COLVIN and DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES [2026] WASAT 51

[2026] WASAT 51 Page 1 JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA) CITATION : COLVIN and DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES [2026] WASAT 51 MEMBER : DR M EVANS-BONNER, SENIOR MEMBER HEARD : 17 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 12 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : EOA 4 of 2024 EOA 5 of 2024 EOA 28 of 2024 EOA 17 of 2025 BETWEEN : BRENDA COLVIN Applicant AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES Respondent FILE NO/S : EOA 6 of 2024 BETWEEN : BRENDA COLVIN Applicant AND NADEEM KHAN Respondent -- 1 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 2 Catchwords: Equal opportunity - Complaints of impairment discrimination in accommodation and victimisation - Multiple application referrals to Tribunal Recusal application refused - Tribunal Member's alleged statements made during case management hearing - Applicant asserted complaint made to the Australian Human Rights Commission about the Tribunal Member Stay application refused - No jurisdiction to grant stay in original jurisdiction Dismissal or strike out of proceedings - Applicant failed to comply with Tribunal's orders - Notice proceedings may be dismissed for want of prosecution - Multiple extensions of time - Four out of five proceedings dismissed for want of prosecution - Applicant provided with opportunity to comply with orders in the remaining proceeding Legislation: Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 90(2) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 9(a), s 9(b), s 25(2), s 32(1), s 32(6)(c), s 46, s 46(3), s 47, s 47(1)(a), s 47(1)(c), s 47(2), s 48, s 48(1)(a), s 48(1)(c), s 49, s 105 Result: Recusal application refused Stay application refused Proceedings in EOA 4 of 2024, EOA 5 of 2024, EOA 6 of 2024 and EOA 28 of 2024 dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to s 46(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) Further programming orders made in EOA 17 of 2025 Category: B -- 2 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 3 Representation: EOA 4 of 2024 EOA 5 of 2024 EOA 28 of 2024 EOA 17 of 2025 Counsel: Applicant : No Appearance Respondent : Mr A Visram Solicitors: Applicant : N/A Respondent : State Solicitor's Office EOA 6 of 2024 Counsel: Applicant : No Appearance Respondent : No Appearance Solicitors: Applicant : N/A Respondent : N/A Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Badat v BP Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] [2026] WASC 89 Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 GSA v Department of Communities [2026] WASCA 36 Hendry v State of Western Australia (No 3) [2025] FCA 1262 KMR v JWH [2026] WASC 17 Ogbonna v Qantas Airways Ltd [2023] WASCA 168 Reynolds v Rayney [2023] WASCA 144 Smith v Bank of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 15 Summerville and Department of Education [2006] WASAT 174 Sweetman and Skytree Homes Pty Ltd [2025] WASAT 104 -- 3 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 4 The Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse [2005] WASCA 93 Tronox Management Pty Ltd v Cokic [2026] WASC 63 Turner and Maunsell Australia Pty Ltd [2006] WASAT 52 Winter and Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87 Zinni v Coventry Group Ltd, unreported, EOT of WA, 21 March 2002 -- 4 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 5 REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: Overview 1 Ms Colvin is a tenant in public housing. She is the mother and sole carer for a minor child who is living with significant disabilities. 2 Ms Colvin is the Applicant in five matters referred to the Tribunal by the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity (Commissioner) under s 90(2) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) (EO Act) after the Commissioner dismissed them as lacking in substance. 3 The relevant matters are EOA 4, 5, 6 and 28 of 2024 and EOA 17 of 2025. 4 The Department of Communities was named in the referral as the Respondent in each matter, except for EOA 6 of 2024 where Mr Khan, an employee at the Department of Communities, was named as the Respondent. Mr Khan has not participated in the proceedings to date. For convenience, I will refer to the Department of Communities as the Respondent. 5 EOA 4, 5, and 6 of 2024 were referred to the Tribunal on 7 February 2024. EOA 28 of 2024 was referred to the Tribunal on 6 August 2024. EOA 17 of 2025 was referred to the Tribunal on 26 August 2025. The matters have been programmed concurrently. 6 To date, in EOA 4, 5 and 6 of 2024 there have been nine directions hearings and three compulsory conferences. In EOA 28 of 2024 there have been eight directions hearings and three compulsory conferences. In EOA 17 of 2025 there have been six directions hearings and one compulsory conference. 7 For convenience, I will refer to the first four matters as the 2024 Matters, and the fifth matter as the 2025 Matter. 8 The Respondent was initially represented by an in-house lawyer from the Department of Communities, Mr King. Following Ms Colvin naming Mr King as a respondent in her complaint to the Commissioner in the 2025 Matter, in late December 2025, the State Solicitor's Office (SSO) came on the record as the legal representative for the Respondent. The lawyer with carriage of the matters from the SSO is Mr Visram. -- 5 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 6 9 Ms Colvin's complaints in each of the matters concern allegations of impairment discrimination in accommodation and victimisation for making a complaint. 10 Broadly speaking, Ms Colvin's complaints to the Commissioner were that: (a) the Department of Communities (or the Housing Authority) discriminated against her by refusing or failing to carry out repairs and maintenance to the inside and outside of her property, and refusing the approval of a shed; and (b) that the Respondent and numerous employees of the Respondent, and particularly Mr Khan, victimised her for making complaints to the Commissioner. 11 In submissions lodged with the Tribunal over time, Ms Colvin has sought to add on additional applicants to the 2024 Matters, including her minor child, and respondents, including individuals working for the Respondent. To date, whether additional parties should be joined was still to be determined by the Tribunal. 12 Ms Colvin has not complied with orders I made on 22 January 2026. Those orders gave Ms Colvin additional time, until 10 April 2026, to file a statement of issues facts and contentions (SIFC) and the filing of an indexed and paginated bundle of the documents in logical or chronological order she wished to rely on at the final hearing (Hearing Bundle) in each of the 2024 and 2025 Matters. 13 Later in these reasons, I provide a detailed chronology of the timing of the orders requiring Ms Colvin to file SIFCs and Hearing Bundles and her reasons for not complying with them. 14 By way of overview: (a) For the 2024 Matters Ms Colvin has been granted six extensions of time to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles. (b) For the 2025 Matter Ms Colvin was granted one extension of time to file her SIFC and Hearing Bundle. 15 After receiving her fourth extension of time for the 2024 Matters on 12 December 2025, Ms Colvin filed SIFCs comprising over 400 pages in EOA 4, 5 and 6 of 2024 and comprising 74 pages in EOA 28 of 2024. Further, the Hearing Bundles comprised an index only and no documents -- 6 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 7 with documents referred to in the indexes using a numbering system only known to Ms Colvin. 16 Two further extensions in the 2024 Matters, and an extension in the 2025 Matter, were granted so that Ms Colvin could submit revised SIFCs and Hearing Bundles. When I first extended the time for compliance with the orders on 12 December 2025, I imposed page limits which Ms Colvin strongly disagreed with. When I extended the time for compliance with the orders again on 22 January 2026, I increased the page limits. Ms Colvin maintained her objection to page limits despite the increase. 17 As I have mentioned, the 22 January 2026 orders required Ms Colvin to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles by 10 April 2026. 18 No revised SIFCs or Hearing Bundles were filed on the 2024 Matters by 10 April 2026. No SIFC or Hearing Bundle was filed on the 2025 Matter either. 19 On 2 March 2026, Ms Colvin filed her first recusal application (First Recusal Application). That recusal application was dismissed at a directions hearing on 6 March 2026. 20 On 7 March 2026, Ms Colvin applied for an 'internal review' of my orders restricting the page numbers and a 'stay of proceedings'. A directions hearing took place on 13 March 2026. At that directions hearing, the President of the Tribunal dismissed the application for an internal review on the basis that there is no jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal under the EO Act or the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) to conduct any such internal review. 21 On 8 April 2026 Ms Colvin filed another 'stay' application, and on 10 April 2026, she filed the current recusal application (Recusal Application) seeking that I be removed from further involvement in the matters and for a different Member to preside. 22 In the 22 January 2026 orders, a directions hearing was listed on 17 April 2026, which was seven days after the SIFCs and Hearing Bundles were due. Ms Colvin was on notice that if she did not comply with the 22 January 2026 orders, the matters may be dismissed for want of prosecution. 23 Ms Colvin failed to appear at the directions hearing on 17 April 2026. -- 7 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 8 24 As at the time of a directions hearing on 17 April 2026, Ms Colvin had not filed the SIFCs or Hearing Bundles. 25 Being satisfied that Ms Colvin had notice of the time and date of the 17 April 2026 directions hearing, I proceeded and made orders: (a) dismissing the recusal application filed by Ms Colvin; (b) dismissing her application for a stay order in all five matters; (c) dismissing the proceedings in the 2024 Matters in their entirety for want of prosecution; and (d) refusing to dismiss the 2025 Matter and making programming directions to give a second extension of the time for Ms Colvin to file a SIFC and Hearing Bundle. 26 These are my reasons for making those orders. Ms Colvin's recusal and stay applications 27 On 8 April 2026, Ms Colvin filed an application using the Tribunal's 'Interim Application' Form which was titled 'Urgent Stay of Proceedings' (Stay Application). The submissions she included in that form comprise approximately 12 typed pages and are repetitive in nature. 28 Ms Colvin filed another 'interim application' on 10 April 2026 titled, 'Recusal of Senior Member Evans-Bonner (2nd Request)' (defined above as the Recusal Application). The submissions she included in that form comprise approximately 16 typed pages and are repetitive in nature and repeat submissions made in the Stay Application. 29 In the Recusal Application Ms Colvin advised that she intended to file further evidence and submissions but did not advise when she intended to do so. 30 As I have understood those applications, Ms Colvin was asking: • That I recuse myself from any further involvement in the matters and that 'the matter be heard by a different member'; and • For a 'stay' of the proceedings. The reasons for the stay appear to be that the stay is being sought pending the recusal application being decided and so that Ms Colvin would not have to comply with the Tribunal's orders to file SIFCs and Hearing Bundles. -- 8 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 9 The directions hearing on 17 April 2026 31 As I have mentioned, Ms Colvin failed to attend the directions hearing on 17 April 2026. 32 The hearing attendant unsuccessfully attempted to telephone her1 from the hearing room approximately three times in the minutes before the commencement of the directions hearing at 10.00 am. 33 After the commencement of the directions hearing the Tribunal attempted to telephone Ms Colvin from the hearing room at 10.15 am, 10.17 am and 10.30 am. There was no answer and no ability to leave a voicemail message. 34 As I have outlined above, the orders listing the directions hearing for 17 April 2026 were made on 22 January 2026. They were made at a directions hearing that day which was attended by Ms Colvin. She was present when I made the orders listing the directions hearing for 10.00 am on 17 April 2026.2 35 The Tribunal's records show that the orders sent to Ms Colvin by email were opened on 18 February 2026 at 2.14 pm. 36 Being satisfied that Ms Colvin had notice of the time and date of the directions hearing, I proceeded. 37 I also note that Ms Colvin telephoned the Tribunal on 8 April 2026 and spoke to a case manager. During that conversation the case manager reminded her of the directions hearing on 17 April 2026. The case manager also spoke with the Respondent's legal representative by telephone on 10 April 2026 and reminded him of the directions hearing on 17 April 2026. 38 Further, on 10 April 2026, Ms Colvin telephoned my case manager and left a voicemail saying that she was going to ask the President for another Member to progress the matter 'next week'. 39 Ms Colvin was also on notice that if she did not comply with the orders of 22 January 2026 regarding submitting her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles, that the matters may be dismissed at the 17 April 2026 directions hearing for want of prosecution. 1 Ms Colvin has attended all directions hearings by telephone. 2 ts 31 and 33, 17 April 2026. -- 9 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 10 40 She was also verbally reminded at the directions hearing on 6 March 2026, when I dismissed a previous recusal application made by Ms Colvin, that the 22 January 2026 orders were still in place and that she needed to comply with them.3 41 At the directions hearing on 17 April 2026, Mr Visram appeared for the Respondent. 42 I first considered the Recusal Application, which I dismissed. 43 I then considered Ms Colvin's Stay Application. 44 The last issue I considered was whether Ms Colvin's five matters (the 2024 Matters and the 2025 Matter) should be dismissed. 45 Before I address these issues in turn, I will briefly outline the Respondent's submissions. Respondent's submissions 46 The legal representative for the Respondent, Mr Visram, filed submissions on 16 April 2024. They were titled 'Respondent's outline of submissions in response to applicant's stay application and second recusal application' and comprised 8 pages. 47 At the directions hearing on 17 April 2026, Mr Visram asked me to dismiss all five of Ms Colvin's applications under s 46(3) of the SAT Act for want of prosecution. 48 He submitted that the proceedings in the five applications had been on foot for a significant amount of time and that no substantial progress had been made. 49 Further, it was submitted that Ms Colvin appeared to indicate that she will not comply, had shown no intention of complying, and/or did not otherwise appear capable of complying with the Tribunal's orders. 50 In written submissions, Mr Visram also argued that it would also be open to the Tribunal to dismiss the five proceedings as lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process within the meaning of s 47(1)(a) and (c) of the SAT Act. 51 Additionally, Mr Visram submitted the Tribunal could dismiss the five matters on the basis that Ms Colvin is conducting the proceedings in 3 ts 31, 17 April 2026. -- 10 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 11 such a way that unnecessarily disadvantages the Respondent by her conduct within the meaning of s 48(1)(a) and (c) of the SAT Act. 52 At the directions hearing on 17 April 2026, Mr Visram submitted that there was no basis for the recusal. He submitted that I had already determined the First Recusal application on 6 March 2026, and that there had been no change of circumstances since that time. 53 I asked Mr Visram about two factors I had identified in Ms Colvin's current Recusal Application which appeared new or different to those previously considered. Those were: (a) a complaint of disability discrimination Ms Colvin has allegedly made about me to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) sometime in March 2026 after I had refused to recuse myself on 6 March 2026; and (b) allegations that I have made comments during directions hearings about the merits of Ms Colvin's applications. This factor seemed to overlap with submissions in the First Recusal Application, however, giving Ms Colvin the benefit of the doubt, I have considered it. I understood Ms Colvin to be referring to comments that I may have made during directions hearings held on 14 November 2025, 12 December 2025 and 22 January 2026. For completeness, I have also considered the directions hearing on 6 March 2026. 54 Having come on the record in late December 2025, Mr Visram was only present at the 22 January 2026 and 6 March 2026 directions hearings. His submission was that I had not made any statement at those directions hearings that could be the subject of any complaint or recusal application. 55 He observed that we do not know the content of any complaint Ms Colvin may have made to the AHRC, but that it should not prevent my continuing to hear the matters. Recusal Recusal Applications 56 As is evident from Ms Colvin's reference to a '2nd Request' in her current Recusal Application, I have already heard and determined a previous recusal application made by Ms Colvin on 2 March 2026 (the First Recusal Application). I dismissed that recusal application at a -- 11 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 12 directions hearing on 6 March 2026 and gave oral reasons for my decision. 57 In her current Recusal Application dated 10 April 2026, Ms Colvin repeated some of the factors she identified as being the basis for her First Recusal Application. These were her perceptions about my competence, allegations that I had been rude to Ms Colvin during directions hearings, an allegation that I had received secret prejudicial information from the Respondent that was not disclosed to Ms Colvin, and Ms Colvin's discontent with my imposing page limits on her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles. 58 In the First Recusal Application, I refused to recuse myself and dismissed Ms Colvin's application for recusal. I applied the relevant law including the test for apprehended bias in the seminal case of Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (Ebner)4 which was discussed and applied together with other more recent and relevant case law by Justice Jackson in the Federal Court case of Hendry v State of Western Australia (No 3) (Hendry).5 I concluded that I was not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer would interpret the factors raised by Ms Colvin as indicating a possible bias on my part. 59 I was of the view that the fair-minded lay observer would, in my view, understand the context of any statements and case-management decisions made, and would appreciate that the factors raised by Ms Colvin were based on misinterpretation, assumptions, and frustration that I would not give her what she wanted with respect to the page number limits and the additional time she wanted to prepare her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles. 60 I was not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions I am required to decide in Ms Colvin's applications. Legal principles on recusal for apprehended bias Ebner Test 61 I have already referred, in passing, to the 'fair-minded lay observer' test, and my conclusions having applied that test in the First Recusal Application. 4 Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 (Ebner) at [6]. 5 Hendry v State of Western Australia (No 3) [2025] FCA 1262 (Hendry) at [30]. -- 12 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 13 62 As was recently explained by Justice Jackson in Hendry at [35], applying the Ebner test (Ebner Test) requires the following steps: (1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer. 63 A comprehensive outline of the relevant legal principles was recently provided by Justice Lundberg in Tronox Management Pty Ltd v Cokic (Tronox).6 His Honour stated: [17] The applicable test to assess whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias was restated by Quinlan CJ in Ogbonna v CTI Logistics: [9] In relation to the former [that is, the test for apprehended bias], the test to be applied in determining whether I should recuse myself by reason of a reasonable apprehension of bias is well established. A judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. [10] In applying this principle, it is necessary to identify what is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal or factual merits, and to articulate a logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The test is objective and the fair-minded observer taken to be reasonable and to remember that the person being observed is a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. (footnotes omitted) [18] In support of the above passages, Quinlan CJ cited the statements of principle expressed by Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, as follows: [6] Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of 6 Tronox Management Pty Ltd v Cokic [2026] WASC 63 (Tronox) at [17] - [21]. -- 13 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 14 a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle. [7] The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror. [8] The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an "interest" in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. -- 14 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 15 [19] These statements were recently reiterated in the unanimous decision of the High Court in Charisteas v Charisteas. [20] While the fair-minded lay observer 'is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice'. The question must also be determined by remembering that the judge is a professional 'whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [that he or she] discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial'. [21] The application of the fair-minded lay observer test involves, in the words of Tottle J in Barnel Investments Pty Ltd v Conceptual Technologies Pty Ltd a 'value judgment which is to a significant extent an intuitive judgment not readily susceptible of close analysis'. (footnotes omitted) 64 Recently, the Court of Appeal in GSA v Department of Communities7 summarised the test for apprehended bias as follows: [23] In summary, reasonable apprehension of bias will be established if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the relevant judicial officer might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question he or she is required to decide. In applying this principle it is necessary to identify what is said might lead the judicial officer to decide a case other than on its legal or factual merits and to articulate a logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The reasonableness of the apprehension may then be assessed. [24] The test is objective and the fair-minded lay observer is someone who is aware that the person who is being observed is a professional judicial officer whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. However, the fair-minded lay observer is cognisant of human frailty and understands that information and attitudes consciously and conscientiously discarded might still sometimes have a subconscious effect on even the most professional of decision-makers. 65 In Tronox, Lundberg J provided the following relevant commentary about the duty of Judges to hear and determine the cases constituted to 7 GSA v Department of Communities [2026] WASCA 36 at [23] - [24]. -- 15 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 16 them and the need for there to be substantial grounds to warrant disqualification:8 [33] In assessing the defendant's application, I recognise it is important that justice must be seen to be done. Equally, I recognise the weight to be attributed to the notion that judicial officers must discharge their duty to sit, and not to encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour. [34] Parties may be encouraged in this regard if judges too readily accede to suggestions of an appearance of bias. Fundamentally, a judge should not disqualify himself or herself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias unless substantial grounds are established. (footnotes omitted) Recusal application after case management proceedings 66 As Ms Colvin's matters are at the case management stage of the proceedings, it is useful to say something about the law when a recusal application is made in that context. 67 Recently, in Badat v BP Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] (Badat)9 Howard J considered an application for recusal on the ground of apprehended bias in which exchanges between counsel and the Judge during case management hearings were factors. 68 Informed by the legal principles stated by Howard J as being relevant to statements made from the bench during a case management hearing, I am satisfied that the following principles can be applied to Tribunal proceedings, including in circumstances where an applicant is self-represented: • The fair-minded observer would appreciate the nature and purpose of a case management proceeding to inform their understanding of what is appropriate conduct by both the parties and the Tribunal Member; • A Tribunal Member is not precluded from showing irritation or displeasure at the way parties conduct themselves in the proceeding, and when that occurs, any comments or conduct 8 Tronox at [33] - [34]. 9 Badat v BP Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] [2026] WASC 89 (Badat) at [17] - [21]. -- 16 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 17 should be assessed within the full context of the case management hearing; and • The fair-minded observer would consider what was said as a whole, and the context of what was said. That is, they 'must be assumed to know … the whole context in which something is said, including having access to the full transcript, rather than cherry-picked quoted extracts'.10 69 It is also relevant to clarify that the bringing of a recusal application does not mean that orders made by the Judge or the Member do not have to be complied with. Any orders made by the Judge or Member remain on foot until different orders are made which say otherwise. 70 I also observe that a recusal application cannot be brought to secure more time to comply with the Tribunal's orders. A party cannot use a recusal application to set their own timetable. In Ms Colvin's Recusal Application, which was filed on the same day as her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles were due in the five matters, Ms Colvin indicated that she would be filing further affidavit evidence and submissions in support of her already lengthy and detailed recusal submissions. If a party is of the view that there are grounds for recusal, an application should be made promptly, and completely, so that it can be dealt with by the Tribunal so as not to cause further delay. Although repetitive, the basis for Ms Colvin's Recusal Application was fully articulated in her written submissions, and I was able to consider and determine it. Step 1 of the Ebner Test 71 The first step is to identify the factors which Ms Colvin says are the basis for her current Recusal Application. 72 Ms Colvin's current Recusal Application repeats the factors she put forward as the basis for her First Recusal Application. As I have considered and decided those matters already in the First Recusal Application. I do not need to decide them again. 73 The current Recusal Application is repetitive, and lengthy. I have endeavoured to consider it in its totality to see if there are further or new factors put forward by Ms Colvin as the basis for her current Recusal Application which I may need to consider. 10 Badat at [21]. -- 17 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 18 74 As I understand Ms Colvin's Recusal Application, she has identified the following new factors as being a basis for recusal: • Firstly, Ms Colvin asserts that I have made statements during directions hearings, expressing views about her matters which suggest that I have pre-judged their merits. I understand Ms Colvin's complaints to concern directions hearings held on 14 November 2025, 12 December 2026, 22 January 2026 and possibly 6 March 2026; and • Secondly, Ms Colvin asserts that I have a conflict of interest because Ms Colvin says she has recently made a disability discrimination complaint against me to the AHRC. I understand this complaint was apparently made after the directions hearing on 6 March 2026 when I dismissed the First Recusal Application. Step 2 of the Ebner Test 75 This step involves an articulation of a logical connection between the factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the question on its merits. 76 With respect to statements that I may have made which indicated a pre-judgment of Ms Colvin's complaints, Ms Colvin has not been able to articulate anything specific from the transcripts of the directions hearings that suggest a pre-judgment. 77 I have also reviewed the transcripts in question which do not show any statements that could be perceived as a pre-judgment of the substantive issues. 78 In my oral reasons on 6 March 2026 when I decided the First Recusal Application, I observed that there appeared to have been a lot of misunderstandings and assumptions on the part of Ms Colvin that formed the basis of the First Recusal Application. In my respectful view, the same can be said of the current Recusal Application. 79 The transcripts of the relevant directions hearings show that I have endeavoured to help Ms Colvin as a self-represented person, by explaining jurisdictional and procedural matters including: • how to prepare the index to a hearing bundle; • explaining why hundreds of pages are not required in her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles; and -- 18 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 19 • explaining the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the complaint that was before the Commissioner and that subsequent events which occurred after the referral from the Commissioner were not before the Tribunal and are outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 80 I am satisfied that there is therefore no logical connection between anything said at the directions hearings and my being unable to continue to manage the matters and to ultimately determine them on their merits. 81 With respect to the complaint of disability discrimination that Ms Colvin says she has made about me to the AHRC, the lodgement of a complaint does not have a logical connection to my ability to continue to manage the matters and to determine them on their merits. 82 Litigants cannot pick and choose their Judges or Tribunal Members and there must be substantial grounds justifying the recusal.11 As the Court of Appeal observed in Reynolds v Rayney,12 'it is the responsibility of a Judge to sit and hear a case assigned to that Judge. Judges do not select their cases and parties cannot select their judges'. The same can be said, in my respectful view, of Tribunal Members. If simply making a complaint about a Judge or Tribunal Member was a basis for recusal, it could result in parties being able to choose, or rather exclude, a Judge or Tribunal Member from hearing their matter by making a complaint against them. 83 Parties to Court or Tribunal proceedings are free to make complaints about any grievances that they may have to internal or external bodies, and there are processes in place for the making, investigation and resolution of those complaints. There may be statutory rights of appeal if a person disagrees with a judgment or an order made by a Court or Tribunal. For example, the SAT Act provides for rights of appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of law.13 Complaints and appeals are a normal part of judicial and Tribunal life. Consequently, there will generally be no logical connection between the making of a complaint and the ability to make impartial decisions on their merits, which is something that Judges and Tribunal Members are trained to do. 84 Accordingly, I am satisfied that there is also no logical connection between Ms Colvin advising me that she has made a complaint against 11 See Ebner at [19]. 12 Reynolds v Rayney [2023] WASCA 144 at [30]. 13 SAT Act, s 105. -- 19 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 20 me to the AHRC and my being unable to continue to manage the applications and to determine the applications on their merits. Step 3 of the Ebner Test 85 The third step involves an assessment of the reasonableness of the apprehension from the perspective of the fair-minded observer. 86 With respect to any statements made during directions hearings, the fair-minded lay observer, having regard to the totality and context of what was said during directions hearings would not reasonably consider that I had expressed a view on the ultimate merits of Ms Colvin's applications. 87 With respect to Ms Colvin's assertion that I am now in a position of conflict of interest because she says she has made a complaint to the AHRC about me, a fair-minded lay observer would recognise that it is part of the ordinary course of Tribunal practice that parties disagree with orders made by the Tribunal, make complaints against Tribunal Members and/or lodge appeals. However, I am satisfied that a reasonable fair-minded lay observer would not perceive there was any reasonable or logical connection between such a complaint and my ability to impartially case manage Ms Colvin's matters, or to ultimately decide their substantial merits at a final hearing. 88 In conclusion, a fair-minded lay observer would not perceive that the apprehensions alleged by Ms Colvin were reasonable. 89 I am therefore not satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions I am required to decide during the case management, or indeed, in any final hearing of Ms Colvin's applications. 90 I therefore refuse the application that I recuse myself. The Recusal Application should be dismissed. Stay order 91 Ms Colvin is also seeking a 'stay' order. I understand Ms Colvin wants to stay the proceedings until the Recusal Application is determined in her favour, and to allow time for another Member to make different case management orders that Ms Colvin agrees with. -- 20 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 21 92 Ms Colvin's five matters were referred to the Tribunal under s 90(2) of the EO Act. They fall within the Tribunal's original jurisdiction, and not the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. 93 A stay order can be applied for in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction to stay the operation of a decision that is the subject of a review.14 However, in Ms Colvin's matters, there is nothing to stay because the Tribunal is not reviewing decisions of the Commissioner. 94 Consequently, I am satisfied and find that Ms Colvin's application for a stay order is misconceived (as per s 47(1)(a) of the SAT Act), and should be dismissed under s 47(2) of the SAT Act. 95 If a party needs more time to comply with orders made by the Tribunal in its original jurisdiction, for example, to file a SIFC and/or Hearing Bundle, the party can apply to the Tribunal to vary the dates for compliance in the orders. 96 Whilst the Tribunal will usually give greater latitude to self- represented applicants, it is nevertheless an applicant's responsibility to progress their own matters. 97 It is also the responsibility of the Judge or Member case managing an application to ensure that a matter progresses through the Tribunal. This is in accordance with the objectives of the Tribunal in s 9 of the SAT Act, which include that when dealing with matters in its jurisdiction the Tribunal should endeavour to achieve the resolution of disputes fairly, according to their substantial merits and speedily and with as little formality as possible to minimise the cost to the parties. 98 This must be balanced with the need to provide natural justice to the parties15 and to otherwise ensure that the parties are given a sufficient opportunity to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered16. However, the provision of natural justice and allowing a party to be heard does not mean that a party will have unlimited opportunities17 and be able to set their own timeline in which to progress their matter. 99 Ms Colvin has, on numerous occasions, been given additional time to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles, and the matters have made little 14 SAT Act, s 25(2). 15 SAT Act, s 32(1). 16 SAT Act, s 32(6)(c). 17 Ogbonna v Qantas Airways Ltd [2023] WASCA 168 at [17] - [18] (Ogbonna) cited in Sweetman and Skytree Homes Pty Ltd [2025] WASAT 104 at [71]. -- 21 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 22 to no progress, despite being in the Tribunal for approximately two years for the 2024 Matters, and eight months for the 2025 Matter. 100 I am not satisfied that Ms Colvin's matters should be effectively put 'on hold' as she has requested. Nor am I satisfied that she should be given more time to comply with the Tribunal's orders with respect to the 2024 Matters. 101 As I explain in the following section, instead of Ms Colvin being given more time to comply, the 2024 Matters should be dismissed, but she should be given a further opportunity to progress the 2025 Matter. Dismissal 102 Ms Colvin is on notice that if she does not comply with the Tribunal's orders with respect to filing her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles, her first four applications may be dismissed. 103 As I outlined above, the Respondent has also put forward alternate grounds for dismissal, under s 47(2) and s 48 of the SAT Act in their written submissions. 104 Those written submissions were filed late in the afternoon the day before the directions hearing and so Ms Colvin would not, in my view, have had adequate notice they might be considered at the 17 April 2026 directions hearing. 105 I have therefore only considered whether the five matters should be dismissed for want of prosecution because that is something that Ms Colvin has been on notice of since 14 November 2025. Want of prosecution 106 The relevant parts of s 46 of the SAT Act provide that: (3) At any time, the Tribunal may make an order dismissing or striking out all, or any part, of a proceeding before it for want of prosecution. (4) The Tribunal's power to make an order under subsection (3) is exercisable only by a legally qualified member. (5) The Tribunal may make an order under this section on the application of a party or on its own initiative. -- 22 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 23 107 In The Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse (Hancock)18 the Court of Appeal identified guidelines which will usually be relevant to a Court's decision to exercise discretion to dismiss a case for want of prosecution.19 108 I am satisfied that the guidelines, that may, depending on the circumstances of the case, be relevant in a Tribunal context, are the: • length of the delay; • explanation for the delay; • hardship to the applicant if the proceeding is dismissed; • prejudice to the respondent if the proceeding is allowed to proceed notwithstanding the delay; and • conduct of the respondent in the proceeding. 109 In a joint judgment in Hancock, Steytler P and Owen JA cautioned against the principles being used 'as a check list to be ticked off one after the other'.20 There Honours stated that: '[i]t will always be necessary for the court to stand back and ask: what does justice, in all the notions or senses of it that are relevant, require in the circumstances of this case?'. 110 In my view, it is also relevant to consider the statutory context when considering the above guidelines. The EO Act is beneficial in that it permits a person aggrieved by certain types of conduct to make a discrimination claim. An applicant may be in a position of disadvantage, for example, if they are living with a disability and/or if they are self- represented in the Tribunal. The objectives of the Tribunal, as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act are also relevant when considering dismissal. So too, is the requirement for the Tribunal to provide natural justice21 and to ensure the parties have the opportunity to be heard22. 111 In my view, when evaluating the guidelines identified in Hancock, it is also relevant to consider whether, overall, Ms Colvin has been given a sufficient opportunity to present her case. 18 The Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse [2005] WASCA 93 (Hancock) at [100] per Steytler P and Owen JA. 19 The guidelines have been cited with approval in subsequent cases, for example, by the Court of Appeal in Smith v Bank of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 15 at [4] per Owen JA and at [78] per Newnes JA. 20 Hancock at [103] per Steytler P and Owen JA. 21 SAT Act, s 32(1). 22 SAT Act, s 32(6)(c). -- 23 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 24 Timeline of the progress of the matters through the Tribunal 112 I have summarised the timeline to some extent in the overview at the beginning of these reasons. 113 However, I will provide a more detailed timeline of the progress of the matters through the Tribunal because it is relevant to the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay. 114 The first three matters were each referred to the Tribunal under s 90(2) of the EO Act by the Commissioner on 7 February 2024. The fourth matter, EOA 28 of 2024, was referred to the Tribunal on 6 August 2024. The 2025 Matter was referred to the Tribunal on 26 August 2025. 115 The 2024 Matters were sent to compulsory conferences on 13 November 2024 and 30 January 2025 with a Senior Member to attempt to resolve the complaints by mediation. 116 On 7 November 2024, a Magistrate dismissed an application by Ms Colvin for a final violence restraining order against Mr Khan, expressing the view that it was 'a vexatious claim', and ordered her to pay costs of $12,000.23 117 On 31 March 2025, the Respondent filed submissions seeking dismissal of the 2024 Matters. 118 At a directions hearing on 4 April 2025, I expressed concerns with the legal correctness of some of the Respondent's submissions. Instead of programming a dismissal, I made programming orders which, in summary, required the Applicant to file, by 16 May 2025, a SIFC, together with a Hearing Bundle, she wished to rely on at the final hearing for the 2024 Matters. The orders listed a directions hearing for 13 June 2025 to consider if the Respondent wanted to proceed with a dismissal application once they were able to understand the legal basis for Ms Colvin's complaints in her SIFCs. 119 The second order I made on 4 April 2025 was that other than the SIFCs and Hearing Bundles, Ms Colvin must not file any further submissions or documents without prior leave of the Tribunal. Those orders were not complied with. Dozens of documents and 23 Transcript of proceedings in Perth Magistrates Court, page 163 and page 170. Ms Colvin was also granted an interim violence restraining order against another senior staff member of the Respondent, Mr Geddes, on 13 May 2024. -- 24 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 25 submissions were filed by Ms Colvin on the 2024 Matters subsequent to the making of that order. 120 On 15 May 2025, orders were made by the Tribunal, following a request from Ms Colvin, extending the date by which the SIFCs and Hearing Bundles should be filed by to 26 July 2025. 121 The reasons given by Ms Colvin for wanting the extension included:24 that there was a 'significant wait for pro-bono legal advice' which she had 'now received'; that she was finding the SIFC and Hearing Bundles to be laborious, but that they were nearing completion; that she had spent a significant amount of time making another equal opportunity complaint against the Respondent; that she was seeking review by the Information Commissioner because the Respondent did not provide her with Freedom of Information (FOI) information she requested; that her child had personal commitments and medical appointments in June, and that she was caring for and homeschooling her child, leaving her with limited time to complete the SIFC and Hearing Bundles; and that the Respondents (referring to the Department of Communities and Mr Khan) had been given extensions.25 122 On 24 July 2025, orders were made by the Tribunal, following a request from Ms Colvin extending the date by which the SIFCs and Hearing Bundles should be filed to 15 September 2025. The reasons Ms Colvin stated for wanting the extension included that 'there is a significant wait for pro-bono legal advice', that EOA 4 of 2024 was the primary complaint which involved approximately 65% of the total workload, that she had limited time to complete the SIFCs after home schooling her child and attending to personal, therapy and medical commitments, and that the Respondents had been given several extensions. 123 On 26 August 2025, the Commissioner referred the 2025 Matter to the Tribunal under s 90(2) of the EO Act. 124 On 15 September 2025, orders were made by the Tribunal, following a request from the Applicant, extending the date by which the SIFCs and Hearing Bundles were to be filed, to 10 November 2025. The reasons Ms Colvin stated for wanting the extension included: that there were a lot of 'moving parts' and a significant wait for her next pro- 24 'Request for a Variation to the Order' dated 4 April 2025 dated 12 May 2025. 25 It is unclear as to what Ms Colvin's reference to the Respondent being given extensions is referring to. No programming orders were made requiring the Respondents to file any documents. -- 25 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 26 bono legal meetings which were not for another six weeks; her child continued to have home schooling, medical, personal and therapy commitments on an ongoing basis leaving her with limited time to complete the four SIFCs; she had spent time lodging FOI applications to obtain evidence for the SIFCs and for the final hearing; and that she had spent time engaging with the Equal Opportunity Commission with respect to the most recent complaint referred to the Tribunal, being the 2025 Matter. 125 On 5 November 2025, the Ms Colvin filed a request to extend the date of filing of the SIFCs and the Hearing Bundles to 30 April 2026. The reasons for requesting the extension were that the Applicant's pro- bono lawyers were assisting with other matters including a new restraining order application against Mr Khan, and a FOI external review at the Office of the Information Commissioner. Due to being occupied with these matters, Ms Colvin said that her pro-bono lawyers had not had a chance to assist with the completion of the remaining SIFCs. Ms Colvin also stated that she had limited daily time to complete the SIFCs because she was caring for and homeschooling her child who has complex needs and requires significant support. She would be going on a holiday in January 2026, and her pro-bono lawyers could not assist until the end of February. Further, she stated that her child had medical appointments and procedures in March 2026. 126 In addition to the written reasons for wanting an extension, at the directions hearing on 14 November 2025, Ms Colvin stated that she thought the claims were 'complex', that there were four and a half years' worth of material to consider and that the claims were interrelated. The Respondent opposed the extension and submitted that 'some time ago the threshold for dismissing these proceedings on the ground of want of prosecution' had been reached.26 127 At the directions hearing on 14 November 2025, I made orders in the 2024 Matters extending the time for the Applicant to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles to 11 December 2025, and putting her on notice that if she did not file them by 11 December 2025, that the four applications may be dismissed at a directions hearing on 12 December 2025 for want of prosecution pursuant to s 46(3) of the SAT Act. 128 In notes to the orders I stated that Ms Colvin had already been given three extensions, that she had had seven months to file her SIFCs and 26 ts 18, 17 April 2026. -- 26 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 27 Hearing Bundles and that I was of the view that it would not be in accordance with the Tribunal's objectives in s 9(a) and (b) of the SAT Act to grant Ms Colvin a further extension. 129 I sent the matters to a compulsory conference on 28 November 2025 with two Senior Members to attempt to resolve the complaints by mediation. The Respondent strongly opposed the compulsory conference on the basis that it would be futile because the Respondent still did not know what Ms Colvin's case was. 130 Ms Colvin did not lodge any documents until the morning of a directions hearing on 12 December 2025. Her SIFCs were each over 400 pages in EOA 4, 5 and 6 of 2024 and 74 pages in EOA 28 of 2024. Her Hearing Bundles comprised an index and no documents were attached. Documents were referred to in the indexes using a numbering system only known to Ms Colvin. I accepted Ms Colvin's explanation that the documents were a day late because Ms Colvin had encountered difficulty filing them through the eCourts portal. 131 At the directions hearing on 12 December 2025, I gave Ms Colvin a fifth extension to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles by 3 March 2026. I also made orders limiting the page numbers of the SIFCs to no more than 15 typed pages in 12-point times new roman font with no less than 1.5 cm line spacing. I limited the Hearing Bundles to 40 pages. I also made an order that the Tribunal would only consider the documents in the Hearing Bundles. This was on the basis that numerous documents had been filed by Ms Colvin on each matter and in several matters over 100 folios of documents were on the files. 132 Both verbally during the directions hearing on 12 December 2025, and in the notes to the 12 December 2025 orders, I placed Ms Colvin on notice that if she did not comply with the orders to file her SIFC and Hearing Bundle that the 2024 Matters may be dismissed for want of prosecution. 133 The first orders I made in the 2025 Matter for the filing of a SIFC and Hearing Bundle were made at the 12 December Directions Hearing. As I have mentioned, the matters were programmed concurrently so that the documents in all matters were due at the same time. 134 On 19 December 2025, Ms Colvin requested that I vary the 12 December 2025 order because she was having difficulty complying with the page limits and font size which she said were 'unrealistic'. She also referred to having 'numerous personal commitments, a severely -- 27 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 28 disabled Child with severe complex needs, other legal matters, holidays and [that] the Applicant's complaints cover a lot of incidents … numerous issues and events…'. She said that there was a lot of work associated with the first four complaints and requested that the 2025 Matter be 'set aside' until the 2024 Matters were 'complete'. 135 On 15 December 2025 the SSO filed a notice of legal representation in the 2025 Matter. On 29 and 30 December 2025, the SSO filed notices of legal representation in the 2024 Matters. As I mentioned above, previously an in-house lawyer, Mr King, had represented the Respondent. 136 I held a directions hearing on 22 January 2026 to discuss Ms Colvin's request to remove the page number limits. 137 At that directions hearing I varied the 12 December 2025 order to increase the page limit for the SIFC from 15 to 25 pages and increased the pages of documents in the hearing bundle from 40 to 50 pages. For clarity, I also made another order that the Tribunal would also separately consider the documents in the referral report from the Commissioner in addition to the hearing bundle. I declined Ms Colvin's request to defer the 2025 Matter until the others were decided as the matters appeared to be related and there was some overlap with the earlier applications. I gave oral reasons for making the orders. 138 At the directions hearing on 22 January 2026, the Respondent suggested the time for Ms Colvin to lodge her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles could be extended to give her some further time. With some reluctance on my part given the amount of time these matters (particularly the 2024 Matters) had been on foot, I extended the time for compliance to 10 April 2026. The Respondent nevertheless expressed concerns about the amount of time that the matters had been on foot and Ms Colvin's noncompliance with the orders.27 139 On 12 February 2026, Ms Colvin filed submissions on all the matters asking for, amongst other things, the page number limits in the SIFCs and evidence to be removed and again, for the 2025 Matter to be 'deferred' until the 2024 Matters were 'complete'. She referred to the possibility that she may make a recusal application if these issues were not resolved to her satisfaction. 27 ts 36, 17 April 2026. -- 28 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 29 140 In a letter filed with the Tribunal and dated 18 February 2026, the Respondent stated that Ms Colvin was seeking to re-litigate issues that were determined at the 22 January 2026 directions hearing, where she was given the opportunity to be heard at length. The Respondent's position was that all five proceedings should continue and be heard together, Ms Colvin should comply with the 22 January 2026 orders without variation and that if she did not comply with the orders the Tribunal should dismiss the matters for want of prosecution, as foreshadowed in the Tribunal's 12 December 2025 orders. 141 On 20 February 2026, I made orders listing the matters for a directions hearing on 6 March 2026. 142 On 27 February 2026 Ms Colvin filed a copy of a 'Notification of Hearing' document for a restraining order mention hearing on 13 April 2026 where she was seeking a misconduct restraining order against Mr Khan. 143 On 2 March 2026, Ms Colvin filed the First Recusal Application. 144 At a directions hearing on 6 March 2026, I refused to recuse myself, dismissed the First Recusal Application and gave oral reasons for doing so. 145 On 7 March 2026, Ms Colvin filed a document seeking a stay of the proceedings pending an internal review of the orders I made on 22 January 2026. In that document she stated that she had made a 'formal Disability Discrimination complaint' to the AHRC on 6 March 2026 because I had not removed the page limits after three requests from her to do so. 146 At a directions hearing on 13 March 2026 the President dismissed Ms Colvin's application for an internal review on the basis there was no jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal under the EO Act or the SAT Act to conduct an internal review. 147 On 8 April 2026, Ms Colvin filed the Stay Application. 148 On 10 April 2026, Ms Colvin filed the current Recusal Application. 149 By 10 April 2026, Ms Colvin had not complied with the 22 January 2026 orders to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles in the 2025 Matter, and no updated SIFCs or Hearing Bundles were filed for the 2024 Matters. -- 29 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 30 150 I will now consider the guidelines relevant to the exercise of discretion to dismiss a proceeding for want of prosecution. Length of the delay 151 The period of time that has passed since the commencement of the proceedings has been considerable. The first three matters have been in the Tribunal for two years and two months, the fourth matter for approximately two years, and the 2025 Matter for nearly eight months. 152 Orders were first made on 4 April 2025, requiring Ms Colvin to file her SIFC and Hearing Bundles in the 2024 Matters by 16 May 2025. Approximately 11 months have passed since that initial filing date. 153 Orders were first made on 12 December 2025 in the 2025 Matter, requiring Ms Colvin to file a SIFC and Hearing Bundle by 3 March 2026. Approximately six weeks have passed since that filing date and the directions hearing on 17 April 2026. 154 I varied the orders to extend the time for compliance in the 2024 Matters four times on: 15 May 2025 to 26 July 2025; 24 July 2025 to 15 September 2025; 15 September 2025 to 10 November 2025; and 14 November 2025 to 11 December 2025. I further varied the orders to extend the time for compliance a fifth time on 12 December 2025 to 3 March 2026; and a sixth time on 22 January 2026 to 10 April 2026. 155 For the 2025 Matter, on 22 January 2026 I varied the orders to extend the time for compliance to 10 April 2026. 156 As at 17 April 2026, Ms Colvin had not filed a SIFC and Hearing Bundle in the 2025 Matter. She also failed to file revised SIFCs and Hearing Bundles in the 2024 Matters. 157 Since the applications were referred to the Tribunal by the Commissioner on 7 February 2024 and 6 August 2024, there has been little, if any, progress in the progression of the applications. Explanation for the delay 158 I have already outlined Ms Colvin's explanations for the delay when outlining the timeline. 159 Her explanations were similar on each occasion. They included that she has needed time to obtain pro-bono legal advice and to wait for appointments with pro-bono lawyers, that compiling the documents is -- 30 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 31 time consuming given the volume and complexity of her claims, her responsibilities of caring for a child with disabilities including homeschooling and attending to her child's personal and medical appointments, the making of FOI requests to obtain documents from the Department of Communities and appealing FOI access decisions to the Information Commissioner, and going on a holiday. 160 Some of those explanations such as waiting for relevant documents to be produced under FOI, waiting for appointments with pro-bono lawyers and legal advice, and significant caring and homeschooling responsibilities are understandable and may justify further time being granted to a party. However, if those reasons persist over an extended period, the reasonableness of those requests diminishes. I am satisfied that is the case here, and that the explanations for the delay in the 2024 Matters, which have substantially persisted over time, are no longer reasonable. 161 The Respondent acknowledges that the EO Act is beneficial legislation and that latitude must be given, especially to self-represented complainants.28 The Respondent further acknowledges that allowances must be made where one party is legally represented and the other is not.29 The Respondent highlights, however, that Ms Colvin has stated several times over the last six months that she required further time because she has had meetings with pro-bono lawyers, or because she was waiting for assistance from pro-bono lawyers. They submit that a balance must be struck between affording her the chance to be legally represented against the main objectives in the Tribunal in s 9, including to act speedily and to minimise cost to the parties. 162 I agree. Ms Colvin has been given ample opportunity and time to obtain legal advice by the Tribunal for a period exceeding six months. In fact, in EOA 4, 5 and 6 of 2024, from 4 June 2024 until 6 August 2024, Hammond Legal were representing Ms Colvin.30 Additionally, from 4 April 2025, Ms Colvin referred to having obtained pro-bono legal advice. For example, on 12 May 2025 she stated that, '[t]here was a significant wait for pro bono legal advice which I have now received.'31 28 Zinni v Coventry Group Ltd, unreported, EOT of WA, 21 March 2002, cited in Winter and Commissioner of Western Australian Police Service [2006] WASAT 87 at [42]. 29 Turner and Maunsell Australia Pty Ltd [2006] WASAT 52 at [49]. 30 'Notice of Legal Representation' filed on 4 June 2024 and 'Notice of Legal Representative Ceasing to Act' filed on 6 August 2024. 31 'Request for a Variation to the Order' dated 12 May 2025. -- 31 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 32 I am therefore satisfied that Ms Colvin has had a sufficient opportunity to seek legal advice, and that she has been able to obtain that advice. 163 Ms Colvin has also been occupied with doing other things, other than progressing her applications in this Tribunal. 164 She has stated that she has been occupied with work associated with restraining order proceedings against Mr Khan. At the directions hearing on 14 November 2025, she stated that she had taken out another restraining order against Mr Khan, and would be in court on 5 December [2025].32 At the directions hearing on 22 January 2026, Ms Colvin wanted longer than 3 March 2026 to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundle because she said she had a misconduct restraining order application to deal with, and that she had to file submissions by mid- February.33 165 Ms Colvin has also filed dozens of additional documents on the 2024 Matters. She has done so despite the order I made on 4 April 2025 that other than the SIFCs and Hearing Bundles, she must not file any further submissions or documents without prior leave of the Tribunal. 166 Ms Colvin has also been focussing her attentions on other applications that do not progress these matters. As I have outlined above, she has made two recusal applications, an application for an internal review, and the Stay Application. She has also informed me that she has made a complaint of disability discrimination to the AHRC. Also, at the directions hearing on 6 March 2026, Ms Colvin told me that she could not comply with the 22 January 2026 orders because she would be seeking legal advice and had 'other Supreme Court matters appealing your decisions'.34 167 When a person has an application in a Court or a Tribunal, they need to prioritise and progress it. They cannot dictate the timing for compliance with orders made based on other priorities. 168 The following passage from Lundberg J's judgment in KMR v JWH (KMR)35 is relevant in this regard. KMR concerned whether an appellant 32 ts 22 - 23, 17 April 2026. 33 ts 30, 17 April 2026. 34 ts 31, 17 April 2026. 35 KMR v JWH [2026] WASC 17 (KMR). -- 32 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 33 should be given leave for an extension of time to appeal a decision of this Tribunal in the Supreme Court. Lundberg J observed:36 Busy litigants cannot simply decide for themselves that particular matters will be given a lower priority in their own self-selected running list of litigation tasks. Rather, a party is obliged to prioritise matters according to the time requirements established by Parliament, or by the rules of the court. To allow litigants to decide their own priorities would be to seriously undermine the policy which drives the imposition of time limits set by Parliament and by the rules. 169 In my view, these principles are also applicable to proceedings in this Tribunal. I note that the main objectives of the Tribunal in s 9 of the SAT Act refer to the Tribunal's objective to 'act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable'. Parties need to prioritise the progress of their matters in the Tribunal by complying with orders on time, despite any other obligations or priorities they may have. 170 I am satisfied, and I find, that instead of progressing the 2024 Matters and the 2025 Matter, Ms Colvin has prioritised other tasks instead of progressing the 2024 Matters and the 2025 Matter in this Tribunal. Hardship to the Applicant if the proceeding is dismissed 171 A dismissal under s 46(3) of the SAT Act would bring Ms Colvin's applications in this Tribunal to an end and she would not be able to pursue them further. 172 She may be able to pursue other legal avenues under tenancy law, but she would not be able to re-litigate her equal opportunity claims. 173 Ms Colvin would be unlikely to be able to seek judicial leave to bring another proceeding of the same kind, as contemplated in s 49 of the SAT Act, because the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is dependent on the Commissioner referring a matter to it under the EO Act. 174 The 2025 Matter does, however, contain similar complaints to the 2024 Matters. It alleges a failure to undertake repairs and maintenance to Ms Colvin's property, the refusal to approve a shed, victimisation for making a complaint, plus additional claims involving the alleged refusal to install a video doorbell and her rent being increased. 36 KMR at [35]. -- 33 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 34 175 If the 2025 Matter is not dismissed, the subject matter of some of Ms Colvin's claims would still be before the Tribunal with her additional, more recent, claims. However, a complaint to the Commissioner needs to be lodged within 12 months of the date of the contravention of the EO Act,37 and so the Commissioner will generally only consider events which are relevant to that time period. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction to deal with the issues raised in the complaint that was determined by the Commissioner.38 This may mean that although there is some overlap in the subject matter, only complaints arising in that 12 month period that were determined by the Commissioner are before this Tribunal. 176 I am therefore satisfied, and I find, that Ms Colvin will suffer some hardship if the 2024 Matters and the 2025 Matter are dismissed because she will lose the opportunity to pursue all or part of those complaints under the EO Act. Prejudice to the Respondent if the proceeding is allowed to proceed 177 It is relevant to consider prejudice resulting from the delay up until the present time, and any additional prejudice likely to be suffered by the Respondent if the matters were to continue. 178 The Respondent submits it has expended substantial time and expense and has incurred ongoing costs in defending the five separate proceedings. I am satisfied that this is likely, taking into account the number of directions hearings held, the three compulsory conferences, the volume of materials filed by Ms Colvin on each matter (particularly with respect to the 2024 Matters) which the Respondent has had to review, the other applications and lengthy submissions she has filed including two recusal applications, two stay applications and an application for internal review, and the substantial length of time the proceedings have been in the Tribunal for (comprising 2 years, and 2 years and two months, for the 2024 Matters). 179 The Respondent is now in the position, some two years after the 2024 Matters were referred by the Commissioner, of not having a clear understanding of the case to be met in the absence of a satisfactory SIFC in any of the matters. Indeed, it is accurate to say that some two years in, the matters are not nearing finalisation. 180 The Respondent further submits that having ongoing proceedings which do not appear to be nearing finalisation is causing a strain on the 37 EO Act, s 83(4). 38 Summerville and Department of Education [2006] WASAT 174 at [11]. -- 34 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 35 relationship between the Housing Authority (who are the current landlord and were previously operating within the Department of Communities) and Ms Colvin, along with creating difficulties for the Housing Authority, and the individuals working there, in managing the tenancy. Whilst there is no specific evidence about this, the length of time and the nature of the allegations made by Ms Colvin in these proceedings lends significant weight to the plausibility of this submission. 181 Whilst some latitude needs to be given to Ms Colvin as self- represented party, the Respondent is entitled to have the matter progress and to know the case against them. This has not happened, and despite it being two years since the 2024 Matters were referred they are not nearing finalisation. 182 Overall, I am satisfied that the Respondent has suffered prejudice (including substantial time, cost, stress and difficulties managing the ongoing tenancy) because of the lack of progress and delays in Ms Colvin progressing the 2024 Matters in particular. The statutory context 183 The Tribunal is created by the SAT Act, and derives its powers from the Sat Act and the enabling act (in this case, the EO Act),39 and so the statutory context is also relevant for me to consider in deciding whether discretion should be exercised to dismiss a matter. 184 I have already mentioned s 9 of the SAT Act which states that the main objectives of the Tribunal include to achieve the resolution of disputes fairly, according to the substantial merits of the case, speedily and to minimise the costs to the parties. Allowing Ms Colvin a seventh extension to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundle in the 2024 Matters, would not be consistent with those objectives. 185 I have also mentioned s 32(1) of the SAT Act which provides that the Tribunal is bound by the rules of natural justice, except to the extent that the SAT Act or the enabling act (in this case the EO Act), authorises a departure from those rules. A party needs to be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case. As I mentioned above, the requirements of natural justice do not require a party to have an unlimited opportunity to do so. The following statement from Ogbonna40 was made with respect to the discretion to grant or refuse an adjournment. 39 See paras [110] and [116] above where I discuss the beneficial nature of the EO Act. 40 Ogbonna cited in Sweetman and Skytree Homes Pty Ltd [2025] WASAT 104 at [71]. -- 35 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 36 However, in my respectful view, it is applicable to Ms Colvin's situation with respect to the lack of progress in 2024 Matters in particular. The Court of Appeal stated: 17 The discretion to grant or refuse an adjournment must also be exercised consistently with the obligation of the court to determine disputes in a manner which is procedurally fair. However, it is well established that this does not require that a party be given an unlimited opportunity to present a case. What is required is that the parties are provided with a sufficient opportunity to present their cases. A party who is given a sufficient opportunity to present their case, and who fails to take advantage of that opportunity without reasonable cause, cannot complain that they have been denied procedural fairness because the court has declined to provide a further opportunity to do so. 18 In considering whether determination of litigation is just, regard must be had to the interest of other parties to the litigation and other litigants in other cases. Speed and efficiency, in the sense of minimum delay and expense, are aspects of the just resolution of proceedings. Considerations of speed and efficiency cannot detract from the requirement that a party to litigation be given sufficient opportunity to present their case. However, where a party has been given a sufficient opportunity to present their case, then a decision about an adjournment to provide further opportunity must take account of the injustice to the other parties which may follow from the delay, expense and disruption which results from a listed hearing not proceeding. (footnotes omitted) 186 I am satisfied allowing Ms Colvin a seventh extension in the 2024 Matters would be to shift into the realm of unlimited opportunity. 187 Similarly, s 32(6)(c) of the SAT Act requires the Tribunal to take measures that are reasonably practicable to ensure that the parties have the opportunity in the proceeding call or give evidence and to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered. For the 2024 Matters, Ms Colvin has 11 months to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles and been given further time to comply on six occasions. She has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 188 I am satisfied, particularly with respect to the 2024 Matters, and I find, that Ms Colvin has had sufficient opportunities to progress the matters, and more specifically, to file her SIFCs and Hearing Bundles. To afford her a seventh extension of time in which to file those documents would be unreasonable, and not in accordance with the objectives in s 9 of the SAT Act. -- 36 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 37 Conclusion on dismissal 189 Having regard to the factors in Hancock including the substantial length of the delay, the reasons being provided for the delay having changed very little over the passage of many months, the prejudice to the Respondent, and having regard to relevant provisions in the SAT Act, I am satisfied, and I find, that discretion should be exercised to dismiss the 2024 Matters in their entirety for want of prosecution, pursuant to s 46(3) of the SAT Act. 190 In making this finding, I have also weighed the prejudice to Ms Colvin whose opportunities to pursue those equal opportunity claims will now be lost. However, I am satisfied that any prejudice to Ms Colvin is greatly outweighed by the other considerations that weigh in favour of dismissal. 191 I am not, however, entirely satisfied that the 2025 Matter should be dismissed for want of prosecution, although it is close to meeting the criteria for dismissal on that basis. 192 The length of the delay in the 2025 Matter is substantially less than the others. It has been in the Tribunal since it was referred by the Commissioner on 26 August 2025, some eight months ago. Orders were first made in that matter 12 December 2025, and an extension of the time for compliance was granted to Ms Colvin in the orders made on 22 January 2026 to 10 April 2026. That filing date has not been complied with, and no SIFC or Hearing Bundle have been filed. 193 I therefore made orders on 17 April 2026 extending the time for Ms Colvin to file her SIFC and Hearing Bundle in the 2025 Matter to 22 May 2026. I have also increased the page limit of the SIFC to 50 pages, noting that several of the claims in the 2024 Matters are repeated in the 2025 Matter. I am of the view that this is more than what is reasonably needed, however, contesting the page number limits has been a source of distraction to Ms Colvin, and increasing the limit may help to encourage her to file her SIFC in the 2025 Matter. 194 Similarly, I have removed the page number limit from the Hearing Bundle, and note that, as was the case in the 22 January 2026 orders, the Hearing Bundle will be considered in addition to the report sent to the Tribunal by the Commissioner which totals some 681 pages. 195 Should Ms Colvin include information in her SIFC that is not before the Tribunal, or should she include documents that are not relevant in the -- 37 of 38 -- [2026] WASAT 51 Page 38 Hearing Bundle, the Respondent is at liberty to apply to the Tribunal for further orders with respect to those issues. This may have costs implications for Ms Colvin. 196 In the 17 April 2026 orders I have put Ms Colvin on notice that if she does not comply with the orders to file her SIFC and Hearing Bundle by 22 May 2026, or if she fails to attend the next directions hearing on 29 May 2026, the 2025 Matter may be dismissed for want of prosecution. 197 Given that for each extension Ms Colvin has cited that she is waiting for pro-bono appointments or legal advice, I have also included an order that she is to file evidence confirming when and whether she has sought legal advice concerning this proceeding. Hopefully, this may encourage Ms Colvin to engage with her pro-bono legal representatives and to progress the 2025 Matter. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. DR M EVANS-BONNER, SENIOR MEMBER 12 MAY 2026 -- 38 of 38 --