AMOUR and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] WASAT 58

[2026] WASAT 58 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : FIREARMS ACT 2024 (WA) CITATION : AMOUR and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] WASAT 58 MEMBER : MR E CADE, MEMBER HEARD : 12 JANUARY 2026 DELIVERED : 19 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : CC 504 of 2025 BETWEEN : CHRISTOPHER ROBERT AMOUR Applicant AND COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Respondent Catchwords: Firearms Act 2024 (WA) - Whether a finding of guilt for an offence of criminal damage under s 444(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (WA) dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction is a disqualifying offence Legislation: Constitution Act 1889 (WA), s 2 Criminal Code (WA), s 74, s 378, s 444, s 444(1)(b) Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), s 3(1), s 128(1), s 128(1)(a), Div 2 Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 11, s 11(1), s 11(2), s 11(3), s 11(3)(a), s 11(3)(a)(i), s 11(3)(a)(ii), s 11(3)(a)(iii), s 11(3)(a)(iv), s 11(5) Firearms Act 2024 (WA), s 4(1), s 4(1)(b), s 4(2), s 4(3), s 5, s 5(a), s 5(b), s 5(c), s 5(d), s 5(e), s 5(f), s 5(1)(a), s 9, s 9(1), s 9(1)(d), s 11(3), s 11(3)(b), s 11(6), s 146, s 147, s 192(1), s 192(1)(c), s 335, s 427(a), s 427(b), s 427(d), -- 1 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 2 Pt 16 Firearms Bill 2024 (WA) Firearms Regulations 2024 (WA), reg 4, reg 5(3), reg 5(2)(b), reg 5(6) Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 4(1), s 78(1)(a), s 80, s 80(1) Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA), cl 2(5) Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA), s 3(1) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29 Result: Respondent's decision affirmed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : Mr C Porter and Mr T Andrews Respondent : Ms R Panetta and Mr C Burke Solicitors: Applicant : Andrews Legal Respondent : State Solicitor's Office Case(s) referred to in decision(s): APP and Commissioner of Police [2026] WASAT 19 Cohen v Curchin [2008] WASC 8 Fox v Beringer [2011] WASC 38 Glass v Ralph [1966] WAR 91 Johnson v Staskos [2015] WASCA 32 Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 Narrier v Director Public Prosecutions (WA) [2025] WASCA 51 O'Connell v Welsh [2005] WASCA 11 Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Valuer-General (2007) 154 LGERA 437 -- 2 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 3 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Background 1 On 25 February 2021, the applicant was granted a licence under the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (1973 Act) to possess, carry and use a bolt action repeater rifle. On various dates in 2021, 2022 and 2023 the applicant was granted licences under the 1973 Act to possess, carry and use three other firearms. 2 On 24 February 2024, the applicant was charged with one count of criminal damage under s 441(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (WA) (criminal damage charge). 3 On 24 October 2024, the Perth Magistrates Court convicted the applicant on his plea of guilty to the criminal damage charge, imposed a fine of $750 and made a spent conviction order (the criminal damage offence).1 The factual background to the criminal damage offence involved damage caused by the applicant to a vehicle which was 'illegally' parked on the applicant's private parking space at his apartment building.2 It is not in dispute the offence did not involve damage by fire, it was not committed in any circumstance of aggravation and the amount of injury done did not exceed $50,000. 4 The respondent did not consider the applicant's conviction for the criminal damage offence disqualified the applicant from a holding a firearm licence under the 1973 Act. 5 On 31 March 2025, the Firearms Act 2024 (WA) (2024 Act) commenced and the 1973 Act was repealed. 6 On the commencement of the 2024 Act a person who held a firearm licence or licences under the 1973 Act immediately before 31 March 2025 was from that date taken to hold a firearm authority under the 2024 Act. The applicant was such a person and his firearm authority was given the number 10028704. 7 On 20 May 2025, the respondent issued the applicant with a notice of mandatory cancellation of his firearm authority pursuant to s 192(1)(c) of the 2024 Act on the ground the applicant is, for a period of 10 years commencing 24 October 2024, a disqualified person within the meaning 1 Respondent's SIFC, para 7; Exhibit 1, page 29. 2 Respondent's SIFC, para 6, Exhibit 1, page 29. This is the extent of my knowledge about the criminal damage offence as I have not been provided with the statement of material facts or the learned magistrate's sentencing remarks. -- 3 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 4 of s 9(1)(d) of the 2024 Act 'as a result of … a disqualifying offence for which a finding of guilt has been made against you'.3 8 The notice went on to tell the applicant '… pursuant to section 192(1)(c) of the [2024] Act … the Commissioner must cancel your firearm authority.' The notice then required the applicant to lawfully dispose of his four firearms and ammunition within one month. 9 On 27 June 2025, the applicant sought reconsideration by the respondent of its decision made on 20 May 2025. On 3 July 2025, the respondent informed the applicant the decision made on 20 May 2025 would stand.4 10 On 24 July 2025, the applicant applied to the Tribunal pursuant to s 335 of the 2024 Act for review of the decision of the respondent made on 3 July 2025. On 12 January 2026, I heard the application for review. 11 In dealing with a matter upon review my functions and discretions correspond with those exercisable by the decision-maker, in this case the respondent, in making the reviewable decision: State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), s 29. 12 Under s 27 of the SAT Act: (a) The review is to be by way of a hearing de novo and it is not confined to matters that were before the decision-maker; (b) The reasons for decision provided by the decision-maker or any grounds for review set out in the application do not limit the Tribunal in conducting the review; and (c) The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time the decision was made. 13 Under s 192(1)(c) of the 2024 Act, if I am satisfied the applicant is a disqualified person I must affirm the decision of the respondent to cancel the applicant's firearm authority. Conversely, if I am not satisfied the applicant is a disqualified person I must, in the circumstances of this review, set aside the decision of the respondent. 3 Notice of delegate of the Commissioner of Police to the applicant dated 20 May 2024, Exhibit 1, pages 60 - 61. 4 Email of Sergeant Butterfield dated 3 July 2025; Exhibit 1, page 65. -- 4 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 5 Overview of the review 14 Without regard to technicalities, which will be discussed later in these reasons, for the purpose of this review a disqualified person under the 2024 Act is a person found guilty of a disqualifying offence.5 A disqualifying offence under the 2024 Act is defined to be a serious offence as defined in s 128(1) of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) (CI Act) Act.6 Relevantly for this review, s 128(1)(a) defines a serious offence to be an offence for which the statutory penalty is imprisonment for 5 years or more or life. 15 The applicant will therefore be a disqualified person only if the statutory penalty for the criminal damage offence is imprisonment for 5 years or more or life. 16 The summary conviction penalty for the criminal damage offence is imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $36,000 while the penalty on indictment is imprisonment for 10 years (unless committed in circumstances of aggravation or racial aggravation in which case it is imprisonment for 14 years). 17 The real question in this review is, therefore, whether on proper construction the statutory penalty for the criminal damage offence is the summary conviction penalty or whether it is the penalty on indictment. 18 The applicant contends that on proper construction the statutory penalty for the criminal damage offence is the summary conviction penalty. The respondent disputes this and contends that it is the penalty on indictment. The 2024 Act 19 The 2024 Act was passed by Parliament and received Royal Assent on 27 June 2024. Part 1 came into effect on the day the 2024 Act received Royal Assent, and the transitional provisions contained in Pt 16 commenced on the following day. The remainder of the 2024 Act commenced on 'commencement day', 31 March 2025. The 1973 Act was repealed by the 2024 Act with effect from commencement day. 20 The principles of the 2024 Act are set out in s 4(1): 5 2024 Act, s 9(1)(d). 6 2024 Act, s 5. -- 5 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 6 (a) there is an overriding need to ensure public safety in connection with the possession and use of firearms in the community; (b) the possession and use of firearms is a privilege that is always conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety; (c) public safety can be ensured by strict controls to secure the safe and responsible possession and use of firearms in the community. 21 The objects of the 2024 Act are set out in s 4(2): (a) to improve public safety by ensuring the safe and responsible possession and use of firearms; (b) to specify the purposes for which a person can be authorised to possess or use a firearm; (c) to minimise the risk of persons becoming victims of crimes that involve the use of firearms; (d) to prevent persons from having access to firearms for criminal purposes; (e) to prevent access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour; (f) to prevent access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of misuse of firearms; (g) to minimise the risk of persons causing harm, including psychological harm, to themselves or others by the misuse of firearms; (h) to reduce the number of firearms unlawfully possessed in the community; (i) to facilitate a nationally consistent approach to the control of firearms. 22 Section 4(3) of the 2024 Act says: Persons performing functions in or in connection with the administration of this Act (including when constituting, or as a member of, a court or tribunal) must have due regard to the principles and objects of this Act. 23 In APP and Commissioner of Police [2026] WASAT 19 (APP) the Tribunal (differently constituted) discussed several aspects of the 2024 Act. It said there, relevant to this review: -- 6 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 7 86 First, as to legislative purpose, the statutory scheme evinces an intention to closely regulate persons who wish to obtain and hold a firearm authority. Counsel for the Delegate, Mr Bruce-Smith, labelled the statutory scheme under the 2024 Act as being one of 'safety-first'. That is, the purpose of the statutory scheme is the overriding need to ensure public safety. 87 In our view, taking account of the express principles and objects of the 2024 Act, that submission can be accepted. It is also evident in the Second Reading Speech for the Firearms Bill 2024 (WA),7 where the Minister for Police, the Hon Paul Papalia MLA, explained that the legislation was directed to: … the paramount need to ensure public safety in connection with the possession and use of firearms in the community to be achieved through strict control over such possession of firearms. … the bill will introduce key measures to minimise the risk of firearm misuse causing harm to others or the person in possession of the firearm. This will be achieved through improvements to the fit and proper person test, supported by health assessment and training processes, and more robust storage requirements. … Ultimately, these significant reforms will go a long way towards the government's priority to ensure public safety by diminishing the risk posed by unlawful firearm activities. (Tribunal's emphasis) 88 In our view, the purpose of the 2024 Act is directed to the overriding need to minimise or diminish the risks posed by firearms in the community, to ensure public safety. Given some recent domestic and national events involving firearms, such a statutory scheme is in the public interest and reflects the role of the legislature 'to make laws for the peace, order and good Government' of Western Australia.8 89 Second, the statutory scheme for obtaining a firearm authority, set out in pt 4 of the 2024 Act, reinforces public safety as the overriding consideration. That is evident in s 138 which provides that the Commissioner must not grant a firearm authority to a person if they are of the opinion that it is not desirable in the interests of public safety. Nor can there be an argument that a person has a 'right' to hold a firearm authority. The possession of 7 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 February 2024, pages 242, 246 (Hon P. Papalia MLA). 8 Constitution Act 1889 (WA), s 2. -- 7 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 8 a firearm is a privilege that is always conditional as against the overriding need to ensure public safety.9 90 Third, as an aspect of ensuring public safety, the 2024 Act places much emphasis on the requirement that a person be a fit and proper person to hold a firearm authority. We agree with the parties that the phrase 'fit and proper person' should not be read and applied narrowly. It is a phrase which, having regard to the text, context and purpose of the 2024 Act, prompts the widest scope for judgment, and for rejection, of an application for a firearm authority based on the fit and proper person requirement.10 91 Under the 1973 Act, while the Commissioner could take account of a person's history or [sic], or a tendency towards, violence, in deciding whether that person was a fit and proper person, the scope of that inquiry was directed to events within 5 years of the application for a firearm authority, and focused, relevantly, on convictions involving assault with weapons or violence or whether a violence restraining order had been made against the person.11 92 Under the 2024 Act, the scope of the Commissioner's inquiry, to enable them to form an opinion as to whether an applicant for the grant, or the holder, of a firearm authority, is a fit and proper person, have been significantly enhanced and strengthened. By s 139, the Commissioner must not grant a firearm authority to person if they are of the opinion that the person is not a fit and proper person. For example, div 2 of pt 4, which spans three sub- divisions across 12 sections, is directed to the fit and proper person requirement. The requirement may include consideration of a person's age and citizenship/residency status, health considerations, any criminal record, tendencies towards violence or intimidation, the risk of the firearm being misused as well as whether a person's associates and close associates are fit and proper persons. … 111 Tenth, while the 2024 Act is directed to risk minimisation, it is axiomatic that any statutory scheme that provides for, or allows, firearms to be in the community for professional or recreational reasons carries an inherent risk of misuse. As is evident by the 2024 Act, the community's tolerance for risks from firearm 9 2024 Act, s 4(1)(b). 10 Minitti [11]. 11 1973 Act, s 11(2) and s 11(3). However, s 11(6) authorised the Commissioner to inter alia take into account convictions outside the 5-year period. -- 8 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 9 misuse has considerably reduced in recent years. Firearm misuse can carry with it horrific consequences … 24 In my view, these observations correctly describe the changes effected by the 2024 Act. The criminal damage offence 25 Section 444 of the Criminal Code is, in its entirety: 444. Criminal damage (1A) In this section - circumstances of aggravation has the meaning given in section 221.12 (1) Any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any property is guilty of a crime and is liable - (a) if the property is destroyed or damaged by fire, to life imprisonment; or (b) if the property is not destroyed or damaged by fire, to imprisonment for 10 years or, if the offence is committed in circumstances of aggravation or in circumstances of racial aggravation, to imprisonment for 14 years. Alternative offence: s. 445. Summary conviction penalty: for an offence where - (a) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies; and (b) the amount of the injury done does not exceed $50,000, imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $36,000. (2) Property that is capable of being destroyed or damaged by fire includes vegetation. Overview of the applicant's contentions 26 The applicant contends: 12 As noted above, the parties agree that the criminal damage offence was not committed by the applicant in any circumstance of aggravation. -- 9 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 10 (a) The principles of statutory construction are well settled: Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31] - [36]. (b) Under the principle of legality, there should be no abrogation or curtailment of certain principles, rights and privileges unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language. Under both the 1973 Act and the transitional provisions of the 2024 Act the applicant had a vested right subject to statutory regulation to own and possess his firearms. The process of statutory construction in this review should, therefore, consider whether the applicant's vested right has been abrogated by unambiguous language. (c) Under s 9(1)(d) of the 2024 Act, the applicant would be a 'disqualified person' only if 'during the period prescribed by the regulations as the disqualifying period' there was a 'disqualifying offence for which a finding of guilt has been made against' him. (d) A serious offence within s 128(1) of the CI Act is defined to mean an offence 'the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment for 5 years or more or life'. (e) Section 5 of the 2024 Act defines a disqualifying offence by reference to a definition of serious offence in s 128(1) of the CI Act. What Parliament did here was to 'weld' the words in s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act to the words in s 9(1)(d) of the 2024 Act to create an amalgam definition. This amalgam, significantly, includes the words 'for which a finding of guilt has been made against the person'. The inclusion of these words in the amalgam expression requires the definition to be applied at the time when a person is found guilty of the serious offence, which in this case was at the time when he was convicted and sentenced by a court of summary jurisdiction. (f) The definition in s 128(1) of the CI Act closely resembles the form of words used in s 78(1)(a) and s 80(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act). Section 78(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act says: (1) If a court convicts a person of an offence the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment and that offence was committed during the suspension period of suspended imprisonment imposed on the person in relation to another offence, the court - -- 10 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 11 … (g) The applicant relies on the decision in O'Connell v Welsh [2005] WASCA 11 (O'Connell) as to the proper construction of the expression statutory penalty in s 78(1)(a) and s 80(1) of the Sentencing Act. The central point expressed in O'Connell is that the penalties specified in the Code often depend upon the circumstances. For example: [20] Now in the case of stealing, there are many penalties "specified" in the Criminal Code, depending upon the circumstances. Sometimes the circumstances will arise from the facts of the offence, for example the value of the property or the nature of the property stolen. Sometimes the circumstances arise during the court process; for example the decision of the court to deal with the charge summarily or on indictment; or the decision of a Magistrate after hearing a stealing case summarily and who convicts the accused, to commit the convicted person to a higher court for sentence. The statutory penalty, depending upon the existence or non- existence of these circumstances, may range from a maximum of a fine of $2000 to a maximum of 14 years imprisonment. [21] Of course, a range of penalties is open to the court in relation to most offences specified in written laws in this State. So s 78 of the Sentencing Act has been drafted by requiring the court to look at the specified penalties in the written law to see whether imprisonment is a possible penalty in relation to the charge of which the accused is convicted. In looking to see whether imprisonment is a possible penalty, the court is not asked to have regard to the sentence which might be imposed by the court in the exercise of its discretion. The task of the court is not to look only at the words of the statutory provision; that would be impossible because it is at least necessary to look to the facts as found to see what part of the written law provides the applicable penalty. If regard is had to the facts as found, this will show whether the conviction is one, say for stealing testamentary instruments, in which case the maximum penalty would be 10 years; or one where the thing is stolen from a public office in which case the penalty is a maximum of 14 years. If the facts as found do not fit into any of the "special cases", then the penalty would be a maximum of 7 years imprisonment. In this case there are no facts alleged that bring the case within the "special cases" provisions of s 378 of the Criminal Code - which means that if regard is had only to s 378, the penalty "is" imprisonment, ie 7 years imprisonment. The Magistrate said that stealing "is an offence that carries 7 years in prison. So it's a breaching offence". -- 11 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 12 (h) The definition of the expression statutory penalty in s 4(1) of the Sentencing Act is the same as the definition of statutory penalty in s 3(1) of the CI Act, which in both Acts is 'the penalty specified by a written law for the offence'. The principles guiding the proper construction of the expression statutory penalty which were identified in O'Connell must therefore apply equally to the definition of the same expression in the CI Act. The effect of this is that at the time a charge is laid for an indictable offence the statutory penalty is the penalty available on indictment, but this will change should an offender be dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction. In that case, the statutory penalty for the purpose of the Sentencing Act is then the summary conviction penalty. (i) Section 444 of the Criminal Code provides for a range of statutory penalties including: imprisonment for 10 years if convicted on indictment; imprisonment for 14 years if committed in circumstances of aggravation and convicted on indictment; and a summary conviction penalty of imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $36,000. 27 Through the process of reasoning applied in O'Connell the applicant says the statutory penalty for the criminal damage offence is the penalty available to the court of summary jurisdiction which on 24 October 2024 convicted and sentenced him, which is the summary conviction penalty of imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $36,000. 28 The applicant says the authority of Narrier v Director Public Prosecutions (WA) [2025] WASCA 51 (Narrier) does not stand for the proposition advanced by the respondent as this would produce the absurd result of automatically disqualifying a person convicted of a trivial offence, such as stealing a pencil, from holding a firearm authority. 29 Therefore, the applicant says on proper construction the criminal damage offence for which the applicant was convicted is not a serious offence under the 2024 Act as it is not an offence for which a finding of guilt has been made the statutory penalty for which is imprisonment for 5 years or more or life. Consequently, the applicant says he is not subject to a disqualifying period and he has not committed a disqualifying offence. Therefore, the applicant says he is not a disqualified person under the 2024 Act and I should therefore set aside the respondent's decision. -- 12 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 13 Overview of the respondent's submissions 30 The respondent contends the process of proper construction is to take the words in the 2024 Act and the CI Act and arrive at their meaning through the application of the principles of statutory construction without recourse to the construction of a similar or identical expression in other legislation. The respondent says this requires considering the overarching object of the 2024 Act which is to promote public safety. This is met by reducing the risk that a person will misuse a firearm by requiring the Commissioner to cancel the firearm authority of a person who has been convicted of a serious offence even if they are convicted and sentenced by a court of summary jurisdiction which imposes a summary conviction penalty. 31 The respondent says that the construction of the words statutory penalty in O'Connell as advanced by the applicant is not a useful guide to the proper construction of words within the 2024 Act as the Sentencing Act has very different objects to the 2024 Act and the CI Act. The respondent referred to Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Valuer- General (2007) 154 LGERA 437 (Trust Company) at 444: A popular exercise amongst lawyers involves considering previous decided cases in which judges have considered the meaning of the same or similar words. That exercise can sometimes help in illustrating nuances or range of meanings that the expression that is being construed is capable of having as a matter of ordinary English usage, or in a particular statutory context. However, unless the provision being construed in the previously decided case is in the same words and the same context as the provision whose meaning presently needs to be construed, that exercise is far from decisive. The words of the statute in question, in their context and with their history and purpose, have primacy. 32 The respondent also referred to Glass v Ralph [1966] WAR 91 at 95: The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without, in the first place, reference to cases. 33 The respondent observes that in any event there is authority the words statutory penalty within cl 2(5) of the Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA) on proper construction mean the penalty available on indictment: Cohen v Curchin [2008] WASC 8, [29] and [32] (Cohen). -- 13 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 14 34 That is, the respondent says s 444(1)(b) of the Criminal Code creates only one offence with only one statutory penalty, which is imprisonment for 10 years (unless committed in a circumstance of aggravation in which case it is 14 years). The corollary of this is that the summary conviction penalty provided for in s 444 is not the statutory penalty but is the jurisdictional limit of a court of summary jurisdiction. The respondent points to a statement of the Court of Appeal in Narrier in support of this position: [24] … It is well-established that a summary conviction penalty is a jurisdictional limit rather than a maximum penalty which applies on a summary conviction. When a magistrate sentences a person for a stealing offence against s 378 of the Code in relation to property not exceeding $1,000 in value, the task under s 6 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) remains to impose a sentence which is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. It remains the case that the seriousness of the offence is to be determined taking into account the statutory penalty for the offence. In the circumstances provided for in item (5)(a) of s 378 of the Code, that statutory penalty remains imprisonment for 14 years[.] (footnotes omitted) 35 The respondent contends that the meaning of the expression serious offence as defined in s 5 of the 2024 Act must be found through examination of the words in issue within their context and purpose in the 2024 Act and the CI Act: Mohammadi. This task should begin by looking to the underlying purpose of the 2024 Act and the CI Act. In order to assist in discerning the underlying purpose of the 2024 Act the respondent refers to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Firearms Bill 2024 (WA): The Bill introduces a suite of provisions aimed at removing and preventing firearm authorities and firearms from being obtained by those who have committed serious offences, are subject to a disqualifying order (such as a Family Violence Restraining Order made under the Restraining Orders Act 1997), or are members of disqualified organisations. These provisions intend to improve public safety by disqualifying persons identified as risks to others from possessing and using firearms and related things, or engaging in firearm activities And: … the Bill provides that all serious offences, defined in the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 section 128(1) mainly as offences that carry an imprisonment term of or above 5 years, will be disqualifying offences. These are offences of such severity that, in the overarching interest of -- 14 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 15 public safety, would prevent a person from even applying for a licence, permit or approval (firearm authority). 36 The respondent then refers to the principles and objects set out in s 4(1) and s 4(2) of the 2024 Act. The respondent contends that these principles and objects:13 … are largely centred on ensuring public safety around the use and possession of firearms in the community. One important way in which public safety is achieved in this setting is by preventing access to firearms 'by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour'. s 4(2)(e) of the [2024 Act]. 37 The respondent says a construction which reduces the risk of misuse of a firearm promotes 'the overarching interest of public safety'. Such a construction would find that a person who has committed even a minor example of a serious offence is a disqualified person. The alternative construction, which would find that only a person who has committed a serious example of a serious offence is a disqualified person would not promote this overarching interest. 38 The respondent also says the principle of legality is a common law presumption to the effect that Parliament does not intend to interfere with common law rights and freedoms unless this intention is made explicit through clear and unambiguous language. However, holding a firearm authority is a statutory privilege and is not a common law right. Neither is it a statutory right or a vested property right. Accordingly, the principle of legality is not relevant in this review. 39 Therefore, the respondent says on proper construction the criminal damage offence for which the applicant was convicted is a serious offence as it is an offence for which a finding of guilt has been made the statutory penalty for which is imprisonment for 10 years. 40 Consequently, the respondent says the applicant by reason of being convicted of the criminal damage offence has been found guilty of a serious offence, that he is at this time subject to a disqualifying period and he is therefore a disqualified person. I should therefore affirm the respondent's decision. Principles of statutory construction 41 The principles of statutory construction are well settled. 13 Respondent's SIFC, para 55; Exhibit 1, page 38. -- 15 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 16 42 In Mohammadi [31] - [36] the Court of Appeal observed: 31 … Statutory construction requires attention to the text, context and purpose of the Act. While the task of construction begins and ends with the statutory text, throughout the process the text is construed in its context. Statutory construction, like any process of construction of an instrument, has regard to context. As Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ recently explained in SZTAL: The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected. 32 The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. 33 The objective discernment of the statutory purpose is integral to contextual construction. The statutory purpose may be discerned from an express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about the desired or desirable reach or operation of relevant provisions. 34 Discernment of statutory purpose is particularly significant in cases, commonly encountered, where the constructional choice presented is from 'a range of potential meanings, some of which may be less immediately obvious or more awkward than others, but none of which is wholly ungrammatical or unnatural'. In such a case, the choice 'turns less on linguistic fit than on evaluation of the relevant coherence of the alternatives with identified statutory objects or policies' … 35 Thus, the material provisions of the Act must be understood, if possible, as parts of a coherent whole. 36 Statutory texts enacted by the same legislature are to be construed, so far as possible, to operate in harmony and not in conflict. Where two or more statutory enactments comprise the -- 16 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 17 overlapping legislative scheme, the enactments should be construed accordingly, and the court should endeavour to produce a rational, sensible, efficient and just operation in preference to an inefficient, conflicting or unjust operation. (Citations omitted) 43 Section 18 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act) also provides that: In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. Consideration 44 Section 192(1) of the 2024 Act says, 'The Commissioner must cancel or refuse to renew a firearm authority if - … (c) the Commissioner is satisfied that the holder of the firearm authority is a disqualified person …'. 45 The process of determining whether the applicant is a disqualified person under the 2024 Act requires the application of provisions under the 2024 Act, the CI Act, the Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA) (Spent Convictions Act) and the Firearms Regulations 2024 (WA) (Regulations). For the purpose of this review these provisions are: (1) Section 5 of the 2024 Act, which defines a disqualified person to have the meaning given in s 9(1). (2) Section 9(1)(d) of the 2024 Act, which says that a person is a disqualified person 'during the period prescribed by the regulations as the disqualifying period for a disqualifying offence for which a finding of guilt has been made against the person'. (3) Section 5 of the 2024 Act, which relevantly defines a disqualifying offence to mean 'a serious offence as defined by the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 section 128(1)'. (4) Section 128(1)(a) of the CI Act, which relevantly defines a 'serious offence' to mean an offence 'the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment for 5 years or more or life'. (5) Section 3(1) of the CI Act, which defines a statutory penalty to mean 'the penalty specified by a written law for the offence'. -- 17 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 18 (6) Section 11(3) of the 2024 Act, which says a 'finding of guilt in relation to an offence is a finding of guilt for the purposes of [the 2024 Act] even if it is - (a) a spent conviction as defined in the section 3(1) of the Spent Convictions Act 1988'.14 (7) Section 427(a) of the 2024 Act, which extends s 9 to 'a disqualifying offence committed before commencement day'. (8) Section 427(d) which extends s 9 to 'a disqualifying period that started before commencement day'. (9) Regulation 5(3) of the Regulations which says: (3) For the purposes of section 9(1)(d) of the Act, if subregulation (2) does not apply,15 the disqualifying period for a disqualifying offence for which a finding of guilt has been made against a person is the period that - (a) begins on the day on which the person is found guilty of the offence; and (b) is calculated by adding - (i) any term of imprisonment imposed for the offence; and (ii) the maximum period of imprisonment for the offence that could have been imposed on the person[.] (10) Regulation 5(6) of the Regulations which says: (6) If the disqualifying offence is an indictable offence to which a summary conviction penalty applies and the offence is dealt with summarily, a reference in subregulation (3)(b)(ii) or (4) to the maximum period of imprisonment is a reference to the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed on the person if the offence had not been dealt with summarily. 46 The provision which is in dispute in this review is whether, on proper construction, the statutory penalty defined in s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act for the criminal damage offence for which the applicant was 14 It is not in dispute in this review that the spent conviction granted to the applicant in respect of the criminal damage offence is a spent conviction as defined in the s 3(1) of the Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA). 15 Regulation 5(2)(b) provides that a disqualifying period ends on the death of a person. -- 18 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 19 found guilty is the summary conviction penalty or whether it is the penalty that applies on indictment. 47 The contending constructional choices proposed by the applicant and the respondent as to the meaning of the words statutory penalty within s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act present two options, each of which is grammatical and natural. Each is also supported by the construction of those words for a purpose of the Sentencing Act (O'Connell and Cohen). 48 I accept that in this review the two constructional choices advanced by the parties are the only available choices. 49 So far as the question of authority is concerned, I am not satisfied that either O'Connell or Cohen stand as authorities for the proper construction of the words statutory penalty within s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act for the purpose of s 9 of the 2024 Act. 50 This is because these words appear within the context of the Sentencing Act and not within the context of the CI Act, but also because they appear within an 'overlapping legislative scheme' which is not considered in either O'Connell or Cohen. I am therefore satisfied that I should take the approach suggested in Glass, that is, to 'take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without, in the first place, reference to cases.' 51 In accordance with the statements in Mohammadi I am to discern the principles and purposes of the 2024 Act and the CI Act, by looking to the 'express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials'. Also, in accordance with the statements in Mohammadi, I must be mindful that 'the primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute', while nonetheless recognising that the expression is part of an 'overlapping statutory scheme'. I must also ensure that I 'have due regard' to the express principles and objects of the 2024 Act. 52 The proper construction of the expression statutory penalty within s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act is therefore the construction which is consistent with the language of the CI Act and the 2024 Act and which promotes the purposes of those Acts. -- 19 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 20 53 The first step of this task is to consider the language of the relevant definition of disqualifying offence in s 5 the 2024 Act, which is:16 disqualifying offence means an offence that is - (a) a serious offence as defined in the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 section 128(1) … 54 The clear meaning of this definition in s 5 of the 2024 Act is that every offence which is a serious offence in s 128(1) of the CI Act is therefore a disqualifying offence for the purpose of s 9 of the 2024 Act. I respectfully do not agree with the applicant that what Parliament did here was to 'weld' the definition of serious offence' in s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act to the definition of disqualifying offence in s 9(1)(d) of the 2024 Act to create an amalgam definition. 55 The second step of this task is to consider the language of s 128(1) of the CI Act. Section 128 is one of three sections within Division 2 of the CI Act. It is useful to set the relevant parts of each of this Division, which are: Division 2 - Arrest without an arrest warrant 127 Arrest warrant not required to exercise this Division's powers The powers in this Division may be exercised without an arrest warrant. 128 Arrest power for offences (1) In this section - serious offence means an offence - (a) the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment for 5 years or more or life; or … (2) A police officer or a public officer may arrest a person for a serious offence if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed, is committing, or is just about to commit, the offence. … 56 Section 128(1) of the CI Act grants to a police officer or public officer the authority to arrest without an arrest warrant a person they reasonably suspect has, is or is just about to commit an offence for which 16 Section 5 of the 2024 Act also permits offences to be prescribed by the regulations. However, the offences so prescribed are not relevant to this review. -- 20 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 21 the statutory penalty is imprisonment for 5 years or more or life. I adopt here the statement of McLure P in Johnson v Staskos [2015] WASCA 32 at [14] that the 'purpose and intent of s 128 is to exhaustively state the conditions that enliven a police officer's power to arrest a person'. 57 Importantly, this means the statutory penalty for the purpose of s 128(1) of the CI Act is to be determined at the time when a police officer or public officer reasonably suspects the person has, is or is just about to commit an offence. That is, the statutory penalty for the purpose of s 128(1) of the CI Act does not depend on whether a person is ever sentenced for the offence in the summary jurisdiction. 58 In my view, this construction is consistent with the reasoning in O'Connell because the time at which I am to consider the 'applicability' of s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act is at the 'outset' of the criminal process. That is, the definition in s 128(1)(a) applies at the time when a police officer or public officer is considering arresting a person and not at the time the person is found guilty of the offence.17 The statutory penalty for the offence of criminal damage at that time is the penalty on indictment. This is consistent with the statement of the Court of Appeal in Narrier at [24].18 59 Therefore, I find that the definition of serious offence in s 128(1)(a) of the CI Act provides that the statutory penalty for the offence of criminal damage under s 444(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for which the applicant was found guilty on 24 October 2024 is imprisonment for 10 years. 60 In accordance with s 4(3) of the 2024 Act I must also consider whether this construction gives 'due regard' to the principles and objects of the 2024 Act. This requires me to consider whether it furthers 'the overriding need to minimise or diminish the risks posed by firearms in the community [and] to ensure public safety'. In my view a construction which finds a person who is convicted and sentenced by a court of summary jurisdiction for an offence of criminal damage is disqualified from holding a firearm authority minimises and diminishes the risks posed by firearms in the community to a greater extent than one which does not. 17 O'Connell at [24]. 18 While not expressly stated, this appears to be the conclusion reached by in Fox v Beringer [2011] WASC 38 [26]. See also Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission Report 5 Police Power of Arrest, Parliamentary Inspector’s Report, March 2022. -- 21 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 22 61 This construction is also consistent with many of the offences prescribed in reg 4 for the purpose of the definition of disqualifying offence in s 5 of the 2024 Act. This is because many of the offences so prescribed have a statutory penalty of less than imprisonment for 5 years. While I place little weight on this matter, the construction is also consistent with reg 5(6) and the example given for the subregulation. 62 For the reasons given by the respondent I agree the principle of legality has no relevance in this review. This is primarily because the possession of a firearm is a statutory privilege under s 4(1)(b) of the 2024 Act. 63 Given the principles and objects of the 2024 Act it is also, in my view, not absurd to disqualify a person convicted of stealing an item of small value from holding a firearm authority. 64 Finally, as set out above: (a) Under s 11(3)(b) of the 2024 Act, a finding of guilt in relation to an offence is a finding of guilt for the purposes of the 2024 Act even if it is a spent conviction. (b) Under s 427(a) of the 2024 Act, s 9 extends to a disqualifying offence committed before commencement day. (c) Under s 427(d) of the 2024 Act, s 9 extends to a disqualifying period that started before commencement day. 65 For these reasons, I find that on proper construction the statutory penalty for the criminal damage offence for which the applicant was convicted and sentenced on 24 October 2024 by a court of summary jurisdiction does include a penalty of imprisonment of 10 years, which is more than a period of imprisonment of 5 years. That is, it is a disqualifying offence within the meaning of s 5 of the 2024 Act. The applicant is therefore under reg 5(3) subject to a disqualifying period of 10 years commencing on 24 October 2024 and so at this time he is a disqualified person under s 9(1)(d) of the 2024 Act. 66 Pursuant to s 192(1)(c) of the 2024 Act, I must now affirm the decision of the respondent made on 3 July 2025 to affirm the cancellation of the applicant's firearm authority 10028704. -- 22 of 23 -- [2026] WASAT 58 Page 23 Orders The Tribunal orders: 1. The decision of the respondent made on 3 July 2025 to affirm the cancellation of the applicant's firearm authority 10028704 is affirmed. 2. The application is dismissed. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. MR E Cade, MEMBER 19 MAY 2026 -- 23 of 23 --