CE [2026] WASAT 77

[2026] WASAT 77 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) CITATION : CE [2026] WASAT 77 MEMBER : JUDGE H JACKSON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT MS J DE KLERK, MEMBER MS N FINDSON, MEMBER HEARD : 19 MAY 2026 DELIVERED : 11 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 6 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : GAA 469 of 2026 CE Represented Person EF Applicant Catchwords: Guardianship and administration - Review of orders made by Full Tribunal - Claim by represented person of full capacity - Previous claim by represented person of diminished capacity - Orders of guardianship and administration revoked - Turns on own facts Legislation: Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 17A, s 40, s 43, s 64, s 86 -- 1 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 2 Result: The orders of guardianship and administration made on 21 January 2026 are revoked Category: B Representation: Counsel: Represented Person : In Person Applicant : In Person Solicitors: Represented Person : N/A Applicant : N/A Case(s) referred to in decision(s): -- 2 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 3 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: (These reasons were delivered orally and have been taken from the transcript of the hearing. They have been lightly edited to correct grammatical errors or infelicity of expression, to add headings, improve formatting and ensure accuracy of quotes.) Introduction 1 CE is a 53 year old man who lives in [redacted]. 2 On 30 June 2025, LC applied under s 40 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) for the appointment of the Public Advocate as CE's guardian, and the appointment of the Public Trustee as the administrator of CE's estate. 3 LC is a former paid support worker for CE but now describes herself as his friend. 4 Amongst other things, LC's application stated that there was an urgent need for decisions to be made on CE's behalf 'as security of [his] housing is at imminent risk'. 5 On 26 August 2025, a single member made orders: a. appointing the Public Advocate as CE's limited guardian, with the functions of accommodation, services, and as next friend in litigation; and b. appointing the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of CE's estate. The Public Trustee was also directed to investigate whether CE had an interest in the property in which he was living and whether he had a claim under the National Redress Scheme. 6 Those orders were made subject to a further order requiring that they be reviewed by 26 August 2026 - i.e. 12 months from the date of the orders. 7 On 9 October 2025, EF, a disability advocate, applied under s 17A of the GA Act for a review of the decisions made on 26 August 2025. 8 That application described the orders that had been made as having had a 'catastrophic impact' on CE's life. EF's application said that the orders had unnecessarily 'intruded into domains' of CE's life 'while not addressing the critical area of risk of security' of his house. -- 3 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 4 9 By orders made 17 October 2025, EF's application was taken as an application under s 86 of the GA Act and the matter was listed for hearing on 8 December 2025 before the same member who had made the orders on 26 August 2025. 10 The hearing on 8 December 2025 was adjourned part-heard to 30 December 2025 as it had not been possible to complete the matter in the time available. On 23 December 2025, the hearing listed for 30 December 2025 was adjourned to 21 January 2026. 11 On that date, the single member made orders appointing: a. the Public Advocate as CE's limited guardian, with the functions of accommodation and services; and b. the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of CE's estate. 12 Two other orders were made regarding the administration of CE's estate. 13 The first was a reformulation of the Public Trustee's powers of investigation into whether CE has an interest in the property in which he lives. In addition to empowering the investigation into that claim, the Public Trustee was granted the power to 'take all necessary actions to secure that claim if considered meritorious'. 14 The second authorised the Public Trustee to allow CE a trial, whereby he, that is CE, would manage the balance of his income after the Public Trustee had paid his essential expenses. 15 On 23 January 2026, CE applied for review of those orders under s 17A of the GA Act. 16 We heard that application on 19 May 2026. At the conclusion of the hearing, we reserved our decision. These are our reasons for the decision. 17 In determining the application for review, it has been our role to remake the original decision. As such, it has not been necessary for anyone to prove that the earlier decision - the decision under review - was wrong. Rather, we have started again. 18 We have done so having regard to all of the material that was before the original decision-maker. We have also had regard to: -- 4 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 5 a. the transcript of the hearing held in December 2025 and January 2026 by the original decision-maker; b. any other documents filed by any of the parties since that original hearing; and c. anything that was said at the hearing before us on 19 May 2026. In that regard, we note that the following people addressed us at that hearing: i. CE, both directly and through his legal representative, Ms L; ii. LC; iii. HA, a psychologist; iv. SL, a psychiatrist; and v. FE, the delegated guardian, from the Office of the Public Advocate. 19 We note that CE, LC and HA all appeared by telephone and were located in the same room when they gave evidence. 20 Having taken all of that material into account, we are satisfied that CE does not lack capacity. That is, the presumption of capacity is not displaced. 21 As such, the orders made on 21 January 2026 must be discharged. 22 Such an outcome would not ordinarily result in the publication of written reasons. However, as will be seen, we have considerable concerns with certain aspects of this matter, particularly the manner in which CE and his supporters have viewed the role of the Tribunal, as well as the evidence that has been provided. In our view those concerns are sufficient to warrant the publication of these reasons which include a recommendation that certain matters are investigated further. 23 We then turn to the question of the principles on which our decision has been made. -- 5 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 6 Principles 24 Section 4 of the GA Act establishes four principles which must guide all decision-making by the Tribunal under that Act. 25 The first is that all persons, including CE, are presumed to be capable of making decisions in their own best interest. 26 That presumption may be displaced but only by clear and cogent evidence to the contrary. 27 The second is that, to the extent that we are able to do so, we must try to obtain and understand the wishes of a person for whom orders may be made. 28 That does not require us to follow or enact those wishes, but we must seek to ascertain what they are. 29 The third is that all decisions that we make must be made with a view to furthering the best interests of the person for whom orders are proposed to be made. 30 The fourth is that any decision we make must limit the freedoms and liberties of the person for whom orders are proposed as little as possible and only to the extent that it is necessary to pursue their best interests. Issues to be resolved 31 In an application concerning the question of whether orders of guardianship and/or administration should be made for a person, there are five issues that must be resolved: capacity; need; function; identity; and duration. 32 The issue of 'capacity' is addressed first because, as we have just stated, the starting position is that all persons are presumed to have such capacity. 33 Unless that presumption is displaced, we cannot go any further. That is, the second issue of 'need' arises only if it is decided that someone lacks capacity. 34 'Need' asks whether there are less formal and less intrusive means by which decisions can be made for the person other than formal orders of guardianship and/or administration. -- 6 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 7 35 Only if there is a need for formal orders - a need for a substitute decision-maker to be appointed - is it permissible to look at the issue of 'function'. 36 The third issue, 'function', looks to the breadth and nature of the decision-making power. It is important to consider those matters because, again, we must not make orders that impinge on someone's liberty unless it is necessary to do so to look after their best interests. 37 The fourth issue is 'identity'. It asks who should be appointed to be the person's guardian and/or administrator. The GA Act sets out criteria that must be met before a person may be appointed to those positions. In the case of a guardian, they must not have a conflict of interest. In either case, they must be considered suitable. If no one else is suitable, the GA Act identifies an appointee of last resort. 38 'Duration' is the fifth issue. Duration concerns the maximum length of the order. It sets the date by which the orders must be reviewed. CE's Wishes 39 We repeat that we are obliged to ascertain CE's wishes. 40 In circumstances where we have already indicated that we are satisfied that CE has capacity, and the orders should be discharged, it might be seen as unnecessary to describe CE's wishes. However, to do so assists us in explaining the progress of this matter over time. 41 As noted above, the first application was made by LC on 30 June 2025. In that application, she said that CE has 'complex PTSD', that is, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and autism spectrum disorder. She said that, when stressed, CE becomes 'overwhelmed to the point that he is effectively in a state of helpless stoppage'. She said that at the time of her application he was in that state and that decisions needed to be made for him. As we said, the issue of housing security was described in her application as 'at imminent risk'. 42 At the hearing before us, there was no suggestion from CE, Ms L, who appeared on his behalf, or anyone else that LC's original application was made in error or without CE's agreement or involvement. -- 7 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 8 43 Rather, when we took CE to the original application as indicative of his desire for a substitute decision-maker, his complaint was not that the original application was made in error but that the Tribunal made the 'wrong orders' in deciding it. 44 That is reflected in the application made by EF on 9 October 2025. In the section of the form in which reasons are given for seeking review of the orders made, EF said that the orders made had 'had a catastrophic impact' on CE 'and intruded into domains of their [sic] life that were not needed while not addressing the critical area of security of their home and loss of their home as an asset/part of their estate'. EF sought orders revoking non-accommodation functions of guardianship, and sought orders of administration which focused on the Property. 45 That is, we understand EF's explanation to express CE's wishes for orders that did no more than would assist him to obtain housing security. 46 The application made by CE that commenced this proceeding was to the same effect and uses very similar language. 47 However, at the hearing, Ms L advised that CE's wishes had changed and that he wanted all orders of guardianship and administration relating to him and his estate to be revoked. 48 When he spoke to us at the hearing, CE expressed the same view. He insisted that he had full capacity to make reasonable decisions that are in his own best interest in all domains and that, as a result, the orders should be revoked. 49 It is not unusual for people subject to orders under the GA Act to insist that they have capacity. 50 It is, however, most unusual for that to occur in circumstances where the orders in question were made in response to an application brought by, or with the agreement of, the person subject to those orders. 51 We repeat, the original application seeking orders of guardianship and administration was made with CE's agreement. 52 In that context, we reiterate the principles stated above, that is: a. that in making decisions under the GA Act, the Tribunal is informed by the wishes of the proposed represented person, but is not bound by those wishes; and -- 8 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 9 b. that the Tribunal is obliged to make decisions which it considers to be in the represented person's best interests, all the while conscious that their freedoms should not be infringed upon more than is necessary to achieve those best interests. 53 The application made for CE by LC sought particular orders and, to achieve those orders, certain evidence was relied upon. 54 The single member relied upon that evidence to form a view that CE required decisions to be made for him that were broader in scope than that for which CE considered he needed. 55 While CE and his supporters do not seem to have anticipated it, such an outcome was always a possibility and, given the written evidence that was relied upon by CE, we are unable to disagree with the orders that were made. 56 When faced with an outcome which he did not like, but which he brought upon himself, CE and his supporters have unfairly sought to lay blame elsewhere. As part of that process he has, seemingly with their support, very unhelpfully refused to engage in any way with the agencies that were appointed to assist him. 57 Relevantly for our purposes, he has also changed his approach and now insists that he has capacity to make all relevant decisions. Capacity 58 We turn, then, to the question of capacity, and we start with a reiteration of the presumption and a statement of the relevant tests The Presumption and the Tests 59 We repeat that we start with the presumption that CE is capable of making reasonable decisions in his own best interest. We also repeat that that presumption may only be displaced by clear and cogent evidence to the contrary. 60 We also note that, in respect of administration, s 64 of the GA Act provides a three-limbed test. Each limb must be satisfied before the presumption is displaced. Specifically, before we are satisfied that the presumption is displaced, we must be satisfied that: a. CE is incapable of making reasonable decisions in his own best interest; -- 9 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 10 b. CE has a mental disability; and c. CE's incapacity is due to, or because of, that mental disability. 61 Mental disability is defined in s 3 of the GA Act. It is an inclusive definition, so it is not limited to the examples given. The examples are 'an intellectual disability, a psychiatric condition, an acquired brain injury and dementia'. 62 The test for guardianship, which is in s 43 of the GA Act, is simpler. It asks only whether we are satisfied that CE is: a. incapable of looking after his own health and safety; b. unable to make reasonable decisions in respect of matters relating to his person; or c. in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of his own health and safety. 63 For the reasons that follow, we are not satisfied that the presumption is displaced as to either personal decision-making or decisions as to his estate. Medical Evidence 64 We will briefly outline the medical evidence, which is as follows. 65 First is a report filed 10 July 2025 by KD, who appears to be, or have been, CE's General Practitioner. She did not attend to give evidence at the hearing. a. KD said in her report that at the time, that is, at the time of her report, she had known CE for 10 years and had seen him 21 times in the past 12 months, with all but two of those appointments by telehealth.1 b. She said that she was unsure whether a cognitive assessment had been performed on CE, and gave a diagnosis of Autism, ADHD and PTSD. c. She said that his level of impairment of executive function 'fluctuates' and that when he is under a high level of stress that 1 Hearing Book (HB), page 237. -- 10 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 11 he 'may not be able to manage' even simple financial decision- making. d. She said that he was unable to manage complex financial matters due to his '[i]mpairments in concentration, executive functioning and fluctuations in physical health'. She said that he '[m]ay struggle with' decisions in relation to legal matters due to the difficulties previously referred to. She says that he has 'consistently reported struggling to keep up with tasks that have [an] administrative burden'. e. As to his personal decision-making, she said that CE could make reasonable decisions about his medical treatment, but she was unsure whether he could make reasonable decisions about his accommodation and services. As to those matters, she said that he was 'capable of making decisions' but 'may need assistance with the process' (that is, for accommodation) and as to services 'may need assistance to identify options'. 66 We also have three reports by SL, a psychiatrist who has seen CE since 2007. The first report is dated 25 June 2025, the second 31 July 2025 and the third 17 October 2025. SL also gave evidence at the hearing. 67 Despite being only six weeks apart, there are material differences in the first and second reports that are not explained. 68 In the first report (25 June 2025), SL said that he had seen CE more or less weekly for some time. a. He said he had performed an assessment of cognitive capacity and that CE's 'cognition [is] not impaired but he is being treated for ADHD resulting in impulsivity and poor decision making'. He said that CE did have a mental disability and said that CE suffered from 'Adult ADHD', Autism Spectrum Disorder and 'Combative Personality'. b. As to financial decision-making, SL said that CE is able to 'perform routine simple matters, but unable to perform more complex functions such as dealing with estate agent'. c. As to personal decision-making, he said that CE could make reasonable decisions about his accommodation, medical treatment and services. -- 11 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 12 69 The second report from SL is dated 31 July 2025, only a little more than four weeks after the first. a. In this report SL said that he had not performed an assessment of cognitive capacity and that CE has a mental disability, which he diagnosed as 'moderately severe autism spectrum disorder, intermittent explosive disorder and chronic anxiety disorder'. b. He said that CE is able to make reasonable decisions as to both simple and complex financial matters. He said that CE was unable to make legal decisions but was able to instruct counsel. c. As to personal decision-making, he said that CE could make reasonable decisions about his accommodation, medical treatment and services. As to the latter, he said that CE receives NDIS support. 70 In this second report, SL does not provide any details which explain or justify either the opinions expressed or the differences in those opinions from those expressed in the first report. 71 SL's third report is dated 17 October 2025 and was filed 29 October 2025. a. SL said that CE has a mental disability, which he diagnoses as 'chronic depression'. No mention is made of ADHD, autism spectrum disorder, anxiety or intermittent explosive disorder. b. SL says in this third report that CE is able to make reasonable decisions about both simple and complex financial matters, but that he is unsure about his capacity to make reasonable decisions in relation to legal matters. c. He also says that CE is able to make reasonable decisions in relation to each of the three fields of personal decision-making - accommodation, medical treatment and services. By way of 'details', he says that CE 'has suitable accommodation' and '[r]eceives NDIS assistance'. 72 As we have previously noted above, SL also gave evidence at the hearing. 73 SL was asked about the inconsistencies in his written reports. He acknowledged those inconsistencies and said that they were the result of fluctuations in CE's capacity, which changed with his mental -- 12 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 13 health. He described CE as having a 'borderline' capacity and said that his capacity fluctuates depending on 'personality issues'. By way of explanation, he said that when CE was angry with people, he was not 'capable'. 74 He subsequently repeated this, in a slightly different way by saying that CE's 'emotions' play a role in his capacity. 75 SL then turned to the issue of diagnosis. He said that while CE 'may be' on the autism spectrum disorder spectrum, it was not determinative. That is, we understood him to say, he was of the view that any issue of capacity did not turn on CE's autism. 76 As to PTSD, he said that he, that is SL, was a specialist in PTSD and that CE 'clearly' does not suffer from PTSD. He also said that while CE may be prescribed dexamphetamines, he, that is SL, was 'not certain that [CE] had or has ADHD'. 77 He was asked to explain these views given that his previous written reports give CE various diagnoses. SL said that he has 'thought long and hard' about the matter in light of the current proceedings and had come to the views he had expressed. 78 He also said that there was no 'persistent' evidence of anxiety or of explosive anger. 79 SL was also asked why it is that CE 'shuts down' when upset. He said that CE did so 'as a conscious decision on his part'. He said that CE 'burns' relationships, that he had burned his relationship with his father and was in the process of doing the same with SL. He said that when CE 'shuts down', it can be seen as a 'sulk'. SL was very clear that he does not see that shutting down 'as a function of cognition'. 80 Despite SL's focus on CE's emotions, and his evidence of 'burning' relationships and his refusal to engage with people he is angry with, SL disagreed with the suggestion that CE might have a personality disorder, saying that CE was within a 'reasonable range'. 81 When he was asked to describe the current focus of CE's treatment, SL said that it was 'dealing with this process'. SL said that CE had 'got a result different to what he wanted', when the Tribunal made orders broader than those that he had sought. He said that CE does not seem to have understood that that was possible. He said, however, that that lack of understanding was not due to a lack of -- 13 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 14 capacity. It was those matters that he was assisting CE with at the present. 82 SL also gave evidence about CE's use or abuse of medicinal cannabis. As we will see, a report from the Public Trustee speaks of CE spending half his income on medicinal cannabis. That was put to Ms L during her opening submissions. SL heard that exchange and, subsequently, expressed concerns about CE's cannabis use. He said that CE's inability to function during the day was due to his use of medicinal cannabis. When asked whether CE's use of medicinal cannabis might amount to a psychiatric condition, he agreed that it could. SL also said that CE had recently asked him, that is SL, to write to CE's pharmaceutical supplier of medicinal cannabis and to approve a doubling of the amount that he can buy, but SL said that he had refused that request. Support Provider Evidence LC 83 We turn, then, to the evidence provided by support providers. 84 LC filed a written report for the initial hearing. It says that she has qualifications in nursing, that at the time of the report she held the position of 'support worker' and that she had known CE for approximately one year. She also said that CE: a. has diagnoses of Autism Spectrum Disorder, ADHD, CPTSD, by which we understand her to mean complex post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. b. has no contact with his family and is 'quite isolated'. She said that CE's friendships are linked to people able to provide him with support services. Indeed, she says, CE will 'freely admit that he does not want to receive formal supports from someone he wasn't also willing to be friends with'. c. has NDIS support and, through that, has a number of people providing him with assistance, which she describes as including 'personal care support and household and yard maintenance'. She also notes that St Vincent de Paul provides financial counselling. 85 As to financial decision-making, LC said that: -- 14 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 15 a. CE is 'currently managing his own finances with support from a financial counsellor' and that he previously had a Recovery Coach who had also provided 'support' but that recently ended. b. CE's capacity to make decisions 'varies according to the stress levels he is under. When stress triggers an emotional shutdown, he becomes unable to make a decision [and] as the decisions become more complex and cause greater stress, his ability to make decisions decreases'. c. CE 'sometimes requires charity to pay the bills' and that he is vulnerable to financial exploitation from his father who owns the home he is renting'. 86 As to personal decision-making, she said that CE 'works well with his medical professionals and follows their advice' and, as to services, that he would prefer to be more independent but is 'coming to accept that greater support requirements are needed and accepted'. As to accommodation, LC said that: a. CE is living in a house owned by his father and that when the land was purchased, and the house was being built, CE considered that it was to be for him, but he was first denied access to it and it was then rented to him at the highest rent he could afford. b. She said that CE is unable to liaise with his father's estate agent which puts him at risk of homelessness and that there are also issues of unremedied maintenance. c. More generally, LC said that CE's decision-making capacity is affected by his mental health condition which is, in turn, affected by the way he is treated by various professionals. She said that if he is treated well and feels safe and respected, he is more capable of making his own decisions and vice versa. 87 LC also gave evidence at the hearing. Having heard the evidence of SL, she renounced all of her previous evidence and deferred to that of SL on the basis of his greater knowledge of CE and his, that is SL's, superior qualifications. 88 Although she did not elaborate any further, we understood her to say that she accepts SL's evidence that CE has capacity to make -- 15 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 16 decisions in his own best interests and that CE's 'shutting down' is a conscious decision, a sulk, made by him when he is angry. 89 LC was then questioned by the Tribunal as to her role in CE's life. She said that she had previously been employed as a support worker for CE but was now his 'friend'. 90 When asked, she agreed that she had 'intended' to commence a small business with CE, although the project appears to have stalled. However, she said that she had 'given' CE sums of money for the purpose and that that had occurred during her time as his paid support worker. 91 When asked whether those sums were given to CE as a loan, she said that they were not, as she did not want to 'complicate' her relationship with CE. In doing so, she emphasised her friendship with him. 92 With respect, that answer makes no sense. Indeed, we consider it to be disingenuous. 93 LC was paid by the NDIS to provide CE with services as his support worker. To enter into a commercial relationship, that is, to start a business with him, is to complicate that relationship. It also complicates any friendship, which itself is a complication of the professional relationship. 94 For a paid support worker to enter into a commercial relationship with their client is to inappropriately blur the boundaries of, and might be said to exploit, the existing relationship. Whether or not the sums given were a loan, an injection of capital or otherwise is not a matter of 'complication', the relationship has already been 'complicated'. 95 We also have considerable concerns about LC's evidence as to CE's capacity. 96 In short, in June last year, she brought an application for formal orders of guardianship and administration. In significant part, that application relied on her opinion as his paid support worker, that CE lacked capacity to make decisions. 97 As we have noted, CE has been unhappy with the orders made as a result of that application and subsequently continued. LC then attended -- 16 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 17 at the hearing before us and adopted evidence that was entirely inconsistent with her previous position. 98 While it is common, and entirely acceptable, for someone with less expertise in an area to defer to the opinion of someone with greater expertise in that area, she appears to have gone much further than that. 99 SL's expertise is in psychiatry. LC's knowledge and experience working with CE allows her to give everyday examples of how CE interacts with the world that may be relevant to an assessment of his capacity. There is a degree of cross-over between her evidence and that of SL but it seems likely that she could, had she wished to do so, acknowledged and deferred to SL's expertise while expressing her own views about CE's capacity. HA 100 We also have two documents filed by HA, a psychologist who has seen CE since October 2023. The first is a report dated 8 August 2025. a. HA says that CE has no family and few friends that provide any support. b. He says that CE suffers from 'coercive abuse' from his father, both directly and indirectly through his father's estate agent. He says that that abuse has gone on for 'a decade and [sic or?] more and has escalated'. He said that it materially impacts negatively on CE's physical and mental health. c. He says that when CE is mentally well, he is able to deal with most issues independently, but that the abuse he receives creates fatigue and triggers, that prevent him from doing so. d. He says that at the time of the report CE was not even keeping up with everyday decision-making. 101 The second report from HA is in the form of a 'submission' dated 3 December 2025: a. It says that the orders made, which gave authority to the Public Trustee for routine decision-making, have been 'devastating for [CE] and compounded his feelings of powerlessness'. b. He says the same thing about the services function for the guardian. -- 17 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 18 c. He recommends that orders be limited to the issue of housing security, with a power to investigate CE's 'lawful entitlement' to the same. Guardianship orders should, he says, be similarly limited. 102 HA gave evidence at the hearing. He heard the evidence of SL but said that his views had not changed from those set out in the two documents just referred to. He described the actions of the real estate agent tasked by CE's father with managing the rental arrangement as engaging in coercive control. 103 As we will describe shortly, the Public Trustee's involvement in the rental arrangements since its appointment does not support that view. Amongst other things: a. the Public Trustee advised that the rent being charged to CE is a fraction of market rents; b. there is no evidence to support the claim that CE has an interest in the Property; and c. the Public Trustee was able to quickly and easily enter into a 12 month lease. 104 The Public Trustee has also formed the view that there is no basis for a claim under the National Redress Scheme. 105 We raised the Public Trustee's findings as to the rent being charged with HA as a query to his evidence of coercive control. We asked whether he (HA) had taken steps to obtain collateral evidence to confirm statements made to him by CE. Although not specifically noted in our question, we note HA's claim that CE's father has been 'engaged in abuse of his son for a decade and more' and yet HA has only treated CE since October 2023. 106 In responding to our question HA's voice became noticeably higher pitched and the speed at which he spoke increased considerably. In our view the question caused him to become noticeably agitated. Further, rather than answer the question asked, he spoke, instead, of what he said were 'dozens' of breaches of the lease by CE's father. 107 That exchange, and the inconsistency of his evidence of abuse of CE by his father with the objective evidence, causes us to question -- 18 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 19 whether HA has lost his objectivity. We are concerned that he may have become an uncritical mouthpiece of CE. Ms Y 108 We turn then to the evidence of Ms Y. 109 Our concerns with LC and HA appear to be supported by the evidence of Ms Y, a support coordinator, whose report is dated 10 April 2026. 110 She says that CE's 'primary support appears to be [LC] who is both a support worker and a friend'. 111 She also says that there are 'conflicting views' as to CE's relationship with his father, which she describes as 'complex'. Amongst other things, she notes that HA, 'has expressed concerns that [CE] may have been coerced historically by his father; however, this has not been substantiated through the SAT investigation'. 112 Significantly, in answer to the question whether CE is vulnerable to financial exploitation she said: Yes, [CE] may be vulnerable to financial exploitation, as evidenced by the involvement of multiple parties in financial arrangements and the lack of clarity surrounding some service payments. Public Trustee's Reports 113 We turn then to the Public Trustee's reports. There are four such reports. 114 In the report of 25 November 2025, the Public Trustee notes that no contact had been made with CE. That approach was said to be in accordance with the advice of LC and HA who advised 'on numerous occasions' that CE would be 'highly stressed without supports available' during a conversation with the Public Trustee. 115 We note that there is no indication that any attempt was made to provide such support and we are satisfied that the absence of contact was not due to any failings by the Public Trustee but was, rather, due to CE's refusal to engage with it. The report states: Without interaction with [CE], it has been difficult to assist or support him anymore than I have. -- 19 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 20 116 At the hearing, CE effectively confirmed that he had refused to engage with the Public Trustee and the Public Advocate. When we put that to him, he said that he did so because the 'wrong orders' were made. 117 We accept that the orders made were broader than CE wanted, but it must not be forgotten that the original application was made by LC with CE's agreement to obtain the appointment of the Public Trustee and the Public Advocate to secure housing. 118 That is, in fact, exactly what has occurred. The Public Trustee's 25 November 2025 report notes that it had signed a 12 month lease for CE which 'was a matter of concern for [CE]'. The report includes a quote from the estate agent that: The only reason that there is no lease agreement is that we were not able to communicate with [CE]. I did make attempts with different support workers to get one in place on numerous occasions. 119 The report also noted that the rent paid by CE was for $230 a week which is, the report notes, substantially below the market rate of $485 - $635 per week. 120 The report also notes that there was no evidence that CE had paid funds toward the purchase of the Property or otherwise such that there might be evidence to support his claim to an interest in it. 121 In short, the objective evidence is to the effect that the Public Trustee quickly and easily provided the housing security which was said to have been withheld by both CE's father and his estate agent as part of a campaign of coercive control and that the rent being charged was at a fraction of market rates. 122 Despite the Public Trustee performing the role for which LC asked the Tribunal to appoint it, CE has refused to engage with it and there appears to have been no suggestion that his supporters have encouraged any other course. Indeed, the Public Trustee's report of 25 November 2025 suggests that HA may have acted to challenge the work done by the Public Trustee. 123 CE's refusal to engage with the Public Trustee continued to at least the hearing before us on 19 May 2026: a. An email from the Public Trustee to the Tribunal dated 19 December 2025 stated that it would be necessary for the -- 20 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 21 Public Trustee to communicate with CE to allow it to administer his estate, if reappointed as his estate's administrator. b. In its report of 21 January 2026, the Public Trustee noted that its investigation concluded that there were no grounds to support a claim under the National Redress Scheme but that those findings were not communicated to CE due to his wishes that the Public Trustee not contact him. c. In the report of 17 March 2026, the Public Trustee notes that CE had complained about being contacted by the Public Trustee when it asked about his vehicle's registration. d. In its report of 4 May 2026, the Public Trustee noted: i. that there had been no contact between it and CE; and ii. that there is no evidence to support CE's claim to the property and that the direction as to investigation of that matter should be removed. 124 Finally, we note that in its report of 25 November 2025, the Public Trustee reported that CE's bank statements showed that he would 'regularly' spend his pension within a couple of days and that about 50% of it was spent on medicinal marijuana, with the result he was without funds for about a fortnight. 125 However, in its most recent report, of 4 May 2026, the Public Trustee reports that, after paying his rent and utilities, it provides CE with an allowance with which he pays for his groceries 'and general spending'. Significantly the report notes that CE 'has not contacted the Public Trustee for any advances'. Public Advocate 126 The Office of the Public Advocate has filed four documents with the Tribunal. 127 The first is an investigation report filed 25 August 2025 in which: a. the investigator opined that CE may not be someone for whom orders could be made. It recommended that the application be dismissed; -- 21 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 22 b. the investigator noted that CE's friends have a dual role as support workers, for which they are paid; and c. otherwise, the report focuses on CE's fears of eviction and his complex relationship with his father who, the report notes, CE claims is the source of abuse. 128 The second is a report filed by the Public Advocate's delegated guardian on 5 December 2025. It says that: a. CE can become overwhelmed causing him to shut down mentally and emotionally; b. prior to the orders, CE was supported by unregistered friends and neighbours with a high turnover of supports, with the Office of the Public Advocate being advised that he, that is CE, had 'sacked them'; c. CE's NDIS plan 'has been overspent multiple times leaving him without adequate supports and concerns over who has been accessing his funds'; d. there is a need for ongoing decisions to be made around his NDIS services 'to ensure that [he's] adequately supported and funds are used appropriately to protect him from exploitation'. It says: In the past [CE] has been vulnerable due to lack of oversight of his supports, the payment of those supports and the engagement of unregistered providers without any criminal clearances. 129 On 13 December 2025, the Office of the Public Advocate filed an eight-page document recording its attempts to contact and provide support to CE. 130 On 14 May 2026, the delegated guardian provided a brief update report which advises that: a. At CE's request, no contact had been made by the guardian; b. Approval had been given for the NDIS Plan Manager to pay previous invoices incurred in good faith and for the engagement of an NDIS funded Occupational Therapist; c. CE is engaging with independent support workers that he chose prior to the Public Advocate's appointment; -- 22 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 23 d. A support coordinator has been engaged by the delegated guardian but CE is refusing to meet with her; e. There are no reports that CE is at risk; and f. The Public Advocate encourages us to 'explore' the need for a guardian, given CE's view that he does not need one. 131 The delegated guardian also gave evidence at the hearing. She said that, in her view, CE and his 'advisers' had been 'misguided' in making the initial application and were now 'trying to manage the fallout'. 132 She disagreed with statements made by CE that he had been left without access to funds and said that the Public Trustee had acted promptly and appropriately. In particular, she noted the prompt manner in which a 12 month lease had been secured. 133 Finally, she expressed concern with the prospect that CE might have control over how his NDIS funding might be spent in the future should the guardianship orders be revoked and she spoke of 'evidence of previous exploitation' in that regard. CE's Evidence 134 CE also gave evidence at the hearing. He was eloquent and able to move from one topic to another when we asked questions of him. 135 Having said that, he was clearly agitated about certain matters, primarily his accommodation about which he spoke animatedly and at length until stopped by questions from the panel. He said that he had 'been fighting for tenancy rights', including with an NDIS 'recovery coach', that he had wanted a five year lease and that that desire had been 'leveraged' against him by, we understand, his father and his father's real estate agent. 136 He also said that he had not wanted to sign the lease offered, but that the lease was signed by the Public Advocate (by which we understood him to mean the Public Trustee) and that it had been 'illegally backdated'. 137 We challenged him on that complaint by noting his refusal to speak with the agencies. He sought to avoid the inconsistency in his position by saying that the 'wrong orders' had been made and that there was 'no suggestion of lack of capacity'. -- 23 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 24 138 We then sought to challenge him on that statement by referring to the original application, to which he claimed that the Tribunal had 'vastly overstepped its role'. 139 We also questioned him about the Public Trustee's report that he would spend his pension in a couple of days of receiving it and that he would spend up to half of it on medicinal cannabis. 140 He disagreed with the first finding, but agreed that 'towards the end' he was spending a lot of money on medicinal cannabis. By 'toward the end' we understood him to refer to the period shortly before orders were made. 141 He insisted however, that he 'always paid [his] bills', despite the Public Trustee reporting that, when appointed, he was in arrears on rent and to Synergy. 142 At that point he complained that his chest was 'tight' due to anxiety, although, after enquiries from us, he said that he was feeling well, at which point we heard from LC. He did not pursue the suggestion of a break. Discussion and Findings as to Capacity 143 There is some evidence that CE suffers from a mental disability. 144 As we have noted, his GP's report gave several diagnoses. We give that some weight although her report is now 12 months old and she did not give evidence at the hearing. In particular, she did not hear the evidence of SL. 145 HA's written evidence was to the effect that CE has various diagnoses of mental disability and he maintained his position despite the evidence of SL. However, we give little weight to his views, as we are concerned that he appeared to lack objectivity, including by relying solely on what CE tells him. 146 LC's written report noted various diagnoses for CE although that appears to have been in reliance on other people's views. 147 SL's written reports also gave various diagnoses. 148 At the hearing, however, as we have noted, SL renounced these previous diagnoses and gave firm evidence that none of them applied, save for, perhaps, drug addiction and autism spectrum disorder. -- 24 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 25 He was, however, very clear that CE's position on the ASD spectrum was not such as to impact his capacity to make reasonable decisions in his own best interests. 149 Indeed, as we have noted, his evidence was that CE had capacity to make such decisions. 150 Given the above, we are not satisfied that CE has a mental disability, save for perhaps, that of 'drug addiction'. 151 However, such a finding is of little utility in any event, as we are satisfied that CE is able to make reasonable decisions in his own best interests. 152 In that regard, we rely upon the evidence of SL, which we have previously detailed, above. As we understand it, his opinion is that while CE can be overcome by emotions, and in particular anger, when things don't go his way, that does not represent a failure of cognition or executive functioning. Rather, his evidence was that, when angry, CE makes a conscious decision to 'shut down', or, in SL's words, to sulk. 153 That evidence is consistent with what has happened since the orders were made appointing the Public Trustee and Public Advocate as administrator and guardian respectively; CE has refused to engage with them. Significantly, he appears to have continued to function without their assistance and without adverse impacts. 154 The evidence of the Public Trustee, as noted above, is to the effect that it provides CE with an allowance after it has paid his rent and utilities and that CE had not sought additional funds from it and, indeed, has had almost no dealings with it. 155 That evidence provides support for the view that CE's cognition and executive functioning is such as to allow him to budget, exercise restraint and otherwise make decisions which ensure that he spends only what he has available on food and groceries and other items of discretionary spending. 156 We also rely on the evidence of the Public Advocate. The first evidence from the Public Advocate was from an investigator whose report predated the first hearing. The author of that report opined that CE was not a person for whom orders could be made. -- 25 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 26 157 The current evidence from the delegated guardian is to the effect that CE has ignored the appointment of a guardian and has engaged services on his own behalf and, as noted above, we are encouraged to consider the revocation of the orders. The current evidence from the delegated guardian is also to the effect that no reports of risk or adverse impacts have been made about CE. 158 We also rely in this regard upon our own 'observations' of CE. While he appeared to have firm views about both his housing situation and the injustice of the current situation, as we have said, we engaged with him on several topics, which required him to move quickly from one topic to another, applying both memory and reasoning to respond. 159 We note that the evidence is not all one way. There is evidence from LC that prior to the appointment of the Public Trustee, CE sometime required charity to pay his bills. However, as we have noted, the evidence of the Public Trustee, which is more recent, and more reliable, is to the effect that CE appears to be able to spend within his means. 160 There are also several references to his previous exploitation by service providers, including evidence that his NDIS annual budget had been quickly overspent. 161 We are considerably concerned by this. 162 On the one hand, it might be said to suggest a vulnerability for CE. There may, however, be other explanations. CE's evidence included a defence of those engaged through that process, saying that it was difficult to engage providers in the region in which he lives. 163 In our view it would be appropriate for the National Disability Insurance Agency to carefully consider CE's package in light of our findings that he has capacity to make decisions in his own best interest. There may also be a role for the NDIS Commission. 164 We make that observation because we are deeply concerned with what we perceive to be the inappropriate manner in which the regime established under the GA Act, and the Tribunal's resources, have been used by CE and his supporters. 165 There would appear to be a very complex dynamic at play between CE and his father and we should not be understood to be making findings about its rights and wrongs. -- 26 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 27 166 However, the evidence of the Public Trustee was that there is no evidence to support CE's claim that he has an interest in the Property. Its evidence also strongly suggests that CE's father was not responsible for the absence of a formal lease. When those matters are combined with a charged rent that is well below market rates, it is difficult to find any basis for the claims of CE and HA that CE's father was exercising coercive control over him through their relationship as landlord and tenant. 167 As such, the application for orders made by LC appears to have been made in a conscious effort to co-opt public agencies as leverage by CE against his father. When CE became aware that they were not going to be so co-opted, he both refused to engage with those agencies and sought to have the orders revoked. 168 If that is what has occurred, and we emphasise that we make no findings in this regard, it would be a serious misuse of the regime established by the GA Act and of the Tribunal's resources. 169 In those circumstances, we consider it appropriate for the relevant agencies to review CE's NDIS package. Given SL's evidence and the findings that we have made, we consider it prudent to ensure that CE only receives funding for which he is entitled, given his diagnoses and needs. 170 If the decision is made to continue to provide CE with NDIS funding, the evidence supports the need for closer oversight of those engaged by him and the manner in which the money is spent. 171 We will finish by saying something of HA and LC. 172 We have previously found that LC's apparently aborted attempt to start a small business with CE inappropriately blurred the boundaries of her relationship with him as his support worker. We have also expressed concerns that HA may lack objectivity. 173 Save for those matters, we emphasise that we have not made any adverse findings about them. In particular, our recommendation that CE's package be reviewed should not be seen as an implicit condemnation of them and their role. 174 In short, we are satisfied that, while the evidence is not all one way, there is enough to find that CE has capacity to make decisions in -- 27 of 28 -- [2026] WASAT 77 Page 28 his own best interests in both a financial setting and in relation to his person. 175 Put another way, the presumption of capacity has not been displaced. Need/Function/Identity and Duration 176 As we have found that the presumption of capacity is not displaced, there is no role for us to consider whether there is a need for formal orders, the scope and duration of such orders, or who should be appointed to the roles. Orders 177 Rather, it is appropriate, indeed necessary, for orders to be made revoking the orders made on 21 January 2026 in relation to both administration and guardianship. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. DM Associate 6 JULY 2026 -- 28 of 28 --