LJ [2026] WASAT 73

[2026] WASAT 73 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) CITATION : LJ [2026] WASAT 73 MEMBER : MS R BUNNEY, MEMBER HEARD : 7 APRIL AND 12 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 24 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 25 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : GAA 1905 of 2026 LJ Represented Person PUBLIC TRUSTEE Applicant KJ Third Party Catchwords: Administration - Review of administration order - Administrator to act in best interests of represented person - Purposes of Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) - Conflict of interest - Suitability of administrator - Role of administrator - Role of guardian - Consideration of expenses incurred in performance of function of guardian - Supervision of administrator - Administrator unable to perform the functions of administrator - Family law financial settlement - Costs in Tribunal proceedings -- 1 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 2 Legislation: Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4(2), s 4(3), s 4(4), s 4(5), s 4(6), s 4(7), s 16(4), s 64(1)(a), s 68(3), s 68(3)(c), s 70, s 70(1), s 71, s 71(5), s 72(3), s 80(3), s 86, s 118, s 118(1), s 118(2) Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18, s 56(2) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(2), s 32(4), s 87(1), s 87(2) Result: Public Trustee appointed as plenary administrator Category: B Representation: Counsel: Represented Person : N/A Applicant : Ms C Ngare Third Party : Ms V Saragih Solicitors: Represented Person : N/A Applicant : Public Trustee Third Party : Green Arc Legal (7 April 2026) and Erity Legal (12 June 2026) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): DW and JM [2006] WASAT 366 EH [2008] WASAT 222 FY [2019] WASAT 118 GD and AD [2005] WASAT 203 LC and JS [2007] WASAT 127 Perpetual Trustees WA Limited and the Public Trustee [2009] WASAT 253 Re The Full Board of Guardianship and Administration Board [2003] WASCA 268 -- 2 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 3 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Summary 1 The Public Trustee has sought a review of the administration orders made for LJ in February 2025 pursuant to s 86 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act). 2 The orders under review appoint LJ's daughter KJ as his limited administrator with all the powers of a plenary administrator save for two functions conferred on the Public Trustee. The Public Trustee is the limited administrator responsible for managing the family law financial settlement with LJ's wife and considering the matter of a $50,000 gift to KJ. 3 SJ is LJ's wife and KJ's mother. KJ and SJ are LJ's joint guardians and have the authority to make decisions about his accommodation, treatment, services and restrictive practices in aged care. They are appointed to continue in this role for 5 years. 4 SJ and LJ have been separated for over 40 years but have not divorced. 5 LJ has just turned 80. He is a self-funded retiree with significant assets valued at many millions of dollars (Estate). He previously worked as a financial planner and retired at age 56 when he was financially secure. 6 SJ is a similar age to LJ and lives in a property owned by the Department of Housing. Her income is the aged pension. KJ is aged in her 40s and lives with her mother. KJ works in paid employment. 7 At the hearing in February 2025, SJ gave evidence that LJ had put money aside for her to buy a home. As the price of real estate had increased, he told her that she would need more money. No agreement about a particular amount had been reached. SJ gave evidence that LJ also gave her money, approximately $100 per week, to assist with her expenses. 8 KJ gave evidence that LJ agreed to give her $50,000 to put towards buying a property. The administration order was therefore crafted to allow KJ to continue to assist LJ with his Estate, but to insulate her from the conflict of interest relating to the $50,000 gift and the transaction to be finalised and documented between her parents. -- 3 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 4 9 In April 2026, the Public Trustee applied to review the administration order due to concerns with how KJ was discharging her obligations as administrator. The Public Trustee cited concerns about not being advised KJ had put LJ's home (Property) on the market for sale and delays in receiving disclosure documents from her. The Public Trustee was also concerned KJ was advocating to reduce the size of the Estate, which the Public Trustee viewed as being against LJ's interests. 10 The proceeding was first heard in April 2026 at short notice. I adjourned the matter to allow time for further conferral and for KJ to provide disclosure documents to the Public Trustee. 11 At the second hearing in June, more detailed information was available about KJ's administration of the Estate. KJ had lodged the annual accounts (Accounts) with the Private Administrator Support division of the Public Trustee (PAS Team) which disclosed: (a) around $5,000 KJ had claimed from the Estate for costs relating to her duties as guardian; and (b) $5,500 paid from the Estate to SJ's family lawyers, Baily Family Law (BFL) for SJ's legal fees in relation to the financial settlement. 12 KJ also paid her legal fees relating to the April hearing from the Estate and was intending to pay a further $7,000 or more in respect of the June hearing. KJ was still advocating for interim measures to reduce the Estate to minimise LJ's aged care fees and had communicated with Services Australia in that regard. 13 The Public Trustee was justified in seeking a review of the administration order. For the reasons set out below, I am not satisfied KJ can act in LJ's best interests due to a conflict of interest. Further, I am unable to find KJ suitable to be appointed as administrator as she is unable to perform the functions vested in the administrator. 14 I will appoint the Public Trustee as LJ's plenary administrator for 5 years. Principles to be observed by the Tribunal 15 The primary concern of the Tribunal when making decisions under the GA Act is the best interests of the person for whom the application -- 4 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 5 was made, LJ.1 The Tribunal must ascertain LJ's views and wishes, as far as possible.2 16 The starting point for the Tribunal is that every person is presumed to be capable of looking after their own health and safety, managing their own affairs and making reasonable judgments about matters relating to their estate and their person.3 If this 'presumption of capacity' is set aside by cogent evidence, the Tribunal can consider making guardianship and administration orders. 17 The Tribunal must consider whether LJ's needs could be met by other means less restrictive on his freedom of decision and action.4 If the Tribunal makes an order, the order must impose the least restrictions possible.5 18 The Tribunal will take all facts and circumstances into account when determining LJ 's best interests. The Tribunal may inform itself on any matter as it sees fit, and is not bound by rules of evidence, which ensures, as far as possible, that all relevant information can be considered by the Tribunal to make the correct decision in LJ's best interests.6 19 When making this decision, I have taken into account the evidence filed on LJ's Tribunal matters since February 2025 and the evidence given at Tribunal hearings in February 2025, April 2026 and June 2026. The evidence I have relied on is summarised in these reasons. Issues 20 The issues I must determine are: (a) whether LJ lacks the capacity to make decisions about his financial and legal matters; (b) if so, whether there is a need to make an order, or whether there is another way for decisions to be made that is less restrictive on LJ's freedom of decision and action; 1 GA Act, s 4(2). 2 GA Act, s 4(7). 3 GA Act, s 4(3). 4 GA Act, s 4(4). 5 GA Act, s 4(5) and s 4(6). 6 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), s 32(2) and s 32(4). -- 5 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 6 (c) if so, who the administrator will be and the functions or powers they require; and (d) when the order will be reviewed. 21 The most contentious issue for determination is who to appoint as administrator, as KJ seeks to continue her appointment. LJ's views and wishes 22 When considering all matters under the GA Act, the Tribunal must ascertain LJ's views and wishes, as expressed or gathered from his previous actions.7 23 LJ attended the beginning of the April hearing by videolink but was unable to express a view about who he would want to be his administrator. I observed LJ to be confused and tangential in his comments. He was also in pain because of a back injury and left the hearing after a short period of time. 24 KJ submitted that LJ's views are contained in documents he prepared in the 1980s in which he expressed his opinion that government interference in personal decision-making was fundamentally objectionable. KJ asserts that the appointment of the Public Trustee, a government body, as administrator would be contrary to LJ's expressed wishes. 25 I accept that LJ, like many people, would not want the Public Trustee to be appointed as his administrator. However, the requirement for the Tribunal to ascertain the represented person's views and wishes is not so the Tribunal can give effect to them, but to give them weight and balance when considering matters under the GA Act. Capacity 26 To appoint an administrator, the Tribunal must be satisfied that LJ is currently unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of his estate.8 27 'Mental disability' is defined in the GA Act and includes an intellectual disability, psychiatric condition, dementia and acquired 7 GA Act, s 4(7). 8 GA Act, s 64(1)(a). -- 6 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 7 brain injury.9 The definition is inclusive and was described by the Full Tribunal in the case of FY as follows:10 The ordinary meaning of the term 'mental disability' in the GA Act thus contemplates that a person's mind is affected by an impairment, incapacity or inability to function in a manner, or within a range, considered normal, or which is objectively measurable. … … the definition of 'mental disability' does not require any precise degree of mental disability, measured by reference to some medical or scientific benchmark … … … A finding that a person has a 'mental disability' may, of course, be referrable to the existence of one, or a combination of more than one, identified medical conditions. In other cases, the underlying cause of a person's mental disability may not be entirely clear, or susceptible to a particular medical diagnosis, but the existence of the mental disability may be beyond doubt. 28 The Aged Care Assessment Team assessment prepared on 29 January 2025 recorded that LJ had recently been hospitalised three times due to seizures, multiple falls, medication overdose, cognitive decline and being unable to cope at home. KJ told the assessor that the family had noticed a long-term gradual cognitive decline over many years. 29 The medical evidence before the Tribunal was prepared by consultant geriatrician Dr T.11 Dr T found that LJ had a cognitive impairment and noted the collateral history from KJ and SJ suggested there may be a progressive underlying neurocognitive disorder as LJ had deteriorated since a motor vehicle accident in 2017. 30 Dr T's view was that LJ was not capable of making decisions about complex financial and legal matters, and did not have the capacity to sign an enduring power of attorney. It was not clear to Dr T whether LJ had the capacity to manage his day-to-day finances, although given his impaired recall and disorientation, Dr T presumed LJ would not be able to do so. 9 GA Act, s 3. 10 FY [2019] WASAT 118 at [27], [31] and [32]. 11 Medical report dated 15 February 2025 and clinic letter dated 14 February 2025 prepared by Dr T. -- 7 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 8 31 LJ scored 21/30 on a Montreal Cognitive Assessment Test undertaken in December 2024. Just one month later, in January 2025, LJ scored 15/30 on the same test, which is a rapid decline. 32 No one that attended the hearings in 2026 suggested that LJ had recovered and was now able to manage his finances. 33 I am satisfied that the cognitive impairment is the cause of LJ's inability to make reasonable judgments in respect of his Estate. He was completely independent prior to November 2024, and it was not asserted by any person that there was any other cause of his lack of capacity. 34 I am therefore satisfied, and I find, that LJ is unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of all his estate. LJ is a person for whom the Tribunal can appoint an administrator. Does the Tribunal need to make orders? 35 When considering whether LJ needs an administrator to be appointed, I must adopt a less restrictive alternative if possible.12 LJ did not previously sign an enduring power of attorney and is unable to sign a one now, so that option is not available. I am satisfied that informal arrangements are not appropriate as LJ requires his decision- maker to have the legal authority to manage his Estate, which involves complex legal issues. 36 I am therefore satisfied on the evidence before me that there no less restrictive alternative available for decisions to be made in LJ's best interests other than by the appointment of an administrator. Who should be LJ's administrator? 37 Section 68 of the GA Act provides that when appointing an administrator, the Tribunal can appoint an individual over the age of 18 who has consented to act and who, in the opinion of the Tribunal, will act in the best interests of LJ and is otherwise suitable to act as the administrator of the estate. 38 For the purposes of establishing suitability, the Tribunal will take into account, among other things, LJ's wishes and whether the proposed 12 GA Act, s 4(6). -- 8 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 9 administrator will be able to perform the functions to be vested in the administrator.13 39 KJ is consenting to the appointment as LJ's administrator. I am satisfied KJ is over the age of 18. Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that if I could ask LJ who he would want to manage his finances, he would prefer the appointment of KJ over the Public Trustee. 40 The evidence before the Tribunal is that the relationship between LJ and KJ is close, caring and supportive. KJ's evidence, which I accept, is that: (a) she attends LJ's aged care facility to bring him food he is more likely to eat and often feeds him directly when he is unable to feed himself; (b) she provides non-alcoholic wine for LJ as he becomes agitated when he asks for wine and cannot have it; (c) she has attended the aged care facility repeatedly at the request of staff to manage LJ's behaviour; (d) she was present when LJ was given incorrect medication and when his crash mat was found soiled and left in his room; (e) she has found him lying on the floor several times after a fall before carers attended; (f) she organises alternative therapies for him such as naturopathy and puts fresh flowers in his room; and (g) she spent significant time clearing, cleaning, and preparing the Property for sale, as well as meeting with real estate agents and trades on site. 41 I accept KJ's evidence that she works in the city, and appointments and inspections could not always be scheduled outside business hours. On those days, she would drive to work and pay for parking so she could attend aged care facility inspections, and medical and other appointments throughout the day. 13 GA Act, s 68(3). -- 9 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 10 42 I accept that KJ's evidence was truthful and honestly given. She has done her best to explain why she made the decisions she did and she has properly conceded she has made mistakes. 43 I will first address the requirement that the administrator must act in the represented person's best interests. Administrator must act in the represented person's best interests 44 The Tribunal must be satisfied that the administrator will act in the best interests of the represented person. This means, among other things, the administrator cannot prefer the interests of anyone else above those of the represented person. An administrator is in a fiduciary position in respect of the represented person.14 A fiduciary is defined as:15 Fiduciary: A person who is under an obligation to act in another's best interests to the exclusion of the fiduciary's own interest. A fiduciary cannot use his or her position, knowledge or opportunity to the fiduciary's own advantage, or have a personal interest in, or inconsistent engagement with, a third party, unless fully informed and free consent is given. In acting for or in the interests of the other, the fiduciary acts in a representative capacity[.] 45 I note the definition above is modified in the context of a represented person who cannot give fully informed and free consent, as a declaration has been made that they do not have the capacity to make reasonable judgments in respect of their estate. 46 A conflict of interest exists if the administrator's duty to the represented person is affected by their duty to someone else or by their own personal interests. Even when acting honestly, the interests of another or their own personal interests can consciously or subconsciously influence the decision-making of an administrator. 47 I will next describe the matters that satisfy me KJ has a conflict of interest. Payment of SJ's legal fees in the family law matter 48 I make the following findings of fact in paragraphs [49] to [53] in relation to the payment of SJ's legal fees. 14 DW and JM [2006] WASAT 366 at [31]. 15 Butterworths, Australian Legal Dictionary (1997) at 471, cited in DW and JM [2006] WASAT 366 at [29]. -- 10 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 11 49 On 7 April 2025, KJ paid $550 to BFL. 50 On 22 April 2025, KJ paid $3,000 to BFL. 51 KJ twice met with the Legal Officer from the Public Trustee, Ms S, in mid-2025 and discussed, among other things, her intention to sell the Property. The payment of SJ's legal fees was not discussed with Ms S. 52 On 15 August 2025, KJ paid $2,000 to BFL. Ms S ceased being the Legal Officer with conduct of the matter in late August 2025. 53 From November 2025 to May 2026, numerous emails were exchanged between KJ and the Legal Officers from the Public Trustee, Ms C, Mr G and Ms N, none of which mention paying $5,500 to BFL for SJ's legal fees (Payment). KJ's position 54 KJ contends that because LJ holds the financial assets, using funds from the Estate to pay SJ's legal fees was the 'right thing to do'. KJ views the Payment as properly characterised as a settlement cost incurred in the best interests of the Estate. KJ says the Payment was made to avoid further expense and to finalise the financial settlement to protect the Estate. KJ asserts there is no conflict of interest if the Payment was made genuinely in the best interests of the Estate. 55 KJ contends that a payment made in good faith and capable of authorisation is a defect that can be cured, and her facilitation of the Payment is not sufficient to revoke her appointment as administrator. KJ asserts that an administrator is only removed in cases involving concealment of transactions, an absence of proper accounting or the personal enrichment of the administrator at the expense of the represented person's estate. 56 KJ acknowledges that making the Payment was a mistake. She has made two suggestions as to how deal with the Payment and for her to remain LJ's administrator. The first is to seek authorisation from the Tribunal for the Payment as a gift to SJ. The second is to treat the Payment as an adjustment in the family law proceedings. KJ's proposal to seek retrospective authorisation from the Tribunal 57 KJ seeks authorisation from the Tribunal that the Payment was a gift to SJ. The annual gifting authority of $7,000 for the period in -- 11 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 12 which the Payment was made has been exhausted, and exceeded, so KJ's request would require the Tribunal to retrospectively authorise the Payment as a benevolent payment or disposition.16 58 Section 70(1) of the GA Act provides a broad discretion for an administrator to 'act according to [their] opinion of the best interests of the represented person'. KJ believes the Payment was made in LJ's best interests as it is in LJ's best interests that the family law matter be finalised, and it is necessary for SJ to receive legal advice for that to occur. 59 Section 71(5) of the GA Act provides: In exercising its jurisdiction under this Part the State Administrative Tribunal may take a liberal view of the best interests of the represented person as mentioned in section 4(2), and in particular may, if the circumstances so require, empower an administrator to make a payment or enter into a transaction of a kind described in section 72(3) on behalf of the represented person. 60 The ordinary meaning of the word 'liberal' in this context is 'not strict or rigorous'.17 61 When reading sections 70 and 71, it does appear that the administrator can take a liberal, or expansive view, of what is, in their opinion, in the represented person's best interests. 62 Section 72(3) states: (3) Notwithstanding this section or section 71, an administrator shall not without the authority of the State Administrative Tribunal under section 71(5) - (a) make a payment or disposition of a charitable, benevolent or ex gratia nature; or (b) make a payment in respect of a debt or demand that the represented person is not obliged by law to pay. 63 When interpreting a provision of a written law, 'a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law … shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose 16 GA Act, s 72(3). 17 Macquarie Dictionary (2013). -- 12 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 13 or object'.18 It is therefore necessary to consider the objects of the GA Act and the protective nature of the legislation. 64 The long title of the GA Act states the Act is to provide 'for the administration of the estates of persons who need assistance in their financial affairs'. In Re The Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board, Heenan J described the purpose of administration as follows:19 … The emphasis is on conserving the property and financial resources of the disabled person to ensure that they are available for his or her own needs, welfare and enjoyment and are not dissipated. These seem to be the primary objectives of the legislation and all the provisions of the GA Act can be seen to have meaning and effect as leaning towards the achievement of those purposes. In the main, these will be accomplished by conserving the resources and property of the person under administration for use to his or her own advantage or, in cases where expenditure or imminent disposition of property are necessary or advantageous, by scrutinising the transaction to see if it is justifiable or provident having regard to all the circumstances, bearing always in mind the continuing and future needs of the person who's estate is under administration. 65 Section 72(3) states that the administrator 'shall not without the authority of the State Administrative Tribunal under section 71(5) … make a payment'. The use of the word 'shall' means the function conferred must be performed.20 The Tribunal has interpreted this to mean that the power of the Tribunal to authorise payments under s 72(3) is prospective only, as the administrator must first have received authorisation from the Tribunal for the payment to be made.21 66 When considering the objects and context of the GA Act, the purpose of s 72(3), which requires Tribunal authorisation of certain types of payments, is to conserve the represented person's estate as it restricts the broad powers of an administrator, acting in their opinion of the represented person's best interests, to ensure that the financial resources of the represented person are available for their own 'needs, welfare and enjoyment and are not dissipated'.22 Section 72(3) is a legislative recognition that giving gifts, making benevolent payments or paying a debt the person is not obliged to pay may adversely affect the 18 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18. 19 Re The Full Board of Guardianship and Administration Board [2003] WASCA 268 at [44]. 20 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 56(2). 21 EH [2008] WASAT 222 at [25]; Perpetual Trustees WA Limited and the Public Trustee [2009] WASAT 253 at [84] - [86]. 22 Perpetual Trustees WA Limited and the Public Trustee at [61]. -- 13 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 14 represented person's estate, and therefore requires an objective assessment by the Tribunal before such a disposition is made.23 67 The Tribunal is therefore unable to retrospectively authorise the Payment. KJ's proposal that the Payment be treated as an adjustment in the family law matter 68 KJ's second proposal is that the Payment be treated as an adjustment in the family law matter.24 However, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make such an order or direction. The Payment can only be characterised, particularly after the fact, by agreement between the parties or by the Family Court. KJ's request for the Tribunal to authorise the Estate to pay SJ's ongoing legal fees in the family law matter 69 KJ requested I make an order that the Estate pay SJ's legal fees for the entirety of the family law matter.25 As the order I am making in this decision revokes KJ's appointment as administrator, I do not need to consider her request in respect of this proposed gift. Repeated requests for interim measures 70 I make the following findings of fact in paragraphs [71] to [79] in relation to KJ's requests for interim measures. 71 In November 2025, KJ twice asked Ms C, the Legal Officer with conduct of the matter at that time, for updates in relation to her $50,000 gift. 72 In January 2026, KJ started emailing Ms C to ask whether it was possible to implement 'interim measures' or 'interim options' to reduce the means-tested care fees LJ was being charged. KJ referred to the payment of the fees as an 'ongoing financial loss'. 73 KJ viewed the fees being charged as too high because the fees were calculated based on the current value of LJ's Estate. KJ therefore asked Ms C to consider whether any interim measures or options could be taken to reduce the value of the Estate so that the means-tested care fee would be correspondingly reduced. 23 DW and JM [2006] WASAT 366 at [31]. 24 Submissions of KJ filed 19 June 2026 (KJ Submissions), page 10. 25 Submissions of Ms S at hearing of 12 June 2026. -- 14 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 15 74 Ms C advised KJ that it would not be in LJ's best interests to pursue an early diminution of his Estate to reduce his means-tested care fees. Ms C confirmed that LJ's family lawyers shared this view. 75 In March 2026, KJ wrote to Mr G, a senior Legal Officer at the Public Trustee, to: (a) advise she had made repeated requests to Ms C in relation to the interim measures; (b) allege Ms C was unresponsive in relation to KJ's queries about interim measures and had not provided a substantive answer; (c) seek an update from Mr G in relation to her $50,000 gift; and (d) ask Mr G whether any interim measures were available to reduce the ongoing financial impact on LJ's means-tested care fees while the family law matter was not finalised. 76 Mr G responded to say the Public Trustee was aware that SJ was the other side to the family law matter and KJ lives with SJ. Mr G referred to the obvious risk of a conflict of interest and how it was prudent for the Legal Officers to be cautious in their approach to responding to queries received from KJ. 77 In mid-May 2026, KJ advised the Public Trustee she had contacted Services Australia to ask whether they could review LJ's means-tested care fees in light of the ongoing family law matter. 78 In early June 2026, KJ told the Public Trustee that Services Australia requested a summary of the family law matter as part of a review of the means-tested care fees. 79 The Accounts record the Estate as having two liabilities; the financial settlement to SJ of an undetermined amount and $50,000 owing to KJ. KJ's position 80 KJ contends that she was acting in the best interests of the Estate in seeking interim measures. KJ's view is that the Public Trustee is obliged to act in LJ's best interests and one of the ways the Legal Officers can do that is to consider the means-tested care fee and how to minimise it. KJ asserted the delays in receiving a response from -- 15 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 16 Ms C had likely contributed to higher care fees for LJ and no interim arrangements had been identified or implemented. 81 KJ believes it is inevitable that the financial settlement will occur and as it was taking much longer than she anticipated, LJ was paying an 'artificially elevated' means-tested care fee as it was calculated on the value of his 'current pre-settlement asset position'. Conclusion 82 I am satisfied, and I find, that the basis for seeking the interim measures was to accelerate the payments the Public Trustee was authorised to consider, being the financial settlement with SJ and $50,000 to KJ. KJ identified these payments in the Accounts as the only liabilities the Estate was obliged to pay. 83 I am satisfied, and I find, that this is evidence of the conflict of interest, as while there may be a benefit to the Estate of paying lower means-tested care fees, KJ was acting to protect SJ's interest in securing a financial settlement and her own interest in receiving $50,000 from her father. Non-payment of refundable accommodation deposit (RAD) 84 I make the following findings of fact in paragraphs [85] to [91] below in relation to the non-payment of the RAD. 85 LJ was assessed to pay a RAD of $550,000. 86 KJ paid a partial RAD of $30,000. 87 LJ is paying a means-tested care fee of $15,542 per month, which includes a daily accommodation payment (DAP) of $3,336 per month, which is calculated on the unpaid portion of the RAD. The DAP of $3,336 per month will be eliminated once the full RAD is paid. 88 At the April hearing, KJ's solicitor advised that KJ may use part of the proceeds of sale of the Property to pay the RAD. 89 The Accounts, which were filed after the April hearing, demonstrate that on 28 February 2026, LJ held over $700,000 in cash in his bank accounts. 90 The Accounts state that LJ earned approximately $31,000 in interest on his cash in the reporting period of 12 months. LJ would therefore earn approximately $2,580 per month in interest. -- 16 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 17 91 The Accounts did not include the liability of $520,000 owing to the aged care facility by way of the unpaid portion of the RAD. KJ's position 92 KJ gave four reasons why she did not use LJ's cash reserves to pay the RAD. First, LJ was very unwell in late 2025 and she did not think he would live very long. She determined that as he would likely pass away, there was no point in paying the RAD. 93 Second, the interest earned by LJ's cash offset the payment of the DAP. KJ's view was that LJ was more or less 'breaking even' and she was more concerned that he was still paying the means-tested care fee based on his pre-settlement asset position. 94 Third, KJ's strategy in relation to the overall management of the Estate was to look at the 'whole financial picture' once the Property was sold and the financial settlement was paid to SJ. KJ intended to speak to LJ's financial planner and review LJ's full financial position so decisions about investing could be made with a complete and accurate understanding of LJ's assets. KJ's view was that committing a large lump sum by way of a RAD before having that clarity did not seem prudent. 95 Fourth, KJ did not pay the RAD to ensure she could act quickly once the financial settlement was finalised. KJ wanted to ensure that whatever the terms of the financial settlement, she could manage LJ's assets to promptly pay the settlement to SJ. Conclusion 96 I am satisfied, and I find, that an administrator acting in the represented person's best interests would pay the RAD when liquid funds were available to do so. The Estate would have saved around $750 per month, being the difference between the DAP of $3,336 and the interest earned on the cash of approximately $2,580 per month. 97 KJ acknowledged that she had no intention of paying the RAD until after the financial settlement was finalised. So rather than paying the RAD in the best interests of the Estate, KJ preferred SJ's interests by ensuring that liquid funds were available to pay a financial settlement to SJ, which is a conflict of interest. -- 17 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 18 Conclusion in relation to the conflict of interest 98 An administrator is in a fiduciary position with respect to a represented person. This means that the administrator cannot allow their duty to the represented person to be affected by their duty to someone else or by their own personal interests. 99 A conflict of interest does not require dishonesty, theft or fraud. A person can be honest, well-intentioned and acting transparently and still have a conflict of interest. This is because their judgment may be influenced by family relationships, emotional attachments and financial interests. Because these influences can be unconscious, the person may not recognise the effect of the conflict on their decision-making. 100 The conflict of interest in this matter is between KJ's feelings of loyalty and desire for a fair outcome for her mother, and her role as administrator for her father. KJ has not been able to keep separate her interests and those of her mother to exercise the level of independence required to manage the Estate in LJ's best interests. 101 I accept that KJ was acting in good faith and genuinely does not recognise the conflict of interest. KJ believes she is acting in LJ's best interests, but I am satisfied, and I find, that: (a) KJ facilitating the Payment to SJ and asking for the Estate to pay SJ's ongoing legal fees; (b) her repeated requests for the Public Trustee to consider interim measures to reduce the size of the Estate; and (c) not paying the RAD at the expense of the Estate to ensure sufficient cash reserves were available to pay the financial settlement to SJ, is inconsistent with the responsible management by an administrator of a represented person's estate solely in their best interests and evidence of a conflict of interest. 102 While KJ made appropriate concessions in terms of her mistake in paying her mother's legal fees and not paying the RAD, I am satisfied that she is unable to act in LJ's best interests due to the conflict of interest. 103 I will next discuss KJ's suitability to be appointed as LJ's administrator. -- 18 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 19 Suitability to act as administrator 104 When assessing the suitability of a proposed administrator, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the person is able to perform the functions to be vested in the administrator.26 105 I will next address the matters that satisfy me that I am unable to find KJ suitable to be appointed as the administrator as she is unable to perform the functions to be vested in the administrator. Lack of follow up of unexplained transactions 106 I make the following findings of fact in paragraphs [107] to [112] in relation to the transactions on LJ's account in late 2024 and KJ's lack of follow up. 107 LJ was in hospital from November 2024 to January 2025. 108 In December 2025, LJ's bank statements show cash withdrawals of $800 and charges of around $400 incurred at various stores. 109 In April 2026, the Public Trustee sought clarification of these charges from KJ on the basis that such spending was inconsistent with the actions of a hospital inpatient. 110 KJ responded in May 2026 to say the transactions occurred prior to her appointment as administrator, which meant she did not need to investigate them. 111 The Public Trustee asked her, now that the matter has been raised, whether she would investigate those transactions in LJ's best interests. 112 In June 2026, KJ asked the Public Trustee to justify the need for the transactions to be investigated. Conclusion 113 Even though the transactions occurred prior to KJ's appointment as administrator, it is common practice for administrators to investigate events that occurred prior to their appointment. I am satisfied, and I find, that KJ's objection to investigating the transactions on LJ's account demonstrates she is not acting diligently to protect LJ's interests. KJ has not scrutinised the transactions to see if they were 26 GA Act, s 68(3)(c). -- 19 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 20 justifiable, provident or for LJ's benefit. KJ is therefore unable to perform the functions of the administrator. KJ's expenses as guardian 114 KJ provided the document below to the Public Trustee in April 2026 to explain the expenses she incurred and claimed from the Estate totalling $6,208.80: 115 KJ contends she has reimbursed herself for reasonable out-of- pocket expenses necessarily incurred while carrying out her roles of administrator and guardian. KJ relies on the Private Administrator's Guide which states that an administrator is entitled to reimbursement from the estate of any expenses reasonably incurred in carrying out the duties of an administrator, such as telephone expenses, postage or accounts paid on behalf of the represented person.27 116 KJ also relies on s 118 of the GA Act which states: 118. Expenses (1) An administrator may reimburse himself for or pay out of the estate of the represented person all expenses reasonably incurred in or about the performance of his functions. (2) A guardian is entitled to receive from the represented person such expenses as are reasonably incurred in or about the performance of his functions and are allowed by the State Administrative Tribunal, either generally or in any particular case. 27 Private Administrator's Guide, page 20 under the heading of 'What if I spend my own money?'. -- 20 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 21 117 Whether the expenses relating to KJ's role as administrator are allowed is a matter for the Public Trustee, who supervises the conduct of administrators. The Public Trustee is currently reviewing the Accounts and will decide whether expenses are allowed or disallowed, and whether any loss has occurred to the Estate.28 As the Tribunal does not involve itself in the day-to-day administration of a represented person's estate, it is not appropriate that I make any comment in respect of the expenses KJ has claimed in relation to her role as administrator. 118 However, in respect of the expenses relating to KJ's guardianship duties, s 118(2) of the GA Act provides that any expenses claimed by a guardian must be reasonably incurred in or about the performance of the role of the guardian and be allowed by the Tribunal. I will therefore consider the expenses claimed by KJ in the performance of her role as guardian. Consideration of expenses of the guardian 119 The expenses purporting to relate to the functions of a guardian include: (a) from February to April 2025, expenses totalling $450 as follows: (i) 'Relacs appt x 2 parking' $90;29 (ii) 'Residential care inspections - parking' $180; and (iii) 'GP consultation - parking and appt' $180; (b) from April to September 2025, hospital visits and parking totalling $2,548.00, comprising parking twice per week and the cost of driving 22km for each visit; and (c) from October 2025 to February 2026, travel for 'guardian duties' totalling $2,057.00 comprising 110 trips of 22 kilometres each. 120 Subject to KJ providing receipts to the Public Trustee to evidence each expense, I will allow $450 in expenses from February to April 2025 as I am satisfied the expenses directly relate to the duties of a guardian. The parking related to meeting with Relacs and inspecting residential care facilities is related to making a decision in respect of the accommodation function. The costs associated with attending a 28 GA Act, s 80(3). 29 Relacs is the organisation engaged by KJ to find appropriate accommodation for LJ. -- 21 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 22 GP consultation including parking are related to making decisions about LJ's medical treatment. 121 I do not allow the expenses totalling $2,548.00 relating to travel and parking for hospital visits between April and September 2025. It is not necessary for a guardian to visit the represented person in hospital to make decisions about matters under their authority. 122 I do not allow the expenses totalling $2,057.00 relating to travel for 'guardian duties' from October 2025 to February 2026, which was when LJ had moved to residential aged care. It is not necessary for a guardian to visit the represented person 110 times in 5 months, which averages approximately 5.5 visits per week, to make decisions in relation to the functions held by the guardian. KJ's evidence set out in paragraph [40] sets out that tasks she was undertaking for LJ. 123 It is unclear whether the expenses incurred between February and April 2025 identified as 'misc errands - parking' in the amount of $225 and 'car/petrol, misc items food' in the amount of $200 are classified by KJ as relating to guardian duties. In the event KJ asserts they relate to guardian duties, I do not allow these expenses as they are not referable to a function of the guardian. 124 KJ contends that the expenses were incurred in LJ's best interests, as more frequent visits from family will improve his mental health.30 However, s 118 of the GA Act makes it clear that the expenses of a guardian (or administrator) can only be reimbursed if they were reasonably incurred in or about the performance of the functions of the guardian (or administrator). Conclusion in respect of the expenses of the guardian 125 The role of the guardian is to make decisions within the limit of their authority. KJ and SJ are the joint guardians making decisions about LJ's accommodation, services, medical treatment and restrictive practices. By all accounts, KJ and SJ have been making good decisions for LJ in his best interests. 126 Making decisions in relation to those functions does not include attending upon a represented person to manage behavioural issues, buying food to feed the represented person or visiting them frequently to improve their mental health. Those are the actions of caring family members or friends if they are willing and able to do so. 30 Email from Ms S to Ms N dated 8 June 2026. -- 22 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 23 127 KJ proposed the expenditure relating to family traveling to visit LJ could be considered under the gifting provision in the orders.31 Aside from the admission that the visits were not conducted to perform the function of the guardian, the annual gifting authority of $7,000 was exhausted and exceeded in the relevant period when the expenses were incurred. As discussed earlier in these reasons, the Tribunal does not have the power to retrospectively approve such a payment or disposition. 128 The decisions KJ has made about the expenses claimed in the performance of her role as guardian satisfy me, and I find, that she is unable to perform the function of LJ's administrator. She has not scrutinised the expenditure to see if it is justifiable or reasonably incurred in the performance of a function of the guardian and she has not acted to conserve the Estate for LJ's use. 129 To be clear, buying food for LJ or fresh flowers for his room are costs relating directly to his support and enjoyment of life. Anyone purchasing items like this for LJ would expect to be reimbursed by his administrator for those items. 130 However, the cost of petrol consumed and parking paid to bring the items to LJ, or to visit him to improve his mental health, is not a cost that is reimbursable by the Estate without prior authority, because it is not a cost related to the functions of a guardian. This is because the person who is voluntarily choosing to bring the items or visit LJ are voluntarily choosing to incur their costs of transportation, being petrol and parking. KJ's costs incurred in this application 131 KJ engaged a solicitor to represent her at the April and June hearings. KJ contends that as she did not know what the application was about, it was reasonable of her to obtain legal advice and representation. 132 KJ confirmed that she paid $2,000 from the Estate for advice and representation at the April hearing. Her solicitor confirmed at the June hearing that there was around $7,000 in unbilled work in progress on the file, which likely did not include the time spent at the hearing that day. 31 Email from Ms S to Ms N dated 8 June 2026. -- 23 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 24 The law in relation to the payment of legal fees 133 The State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) sets out the starting point in relation to costs in Tribunal proceeding, which is that each party bears their own costs.32 However, the Tribunal has discretion to make an order for the payment by a party of all or any of the costs of another party in a proceeding33 or to be paid from the estate of the represented person.34 134 Section 16(4) of the GA Act provides that the Tribunal can order legal fees be paid from the estate of the represented person if the Tribunal is satisfied the applicant for costs acted in the best interests of the represented person.35 135 It is not difficult for a party to assert they are acting in the represented person's best interests, as most parties are focused on the wellbeing of the person when making an application to the Tribunal. However, 'good intentions' are not sufficient to be awarded costs.36 The Tribunal has a statutory obligation to consider the best interests of the represented person and the discretion under s 16(4) to award costs is not independent from the overarching principle in the SAT Act that each party bears their own costs. 136 Parties of course have a right to legal representation but if they decide to engage a solicitor to act in a GA Act matter, they make that decision on the basis that they are responsible for paying their own legal fees. This is particularly so in this matter as the review was sought by the Public Trustee due to concerns about KJ's conduct as administrator, which have been borne out by the evidence. 137 KJ accepts it is proper that she repay the $2,000 to the Estate and reserved her 'position as to whether [her legal fees incurred in April] should be addressed or adjusted within the family law settlement process'.37 32 SAT Act, s 87(1). 33 SAT Act, s 87(2). 34 GA Act, 16(4). 35 See LC and JS [2007] WASAT 127 at [56] for the matters the Tribunal will consider when determining whether to order costs from the estate of the represented person. 36 GD and AD [2005] WASAT 203 at [69] - [70]. 37 KJ Submissions, page 15. -- 24 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 25 Conclusion in relation to suitability to act as administrator 138 For the reasons set out above, I am unable to find KJ suitable to be appointed as LJ's administrator. KJ has refused to investigate transactions on LJ's bank account while he was in hospital, even when prompted to do so by the Public Trustee. She has misunderstood the role of the guardian and then as administrator, has reimbursed herself for expenses unrelated to her performance of the functions of the guardian. KJ has also used Estate funds to pay her legal fees relating to this proceeding, which is not an allowable use of Estate funds. 139 I am satisfied, and I find, the following additional matters go to KJ's suitability and inability to perform the functions of the administrator: (a) KJ did not seek the authorisation of the Tribunal before making the Payment to BFL in breach of the GA Act; (b) KJ did not discuss the Payment with the Public Trustee, demonstrating she did not understand or appreciate the separate limited administration functions to be performed by herself and the Public Trustee; (c) KJ did not accept that LJ was required by law to pay the means- tested care fee based on the current value of his assets and repeatedly asked the Public Trustee to consider her query, which incurred costs with LJ's family lawyer unnecessarily; (d) KJ did not keep the Public Trustee updated in relation to the sale of the Property. She advised Ms S in July 2025 of her intention to sell and despite all the correspondence with Ms C and Mr G between November 2025 and March 2026, she did not mention the progress of the sale. KJ did not advise the Public Trustee that the listing authority was signed with the real estate agent on 19 March, which was the same day BFL wrote to LJ's family lawyers to advise that the Property would shortly be on the market for sale, confirming that SJ's lawyers had more information about the pending sale of the Property than LJ's lawyers; (e) KJ did not provide the Public Trustee with relevant documents in relation to the sale of the Property, which must be disclosed to SJ's family lawyers, and it was necessary for Ms N to request those documents on 29 April 2026; and -- 25 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 26 (f) KJ's ambiguous reference to her legal fees incurred in these proceedings being addressed in the family law matter between her parents indicates a general lack of understanding of the separation of the legal matters. 140 As I am unable to appoint KJ as the administrator, the only option open to the Tribunal is to appoint the Public Trustee. What functions does the administrator need? 141 I am satisfied the administration order should confer plenary functions on the Public Trustee to manage all aspects of LJ's Estate in his best interests. 142 I will set the gifting authority at $7,000 per annum, which is the same as in the order under review made in February 2025. At that time, KJ and SJ gave evidence that LJ may spend up to $1,500 per year on birthday and Christmas presents. SJ gave evidence that LJ would also assist her financially by providing her with an average of around $100 per week. I set the gifting authority as $7,000 to cover both forms of gifting. 143 I will include an authority so that the Trust Manager of LJ's Estate can inspect and access the documents held by the PAS Team in respect of the Estate. I will also include the direction to consider the gift of $50,000 to KJ. How long should the order run before review? 144 The Tribunal is required to fix a period for the review of the order, the maximum period of time allowed being 5 years. The medical evidence is clear that LJ has a cognitive impairment and may have an underlying neurocognitive disorder, so I am satisfied that LJ's need for a substitute decision-maker is ongoing. Further, the issues that currently preclude KJ's appointment are unlikely to resolve, even when the financial settlement with SJ is finalised. 145 I am satisfied it is appropriate to review the order in the maximum term possible. The administration order will be reviewed before 7 April 2031 which is the date for the review of the guardianship order. Orders The Tribunal makes the following orders: -- 26 of 27 -- [2026] WASAT 73 Page 27 1. The Tribunal declares that the represented person [LJ] is: (a) unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all of his estate; and (b) in need of an administrator of his estate. Administration 2. The administration order of 27 February 2025 is revoked and substituted with the order below. 3. The Public Trustee of 553 Hay Street, Perth, Western Australia is appointed plenary administrator of the represented person's estate with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA). 4. The administrator is authorised to expend up to a total amount of $7,000 per annum on gifts on behalf of the represented person. 5. Pursuant to s 73(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the Public Trustee as plenary administrator is authorised to inspect and otherwise have access to any documents (including accounts submitted under s 80 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA)) held by the Private Administrator Support division of the Public Trustee. 6. The administrator is directed to consider the gift of $50,000 to [KJ]. 7. The administration order is to be reviewed by 7 April 2031. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. MS R BUNNEY, MEMBER 25 JUNE 2026 -- 27 of 27 --