SINGH -v- ZAZI [2026] WADC 57

[2026] WADC 57 [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 1 JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CIVIL LOCATION : PERTH CITATION : SINGH -v- ZAZI [2026] WADC 57 CORAM : JEYAMOHAN DCJ HEARD : 23 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : Ex tempore PUBLISHED : 26 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : APP 6 of 2026 BETWEEN : GURDIT SINGH Appellant AND BILAL HABASHI ZAZI Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE MALLEY File Number : ROC/GCLM/1145/2023 Catchwords: Magistrates Court appeal - Whether appellant was denied procedural fairness - Litigant in person - Turns on own facts -- 1 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 2 Legislation: Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) Result: Leave to appeal is refused Appeal dismissed Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In person Respondent : No appearance Solicitors: Appellant : Not applicable Respondent : Not appplicable Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36 Cameron v Cole [1944] HCA 5; (1944) 68 CLR 571 Defendi v Szigligeti [2019] WASCA 115 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196 Frigger v Frigger [2023] WASCA 103 Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; (1990) 64 ALJR 458 Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 Ibrahim v The Honourable Justice Carolyn Martin [2012] WASC 338 International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49; (2009) 240 CLR 319 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65 Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36 Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 25 R v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271 Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 148 Rowe v Stoltze [2013] WASCA 92 Sampey v Doherty [2024] WASCA 105 -- 2 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 3 Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288 Total Value Auto & Finance Pty Ltd v Small [2004] NSWSC 1040 Ward v West Coast Suzuki Marine Pty Ltd [2021] WADC 37 Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 Woodley v Woodley [2018] WASCA 149 -- 3 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 4 JEYAMOHAN DCJ: [This decision was delivered extemporaneously on 23 June 2026 and edited from the transcript.] Introduction 1 On 23 November 2023, Bilal Harbashi Zazi (Mr Zazi), the respondent in this appeal, commenced proceedings in the Magistrates Court against Gurdit Singh (Mr Singh), the appellant, claiming damages of $30,000 plus costs in respect of the value of a 2010 135i BMW (Vehicle), said to be owned by Mr Zazi, which Mr Zazi alleges Mr Singh sold without his permission to a third party for the amount of $16,000 (Claim).1 2 On 10 July 2024, the matter proceeded to trial for hearing before Magistrate Malley. Mr Zazi was legally represented at trial. Mr Singh appeared as a litigant in person. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned magistrate reserved his decision. 3 On 7 August 2024, the learned magistrate delivered his reasons for decision, finding for Mr Zazi in the sum of $13,087.88 payable by Mr Singh to Mr Zazi and an order that Mr Singh pay Mr Zazi's cost to be taxed or agreed (Decision). 4 By notice of appeal filed 21 January 2026, Mr Singh appeals against the Decision. Mr Singh also requires the court's leave to proceed as the appeal was brought out of time. 5 By notice of respondent's intention filed 12 March 2026, Mr Zazi indicated his intention to take part in the appeal. By correspondence to the court dated 17 June 2026, Mr Zazi's solicitors wrote advising that Mr Zazi opposes the appeal and intends to rely on written submissions filed 17 June 2026 but does not otherwise intend to appear at the hearing of the appeal. 6 The appeal proceeded to substantive hearing before this court on 23 June 2023. 7 For the reasons which follow, leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is otherwise dismissed. 1 Magistrate's Court File Case Number ROC/GCLM/1145/2023 (MB), page 575. -- 4 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 5 Appeal to the District Court 8 The appeal is brought pursuant to s 40 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) (MCCPA). 9 An appeal cannot be commenced more than 21 days after the date of judgment, unless the District Court gives leave to do so.2 10 An appeal from a decision of a magistrate to the District Court is by way of rehearing. It is not a hearing de novo. Given the appeal is by way of a rehearing it is necessary for the appellant to demonstrate error in the court below. This error must be a legal, factual or discretionary error.3 The Court of Appeal may ascertain what material or evidence was before the lower court in any manner it considers is sufficient.4 11 No new evidence was sought to be adduced in the appeal. I have therefore determined the appeal on the evidence that was before the magistrate. Grounds of appeal 12 The notice of appeal contains the following four grounds of appeal: 1. Denial of procedural fairness (Ground 1). 2. Error of law - decision on an unpleaded basis (Ground 2). 3. Error of law - failure to apply correct legal principles (Ground 3). 4. Findings not open on the evidence (Ground 4). 13 The grounds of appeal were further augmented in the notice of appeal which characterised the grounds of appeal further as follows: Ground 1: Denial of Procedural Fairness The learned Magistrate denied [Mr Singh] procedural fairness by: (a) refusing to consider documentary evidence that had been filed by the Appellant; 2 MCCPA s 40(3). 3 Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36 [13] - [15]; Ward v West Coast Suzuki Marine Pty Ltd [2021] WADC 37. 4 MCCPA s 43(2). -- 5 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 6 (b) failing to explain to the self-represented Appellant the critical procedural distinction between evidence being filed and evidence being formally tendered, being assistance reasonably required to ensure a fair hearing; and (c) failing to afford the Appellant an opportunity to properly tender that evidence once it became apparent that the court would not consider filed materials unless tendered. In circumstances where the Appellant was self-represented and where the exclusion of the evidence was material to the outcome of the proceedings, the Appellant was deprived of a real and meaningful opportunity to present his case, amounting to a denial of procedural fairness and an error of law. Ground 2 Error of Law: Decision on an Unpleaded Basis The Respondent pleaded and conducted the proceedings on the basis that he was the sole owner of the vehicle and that the Appellant had wrongfully sold the vehicle without authority. The learned Magistrate rejected that pleaded case, including allegations of sole ownership and conversion, yet erred in law by determining the matter on a different and unpleaded basis, namely by ordering a division of sale proceeds and insurance funds between joint owners, without affording the Appellant an opportunity to address that basis. Ground 3 Error of law: Failure to Apply Correct Legal Principles Having accepted that repairs were undertaken to the vehicle using insurance proceeds, the learned Magistrate erred in law by making no allowance for repair expenses and by failing to apply correct legal principles to the assessment of deductions from the insurance proceeds. Ground 4 Findings Not Open on the Evidence The learned Magistrate made findings that were internally inconsistent and not open on the evidence, including finding that the Respondents signature on the transfer document was genuine while concluding that no transfer of interest occurred, without reconciling those findings. Issues for determination 14 Mr Singh's grounds of appeal are at times difficult to follow. However, Mr Singh's grounds of appeal can be understood including by having had regard to the parties' respective written submissions and the oral submissions made by Mr Singh at the hearing of the appeal. 15 Given the appeal was commenced out of time, leave to appeal is an issue to be determined. -- 6 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 7 16 The following issues arise for determination: 1. Leave to appeal out of time. 2. Was there a denial of procedural fairness because the learned magistrate did not give Mr Singh sufficient opportunity to present his case? (Ground 1) 3. Was there a denial of procedural fairness because the learned magistrate did not give Mr Singh sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence? (Ground 1) 4. Whether the learned magistrate erred in law. (Grounds 2, 3 and 4) Litigant in person appeal 17 Mr Singh appeared as a litigant in person at the lower court proceedings and at the hearing of the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr Singh was expressly given the opportunity to adjourn the hearing of the appeal to the extent he was of the view that the assistance of an interpreter would be required. Mr Singh did not act on this opportunity and confirmed that he was minded to proceed with the hearing of the appeal. 18 Further, Mr Singh submitted that he was not served with Mr Zazi's written submissions filed 17 June 2026 and only subsequently became aware of the submissions on reviewing the court's electronic file on 22 June 2026. Mr Singh was expressly given the opportunity to adjourn the hearing of the appeal to afford him additional time to consider Mr Zazi's written submissions. Mr Singh similarly did not act on this opportunity and confirmed that he was minded to proceed with the hearing of the appeal. 19 As Mr Singh is a litigant in person in the appeal, he is entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules.5 I approach the documents in which he articulates his appeal with some flexibility.6 I need to be astute to ensure that, in a poorly expressed or unstructured document in which he sets out his case, there is no viable case which, with appropriate amendment or permissible assistance from the court, could be put into proper form.7 5 Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 [10] (reasons of the court). 6 Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 536 - 537 (Kirby P), 543 (Hope JA, with whom Samuels JA agreed); Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) [2012] WASC 48 [10] (Pritchard J). 7 Ibrahim v The Honourable Justice Carolyn Martin [2012] WASC 338 [21] (Beech J); Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288 [15] (EM Heenan J, with whom Murray & Le Miere JJ agreed). -- 7 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 8 20 At the same time, I also need to ensure that any latitude given to the appellant as a litigant in person does not deprive the respondent of his rights to procedural fairness and a fair hearing.8 Magistrates Court proceedings 21 On 23 November 2023, Mr Zazi commenced proceedings in the Magistrates Court against Mr Singh claiming damages of $30,000 plus costs in respect of the value of the Vehicle said to be owned by Mr Zazi, which Mr Zazi alleges Mr Singh sold without his permission to a third party for the amount of $16,000.9 22 Included in Mr Zazi's Claim is the proceeds of an insurance payout in the amount of $10,175.66 said to have been made by RAC on or about 14 February 2022 following the Vehicle being involved in an accident on or about 8 January 2022 (RAC Payment). At that time, Mr Zazi was the registered owner of the Vehicle and Mr Singh had been driving the Vehicle at the time of the accident. 23 Mr Zazi in his Claim alleges that Mr Singh in effect received the RAC Payment and was to use this money to repair the damage to the Vehicle for Mr Zazi. 24 The allegations in the Claim were disputed by Mr Singh.10 25 As appears from Mr Singh's statement of defence, Mr Singh's position can be summarised as follows:11 I purchased the car in partnership with the claimant on 20/12/2021. The car was in the claimant's name. I paid the entire purchase price. The claimant paid back me for his 50% share on 10/03/2022. I purchased the claimant's share on 14/10/2022 he signed an undated vehicle ownership transfer paper and I took the permanent possession of the car. I sold my car on 11/02/2023. 8 Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36 [47] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon & Edelman JJ) (Nobarani); Woodley v Woodley [2018] WASCA 149 [76] (judgment of the court) (Woodley); Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65 [51] (judgment of the court) (Moleirinho). 9 MB, page 575. 10 MB, pages 571 - 573. 11 MB, page 563. -- 8 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 9 26 It is Mr Singh's position that he met with an accident on 8 January 2022 whilst in possession of the Vehicle due to a third party's negligence and the third party's insurance was going to pay for the damage. As to the RAC Payment, Mr Singh's position can be summarised as follows:12 The third party's insurance was going to pay for the damage, The defendant requested me to receive the funds in my bank account as he was a bonafide Centrelink payments receiver and cash worker. Cosmetic damages were repaired. The car has ongoing mechanical and electrical issues. 27 On 10 July 2024, the matter proceeded to trial for hearing before Magistrate Malley. Mr Zazi was legally represented at trial. Mr Singh appeared as a litigant in person. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned magistrate reserved his decision. 28 On 7 August 2024, the learned magistrate delivered his reasons for decision, finding for Mr Zazi in the sum of $8,000 for the vehicle and $5,087.88 for the RAC Payment in a total of $13,087.88 payable by Mr Singh to Mr Zazi and an order that Mr Singh pay Mr Zazi's cost to be taxed or agreed. 29 In reaching his Decision, the learned magistrate relevantly found as follows: 1. Mr Singh sold the Vehicle to a third party for an amount of $16,000. 2. Mr Zazi and Mr Singh purchased the Vehicle jointly. 3. At no time did Mr Zazi transfer his interest in the Vehicle to Mr Singh. 4. Based on that conclusion, Mr Zazi would be entitled to 50% of the sale proceeds of the Vehicle of $8,000. 5. Having reached that conclusion, there remains the issue of the $10,175 paid into the Mr Singh's account by RAC. Such amount should be equally divided between the two. 6. Given the finding that each party has a 50% interest, the insurance payment likewise should be split 50/50 of $5,087.88. 12 MB, page 563. -- 9 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 10 Enforcement proceedings against Mr Singh 30 By application filed with the Magistrates Court on 6 November 2024, Mr Zazi applied for property seizure and sale orders seeking payment of the balance of the judgment sum and costs.13 31 On 8 November 2024, a property seizure and sale order was issued (PSSO Order).14 A Form 25 property seizure and sale order notice was subsequently issued in respect of the judgment debt.15 32 By means inquiry summons Mr Singh was ordered to attend a means inquiry on 9 July 2025 (Means Inquiry Summons).16 Mr Singh was served with the Means Inquiry Summons on 5 June 2025.17 33 The means inquiry on 9 July 2025 was adjourned to 23 July 2025 to allow Mr Singh, the judgement debtor, time to produce further evidence and materials. Relevantly, the following orders were made (Means Inquiry Order):18 … 2. The Judgment Debtor must provide the full legal name of his wife to the Court on or before 18 July 2025. 3. The Judgment Debtor must produced to the Court no later than 21 July 2025: (i) Proof of income for himself and his wife - 3 current payslips or current statement from Centrelink; (ii) All individual and joint bank statements for the last 6 months; (iii) Tax returns for himself and his wife for the last 3 years; (iv) A current invoice for electricity, gas, telephone, water, land rates and any other relevant expenditure which are in either his name or in the name of his wife; (v) A current statement of any individual and joint loan and credit card debts; 13 MB, pages 143 - 146. 14 MB, pages 140 - 142. 15 MB, pages 118 -121. 16 MB, pages 105 -109. 17 MB, page 101. 18 MB, pages 99 - 100. -- 10 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 11 (vi) Any other documents relating to joint expenditure and debt; (vii) Proof of ownership or any business or business entities controlled by either himself or his wife. 34 By email to the Magistrates Court dated 18 July 2025, Mr Singh wrote providing his 'wife/ex-wife's full legal name' and stating that he has provided this to comply with the order made on 9 July 2025 (ie the Means Inquiry Order).19 35 On 23 July 2025, an enforcement order was made by consent in respect of the Means Inquiry Order in the following terms (Instalment Order):20 1. The Judgment Debtor is ordered to pay the Judgment Debt of $32671.70 (inclusive of enforcement costs and interest) to be paid by an instalment of $10000.00 on or before 23 August 2025 and the balance $22671.70 on or before 28 October 2025. 36 Subsequent to the making of the Instalment Order on 23 July 2025, the enforcement proceedings have been ongoing since that time. On a review of the lower court file, it is apparent that between 23 July 2026 to January 2026, Mr Singh continued to communicate with the Magistrates Court in respect of the enforcement proceedings about payment of the outstanding judgment debt.21 Leave to appeal out of time 37 Section 40(3) of the MCCPA provides that an appeal cannot be commenced more than 21 days after the date of judgment unless the court gives leave to do so. The rules are in place to preserve finality in court proceedings and promote the prompt resolution of legal disputes. Consequently, where an application to appeal out of time is brought, the court should be slow to grant leave unless justice requires it. The allowance of such applications is not automatic.22 38 The learned magistrate's decision in the matter was delivered on 7 August 2024. Consequently, the last day for appealing the decision was 28 August 2024. 39 The appeal to this court was not filed until 21 January 2026. 19 MB, page 95. 20 MB, page 32. 21 MB, pages 1 - 31. 22 Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; (1990) 64 ALJR 458. -- 11 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 12 The appellant's position 40 Mr Singh filed an affidavit in support of his application for leave to appeal out of time.23 Mr Singh, in his affidavit, relevantly deposes to the following matters: 1. That at all times, he was self-represented in the lower court proceedings and did not have the benefit of legal advice regarding appeal rights.24 2. That he had limited legal knowledge and limited English language proficiency and did not understand that: (a) errors of law or procedural fairness could form grounds of appeal; (b) that there were strict statutory time limits for commencing an appeal; or (c) the procedural steps required to properly commence an appeal.25 3. That following judgment, enforcement action was commenced against him which required urgent attention and caused significant financial pressure and stress.26 4. That after judgment, he continued to be self-represented and was dealing with significant personal and family emergencies including that his grandfather suffered paralysis; that the appellant was required to accompany him in the hospital in Australia and to India as he was not able to travel alone; that he was required to travel overseas due to a death in the family.27 5. That once he understood his rights of appeal and the nature of the errors relied upon, he acted promptly to commence this appeal.28 23 Affidavit in Support of Leave to Appeal sworn 19 January 2026 (Singh Affidavit). 24 Singh Affidavit, page 2, pars 5 - 6. 25 Singh Affidavit, page 2, pars 7 - 8. 26 Singh Affidavit, page 3, pars 18 - 19. 27 Singh Affidavit, page 3, pars 20 - 26. 28 Singh Affidavit, page 3, par 27. -- 12 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 13 41 At the hearing of the appeal, Mr Singh relied on his written submissions filed 7 June 2026, and oral submissions, in addition to the matters deposed to in the Singh Affidavit. As to the timing of Mr Singh's personal and family emergencies deposed to in the Singh Affidavit, Mr Singh's position is that this occurred in August 2025. The respondent's position 42 By the respondent's written submissions filed 17 June 2026, it is Mr Zazi's position that there was a period of three months between the Decision and the commencement of the enforcement proceedings. During this period it is submitted that Mr Singh had ample time to seek legal advice and commence an appeal, but failed to do so and has provided no explanation for why an appeal was not commenced prior to the enforcement proceedings. 43 As to the delay in commencing the appeal due to personal and family emergencies, Mr Zazi submits that the family emergencies Mr Singh relies on occurred between August 2025 to January 2026. Further, Mr Singh's claims with respect to family emergencies remain unsubstantiated as Mr Singh has not provided any evidence to demonstrate the veracity of the claims. 44 Mr Zazi also points to Mr Singh having consented to a payment instalment order in respect of the judgment debt the subject of the enforcement proceedings. Disposition 45 The principles relating to applications for leave to appeal out of time are well settled. Generally speaking, there are 'four major factors to be considered in the exercise of the discretion which is conferred upon the court. They are, first, the length of the delay, secondly, the reasons for the delay, thirdly, whether there is an arguable case and, fourthly, the extent of any prejudice to the respondent'.29 Length of the delay 46 I must first consider the length of the delay. The appeal was commenced some 18 months after the Decision, and subsequent to Mr Singh actively engaging in the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment sum and subsequent judgment debt. 29 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196, 198 (Kennedy J). -- 13 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 14 Reasons for the delay 47 The circumstances Mr Singh points to in respect of the delay in commencing the appeal are in respect of matters, which on Mr Singh's own position, occurred at a point in time some 12 months after the Decision. 48 As to the reasons for the delay, in the present matter, on my review of the materials, Mr Singh has provided no meaningful explanation for the significant delay in commencing the appeal. Whilst I acknowledge the matters Mr Singh deposes to in the Singh Affidavit in respect of family members' ill health and 'emergencies' nothing is adduced by way of evidence. Further, on Mr Singh's own timeline, these family emergencies occurred at a point in time some 12 months after the Decision and well after the time within which a notice of appeal should have been lodged. On a review of the lower court file, it is evident that Mr Singh continued to engage with the Magistrates Court processes, and with Mr Zazi, for some 18 months after the Decision, including in relation to the enforcement proceedings giving rise to the judgment debt including during this period. 49 Rather, Mr Singh's reasons for delay are intertwined with his assertion that he did not understand his rights of appeal. Mr Singh's assertion that he did not understand his rights of appeal is unsupported by any explanation as to why he did not seek legal advice or otherwise take steps in relation to the appeal in circumstances where he was clearly engaging with the lower court process. 50 Equally, Mr Singh offers no explanation as to why an appeal was not commenced before he undertook procedural steps in the enforcement proceedings and consented to orders directed to satisfaction of the judgment debt arising from the Decision. Matters which Mr Zazi continued to incur costs in respect of. Whether Mr Singh has an arguable case 51 I now turn to whether Mr Singh has a reasonably arguable case on the merits. I have had regard to Mr Singh's statement of defence and his position and the evidence and materials before the learned magistrate. I have also had regard to the transcript of the hearing on 10 July 2024 and the matters put to Mr Zazi by way of cross-examination. I have further had regard to Mr Singh's written and oral submissions in the context of this appeal. -- 14 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 15 52 Mr Singh's position is that at all relevant times he was the sole owner of the Vehicle and was therefore entitled to the full proceeds of sale of the Vehicle. Alternatively, even if the learned magistrate is correct in finding that Mr Singh had a 50% interest in the Vehicle (which is not accepted by Mr Singh), then the learned magistrate failed to deduct from Mr Zazi's 50% portion of the RAC Payment, the cost to Mr Singh of repairing the Vehicle following the accident. 53 I have further taken into account Mr Singh's grounds of appeal as they appear in his notice of appeal and Mr Singh's written and oral submissions. 54 Mr Singh's submissions refer to the conduct of the learned magistrate during the hearing on 10 July 2024 and the manner in which the proceedings were conducted in circumstances where Mr Singh was an unrepresented litigant in person. These grounds rely on a failure to accord proper procedure to Mr Singh. Mason J in Kioa v West, said as follows:30 What is appropriate in terms of natural justice depends on the circumstances of the case and they will include, inter alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject-matter, and the rules under which the decision-maker is acting ... 55 In this respect the expression 'procedural fairness' more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case. 56 The term natural justice generally refers to the requirement that a party to proceedings be given a fair hearing. This normally requires that each party be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case or to answer the case against them, by evidence and argument.31 What is necessary to satisfy the requirement that a party be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case cannot be determined in the abstract but only in the context of the particular case under review.32 30 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584 - 585. 31 See Cameron v Cole [1944] HCA 5; (1944) 68 CLR 571, 589 (Rich J); International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49; (2009) 240 CLR 319 [54] (French J); see also [88] (Gummow & Bell JJ), [141] - [146] (Heydon J). See also Rowe v Stoltze [2013] WASCA 92 [51] (Newnes JA, with whom Pullin & Murphy JJA agreed). 32 Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 148 [57]. -- 15 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 16 57 The principles of procedural fairness were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Defendi.33 The Court of Appeal in Defendi then referred to s 13 of the MCCPA noting that it 'provides relevantly, that in dealing with cases, the court is to ensure that cases are dealt with justly, which includes ensuring that cases are dealt with efficiently, economically and expeditiously, and that the court's judicial and administrative resources are used as efficiently as possible'.34 The content of procedural fairness also needs to be understood having regard to the nature of the proceedings.35 58 It is in this overall context that the question arises as to whether Mr Singh was afforded procedural fairness by the learned magistrate at the hearing on 10 July 2024. 59 As observed earlier, as a litigant in person, including at the hearing on 10 July 2024, Mr Singh was entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules. 60 One 'abiding difficulty' faced by a court dealing with a litigant in person is 'the tension between the duty of a … judge to ensure a fair and just trial and the requirement that the court maintain a position of neutrality and impartiality as between the parties'.36 61 The court also needs to ensure that any latitude given to one party as a litigant in person does not deprive the other of their right to procedural fairness and a fair hearing.37 62 The balance is ordinarily struck by limiting the assistance given to a litigant in person to that which is necessary to overcome, so far as is reasonably practicable, the procedural disadvantages a litigant in person faces by reason of not being legally trained.38 As was observed by the Court of Appeal in Zerjavic a self-represented litigant is subject to the practice and procedure of the court as much as any other litigant.39 33 Defendi v Szigligeti [2019] WASCA 115 [45] - [48] (Defendi). 34 Defendi [50]. 35 Frigger v Frigger [2023] WASCA 103 [42]. 36 Zerjavic v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 40 [74] (judgment of the court) (Zerjavic). 37 Nobarani; Woodley; Moleirinho. 38 Zerjavic [74] - [75]. 39 Zerjavic [75] - [76]. -- 16 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 17 63 From the review of the manner in which the hearing proceeded on 10 July 2024, it is evident that the learned magistrate explained to Mr Singh the court's hearing process and evidentiary threshold to be met. For example, in relation to cross-examining the witness, Mr Zazi:40 HIS HONOUR: Okay. Mr Singh, your opportunity to ask questions of the witness. I don't want you to tell me your version of events yet. SINGH, MR: Yes. HIS HONOUR: Any questions you wish to ask him about what, you say, occurred, put it to him. If he agrees, he agrees; if he disagrees, so be it. … HIS HONOUR: Just ask him something about the agreement, if there was any. This is not a personal attack. … 64 And, for example, in relation to cross-examining the witness, Mr Zazi, as to matters of evidence arising from the documents relied on:41 HIS HONOUR: There's another document to come. Yes, you've got a question. SINGH, MR: Yes. These are three documents that – two are for one - like, two that were signed on 20 December 2021 for the deal between BMW and Camry. And the other one is – that one was filled in 2023 when I sold the BMW. Can you see, like, if that handwriting looks same to you, with your (indistinct) … HIS HONOUR: That's just a pointless question. You ask him, is that your signature or it's not your signature. That's the question you ask. Not, does it look similar or anything like that. Is that your signature on the February transfer? … HIS HONOUR: But these are the same documents that have already been tendered. 40 MB, Magistrates Court transcript dated 10 July 2024 (MC July 2024), ts 23. 41 MC July 2024, ts 26. -- 17 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 18 65 And, for example, as to evidence before the court:42 SINGH, MR: 10 March 2022. HIS HONOUR: Okay. Is there any documents or evidence of that? … SINGH, MR: WhatsApp message. Looks like it as all the exchanges. Mr Zazi has said, like, all these payments were - - - HIS HONOUR: Okay. So, where have you got the WhatsApp messages? SINGH, MR: Yes, like, in my annexures, sir. HIS HONOUR: In your what? LI, MR: Annexures, I believe he said. SINGH, MR: Annexures. HIS HONOUR: Well, have you got them, have you produced them? SINGH, MR: Yes. I have already submitted them, and you want - - - HIS HONOUR: Not relevant. What you send to the court, I don't give a stuff about. I don't look at it. SINGH, MR: Okay. HIS HONOUR: This is a trial, for heaven's sake. You present the documents and that's it. SINGH, MR: Yes. HIS HONOUR: If you don't present them, then I don't see them, and that's the end of that. Show it to Mr Li, if you wouldn't mind. … THE WITNESS: Yes. I doesn't know anything about it. 66 And in relation to the need for evidence to be before the court where Mr Singh relies on documents:43 HIS HONOUR: Okay. It appears – just so you understand it, he hasn't acknowledged any of that. That's you sending him, saying - - - 42 MC July 2024, ts 28. 43 MC July 2024, ts 29. -- 18 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 19 SINGH, MR: Your Honour, he acknowledged that, like, this is how all that confirmation was when the payment was done. HIS HONOUR: Yes. But have you got a text message of him saying, yes, I agree or yes, that's right? SINGH, MR: No, your Honour. 67 And in relation to the RAC Payment and the evidence of receipt including in the context of cross-examining the witness, Mr Zazi:44 HIS HONOUR: Presumably you received $10,000-odd? SINGH, MR: Yes. HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, you can give evidence of what happened to the 10,000. And then, in October, the claimant transferred his share and you paid him cash. SINGH, MR: Yes, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Okay. Well, that's the relevant thing. Put to him, first of all, in relation to the original agreement, what was the original agreement between the parties, and then put to him what happened in October '22. That seems to be it. 68 Subsequent to these matters, having heard from both parties, the learned magistrate gave Mr Singh the opportunity to 'sum' up his case, explaining that:45 HIS HONOUR: Just so I understand, the $10,000-odd you received for RAC, that was in February '22?---Yes, your Honour. … So, is it the case – I'm just asking you if the case is that you've got no evidence as to the expense – of what you did with that $10,000-odd, other than putting it into your own account?--- … Have you got any evidence that you expended any money on the car after the receipt of that, any evidence? An invoice from Joe Blogs, panel beater shop, a receipt for $5000 from somebody who say they were a panel beater, anything? If you're going to work in cash, Mr Singh, you do so it's your peril?---What does the peril mean? I didn't understand that. 44 MC July 2024, ts 30. 45 MC July 2024, ts 51 - ts 53. -- 19 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 20 You got nothing?---Yes. And in relation to – I'm just a bit confused. In relation to the payment when you decided to buy the car outright off Mr Zazi - - -?--- how did you pay him?---Cash, your Honour. … How did you pay him in cash? Where did you get that 7000 from?--- … Okay. Have you got a record of removing $7000 from your account on the day you say it was sold or paid?---No, it was not deposited into the account. … You acknowledge that, of the $10,000-odd from the insurance company, the money went into your account. None went to the claimant, and there's no evidence as to what repairs, if any, were carried out. Yes?---So, like, the repair was done as acknowledged by the claimant as well, and when I bought his share, that $7000 I paid, that was including the price of the car and any unused fund from $10,000. How does that work? How did you calculate that? You give me – how did you calculate any unused – what basis, because I'm just trying to understand what basis have you got? People in modern times, given technology, Mr Singh, keep records, and they do it in various ways, financial records. It appears to me that you're living in a world of money flow that doesn't have any track record, doesn't follow anywhere. You can't trace it?---Initially, when I was making the payments to him, was paid fortnightly. But then he started asking money here and there, $200 - - - There's no evidence of any of that?--- 69 As a general rule, a court should not place an arbitrary time limit on cross-examination. However, there may well be situations in which 'it might be reasonable and proper at some stage of a cross-examination to impose a time limit'.46 It is evident from the transcript of the hearing before the learned magistrate that Mr Singh was given the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine Mr Zazi. There is nothing to suggest that Mr Singh did not have sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Mr Zazi and he had ample opportunity to challenge the evidence of Mr Zazi. 46 R v Kelly; Ex parte Hoang van Duong (1981) 28 SASR 271, 273, cited with approval in: Total Value Auto & Finance Pty Ltd v Small [2004] NSWSC 1040 [53] (Campbell AJ). -- 20 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 21 70 Mr Singh further submits that he was denied procedural fairness because he was not given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence. As to this, Mr Singh points to the learned magistrate's refusal to allow the appellant to produce invoices of payment made for the repair of the Vehicle. 71 I have had regard to the transcript of the hearing on 10 July 2024. However, Mr Singh's exchange with the learned magistrate during the course of the trial was as follows:47 HIS HONOUR: No. Too late. What do they relate to, anyway? SINGH, MR: They relate to fixing the car. HIS HONOUR: The BMW? SINGH, MR: The BMW. HIS HONOUR: Yes. That's why I asked you about that. Specifically, I said, have you got anything and you said, no. So, no, I'm not going to allow anything to come in now. Too late. SINGH, MR: My understanding was that all the documents that I have already present – submitted are considered. 72 The learned magistrate makes express reference to this in his reasons for decision delivered 7 August 2024: 48 Only after the conclusion of the proceedings did the defendant try and raise that he had invoices. At that point it was too late. From the start to finish this whole arrangement between the parties, to use a base term, was a dog's breakfast. Both versions have so many holes that you drive a truck through them. Bearing in mind the complainant carries the onus on the balance of probabilities I've reached the conclusion that he has failed to establish to the required standard that he was the soul owner. 73 These grounds of appeal, and the submissions contained in them, rely on a re-agitation of the issues before the learned magistrate. I am of the view, and having had regard to the principles expressed by the Court of Appeal in Sampey v Doherty,49 that they do not establish that the learned magistrate's findings of fact were wrong. 47 MC July 2024, ts 60 - ts 61. 48 MB, Magistrates Court transcript dated 7 August 2024, ts 3. 49 Sampey v Doherty [2024] WASCA 105 [210]. -- 21 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 22 74 As to whether there was a denial of procedural fairness because the learned magistrate did not give Mr Singh sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence, Mr Singh, in my view, was given ample opportunity to produce to the court the evidence and materials he sought to rely on and to present his case. Prejudice to Mr Zazi 75 Mr Zazi submits that the delay in payment of the judgement debt has caused, and continues to cause, significant prejudice to the respondent. Since the primary court's decision on 7 August 2024 to date the respondent has not received any payment of the judgment debt, despite the fact that the appellant previously agreed to a payment plan for instalments. 76 Mr Zazi relevantly points to the following matters: 1. The respondent has been owed the judgement debt for over 1 year and 10 months, during this period the respondent had to pursue enforcement action against the appellant, including making numerous enforcement applications, court appearances and incurring associated costs of the following enforcement steps: (a) applying to the Magistrates Court for PSSO; (b) applying to the Magistrates Court for a Means Inquiry Summons; (c) preparing for and attending the means inquiry hearing at the Magistrates Court on 23 July 2025; (d) agreeing to a payment plan for the appellant to pay the judgement debt in instalments; (e) applying to the Magistrates Court for a default inquiry; (f) preparing for and attending the default inquiry hearing at the Magistrates Court on 21 January 2026; and (g) applying to the Magistrates Court for a warrant for arrest following the appellant's failure to attend the default inquiry hearing. -- 22 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 23 Findings - application for leave to appeal out of time 77 In all of the circumstances, there is nothing in Mr Singh's case to indicate any reasonably arguable error by the primary judge. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that any prejudice would be suffered by Mr Singh if an extension of time were not granted whereas the prejudice to Mr Zazi would be significant. 78 The fact that Mr Singh does not like this result does not mean that he has been denied natural justice. As this court has previously noted in Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd:50 … [T]he question of whether there has been a failure to comply with the rules of natural justice is not answered by reference to the outcome of the exercise of the relevant power. The principles of natural justice are not concerned with the merits of a particular exercise of power, but with the procedure that must be observed in its exercise. The focus of attention must therefore be on the position as it stood before the impugned decision is taken. … 79 I have also had regard to the procedural history of the matter leading up to the hearing on 10 July 2024. It is clear that Mr Singh was actively participating in the proceedings and elected to proceed at the trial as an in-person litigant and did so actively including in the course of cross-examining Mr Zazi and advancing his defence case theory. 80 I would add for completeness that where Mr Singh now seeks leave to commence this appeal out of time, Mr Singh has done so in circumstances where the very Decision the subject of this appeal has been by Mr Singh's own conduct and actions the subject of consent and agreement in respect of the enforcement proceedings. Such action therefore amounting to an abuse of the court's processes. Conclusion and final orders 81 For the reasons which I have set out above, leave to appeal is refused, and the appeal should otherwise be dismissed. 82 The appropriate final order are: 1. Leave to appeal is refused. 2. The appeal be dismissed. 83 I will hear the parties as to costs. 50 Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd [2021] WASCA 25 [26]. -- 23 of 24 -- [2026] WADC 57 JEYAMOHAN DCJ [2026] WADC 57 (MJW) Page 24 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia. MO Associate 25 JUNE 2026 -- 24 of 24 --