CHEEMA and SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2025] WASAT 126 (S)
[2025] WASAT 126 (S)
Page 1
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT : ASSOCIATIONS INCORPORATIONS ACT 2015
(WA)
CITATION : CHEEMA and SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN
AUSTRALIA [2025] WASAT 126 (S)
MEMBER : MR E CADE, MEMBER
HEARD : 24 FEBRUARY 2026
DELIVERED : 22 MAY 2026
FILE NO/S : CC 137 of 2025
BETWEEN : JASKIRAN KAUR CHEEMA
First Applicant
RAJINDER SINGH BASSI
Second Applicant
PUSHPINDER SINGH
Third Applicant
RANI KAUR SAMRA
Fourth Applicant
BALJIT KAUR SIDHU
Fifth Applicant
DALJIT SINGH DHILLON
Sixth Applicant
PARAMJIT KAUR TUR
Seventh Applicant
ROWINDERJEET KAUR
Eighth Applicant
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AND
SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S : CC 138 of 2025
BETWEEN : BALDEV SINGH BAGGA
First Applicant
LAKHBIR SINGH SIDHU
Second Applicant
DIDAR SINGH CHEEMA
Third Applicant
AMRITPAL SINGH
Fourth Applicant
AND
SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S : CC 139 of 2025
BETWEEN : DEVRAJ SINGH
Applicant
AND
SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
FILE NO/S : CC 154 of 2025
BETWEEN : AMARJIT SINGH PABLA
Applicant
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AND
SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
(INC)
Respondent
Catchwords:
Application for costs - Whether appropriate to award costs - Respondents to pay
a portion of costs claimed
Legislation:
Associations Incorporation Act 2015 (WA),
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 87, s 87(1)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 42A
Result:
Order for costs in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025
No order for costs in CC 154 of 2025
Representation:
CC 137 of 2025
Counsel:
First Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Second Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Third Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Fourth Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Fifth Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Sixth Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Seventh Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Eighth Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Respondent : Mr A Sidhu
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Solicitors:
First Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Second Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Third Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Fourth Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Fifth Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Sixth Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Seventh Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Eighth Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Respondent : Rekhraj Legal
CC 138 of 2025
Counsel:
First Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Second Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Third Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Fourth Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Respondent : Mr A Sidhu
Solicitors:
First Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Second Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Third Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Fourth Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Respondent : Rekhraj Legal
CC 139 of 2025
Counsel:
Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Respondent : Mr A Sidhu
Solicitors:
Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Respondent : Rekhraj Legal
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CC 154 of 2025
Counsel:
Applicant : Mr PG McGowan
Respondent : Mr A Sidhu
Solicitors:
Applicant : Equitas Lawyers
Respondent : Rekhraj Legal
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Bejawn v The Sikh Association of Western Australia Inc [2023] WASC 152
Chiropractic Board of Australia and Ebtash [2020] WASAT 86 (S)
Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa [2020] WASAT 167
Medical Board of Australia and Tan [2022] WASAT 57 (S)
Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58
Sivanpathakumar and The Management Council of Saiva Maha Sabai Of WA
INC [2022] WASAT 96 (S)
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REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
1 The applicants in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025, CC 139 of 2025
and CC 154 of 2025 (Applicants) by way of an application for costs
under s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT
Act) seek a costs order in their favour for the costs incurred by them in
the substantive proceedings in this Tribunal. The Applicants seeks their
legal costs in the amount of $98,542.32. The Respondent opposes the
application.
2 The decision and reasons for decision in the substantive
proceedings are set out in Cheema and Sikh Association of Western
Australia [2025] WASAT 126 (Cheema). By way of background, the
substantive proceedings were before the Tribunal within its original
jurisdiction under s 182(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act 2015
(WA) (AI Act) for orders against the Respondent relating to the
expulsion of the Applicants from membership of the Respondent.
3 Applications CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025, CC 139 of 2025 and
CC 154 of 2025 (the applications) were heard together before me
as a final hearing over 5 days between 5 and 12 August 2025.
4 The decisions I made in Cheema can be summarised as follows:
1. Each of the Applicants was, in substance, granted the relief they
had sought in their respective application: Cheema [4], [98],
[135], [172] and [197];
2. Each of the Applicants was mostly successful with respect to the
grounds raised by them that they were not properly expelled from
the Respondent in accordance with the rules of the Respondent:
Cheema [1] - [3], [23], [97], [103], [134], [140], [171], [176] and
[196]; and
3. None of the Applicants was in any way successful with respect
to the grounds raised by them that I should determine the merits
of the grounds given by the Respondent for their expulsion from
the Respondent or that I should inquire into whether members
of the EXCO were motivated to pursue the expulsion of the
Applicants for improper reasons: Cheema [21], [23] and [39].
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Principles relevant to the determination of a costs application
5 The starting point for the consideration of costs is s 87(1) of the
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), which is that
'[u]nless otherwise specified in [the SAT Act], the enabling Act [which
is the AI Act], or an order of the Tribunal under [s 87 of the SAT Act],
parties bear their own costs in a proceeding of the Tribunal'.
6 There is nothing in the Associations Incorporation Act 2015 (WA)
(AI Act) which precludes the Tribunal from making a costs order under
s 87 of the SAT Act.
7 An application for costs must, however, be made within 21 days of
the orders to which the application relates being made by the Tribunal:
r 42A State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA) (Rules). In this
case, the orders to which the costs applications relate were made on
11 November 2025 and the costs applications were lodged with the
Tribunal on 26 November 2025. The costs applications are therefore
within the time allowed under the Rules.
8 This Tribunal (constituted by President Justice Pritchard, (as she
then was) Senior Member, Ms P Le Miere and Senior Sessional Member,
Dr P Winterton) said in Medical Board of Australia and Tan [2022]
WASAT 57 (S) (Tan) the principles in relation to awards of costs under
s 87(2) of the SAT Act are 'well established' [126]. These principles,
as set out in Tan, are:
127 The starting point in relation to any application for costs in the
Tribunal is that, subject to any contrary provision in an enabling
Act, the parties to proceedings bear their own costs unless the
Tribunal orders otherwise. However, the Tribunal has a
discretion to order a party to pay all or any of the costs of another
party.
128 The legal rationale for an order for costs under s 87(2) is that an
order for costs is not to punish the person against whom the order
is made, but to compensate or reimburse the person in whose
favour it is made. Accordingly, even in the statutory context
where the presumptive position is that no costs will be ordered,
generally speaking, the question is whether, in the particular
circumstances of the case, it is fair and reasonable that a party
should be reimbursed for the costs it incurred. The onus is on the
party seeking an order in its favour.
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129 The Tribunal's discretion in relation to the award of costs is a wide
one. Nevertheless, it is exercised judiciously and not
capriciously.
…
135 In assessing costs, the Tribunal takes a 'robust and broad-brush
approach' and bases its determination on what reasonable
allowance should be made for the work necessarily done to bring
the proceedings to a conclusion.
136 An assessment of costs should be approached in a broad fashion
and should not descend into an inquiry into small items of
expenditure.
137 Although the assessment of costs involves a relatively broad and
robust approach, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the costs
claimed are reasonable and necessary. The Tribunal must also be
satisfied that the costs claimed are not excessive. Any costs
awarded must be compensatory and not punitive in nature.
138 Furthermore, the Tribunal must explain why an award of costs is
reasonable, and if so, in what amount.
(footnotes omitted)
9 This Tribunal will apply these principles when determining this
costs application.
10 As the Tribunal (differently constituted) observed in
Sivanpathakumar and The Management Council of Saiva Maha Sabai
Of WA INC [2022] WASAT 96 (S) (Sivanpathakumar (S)) at
[18] - [20]:
18. It is also important to reiterate that an award of costs made by the
Tribunal is not intended to be a full indemnity or reimbursement
for the actual expenses incurred by a party to proceedings in the
Tribunal.
19. A party seeking costs in the Tribunal must ensure that
'the Tribunal is appropriately informed as to the work done and
time taken as it claimed for and the rates which are said to apply
to that work.'
20. There is no prescribed scale of party/party costs in relation to
Tribunal proceedings. However, where the Tribunal makes an
order for costs and fixes or assesses the amount of costs,
the Tribunal will have regard to the hourly rates set out in the
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applicable costs determinations made by the Legal Costs
Committee.
(footnotes omitted)
11 Finally, with particular relevance to this costs application, the
Tribunal in Sivanpathakumar (S) also said:
26. It is important to note that Parliament has conferred jurisdiction
on a forum where the presumptive position is that each party
bears its own costs.
27 However, it is also equally important to note that Parliament
intended that the Tribunal be an option of last resort for the
determination of such disputes. This is because the Tribunal
cannot determine a dispute for the purposes of s 182(1) of the AI
Act unless the dispute cannot be resolved under the dispute
resolution procedure of the incorporated association.
Accordingly, if a party to a dispute jumps the gun and applies to
the Tribunal before engaging in, or exhausting, the dispute
resolution procedure of the incorporated association, then that
party may be at risk of having a costs order made against them.
(footnotes omitted)
Issues
12 The issues to be determined by me in this costs application are:
(a) whether I should exercise my discretion to make an order for
costs to the Applicants; and
(b) if so, the amount of those costs.
The position of the parties
13 The Applicants rely on the following grounds in support of their
costs applications:
1. My findings were made on the basis of matters conceded by
the Respondent, which shows that the Respondent's opposition to
the applications was groundless and indefensible; and
2. The Respondent knew or should have known that by admitting
new members to the Respondent and bringing the number of
members to the maximum permitted under its rules that it had
placed itself in a position where it could not comply with its
obligation under rule 22.3 to mediation in good faith with the
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Applicants, which shows the Respondent wilfully disregarded
the substantial demerits of its own position.
14 The consequence of this, the Applicant says, is that the Respondent
frustrated the statutory purpose of the Tribunal so as justify an order for
costs in favour of the Applicants.
15 The Respondent opposes the Applicants' application for costs on the
basis that as its participation in the proceedings was reasonable such that
no costs order should be made in the Applicants' favour.
16 In the alternative, the Respondent says that if I do make a costs order
in favour of the Applicants that the costs claimed are excessive, and
should be reduced at least to the extent that they are claiming costs for
arguing that I should determine the merits of the grounds given by the
Respondent for their expulsion from the Respondent or that I should
inquire into whether members of the EXCO were motivated to pursue
the expulsion of the Applicants for improper reasons.
Should I exercise my discretion to make an order for costs to the
Applicants
17 I said in Cheema at [38] the issues I need to determine are:
1. Does the Constitution require a show-cause notice to allege a
contravention by the member of the Constitution and if so, did the
notice allege a contravention by the member of the Constitution?
2. Was the expulsion notice given to the member given within the
time required under the Constitution and if it was not given within
the time required, whether the expulsion notice is invalid?
3. Were the Trustees permitted to postpone the holding of
mediations in accordance with the request made by the applicants'
solicitor's on 28 June 2024 and, if so, when should they have
recommenced scheduling mediations?
4. Were the mediations held by the Trustees after the Applicants had
commenced proceedings in the Tribunal valid mediations under
r 8.2.(g) and r 22?
5. If at the date of a mediation held by the Trustees under r 8.2(g)
and r 22 the number of members of the Association was
the maximum number of members permitted under the rules,
was the EXCO participating in good faith to settle the matter that
is the subject of the mediation?
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6. Were the outcomes of the mediations held by the Trustees
outcomes which resolved the disputes between the applicants and
SAWA?
18 I determined issue 2 for each of the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025,
CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 on the basis of a chronology which
was not in substantial dispute, although this is not to say that the parties
were in total agreement about each item in the chronology. There were,
in fact, some important differences between the Applicants and the
Respondent, for example, as to whether the EXCO was required to
consider and vote on a resolution on the expulsion of a member from
the Respondent at a single meeting or whether it could do this over two
separate meetings: Cheema [37], [38], [52] - [66], [117] - [125], [154]
- [162] and [194] - [195].
19 However, it is clear that even on the chronology contended by the
Respondent that the expulsion notice given to each of the Applicants in
CC 137 of 2022 was not given to them 'within 7 days after' the meeting
at which the decision is made, as required by r 8.2(f), but rather was given
to them within eight days after the relevant meeting: Cheema [52] - [66].
While the Respondent did argue that these expulsion notices were given
within time because the calculation of time (days) for the purpose of
r 8.2(f) should be understood to mean 'workings days' or 'business' days
and so exclude Saturday and Sunday, it did not support its argument with
any authorities or any consideration of the meaning of the word 'day'
within the context of the rules of the Respondent.
20 Ultimately, I did not accept the Respondent's arguments on this
point and I found that the word 'day' should carry its ordinary legal
meaning which is a period of 24 hours calculated from midnight to
midnight, and that it therefore did include Saturday and Sunday. My
construction of the word 'day' was not a complex task and it should have
been apparent to any lay person who considered the matter.
21 In my opinion the Respondent was aware, through the Applicants
correspondence to the Association before any of the proceedings were
commenced and then later through the Applicant's written submissions
lodged prior to the final hearing, that each of the expulsion notices it gave
to the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of
2025 were given outside of the time required by r 8.2(f) and that as
a consequence was invalid. This in itself would have been determinative
of each of the applications except for the applicant in CC 154 of 25.
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22 Had the Respondent acted reasonably it would have accepted well
before the final hearing that it had stumbled at the very first step in the
process it used to expel the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of
2025 and CC 139 of 2025. Indeed, in my view the Respondent should
have accepted that its process was flawed and it should have rescinded
the expulsions of these Applicants well before any of them even
commenced a proceeding in this Tribunal.
23 By not accepting its expulsion of the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025,
CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 were invalid the Respondent was
acting contrary to its Constitution. By requiring these Applicants to then
assert their rights at a contested final hearing after this had been clearly
pointed out to them by the Applicants the Respondent was also acting
contrary to the main objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of the
SAT Act.
24 I determined issue 5 for each of the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025,
CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 on the basis of a fact which was
conceded by the Respondent, which was that with the admission on
8 June 2024 of 50 new members the Respondent had reached the
maximum number of members (500) permitted under r 7.1(b).
The significance of this fact was, however, disputed by the parties.
25 Ultimately, I found that the decision of the Respondent to admit the
new members on 8 June 2024, made only shortly after it had purported
to expel each of the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and
CC 139 of 2025, was a decision which meant that the Respondent could
not mediate with the Applicants in 'good faith' as it was required to do
under r 22.3(a). This was because I found that as a result of the admission
of the new members no outcome from the mediation could result in
the Respondent agreeing to restore the Applicants as members of the
Respondent: Cheema [84] - [95].
26 In my opinion, the Respondent was aware through the written
submissions lodged by the Applicants prior to the final hearing that it
could not mediate in good faith with the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025,
CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 as it was required to do under its
own Constitution. Again, this finding alone would have been
determinative of each of the applications. For this reason, by opposing
the applications through to a final hearing and so requiring the Applicants
to argue their position at a final hearing, the Respondent was
acting contrary to the requirements of its own constitution as well as
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acting contrary to the main objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of
the SAT Act.1
27 The remainder of the issues to be determined by me were not
resolved with the assistance of an agreed chronology or on facts
conceded by the Respondent. Accordingly, I do not accept with respect
to these remaining issues that the Respondent was acting contrary to the
requirements of its own constitution as well as acting contrary to the main
objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act.
28 However, in my opinion my reasons for determining issues 2 and 5
each separately justifies me making an award to the Applicants in
CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025. I am particularly
mindful that the Applicants did not rush into making applications with
this Tribunal but engaged in lengthy correspondence with the
Respondent over many months during which the strength of their
positions was fully revealed.
29 However, none of these reasons for making a costs order applies to
the Applicant in CC 154 of 2025.
30 I will therefore make an order for costs in favour of the Applicants
in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 but I will decline
to make an order for costs in favour of the Applicant in CC 154 of 2025.
What amount of costs should I award the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025,
CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025?
31 The Applicants have sought orders for the costs of the applications
fixed (collectively) in the amount $98,542.32. However, as I said above,
I have declined to make an award for costs in favour of the Applicant in
CC 154 of 2025. I therefore need to consider whether there should be an
adjustment of the costs sought by the Applicants to reflect my decision
that no costs are to be awarded to the Applicant in CC 154 of 2025.
32 The Applicant in CC 154 of 2025 was one of fourteen Applicants.
However, the cases of the Applicants were not all of the same degree of
legal or factual complexity. The Applicant in CC 154 of 2025 had the
least complex case of any of the Applicants. The only novel feature of
this application was in its facts, which were relatively few in number.
1 See CC 138 of 2025 (Cheema [130] - [131]), CC 139 of 2025 (Cheema [167] - [168]) and CC 154
of 2025 (Cheema [178]).
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33 In my view the novel factual features of the application in CC 154
of 2025 contributed to only a very small part of the costs of the
Applicants in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025.
I am satisfied that any order for costs made to these Applicants should
be reduced by not allowing those items expressly identified in the
Applicants' bill of costs relating to CC 154 of 25. These are: item 2 $471,
item 4 $968, item 8 $984 and item 9 $518 for a total of $2,941. There are
also some items such as preparing witness statements, mastering the brief
and conferral and correspondence which I accept are not possible to
disaggregate with any precision and yet which do include work in
CC 154 of 25. In my view it would be proper to reduce the Applicant's
bill of costs by $2,000 to reflect the small contribution of work done in
those items for CC 154 of 25. This brings the total reduction for CC 154
of 25 to $4,941. After this deduction the claim for costs is reduced to
$95,601.32 which I will round down to $95,000.
34 The Respondent also contends that any costs order made in favour
of the Applicants should be reduced at least to the extent that they are
claiming costs for arguing that I should determine the merits of
the grounds given by the Respondent for their expulsion from the
Respondent or that I should inquire into whether members of the EXCO
were motivated to pursue the expulsion of the Applicants for improper
reasons. The Respondent contends that the Applicants costs should be
reduced by 40% to 'reflect partial success and unnecessary enlargement
of proceedings'.
35 The Respondent says that allegations made by the Applicants
particularly as to the motivations of certain members of the EXCO were
of such a serious nature that the reputations of those EXCO members
were at stake, which made it reasonable that it oppose the applications.
36 The Applicants contend that if I decide to reduce its order for
costs in favour of the Applicants for this reason that it should reduce the
costs sought by no more than 10% to 15%.
37 I accept the Respondent's contentions that due to the nature of the
allegations made by the Applicants in CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025
and CC 139 of 2025 as to the merits of the grounds given by the
Respondent for their expulsion and as to whether members of the EXCO
were motivated to pursue the expulsion of the Applicants for improper
reasons that it was reasonable for the Respondent to oppose those
allegations.
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38 I note I raised this issue with the Applicants at the commencement
of the final hearing but despite this the Applicants proceeded to rely in
their cases on these matters. By doing this the Applicants in CC 137 of
2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 substantially and
unreasonably prolonged the hearing. To that extent, I find the Applicants
were also acting contrary to the main objectives of the Tribunal as set out
in s 9 of the SAT Act.
39 I have reviewed the hearing books for each of the applications.
For example, the hearing book in CC 137 of 2025 comprised about 1,600
pages. In general terms, the documents within this book can be described
as:
• Documents relevant to each Applicants expulsion: pages 1 - to
241;
• Applicants SFIC pages 243 to 300;
• Further documents pages 301 to 832;
• Witness statement for each Applicant pages 833 to 1218;
• Respondent's SFIC pages 1238 to 1251;
• Documents pages 1252 to 1423; and
• Witness statements pages 1423 to 1453.
40 The Applicants further documents in pages 301 to 832 includes
minutes dating back to 2022, a copy of Bejawn v The Sikh Association
of Western Australia Inc [2023] WASC 152, a transcript of a costs
hearing in the Supreme Court, a Bill of Costs in that same Supreme Court
proceedings, a petition to call a special general meeting as well as other
documents relating to the circumstances of the expulsion of the
Applicants.
41 The witness statements of each of the Applicants properly deals
with both the process of the expulsion of the Applicants as well as
matters relating the merits of the grounds given by the Respondent for
their purported expulsion and material as to the alleged motivations
behind certain members of the EXCO.
42 The witness statements and documents lodged by the Respondents
deal with both the process of the purported expulsion of the Applicants
as well as responding to the allegations made by the Applicants as to the
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merits of the grounds given by the Respondent for their purported
expulsion. These are matters which are both factually and legally
complex.
43 In my opinion, a little above one third of the totality of
the documents lodged by both parties deals in CC 137 of 2025 deals with
the merits of the grounds given by the Respondent for their purported
expulsion as well as the alleged motivations behind certain members
of the EXCO. A considerable part of the cross examination by counsel
for the Applicants of the Respondent's witnesses was also spent on these
factually and legally complex matters. The situation on this point is
similar with respect to the Applicants in CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of
2025. As a matter of impression a little above one third of the time in
the hearing was spent on such matters.
44 Taking a 'broad brush' approach to this matter, I am satisfied that a
little more than a third of the Applicants costs in CC 137 of 2025, in
CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025 were due to the Applicants pursuing
matters over which the Tribunal had no jurisdiction and in doing so were
acting contrary to the main objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of
the SAT Act.
45 For this reason, I am satisfied the remaining costs claimed by the
Applicants in CC 137 of 2025, in CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025
should be reduced by a little over about one third. Without any pretence
at mathematical precision and taking a 'broad brush' approach it is in my
view just and proper to reduce the Applicants' claimed costs by 40%.
This then reduces the Applicants claim for their costs to $57,000.
46 The allowed amount of costs must, though, be reasonable and not
excessive in nature. After reviewing this amount I am satisfied that
whilst it is large it relates to thirteen separate applications which were
strongly contested by the Respondent through to the conclusion of a final
hearing. I am also satisfied the applicant has also claimed only for those
tasks necessary for the conduct of the hearing and has claimed only
the minimum of time in which the tasks could have been completed.
On the other hand, it is also important to reiterate that an award of costs
made by the Tribunal is not intended to be a full indemnity or
reimbursement for the actual expenses incurred by a party to proceedings
in the Tribunal. Given this I am satisfied it is fair and reasonable to
require the Respondent to contribute $55,000 (inclusive of GST) toward
the Applicants costs.
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47 However, this is not the end of the matter as I must next consider
whether I am satisfied the Applicants' have in fact incurred the legal costs
they claim. Past decisions of the Tribunal are replete with observations
to this effect. For example, in Chiropractic Board of Australia and
Ebtash [2020] WASAT 86 (S) the Tribunal (constituted by President
Justice Pritchard, (as she then was), Senior Member Le Miere and Senior
Sessional Member Carlin) said:
143 The relevance to the Tribunal in relation to what the Board has
paid in legal fees is to provide evidence to us that what is being
sought by way of a costs order by the Board is a recovery of fees
that have been incurred by the Board. It is trite law that a party
may not recover in a costs order more costs than it has actually
incurred.
144 In respect of disbursements, we must know what disbursements
have been incurred - a disbursement is unlikely to be allowed
without an appropriate invoice being produced.
48 It has also been observed that it might be proper for me to require
a party claiming its legal costs to provide the Tribunal with an affidavit
attaching the tax invoices as charged or with a short form bill of costs:
Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58 at [415].
49 The Applicants did provide a short form bill of costs with reference
to the appropriate scales, with tax invoices and with invoices for
disbursements. On the basis of these documents, I am satisfied the
Applicants have incurred the costs they have claimed.
Ancillary orders
50 In addition to an order for their costs the Applicants seek an order
under s 73 of the SAT Act that would prevent the Respondent from
demanding that the Applicants pay to the Respondent any amount of
costs that are awarded in their favour, and which would also prevent the
Respondent from demanding that the Applicants pay the Respondent's
legal costs in these applications. The Applicants provided me with no
authorities in support of its contention I could make the ancillary orders
sought.
51 In considering whether to make the ancillary orders sought I have
looked to the words of s 73(1) of the SAT Act which gives to the Tribunal
the power to make 'any ancillary order or direction the tribunal considers
appropriate for achieving the purpose for which it may exercise the
primary power.'
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[2025] WASAT 126 (S)
Page 18
52 I have also taken into consideration that counsel for the Respondent
at the costs hearing conceded that the Respondent has at a general
meeting passed a resolution requiring members to pay to the Respondent
costs that are awarded in their favour, and it has also passed a resolution
requiring members to pay the Respondent's legal costs.
53 The Applicant's request for such ancillary orders is therefore based
in the past actions of the Respondent.
54 However, even so, I am not persuaded I should make ancillary
orders in this costs application. This is for the following reasons:
55 First, I doubt the power given to the Tribunal by s 73(1) of the SAT
Act 'for achieving the purpose for which it may exercise the primary
power' permits it to go beyond facilitating compliance with its order:
Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa [2020] WASAT
167 per Pritchard J at [28] - [32].
56 Second, there is no degree of certainty or even likelihood that such
a resolution would ever be proposed or that the Respondent would in fact
pass such a resolution.
57 Third, it is not clear to me that the Respondent has the power to pass
such a resolution, with the consequence that if it does the Applicants will
then have a remedy independent of any ancillary order I make.
58 Fourth, as it is not clear to me that the Respondent has the power
to pass such a resolution, I am not satisfied I should make an order
preventing the Respondent from doing what it might be improper for it
to do.
Orders
CC 137 of 2025, C 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of 2025
The Tribunal orders:
1. Pursuant to s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004
(WA), the Respondent shall pay the Applicants' costs in
applications CC 137 of 2025, CC 138 of 2025 and CC 139 of
2025 fixed at $55,000 (including GST).
2. The Applicants' application for costs is otherwise dismissed.
3. The Applicants' application for ancillary orders is dismissed.
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[2025] WASAT 126 (S)
Page 19
CC 154 of 2025
The Tribunal orders:
1. The Applicant's application for costs is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of
the State Administrative Tribunal.
MR E Cade, MEMBER
22 MAY 2026
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