THOMAS ACKLAND v THE KING [2025] SASCA 15

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HIS HONOUR JUDGE MUSCAT) DCCRM-22-90 Applicant: THOMAS ACKLAND Counsel: MR B ARMSTRONG - Solicitor: KP LAWYERS Respondent: THE KING Counsel: MS T COSTI WITH MR E SAKOULIDIS - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 11/02/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-24-015604 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ACKLAND v THE KING [2025] SASCA 15 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Acting Chief Justice Livesey, the Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby) 11 February 2025 CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - SENTENCE Application for permission to appeal against sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive. The appellant was sentenced to a single sentence of imprisonment for 14 years, together with a non- parole period of 11 years, 2 months and 12 days, for 14 counts of child sex offending against 14 boys, pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA): 1. one count of sexual abuse of a child, contrary to s 50(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA), for which the maximum penalty was life imprisonment; 2. 13 counts of aggravated communicating with a child for a prurient purpose, contrary to s 63B(3)(b) of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty was imprisonment for 12 years (since increased to 15 years). The circumstance of aggravation was that the appellant was a teacher. The offending spanned more than two years and the 14 boys were all students of the rural school at which the appellant taught, aged between 12 and 17, turning 18 years. The appellant used Snapchat to engage in sexualised communications which in some cases progressed to exchanging a large number of sexual images and videos. -- 1 of 12 -- The offending continued despite the appellant receiving a number of warnings and being interviewed by police. The offending was not isolated and there was uncharged offending preceding and during the charged offending. The offending only stopped on the appellant’s arrest. In an interview with a psychologist and a statement read out to the sentencing court, the appellant denied having a sexual interest in males or male children. The sentencing judge found that there was a high risk of re-offending. Held (the Court): granting permission to appeal but dismissing the appeal: 1. Whilst the sentence is a heavy one, it did not exceed the limits of a sound exercise of sentencing discretion. 2. The appellant disregarded his professional duties and responsibilities as an educator. He engaged in an egregious breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the school and the broader community. His offending was brazen, persistent and predatory. It was necessary for the sentencing court to protect the safety of the community, and mark its disapproval of serious child sexual abuse offending undertaken by a teacher toward his students. 3. It cannot be said that the sentence is unreasonable or unjust. 4. Observations made about the s 50(1) offending and the increasingly blurred significance of any demarcation between physical contact offending and communication offending against children; the s 63B(3)(b) offending and the dangers associated with making assumptions about the scope for harm to be caused by different kinds of child sexual abuse; and about appellate review of sentencing for a number of offences where notional sentences, partial concurrency and principles of totality and proportionality must be reviewed. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 50(1), 63B(3); Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 3, 26, 54, referred to. Adam (A Pseudonym) v The King [2024] SASCA 149; Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135; Cunningham v The King [2024] SASCA 138; Cuong v The Queen [2021] SASCA 89; Glade v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 83; Moss v The Queen [2021] SASCA 101; Nguyen v The Queen (2022) 140 SASR 554; Payne v The Queen (2002) 131 A Crim R 432; R v Bahrami (2020) 137 SASR 327; R v Beaumont [2023] SASCA 128; R v Bennett [2005] SASC 55; R v Bradley [2024] SASCA 56; R v Brandon [2024] SASCA 9; R v B, RWK (2005) 91 SASR 200; R v D (1997) 69 SASR 413; R v Gridley [2013] SASCFC 29; R v Kohlhagen [2016] SASCFC 19; R v Seymour (A Pseudonym) [2024] SASCA 41; R v Symonds [1999] SASC 217; R v Urch [2024] SASCA 28; R v Williams [2015] SASCFC 66; Symons v The Queen (2018) 130 SASR 503; Turnbull (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] SASCA 121; Walsh v The King [2024] SASCA 146; Warner v The King (2022) 142 SASR 275, considered. -- 2 of 12 -- ACKLAND v THE KING [2025] SASCA 15 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey ACJ, Doyle and Bleby JJA THE COURT: Introduction 1 This is an application for permission to appeal against sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive. 2 On 8 December 2023, the appellant was sentenced to a single sentence of imprisonment for 14 years, together with a non-parole period of 11 years, 2 months and 12 days,1 for 14 counts of child sex offending against 14 adolescent male children, pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (the Sentencing Act): 1. one count of sexual abuse of a child, contrary to s 50(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA), for which the maximum penalty was life imprisonment; 2. 13 counts of aggravated communicating with a child for a prurient purpose, contrary to s 63B(3)(b) of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty was imprisonment for 12 years (this has since increased to 15 years). 3 The circumstance of aggravation was that the appellant abused his position of trust and authority, as each boy was a student of the school at which the appellant was a teacher. A number of the victims were being taught by the appellant at the time of his offending. As the sentencing judge described it:2 You betrayed the position of authority and trust reposed in you by the school, the parents of the students you abused and of course, the very students themselves, who you were responsible for teaching and providing pastoral care to and not grooming and then abusing them for your own sexual gratification. … You heard the very many victim impact statements … What was evident is that your behaviour has had a significant impact on most of the victims, their families, the school and across the broader community within the district or region. Offences such as you committed in your position [have] wide reaching effects. When your conduct was brought to light, many people were shocked that someone so admired, respected, popular and trusted within the school and the wider community could do such a thing. 1 The appellant was subjected to a non-parole period of four-fifths of the head sentence because he was sentenced as a serious repeat offender within the meaning of s 54 of the Sentencing Act. 2 Sentencing remarks by Judge Muscat dated 8 December 2023, p 1. -- 3 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 2 4 Following argument on 11 February 2025, permission to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed. These are the reasons for those orders. The circumstances of the offending 5 For around 3 years and two months between January 2018 and March 2021, the appellant engaged in sexualised communications with boys ranging in age from 12 years to 17, turning 18 years. 6 The appellant had come into contact with each child through his role as a teacher. He taught some of the boys English. For others he was their care group teacher, or he had come into contact with them through school sport or other extra-curricular activities. 7 It is noteworthy that in April or May 2018, the appellant was explicitly warned against contacting students on social media and reminded about the school’s policy. In June 2020, following receipt of a Crime Stoppers report, police spoke to the appellant about a report of inappropriate communications with students. The appellant denied that he was in contact with students on Snapchat or any other social media platform. This lie was compounded by the circumstance that offending involving six of the boys had occurred during 2020, whether before or at about the time of the conversation with police, but the offending continued. The offending against four other boys commenced only after the conversation with police. 8 It is not necessary to address in any detail the circumstances of each count. Whilst there were variations in the offending against each boy, there were also broad similarities. It is sufficient to provide an overview of the kind of conduct in which the appellant engaged. 9 Most of the appellant’s communications were undertaken using the social media application, Snapchat. Some were in person. The appellant encouraged inappropriate conversations with boys in the classroom, whether during class or during breaks. At times “homework” was used as a euphemism for masturbation. 10 In most cases the appellant and the boys began communicating in a non-sexual manner before communications progressed to sexualised conversations. The appellant then sent clothed images of himself and, over time, images of himself without a top and ultimately, images of his genitalia.3 11 Whether or not it was the appellant who initiated the electronic communications, he soon sent each boy “the rules”, which were: that they were not to tell anyone, they were to change the appellant’s name in their application, and no screen shots of messages or images were to be taken so that there was no 3 Count 2, concerning M. -- 4 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 3 record of their “snaps”. To some, these rules were accompanied by a direction that the boys should send images of themselves to the appellant. 12 A significant feature of the offending was the appellant’s attempts to normalise his offending by describing it as “bro stuff” or part of a “bro code”. He adopted a light-hearted and non-threatening tone to his messages by using phrases such as “Ha” or “Haha”. The appellant pressed a number of the boys to tell him where they would “draw the line”. In all but two cases the offending was committed against a background of a course of conduct involving similar offending. The offending only stopped once the appellant was arrested in March 2021. 13 Apart from sending images of himself, both clothed and naked, the appellant encouraged boys to send him naked images of themselves. He communicated about masturbation. He sent some of the boys pictures of himself with ejaculate on his chest. 14 In one case, the offending occurred in a context where the boy was struggling with his sexuality and the appellant’s messages included video of himself with erections and masturbating. He encouraged the boy to reciprocate, and he did so. The boy sent the appellant an image of ejaculate on his own bare chest. Apart from exchanging images of genitalia, they exchanged video of themselves masturbating.4 15 In the case of another of the boys, the appellant sent an unsolicited picture of his testicles protruding from the bottom of his shorts, and he followed this with 60 more images of his testicles. The appellant repeatedly requested nude images and sent an image of the appellant holding his own penis. 16 On a number of occasions, the appellant persisted with his communications despite reluctance or disapproval from the boys. For example, in one case,5 the appellant asked whether the boy wouldn’t mind sending him a “sneaky nut pic” to which the child responded by calling the appellant a “sicko”. The appellant’s response was an image of himself with his middle finger raised and the words “I said I wouldn’t mind if you did”. In other cases, the messaging was brief, and the boys soon terminated communications with the appellant. 17 It is clear that the appellant exploited his role as a popular teacher of adolescent boys for the purposes of his own sexual gratification. The appellant disregarded his professional duties and responsibilities as an educator. His offending was brazen, persistent and predatory. 4 Count 3, concerning J. 5 Count 22, TL. -- 5 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 4 The circumstances of the offender 18 By the time of sentence, the appellant was aged 41 and had enjoyed a stable and positive upbringing before qualifying as a teacher. He had worked as a teacher for around eight years before arrest. 19 The appellant retained the support of some members of his family, and he was employed in his parents’ landscaping business when he was assessed by Mr Alan Fugler, psychologist. Nonetheless, the sentencing judge did not take into account the appellant’s good character because this had enabled him to undertake his offending. 20 In his report dated 11 October 2023, Mr Fugler recorded a history of the appellant’s early years on a farm in a country setting where he encountered high levels of anxiety in social situations involving females. The appellant did not have his first girlfriend until he was 25 years, and he eventually accessed pornographic material on the internet involving homosexual adult males. The appellant described internal tension and conflict associated with his continued belief that his sexual orientation was heterosexual. The appellant had not had any sexual contact with males before his offending with his adolescent male students. 21 It was only under detailed questioning from Mr Fugler that the appellant accepted that he may have been confused about his sexuality for some years and repressed his homosexual urges. Nonetheless, he denied a primary deviant sexual interest in males under the age of consent. 22 The appellant admitted to Mr Fugler that he had known that his behaviour was unlawful and an abuse of power. His anxiety was related to the high likelihood of negative consequences if he was caught. These were, nonetheless, outweighed by the opportunity to express his repressed sexual behaviour. Mr Fugler recommended the assistance of an experienced counsellor within the gay community. 23 A significant feature of the sentencing process was the statement prepared by the appellant and read out by his counsel during sentencing submissions. It is not necessary to set the statement out in detail. It is sufficient to observe that the sentencing judge did not regard it as containing a genuine apology or any expression of real insight into the appellant’s conduct or the harm it had caused his victims, their families and the community. 24 Remarkably, the appellant denied that his communications were of a sexual nature and he asserted that he had no sexual interest in men or male children. The appellant characterised his conduct as “stupidity”. He said he had been trying to act towards his victims as “buddies” or “as friends”. The appellant apologised to his students, their families, his co-workers, his parents and to his extended family for “any embarrassment or grief that I may have caused”. -- 6 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 5 The approach of the sentencing judge 25 After the appellant’s counsel read the statement just mentioned, the sentencing judge said that he was not prepared to accept what the appellant had said. The appellant declined the opportunity to give evidence before the sentencing judge to support the claims made to Mr Fugler and in his statement. 26 The sentencing judge was clearly troubled by the appellant’s failure to openly acknowledge his sexual interest in adolescent male children. For example, as the sentencing judge explained to the appellant:6 You stated that you lost sight of the fact that while the students may have been ‘young men’, they were still children. They were not young men, they were schoolboys. You asserted that your intention to treat the students as ‘buddies or as friends’ crossed the line between the student and teacher relationship. I totally reject this claim. While you most certainly crossed that line, you did so in order to gratify your sexual interest in the students. The evidence from all of the students demonstrates that beyond any doubt. You stated that you intend to use your time in prison to reflect on your behaviour. However, unless you reflect that your behaviour involved a prurient interest in the students you abused, then you will not benefit from that self-reflection. Further, you stated that you are not in denial regarding your sexuality. You stated that you are heterosexual and that you have no sexual urges toward the male gender or children. You professed that your behaviour toward the students was explicable as ‘stupidity’ on your behalf in what you accepted were inappropriate messages that you sent to them. I do not accept any of that either. It is clear to me on all of the available evidence before the court that you are, contrary to what you have stated to Mr Fugler, presently in denial regarding your sexuality and that you are sexually attracted to adolescent males. Your behaviour toward the students cannot be explained through mere stupidity as you asserted. It was much more sinister than that. 27 The sentencing judge was concerned that the appellant remained in denial and that his claims of having no homosexual interest in his male students was “disingenuous and, quite frankly, hypocritical”.7 The sentencing judge regarded the appellant’s total lack of insight as demonstrating an absence of true remorse and contrition, and this reflected adversely on the appellant’s rehabilitation prospects. 28 The sentencing judge referred to the warnings that the appellant had received in 2018 and 2020, already mentioned, as well as the fact that in early 2021 he had been spoken to by two of his students who had received sexualised communications. As the sentencing judge explained:8 6 Sentencing remarks by Judge Muscat dated 8 December 2023, p 4. 7 Sentencing remarks by Judge Muscat dated 8 December 2023, p 5. 8 Sentencing remarks by Judge Muscat dated 8 December 2023, p 5. -- 7 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 6 Despite all of that, you continued to communicate with students for a prurient purpose with the intention of making them amenable to sexual activity and you were maintaining your unlawful sexual relationship with one of those students. Your sexual behaviour towards the students persisted. It only stopped when you were arrested by the police. Your sexual interest in children is patent. You seriously need to wake up to yourself over what you were doing and why you were doing it and stop pretending otherwise. Reform or rehabilitation begins with an acceptance of responsibility. It also depends on an honest acknowledgement of the reasons behind one’s offending behaviour. 29 The sentencing judge addressed each count and the circumstances of each victim in some detail in a way that is not now criticised. The sentencing judge explained that there were other students who were prepared to give evidence about similar conduct dating back to 2017. 30 Indeed, a number of the charges to which the appellant pleaded guilty occurred in a context of significant uncharged offending. Whilst the sentencing judge reminded himself that the appellant was only to be punished for the charged conduct, the relevance of the uncharged conduct was that it deprived the appellant of any scope for leniency in sentencing.9 31 The sentencing judge found that the appellant’s risk of re-offending was high and could only be reduced through willing and meaningful participation in a child sexual offender treatment program. 32 Pursuant to s 26(2a) of the Sentencing Act, the sentencing judge was required to indicate the notional sentences he would have imposed for each count. A table setting out the relevance offence and the notional sentence determined by the sentencing judge, follows: Count Offence Maximum penalty (imprisonment) Victim Notional sentence 2 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. M 2 years. 3 Sexual abuse of child. Life. J 6 years. 5 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. K 2 years. 6 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. C 9 months. 8 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. A 2 years. 10 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. W 2 years. 12 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. JM 2 years. 9 Sentencing remarks by Judge Muscat dated 8 December 2023, p 7. -- 8 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 7 Count Offence Maximum penalty (imprisonment) Victim Notional sentence 14 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. S 2 years. 15 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. D 18 months. 16 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. T 2 years. 18 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. JHP 18 months. 19 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. TL 18 months. 21 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. JR 18 months. 22 Aggravated communicating with child for prurient purpose. 12 years. TL 9 months. 33 The sentencing judge indicated he would have applied a reduction of 5 per cent on account of the appellant’s late guilty pleas for utilitarian reasons.10 34 Whilst the appellant referred to an accumulated total of 27 years and 6 months, the sentencing judge did not accumulate the notional sentences in that way.11 Rather he simply said that he applied “the principle of proportionality or totality” when arriving at what he described as a “proportionate sentence” of 14 years for all 14 offences. He did this notwithstanding his view that the circumstances of each offending would ordinarily suggest that an accumulation of the sentences would be justified.12 The appellant’s contentions on appeal 35 It is, respectfully, a little difficult to understand the appellant’s case on appeal. The appellant accepted that the offence of sexual abuse of a child, contrary to s 50(1) of the CLCA,13 may be analysed through the prism of R v D, and that even where it does not apply, that sentencing standard can still provide guidance.14 10 A proposed appeal ground complaining about the failure to make a reduction for the appellant’s guilty pleas was abandoned at the hearing. 11 Cf Cuong v The Queen [2021] SASCA 89, [6]-[7] (Lovell and Bleby JJA). 12 Sentencing remarks by Judge Muscat dated 8 December 2023, p 16. The sentencing judge referred to R v Symonds [1999] SASC 217 (Doyle CJ); R v B, RWK (2005) 91 SASR 200 (Vanstone J) and R v Bennett [2005] SASC 55 (Doyle CJ, with whom Vanstone and White JJ agreed) for the proposition that attempting to explain concurrency and accumulation of sentences may become artificial where the totality principle will so obviously operate. 13 Offending against s 50(1) of the CLCA was formerly described as maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child. 14 R v D (1997) 69 SASR 413. The sentencing standard is imprisonment for 12 years (children under 14 years) and 10 years (children over 14 years) for child sexual offences over a period of around two months involving unlawful sexual intercourse by offenders in positions of trust and authority, see for example Warner v The King (2022) 142 SASR 275 and Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135. -- 9 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 8 36 The appellant relied on the approach explained in Nguyen v The Queen regarding manifest excess and notional sentences.15 37 Although the appellant also relied on R v Seymour (A Pseudonym),16 that was a case involving one count of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child contrary to s 50(1) of the CLCA where there was no formal position of trust. This and other cases were recently reviewed in some detail by this Court in Adam (A Pseudonym) v The King.17 As is there made clear, R v Seymour (A Pseudonym) involved contact offending involving one victim rather than abuse and communication offending involving 14 separate victims. 38 As for the communication offending generally, the appellant acknowledged that there was no established sentencing standard, and reference was made to recent cases where sentences had ranged from imprisonment for one year to just over two years.18 39 The appellant relied on his stable upbringing and positive home environment, as well as his good character and excellent work history. It was suggested that because the appellant was intelligent, he should be able to undertake the analysis necessary for personal deterrence at an earlier stage than many other offenders.19 40 As for the appellant’s statement read out by his counsel during sentencing, and the weight given to that by the sentencing judge, the appellant suggested that the conclusion that the appellant was at high risk of re-offending was reached in an “unorthodox manner”. The appellant relied on the absence of “scientifically validated testing” from a forensic psychologist. Just what that might entail in this case was not satisfactorily explained. 41 The appellant acknowledged that the sentencing process was “far from straightforward” but contended that marking the serious nature of the offending and giving appropriate weight to general and personal deterrence could have been achieved by a period of imprisonment of less than 14 years. The appellant submitted that the only available conclusion was that the sentence fell outside the permissible range of sentences. 15 Nguyen v The Queen (2022) 140 SASR 554, [37]-[38] (Livesey P and Stanley AJA), [199] (Doyle JA); Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135, [82]-[83] (Livesey P, David JA and Bond AJA). 16 R v Seymour (A Pseudonym) [2024] SASCA 41. See also Turnbull (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] SASCA 121. 17 Adam (A Pseudonym) v The King [2024] SASCA 149, from [60] (Livesey P, Bleby and David JJA). 18 Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135; Walsh v The King [2024] SASCA 146. The appellant also referred to R v Gridley [2013] SASCFC 29, R v Williams [2015] SASCFC 66, [30] (Stanley J, with whom Kourakis CJ and Gray J agreed), R v Kohlhagen [2016] SASCFC 19, Moss v The Queen [2021] SASCA 101 and Cunningham v The King [2024] SASCA 138. 19 Although the appellant relied on Payne v The Queen (2002) 131 A Crim R 432, [43] (Steytler J), that was a case concerning mental illness. -- 10 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 9 The determination of the application for permission to appeal sentence 42 The offending concerning s 50(1) of the CLCA in this case tends to demonstrate the increasingly blurred significance of any demarcation between physical contact offending and communication offending against children.20 In addition, this case tends to demonstrate the dangers associated with making assumptions about the scope for harm to be caused by different kinds of child sexual abuse. The victim and community impact statements in this case show that communication offending is not necessarily less harmful than contact offending to victims, their families and the community.21 43 When one views the offending as a whole, it is necessary to recognise the legitimate community concern about adults engaging children in “sexting” and the risk that technology and social media may be misused so as to engage children in sexualised communications and sexual abuse offending more generally.22 Recently, in Brooker v The King, this Court emphasised the need for deterrence in connection with offending involving children over the internet:23 It is necessary for sentencing courts to make it clear that the community does not tolerate the sexual abuse of children, whether in person or over the internet, including by the pernicious production, possession and dissemination of child exploitation material. Appeal courts must likewise do what they can to protect children and the community, by ensuring that sentences deter, denounce and punish offenders and, by their reasons, give due recognition to the interests of victims and their families. This must be done recognising that the prevailing standards of punishment reflect a hardening in community attitudes and increased maximum penalties for offending of this kind.24 44 Whilst the appellant sought to challenge, without prior notice, a handful of the less serious notional sentences,25 the basis for these challenges was difficult to identify, as was how they materially affected the overall sentence. 45 It must be remembered that each offence was committed by a teacher in a position of trust and authority toward students under his care, where some boys were directly under his care. The appellant was under a professional duty to care for and protect his students. Instead, he engaged in an egregious breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the school and the broader community, including the parents and family of each student. The offending involved 20 Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135, [9] (Livesey P, David JA and Bond AJA). 21 Adam (A Pseudonym) v The King [2024] SASCA 149, [78(5)] (Livesey P, Bleby and David JJA); Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135, [66] (Livesey P, David JA and Bond AJA); R v Beaumont [2023] SASCA 128, [48] (Livesey P, Lovell and Bleby JJA). 22 Symons v The Queen (2018) 130 SASR 503, [6] (Kourakis CJ); Turnbull (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] SASCA 121; R v Brandon [2024] SASCA 9; R v Urch [2024] SASCA 28. 23 Brooker v The King [2024] SASCA 135, [88] (Livesey P, David JA and Bond AJA). See Glade v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 83, [29]-[33] (Livesey J, with whom Kelly and Bleby JJ agreed). 24 R v Brandon [2024] SASCA 9, [30] (Livesey P, Doyle and David JJA); R v Bradley [2024] SASCA 56, [61] (Lovell, Bleby and David JJA). 25 Counts 6, 18, 19, 21 and 22 where 9 months or 18 months were imposed. -- 11 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 15 The Court 10 sexualised communications where the more serious offending involved sending or exchanging images and videos. 46 Contrary to the submissions made on appeal, but as the respondent submitted, the notional sentences demonstrate that the penalties were carefully calibrated by the sentencing judge to reflect the degrees of seriousness involved in the appellant’s communication offending. In addition, the offending was far from isolated and involved a number of victims over an extended period within the same rural school. 47 Even if one commenced with the six-year sentence for the offending under s 50(1) of the CLCA, and then partially accumulated each of the sentences for the communication offending, commencing with the most serious, it is difficult to see how the ultimate sentence in this case can be regarded as exceeding the available range.26 48 There is nothing in the criticism regarding the observations made by the sentencing judge about the appellant’s lack of genuine insight and contrition. It is significant that the appellant’s statements to Mr Fugler did not satisfactorily correspond with his own statement read out to the court, nor the evident basis for the pleas of guilty. The appellant declined to give evidence to support what was said to Mr Fugler, or what was said in his statement read to the court. 49 In these circumstances, it was appropriate, indeed orthodox, for the sentencing judge to take a robust view of the matter. There was a proper basis for the finding that, until the appellant openly acknowledged the causes of his offending, he remained at high risk of re-offending. In that setting, he was fortunate to receive the maximum available statutory reduction for his late guilty pleas.27 There is presently little cause for optimism about the appellant’s rehabilitation. Conclusion 50 Whilst the sentence is a heavy one, it did not exceed the limits of a sound exercise of sentencing discretion. It was necessary for the sentencing court to protect the safety of the community,28 and mark its disapproval of serious child sexual abuse offending undertaken by a teacher toward his students. It cannot be said that the sentence is unreasonable or unjust. 51 Permission to appeal sentence should be granted, but the appeal dismissed. 26 Cf Warner v The King (2022) 142 SASR 275, [96]-[104] (Livesey P), [125]-[132] (Doyle JA). 27 Cf R v Bahrami (2020) 137 SASR 327. 28 Sentencing Act, s 3. -- 12 of 12 --