks to assert another cause or causes of the plaintiff's condition, there is an evidentiary onus on the defendant to disentangle and quantify the extent of the plaintiff's condition caused by such other causes.555 341 Where there are multiple causes of damage a plaintiff does not have to prove that the event for which the defendant was responsible was 'the' cause, in the sense of the one and only cause, of the plaintiff's condition. It is enough that the plaintiff shows that the event is 'a' cause of the condition for which damages are claimed.556 342 Causation is a question of fact to be determined after the analysis of all available evidence. The 'but for test' is not a comprehensive and exclusive test of causation, rather a value judgment may be called for.557 It is convenient to deal with that aspect of causation now, before returning later in these reasons to the question of causation of the psychiatric disorders and loss and damage suffered by the plaintiff. 343 The plaintiff's evidence as to her symptoms and limitations, since the Incident and to the date on which she gave evidence, may be summarised as follows: (a) in the period after the Incident she continued to seek treatment due to anxiety, heart palpitations, shakiness, flashbacks, nightmares, and depression; (b) since the Incident she sometimes has flashbacks and can be triggered in certain circumstances (ie watching a program and a woman is getting dragged around by the hair, when at the hairdressers); (c) at the end of 2022 her symptoms were really bad and show as jumping at everything; (d) her symptoms improved following medication, and treatment, including EMDR administered by Ms Scallan, and seeing Dr Priestly in November 2023; 555 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158, 160; Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164, 168; Shorey v PT Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 1104; (2003) 197 ALR 410. 556 Shorey v PT Ltd [44] - [49]; Van der Velde v Halloran [2011] WASCA 252 [95] - [97]. 557 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; Bennett v Minister for Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1 (Medlin); Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 and BGC Residential Pty Ltd v Fairwater Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 268 [41] - [43]. -- 99 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 100 (e) by May 2025 the plaintiff had stopped taking Pristiq because she was feeling quite a bit better and wanted to wean herself off the medication as she was gaining weight; and (f) the plaintiff is considering going back on Pristiq because she feels like she is 'back to square one'. 344 The plaintiff was diagnosed with stage 1 breast cancer on 20 January 2022 and underwent surgery and treatment over a 4-week period in March and April 2022 which the plaintiff says was stressful. The plaintiff also underwent shoulder surgery around October or November 2022. 345 The plaintiff's evidence as to the symptoms set out above was not challenged in cross-examination by the defendant. The defendant in his closing submissions submits that whilst he did push the plaintiff, the contact was momentary and only resulted in a minor mark.558 The defendant submits that there was 'no medical treatment, no time off work, and no ongoing physical injury'.559 The defendant's case theory centres around the plaintiff being motivated by personal hurt rather than psychological injury.560 The defendant relies on the email correspondence sent by the plaintiff to Dr Terace's rooms.561 The defendant further submits that the plaintiff's own medical history shows that she had depression and anxiety recorded multiple times before the Incident.562 346 I have previously made my findings of credibility and addressed the defendant's case theory including his reliance on the email sent by the plaintiff to Dr Terace's rooms. The submissions made by the defendant do not cause me to alter my findings. 347 The defendant in his closing submissions submits that Ms Scallan was 'extremely biased' because she was a 'family friend' of the plaintiff's with that 'closeness' being demonstrated by the plaintiff being allowed to 'run up' a $6,440 unpaid bill.563 The defendant goes onto suggest that the plaintiff may have even received coaching before attending appointment with Dr Terace given the 'sudden appearance' of the assault in Ms Scallan's later reports.564 558 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 1. 559 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 3. 560 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 8. 561 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, pars 8 and 9. 562 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, pars 14 and 15. 563 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 16. 564 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 16. -- 100 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 101 348 I reject these submissions having had regard to the evidence of Ms Scallan, including her answers in cross-examination to this inference. I similarly reject the defendant's submission that Ms Scallan's 'payment arrangement' with the plaintiff supports that closeness and that Ms Scallan's opinion as a result was 'extremely biased'.565 Where the defendant submits that Ms Scallan were biased and that her reports failed to mention the assault until the defendant had made it clear to the plaintiff that the relationship was over, this is not demonstrated by my review of the evidence and materials before this court.566 349 A causal connection will be material if it is shown on the evidence not to have been negligible. This requires a careful analysis of the plaintiff's evidence in relation to the injury she suffered and its circumstances. 350 The plaintiff's evidence is consistent with the notes of Ms Scallan who has been treating the plaintiff since 1 October 2021 following the Incident, and not materially inconsistent with what she told the doctors who reviewed her. 351 A similar submission of bias is made against Dr Crooke.567 I have previously provided my findings with respect to Dr Crooke's evidence. That is, that while I accept that the plaintiff continued to consult with Dr Crooke whilst consulting with Dr Pyne, I find that the primary purpose of the plaintiff's consultations with Dr Crooke were in respect of matters to do with the plaintiff's health generally, and specifically, following the plaintiff's breast cancer diagnosis. However, that it was Dr Crooke who ultimately referred the plaintiff to a psychiatrist. The submissions made by the defendant do not cause me to alter my findings. 352 I accept the evidence of Dr Priestly and Dr Terace, together with the treating psychologist, Ms Scallan, that as a result of the defendant's assault upon her on 23 September 2021, the plaintiff has suffered from PTSD which has caused her to suffer significant stress and anxiety, panic episodes, emotional dysregulation, somatic anxiety symptoms, nightmares directly related to the assault, and persistent hyperarousal. 565 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, pars 16 and 17. 566 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 17. 567 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 17. -- 101 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 102 353 Dr Priestly first saw the plaintiff on 6 November 2023 and continued to see the plaintiff up until 13 October 2025. She gave clear evidence based on her recollection and her clinical notes of her various consultations with the plaintiff. Dr Priestly initially diagnosed the plaintiff with an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified arising in the context of trauma, being the assault. However, by January 2024, Dr Priestly started to treat the plaintiff as if there was some more frank PTSD because of the intrusive thoughts and memories and nightmares and prescribed Prazosin to help with nightmares, but did not diagnose the plaintiff as having met the criteria for PTSD until August 2025. 354 Dr Priestly's evidence is that she formed the diagnosis of PTSD as distinct from the anxiety disorder during the 12-month period that she saw the plaintiff in 2023 and 2024. 355 Dr Priestly attributed the development of the plaintiff's condition to the assault as described by the plaintiff. Although she accepted that other stressors were present, including issues affecting the plaintiff's children and the pressures associated with the impending trial, she did not regard those matters as sufficient to account for the development of PTSD. Rather, they were contributing stressors operating upon the underlying condition. She also observed that the litigation process itself was capable of triggering and exacerbating symptoms by reviving memories and emotional responses associated with the trauma. 356 As at her most recent review in October 2025, Dr Priestly reported that the plaintiff continued to experience significant anxiety and stress, particularly in relation to the forthcoming trial. Notwithstanding some stabilisation of mood with medication, including Agomelatine, the plaintiff remained symptomatic. 357 In arriving at her diagnosis, Dr Priestly gave evidence as to her objective observations of the plaintiff's physical symptoms of anxiety and level of distress, her poor sleep, intrusive thoughts and nightmares. Dr Priestly said that the physical symptoms include the plaintiff's constant heaviness in her chest, the shortness of breath, holding her breath a lot and being easily startled, which the plaintiff told her commenced in the aftermath of the assault. 358 Dr Priestly described the plaintiff talking about mixed emotions, sadness and grief, around the ending of her relationship with the defendant as well as some feelings of embarrassment and some guilt as well. Dr Priestly's evidence was that PTSD can be 'hugely debilitating' and she considered that the plaintiff exhibited features consistent with -- 102 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 103 that diagnosis. However, Dr Priestly's opinion as to the plaintiff's future prognosis for the plaintiff to recover from the PTSD related to the trauma assault is good. 359 Dr Terace, an experienced consultant psychiatrist, assessed the plaintiff on 13 March 2025 following instructions from the defendant's solicitors. Dr Terace's assessment was conducted over approximately 1.5 hours and informed by a range of medical records and reports, and his review of the plaintiff herself. 360 In diagnosing the plaintiff with PTSD, Dr Terace emphasised the multifactorial nature of psychiatric illness, identifying predisposing factors in the plaintiff's history, including prior psychological vulnerability and difficult personal circumstances. Notwithstanding these factors, Dr Terace expressed the opinion that, assuming the assault occurred as alleged, it made a significant and material contribution to the plaintiff's symptoms. 361 As to treatment, Dr Terace considered the plaintiff's past care to have been reasonable and recommended ongoing psychiatric review with the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, psychological therapy and general practitioner oversight. However, in giving his evidence, Dr Terace made it clear that treatment decisions and the plaintiff's ongoing care were matters that should be determined by the treating psychiatrist. 362 In relation to prognosis, Dr Terace expressed uncertainty as to whether full remission would be achieved, again deferring to the treating psychiatrist's assessment. Dr Terace also acknowledged the additional stressors of the legal proceedings. 363 Ms Scallan's clinical notes (Exhibit 81) show a pattern of consultation and treatment following the Incident, beginning on 1 October 2021 and continuing through to 5 September 2025. The plaintiff's first consultation occurred on 1 October 2021. The notes record that the plaintiff presented with 'acute emotional distress following a recent assault' and that the plaintiff reported that the symptoms commenced after the assault by her partner and included intrusive thoughts and hypervigilance. I accept this evidence. It is consistent with the contemporaneous notes and with the plaintiff's presentation to Dr Pyne. -- 103 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 104 364 Ms Scallan's initial assessment of the plaintiff recorded a DSM-5 PCL-5 PTSD assessment which Ms Scallan described as 'extremely severe'. A DASS assessment administered by Ms Scallan on 19 February 2022 similarly recorded extremely severe depression, anxiety and stress. In mid-2022, external stressors emerged - housing insecurity and concerns about one of her children. However, Ms Scallan's evidence was clear that the plaintiff's PTSD symptoms are quite separate. I accept that evidence. 365 Ms Scallan utilised a range of therapeutic strategies, including EMDR, for which she is accredited. Ms Scallan's clinical notes and evidence shows that the plaintiff was motivated to recover, that is there is no suggestion of any exaggeration or malingering. 366 In her December 2023 report, Ms Scallan opined that the plaintiff presented with PTSD, anxiety, depression and emotional distress, all experienced within the context of the assault. She wrote: A full recovery is unlikely. A partial recovery would be dependent on ongoing treatment and support. 367 Ms Scallan's clinical notes record that by September - November 2024, the plaintiff demonstrated partial remission, improved functioning, and minimal symptoms. However, from January 2025, the plaintiff's symptoms worsened in connection with the impending legal proceedings and 'court stressors' with a DASS assessment on 21 January 2025 showed moderate depression, extremely severe anxiety, and moderate stress. 368 In cross-examination, Ms Scallan accepted that an early report to Dr Crooke did not mention the assault. She also accepted that the plaintiff continued to see the defendant after the assault, though she did not know the timeframe. She denied ever having met the defendant previously. I find that none of these matters materially undermine Ms Scallan's clinical observations or the consistency of her long-term treatment records. 369 There is a large measure of consistency in the evidence of Dr Priestly, Dr Terace and Ms Scallan. To the extent that there is any inconsistency, I prefer the evidence of Dr Priestly, given she had the opportunity to examine and form a specialist diagnosis of the plaintiff over a prolonged period of time and in closest proximity to the trial. The evidence of Dr Priestly therefore, as the treating psychiatrist, should be preferred given her direct and sustained involvement in the plaintiff's care and her specialist qualifications. -- 104 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 105 370 However, I have also taken into account the evidence of each of Dr Terace and Ms Scallan whom I accept is the plaintiff's treating psychologist and has been the plaintiff's treating psychologist for a sustained period of time including following the Incident. Findings as to the plaintiff's current symptoms 371 I am satisfied, as I have already found, that the plaintiff suffered acute emotional distress directly attributable to the Incident and demonstrated extremely severe PTSD symptoms on 1 October 2021 when assessed by Ms Scallan. 372 Further, that the plaintiff sustained minor physical injuries as a result of the Incident which had largely resolved by 30 September 2021. 373 The plaintiff, having prima facie established and satisfied me that she was suffering from a psychiatric illness and symptoms consequent upon the assault carried out by the defendant against her, it is for the defendant to satisfy me that such a disorder and the injuries that the plaintiff suffered were not caused by his conduct, but rather by some other factor or factors. 374 The defendant has not satisfied me that his conduct did not materially contribute to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. There is ample evidence that the assault and battery is 'a' cause of the plaintiff's condition for which damages are claimed and, since other factors which contributed to that condition cannot be disentangled, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed for the full amount of her damages. 375 I am satisfied that that the plaintiff's condition was in remission and that she had not attended therapy since January 2018 and there was a significant reduction in her symptoms, and that the plaintiff had been functioning at a healthy level and presented with normal levels of depression, anxiety and stress.568 In particular, I am satisfied that the assault of the plaintiff by the defendant did materially contribute to causing the plaintiff to suffer from an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified arising in the context of trauma, being the assault, but subsequently diagnosed with PTSD due to the Incident. Whilst there were other stressors present in the plaintiff's life, including issues affecting the plaintiff's children and the pressures associated with the impending trial, these matters are not sufficient to account for the development of PTSD but are contributing stressors. 568 Exhibit 97, par 13.2. -- 105 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 106 Issue 4: What is the appropriate assessment for damages? 376 Having found liability and causation in favour of the plaintiff in relation to her claim brought under the tort of battery, it is necessary to assess her injuries, loss and damage. Accordingly, I find that s 3A of the CLA applies. It follows that the plaintiff's claim for damages is to be assessed having regard to normal common law principles without regard to the restrictions and limitations imposed by the CLA. 377 The plaintiff claims damages as outlined in the substituted particulars of damages filed 28 November 2025 in the following categories: Item Amount ($) General damages To be assessed Special damages $11,873.12569 Future medical expenses $36,045.77 Past and future travel $2,750.00 Future loss of earnings $100,000.00 (global claim) Total $150,668.90 (exclusive of non-pecuniary loss) Past special damages The plaintiff's case 378 The plaintiff's claim for special damages is made by reference to the expenses she incurred for various medications and medical and allied health services (medical expenses) in the amount of $11,873.12 as set out in the table at Annexure A of the substituted particulars of damages.570 379 The plaintiff's evidence as to her use of medications prior to trial was not the subject of cross-examination by the defendant. Nor was evidence led from any of the medical practitioners to the effect that the plaintiff's use of medication prior to trial was either excessive or unreasonable. 569 The plaintiff's claims past special damages being out of pocket expenses for travel and treatment, private insurer paid expenses or expenses incurred and owed by the plaintiff in the sum of $11,873.12 as set out in the table at Annexure A to the substituted particulars of damage filed 28 November 2025. 570 Plaintiff's Closing Submissions dated 10 December 2025, par 2.1; Substituted Particulars of Damages dated 28 November 2025; Annexure A, pages 8 - 17. -- 106 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 107 The defendant's case 380 The defendant in his closing submissions dated 5 December 2025 submits that there was 'no medical treatment and no ongoing physical injury'.571 However, the defendant does not challenge the quantification of the sums claimed by the plaintiff and that they had in fact been incurred. Findings and assessment 381 I do not accept the contention of the defendant that treatment is not required. I adopt my observations stated above with respect to the defendant's submissions as to the plaintiff's claimed costs for medical treatment. The submissions are made without any apparent regard to the evidence and materials before the court. 382 I have reviewed the medical notes in relation to each appointment and surrounding appointments for context. In relation to Dr Crooke, the plaintiff has limited her claim to only those consultations related to her mental health treatment plan which on the materials before this court was treatment the plaintiff required as a result of the assault. The plaintiff does not claim for the cost of consultations unrelated to the Incident. The appointments with each of Dr Pyne, Ms Scallan and Dr Priestly related to medical, psychological and psychiatric issues attributable to the assault. I accept the evidence of each them in this regard and am satisfied that the plaintiff required treatment for her symptoms which included psychotherapy and medication. 383 On my reconciliation of Ms Scallan's invoices for the period 9 October 2021 to 1 November 2025, the amount payable to Ms Scallan is in fact $6,440.75. Consistent with my earlier findings, I accept that these invoices were validly rendered and do not accept the defendant's submission that Ms Scallan was biased because she was a family friend of the plaintiff.572 384 The evidence of both the plaintiff and Ms Scallan is that the consultations the plaintiff had with the Ms Scallan up until 28 July 2023 was bulk-billed.573 Whilst it is true that Ms Scallan has deferred payment of her outstanding fee payable from 28 July 2023, I do not attach any weight to the defendant's submission that the plaintiff will be relieved of this payment obligation. 571 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, pars 3, 14, 15 and 20. 572 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, pars 16 and 17. 573 ts 444 - ts 445. -- 107 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 108 385 In those circumstances I am satisfied that it is appropriate to allow the full amount of those out-of-pocket medical expenses claimed by the plaintiff in the amount of $9,946.93 and related travel. I will allow the claim of the costs paid by the plaintiff's private health insurer in the amount of $667.95.574 386 I accordingly allow $9,946.93 for medical expenses and $1,258.24 for related travel, resulting in a total assessment for this head of damages of $11,873.12. Interest on past loss and expenditure 387 The plaintiff claims interest is claimed pursuant to s 32 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) at a rate of 6% per annum from 23 September 2021 to the date of payment or judgment.575 388 The out-of-pocket special damages were incurred in the period between 23 September 2021 to the date of judgment of 3 July 2026, being 249 weeks or 4.77 years. 389 The appropriate rate is the rate for post-judgment interest of 6% per annum.576 It should be halved for this period as the loss was incurred gradually.577 This gives an amount of $1,699.04 ($11,873.12 x 0.06 x 0.5 x 4.77). Future medical expenses The plaintiff's case 390 The plaintiff claims $36,045.77 for future treatment and claims psychiatric treatment in accordance with the oral and written recommendations made by Dr Terace.578 The plaintiff claims for future treatment as follows:579 1. Attendance upon her general practitioner monthly for a 3-year period at a rate $90 per visit in the amount of $2,982.57. 574 See generally, Luntz H and Harder S, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (5th ed, LexisNexis Australia, 2021) (Luntz), pars 4.4.3 and 9.2.4. 575 Writ of summons and SoC dated 15 April 2024. 576 Order 36 r 20 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2022] WASCA 44 [170] (judgment of the court) (Rayney). 577 Rayney [172], [210]; Province Leader of the Oceania Province of the Congregation of the Christian Brothers v Lawrence [2021] WASCA 77 [210] - [243] (judgment of the court). 578 Plaintiff's Substituted Particulars of Damages dated 28 November 2025, pars 3.1 and 4.1; Plaintiff's Closing Submissions, par 157. 579 Plaintiff's Substituted Particulars of Damages dated 28 November 2025, pars 3.1 and 4.1. -- 108 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 109 2. Medication daily for a 3-year period in the amount of $50 per month totalling $1,657.14. 3. Psychotherapy treatment with Ms Scallan fortnightly for a 3-year period (36 sessions in total) at a rate $295 per visit in the amount of $14,647.20. 4. Psychiatric treatment with Dr Priestly monthly for a 3-year period at a rate of $385 per session in the amount of $12,758.85. 5. Additional allowance for general practitioner, pharmacological, psychological and/or psychiatric treatment after a 3-year period during periods of exacerbation of symptoms in the amount of $4,000. 391 With respect to the future psychiatric treatment claimed, the plaintiff submits that although Dr Terace defers to the opinion of the treating psychiatrist, Dr Priestly's evidence was that 'it really depends' and 'ongoing review in the weeks and months following trial would be required to manage the plaintiff's symptoms'. The plaintiff submits that in addition to the two-year treatment period Dr Terace had proposed in his report, given the protracted symptoms from which the plaintiff has suffered, he opined a further 9 - 12 months of treatment would be required on top of the two-year period he originally proposed. The future psychiatric treatment costs claimed by the plaintiff is based on this.580 392 The plaintiff also makes a claim for future travel expenses associated with attending to obtain such treatment in the amount of $2,750. The total claimed by the plaintiff for future treatment and related expenses is $38,795.77. The defendant's case 393 As previously noted, the defendant in his closing submissions dated 5 December 2025 submits that there was 'no medical treatment and no ongoing physical injury' and contends that the plaintiff's psychological symptoms did not cause long-term disability and is not supported by independent psychiatric evidence.581 580 Plaintiff's Closing Submissions, pars 158 - 160. 581 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, pars 3, 14, 15 and 20. -- 109 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 110 Findings and assessment 394 The plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants her reasonable future medical expenses.582 In assessing reasonableness, the court will balance the health benefits to the plaintiff against the cost of the treatment proposed.583 395 I adopt my observations stated above with respect to the defendant's submissions as to the plaintiff's claimed costs for medical treatment. 396 I have reviewed the plaintiff's substituted particulars of damage and medical notes in relation to appointments for psychiatric and psychological treatment and consultation following the Incident on 23 September 2021. I have also had regard to the surrounding medical appointments with the plaintiff's treating general practitioners. 397 The plaintiff in her substituted particulars of damage identifies that she consulted her general practitioner(s) a total of 12 times between the period 24 September 2021 to 20 March 2025 for the purposes of treatment as a result of the Incident. 398 The plaintiff consulted Dr Priestly a total of eight times between the period 6 November 2023 to 13 October 2025. In terms of the plaintiff's future treatment needs, Dr Priestly expressed the opinion that it would depend on how well or otherwise the plaintiff's symptoms settle going forward after this trial. Dr Priestly said that she would review the plaintiff in the weeks and months post this trial concluding. Dr Priestly expressed the opinion that the agomelatine was managing the plaintiff's symptoms and that this would be the treatment.584 399 Dr Priestly's said that if the plaintiff's PTSD increased again, and the agomelatine isn't holding her symptoms, that the plaintiff would need to move back onto the escitalopram, but really 'it just depends'.585 Dr Priestly expressed the opinion that the plaintiff's general practitioner could change the plaintiff's medication if the practitioner was comfortable managing mental health issues and depending on the relationship with the plaintiff.586 From a psychological point of view, 582 Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, 573 - 574 (Gibbs & Stephen JJ) (Sharman). 583 Sharman (573) - (574). 584 ts 403 - ts 404. 585 ts 404. 586 ts 404. -- 110 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 111 Dr Priestly said that the plaintiff could continue to receive some psychological treatment going forward but it would really depend on how her symptoms are in the months.587 400 The plaintiff was reviewed by Dr Terace on the one occasion on 13 March 2025 for the purposes of an assessment on the instruction of the defendant's then solicitors. Dr Terace expressed the opinion that given the stresses associated with trial, he would anticipate that the plaintiff would probably require another nine months to another year of treatment in addition to that he previously generated.588 401 Dr Terace in his report dated 25 March 2025, relevantly recommended the following by way of ongoing treatment:589 [CC] will need to remain under the vigilance of her treating Psychiatrist. The treatment should be as determined by the treating Psychiatrist. I would estimate [CC] would require the support of her General Practitioner on a monthly basis probably for approximately 2 years, but the cost of these sessions are unknown to me. [CC] probably requires ongoing psychotherapy with her treating Psychologist on a fortnightly basis for approximately 24 - 36 sessions. 402 Dr Terace said:590 … Dr Priestly is in a better position than I am to prognosticate her treatment requirements. 403 The plaintiff consulted Ms Scallan a total of 55 times between the period 9 October 2021 to 1 November 2025. Ms Scallan in her February 2025 report expressed the opinion that in light of the sustained nature of the plaintiff's symptoms, continued psychological support would be beneficial in an endeavour to facilitate a level of functioning/partial recovery.591 Ms Scallan recommended ongoing treatment in the form of two sessions per month at a cost of $241 per session.592 Ms Scallan's evidence is that the cost associated with the counselling sessions she provides to the plaintiff is 'on the $240 range', but says that she estimated the cost of consultations at $295 for a 60-minute consultation.593 No indicative end date for the plaintiff's ongoing treatment is provided for by Ms Scallan. 587 ts 404. 588 ts 469. 589 Exhibit 79, pages 27 - 28. 590 ts 469. 591 Exhibit 99, page 22, par (g). 592 Exhibit 99, page 22, par (g). 593 ts 444. -- 111 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 112 404 I have considered the plaintiff's submissions. I have also made earlier made findings with respect to the medical evidence and future treatment needs and maintain those findings in assessing this head of damage. 405 With respect to the evidence in respect of the plaintiff's future treatment needs, consistent with my earlier findings, I prefer the evidence of Dr Priestly. As I observed, Dr Priestly has had the opportunity to examine and form a specialist diagnosis of the plaintiff over a prolonged period of time and in closest proximity to the trial. However, I have also taken into account the evidence of each of Dr Terace and Ms Scallan whom I accept is the plaintiff's treating psychologist. 406 Having had regard to these matters and the evidence, I do not accept the contention of the defendant that treatment is not required. Contrary to the defendant's submission, in my view, having had regard to the opinions of Dr Priestly, Dr Terace and Ms Scallan, it is appropriate to make an allowance the cost of future psychiatric and psychological treatment and medication. In making this allowance, I have had regard to the plaintiff's history of treatment and prognosis for recovery. Relevantly, Ms Scallan's clinical notes record that by September to November 2024, the plaintiff demonstrated partial remission, improved functioning, and minimal symptoms. However, from January 2025, the plaintiff's symptoms worsened in connection with the impending legal proceedings and 'court stressors'. I accept that the legal process acted as a trigger for re-emergence of PTSD symptoms. However, I have also taken into account Dr Priestly's opinion as to the plaintiff's future prognosis for the plaintiff to recover from the PTSD related to the trauma assault is good. 407 I am satisfied therefore that future psychiatric treatment is reasonably necessary due to the psychiatric conditions suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the assault and that it is appropriate to make an allowance for 12 sessions. This allows for a greater than equivalent amount of treatment to the treatment the plaintiff has received from Dr Priestly to date and takes into account Dr Priestly's opinion of the plaintiff's prognosis for recovery. I have allowed a rate of $385 per session, taking into account the most recent rates paid by the plaintiff to consult Dr Priestly. -- 112 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 113 408 I am similarly satisfied that future psychological treatment is reasonably necessary due to the symptomology suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the assault and that it is appropriate to make an allowance for 24 sessions. The plaintiff says that she currently sees Ms Scallan about once a month.594 This allows for the plaintiff to consult Ms Scallan for a prolonged period but which factors into account the plaintiff's prognosis of recovery including following being relieved of the stressors associated with the trial. I have allowed a rate of $295 per session for a 60-minute consultation, taking into account the most recent rates paid by the plaintiff to consult Ms Scallan and Ms Scallan's evidence. 409 The plaintiff has claimed the amount of $2,982.57 for the cost of attending her general practitioner monthly for a 3-year period at a rate of $90 per visit. According to the plaintiff's substituted particulars of damages, the plaintiff consulted her general practitioners a total of 12 times between the period 24 September 2021 to 20 March 2025. Having had regard to this, and the matters set out above, I have am satisfied that an allowance for the plaintiff to consult with her general practitioner is reasonably necessary including for the purposes of medication and review and that it is appropriate to make an allowance for 12 sessions. I have allowed a rate of $90 per general practitioner consultation which I consider to be a reasonable rate having had regard to the plaintiff's past claimed costs. 410 I am of the view that an allowance for the plaintiff's future medication needs is appropriate. The evidence supports the plaintiff's symptoms being managed with medication. I accept the plaintiff's total claimed medication cost in the amount of $1,657.14 and am satisfied that the amount claimed is reasonable. 411 Future travel expenses were also claimed. In my view, such expenses are likely to be incurred for attendance for future appointments and filling medication scripts. However not the global amount claimed of $2,750 in the plaintiff's substituted particulars of damages does not provide any estimated distances and rates.595 Having had regard to distances claimed in Annexure A to the substituted particulars of damages, and averaging the distances travelled per the claimed and the cost claimed, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make an allowance of $671.42 for such costs calculated as follows: 594 ts 118. 595 Plaintiff's Substituted Particulars of Damages dated 28 November 2025, pars 3.1 and 4.1. -- 113 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 114 1. Cost of travel to Dr Priestly at a rate of $0.52 per km: $224.95/8 visits = $28.11 which is the average cost per trip; $28.11 x 12 future visits = $337.32).596 2. Cost of travel to Ms Scallan at a rate of $0.52 per km: $649.54/55 visits = $11.80 which is the average cost per trip; $11.80 x 24 future visits = $283.30. 3. Cost of travel to general practitioner at a rate of $0.52 per km: $55.23/12 visits = $4.60 which is the average cost per trip; $4.60 x 12 future visits = $55.23 4. Cost of travel to chemist (medication) at a rate of $0.52 per km: $328.52/60 visits = $5.47 which is the average cost per trip; $5.47 x 30 future visits = $164.26 Summary 412 The plaintiff is currently 53 years old. An appropriate proxy for the 'foreseeable future' is 3 years, consistent with the plaintiff's submissions and apply a 6% multiplier.597 Service Duration Frequency Cost per week Multiplier Total Psychiatrist 3 years 12 sessions on a quarterly basis $385 per session/$29.61 per week 143.6 $4,251.99 Psychologist 3 years 24 sessions on a bi- monthly basis $295 per session/$45.38 per week 143.6 $6,516.56 General practitioner 3 years 12 sessions on a quarterly basis $90 per session/$6.92 per week 143.6 $993.71 Medication 3 years Daily $50 per month/$11.54 per week 143.6 $1,657.14 TOTAL ASSESSED $13,419.00 596 Note that of the last two of the plaintiff's eight consultations with Dr Priestley were by way of video consultations and did not involve any travel. 597 Luntz, Appendix Table 2, page 1131. -- 114 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 115 413 I assess that the plaintiff has suffered damage in relation to future treatment and related expenses in the amount of $13,419 and future travel expenses in the amount of $671.42 amounting to a total of $14,090.42. Future economic loss The plaintiff's case 414 The plaintiff claims a global amount of $100,000 for future economic loss and relies on the evidence of Ms Scallan and Dr Terace.598 The plaintiff in her substituted particulars of damage submits as against this head of damage that: 1. The plaintiff completed high school in approximately 1989 at around the age of 16. 2. Following her departure from school, and prior to having her first child at the age of 18 the plaintiff worked intermittently in the hospitality and retail industry. 3. After a period of time off after the birth of her first child she obtained a part time job at Woolworths, working there for a few years. 4. In 2000 the plaintiff obtained a job at a bank as a bank teller, she worked there on a part-time basis until she had her second child in 2001. 5. The plaintiff's third child was born in 2005, she returned to the workforce not long after and worked as a receptionist on a part-time basis at a Community Leisure Centre. 6. The plaintiff immigrated to Australia in 2011 and obtained a job as a bank teller at Westpac in Subiaco where she worked for a period of approximately six months. 7. The plaintiff subsequently obtained employment as a customer service representative at the City of Joondalup, working part-time, before securing a full-time permanent position in or around 2015. 598 Plaintiff's Substituted Particulars of Damages dated 28 November 2025, pars 5.1 - 5.10 inclusive; Plaintiff's Closing Submissions, pars 161 - 174. -- 115 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 116 8. Since being employed by the City of Joondalup the plaintiff has obtained a number of promotions and also moved between departments, and at the time of the assault (and since approximately 2020) was working as a swimming pool inspector, in which context she met the defendant. 9. In 2020 and 2021, the plaintiff undertook studies whilst working full-time and obtained Certificates III and IV in Community Services. 10. In or around December 2023, due to a colleague going on maternity leave the plaintiff was seconded to a temporary acting role as the community development project officer, in December 2024 her secondment was extended for a further year and she remains in that temporary position. 11. In addition to her work for the City of Joondalup the plaintiff has undertaken shifts as a suite attendant at Optus Stadium to supplement her income in the financial years ending 30 June 2025 and 30 June 2026. 415 The plaintiff submits that although not suffering any financial loss and being to work out of financial necessity, she has the following had periods of incapacity for work caused by her psychiatric symptoms:599 (a) the day following the incident; (b) the period in early 2023 when she came face to face with the defendant and suffered a partial incapacity for work; (c) a week off work in February 2024 to focus on her recovery; and (d) when suffering from a flashback requiring time out to calm and regulate herself and has further suffered from decreased efficiency in work due to difficulties focussing and lack of motivation due to her symptoms. 416 The plaintiff submits that her temporary role does not require her to partake in her previous duties as a swimming pool inspector which involved attending people's houses to inspect their pools and could be, at times, confrontational. The plaintiff submits that as a consequence of the assault, the plaintiff suffers ongoing cognitive and psychiatric impairment, including difficulties with concentration, memory, 599 Plaintiff's Outline of Closing Submissions dated 10 December 2025, pars 180 and 181. -- 116 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 117 and decision-making. These difficulties are exacerbated in high-stress or emotionally charged environments. The plaintiff also experiences intrusive flashbacks associated with her PTSD, which disrupt her workflow and necessitate periods of recovery. 417 The plaintiff submits that she is now restricted to employment of a low-stress and structured nature, in which tasks are predictable and repetitive, and which avoid exposure to trauma-related triggers including any role which would require high levels of emotional involvement or crisis management. A reduced or flexible schedule, incorporating frequent breaks, is required to manage her condition. The plaintiff submits that by virtue of her restrictions the plaintiff is likely to face difficulties in returning to her substantive role as a swimming pool inspector. Further, the plaintiff submits that she has attained Certificates III and IV in Community Services. However, her capacity to utilise these qualifications has been materially impaired by her psychiatric injuries, as the duties commonly associated with such employment are contra-indicated by her condition. 418 In these circumstances, the plaintiff submits that her parameters of employment have been materially reduced. She is effectively precluded from pursuing employment in the community services sector for which she is qualified and is confined to more limited roles of a low-stress nature, which offer fewer opportunities for advancement and reduced earning capacity. The defendant's case 419 The defendant submits that there is no documented impact on the plaintiff's ability to work and that the plaintiff continued in her role as a swimming pool inspector for three years without interruption. The defendant submits that it is difficult to reconcile this with the plaintiff's claim for $100,000 for future economic loss.600 Whether the plaintiff's parameters of employment have been materially reduced 420 The plaintiff's claim for loss of future earning capacity is predicated on the proposition that her ongoing cognitive and psychiatric impairment means that she is effectively precluded from pursuing employment in the community services sector for which she is qualified such that her parameters of employment have been materially reduced. 600 Defendant's Closing Submissions filed 5 December 2025, par 4. -- 117 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 118 421 The plaintiff submits that she is now restricted to employment: (a) of a low-stress and structured nature, in which tasks are predictable and repetitive; (b) which avoids exposure to trauma-related triggers including any role which would require high levels of emotional involvement or crisis management; and (c) with a reduced or flexible schedule, incorporating frequent breaks, and is therefore confined to more limited roles of a low-stress nature, which offer fewer opportunities for advancement and reduced earning capacity. 422 The evidence of the plaintiff is that she told Dr Pyne that she had the day off work, but that she cannot remember telling Dr Pyne at any stage that she had time off work because of the assault.601 423 The evidence of Dr Pyne is that the plaintiff has had no work restrictions due to the Incident or resulting mental health issues that he is aware of. Dr Pyne was not aware of the plaintiff missing any time off work and had not himself given her any medical certificates for any time off work throughout any of the time that she had consulted him (ie 24 September 2021 - 23 June 2023). 424 The evidence of the plaintiff is that she attended the clinic the day after the Incident for a pre-arranged COVID vaccination and was seen by Dr Pyne because the nurse at the clinic arranged for the plaintiff to be seen by a doctor because the plaintiff was visibly upset.602 As to the balance of the matters the plaintiff relies on, the plaintiff's submissions as to her purported periods of incapacity for work caused by her psychiatric symptoms does not evidence anything by way of any substantive periods of time. 425 The evidence of Dr Crooke, the plaintiff's long time former general practitioner who continued to see the plaintiff in 2023 and 2024, was that plaintiff can function at work and hold down her job. His evidence was that the plaintiff can continue to work. 426 Whilst Ms Scallan expressed the view in her report dated December 2023 that the plaintiff was partially incapacitated for work as a swimming pool inspector following the Incident, and later struggled in her acting role of 'community development project officer', 601 ts 201. 602 ts 190. -- 118 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 119 Ms Scallan's evidence is that she in fact cannot remember exactly what the plaintiff was working as, and that her notes at the time of the consultations do not record these matters.603 Ms Scallan had not previously been provided with the position description of a community transport officer. The evidence of Ms Scallan as to whether or not the plaintiff's anxiety may impair her work capacity was ultimately unclear. That is, there may be some impact on the plaintiff but her opinion was that this could be a matter of days and ultimately quite difficult to put a time limit on.604 Ms Scallan's evidence was that the plaintiff would do better in behind the scenes roles rather than front-line community engagement by way of alternative roles due to the risk of re-triggering and re-traumatising.605 427 The plaintiff was never assessed by Dr Terace about her capacity to work. The question of work capacity and any restrictions as a result of the plaintiff's injuries and symptoms was only put to Dr Terace at trial. The evidence of Dr Terace was therefore appropriately caveated. 428 The evidence of Dr Terace was that psychotic disorders did not predict occupational capacity as of themselves, and not having examined the plaintiff recently, it was difficult for him to give an opinion.606 With regards to the plaintiff's future work capacity, the evidence of Dr Terace was that it would be difficult for him to speculate because of the information available to him. 429 Dr Terace identified potential 'red flags' with respect to some aspects of the various roles put to him by plaintiff's counsel including a community transport officer and working with people with mental health issues.607 The evidence of Dr Terace is that he considered that it may be problematic for the plaintiff to engage in safety critical duties assuming the plaintiff's mental state had not changed or has deteriorated and on this basis raised this concern with the court.608 Dr Terace ultimately deferred to Dr Priestly on the issue.609 430 Similarly, the plaintiff was never assessed by Dr Priestly about her capacity to work. As I have already found, Dr Priestly's opinion as to the plaintiff's future prognosis for the PTSD related to 603 ts 439. 604 ts 501. 605 ts 501; Exhibit 99. 606 ts 482. 607 ts 490. 608 ts 484. 609 ts 490. -- 119 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 120 the trauma (of the) assault is good.610 When expressly taken to the Certificates III and IV in Community Services by plaintiff's counsel, Dr Priestly maintained her evidence. 431 The plaintiff's case seems to be that she would have pursued employment opportunities her Certificates III and IV in Community Services qualified her for, if not for the fact that the assault had rendered her incapable of doing so. However, there is no evidence that the plaintiff took any steps to seek employment related to the types of roles these certificates would have qualified the plaintiff to do. The evidence of the plaintiff is that she was in fact unclear as to what specific roles these qualifications related to.611 Where the evidence of the plaintiff is that she would have liked to have moved into a role helping people with domestic abuse in refuges, potentially as a receptionist, there is no evidence that either of these certificates were a perquisite for the role of a receptionist working in a refuge.612 432 Further, it is the plaintiff's case that if it were not for the fact of the assault, the plaintiff would be in a position to return to her substantive role as a swimming pool inspector with the City of Joondalup at the conclusion of the acting role. The plaintiff was never assessed by any of the medical practitioners as being unable to fulfill the swimming pool inspector role. Assessment 433 As to future economic loss, the plaintiff carries the onus of proving loss of earning capacity and the extent to which that loss produces, or might produce, financial loss.613 Where it is proved, according to a balance of probabilities, that some loss might have been occasioned by an actionable wrongdoing, the value of a lost opportunity is a matter of assessing probabilities and possibilities.614 Assessing the plaintiff's earning capacity had she not been assaulted is necessarily a hypothetical enquiry that must depend on an assessment of the possibilities.615 610 ts 405. 611 ts 73. 612 ts 73. 613 Medlin (18) (McHugh J); Setton v Eves [2006] WASCA 3 [1], [25], [48] (Steytler P, McLure JA & Simmonds AJA); Montemaggiori v Wilson [2011] WASCA 177 [30] (Buss & Newnes JJA). 614 Hodges v Hicks [2025] WASCA 190 [65]; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL [1994] HCA 4; (1994) 179 CLR 332, 355, 368. 615 Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638, 630 - 640 (Brennan & Dawson), 642 - 643 (Deane, Gaudron & McHugh JJ). -- 120 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 121 434 I do not consider that the plaintiff has proved that her residual symptoms diminish her earning capacity to an extent that is likely to result in any substantive economic loss. I am not satisfied therefore that the plaintiff should be entitled to a significant award for future loss of earning capacity in the circumstances. In coming to this conclusion, I have taken into account the following. 435 It is convenient to first consider the nature and extent of any incapacity of the plaintiff to work by reason of her psychiatric and psychological symptoms. As I have already indicated, I have already found that the plaintiff's physical injuries had largely resolved by 30 September 2021, approximately one week after the Incident. There is very little by way of evidence of the plaintiff having had any substantive time off work following the Incident as a result of her psychiatric illnesses and symptoms. Similarly, there is no evidence of the plaintiff having taken sick leave as well as to attend to medical appointments or the like as a result of her symptoms. The plaintiff gave evidence that she continued in the role of a swimming pool inspector following the Incident on a full-time basis until 9 December 2024 when she commenced in the acting role acting community transport officer.616 436 Secondly, consistent with my earlier findings, and a review of the medical evidence, I am also satisfied that the plaintiff's psychiatric conditions and functioning were at their worst in about September 2021 to December 2023. During this period, the plaintiff continued in her substantive role as a swimming pool inspector with the City of Joondalup on a full-time basis. 437 Thirdly, the plaintiff gave evidence that she is still employed by the City of Joondalup and is presently in the role of acting community transport officer.617 438 Fourthly, the plaintiff's case as to her future work capacity relied on the evidence of Ms Scallan and Dr Terace to establish that as a consequence of the assault she is effectively precluded from pursuing employment in the community services sector for which she is qualified, and is confined to more limited roles of a low-stress nature, which offer fewer opportunities for advancement and reduced earning capacity. 616 ts 68, ts 196 - ts 197. 617 ts 120 and ts 196. -- 121 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 122 439 However, I attach little weight to the observation of Ms Scallan that the plaintiff was partially incapacitated for work as a swimming pool inspector following the Incident and later struggled in her acting role of 'community development project officer. First, because Ms Scallan's evidence is that she in fact cannot remember exactly what the plaintiff was working as, and that her notes at the time of the consultations do not record these matters, and secondly, Ms Scallan's evidence as to whether or not the plaintiff's anxiety may impair her work capacity was ultimately unclear. 440 Expert evidence was called from two consultant psychiatrists by the plaintiff, Dr Priestley and Dr Terrace. Both were well qualified and their diagnosis as to the nature of the psychiatric illnesses suffered by the plaintiff were similar, although their formulations of the plaintiff's prognosis for recovery differed slightly. The evidence of Dr Priestly is that the plaintiff's future prognosis recovery from the PTSD related to the trauma assault is good.618 441 In this context, I accept the observations of Dr Terace as to potential 'red flags' with respect to some aspects of the various roles put to him at trial including as a community transport officer and working with people with mental health issues, and that it may be problematic for the plaintiff to engage in safety critical duties assuming the plaintiff's mental state had not changed or has deteriorated. Dr Terace ultimately deferred to Dr Priestly on the issue.619 442 Fifthly, contrary to the submission being advanced, the plaintiff is in fact wanting to continue in the acting role of community transport officer until 23 October 2026 which is when the contract for the acting role is presently in place until. The plaintiff's evidence is that she would apply for the acting role of community transport officer if that role was available to her substantively, a role which the plaintiff says she loves and really enjoys.620 443 The acting role attracts a higher rate of pay to the plaintiff's substantive role of a swimming pool inspector with the City of Joondalup. The plaintiff gave evidence that she does not intend to return to the role of swimming pool inspector as she wants to look for a different role with less confrontation and aggression.621 This aspect 618 ts 405. 619 ts 490. 620 ts 197. 621 ts 196. -- 122 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 123 of the plaintiff's claim for future economic loss is contingent on the plaintiff not having the opportunity to substantively secure the acting role that she enjoys. Whilst the plaintiff has acted in the role of community transport officer for some time, it does not necessarily follow that she would be able to obtain the position substantively should it become available. It is also not clear whether the plaintiff's qualifications and experience qualify her for an equivalent paid position either within the City of Joondalup, where the plaintiff has been employed for some 15 years, or elsewhere. 444 The plaintiff has sought a global amount of damages associated with her purported reduced future work capacity. The plaintiff's claim is predicated on her reduced ability to pursue employment in the community services sector for which she is qualified. As the defendant submitted, there is no documented impact on the plaintiff's ability to work and the plaintiff continued in her role as a swimming pool inspector for some three years without interruption. 445 The plaintiff has been employed by the City of Joondalup since 2011, initially on a part-time basis and since 2015 on a full-time basis. I have already found that since being employed by the City of Joondalup the plaintiff has obtained a number of promotions and also moved between departments. Since the assault, the plaintiff took a second job on a casual basis at Optus Stadium as a suite attendant working game days.622 446 I have considered the plaintiff's income tax returns from the period 30 June 2017 to the date of trial which consistent with the plaintiff's evidence at trial shows an increase in the plaintiff's taxable income following the Incident.623 The plaintiff gave evidence that there is no need for her to work a second job anymore because of an increase in her rate of pay with the City of Joondalup.624 447 The proposition that the plaintiff is precluded from pursuing employment in the community services sector for which she is qualified is simply too general in nature. The plaintiff's case for future economic loss does not engage in any meaningful way with the diagnosis of her treating psychiatrist, Dr Priestley about matters such as the plaintiff's anticipated prognosis over time and presentation and developments. Further, where the plaintiff submits that as a result of the psychiatric 622 ts 120. 623 ts 121 - ts 122; Exhibits 10 - 18. 624 ts 122. -- 123 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 124 illnesses and symptoms caused by the Incident she has a reduced future work capacity in employment for which she is qualified, I did not find this persuasive either. No examples are provided and nothing indicated for context. 448 The evidence of the plaintiff is that she in fact intends to continue to work in the acting role and apply for the substantive community services officer role should it become available. The evidence of the plaintiff is that she does not intend to return to her substantive position as a swimming pool inspector. It is difficult to accept that this is due to any lack of capacity. Here, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the plaintiff continued in the role of swimming pool inspector for several years after the Incident and when her symptoms were at their worst, and that the plaintiff in fact wishes to continue in the role of community transport officer including should the position become available substantively. I have also had careful regard to the medical evidence and the findings I have previously made in respect to matters as to the plaintiff's capacity and prognosis. 449 In such circumstances, I do not consider that there is an appropriate basis to calculate the plaintiff's future loss of earning capacity. I am not satisfied that as a result of the Incident, the plaintiff is now precluded from pursuing employment in the community services sector for which she is qualified, nor by reason of her symptoms as a result of the Incident that she is rendered less competitive in the workplace. 450 I accept however that whilst the plaintiff was unclear as to what specific roles her Certificate III and IV qualifications related to, she says she would eventually have liked to have moved into a role helping people with domestic abuse in refuges. In this context, I have had regard to the observations of Dr Terace as to potential 'red flags'. 451 The plaintiff's employment and earning history following the Incident to the date of the trial, to the plaintiff's credit, demonstrates a person who has a consistent work history and a capacity to continue in employment for a prolonged period of time. She also impressed me as being very committed to her various employment roles, including following the Incident. The evidence as a whole of the plaintiff affords a sound basis for a reasonable prediction that the plaintiff will continue to pursue her various career opportunities in the circumstances. -- 124 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 125 452 Ultimately, I consider that the plaintiff is only entitled to a modest award of damages to recognise that the medical evidence is consistent in attributing the plaintiff's current psychiatric illnesses and symptoms to the Incident. Having had regard to the above matters and my findings, in my view, a global amount of $10,000 would provide fair and reasonable compensation for any impairment to the plaintiff's future earning capacity as a result of her Incident related psychiatric illnesses and symptoms. This sum is inclusive of superannuation. General damages 453 The plaintiff submits that the personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff were caused by the assault and battery and have had a significant impact on the plaintiff's life. The injuries have caused significant pain and suffering, a lack of competitiveness on the open labour market and a need for additional medical treatment.625 The plaintiff submits that she is entitled to be compensated for the condition that she has been left in with a view to giving her fair compensation for the pain, inconvenience and loss of enjoyment which she has sustained.626 454 The plaintiff submits that in contemplating the non-pecuniary losses payable to the plaintiff, the court ought to consider how the injuries have impacted her day-to-day life since the Incident as well as into the future.627 The plaintiff submits that these symptoms persist, her requirement for treatment persists, and treatment that derives directly from the Incident. The plaintiff submits that given, the nature of the domestic violence perpetrated against the plaintiff, the continuous and severe psychological effects from which she continues to suffer, the loss of recreational and social activities, the loss of enjoyment of life, overall, the plaintiff is properly characterised as being of at least moderate severity in the band of potential awards.628 The plaintiff submits an award of not less than $50,000 for the plaintiff's non-pecuniary loss ought to be made. 455 The defendant submitted that the plaintiff's medical history evidences a not insignificant history of mental health issues, attributable to a variety of factors unrelated to the defendant.629 625 Plaintiff's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 20 October 2025, par 124. 626 Plaintiff's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 20 October 2025, par 96. 627 Plaintiff's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 10 December 2025, par 179. 628 Plaintiff's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 20 October 2025, par 105. 629 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 3 November 2025, par 1. -- 125 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 126 Further, that the plaintiff's psychological condition appears to have been influenced and exacerbated by various ongoing life stressors occurring after the alleged assault.630 The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has exaggerated her alleged assault injuries.631 Whilst acknowledging that the Incident did occur, and that he has never denied pushing the plaintiff, the defendant submits that the court to consider the circumstances, the limited nature of the conduct, and the proportionality of the damages now sought.632 456 The defendant submitted that there was no medical treatment, no time off work, and no ongoing physical injury.633 Through the criminal process, the defendant submits that the matter was assessed at the low end of seriousness.634 It is the defendant's position that the plaintiff's distress arose from the end of their relationship, not from the brief Incident in the park.635 In these circumstances, the defendant submits that the court to consider the credibility, timing, and consistency of the evidence and to award damages, if any, that reflect only proven harm, not emotion, assumption, or hindsight.636 Assessment 457 There is specific legislation that awards compensation that victims might apply for under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA). The plaintiff elected not to avail herself of this opportunity and proceeded on the basis of a common law claim for damages for assault and battery in a domestic violence context. 458 The court was referred to a number of decisions in other jurisdictions involving civil claims for damages for the tort of assault and battery. All such awards turn on their own facts but indicated that much would depend upon the nature and extent of the injuries. 459 General damages are ordinarily awarded to compensate for pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary loss.637 The amount of damages must be fair and reasonable compensation for the injuries received by the plaintiff and the disabilities caused, having regard to current general 630 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 3 November 2025, par 2. 631 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 3 November 2025, par 4. 632 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 5 December 2025, par 2. 633 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 5 December 2025, par 3. 634 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 5 December 2025, par 3. 635 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 5 December 2025, par 21. 636 Defendant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 5 December 2025, par 21. 637 M R & R C Smith Pty Ltd t/as Ultra Tune (Osborne Park) v Wyatt [No 2] [2012] WASCA 110 [128] (Pullin JA, with whom Newnes JA agreed & Murphy JA generally agreed). -- 126 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 127 ideas of fairness and moderation.638 The amount must be proportionate to the injuries received and the disabilities suffered by the plaintiff.639 460 The defendant by his intentional actions caused injury and harm to the plaintiff. The defendant assaulted the plaintiff by pushing her in the chest, causing her to fall to the ground and strike her head on the ground. The defendant further assaulted the plaintiff by grabbing her left arm, repeatedly grabbing her hair and grabbing her by the throat. As a direct result of the defendant's violence which, the plaintiff cried, shouted for help, involuntarily wet herself, and was terrified that the defendant was going to, at worst, kill her. I have previously found that this violence occurred while the plaintiff and defendant walked from the Cornerstone Hotel, through adjoining parklands, toward the plaintiff's home over the course of approximately 30 - 45 minutes. 461 Since the Incident, the plaintiff continues to seek treatment due to anxiety, heart palpitations, shakiness, flashbacks, nightmares, and depression and can be triggered in certain circumstances. As a result of the defendant's assault upon her on 23 September 2021, the plaintiff has suffered from PTSD which has caused her to suffer significant stress and anxiety, panic episodes, emotional dysregulation, somatic anxiety symptoms, nightmares directly related to the assault, and persistent hyperarousal. Whilst the plaintiff's symptoms improved following medication, and treatment, the legal process acted as a trigger for re-emergence of PTSD symptoms. The medical evidence is consistent in attributing the plaintiff's current psychiatric illnesses and symptoms to the Incident. 462 I acknowledge that the assault here occurred in the context of an intimate relationship. The plaintiff does not shy away from her history of being in prior abusive relationships in the past, including with her ex-husband. However, she was clear that this past abuse was emotional and not physical in nature. The plaintiff was ashamed about getting herself into another abusive relationship, this time with the defendant. The assault by the defendant involved a significant breach of trust and heightened vulnerability and is a profound violation of the trust and security that ought to characterise intimate partnerships. 638 Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118, 125 (Barwick CJ, Kitto & Menzies JJ) (Planet Fisheries); Houlahan v Pitchen [2009] WASCA 104 [107] (Newnes JA with whom Pullin & Miller JJA agreed) (Houlahan); Winiarczyk v Tsirigotis [2011] WASCA 97 [71] (judgment of the court) (Winiarczyk). 639 Planet Fisheries (125); Houlahan [108]; Winiarczyk [71]. -- 127 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 128 463 In terms of assessing the severity of the plaintiff's psychiatric symptoms and injuries for the purposes of determining an award for general damages, I take into account the following matters. Although the plaintiff only required modest medical treatment in the immediate aftermath of the Incident for her physical injuries, she required more significant treatment for her psychiatric illnesses and symptoms. On the basis of the plaintiff's history I find that she would have suffered some such symptoms from time-to-time, as she did on occasions prior to the Incident, but the defendant, of course, must take the plaintiff as he finds her. 464 A DASS-21 assessment administered to the plaintiff on 28 January 2018 which was several years prior to the Incident indicated that at that time, the plaintiff was experiencing a normal level of depressive, anxiety and stress symptoms.640 Here I have also had regard to the history provided by Dr Crooke and his evidence. Based on the evidence, since the Incident, it is clear that the plaintiff's post-Incident medical condition has required ongoing treatment and reliance on medication to manage her anxiety and PTSD symptoms. It is clear that the Incident re-triggered the plaintiff's pre-Incident mental health condition and I accept the evidence of each of Dr Priestley, Dr Terace and Ms Scallan in this regard. 465 The defendant's suggestion that the plaintiff was exaggerating her symptoms and was motivated by a 'broken heart' to pursue the defendant only after their relationship ended, disregards the totality of the evidence before the court including the medical evidence. That the assault had a serious and ongoing impact on the plaintiff is clear and is not diminished, as the defendant seems to submit, by the lack of any serious physical injuries. 466 Taking all of the matters into account, I am satisfied the assault and battery suffered by the plaintiff at the hands of the defendant had an impact on the plaintiff causing the harm and psychiatric illness and symptoms that the plaintiff complains of. That said, the plaintiff to her credit, continued working full-time after the Incident, including following a breast cancer diagnosis, and even took on a second job, and has continued to maintain an active lifestyle. 467 In all of the circumstances, I conclude a reasonable award for general damages and loss of amenities is $40,000. 640 ts 418. -- 128 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 129 Issue 5: What quantum is the plaintiff entitled to? 468 In summary, for the reasons given above, I have assessed the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled as follows: Item Amount ($) Past special damages $11,873.12 Future medical treatment $14,090.42 Interest on past loss and expenditure $1,699.04 Future economic loss $10,000.00 General damages $40,000.00 Total $77,662.58 469 The award of damages is reduced by the amount of $2,500 to take in account payment of the fine by the defendant.641 After subtraction of the $2,500, the net award is $75,162.58. Conclusion and orders 470 There should be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $75,162.58. 471 I will hear from the parties as to costs. 641 Exhibit 104, Magistrates Court of Western Australia Notice of Conviction dated 15 November 2021. -- 129 of 130 -- [2026] WADC 63 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 63 (MJW) Page 130 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia. MO Associate 3 JULY 2026 -- 130 of 130 --