LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD and ANDREWS [2026] WASAT 81

[2026] WASAT 81 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : LEGAL PROFESSION UNIFORM LAW (WESTERN AUSTRALIA) CITATION : LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD and ANDREWS [2026] WASAT 81 MEMBER : PRESIDENT GLANCY HEARD : 6 FEBRUARY 2026 DELIVERED : 10 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : VR 89 of 2025 BETWEEN : LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD Applicant AND SARITHA CASSANDRA ELIZABETH ANDREWS Respondent Catchwords: Application to dismiss proceeding - Abuse of process - Power of the Legal Practice Board to exercise chapter 5 functions after delegation to the Legal Services and Complaints Committee - Principles of delegation - Whether delegation limits the powers of the delegator - Whether contrary intentions in the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2022 excludes the principles of delegation set out in the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) - No contrary intention found - Whether the bringing of proceedings by the wrong party is an abuse of process - Applying s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Meaning of 'abuse of process' - Utility of joining parties to a proceeding - No utility to joining parties found - Application to dismiss proceedings refused -- 1 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 2 Legislation: Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 59(1)(a) Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 42A, s 42A(1)(a), s 42A(1)(c) Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (repealed), s 428 Legal Profession Uniform Law (Western Australia), s 6, s 7(1), s 300, s 300(1), s 305, s 405(1), s 406, s 406(1), s 406(2), s 408, s 411, s 411(1), s 411(2), s411(3), s 411(4), s 412(5), Chapter 5 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), s 3, s 5(a), s 5(b), s 6(2), s 12, s 20, s 22, s 30, s 37(a)(i), s 37(a)(ii), s 37(b), s 57(1), s 57(2), s 58, s 58(2)(a), s 58(4), s 79, s 80, s 81, s 82, s 207(1), s 209, s 269, s 305, s 313, Pt 3, Div 3, Div 4 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulations 2022 (WA), reg 4 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O56 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 47, s 47(1), s 47(2), s 105(1), s 105(2) Result: Application to strike out proceeding refused Application to join parties refused Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : Mr KM Pettit SC & Mr C Beetham Respondent : Mr JRB Ley SC, Mr J Nagle & Mr MT Lethbridge Solicitors: Applicant : Legal Practice Board Respondent : Croftbridge -- 2 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 3 Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326 Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd & Ors; Jeffery& Katauskas Pty Ltd v Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) & Ors [2009] HCA 43; (2009) 239 CLR 75; (2009) 83 ALJR 1180 Mateljan v Legal Services Complaints Committee [2025] WASC 170 O'Reilly v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria [1983] HCA 47; (1983) 153 CLR 1 Papamihail v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2023] WASCA 183 -- 3 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 4 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Introduction 1 The Legal Practice Board (Board) has commenced proceedings against the Respondent by which it alleges that she engaged in several acts of professional misconduct. The specifics of the allegations are irrelevant for present purposes. 2 The Respondent has applied to have the proceeding struck out or dismissed pursuant to s 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) on the single ground that it is an abuse of process. It is said, in essence, that because the power to investigate and refer disciplinary matters to the Tribunal had been delegated by the Board to the Legal Services and Complaints Committee (LSCC), the proceeding could not be commenced by the Board and, having been commenced without statutory authority, the proceeding constitutes an abuse of process. There are several reasons why this is said to be the case.1 3 The Respondent has also applied to have the LSCC, and the Legal Services and Complaints Officer (LSCO) joined to the proceeding as the Second and Third Respondents respectively, on the basis that each needs to be joined to ensure that they are bound by this decision. 4 The Board opposes each of the applications. Issues 5 The resolution of the applications will be determined by the proper construction of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) (Application Act) and the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) (Uniform Law)2 which now regulates the legal profession in Western Australia. 6 There are three primary issues which I must determine in order to resolve these interim applications. They are: 1 The Respondent also contends that the expansion of the investigation by the Executive Director was invalid because the power to expand an investigation had been delegated to the LSCC, which had in turn delegated that power to the LSCO. The Respondent submits that that matter must be noted in the reasons for decision to avoid unqualified references to steps taken during the investigation being read as acceptance of the validity of what was done. 2 The Application Act applies the Uniform Law as a law of Western Australia, subject to the provisions of the Application Act: see s 6(2) and s 12 of the Application Act. -- 4 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 5 1. whether the Board has any authority to commence any disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal given that it has delegated its powers and functions under Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law to the LSCC; 2. if not, whether the bringing of the application by the wrong party would constitute an abuse of process; and 3. whether the LSCC and the LSCO should be joined to the proceeding. Outcome 7 For the reasons set out below, I have dismissed each of the Respondent's applications. Materials considered 8 In dealing with this matter, I have had regard to the following evidentiary materials: 1. Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 2 February 2026; 2. Affidavit of Saritha Cassandra Elizabeth Andrews sworn 18 November 2025; 3. Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 1 December 2025; and 4. The Applicant's bundle of documents dated 6 November 2025. 9 I have also had regard to the following sets of written submissions: 1. Respondent's submissions in support of application for proceeding to be dismissed or struck out dated 18 November 2025; 2. Applicant's submissions dated 2 December 2025; 3. Respondent's submissions in reply dated 16 December 2025; 4. Respondent's supplementary submissions dated 4 February 2026; and 5. Applicant's further submissions dated 5 February 2026. -- 5 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 6 10 I have also had regard to the oral submissions made at the hearing which took place on 6 February 2026. Factual background 11 The facts set out at [12] - [17] are not in dispute and set out the context in which these issues arise for determination. 12 On 16 November 2023, by an instrument of delegation made pursuant to s 406 of the Uniform Law, the Board delegated to the LSCC its powers and duties under s 300(1) of the Uniform Law (Delegation).3 13 It was determined that, following the commencement of the Uniform Law, new disciplinary proceedings would need to be commenced in the Tribunal in the name of the Board.4 14 Between 10 June 2024 and 20 June 2025, the LSCC was investigating the Respondent's conduct. 15 On 30 June 2025 the LSCC made the following resolution:5 On 30 June 2025 the Legal Practice Board by its delegate the Legal Services and Complaints Committee, resolved to … [initiate and prosecute proceedings pursuant to s 300(1) of the Uniform Law ...]. 16 Mr Daily is employed by the Board as the 'Director Investigations & Review', which includes the role of LSCO. He held the position of Law Complaints Officer under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (LP Act) before he was reappointed as the LSCO under the Uniform Law for a term of five years by resolution of the Board made on 14 July 2025.6 17 On 8 October 2025, Mr Daily instituted this proceeding in the name of the Board.7 The Respondent's intentions in bringing the interim applications 18 Before proceeding further, it is important to record that the Respondent's counsel submitted that the purpose of the Respondent's applications is not to avoid disciplinary proceedings. He said that the 3 Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 1 December 2025, page 39, item 2.28. 4 Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 2 February 2026, pages 3 - 4, para 6. 5 Affidavit of Saritha Cassandra Elizabeth Andrews sworn 18 November 2025, pages 74 - 75, para 8. 6 Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 1 December 2025, page 2, para 5; Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 2 February 2026, pages 13, 15. 7 Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 1 December 2025, page 2, para 5. -- 6 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 7 applications are brought only to ensure that the Respondent's matter is dealt with properly and according to law. It was submitted, in summary, that the Respondent expects that if the current proceeding is struck out, the LSCC will institute new proceedings making the same allegations as have been made in this proceeding. It was said that, when new proceedings are instituted, the Respondent will not take issue with them being brought outside of the six-month limitation period which applies to the commencement of disciplinary proceedings.8 Issue 1: Can the Board institute disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal given it has delegated its powers and functions under Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law to the LSCC 19 Under the LP Act disciplinary proceedings were commenced in the Tribunal in the name of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (LPCC). This was because s 428 of the LP Act provided that if the LPCC determined that a matter should be heard by the Tribunal, it could refer the matter to the Tribunal. 20 Upon the commencement of the Application Act and the Uniform Law on 1 July 2022, the LSCC was established by s 57(1) of the Application Act. Section 269 of the Application Act provides that the LSCC as established under the Application Act is the same entity as, and a continuation of, the LPCC. 21 Section 313(2) of the Application Act provides that the LSCC is authorised to deal with a matter under the provisions of the LP Act as if the relevant provisions pursuant to which the LPCC was dealing with it under the LP Act had not been repealed.9 By s 313(2)(b) a reference to the LPCC in the provisions of the old Act are, from the commencement of the Application Act, to be read as a reference to the LSCC. It is for that reason that those complaints which had been commenced under the LP Act but not resolved before its repeal were continued in the Tribunal in the name of the LSCC. 22 The Board was established by s 30 of the Application Act. It is the 'designated local regulatory authority' for the purposes of Chapter 5 8 ts 64, 6 February 2026. Section 207(1) of the Application Act provides that the Board must initiate a disciplinary proceeding in the Tribunal within 6 months after the day on which the Board decides to initiate proceedings in the Tribunal with respect to the alleged conduct. 9 Including by s 313(1) of the Application Act: (a) a complaint of inquiry being dealt with by the LPCC under the old Act because of s 621 of that Act; (b) a complaint being dealt with by the LPCC under Part 13 of the old Act; and (c) an investigation by the LPCC under s 421 of the old Act. -- 7 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 8 of the Uniform Law.10 Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law concerns dispute resolution and professional discipline. 23 By s 300 of the Uniform Law, which is within Chapter 5, Part 5.4 of the Uniform Law, the designated local authority is empowered to initiate and prosecute proceedings against a respondent lawyer in the 'designated tribunal' if the designated local regulatory body is of the opinion that: a. the alleged conduct may amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct that would be more appropriately dealt with by the designated tribunal; or b. the alleged conduct may amount to professional misconduct. 24 The 'designated tribunal' for the purposes of Part 5.4 of the Uniform Law is the State Administrative Tribunal.11 25 The starting point, therefore, is that, under the Uniform Law, the Board is the body empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal. 26 However, s 406(1) of the Uniform Law authorises a local regulatory authority, in this case the Board, to delegate any of its functions under the Uniform Law to an entity prescribed, or an entity of a class prescribed, by jurisdictional legislation. The subsection requires any such delegation to be in writing. Subsection 406(2) provides that the power to delegate does not apply to the power to delegate a function or the power in s 411 to take over responsibility for a matter from a delegate of the designated local regulatory authority. The power to delegate under s 406 of the Uniform Law is subject to the provisions of the Application Act.12 27 Subsections 37(a)(i) and (ii) of the Application Act authorise the Board to delegate any of its Chapter 5 functions to the Legal Services and Complaints Committee or the Legal Services and Complaints Officer respectively. 10 Section 6 of the Uniform Law defines the term 'designated local regulatory body' as 'a person or body specified or described in a law of this jurisdiction for the purposes of a provision, or part of a provision, of this Law in which the term is used'. Section 20 of the Application Act provides that the designated local regulatory body for the purposes of, among other matters, Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law, is the Legal Practice Board. 11 Application Act, s 22. 12 Application Act s 12 provides that the Application Act prevails in the case of inconsistency between a provision of the Application Act and a provision of the Uniform Law. -- 8 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 9 28 Section 37(b) of the Application Act authorises the Board to delegate any of its other functions under the Uniform Law to a person or class of persons prescribed by local regulations. By reg 4 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulations 2022 (WA) (Regulations) the Board is authorised to delegate any of its functions under the Uniform Law, other than those in Chapter 5, to a Board member, a Board committee or a person employed by or engaged by the Board. Consequently, the Board may not delegate any of its Chapter 5 functions to an employee of the Board. 29 The LSCC was established by s 57(1) of the Application Act. Subsection 57(2) provides that it is a committee of the Board. One of its functions, set out in s 58 of the Application Act, is to carry out a Chapter 5 function delegated to the LSCC by the Board under s 37(a)(i). 30 Subsection 58(4) of the Application Act provides that, other than as permitted by s 408 and s 411 of the Uniform Law, the Board must not direct or impose any requirement on the LSCC as to the performance of its functions. Section 408 is not relevant for present purposes. 31 Subsection 411(1) provides that a local regulatory authority may take over responsibility for a matter from a delegate of the local regulatory authority, if the local regulatory authority is of the opinion that it is appropriate to do so. Section 411(2) provides that where the local regulatory authority takes over a matter from a delegate: (a) the local regulatory authority may deal with and determine the matter afresh, but may adopt or take into account anything done or received by the delegate up to that time; (b) the delegate is to provide any assistance to the local regulatory authority which is required by the authority to deal with the matter; and (c) the delegate otherwise ceases to have responsibility for the matter unless the local regulatory authority refers it back to the delegate under subsection 411(3). 32 Section 411(3) provides that the local regulatory authority may refer a matter back to the delegate at any time and may provide the delegate with directions as to how the matter should be dealt with. -- 9 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 10 33 Section 411(4) provides that the section does not limit any other power that a local regulatory authority has to take over or otherwise deal with a matter, whether under another law or the terms of a delegation. 34 From those provisions it is clear that, relevantly, the Board may delegate to the LSCC the function of bringing disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal. 35 The Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) (ILA (Vic)) applies to the WA Uniform Law.13 Pursuant to s 42A of the ILA (Vic), if an Act confers on a person or body a power to delegate the discharge, exercise or performance of a responsibility, power, authority, duty or function under that or any other Act, then, unless the contrary intention appears, then the following two relevant provisions apply. 36 First, s 42A(1)(a), which provides that the delegation does not prevent the discharge, exercise or performance of the responsibility, power authority duty or function by the person or body. 37 Secondly, s 42A(1)(c), which provides that a responsibility, power, authority, duty or function so delegated, when discharged, exercised or performed by the delegate, shall, for the purposes of the Act, be taken to have been discharged, exercised or performed by the person or body. 38 By instrument of delegation dated 1 July 2022, the Board delegated all of its Chapter 5 functions to the LSCC.14 On 16 November 2023 the Board replaced the initial delegation with a second instrument of delegation.15 By it, the Board again delegated its Chapter 5 functions to the LSCC. 39 By instrument of delegation dated 1 July 2022, pursuant to its power to do so conferred by s 61(1) of the Application Act, the LSCC delegated to the LSCO its powers and duties under the Uniform Law, except the power to initiate and prosecute proceedings in the Tribunal under s 300 of the Uniform Law (and certain other powers which are irrelevant for present purposes).16 Those instruments of delegation were replaced on 16 November 2023. In the November 2023 13 Section 7(1) Uniform Law and s 5(b) of the Application Act which provides that the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) does not apply to the Uniform Law. 14 Affidavit of Saritha Cassandra Elizabeth Andrews sworn 18 November 2025, page 6, para 11. 15 Affidavit of Saritha Cassandra Elizabeth Andrews sworn 18 November 2025, pages 5 - 6; Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 1 December 2025, pages 3 - 53. 16 Affidavit of Saritha Cassandra Elizabeth Andrews sworn 18 November 2025, pages 6, 57 - 60. -- 10 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 11 instrument of delegation, the Board delegated its Chapter 5 functions to the LSCC. 40 Accordingly, there is no doubt, and it was not in issue in the proceeding, that the LSCC is authorised to commence disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal as the delegate of the Board. 41 As I have identified at [31], s 411(1) of the Uniform Law authorises a local regulatory authority to take over responsibility for a matter from its delegate and s 411(2) sets out what happens when it does so. 42 As identified at [32] subsection 411(3) of the Uniform Law permits the local regulatory authority to refer a matter back to a delegate with any directions as to how the matter should be dealt with. The Board's powers after delegation to the LSCC 43 The Respondent submits that it was impracticable for the Board to refrain from delegating the Chapter 5 functions to the LSCC or the LSCO and to attempt to exercise those functions itself. The Respondent submits that the 'unmistakable intention of the Application Act was that, in WA, the Chapter 5 functions would be delegated to and exercised by the LSCC and the LSCO exclusively'. 44 I do not accept that submission. First, all of the provisions regarding delegation are expressed in permissive rather than in mandatory terms. Had it been intended that the Chapter 5 functions were exclusively to be performed by the LSCC and the LSCO, the Application Act could simply have conferred those functions directly upon the LSCC and the LSCO. 45 Secondly, it is not consistent with s 58 of the Application Act, which sets out the functions of the LSCC. One function, set out in s 58(2)(a) is 'to carry out a Chapter 5 function delegated to [it]'. Had it been intended that all of the Chapter 5 functions were required to be delegated to the LSCC by the Board and that the LSCC would then exclusively carry out those functions, s 58(2)(a) would not have used the words 'a Chapter 5 function' which is suggestive of the possibility that not all Chapter 5 functions would necessarily be delegated to it by the Board. 46 Thirdly, that submission is contrary to the general law related to delegation which recognises that the delegation of a power does not -- 11 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 12 prevent the delegator from performing the same functions and exercising the same powers as those conferred upon the delegate. In O'Reilly v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria17 at page 17, Mason J explained the position in the following way: Delegation is not a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but the conferring of authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do for himself. 47 Fourthly, in my view it is inconsistent with s 42A(1)(a) and s 42A(1)(c) of the ILA (Vic), which apply unless a contrary intention appears. For the reasons set out below at [48] - [70], I do not consider that a contrary intention exists. 48 The Respondent submits that a contrary intention to that in s 42A(1)(a) of the ILA (Vic) is apparent in the Uniform Law and the Application Act. She says that if the Board were to have retained the power to initiate proceedings under the Uniform Law despite the delegation of the power to the LSCC, the Board could not exercise the retained power at the same time and in the same manner as the delegate. In order to exercise the power, the Board would be required to notify the LSCC that it was intending to exercise its Chapter 5 powers in relation to a particular matter before doing so, but that any such notice would contravene s 58(4) of the Application Act, which provides that the Board must not direct the LSCC as to the performance of its functions other than as permitted under s 408 and s 411 of the Uniform Law. The Respondent submits that this shows that the intention of the legislation is that that the Board does not retain any power under Chapter 5 when it has delegated the power to the LSCC. 49 I do not accept that submission. Even accepting that, if the Board intended to exercise its power under Chapter 5 in relation to a particular matter it would need to ensure there are not two bodies concurrently performing functions in relation to that matter, inform the LSCC of its intention, and perhaps necessarily direct it to cease its own performance of the delegated Chapter 5 functions in relation to that matter, I would not regard that as a direction of the kind which is prohibited by s 58(4) of the Application Act. Directing the LSCC to cease performing functions in order to do so itself is not the same as directing the LSCC 'as to the performance of its functions'. Rather, in my view it is properly to be conceived of as a withdrawal of the delegation of the Chapter 5 functions in relation to the particular matter (as permitted by 17 O'Reilly v Commissioners of State Bank of Victoria [1983] HCA 47; (1983) 153 CLR 1 (Mason J). -- 12 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 13 s 411 of the Uniform Law). By having the LSCC cease an investigation so as to exercise a Chapter 5 function itself, the Board could not be said to have dictated to the LSCC how it is to investigate a matter, or what the outcome of an investigation should be. 50 Further, on the facts of this case, there was no need to have the LSCC cease to perform any function under Chapter 5 because the position is that the LSCC never intended to commence the proceeding against the Respondent. It had completed its investigation and formed a view as to the characterisation of the conduct of the Respondent. Its resolution, correctly or otherwise, was that the Board institute proceedings against the Respondent. The lodgement of proceedings in the Board's name cannot be conceived of as a direction (even an implicit one) to the LSCC as to the performance of its delegated Chapter 5 functions. 51 The Respondent also submits that the LSCC is independent of the Board, and that its independence 'is inconsistent with an intention that the Board should be legally responsible for exercises of power by the LSCC' such that it evidences an intention that s 42A(1)(c) of the ILA (Vic) does not apply. 52 I do not accept that submission. To the extent that the LSCC is independent of the Board, its independence is to be found in the legislation. Neither the Uniform Law nor the Application Act provide that the LSCC is independent of the Board. Rather, subsection 57(2) of the Application Act provides that the LSCC is a committee of the Board. That an entity is a committee of another entity is not a structure which is typically associated with complete independence of the two entities. The limitations on the Board's ability to direct the LSCC in relation to the performance of Chapter 5 functions are set out in s 408 and s 411. Those limitations are not insignificant. However, that and other matters relied upon by the Respondent to demonstrate the LSCC's independence from the Board, including that the LSCC is not required to submit an annual report of its operations and the exercise of its Chapter 5 functions to the Board, and that it is not exercising those Chapter 5 functions for and on behalf of the Board, do not address the issue. In my view, the structure established by the Application Act and the Uniform Law does not create a complete independence of the LSCC from the Board. In my view, the limitations on the ability of the Board to direct the LSCC are not inconsistent with s 42A(1)(c) of the ILA (Vic) operating to deem a decision of the LSCC to be a decision of the Board. Any independence of the LSCC from the Board does not, in -- 13 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 14 my view, detract from the operation of a provision which deems a function discharged, exercised or performed by the LSCC pursuant to powers delegated to it, to have been discharged, exercised or performed by the Board as the delegator. 53 The Respondent also submits that the independence of the LSCC from the Board is mandated by s 405(1) and s 412(2) of the Uniform Law. I also do not accept that submission. Section 405(1) of the Uniform Law provides that a local regulatory authority exercising Chapter 5 functions must be an independent entity. That section is a reference to the Board and says nothing of the independence of a delegate of the Board exercising Chapter 5 functions which have been delegated to it under the Uniform Law and the Application Act. The fact of delegation of any or all of those functions does not make the LSCC a local regulatory authority as that term is defined in the Uniform Law. Section 412(2) of the Uniform Law provides that a local regulatory authority and its delegates must exercise their functions under the Uniform Law in accordance with applicable provisions of the Uniform Law, the Uniform Regulations and the Uniform Rules and applicable guidelines and directions issued under Chapter 8 of the Uniform Law. None of that says anything about being independent of the Board and none of it supports the proposition either that the Board was required to delegate its Chapter 5 functions or that the Board may not exercise Chapter 5 functions once those functions have been delegated to the LSCC. 54 The Respondent also submits that the Board retains no power to exercise a delegated Chapter 5 function itself because no power to do so is reserved to it under the Application Act. The Respondent says, moreover, that the retention of such a power would be inconsistent with s 58(4) of the Application Act and thereby excludes the operation of the provisions of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act) which, when applicable, provides that a delegator may continue to exercise a power after it has been delegated. I do not accept those submissions. First, for reasons I have already explained, I do not accept that the legislation mandates the delegation of the Chapter 5 functions to the LSCC by the Board. Secondly, the fact that the Application Act does not expressly provide that a delegator retains a power which it has delegated would be unnecessary. As I have already identified, that is the general position in relation to delegation and is reflected in s 59 of the Interpretation Act, which applies to that Act by virtue of s 5(a) of the Application Act. The fact that, where the LSCC has commenced exercising Chapter 5 powers in respect of a specific matter, there may -- 14 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 15 be a need for the Board to direct it to cease doing so, does not compel the conclusion that the Board would not have retained any power to exercise Chapter 5 functions because it had delegated them to the LSCC. 55 In my view the provisions should not be interpreted to prevent the hypothetical possibility of a delegate and delegator both exercising the same power in relation to the same matter. If that were the case, then there would be no situation where s 59(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act or s 42A(1)(a) of the ILA (Vic) could operate because, where two or more people have the power to exercise the same functions in respect of the same matter, there is always a possibility that they may both do so. The solution to the possibility of, for example, both the delegate and the delegator commencing disciplinary proceedings, would be for one to withdraw its application or, in the unlikely event that parties could not resolve the matter between themselves, for the Tribunal to dismiss one or other of the applications under s 47 of the SAT Act. 56 The fact that s 209 of the Application Act provides that the Board may vary an application in the Tribunal but that no such power is conferred upon the LSCC, and that the delegation by the Board of its functions under Chapter 5 of the Uniform Law to the LSCC would not pick up the power in s 209 of the Application Act, supports the conclusion that the Board is intended to be the entity in whose name disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal should be commenced. 57 The Board submits that the proceeding could not be brought in the name of the LSCC because it is not a legal entity. It distinguishes the position of the LSCC, which is established as a committee of the Board from that of the Board itself, which is established as a body corporate with perpetual succession, able to initiate and respond to proceedings in its corporate name. 58 I do not entirely accept that submission. In my view a committee, being a collection of individuals, is capable of bringing and defending legal proceedings in the same way that a group of people who constitute a partnership could do so. However, I do accept that, given that the Board can bring proceedings and has perpetual succession and, unlike the LSCC, has funding and staff, the Board might be regarded as the better entity to institute and prosecute disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal. But of course, whether or not the Board is capable of doing so having delegated its power to the LSCC is the crux of this matter. -- 15 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 16 59 The Applicant also relies on observations made by Gething J in Mateljan v Legal Services and Complaints Committee18 that the LSCC (which effectively took the place of the LPCC when the Application Act and the Uniform Law commenced) had no power to commence proceedings or to have proceedings taken against it in its own name. His Honour's view was that in that case the correct respondent would have been the Board. 60 Mateljan involved an application for judicial review of decisions which had been made by the LPCC in the course of the investigation of a disciplinary complaint and in the disciplinary proceedings which followed. Mr Mateljan had been a client of the practitioner and claimed to have been affected by the conduct of the practitioner concerned and aggrieved by the way his complaint and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings brought against the practitioner in the Tribunal had been handled by the LPCC/LSCC. His Honour observed that the LSCC was a committee of the Legal Practice Board and had not been empowered by the Application Act to bring or defend proceedings in its own name. 61 His Honour acknowledged that in other cases the LPCC (the predecessor to the LSCC) had been the respondent in proceedings before the Court, specifically referring to Papamihail v Legal Profession Complaints Committee,19 but noted that the Court of Appeal in that case had not dealt with the issue of whether proceedings could be brought against the LPCC. 62 Respectfully, I do not entirely agree with Justice Gething's approach which, in any event, is not binding on me given that it was an obiter statement because Mr Mateljan's application was dismissed as an abuse of process on the basis that it did not comply with the requirements of Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Order 56. Whether legal proceedings could be commenced by or maintained against the LSCC was not a matter that had been raised by the parties or the subject of argument. 63 In the end, I do not need to decide whether the LSCC can bring proceedings because the question before me is whether the Board can do so. 64 In my opinion, both the Board and the LSCC, as a result of the delegation of all of the Chapter 5 functions to it by the Board, are 18 Mateljan v Legal Services Complaints Committee [2025] WASC 170 (Mateljan) [20]. 19 Papamihail v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2023] WASCA 183. -- 16 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 17 entitled to exercise Chapter 5 functions, including commencing and prosecuting disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal. 65 The resolution of the LSCC was as follows: On 30 June 2025, the Legal Practice Board, by its delegate the Legal Services and Complaints Committee, resolved to … initiate and prosecute proceedings … 66 That resolution reflected the LSCC's understanding that the legal position was that, by operation of s 42A(1)(c) of the ILA (Vic), a resolution of the LSCC as the delegate of the Board was to be taken to be a resolution of the Board, with the effect that the proceeding should be commenced in the name of the Board. 67 As I have set out above, it is my view that the fact that the Board has delegated Chapter 5 functions to the LSCC does not preclude the Board from exercising those same functions. 68 However, in order to commence proceedings in the Tribunal under s 300 of the Uniform Law, the body doing so, whether the Board or the LSCC, must first itself have formed the view that the conduct the subject of the proceeding either: a. may amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct that would be more appropriately dealt with by the designated tribunal; or b. may constitute professional misconduct. 69 Ordinarily, the Board would not be able to initiate the proceeding in its name simply in reliance on the opinion of the LSCC following its investigation. However, that issue is overcome by the operation of s 42A(1)(c) of the ILA (Vic), which means that the resolution of the LSCC is taken to be a resolution of the Board with the effect that, following the LSCC's resolution, the Board was authorised to bring and prosecute the disciplinary proceeding in the Tribunal in its own name. 70 It follows that my conclusion is that it is open to the Board to have brought the proceeding in its own name. Issue 2: Would the bringing of the application by the wrong party constitute an abuse of process? 71 Given the conclusion I have reached in relation to Issue 1, it is not strictly necessary to determine this issue. Nevertheless, I have done so for the sake of completeness. -- 17 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 18 72 By s 47(1) and (2) of the SAT Act, the Tribunal is empowered to strike out or dismiss a proceeding which it believes is, among other things, an abuse of process. 73 The Respondent submits that a proceeding commenced by an applicant who does not have the requisite power to bring a proceeding must be regarded as an abuse of process. The Respondent submits that, if the Board had no power or authority to initiate the proceeding because, once delegated, the power was exclusively given to the LSCC, then the institution of the proceeding in the Tribunal by the Board is an abuse of process and should be struck out or dismissed. The remedy, it submits, must be the dismissal of the proceeding. The Respondent submits that, if appropriate, an applicant with the legal authority to bring the proceeding may then apply afresh. 74 The Board submits that if the proceeding should have been instituted by the LSCC, s 42A(1)(c) of the ILA (Vic), which applies by virtue of s 7(1) of the Uniform Law, would bring about the result that it would immediately be deemed an act of the Board, in which case the proceeding would have needed to be amended after it had been commenced in order to change the name of the applicant from the LSCC to the Board. 75 The Board submits that even if an error has been made such that the proceeding should have been instituted in the name of the LSCC (which is denied), that error does not constitute an abuse of process and is curable by orders striking out the name of the currently named applicant and substituting the LSCC in its place. It submits that the Tribunal is empowered to make orders to that effect under s 47(2) of the SAT Act. 76 In Erujin Pty Ltd v WAPC20 Allanson J considered an application for leave to appeal a decision of the Tribunal dismissing the applicant's applications for review of certain decisions made by the Western Australian Planning Commission on the basis that they were an abuse of process.21 In that case his Honour stated:22 The expression 'abuse of process' has an acquired legal meaning. Unless a contrary indication appears from the context, it is presumed that it is used in s 47 in that sense. 20 Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326 (Erujin). 21 Section 105(1) of the SAT Act provides that a party may only appeal a decision of SAT by leave and s 105(2) provides that an appeal may only concern a question of law. 22 Erujin [34]. -- 18 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 19 77 His Honour then went on to hold that the three grounds in s 47(1)(a) - (c) of the SAT Act show an intention to use the expression in its acquired meaning.23 78 The acquired meaning of the expression 'abuse of process' is found in cases such as Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v SST Consulting Pty Ltd & Ors; Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v Rickard Constructions Pty Limited (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) & Ors.24 In that case the High Court was called upon to determine whether the litigation funder had committed an abuse of the processes of the court. After setting out the history of the power of a court to prevent an abuse of its process, the majority observed that:25 … the contemporary approach … takes no narrow view of what can constitute "abuse of process". Nevertheless, certain categories of conduct attracting the intervention of the courts emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and included: (a) proceedings which involve a deception on the court, or are fictitious or constitute a mere sham; (b) proceedings where the process of the court is not being fairly or honestly used but is employed for some ulterior or improper purpose or in an improper way; (c) proceedings which are manifestly groundless or without foundation or which serve no useful purpose; (d) multiple or successive proceedings which cause or are likely to cause improper vexation or oppression. 79 The majority then went on to say:26 The term abuse of process, as used in Australia today, is not limited by the categories mentioned above or those which constitute the tort. It has been said repeatedly in judgments of this Court that the categories of abuse of process are not closed. In Walton v Gardiner the majority (comprising French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) adopted the observations in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police that courts have an inherent power to prevent misuse of their procedures in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of procedural rules of court, would nevertheless be "manifestly unfair to a 23 Erujin [34]. 24 Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd & Ors; Jeffery& Katauskas Pty Ltd v Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) & Ors [2009] HCA 43; (2009) 239 CLR 75; (2009) 83 ALJR 1180 (Jeffery & Katauskas) [27]. 25 Jeffery & Katauskas [27]. 26 Jeffery & Katauskas [28]. -- 19 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 20 party to litigation… or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right thinking people". This does not mean that abuse of process is a term at large or without meaning. Nor does it mean that any conduct of a party or non-party in relation to judicial proceedings is an abuse of process if it can be characterised as in some sense unfair to a party. It is clear, however, that abuse of process extends to proceedings that are "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging" or "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment (references omitted). 80 Heydon J, in a separate judgment, approved those statements and said:27 The power of a court to deal with abuse of its process is one aspect of its more general power to control its own processes. The exercise of the power to deal with abuse of process "is not restricted to defined and closed categories, but may be exercised as and when the administration of justice demands. … Words like "unfair", "unjust", "oppressive", "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging", "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment" and "bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people" are not words of exact meaning. Nor are the words "abuse of process" themselves. That notion is not "very precise". Hence it is not surprising that, as Lord Diplock said, "[t]he circumstances in which abuse of process can arise are very varied". "What amounts to abuse of court process is insusceptible of a formulation comprising closed categories. Development continues". 81 Following Erujin, the majority's explanation in Jeffery & Katauskas as to when a proceeding will constitute an abuse of process is to be applied in proceedings in the Tribunal. 82 The Respondent accepts that no prejudice is done to her by the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding by the Board. As I have already noted, the Respondent has acknowledged an understanding that fresh proceedings will be brought in the Tribunal by the LSCC in which the same allegations are made if the current proceeding is dismissed and that she will not seek to avoid them by relying on the fact that they would be being brought out of time. 83 The Respondent has not alleged that the current proceeding has been brought for a purpose other than that of ensuring the protection of 27 Jeffery & Katauskas [57] - [58]. -- 20 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 21 the public by disciplinary action being taken where it is alleged that a practitioner has acted contrary to the standards expected of legal practitioners and that sanctions are imposed where those allegations are made out. The Respondent's submission is that, given that the categories of 'abuse of process' are not closed, I should find that the commencement of a proceeding without statutory authority constitutes an abuse of the processes of the Tribunal. 84 In my view, having regard to what was said by the High Court in Jeffery & Katauskas about the meaning of the expression 'abuse of process' and the purpose of courts being able to respond to abuses of process, and recognising that the categories of abuse of process are not closed, there is no sense in which this proceeding, even if commenced by the wrong party, could be seen to constitute an abuse of process. The Respondent effectively acknowledges that the fruits of any victory in this application would be short-lived because the application is likely to be commenced again in the name of the correct applicant. She acknowledges that she will suffer no prejudice if that occurs. The proceeding is not said to have been brought to harass her or for any improper purpose. In my view, there is no sense in which it could be said that the proceeding brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Indeed, one might more readily think that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by the dismissal of a proceeding which everyone accepts can be brought against her in otherwise identical terms by the LSCC, if not the Board. 85 Commencing a proceeding in the Tribunal in circumstances where an applicant has no authority to do so may render the proceeding liable to be dismissed under s 47 on the grounds that it is misconceived. However, in my view, where one or other of the LSCC or the Board would, under the Uniform Law, be entitled to bring a disciplinary complaint of this kind to the Tribunal, it cannot be said to constitute an abuse of process that it has been commenced by the wrong entity in circumstances where the LSCC investigated the Respondent's conduct and resolved that the Board commence the disciplinary proceeding in the Tribunal, which the Board then did. 86 It follows from that conclusion that I would not have dismissed the application under s 47 of the SAT Act even if I had found that it was not commenced correctly. Amendment of the name of the respondent would have been sufficient and appropriate. -- 21 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 22 Issue 3: Should the LSCC and/or the LSCO be joined to the proceeding 87 Again, because of the conclusion I have reached in relation to Issue 1, it is not strictly necessary to determine this issue although I have nevertheless done so. 88 The Respondent submits that the LSCC and the LSCO should be joined to the proceeding in order that they will be bound by the Tribunal's decision. The Respondent says that, unless they are bound by the decision, the LSCC and the LSCO will not be bound to commence fresh proceedings against her in the name of the LSCC in the event that the Tribunal finds that only the LSCC had the necessary statutory power to commence the proceeding. The Respondent also says that the LSCC and the LSCO should be bound by the decision of the Tribunal which will be directly on point, rather than the obiter judgment of Gething J in Mateljan. 89 The Respondent also stated that she has no intention of seeking costs against the LSCC or the LSCO in the event that her interim application is successful.28 90 The Board opposes the joinder application. The Board's counsel informed the Tribunal that he also had instructions from the LSCC and the LSCO who also opposed the joinder application, but that, because they did so for the same reasons advanced by the Board, neither the LSCC nor the LSCO wished to be heard in relation to the joinder application. 91 The joinder application was opposed for the following reasons: 1. that there is no utility in the joinder of the LSCC or the LSCO. It is submitted that: i. they will be bound by an adverse decision; and ii. they do not seek any benefit from a favourable decision of the Tribunal additional to that of the Board; and 2. Mr Daily, who lodged the disciplinary application with the Tribunal on behalf of the Board, did not do so as the LSCO but rather as an officer and employee of the Board. The LSCO has had no involvement in this matter; 28 Email to Associate from the Practitioner's instructing solicitor Mr Tim Lethbridge dated 2 February 2026. -- 22 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 23 3. if it is necessary to join Mr Daily so as to bind him to orders made, then it would be necessary to join every officer of the Board who was capable of acting on a future resolution of the Board; 4. the LSCC is not a legal entity - if it were to be joined then the members of the Committee would need to be joined individually; and 5. there may be costs implications of joinder for the members of the LSCC and Mr Daily and, given that there is no necessity to join them, the Tribunal should decline to make orders joining them to the proceeding. 92 Finally, the Board submits that the Tribunal will not need to make an order for the joinder of any persons or body if the application to strike out or dismiss the proceeding pursuant to s 47 of the SAT Act is not successful. 93 In my view, it is inconceivable that the LSCC or the LSCO would simply decline to follow the decision of the Tribunal. I would not expect that such bodies, being involved in ensuring that the profession upholds appropriate standards of conduct, would do otherwise than follow the Tribunal's decision, even one which they did not like, unless it were overturned on appeal. 94 In any event, because of the view that I have taken in relation to the application to dismiss or strike out the proceeding it was not necessary to consider joining either the LSCC or the LSCO to the proceeding. Procedural lapse - Uniform Law s 305 95 As I have already found, on 8 October 2025 the Board initiated these proceedings by its officer Mr Russell Daily. Mr Daily was then, and remains, an employee of the Board and also holds the position as the LSCO.29 96 The Respondent submits that the proceeding was not properly commenced by the Board because Mr Daily was not properly authorised to bring the application in the name of the Board, only in the name of the LSCC. That is said to be another reason why 29 Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall affirmed 1 December 2025, page 2. -- 23 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 24 the proceeding is not properly within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and should be dismissed as an abuse of process. 97 The Board submits that Mr Daily commenced the action as an officer of the Board rather than in his capacity as the LSCO. Further, while it denies that there is any issue in relation to Mr Daily's authority, it also submits that any failure by the Board to properly authorise Mr Daily to bring the proceeding in its name would simply be a procedural lapse which the Tribunal can, and should, disregard in the exercise of the power conferred by s 305 of the Uniform Law. 98 Section 305 of the Uniform Law provides as follows: 305 Power to disregard procedural lapses (1) The designated tribunal may order that a failure by the designated local regulatory authority to observe a procedural requirement in relation to a complaint is to be disregarded, if satisfied that the parties to the proceedings have not been prejudiced by the failure. (2) This section applies to a failure occurring before proceedings were instituted in the designated tribunal in relation to the complaint as well as to a failure occurring afterwards. 99 The expression 'procedural lapse' is not defined in the Uniform Law. The Macquarie Dictionary Online defines the expression 'procedural' as 'of or relating to procedure' and 'lapse', relevantly, as 'a slip or slight error'; 'a failure or miscarriage through some fault, slip, or negligence'. 100 In this context, it is my view that a procedural lapse is a lapse in compliance with the established or official way of doing something. 101 The Board submits that what was done by Mr Daily in lodging the application in the Tribunal naming the Board as the Applicant is procedural in nature and perfectly accords with the intention of the Board, and with that of the LSCC. It submits that there is no prejudice to the Respondent occasioned by the naming of the Applicant as the Board rather than the LSCC; that there is no suggestion that the Respondent will be better able to defend herself under proceedings brought in the name of the LSCC rather than the Board. The Applicant submits, therefore, that the Tribunal is practically bound, recognising that the Uniform Law refers to it having a discretion to deal with this issue, if it exists, as a procedural misstep and to substitute the LSCC for -- 24 of 25 -- [2026] WASAT 81 Page 25 the Board if it finds that the proceeding should have been commenced in the name of the LSCC. 102 In my view, the completing of the application form and the lodging of that form with the Tribunal is a procedural matter. 103 If Mr Daily was not properly authorised to commence the proceeding in the Tribunal on behalf of the Board, in light of the Respondent's concession that she does not resist the disciplinary proceedings being brought per se, which I regard as a concession that she will not suffer any prejudice by the disregarding of any procedural lapse, I would exercise the power to disregard the procedural lapse. Conclusion 104 In light of the decision I have reached, the order to be made is to dismiss the Respondent's applications for strike out or dismissal of the proceeding under s 47 of the SAT Act and for joinder of the LSCC and the LSCO. Orders The Tribunal orders: 1. The interim applications dated 30 October 2025 and 19 January 2026 are dismissed. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. WH Associate to the President 10 JULY 2026 -- 25 of 25 --