LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and SINGH [2026] WASAT 57

[2026] WASAT 57 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : LEGAL PROFESSION UNIFORM LAW (WA) CITATION : LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and SINGH [2026] WASAT 57 MEMBER : PRESIDENT GLANCY DR M EVANS-BONNER, SENIOR MEMBER MR R POVEY, MEMBER HEARD : DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS DELIVERED : 15 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : VR 123 of 2023 BETWEEN : LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE Applicant AND RAJBIR SINGH Respondent Catchwords: Vocational regulation - Legal practitioner - Disciplinary proceedings - Allegations of professional misconduct - Allegations of unsatisfactory professional conduct - Maintaining proceedings with no or little chance of success - Affidavit containing false or misleading statements - Failure to comply with legal directions - Failure to provide evidence - Duty of candour to the court - Common law test of professional misconduct - Use of previous decisions as evidence - Drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence - Use of previous decisions as evidence for legal practitioners - Use of previous decisions as -- 1 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 2 evidence in the State Administrative Tribunal - Findings of professional misconduct Legislation: Administration Act 1903 (WA), s 43(2), s 45 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 402, s 403(1), s 572(1) Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA), r 5, r 6(1)(c), r 6(2)(b), r 6(2)(c), r 34(1), r 36(1), r 36(1)(a), r 36(1)(b), r 36(1)(d) Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA), s 266(2), s 282, s 283(1), s 297(1)(a), s 297(1)(b), s 300(1)(b), s 302(3), s 371, s 371(1), s 371(3), s 466(6) Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), s 260(a), s 272, s 315(1), s 315(2) Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules 2015 (WA), r 43, r 43.1 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O4A, r 28 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 32(2), s 60(2) Result: Findings of professional misconduct Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : Legal Practice Board of WA Respondent : N/A Solicitors: Applicant : N/A Respondent : N/A Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 -- 2 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 3 Eugenius Sunny Willison by next friend Maria Beatrix Irmayanti v Clayton William Hollingsworth in his capacity as executor of the will of Kim Robert Willison [2019] WASC 392 Giudice and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2014] WASCA 115 Hollington v F Hewthorn Co Ltd [1943] KB 587; [1943] 2 All ER 35 Irmayanti v Hollingsworth [2021] WASC 429 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 King v Muriniti [2018] NSWCA 98; (2018) 97 NSWLR 991 Kyle v Legal Practitioners' Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115; (1999) 21 WAR 56 Law Society of New South Wales v Sullivan [2000] NSWADT 167 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Chang [2019] WASAT 67 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Gandini [2011] WASAT 86 (S); (2011) 75 SR (WA) 314 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldsmith [2022] WASAT 43 (S) Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lee-Steere [2010] WASAT 189 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lourey [2022] WASCA 114 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Waters [2015] WASC 141 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Bostock [2022] WASAT 100 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Lourey [No 2] [2023] WASAT 77; (2023) 110 SR (WA) 133 Palmer v Dolman; Dolman v Palmer [2005] NSWCA 361 Prothonotary v Comesky [2018] NSWCA 18 R v Van Beelen [2016] SASCFC 71; (2016) 125 SASR 253 The Council of the Queensland Law Society v Wright [2001] QCA 58 Westgyp Pty Ltd v Northline Ceilings Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 244 -- 3 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 4 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Introduction 1 The Legal Services and Complaints Committee (the Applicant) has brought an application under s 300(1)(b) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2022 (WA) (Uniform Law). In that application it is alleged that Mr Rajbir Singh (also referred to in these reasons for decision as the Respondent and the Practitioner) engaged in conduct that amounted to professional misconduct or, alternatively, unsatisfactory professional conduct. 2 Three Grounds were alleged by the Applicant. 3 The first two Grounds concerned the Practitioner's conduct in a proceeding in the Supreme Court in which the Practitioner was acting for a client in a dispute over the administration of a deceased estate. 4 In Ground 1, the Applicant alleged that the Practitioner maintained the Supreme Court proceeding where he knew or ought to have known it had no prospects of success; that he had drafted and filed an affidavit that fell substantially short of the standards expected of a competent legal practitioner; and that he had persistently failed to comply with orders of the Court. 5 Ground 2 alleged that the Practitioner swore and filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court that contained statements he knew to be false or misleading, or alternatively, that he was recklessly indifferent as to whether the statements were false or misleading. 6 Ground 3 alleged that the Practitioner failed to comply with two notices issued by the Applicant during the investigation into the complaint about his conduct in the Supreme Court proceeding. It is alleged that the purpose or substantial purpose of the failure to comply was to hinder the investigation into his conduct. Outcome 7 For the reasons set out below we have found that: (1) each Ground has been made out, but not every fact alleged by the Applicant, especially those relating to the Respondent's state of mind, has been established; and -- 4 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 5 (2) the conduct which we have found in respect of each Ground amounts to professional misconduct. 8 The issue of the disciplinary penalty which is to be imposed as a result of our liability findings, and the question of whether the Applicant should be entitled to its costs of the proceeding, will be determined after we have had the opportunity to hear from the parties about those issues. Procedural history and determination of the application on the documents 9 The Applicant's application was lodged with the Tribunal on 29 November 2023. From then until 26 March 2025, numerous programming orders were made with the consent of the Practitioner, however, for the most part he did not comply with them. 10 Indeed, there was continual non-compliance and minimal participation in the proceeding on the part of the Practitioner. 11 The only documents lodged by the Practitioner in these proceedings were: (a) an affidavit dated 24 October 2024 in response to orders made by the President seeking to ascertain his ability to participate in the proceedings due to the Practitioner having failed to comply with orders up to that point; and (b) two documents lodged on 19 November 2024 purporting to respond to the allegations made by the Applicant, but which only contained single word responses such as 'denied' and 'admitted', despite having been given three opportunities to do so. 12 The Practitioner also failed to lodge any witness statements or documents upon which he intended to rely, despite orders having been made which required him to do so on three occasions. 13 On 26 March 2025, the Tribunal ordered that, following non- compliance with orders made on 18 March 2025, the question of whether the Practitioner had engaged in professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct would, subject to any further order of the Tribunal, be determined on the documents pursuant to s 60(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). -- 5 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 6 The documents 14 The documents to which we have had regard in determining this application are: (1) The application dated 29 November 2023, together with Annexure A which sets out the three Grounds alleged by the Applicant. (2) The documents contained in the Applicant's Bundle of Documents (Exhibit 1) filed on 31 May 2024 which we refer to as Exhibits 1.1 - 1.26 (in the order in which they appeared in the index to the Bundle). (3) The Applicant's Outline of Opening Submissions dated 16 September 2024 which attach a 'Document List' for Supreme Court proceeding CIV 2269/2018 (Court Record) and an 'Own initiative complaint decision' dated 31 October 2022 signed by Legal Services and Complaints Officer Russell Daily (Own Initiative Complaint Decision). (4) The Practitioner's affidavit sworn and filed on 28 October 2024 (Exhibit 2). (5) The Practitioner's Response to Annexure A filed on 19 November 2024 (Response).1 (6) Witness Statement of Stephanie Elizabeth Anne Fulham, an investigator employed by the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia,2 dated 30 May 2024 (Fulham Statement). Our approach to the case Onus and standard of proof 15 We adopt the following passage from Chang3 as to the relevant onus and standard of proof: 1 The Practitioner's Responses to the allegations do not correspond to the paragraph numbering in Annexure A nor do they correspond to the paragraph numbers in the Applicant's Outline of Opening Submissions. The Responses only contain single word responses such as 'denied' and 'admitted'. These inadequacies mean that we cannot ascertain what the Practitioner was seeking to respond to. 2 Section 282 of the Uniform Law provides that the designated local regulatory authority may investigate the whole or any part of a complaint. In Western Australia the designated local regulatory authority is the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia (the Board). 3 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Chang [2019] WASAT 67 at [8]. -- 6 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 7 The Committee bears the onus of proof in relation to the allegations of professional misconduct it makes against the practitioner. The civil standard of proof ('on a balance of probabilities') applies together with the Briginshaw approach, which requires clear and cogent evidence to be adduced by the Committee and for the Tribunal to feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of relevant facts before it can find the practitioner guilty of professional misconduct (or unsatisfactory professional conduct). The Briginshaw approach applies in disciplinary proceedings, because of the nature and seriousness, and potential consequences, of allegations of wrongdoing (or incompetence) made in such proceedings. As Dixon J said in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361 - 362: Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. (Footnote omitted) 16 Accordingly, the Applicant bears the onus of proving, to the civil standard, the allegations made against the Practitioner in each Ground. 17 Furthermore, when, in these reasons for decision we state that we are satisfied and make a finding, we are to be understood to mean that we do so on the balance of probabilities, applying the Briginshaw approach.4 That is, we must feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of a fact, based on clear and cogent evidence, in order to be reasonably satisfied that an allegation is proven. As such, we recognise that ' "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences'.5 Drawing factual inferences 18 The Applicant asks us to find some facts which require the drawing of inferences. Before we can draw an inference from the facts which we have found, we must find that that inference is more probable than other inferences open on the evidence. 4 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 (Briginshaw), 361 - 362 (Dixon J). 5 Briginshaw, 362 (Dixon J). -- 7 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 8 19 In Palmer v Dolman,6 the New South Wales Court of Appeal traced the relevant authorities regarding drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence. Citing the High Court in Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (Bradshaw), the New South Wales Court of Appeal observed:7 [35] The relevant principle in regard to civil cases was expressed by the High Court in the case of Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 5, in a passage that has been repeated many times. The passage is: "Of course as far as logical consistency goes many hypotheses may be put which the evidence does not exclude positively. But this is a civil and not a criminal case. We are concerned with probabilities, not with possibilities. The difference between the criminal standard of proof in its application to circumstantial evidence and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged. In questions of this sort, where direct proof is not available, it is enough in the circumstances appearing in the evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference: they must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is mere matter of conjecture: (see per Lord Robson, Richard Evans & Co Ltd v Astley [1911] AC 674, at 687). But if circumstances are proved in which it is reasonable to find a balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion sought then, though the conclusion may fall short of certainty, it is not to be regarded as mere conjecture or surmise …" … [37] In Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 Gibbs CJ and Mason J said at 536: When the evidence is circumstantial, the jury, whether in a civil or in a criminal case, are required to draw an inference from the circumstances of the case; in a civil case the circumstances must raise a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged ... 6 Palmer v Dolman; Dolman v Palmer [2005] NSWCA 361 (Palmer v Dolman). 7 Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 5, cited in Palmer v Dolman at [35] and [37] - [39]. -- 8 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 9 [38] In Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said at 211 that when a lesser standard of proof than the criminal standard applies, 'the existence of other reasonable hypotheses is simply a matter to be taken into account in determining whether the fact in issue should be inferred from the facts proved'. [39] On these authorities, it is sufficient in a civil case that the circumstances raise a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged (See also Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125). 20 The following useful summary of the position was given by Vaughan J (as he then was), in Westgyp Pty Ltd v Northline Ceilings Pty Ltd,8 referring to Bradshaw and Palmer v Dolman: … proof on the balance of probabilities does not require certainty or the positive exclusion of all hypotheses. It suffices if the circumstances raise 'a more probable inference' in favour of what is alleged, ie the evidence gives rise to a reasonable and definite inference rather than conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability. (Footnote omitted) 21 The particulars to Ground 2 and Ground 3 alleged by the Applicant require us to consider the intention, or in other words the state of mind, of the Practitioner. Specifically, whether he intended the Court to be misled by statements he made in an affidavit (Ground 2), and whether he failed to comply with the investigation into the complaint for the purpose or the substantial purpose of seeking to hinder the Board's investigation (Ground 3). 22 Where we have been required to draw inferences as to the Practitioner's state of mind from circumstantial evidence, we have done so in a manner consistent with the principles identified by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Palmer v Dolman.9 Specifically: (a) we have considered the weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together; (b) we have applied the standard of proof at the final stage of the reasoning process; 8 Westgyp Pty Ltd v Northline Ceilings Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 244 at [57]. 9 Palmer v Dolman [2005] NSWCA 361 at [41]. -- 9 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 10 (c) we have weighed the inference drawn from the proved facts against realistic possibilities as distinct from possibilities that might be regarded as fanciful; and (d) where the competing possibilities are of equal likelihood, or the choice between them can only be resolved by conjecture, we have found the allegation not proved. The Practitioner's failure to give or produce evidence 23 The Practitioner has not filed any affidavit setting out his version of events or any documents to which he considers we should have regard in determining the application. The Practitioner's affidavit (Exhibit 2) is not relevant to the resolution of the allegations. It merely provided an explanation for some of his non-compliance with programming orders in 2024. 24 Accordingly, we have proceeded on the basis that none of the factual allegations are admitted by the Practitioner, but that he is not advancing any positive case in his defence. 25 The Practitioner's failure to give or produce any evidence in these proceedings cannot be used to 'fill gaps or to convert suspicion into inference'.10 26 However, consistent with the principle in Jones v Dunkel,11 where the Practitioner failed to give or produce evidence that would naturally have been expected to support his case with there being no sufficient explanation for its absence, and where that evidence was uniquely within his own knowledge, we have inferred that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted his case. Use of Supreme Court decisions as evidence in this proceeding 27 In proving its case the Applicant relies upon the reasons for decision of: (1) Master Sanderson in Eugenius Sunny Willison by next friend Maria Beatrix Irmayanti v Clayton William Hollingsworth in his capacity as executor of the will of Kim Robert Willison [2019] WASC 392 (Sanderson Decision);12 and 10 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, 313 (Menzies J). 11 Jones v Dunkel, 312 (Menzies J). 12 We will refer to the parties as Master Willison, Ms Irmayanti, the Executor and the Deceased. -- 10 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 11 (2) Allanson J in Irmayanti v Hollingsworth [2021] WASC 429 (Allanson Decision). 28 At common law, the rules against hearsay mean that findings of fact made in reasons for decision in one proceeding (the first proceeding) are not admissible in subsequent proceedings (the second proceeding) to prove facts that were found in the first proceeding where the second proceeding does not involve the same parties as the first proceeding.13 However, the reasons for decision can be adduced in evidence for other purposes, including to demonstrate that a person had a particular state of knowledge at a particular time.14 29 In King v Muriniti15 Basten JA elaborated on the uses to which reasons for decision in one proceeding might be used in subsequent proceedings involving different parties. His Honour said:16 … It would have been appropriate to add that because of the relationship between the court and a legal practitioner, with the concomitant duty of candour imposed on the practitioner, the disciplinary jurisdiction would not permit a practitioner to require the Prothonotary to prove again a finding of misconduct made in other proceedings because reliance could not be placed upon those findings … 30 While the view expressed by Basten JA appears apposite in this case, it is not necessary for us to determine whether, for the reason expressed by his Honour, the findings in the Sanderson Decision and the Allanson Decision need to be proved in this matter, because the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence.17 Accordingly, we are entitled to have and have had, regard to the findings of fact in the Sanderson Decision and the Allanson Decision and have considered all of the material and made our own determination on the issues before us. As required by the rules of procedural fairness, the Practitioner had an opportunity to present evidence on the issue and did not do so.18 13 Hollington v F Hewthorn Co Ltd [1943] KB 587; [1943] 2 All ER 35; R v Van Beelen [2016] SASCFC 71; (2016) 125 SASR 253 at [109]. 14 Prothonotary v Comesky [2018] NSWCA 18 at [48]. 15 King v Muriniti [2018] NSWCA 98; (2018) 97 NSWLR 991 (King v Muriniti). 16 King v Muriniti at [35]. 17 SAT Act, s 32(2). 18 The Practitioner had notice of the issues and the Applicant's intention to rely on the findings of fact made in the Sanderson Decision and the Allanson Decision in the Applicant's Outline of Opening Submissions which were filed on 16 September 2024. -- 11 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 12 31 Accordingly, we have placed considerable weight on the relevant findings of fact set out in the Sanderson Decision and the Allanson Decision for the following reasons: (1) to the extent that the Sanderson Decision and the Allanson Decision are relied upon to establish background facts, such as the identity of parties and their relationships, the facts were uncontentious in those proceedings; (2) the Practitioner adduced evidence in relation to the findings made in the Allanson Decision in the course of the Supreme Court proceedings. Although he did not take up the opportunity to make submissions in relation to the findings which the Court should make as a result of the evidence, he nevertheless had an opportunity to be heard in relation to the making of the findings by Allanson J; and (3) in this proceeding the Practitioner did not lead any evidence to counter the allegations made by the Applicant including allegations that reflect the findings of fact made in the Sanderson Decision or the Allanson Decision. Therefore, we have concluded that any evidence he may have led would not have caused us to make findings that were inconsistent with those in the two decisions. The statutory regime and the applicable legal principles 32 The allegations made in Grounds 1 and 2 are about conduct which is alleged to have occurred in 2019 and 2021. 33 The allegation in Ground 3 concerns conduct in which the Practitioner is said to have engaged in between December 2022 and April 2023. 34 The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (LP Act) was in force at the time of the conduct which is the basis of the allegations in Grounds 1 and 2. However, because the investigation into the conduct did not commence until 31 October 202219 and the allegations were not referred to the Tribunal until the application was lodged on 19 See Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldsmith [2022] WASAT 43 (S) at [32] - [33] and Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Bostock [2022] WASAT 100 at [46] - [52] in which the Tribunal found that the date of the referral of a complaint was central to the determination of whether conduct predating the commencement of the Uniform Law was capable of being dealt with under the Uniform Law rather than the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). -- 12 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 13 29 November 2023, the conduct is to be dealt with under the Uniform Law.20 35 The conduct that forms the basis of Ground 3 occurred after the commencement of the Uniform Law, which therefore applies to that conduct. Unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct - definitions 36 As noted above, the Applicant alleges that the Practitioner has engaged in conduct that constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of the Uniform Law and the common law test enunciated in Kyle.21 It is alleged in the alternative that the conduct amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct. 37 The terms 'professional misconduct' and 'unsatisfactory professional conduct' are defined by s 296 and s 297 of the Uniform Law as follows: 296 Unsatisfactory professional conduct For the purposes of this Law, unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of a lawyer occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent lawyer. 297 Professional misconduct (1) For the purposes of this Law, professional misconduct includes- (a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of a lawyer, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and (b) conduct of a lawyer whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the lawyer is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. 20 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) (Application Act), s 315(1) and s 315(2). 21 Kyle v Legal Practitioners' Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115; (1999) 21 WAR 56 (Kyle) at [61] (Parker J). -- 13 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 14 (2) For the purpose of deciding whether a lawyer is or is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as referred to in subsection (1)(b), regard may be had to the matters that would be considered if the lawyer were an applicant for admission to the Australian legal profession or for the grant or renewal of an Australian practising certificate and any other relevant matters. 38 In Lourey,22 the Court of Appeal said that the common law test of professional misconduct as articulated in Kyle23 continued to have effect because the statutory definitions under the predecessor legislation - s 402 and s 403(1) of the LP Act - were 'not exhaustive'. 39 The Kyle24 test is as follows: … [professional conduct includes] conduct that would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence, or that, to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence. The first limb of this summary includes, but is not confined to, conduct which occurs in the course of legal practice. The other limb necessarily relates to conduct in the course of legal practice because of the reference to "professional conduct"[.] 40 In summary, there are two 'limbs' of conduct described in Kyle that can constitute professional misconduct: (a) conduct that would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence (first limb of Kyle); and (b) conduct that to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence (second limb of Kyle). 41 We have proceeded on the basis that the Kyle test continues to apply under the Uniform Law. 42 Even though professional misconduct is alleged, it is open to the Tribunal to find the Practitioner's conduct amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct.25 22 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lourey [2022] WASCA 114 (Lourey) at [197]. 23 Kyle at [61]. 24 Kyle at [61]. -- 14 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 15 Professional conduct rules 43 With respect to Ground 1 and Ground 2, the Applicant alleges that the Practitioner breached several of the Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA) (Conduct Rules) that were applicable at the time of the alleged conduct.26 44 The Conduct Rules that were alleged to have been contravened are as follows. 45 Rule 5 of the Conduct Rules, which sets out a practitioner's paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice. It provides: A practitioner's duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty, including but not limited to a duty owed to a client of the practitioner. 46 Rule 34(1) which concerns a practitioner's duty to the court and provides: A practitioner must not knowingly or recklessly mislead a court. 47 Rule 6(1)(c) which concerns the delivery of legal services to a client, and which provides: (1) A practitioner must - … (c) deliver legal services competently and diligently; … 48 Rule 6(2)(b) and (c) which provide: A practitioner must not engage in conduct, in the course of providing legal services or otherwise, which - … (b) may be prejudicial to, or diminish public confidence in, the administration of justice; or (c) may bring the profession into disrepute. 25 Uniform Law, s 302(3). 26 The Conduct Rules ceased on 1 July 2022 as a result of the repeal of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) by s 260(a) of the Application Act. -- 15 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 16 49 Rule 36(1) which concerns the steps that a practitioner must take when working on a case. That rule provides: A practitioner must take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure that work the practitioner does in relation to a case is done so as to - (a) confine the case to identified issues which are genuinely in dispute; and (b) have the case ready to be heard as soon as practicable; and (c) present the identified issues in dispute clearly and succinctly; and (d) limit evidence, including cross-examination, to that which is reasonably necessary to advance and protect the client's interests which are at stake in the case; and (e) occupy as short a time in court as is reasonably necessary to advance and protect the client's interests which are at stake in the case. 50 In Ground 3, the Applicant alleges the Practitioner breached r 43 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules 2015 (UL Conduct Rules). Those rules were in force at the time of the alleged conduct that forms the basis for Ground 3. 51 Rule 43.1 of the UL Conduct Rules provides: Subject only to his or her duty to the client, a solicitor must be timely, open and frank in his or her dealings with a regulatory authority. 52 Ground 3 concerns an allegation that the Practitioner did not comply with a notice from an investigator issued under s 371 of the Uniform Law. 53 In summary, s 371(1) of the Uniform Law provides that an investigator carrying out a complaint investigation can require a lawyer to do certain things, including requiring the lawyer to provide written information and to otherwise assist in the investigation of the complaint. 54 Section 371(3) of the Uniform Law provides that the lawyer must comply with the requirement. 55 A failure to do so 'is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct' under s 466(6) of the Uniform Law. -- 16 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 17 Consideration of the allegations 56 Next, we deal with the Grounds and our findings in respect of them. 57 We commence with stating the allegations in Ground 1 and Ground 2, and then we deal with the evidence and findings of fact with respect to those Grounds together. We have done so because both Ground 1 and Ground 2 relate to the Practitioner's conduct of the Supreme Court proceedings. Additionally, the facts for those Grounds are, in our view, more easily understood when the facts are presented chronologically. 58 We then separately deal with the allegations in Ground 3, the factual findings and our conclusions because Ground 3 concerns conduct which occurred at a later time, during the Board's investigation into the matters resulting in Ground 1 and Gound 2. The allegations in Ground 1 and Ground 2 Ground 1 - the allegation 59 The allegation in Ground 1 is as follows: 60 That the Practitioner, between 1 March 2019 and 24 August 2021, engaged in professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law, and further and alternatively within the meaning of the two limbs in Kyle, in that he engaged in conduct which: (1) involved a substantial and consistent failure to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and (2) further and alternatively, would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence, and that, to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence, in the course of acting for Ms Maria Irmayanti as trustee for Eugenius Willison (Client) in relation to a dispute which was the subject of proceedings seeking orders, pursuant to s 45 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) (Application), in the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Supreme Court), in that the Practitioner: -- 17 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 18 (3) maintained the Application after 1 March 2019 in circumstances where the Practitioner knew, or ought to have known, that the Application had no reasonable prospects of success; (4) drafted and filed an affidavit that fell substantially short of the standards to be expected of a competent legal practitioner; and (5) persistently failed to comply with the orders of the Supreme Court regarding the time for taking procedural steps in relation to the Application. 61 The Applicant asserts that in doing so the Practitioner breached the following Conduct Rules (which we outlined above, but summarise here for convenience): (1) Rule 5 of the Conduct Rules, which provides that a practitioner's duty to the court and to the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty, including a duty owed to a client; (2) Rule 6(1)(c) of the Conduct Rules, which requires a practitioner to deliver legal services competently and diligently; and (3) Rules 6(2)(b) and (c) of the Conduct Rules, which provide that a practitioner must not engage in conduct, in the course of providing legal services or otherwise, which: (a) may be prejudicial to or diminish public confidence in the administration of justice; or (b) may bring the profession into disrepute; (4) Rule 36(1) of the Conduct Rules, which provides that a practitioner must take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure that work the practitioner does in relation to a case is done so as to: (a) confine the case to identified issues which are genuinely in dispute; (b) have the case ready as soon as practicable; (c) present the identified issues in dispute clearly and succinctly; and -- 18 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 19 (d) occupy as short a time in court as is reasonably necessary to advance and protect the client's interests which are at stake in the case. Ground 2 - the allegation 62 The allegation made by the Applicant in Ground 2 is: 63 That the Practitioner, on 11 November 2021, engaged in professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) and s 297(1)(b) of the Uniform Law, or alternatively as defined in Kyle, in that he engaged in conduct which: (1) involved a substantial and consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; (2) further and alternatively, would justify a finding that the Practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice; and (3) further and alternatively, would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence, and that, to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed and approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence, in the course of acting for his client in the Application by swearing and causing to be filed in the Supreme Court an affidavit where: (4) the Practitioner knew that the affidavit contained statements that were false and/or misleading; and (5) the Practitioner intended the court to be misled by those statements; or (6) alternatively, the Practitioner was recklessly indifferent as to whether the statements were false and/or misleading and as to whether the Court would be misled by those statements. The evidence and findings of fact relevant to Ground 1 and Ground 2 64 We are satisfied of and make the findings of fact identified in [65] - [133]. -- 19 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 20 65 The Practitioner was admitted to practice in New South Wales on 4 December 2009.27 66 At all material times the Practitioner held a local practising certificate in Western Australia.28 67 From 6 November 2017 to 30 June 2018, the Practitioner was an employee of Chapmans Barristers and Solicitors (Chapmans). From 1 July 2018 to 4 November 2018 the Practitioner was a sole practitioner at Sonraj Legal. He rejoined Chapmans on 3 September 2018 and was employed there until 24 January 2020. On 27 January 2020 he commenced employment at Amasons Legal until 30 June 2022. 29 68 On 17 April 2011, Mr Kim Willison (the Deceased) died in Indonesia, where he was then living. The Deceased had signed various Wills, left assets in Australia, Indonesia and Singapore, had taken out a loan in Italy for one million euros, and there was a pending criminal prosecution against the Deceased in Italy.30 69 The Executor engaged Jackson McDonald, to act for him in relation to the administration of the Estate and to apply for probate in Western Australia.31 70 Probate of the Deceased's Estate (Estate) was granted to Mr Clayton Hollingsworth (Executor) by the Supreme Court on 20 March 2013.32 71 At some time before 2 March 2018, the Practitioner was engaged to act for the Deceased's infant son, Master Willison, in relation to the administration of the Estate. The instructions were provided by Master Willison's mother, Ms Irmayanti,33 who was his next friend.34 Ms Irmayanti was never married to the Deceased.35 27 Exhibit 1.25, page 509. 28 Exhibit 1.25, page 509. 29 Exhibit 1.25, page 509; see also affidavit of the Practitioner dated 31 May 2019 at Exhibit 1.5(a), page 45. 30 Sanderson Decision at [6]; Exhibit 1.1, pages 6 - 7; Allanson Decision at [2] Exhibit 1.2, page 13. See also, Exhibit 1.7(c), pages 271 - 273. 31 Sanderson Decision at [6]; Exhibit 1.1, page 7. 32 Sanderson Decision at [7]; Exhibit 1.1, page 7. 33 Exhibit 1.5(a), page 45. 34 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 263. 35 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 280. -- 20 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 21 72 Master Willison was a beneficiary of the Estate, either in his own right or through Ms Irmayanti acting as trustee.36 There were two other beneficiaries of the Estate who were adult children of the Deceased.37 73 On 2 March 2018, the Executor's solicitors sent a letter to the three beneficiaries of the Estate.38 The correspondence was sent to the Practitioner on behalf of Master Willison. 74 The letter informed the beneficiaries that the Executor had obtained an opinion from an Italian lawyer concerning the enforceability of a loan taken out by the Deceased in Italy. The letter advised that if a beneficiary agreed to receive a distribution from the Estate they would be considered an 'heir' under Italian law and would assume liability for the Italian loan, and that they were seeking further clarification of some issues from the Italian lawyer. It further advised that the beneficiaries should consider their positions and take the opportunity to obtain independent legal advice before confirming if they still wish to receive a share of the Estate under the Will. 75 The letter also informed the beneficiaries of the following matters: (1) the Executor was in a position to distribute the assets of the Estate in accordance with the Deceased's will; (2) some of the assets of the Estate had come from money held in banks in Indonesia (Indonesian Money); (3) the Executor had been required to undertake to the Indonesian banks that he would distribute the Indonesian Money in accordance with Indonesian law which allowed only 'legitimate heirs' (being children born within a marriage) to inherit (the Undertaking) otherwise he would not have been able to collect the Indonesian money from the banks; (4) Indonesian law relating to inheritance appeared to be in conflict with the laws of Western Australia in respect to the distribution of the Indonesian Money because the Deceased was domiciled in Western Australia and therefore Western Australian law 36 A copy of the Deceased's will is not before the Tribunal. An email from the Executor's solicitors to the Practitioner dated 23 August 2018 queries whether Ms Irmayanti should be the plaintiff on the basis that '[t]he Will names Maria [Ms Irmayanti] as a beneficiary (for Sunny) [Master Willison]': see Exhibit 1.7(c), page 317. Nothing turns on the distinction in this proceeding. 37 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 280. 38 Exhibit 1.7(c), pages 271 - 273. -- 21 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 22 applies and the Estate should be distributed in accordance with the Deceased's will; and (5) it would be possible to apply to the Supreme Court for a direction in relation to the distribution of the Indonesian Money but because that might be costly and time consuming the Executor was willing to distribute the Estate, including the Indonesian Money, in accordance with the Deceased's will if: (a) the two adult beneficiaries and Master Willison's mother (Ms Irmayanti), on his behalf, entered into a deed indemnifying the Executor for any claims that might be brought against him for breach of the Undertaking he had made to the Indonesian banks; and (b) the two adult beneficiaries directed the Executor to distribute one-third of the Indonesian Money to Ms Irmayanti for Master Willison in accordance with the Deceased's will and the laws of Western Australia. 76 On 29 March 2018, the Practitioner sent a letter to the Executor's solicitors asking for a copy of the Undertaking so he could advise his client properly and obtain her instructions in relation to the distribution of the assets of the Estate.39 77 The Executor's solicitors provided the Practitioner with a copy of the Undertaking under cover of a letter dated 29 March 2018.40 78 On 5 April 2018 the Practitioner sent the Executor's solicitors a letter in which he stated, amongst other things:41 (1) that the risk of liability occurring from Italy was 'minimal' because his client was residing in Australia and that his client had instructed him to proceed with the distribution of the Estate; (2) his firm did not see any issue with the Indonesian Money being collected from the banks in Indonesia because probate was granted in Western Australia and the laws of Western Australia, and not Indonesia, applied; 39 Exhibit 1.7(c) page 274. 40 Exhibit 1.7(c) page 275. 41 Exhibit 1.7(c) pages 286 - 287. -- 22 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 23 (3) with respect to the Undertaking given by the Executor, that the issue of any civil or criminal liability would only arise if probate was obtained in Indonesia; (4) that no conflict of law existed and it was not necessary to apply to the Supreme Court to determine an issue which was 'very clear' because Indonesian law did not apply in Western Australia; (5) there was, therefore, no need for a deed of indemnity to be entered into as had been proposed and that the likelihood of the Indonesian banks bringing any claim against the Executor were 'remote at best'; (6) the costs of any such application which might be made to the Supreme Court by the Executor ought to be borne by the Executor and not the beneficiaries; and (7) the Estate should be administered forthwith because there had been many delays. 79 On 18 May 2018, the Executor's solicitors sent the Practitioner a draft Deed of Release.42 The Practitioner responded in a letter dated 25 May 2018 in which, amongst other things, he commented on and requested changes to the Deed of Release. The Practitioner stated that he was putting the Executor's solicitors on notice that if he did not receive a satisfactory response, his client would have no option but to file an originating summons in the Supreme Court to obtain orders for the Executor to distribute the Estate monies. 80 The Executor's solicitors responded to the Practitioner's letter on 5 June 2018.43 Their letter of response attached a revised Deed of Release and stated: (1) the Executor could not 'dismiss the possibility that there is a potential conflict of law'; (2) unlike the Practitioner, they had obtained advice from Indonesian lawyers about the matter; (3) the grant of probate had no legal status in Indonesia; 42 This letter is not before the Tribunal but is referred to in the letter from Chapmans dated 25 May 2018 which comments on, and requests changes to the Deed of Release: see Exhibit 1.7(c), pages 288 - 290. 43 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 291. -- 23 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 24 (4) the Indonesian banks had agreed to pay the Indonesian Money to a representative of the Deceased's two adult children (who happened to be the Executor) on the basis that the funds were paid into a separate bank account because the banks did not consider them to be an Estate asset; (5) that the Deceased's adult children had agreed to the Deed of Release which would result in the Practitioner's client receiving an equal share of the money; and (6) the issue could be resolved by the Executor entering into the proposed Deed of Release with the beneficiaries, with the alternative being that the Executor would apply to the Supreme Court to ask the Court to rule on the issue which would result in additional costs and delay. 81 On 18 June 2018, the Practitioner wrote to the Executor's solicitors saying:44 (1) the draft Deed of Release needed to be amended to reflect that no conflict of law existed; (2) Ms Irmayanti would not give the proposed release to the Executor; (3) he had instructions to commence proceedings to determine 'all these issues and for the Court to make appropriate orders'; and (4) that he was putting the Executor's solicitors on notice that his client would be seeking indemnity costs and that 'these matters have dragged on for far too long and it is totally unacceptable on the part of your Client to further delay the distribution of the Estate. There is nothing stopping your client from distributing the Estate assets in accordance with the deceased's Will'. 82 On 5 July 2018, the Executor's solicitors emailed the Practitioner. The email advised that if the Client would not sign the Deed of Release, they had instructions to apply for a ruling from the Supreme Court dealing with the distribution of the Indonesian money to resolve the 44 Exhibit 1.7(c), pages 303 - 304. -- 24 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 25 conflict of law.45 Ten minutes later, the Executor's solicitors sent a further email attaching a clean version of the Deed of Release.46 83 On 20 July 2018, the Practitioner filed an originating summons in the Supreme Court (Originating Summons), which was allocated the matter number CIV 2269 of 2018.47 We will refer to this as the Application. 84 At that time, there were other Supreme Court proceedings on foot, commenced in December 2017, that had been allocated the matter CIV 3079 of 2017. In those proceedings the Client, represented by the Practitioner, brought a claim against the Executor alleging a breach of fiduciary duties in failing to distribute the Estate in a timely manner.48 85 In the Originating Summons for the Application: 49 (1) Master Willison by his next friend, Ms Irmayanti, was named as the Plaintiff; and (2) the Executor was named in his personal capacity as the Defendant. 86 The Originating Summons sought to have orders made pursuant to s 45 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) (Administration Act), with reference to the following questions which were said to arise in respect of the administration of the Deceased's Estate: (1) 'Whether the Defendant, as executor and trustee of the Estate of Kim Robert Willison (deceased) should not forthwith pay over to the Plaintiff or his solicitors the amount admitted by the Defendant to be in his hands as such trustee, payable to the Plaintiff as beneficiary named in the Will of the deceased of the said Estate' (Payment Issue); (2) 'Whether in the payment and distribution of the Estate by the Defendant as executor and trustee, the Defendant is entitled to demand from the Plaintiff the release and indemnity as drafted by the Defendant's lawyers, Jackson McDonald' (Indemnity Issue); 45 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 305. 46 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 307. 47 Exhibit 1.7(a), pages 249 - 256. 48 Sanderson Decision at [2] and [8]; Exhibit 1.1, pages 6 - 7. The Practitioner's conduct in CIV 3079 of 2017 is not the subject of Grounds 1, 2 and 3 alleged by the Applicant. 49 Exhibit 1.7(a), pages 251 - 255. -- 25 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 26 (3) 'Whether there is a no [sic] conflict of laws between the laws of Western Australia and the laws of Indonesia, and if there is any such conflict then whether it should be determined in favour of the laws of Western Australia' (Conflict Issue); and (4) 'Whether the Defendant should not pay to the Plaintiff the costs of these proceedings'. 87 The Originating Summons was not supported by any affidavit.50 88 On 23 August 2018, the Executor's solicitors sent an email to the Practitioner in which they asserted that the Indemnity Issue and the Payment Issue were not in dispute and should, therefore, be withdrawn.51 The email also referred to the possibility of the Executor submitting his accounts to the Court to obtain security for a discharge for his administration by having the accounts passed and settled. The email also referred to various other matters relating to the Originating Summons which are not relevant for present purposes. 89 No affidavit in support of the Originating Summons was filed between 20 July 2018 and 12 December 2018.52 90 On 13 December 2018, the Court made an order requiring the Plaintiff to file and serve any affidavit in support of the Originating Summons on or before 4 January 2019.53 91 By letter to the Practitioner dated 22 January 2019,54 the Executor's Solicitors: (1) noted that the Plaintiff had failed to comply with the Court's order that he file an affidavit in support of the Application by 4 January 2019; (2) informed him that the other two Beneficiaries had executed an irrevocable authority and direction (Authority) instructing the Executor to treat the Indonesian Money as an asset of the estate for distribution in accordance with the Deceased's will and, as a result, the Conflict Issue was resolved; 50 Court Record. 51 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 317. 52 Court Record. 53 Court Record. 54 Exhibit 1.5(f), page 229. -- 26 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 27 (3) asserted that, in those circumstances, the Plaintiff's Application no longer served any purpose; and (4) invited the Plaintiff to discontinue the Application before further costs were incurred. 92 By 27 February 2019 the Plaintiff still had not filed any affidavit in support of the Application.55 93 On 28 February 2019, the Supreme Court made an order requiring the Plaintiff to file and serve any affidavits in support of the Application by 21 March 2019.56 94 By letter dated 1 March 2019,57 the Executor's Solicitors informed the Practitioner that the Executor no longer required the Plaintiff to enter into a deed of release and indemnity. This was because the two adult beneficiaries had provided an Irrevocable Authority to distribute the Indonesian Money as though it formed part of the Australian Estate. They also asked the Practitioner if the Plaintiff client would be agreeable to dismissing the Application. The Executor's Solicitors further informed the Practitioner that the Executor no longer required his client to execute any deed of release and indemnity because the Executor had passed the Estate accounts in the Supreme Court. 95 By letter dated 7 March 2019,58 the Practitioner responded to the Executor's Solicitors acknowledging that the Indemnity Issue was resolved and advising that he had instructions that the Plaintiff was 'agreeable to discontinuing [the Application] on the basis that [the Executor] distribute the estate monies immediately' and on the basis that 'each party bear their own costs in relation to [the Application]'. The Practitioner asked the Executor's solicitors if they would draft consent orders to that effect.59 96 Between 8 March 2019 and 4 April 2019, the Plaintiff failed to file any affidavit in support of the Application or to take any steps to discontinue the Application.60 55 Court Record and Exhibit 1.5(f), page 229 (letter from Executor's Solicitors). 56 Exhibit 1.7(c), page 322. 57 Exhibit 1.5 (f), page 230. 58 Exhibit 1.5(f), page 231. 59 The Practitioner also advised that action CIV 3079 of 2017 would 'stay on foot' and that he would be filing his client's statement of claim on or before 21 March 2019: see Exhibit 1.5(f), page 231. 60 Court Record. -- 27 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 28 97 On 4 April 2019, the Supreme Court again ordered that the Plaintiff file any affidavits in support of the Application.61 98 By 16 May 2019, the Plaintiff had not filed any affidavit as required by the orders of the Supreme Court or taken any other procedural step to progress the discontinuance of the Application. 99 On 16 May 2019 the Supreme Court made a springing order.62 The Court ordered that: (1) the Plaintiff was to file and serve any affidavit in support of the Application on or before 31 May 2019; and (2) the Application would stand dismissed if the order requiring the filing and serving of affidavits was not complied with.63 100 On 31 May 2019, being the last day allowed under the order, the Practitioner filed an affidavit in support of the Application (First Affidavit).64 101 The First Affidavit: (1) did not depose to any facts relevant to the Application; (2) annexed, without indexation and identification, 169 pages of documents and correspondence; and (3) provided no context for, or explanation of, the relevance of the annexed documents to the orders sought. 102 On 26 June 2019, the Supreme Court ordered the Plaintiff to file and serve any submissions in support of the Application by 18 July 2019.65 The Plaintiff failed to comply with that order.66 103 On 5 August 2019, the Supreme Court made orders that: (1) the Plaintiff file and serve any submissions in support of the Application by 19 August 2019; and 61 The 4 April 2019 order is referred to in the Allanson Decision at [22]; Exhibit 1.2, page 17. 62 Allanson Decision at [23]; Exhibit 1.2, page 17. 63 Court Record and transcript. 64 Exhibit 1.5(a), pages 44 - 217. 65 Allanson Decision at [27]; Exhibit 1.2, page 18. 66 Court Record. -- 28 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 29 (2) if the orders for the filing of submissions were not complied with, the Application would stand dismissed.67 104 The Practitioner filed submissions in support of the Application on 19 August 2019.68 105 On 12 September 2019, Master Sanderson granted summary judgment in favour of the Executor (who was the Defendant) in CIV 3079 of 2017.69 106 On 15 July 2020, the Practitioner filed a notice of change of legal representation by which he informed the Court and the Executor that the Plaintiff was now represented by the Practitioner trading as 'Amasons Legal'.70 107 On 24 February 2021, the Supreme Court issued a notice placing the Application on the inactive cases list71 because no steps had been taken between 19 August 2019 and 24 February 2021 other than the filing of the notice of change of legal representation. 108 Between 25 February 2021 and 23 August 2021, the Plaintiff did not take any steps to have the matter removed from the inactive cases list. 109 On 24 August 2021, the Practitioner: (1) filed a summons in the Supreme Court seeking an order that the matter be removed from the inactive cases list;72 (2) swore and filed an affidavit in support of the summons;73 and (3) filed a certificate of urgency. 110 On 24 August 2021, Allanson J heard the application to remove the matter from the inactive cases list and dismissed it. The Application was also dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to 67 Allanson Decision at [28]; Exhibit 1.2 page 18. 68 Allanson Decision at [29], [74] and [75]; Exhibit 1.2 pages 18 and 26. 69 Sanderson Decision at [1] and [16]; Exhibit 1.1, pages 6 and 9. 70 Allanson Decision at [31]; Exhibit 1.2 page 19. 71 Allanson Decision at [45], Exhibit 1.2 page 20. 72 Exhibit 1.7(b), pages 257 - 259. 73 Allanson Decision at [61] - [62]; Exhibit 1.2 pages 22 - 23. -- 29 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 30 O 4A r 28 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA).74 His Honour also made orders that:75 (1) any party seeking to apply for an order for costs was to file an affidavit by 24 September 2021 together with a minute of proposed orders; and (2) the parties were to file submissions as to costs by 15 October 2021. 111 The Practitioner did not file any affidavit or minute of proposed orders as to costs or any submissions in respect of costs in compliance with Allanson J's orders. 112 On 19 October 2021, the Practitioner telephoned the Court and advised that he intended to file an affidavit and submissions as to costs by close of business on 22 October 2021.76 He failed to do so.77 113 On 27 October 2021, the Supreme Court notified the Practitioner that the matter had been listed for 5 November 2021 to enable him to show cause as to why a costs order should not be made against him personally.78 114 On 3 November 2021, the Practitioner wrote to the Supreme Court asking for the 5 November 2021 hearing to be vacated and relisted to 12 November 2021 because he was suffering from a medical condition but that he 'will not be required to attend hospital on that day'.79 115 The Supreme Court granted the Practitioner's request, and the matter was relisted to 12 November 2021. The Court also invited the Practitioner to provide evidence of his medical condition in the event that it may be relevant to his potential liability to pay costs.80 116 On 10 November 2021, the Practitioner requested that the hearing listed for 12 November 2021 be vacated.81 In response, the Practitioner 74 Allanson Decision at [47] - [48]; Exhibit 1.2, pages 20 - 21. 75 Allanson Decision at [7] - [8] and [50]; Exhibit 1.2, pages 14 and 21. 76 Allanson Decision at [52]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 77 Allanson Decision at [52]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 78 Allanson Decision at [53]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 79 Allanson Decision at [53]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 80 Allanson Decision at [53]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 81 Allanson Decision at [54]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. -- 30 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 31 was informed that he would be required to provide medical evidence on affidavit before the request would be considered.82 117 On 11 November 2021, the Practitioner swore and had filed in the Supreme Court an affidavit in support of the application to adjourn the hearing which had been listed for 12 November 2021 (12 November Hearing).83 In that affidavit, which we will refer to as the 11 November 2021 Affidavit, the Practitioner stated: (1) the affidavit was sworn in support of his application to adjourn the 12 November Hearing to a date on or after 26 November 2021; (2) the basis for the adjournment was that he had been suffering from a 'severe mouth infection which has caused [him] to suffer severe mouth pain, mouth inflammation, high fever, and mouth ulcers' (Medical Condition). He said the Medical Condition began approximately two and a half weeks ago and had gradually been getting worse; (3) he attended a dentist on 1 November 2021 and 4 November 2021 and was diagnosed with a 'mouth infection' and prescribed a course of antibiotics; (4) he attended his general practitioner on 6 November 2021 when his Medical Condition did not improve and was prescribed a separate course of antibiotics and pain relief because he had been experiencing 'extreme' pain and again on 10 November 2021; and (5) that he was experiencing symptoms which meant that he was 'unable to speak properly as well as not being able to chew any solid food [and that he had] essentially been on a liquid diet for the last 2 weeks'. 118 The Practitioner attached to the 11 November 2021 Affidavit: (a) a letter from St John Dental stating that the Practitioner had attended the dental centre on 1 and 4 November 2021 'for a sore mouth'. It stated that on 4 November 2021 the Practitioner 'was having severe pain in the mouth and had a high fever' and 82 Allanson Decision at [54]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 83 Exhibit 1.8, pages 451 - 454. -- 31 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 32 that he had prescribed pain relief and prescribed rest84 (Dentist's Letter); and (b) a medical certificate dated 10 November 2021 from his general practitioner that certified that the Practitioner was 'unable to work from 10/11/2021 to 16/11/2021 inclusive due to a medical condition' (Medical Certificate).85 119 The 12 November Hearing was adjourned to 19 November 2021 based on the contents of the 11 November 2021 Affidavit.86 120 Between 12 November 2021 and 16 November 2021, the Practitioner acted for a client in an unrelated Supreme Court matter (Unrelated Matter).87 Prior to this, on 9 November 2021, the Practitioner had written to the other party in the Unrelated Matter.88 Among other things he told them that if they did not reply to his correspondence by 11 November 2021, he would commence the Unrelated Matter in the Supreme Court. 121 On 16 November 2021, in the Unrelated Matter, the Practitioner prepared and had filed the following documents:89 (1) an originating summons; (2) a memorandum of conferral; (3) an undertaking as to damages; (4) a certificate of urgency; (5) a minute of proposed orders; and (6) an affidavit which he had sworn on 15 November 2021. 122 On 16 November 2021, the Practitioner appeared as counsel at a hearing before her Honour, Hill J in relation to the Unrelated Matter.90 He made no mention of the Medical Condition, having been certified as unfit for work including for 16 November 2021, or of any of the matters referred to in the 11 November 2021 Affidavit. 84 Exhibit 1.8, page 453. 85 Exhibit 1.8 page 454. 86 Allanson Decision at [53]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. 87 Allanson Decision at [55]; Exhibit 1.2, page 22. 88 Exhibit 1.9, page 456. 89 Exhibit 1.10, page 464. 90 Exhibit 1.9, page 455. -- 32 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 33 123 Hill J adjourned the hearing to the following day to allow the Practitioner to consider some issues which her Honour had raised about the application in the Unrelated Matter and to allow him to consult counsel about those issues.91 124 At the hearing in relation to the Unrelated Matter before Hill J on 16 November 2021, the Practitioner told her Honour that he had written to the defendant's solicitors on 9 November 2021 foreshadowing the making of the application and that they had replied to him on 11 November 2021.92 We accept that the Practitioner's statement as to those communications was truthful and we find that those communications occurred on those dates. 125 On 18 November 2021, the Practitioner swore, and had filed in the Unrelated Matter, a further affidavit. 126 On 19 November 2021 the Application was listed for a hearing before Allanson J. The Practitioner appeared for the Plaintiff. During the hearing Allanson J informed the Practitioner that he was aware that he had appeared at a hearing related to the Unrelated Matter on 16 November 2021 and that he was concerned that the 11 November 2021 Affidavit, filed in support of the adjournment application, was misleading. His Honour queried whether the Practitioner had provided legal services in relation to the Unrelated Matter between 12 and 16 November 2021.93 127 The Practitioner confirmed that he had provided legal services in relation to the Unrelated Matter between 12 and 16 November 2021 and had appeared at the hearing on 16 November 2021 before Hill J.94 128 Allanson J expressed the view that the 11 November 2021 Affidavit was misleading. The Practitioner apologised for misleading the Court but asserted that he had not done so deliberately.95 129 At the hearing on 19 November 2021, the Practitioner conceded that:96 (1) the Conflict Issue had been resolved by 22 January 2019; 91 Exhibit 1.9, pages 459 - 460. 92 Exhibit 1.9, page 456. 93 Exhibit 1.3(a), pages 31 - 32. 94 Exhibit 1.3(a), page 31. 95 Exhibit 1.3(a), page 32. 96 Exhibit 1.3(a), pages 33 - 36. -- 33 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 34 (2) the Indemnity Issue was resolved from 1 March 2019; (3) he should personally pay the costs of the application to remove the matter from the inactive cases list on a solicitor/client basis; and (4) he should personally pay the Executor's costs of the Application, although he sought leave to adduce further evidence and make submissions on the question of which periods of time ought to be ordered to be paid on a solicitor/client or indemnity basis. 130 Allanson J allowed the Practitioner the opportunity to file affidavits and submissions by 26 November 2021 in relation to the costs issues and informed the Practitioner that his conduct would be the subject of a report from the Supreme Court to the Law Complaints Officer.97 131 On 26 November 2021, the Practitioner swore and filed an affidavit on the question of costs98 and informed the Court by email that his submissions would also be filed later that day.99 No submissions on costs were ever filed.100 132 On 2 December 2021, Allanson J published his reasons for decision in which he recorded that: (1) From its very commencement, the Plaintiff had delayed the progress of the Application by failing to comply with programming orders.101 (2) The Plaintiff's failure to comply with programming orders persisted into the application for costs.102 (3) The preparation and content of the Practitioner's First Affidavit fell far short of the standards expected of a competent legal practitioner. This was because '[t]he text of the affidavit did not give any explanation of its relevance to the orders sought by the plaintiff' and further, that '[t]o the extent that the affidavit could be said to support - or be relevant to - the application for orders 97 Exhibit 1.3(a), pages 32 - 38. 98 Allanson Decision at [57]; Exhibit 1.2, page 22. 99 Allanson Decision at [58]; Exhibit 1.2, page 22. 100 Allanson Decision at [58]; Exhibit 1.2, page 22. 101 Allanson Decision at [5]; Exhibit 1.2, page 13. 102 Allanson Decision at [49]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. -- 34 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 35 under the Administration Act, it did so only through the inclusion of some of the correspondence and a chronology that had been prepared by Jackson McDonald and provided to Mr Singh on 7 September 2017'.103 (4) The Plaintiff had persisted in a hopeless case after 1 March 2019. Allanson J stated that he was 'not satisfied that it must have always been apparent to the plaintiff and his legal representatives that the application was misconceived or without substance' but that in his opinion, 'the letter from Jackson McDonald of 1 March 2019 is the critical event'.104 (5) There was an element of improper, or at least unreasonable, conduct by the Plaintiff or the Practitioner that had been demonstrated.105 (6) The costs of both parties from 1 March 2019, had been 'occasioned by the unreasonable and negligent conduct of the [Practitioner]'.106 (7) Master Willison and the Estate of the Deceased had been 'harmed' by the conduct of the Practitioner. Master Willison's 'inheritance may have been substantially consumed by legal fees' and 'the administration of that estate has been delayed and put to unnecessary expense in wasted legal costs'. His Honour further observed that: 'All of the costs from at the latest 1 March 2019 were, in the relevant sense, wasted'.107 133 In respect of the costs application the Court ordered:108 (1) the Practitioner pay the costs incurred by the Executor in relation to the application to remove the matter from the inactive cases list so that the Executor was completely indemnified for his costs; (2) the Practitioner pay the costs incurred by the Executor in relation to the Application on a party/party basis to 1 March 2019; and 103 Allanson Decision at [25] - [26]; Exhibit 1.2, pages 17 - 18. 104 Allanson Decision at [71] - [74]; Exhibit 1.2, pages 25 - 26. 105 Allanson Decision at [76] - [77]; Exhibit 1.2, page 26. 106 Allanson Decision at [77]; Exhibit 1.2, page 26. 107 Allanson Decision at [77]; Exhibit 1.2, page 26. 108 Allanson Decision at [79]; Exhibit 1.2, pages 26 - 27. -- 35 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 36 (3) the Practitioner pay the costs incurred by the Executor in relation to the Application from 1 March 2019, including the costs of the application for costs, on a solicitor/client basis so that the Executor was completely indemnified for his costs.109 Ground 1 - further findings and conclusions 134 We agree with the opinion of Allanson J that the 'critical event' was the letter from the Executor's solicitors dated 1 March 2019 and that to maintain the Supreme Court Proceeding from that point was 'unreasonable'. We so find. 135 As Allanson J observed, at that point, the Practitioner was advised that his Client was no longer being asked to sign a Deed of Release and indemnity, and that the Estate's accounts had been passed in the Supreme Court. The passing of the accounts effectively meant that the Supreme Court had approved the correctness of the accounts.110 It meant that there was no need for the Court to settle any questions arising in administration under s 45 of the Administration Act, including the questions that were the subject of the orders sought by the Plaintiff in the Application. In short, there was nothing left for the Supreme Court to resolve and yet, the Practitioner did not take any steps to discontinue the Application. 136 We are therefore satisfied, and find, that the Applicant's allegation that the Practitioner continued with the Application after 1 March 2019 in circumstances where the Practitioner knew or ought to have known, that the Application had no reasonable prospects of success is made out. 137 We have already made findings at [101] about the inadequacies of the First Affidavit. We accept the comments of Allanson J in this regard. These included the text of the affidavit failing to give any explanation of its relevance to the orders sought, and annexing, without indexation and identification, 169 pages of documents and correspondence with no context or explanation as to why those documents were relevant to an application for orders under the Administration Act. The inadequacy of that First Affidavit is further illustrated by the fact that the Court made orders on two occasions, on 26 June 2019 and 5 August 2019, that the Practitioner file and serve submissions in support of the Application. In our view, a reasonably 109 Allanson Decision at [79]; Exhibit 1.2, page 27. 110 Administration Act, s 43(2). -- 36 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 37 competent practitioner would know that they were required to depose to facts relevant to an application in an affidavit and to explain the relevance of the orders sought to that Application. In short, we agree with the observation of Allanson J, at [132] above, that the preparation and content of the Practitioner's First Affidavit fell far short of the standards expected of a competent legal practitioner. 138 We are therefore satisfied and find that the allegation that the Practitioner drafted and filed an affidavit (the First Affidavit) that fell substantially short of the standards to be expected of a competent legal practitioner is made out. 139 We have also found that the Practitioner failed to comply with numerous Court orders, including orders made on 13 December 2018, 28 February 2019 and 4 April 2019 requiring him to file and serve an affidavit in support of the Application, which resulted in the Court making a springing order on 16 May 2019. 140 Additionally, we are satisfied and find that: 1. the Practitioner did not comply with Allanson J's orders of 24 August 2021 by filing a minute of proposed orders and submissions on costs by 15 October 2021; 2. at the hearing on 19 November 2021, Allanson J gave the Practitioner a further week to put forward submissions and evidence concerning the making of an indemnity costs order against the Practitioner personally and stated that he was 'not at all impressed by what has happened' and referred to the 'repeated opportunities' the Practitioner had been given by the Court;111 and 3. the Practitioner filed an affidavit in the required time,112 but despite informing the Court by email that he would file submissions later that day, none were filed. 141 Accordingly, we are satisfied and find that the allegation that the Practitioner persistently failed to comply with the orders of the Supreme Court regarding the time for taking procedural steps in relation to the Application is also made out. 111 Exhibit 1.3(a), page 37. 112 Allanson Decision at [23]; Exhibit 1.2, page 17; Exhibit 1.5(a), pages 44 - 217. -- 37 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 38 142 We are further satisfied and find that the Practitioner's conduct, as we have found it, did breach each of the Conduct Rules referred to in Ground 1 at [45] - [49] and [61]. 143 Specifically, pursuing a hopeless case for two and a half years was conduct that was contrary to the Practitioner's duty to the court and the administration of justice in breach of r 5 of the Conduct Rules. Such conduct is also a contravention of r 6(1)(c) which required the Practitioner to deliver legal services to a client competently and diligently, as well as r 6(2)(b) and (c) which requires that the Practitioner must not engage in conduct that may be prejudicial, or diminish public confidence in the administration of justice or which may bring the profession into disrepute. It also breaches r 36(1)(a) and (d) which required the Practitioner to take all reasonable and practicable steps to confine the case to issues that are genuinely in dispute and to occupy as short a time in court as is reasonably necessary to advance and protect the client's interests. 144 The preparation and filing of the inadequate First Affidavit breached r 6(1)(c), which required the Practitioner to deliver legal services to the Client competently and diligently, as well as r 36(1)(b) which required the Practitioner to take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure the work done on the Client's case is completed so as to present the identified issues in dispute clearly and succinctly. 145 Finally, persistently failing to comply with court orders breached the Practitioner's duty to the court and to the administration of justice which is identified in r 5 of the Conduct Rules. It was also conduct that may be prejudicial to or diminish public confidence in the administration of justice or which may bring the profession into disrepute and amounts to a contravention of r 6(2)(b) and (c) of the Conduct Rules. Further, it amounts to a failure to deliver legal services competently and diligently which constitutes a breach of r 6(1)(c) of the Conduct Rules. Characterisation of the conduct 146 In our view, the conduct, persisting as it did over a two-year period, caused the Executor to incur time and expense in defending an application which, from 1 March 2019, the Practitioner knew or ought to have known had no reasonable prospects of success. 147 We find that, viewed in its entirety, the Practitioner's conduct in the Supreme Court matter as found in respect of Ground 1, wasted -- 38 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 39 limited court time and resources and was prejudicial to the proper administration of justice and likely to reduce public confidence in the administration of justice and the legal profession as a whole. 148 We are satisfied that the Practitioner's conduct, in maintaining a hopeless case with no reasonable prospects of success for approximately two years, drafting the First Affidavit which fell short of standards expected of a competent legal practitioner, and persistently failing to comply with court orders, meets the definition of professional misconduct in s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law because the conduct involved a substantial and consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence. 149 We are also satisfied and find that the conduct falls within the definition of professional misconduct within the meaning of both limbs of Kyle because the conduct: (a) would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence; and (b) to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence. 150 Accordingly, we find that the Practitioner's conduct amounts to professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law and within the meaning of both limbs of the Kyle test. Ground 2 - further findings of fact 151 The findings of fact which we have already made are relevant to this Ground. We will not repeat them. 152 As we have already found at [117] in the 11 November 2021 Affidavit the Practitioner expressly swore that he was 'unable to speak properly'. It stated that the Medical Condition was 'severe' and that the Practitioner's condition was 'getting worse' and that he was in 'extreme' pain and was suffering inflammation and a high fever. Further, the Medical Certificate annexed to the 11 November 2021 Affidavit certified the Practitioner to be 'unable to work' from 10 to 16 November 2021 inclusive. 153 We find that this was a clear representation by the Practitioner to the Court that he was unable to perform any work at all (whether legal work such as preparing documents or in court advocacy) during the -- 39 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 40 period 10 November 2021 to 16 November 2021 inclusive (Relevant Period). 154 As we have found at [119], after the Practitioner filed the 11 November 2021 Affidavit, the Supreme Court adjourned the 12 November hearing to 19 November 2021. 155 We are satisfied, and find, that the adjournment was granted because the Court accepted the statements made by the Practitioner in the 11 November 2021 Affidavit, namely that he was experiencing extreme pain and was unable to speak properly due to the Medical Condition, and that he was unable to perform any work for the Relevant Period including being unable to attend the directions hearing on 12 November 2021. 156 We are also satisfied and find, based on the circumstances set out at [157(a)] - [157(c)] below, that the Practitioner knew that this statement (that he could not undertake any legal work at all from 10 November 2021 to 16 November 2021) was false or misleading when he swore the 11 November 2021 Affidavit and filed it in the Court. 157 Specifically: (a) on 9 November 2021, the Practitioner was working on the Unrelated Matter, as evidenced from his letter of that date to the other party in that application, which stated that if he did not receive a reply, he would file an application in the Unrelated Matter by 11 November 2021;113 (b) the Practitioner admitted to Allanson J that he had been working on the Unrelated Matter on 12 November 2021;114 and (c) the Practitioner told Hill J at the 16 November 2021 hearing that he had conferred with the solicitors in the Unrelated Matter between 9 and 11 November 2021.115 158 These circumstances show that the Practitioner was working on the Unrelated Matter in the days before (including the day before) and in the days after he filed the 11 November 2021 Affidavit and that he was working on the Unrelated Matter on the same days as he was 113 Exhibit 1.9, page 456. 114 Allanson Decision at [55]; Exhibit 1.2, page 22. 115 Exhibit 1.9, page 456. -- 40 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 41 preparing the 11 November 2021 Affidavit containing statements to the effect that he was unable to do any work at that time or for the next several days. 159 The Practitioner may have believed that the work he was undertaking on the Unrelated Matter was urgent. He explained to Allanson J, on 19 November 2021, that he 'wasn't in a position to be … working because the medical certification stated that I wasn't fit for work, but the urgency of the matter - well, I didn't really have a choice other than to deal with that matter on an urgent basis'.116 Further, the Practitioner filed a certificate of urgency in the Unrelated Matter which suggests that he believed that the matter needed to be brought before the Court urgently.117 However, we are nevertheless of the view that the statements he made to the Court were false and/or misleading because he was not deprived of the ability to do any work at all. That is, instead of telling the Court he had to work on the Unrelated Matter due to its urgency despite his doctor certifying he was medically unfit for work, he told the Court that he could not work at all. 160 More specifically, we are satisfied and find that the Practitioner's conduct after he filed the 11 November 2021 Affidavit demonstrates that the statements made by the Practitioner in the 11 November 2021 Affidavit were false and/or misleading in a material respect because the Medical Condition did not deprive him of the ability to work between 10 November 2021 and 16 November 2021. We make our finding based on the facts above at [157(a)] to [157(c)], and we also find the following additional facts: (a) The Practitioner admitted to Allanson J that he had been working on the Unrelated Matter on 15 and 16 November 2021 including having taken instructions, filing the application in the Unrelated Matter and appearing at the hearing before Hill J on 16 November 2021. (b) The Practitioner undertook a substantial amount of work on the Unrelated Matter including preparing numerous documents including an originating summons, a memorandum of conferral, an undertaking as to damages, a certificate of urgency, a minute of proposed orders and an affidavit which he had sworn on 15 November 2021, which were filed on 16 November 2021. 116 Exhibit 1.3(a), page 32. 117 Exhibit 1.10, page 464. -- 41 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 42 (c) The transcript of the hearing before Hill J on 16 November 2021 does not disclose any difficulties that the Practitioner had speaking. 161 We are also satisfied and find that the Practitioner intended the Court to be misled by the statements made in the 11 November 2021 Affidavit. The purpose of the 11 November 2021 Affidavit was to secure an adjournment of the 12 November Hearing. There would have been no other reason to claim to be unwell but to secure the adjournment. 162 The Applicant submitted that if we were not satisfied that the statements made in the 11 November 2021 Affidavit were deliberately intended to mislead, we could find as an alternative that the Practitioner was recklessly indifferent as to whether the statements were false and/or misleading and as to whether the Court would be misled by the statements. We have found that the Practitioner deliberately intended the Court to be misled. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider whether the Practitioner was recklessly indifferent to whether the statements were false and/or misleading. 163 The Applicant submits that we can infer from all of the facts as we have found them and the matters at (a) - (e) below, that the Practitioner made the Statements because he wished to work on matters other than the Supreme Court Matter, including the Unrelated Matter, at the relevant time in preference to dealing with the application for costs on the Supreme Court Matter: (a) his failure to comply with orders between 24 August 2021 and 27 October 2021 and his failure ever to provide any explanation for doing so; (b) that he was never hospitalised from the Medical Condition - which the Applicant submits we can find from the fact that he never provided any evidence of being hospitalised for the Medical Condition at the time; (c) that he knew he would be required to work on the Supreme Court Application and the Unrelated Matter over the same period of time; (d) that he in fact worked on the Unrelated Matter at the time he claimed that he was said to be unable to work; and -- 42 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 43 (e) he has provided no explanation for why he was able to work on and appear at a hearing concerning the Unrelated Matter at the time he was said to be unfit to work in the Supreme Court Application. 164 Beyond the reason being that he wished to secure an adjournment of the 12 November 2021 Hearing, we cannot make the inference as to his motivation to the requisite standard. It could have been because he wished to work on the Unrelated Matter, as has been submitted by the Applicant. However, it also could have been because the Practitioner was seeking to avoid the upcoming hearing before Allanson J because he had been told by the Court that at that hearing he would be required to show cause as to why a costs order should not be made against him personally.118 Choosing between these two possibilities would be a matter of conjecture. We are unable to draw the inference sought by the Applicant. Characterisation of the conduct 165 The Applicant submits that the Practitioner's conduct that is the subject of Ground 2 breached the following Conduct Rules, which we have outlined above, but summarise here for convenience: (1) Rule 5, which provides that a practitioner's duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of the inconsistency over any other duty including a duty to the client; and (2) Rule 34(1), which provides that a practitioner must not knowingly or recklessly mislead the court. 166 The Applicant also submits that: (a) apart from the contents of the Conduct Rules, the duty of a legal practitioner not to mislead the court is at the heart of their duty as an officer of the Court; and (b) that the duty of candour and fairness is 'quintessential to a lawyer's role as officer of the court; the court and the public expect and rely upon it, no matter how new or inexperienced the practitioner': The Council of the Queensland Law Society v Wright [2001] QCA 58 at [67], 118 Allanson Decision at [53]; Exhibit 1.2, page 21. -- 43 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 44 such that a finding that a practitioner has intentionally misled a court 'is a matter of the utmost seriousness': Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Waters [2015] WASC 141 at [8]. 167 In Giudice and Legal Profession Complaints Committee119 the Western Australian Court of Appeal observed: A legal practitioner owes duties of candour and honesty to the court. Indeed, the duty of a legal practitioner not to mislead the court is at the heart of his or her duty as an officer of the court. See Vogt v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2009] WASCA 202 [61] (Owen, Wheeler & Newnes JJA). 168 That a practitioner's paramount duty is to the court is perhaps the best known and primary ethical obligation. It is one of the foundational principles underpinning the special position occupied by members of the legal profession in the administration of justice and the legitimacy of the profession and public confidence in practitioners' adherence to this obligation is integral to the maintenance of the rule of law. 169 In this case, given the facts as we have found them, we have no hesitation in finding, despite the seriousness of such a finding, that by his conduct the Practitioner breached r 5 and r 34(1) of the Conduct Rules, breached his general obligation of candour to the Court and his fundamental obligation to the Court. 170 We are therefore satisfied and find that the conduct as found in relation to Ground 2 is of a kind that would justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice: s 297(1)(b) of the Uniform Law. 171 The Applicant also submitted that the Practitioner's conduct in this Ground involved a substantial and consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, in accordance with s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law. In our view, the conduct is better characterised under s 297(1)(b) because the statements were made in one affidavit, and the conduct cannot be said to be both 'substantial and consistent'. We therefore decline to find that the conduct can be characterised as professional misconduct coming within the definition of that term in s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law. 172 We are, however, satisfied that the conduct we have found occurred in connection with Ground 2 does meet the definition of 119 Giudice and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2014] WASCA 115 at [100]. -- 44 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 45 professional misconduct in both limbs of the Kyle test, because it would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by members of the profession of good repute and competence and, to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by such members of the profession. Ground 3 The allegations 173 The allegation in Ground 3 is as follows: 174 That the Practitioner, between 22 November 2022 and continuing during the investigation by the Legal Practice Board (Board) of a complaint against him in relation to his conduct of the Application (Complaint), engaged in professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297 of the Uniform Law, in that he engaged in conduct which: (1) would justify a finding that the Practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice: (s 297(1)(b) of the Uniform Law);120 and (2) further and alternatively, would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence (first limb of Kyle), and that, to a substantial degree, fell short of the standard of professional conduct observed and approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence (second limb of Kyle), in that he failed to comply, without reasonable excuse, and for the substantial purpose of seeking to hinder the Committee's investigation into the Complaint, with two notices issued pursuant to s 371 of the Uniform Law, to the Practitioner by an investigator duly appointed by the Board. 175 The Applicant alleges that failure to comply with two notices issued by the Board pursuant to s 371 of the Uniform Law (which we define below as the First Notice and the Second Notice) has hindered the investigation into both the Complaint and, following the Practitioner's first failure to comply with the notice of the Board, a subsequent expanded complaint (Extended Complaint), in the following ways: 120 Annexure A alleged a breach of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law, but footnote 135 to the Applicant's Outline of Opening Submissions confirmed that this allegation was no longer pressed. -- 45 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 46 (a) it has delayed the investigation of the Complaint and the Extended Complaint; (b) it has required the Applicant to seek from alternative sources information and documents which should have been provided to it by the Practitioner; (c) it made it difficult for the Applicant to verify: (i) that the Costs Orders121 have been satisfied by the Practitioner; (ii) if not, whether the Practitioner has taken steps to agree to satisfy the Costs Orders by way of, for example, a payment arrangement; and (iii) if not, whether the Practitioner is now, or has ever been, in a position to satisfy the Costs Orders or to enter into an agreement with the Executor's Solicitors; and: (d) ultimately, deprived the Applicant of information relevant to the investigation of the Complaint and the Extended Complaint, including information relevant to the Practitioner's personal circumstances at the time of the relevant conduct, as to form a view as to whether the Practitioner remained a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and, if so, whether it should be subject to conditions. Findings of fact 176 We adopt, without repeating, the findings of fact we have made in relation to Grounds 1 and 2 and make the additional findings of fact at [177] - [198] which are relevant to Ground 3. 177 On 3 December 2021 Allanson J sent a letter to the Chair of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee enclosing a copy of the transcript of the hearing which had taken place on 19 November 2021 and expressing concerns about the Practitioner's conduct in relation to the Application (Referral).122 121 We understand this to be a reference to the costs orders made by Allanson J on 2 December 2021: see Allanson Decision at [70] (Costs Orders). 122 Exhibit 1.4, page 28. -- 46 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 47 178 On 30 June 2022, Mr Russell Daily occupied the office of the Law Complaints Officer pursuant to s 572(1) of the LP Act.123 179 As at 1 July 2022 and at all relevant times, Mr Daily held the position of Law Complaints Officer of the Legal Services Complaints Committee.124 180 On 31 October 2022, in his capacity as the Law Complaints Officer, Mr Daily reviewed the Referral and, using powers which had been delegated to him as the Legal Services and Complaints Officer, initiated a complaint against the Practitioner pursuant to s 266(2) of the Uniform Law. 125 181 On 1 November 2022, Ms Fulham, an Investigator appointed by the Board, issued to the Practitioner a notice pursuant to s 371 of the Uniform Law (First Notice).126 The First Notice informed the Practitioner of the substance of the Complaint and required the Practitioner to:127 (1) respond to the Complaint in writing by 22 November 2022; (2) provide nine specified court documents and pieces of correspondence which the Practitioner had either written or received in the course of the Supreme Court Proceeding; and (3) confirm that he had paid the costs he had been ordered to pay by the Costs Orders. 182 On 22 November 2022, the Practitioner sent an email to the Board requesting that the time for compliance with the First Notice be extended for three weeks to allow him to go through his physical file and obtain counsel's legal advice.128 183 On 22 November 2022, Ms Fulham responded to the Practitioner's email confirming that a three-week extension had been given and the response to the First Notice was now due on 13 December 2022.129 Ms Fulham's email also advised the Practitioner that further extensions would not be granted in the absence of compelling reasons. 123 Exhibit 1.12, page 467, para 2. 124 Section 272 of the Application Act provides that the Law Complaints Officer on 30 June 2022 is taken as at 1 July 2022 to be appointed to the Office of the Law Complaints Officer. 125 Exhibit 1.12, page 467, para 2. 126 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 518, para 5. 127 Exhibit 1.12, pages 467 - 479. 128 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 519, para 8; Exhibit 1.13, page 480. 129 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 520, para 9; Exhibit 1. 13, page 480. -- 47 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 48 184 On 13 December 2022, the Practitioner telephoned the Board and requested a further extension of time to respond to the First Notice on medical grounds.130 185 On 13 December 2022, Ms Fulham sent an email to the Practitioner confirming what had been communicated to him in the telephone discussion about the request for an extension. The email stated that the Practitioner's request for a further extension would be considered after receipt of a statutory declaration and a medical certificate.131 186 On 15 December 2022, the Practitioner sent an email to the Board attaching a statutory declaration of that same date (Statutory Declaration)132 and a letter from his General Practitioner dated 13 December 2022 (GP's Letter).133 187 In the Statutory Declaration the Practitioner relevantly stated: (1) that he had been forced to move out of his home suddenly around 23 November 2022; (2) that a friend had collected his files and taken them to his residence (that is, the friend's residence) towards the end of November 2022; (3) his friend had then left for Melbourne to attend a wedding and had only recently returned; (4) as a consequence, he did not have access to the files; (5) he was suffering from medical issues as detailed in the GP's Letter and as a consequence, he had been unable to brief counsel; (6) it had been a 'very difficult and torrid time' for him in the last three to four weeks; and (7) he now had access to his file and would be in a position to provide the documents requested by the Board and his submissions to the Board. 130 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 520, para 11. 131 Exhibit 1.14, page 482. 132 Exhibit 1.16, pages 484 and 487. 133 Exhibit 1.16, pages 486. -- 48 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 49 188 The GP's Letter identified that the Practitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, possible depression, and liver dysfunction. The GP stated that the cause of the possible depression was the fact that he was unable to see his children, who were then residing in Singapore with their mother. The letter also stated that the Practitioner had not been able to obtain employment due to pending criminal charges and consequently had to go on Centrelink payments. The letter reported that the Practitioner was very upset about this. The GP's Letter concluded by stating that, under those circumstances, the GP would appreciate if the Board could give the Practitioner some time to provide the Board with the required documents.134 189 On 19 December 2022, Ms Fulham extended the time for compliance with the First Notice to 16 January 2023.135 190 The Practitioner did not respond to the First Notice by 16 January 2023.136 191 On 17 January 2023, the Practitioner called the Board's reception and left a message for Ms Fulham to return his call.137 Ms Fulham rang the Practitioner and advised him that he was in breach of the First Notice.138 The Practitioner said he would be revoking his application for a practising certificate because he did not think he would be returning to practice. The Practitioner asked for a further extension of time to provide his submissions and said he was working with pro-bono counsel to get his submissions ready.139 192 On 24 January 2023 the Board wrote to the Practitioner, advising that they had given him an extension until 31 January 2023 to comply with the First Notice and had noted his intention not to return to legal practice and to revoke his application for an Australian practising certificate, and his willingness to cooperate with the Committee. The letter to the Practitioner enclosed an undertaking for the Practitioner's consideration.140 134 Exhibit 1.16, page 486. 135 Exhibit 1.19, page 491. 136 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), pages 522 - 523, paras 19 - 21. 137 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 523, para 22. 138 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 523, paras 22 - 23. 139 Exhibit 1.20, pages 495 - 496. 140 Exhibit 1.21, pages 497 - 498. -- 49 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 50 193 The Practitioner did not respond to the First Notice by 30 January 2023.141 194 On 6 February 2023, the Practitioner emailed Ms Fulham. In the email the Practitioner stated that he wanted to 'make a few points in relation to [his] position'.142 In summary, they were: (1) the Practitioner complained that the Board had not advised him of the Referral until the day after he applied for his practising certificate, being 13 months after the Referral from Allanson J. He complained that he was being asked to provide a response in a restricted timeframe and that he had not been afforded procedural fairness. He asked for an explanation from the Board about the delay and stated that '[b]y rights I should be afforded the same amount of time to reply'; (2) that he had not been able to respond to the Board 'due to the stress caused by this whole affair and the fact I was not aware of any such complaint until after I applied for my Practising Certificate'; (3) that he would like this complaint not to be determined until after 'my criminal matter' was determined; and (4) that his 'career is on the line and I have been going through extreme financial hardship as a consequence'. 195 The Practitioner has never responded to the First Notice.143 196 By letter dated 16 March 2023, Ms Fulham wrote to the Practitioner notifying him that the Board had expanded the scope of its investigation pursuant to s 283(1) of the Uniform Law. The Practitioner was informed that the Board was now also investigating whether the Practitioner had obstructed, deliberately or otherwise, the Board's investigation of the Extended Complaint.144 197 In the same letter, Ms Fulham also gave the Practitioner notice, pursuant to s 371 of the Uniform Law (Second Notice),145 that he was 141 See generally Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), pages 524 - 525; see also the email from the Practitioner dated 6 February 2023 at Exhibit 1.22, page 499 where, amongst other things, he asks for more time to respond. 142 Exhibit 1.22, page 499. 143 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 527, para 36. 144 Exhibit 1.23, page 503, para 14. 145 Exhibit 1.23, pages 501 - 505. -- 50 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 51 required to provide, by 13 April 2023, and verified by statutory declaration: (a) the documents and information required to be produced in answer to the First Notice; and (b) information responding to the Extended Complaint. 198 The Practitioner did not comply with the Second Notice by 13 April 2023 or at all.146 Characterisation of the conduct 199 Practitioners are required to cooperate with reasonable requests of the regulatory authority because the public confidence in the profession, and by extension, the proper administration of justice depends on the power and ability of the regulatory authorities being able to regulate the activities of practitioners so that the courts, the profession and the public can have confidence that only people with the requisite ability and ethical character are entitled to practice and that appropriate professional standards are maintained. 200 In Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Lourey [No 2]147 the Tribunal observed that 'legal practitioners have been subject to an obligation to inform and assist investigatory bodies for many years, and since well before statutory obligations were imposed'. 201 In Lourey [No 2], the Tribunal cited the following relevant passage from Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lee-Steere:148 [22] The reputation of the legal profession in the eyes of the public and among its members depends to a large extent upon the power and ability of the Board and the Committee to regulate effectively the activities of all legal practitioners. The purpose of the Act is expressly stated in its long title 'to provide for the regulation of legal practice in Western Australia'. [23] It is incumbent upon all legal practitioners to ensure that the above purpose is realised in all respects. To that end, legal practitioners are obligated to cooperate with the reasonable requests of their regulatory body to the fullest extent. It is a duty owed to the Board and the Committee in a measure not less 146 Exhibit 1.26 (Fulham Statement), page 527, para 36. 147 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Lourey [No 2] [2023] WASAT 77; (2023) 110 SR (WA) 133 (Lourey [No 2]) at [237]. 148 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lee-Steere [2010] WASAT 189 at [22] - [24] cited in Lourey [No 2] at [240]. -- 51 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 52 than the duty owed by a practitioner to his or her client and to a Court or Tribunal. [24] In our view it is unacceptable, both to members of the public and to the profession, for a practitioner to undermine the authority of a regulatory body by ignoring its requests for information or failing to respond to those requests with alacrity and with complete honesty. To flaunt that authority is to fly in the face of the legislative intent and disables the body from executing its statutory functions. Such conduct is viewed by this Tribunal in a most serious light and will not be countenanced. 202 The Tribunal also cited with approval the following statement from the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal in Law Society of New South Wales v Sullivan:149 The disregard of a clear statutory direction from one's professional association indicates, in the Tribunal's view, prima facie unfitness to practice. 203 In this case, as in the case of Sullivan, the Practitioner did not fail to comply with a request but failed to comply with a legal direction. Although we make no finding of the commission of an offence under s 371(3) of the Uniform Law, we do find that the Practitioner failed to comply with the law by failing to respond and, in doing so, breached his professional obligation to uphold the law.150 The duty owed by practitioners to the regulatory authority has been said to be a duty that is owed in a measure not less than the duty owed to the court.151 204 The Applicant submits that we can find that the Practitioner's purpose, or substantial purpose, in failing to comply with the First Notice and the Second Notice was to hinder the investigation of the Complaint and the Expanded Complaint. The Applicant asserts that the Practitioner's conduct in this regard was deliberate. It submits that that fact can be inferred from the following facts: (1) the Practitioner knew that a complaint had been made about his conduct because the letter under cover of which each Notice was sent to him said as much; 149 Law Society of New South Wales v Sullivan [2000] NSWADT 167 at [80] (Sullivan) cited in Lourey [No 2] at [241]. 150 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Gandini [2011] WASAT 86 (S); (2011) 75 SR (WA) 314 at [26]. 151 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lee-Steere at [23]. -- 52 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 53 (2) the Practitioner knew that the Board was conducting an investigation into the Complaint and, subsequently, the Extended Complaint; (3) the Practitioner knew that he had been required by the First Notice and the Second Notice to provide documents and information to the Board for the purposes of its investigation into the Complaint and, subsequently, the Extended Complaint; (4) the Practitioner had informed the Board that, as at 15 December 2022, he had obtained from his friend the file containing the documents which he needed in order to provide information and documents in response to the First Notice and the Second Notice; (5) the Practitioner has not provided any documents or information required of him by the First Notice or the Second Notice; (6) the Practitioner has not offered to the Board or the Tribunal any alternate explanation for his failure to respond to either the First Notice or the Second Notice; and (7) the Practitioner must have known that failing to provide the documents and information would hinder the investigation into the Complaint and the Extended Complaint because he was the obvious source from which information relevant to the investigation into the Complaint and the Extended Complaint would need to be obtained. 205 In summary, the Applicant has asked us to draw an inference that the Practitioner's purpose or substantial purpose in failing to respond to the First Notice and the Second Notice was to hinder the investigation into his conduct. 206 However, in our view, the facts which we have found suggest that there may have been other reasons for the delay at various times. Those reasons included that the Practitioner: (a) did not have access to the file which was at his friend's residence and his friend had gone to Melbourne; -- 53 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 54 (b) needed time to brief counsel;152 (c) was experiencing stress in his personal life; (d) was experiencing physical health issues; (e) intended to revoke his application for a practising certificate because he did not intend to continue to practise law; (f) wanted to defer this complaint until his criminal matter was determined; and (g) was aggrieved by the amount of time the Board had taken to advise him of the complaint (which occurred some 13 months after the Referral) and that he wanted the same amount of time to comply.153 207 We are not satisfied to the requisite standard that we can draw the inference that the Applicant has asked us to. That is, we are not satisfied that the Practitioner was seeking to hinder the investigation by delaying and failing to respond to the Notices. The other inferences to which we have referred at [206] are equally open. 208 The Board also submits that we can find that the investigation was in fact hindered by the Practitioner's conduct. 209 There is no evidence before us as to the effect of the failure to respond to the First Notice and the Second Notice upon the investigation. Ms Fulham does not state in the Fulham Statement that the investigation into the Practitioner's conduct was hampered by his failure to respond to the First Notice and the Second Notice. 210 We are nevertheless satisfied, as a matter of logic, that the Practitioner's failure to comply with the First Notice and the Second Notice would have delayed the investigation while the Board was waiting for the Practitioner's responses. We are also satisfied that, in the absence of any responses to the First Notice and the Second Notice from the Practitioner, the Board would have been required to seek information from other sources. It is self-evidently the case that 152 See Exhibit 1.24, pages 506 - 507. An email to a barrister from Mr Colella, a Manager - Investigations and Legal at the Board, dated 6 July 2023 which attaches a 'determination letter' and Mr Singh's affidavit dated 11 November 2021 obtained from the Court, and a response from the barrister thanking Mr Colella for the email and stating that if he had any questions he would be in touch, indicating that the Practitioner made some attempt to engage counsel, although there is no further correspondence with the barrister, or evidence that the Practitioner engaged the barrister to represent him in Exhibit 1. 153 Exhibit 1.22, page 499. -- 54 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 55 without the responses from the Practitioner the investigation had to be undertaken by different means. We are also satisfied that the lack of any responses from the Practitioner would have made it difficult for the Board to form a view about whether the Practitioner was a person who was fit and proper to practise. To that extent, we are satisfied that the conduct of the Practitioner, in failing to respond to the First Notice and the Second Notice, had the effect of hampering the Board's investigation into the Practitioner's conduct. 211 The Board submits that failure to comply with the First Notice and the Second Notice breached r 43 of the UL Conduct Rules which, as we have stated above, applied at the time of the conduct with respect to the notices and which requires solicitors to be timely, open and frank in their dealings with the regulatory authority. We so find. A practitioner who does not respond at all to notices issued pursuant to s 371(1) of the Uniform Law cannot but be said to have failed to be timely, frank and open in his dealings with the regulatory authority. 212 Section 466(6) of the Uniform Law provides that the failure of an Australian lawyer to comply with a notice issued pursuant to s 371 of the Uniform Law may be capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The authorities to which we have referred above makes it clear that such a failure is a serious breach of a practitioner's professional obligations. 213 In this case, we find that the Practitioner's conduct in failing to respond to the two notices issued pursuant to s 371(1) of the Uniform Law meets the definition in s 297(1)(b) of the Uniform Law because it would justify a finding that he is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. 214 We also find that it meets the definition of professional misconduct in both limbs of the Kyle test because it is conduct that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by practitioners of good repute and competence, and to a substantial degree fell short of the standards of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competence. Conclusion 215 For the reasons set out above, we are satisfied, and we have found, that the Practitioner engaged in: -- 55 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 56 (a) professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law and both limbs of Kyle with respect to Ground 1; (b) professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) and (b) of the Uniform Law and both limbs of Kyle with respect to Ground 2; and (c) professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(b) of the Uniform Law and both limbs of Kyle with respect to Ground 3. Orders 216 We will hear from the parties as to the form of orders which should be made to give effect to our findings. 217 We will also hear from the parties as to the programming orders which should be made to facilitate a hearing as to the penalty and costs orders which should be made as a result of our findings. 218 Accordingly, we make the following orders: The Tribunal orders: 1. By 12 June 2026, the parties are to confer and are to file with the Tribunal an agreed minute of proposed orders which: (a) give effect to the findings set out in the reasons for decision; and (b) programme the matter to a hearing on the issues of penalty and costs. 2. Failing reaching agreement as to the orders to be made to deal with the issues identified at paragraphs (a) and (b) of order 1, each party is to file a minute setting out the orders which it considers ought to be made to address those issues by 12 June 2026. -- 56 of 57 -- [2026] WASAT 57 Page 57 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. WH Associate to the President 15 MAY 2026 -- 57 of 57 --