Air New Zealand Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ; PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] HCA 21
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ
Matter No S245/2016
AIR NEW ZEALAND LTD APPELLANT
AND
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
COMMISSION RESPONDENT
Matter No S248/2016
PT GARUDA INDONESIA LTD APPELLANT
AND
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
COMMISSION RESPONDENT
Air New Zealand Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission
[2017] HCA 21
14 June 2017
S245/2016 & S248/2016
ORDER
Matter No S245/2016
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Matter No S248/2016
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
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2.
Representation
B W Walker SC with N J Owens SC and R A Yezerski for the appellant in
S245/2016 (instructed by Norton White Lawyers)
N C Hutley SC with T J Brennan and R J Scheelings for the appellant in
S248/2016 (instructed by Norton White Lawyers)
J C Sheahan QC and J A Halley SC with D F C Thomas and H Younan for
the respondent in each matter (instructed by Australian Government
Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject
to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law
Reports.
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CATCHWORDS
Air New Zealand Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission
Trade practices – Restrictive trade practices – Price fixing – Market
identification – Location of market – Meaning of market "in Australia" – Where
airlines competed to supply unidirectional air cargo services from ports of origin
outside Australia to destination ports within Australia – Where airlines arrived at
understanding to impose various surcharges and fees for supply of air cargo
services – Whether market for air cargo services "in Australia" for purposes of
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
Trade practices – Restrictive trade practices – Price fixing – Foreign state
compulsion – Where airlines contravened s 45 of Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth) – Whether conduct compelled by foreign law or foreign regulator's
administrative practices.
Statutory interpretation – Inconsistency – Where s 13(b) of Air Navigation Act
1920 (Cth) required airlines to comply with "agreement or arrangement" – Where
Australia-Indonesia Air Services Agreement "agreement or arrangement" within
meaning of ss 12(2) and 13(b) of Air Navigation Act – Where
Australia-Indonesia Air Services Agreement required agreement between
international airlines on minimum tariffs – Where ss 45 and 45A of Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) prohibited arriving at understandings concerning prices
with competitors – Whether ss 12 and 13 of Air Navigation Act inconsistent with
ss 45 and 45A of Trade Practices Act such that latter did not apply to
contravening conduct.
Words and phrases – "competition", "foreign state compulsion", "market
identification", "market in Australia", "otherwise competitive with", "practically
and operatively inconsistent", "price fixing", "rivalrous behaviour",
"substitutability", "supply and demand".
Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth), ss 12, 13.
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 4, 4E, 45(2), 45(3), 45A.
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1 KIEFEL CJ, BELL AND KEANE JJ. The factual background and the
legislative provisions relevant to the issues in these appeals are set out in full in
the reasons of Gordon J. We gratefully adopt them and her Honour's summary of
the decisions of the courts below.
2 It is sufficient for the purposes of these reasons to state a few facts. Air
New Zealand Ltd ("Air New Zealand") and PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd ("Garuda")
were found by the primary judge to have been parties to understandings which
amounted to price fixing. The understandings involved the imposition of
surcharges and fees associated with the carriage of air cargo from ports in Hong
Kong, Singapore and Indonesia to destination ports in Australia1.
3 The primary judge found that this conduct would have contravened
s 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TPA"), which prohibits a
corporation arriving at an understanding which has the purpose, or has or is
likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. The competition
spoken of, other provisions explain, is competition in a market for goods and
services in Australia. His Honour concluded that s 45(2) was not contravened
because the competition which took place between the airlines occurred in
markets in Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia, not in any market in Australia2.
4 Despite the epic character of this litigation – the trial occupied 57 sitting
days and the hearing of the appeal to the Full Court six days – the principal issue
is within short compass. It is whether the primary judge was correct to hold that
there was not a market in Australia for the air cargo services for which Air New
Zealand and Garuda competed. The majority of the Full Court held that this was
incorrect and allowed the appeals of the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission from that decision.
5 In our view the findings of fact made by the primary judge lead irresistibly
to the conclusion that there was a market in Australia for the airlines' air cargo
services, and that the appeals of the airlines should therefore be dismissed.
1 It may be noted that, for convenience, both the primary judge and the Full Court
focused upon routes between Hong Kong and ports in Australia, but their reasoning
applied equally to routes from Singapore and Indonesia to Australia. The same
approach will be adopted here.
2 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 393 [20].
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Kiefel CJ
Bell J
Keane J
2.
The statutory provisions
6 During the relevant period, s 4E of the TPA provided:
"For the purposes of this Act, unless the contrary intention appears,
market means a market in Australia and, when used in relation to any
goods or services, includes a market for those goods or services and other
goods or services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with,
the first-mentioned goods or services."
7 The operative provisions of the TPA were contained in s 45(2)(a)(ii) and
(b)(ii), which were relevantly in the following terms:
"A corporation shall not:
(a) … arrive at an understanding, if:
…
(ii) a provision of the proposed … understanding has the
purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of
substantially lessening competition; or
(b) give effect to a provision of [an] … understanding … if that
provision:
…
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of
substantially lessening competition."
8 For the purpose of s 45 of the TPA, s 45A(1) operated to deem a provision
of an understanding to have the purpose, or to have or be likely to have the effect,
of substantially lessening competition "if the provision has the purpose, or has or
is likely to have the effect … of fixing … the price for … services supplied … by
the parties to the … understanding".
9 For the purposes of the TPA, s 4(1) defined "price" to include "a charge of
any description" and defined "services" to include "any rights … benefits,
privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred in
trade or commerce".
10 Section 45(3) of the TPA provided, for the purposes of ss 45 and 45A,
that:
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Kiefel CJ
Bell J
Keane J
3.
"competition, in relation to a provision of [an] … understanding … means
competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party to the …
understanding … supplies … or is likely to supply … services".
11 Read epexegetically in the light of ss 4E, 45A and 45(3), s 45(2) operates
where a corporation arrives at or gives effect to an understanding to fix prices in
any market in Australia in which the corporation competes to supply services3. It
was not in dispute that the airlines were parties to understandings that would
have contravened s 45(2) of the TPA if they were in competition to supply
services in a market in Australia.
A market in Australia
12 The authorities confirm that a market, within the meaning of the TPA, is a
notional facility which accommodates rivalrous behaviour involving sellers and
buyers4. In Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co
Ltd5, Deane J, after noting that "[s]ection 4E confines 'market' for the purposes of
the Act to 'a market in Australia'", went on to say that "'market' should, in the
context of the Act, be understood in the sense of an area of potential close
competition in particular goods and/or services and their substitutes". Dawson J
agreed6 generally with Deane J, adding7:
"A market is an area in which the exchange of goods or services between
buyer and seller is negotiated. It is sometimes referred to as the sphere
within which price is determined and that serves to focus attention upon
the way in which the market facilitates exchange by employing price as
the mechanism to reconcile competing demands for resources".
3 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group
Ltd (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [65]; 339 ALR 242 at 257; [2016] HCA 49.
4 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1989) 167
CLR 177 at 188, 195, 199; [1989] HCA 6; Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 454-455
[247]-[248], 455-456 [252]-[253]; [2003] HCA 5; Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group Ltd (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at
156 [66], [69], 165-166 [126]; 339 ALR 242 at 257, 258, 270.
5 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 195.
6 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 198.
7 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 199.
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Kiefel CJ
Bell J
Keane J
4.
13 Similarly, in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission8, McHugh J observed9:
"[T]he market is the area of actual and potential, and not purely
theoretical, interaction between producers and consumers where given the
right incentive ... substitution will occur. That is to say, either producers
will produce another similar product or consumers will purchase an
alternative but similar product."
14 Section 4E of the TPA proceeds upon the express footing that,
notwithstanding the abstract nature of the concept of a market, it is possible to
locate the market where the competition protected by the TPA occurs in
Australia. Reconciling the abstract notion of a market with the concrete notion
of location, so that they work coherently, presents something of a challenge.
Particularly is this so because "competition" describes a process rather than a
situation10. But given that the TPA regulates the conduct of commerce, it is
tolerably clear that the task of attributing to the abstract concept of a market a
geographical location in Australia is to be approached as a practical matter of
business. It is important that any analysis of the competitive processes involved
in the supply of a service is not divorced from the commercial context of the
conduct in question11.
15 It was common ground between the parties that a market in Australia does
not cease to be so located because it encompasses other places as well. The issue
then is whether the rivalrous behaviour – in the course of which suppliers and
acquirers might be matched – occurred in Australia, whether or not it also
occurred elsewhere.
8 (2003) 215 CLR 374.
9 (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 455-456 [252].
10 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd – Proposed Merger (1976) 8
ALR 481 at 515.
11 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group
Ltd (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [70]; 339 ALR 242 at 258.
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Kiefel CJ
Bell J
Keane J
5.
The facts about the market
16 The primary judge found12 that the activity of flying freight to ports in
Australia involved: transporting cargo from a port of origin to a port of
destination; ground handling services at both origin and destination airports;
inquiry services for tracing delayed or lost shipments; and dealing with issues
arising from damaged cargo at destination. These services were supplied and
acquired as a single package, or suite, of services13. These findings of fact were
affirmed on appeal14.
17 In providing these services, the airlines took possession of the cargo to be
transported from a freight forwarder at the airport of origin. The range of airlines
available to be selected to provide the service was limited by the need for any
such airline to have a presence in the port of origin. The service of taking
possession of the cargo in the port of origin with a view to flying it to a
destination port in Australia could not be performed anywhere but in the port of
origin15.
18 The primary judge found16 that the markets in which Air New Zealand and
Garuda competed were route-specific markets for the service of flying cargo
from individual origin ports in Singapore, Hong Kong or Indonesia to individual
destination ports in Australia.
19 The primary judge found that the participants in these markets were the
airlines, freight forwarders, and shippers – being either exporters at origin or
importers at destination – whose cargo volume was sufficiently significant to
motivate the airlines to pursue their custom. These shippers often, but not
12 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 445-446 [252]-[256], 459 [336].
13 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 456 [321].
14 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 201 [21]-[22], 217 [96], 275 [591]-[593], 283 [638].
15 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 456 [319]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v
PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 285-286 [650].
16 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 445-446 [252]-[256], 459 [336].
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6.
always, made decisions about the choice of airline; and where the shipper was an
importer in Australia, that decision was likely to be made in Australia. Where
the choice of airline was not made by a shipper, it was usually made by a freight
forwarder who also provided necessary ancillary services not provided by the
airlines. Smaller shippers who left the choice of carrier to their freight
forwarders were not regarded as participants in any of the markets identified by
the primary judge17.
20 Apart from rare occurrences (typically involving live animals), airlines
dealt directly only with freight forwarders situated in the port of origin or in
nearby environs, and not with shippers18. Local cargo sales offices of the
airlines, at the port of origin, published from time to time standard rates as
"tariff" or "rate" sheets or schedules. Contract and other rates (as opposed to
standard rates) were negotiated between freight forwarders and staff of airlines at
the local sales office, at the airport of origin19.
21 Importantly, the primary judge found that the airlines "tousled [sic] to
obtain"20 the custom of those shippers in Australia who were substantial
importers. His Honour said that "[a]lthough the contracts of carriage were
entered into in Hong Kong by the freight forwarders … as a practical matter,
substantial importers in Australia had the capacity to influence or even direct the
decision as to which airline was to be used"21 to transport goods from the airport
of origin to Australian airports. His Honour said that the evidence "strongly
suggested" that the airlines regarded these shippers both as targets for their
17 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 454 [309].
18 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 447 [266]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v
PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 286 [650].
19 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 412-413 [94]-[99], 414 [107]; Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (2016) 244 FCR 190 at
285-286 [650].
20 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 455 [313].
21 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 455 [314].
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7.
marketing activities and as the ultimate source of this business22. A cursory
examination of the cargo magazines produced by the airlines for the cargo trade
showed that these larger shippers were regarded by the airlines as objects to be
pursued. It was obvious, his Honour said, that the airlines would "compete for
volumes of cargo directly from large shippers"23. The airlines' marketing
magazines were directed to multiple markets. The marketing materials
proceeded upon the basis that, regardless of the port of origin, the airlines were
focused on shipper activity24.
Were the airlines competing in Australia?
22 The primary judge treated the place where the ultimate choice of airline
was effected (referred to in the courts below as "the switching decision") as the
location of the market25 and so identified Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia
as markets, but not Australia26. In his Honour's view the decision in Re
Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd – Proposed Merger27
("QCMA") and s 4E require the place where substitution between competing
sources may occur to be used to determine the location of the market28. That is to
say, the place where the contracts of carriage were made and where the airlines
began to carry out their obligations was decisive.
23 This approach, with respect, accords too much significance to the fact that
substitution or switching may occur outside Australia. It accords too much
22 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 449 [272].
23 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 449 [272].
24 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 449 [277].
25 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 447 [264].
26 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 393 [20].
27 (1976) 8 ALR 481.
28 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 455 [317], 456 [321].
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8.
weight to what was said in QCMA about substitutability of products or services
and its place in s 4E.
24 In QCMA29 the Trade Practices Tribunal explained that a market is "the
field of actual and potential transactions between buyers and sellers amongst
whom there can be strong substitution … if given a sufficient price incentive".
Later, in discussing the distinction between markets and sub-markets, it was
said30 that:
"Where the defining feature of a market is the existence of close
substitutes (whether in demand or supply), the defining feature of a sub-
market is the existence of still closer and more immediate substitutes."
25 The Tribunal did not say that substitutability will be the defining feature
of a market in every case. The passage takes as its premise that it is the defining
feature for the question at hand.
26 This is not to suggest that substitutability may not be an important, or even
a decisive, factor in market definition in some cases, just as barriers to entry may
be. It is rather that concepts such as market and cross-elasticity of supply and
demand provide no complete solution to the definition of a market, as Dawson J
observed in Queensland Wire Industries31. Much will depend upon the context in
which the question arises. The exercise of market definition needs to take into
account the conduct in question and its effects, and the statutory terms governing
the question32.
27 The market spoken of in s 4E is a market in Australia. Section 4E treats
substitutability as the principal driver of the rivalrous behaviour accommodated
by a market. The act of switching or substitution marks the conclusion of that
rivalry: one of the rivals has prevailed. The place where that success is
formalised by the signing of a contract may often, as a practical matter of
business, say something significant about the location of the process of rivalry
for the purposes of s 4E of the TPA. But it will not necessarily do so.
29 (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 517.
30 (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 517.
31 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 198-199.
32 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group
Ltd (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [69]; 339 ALR 242 at 258.
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9.
28 The locations of the making of the contractual match and of the
performance of the contract may be significant, not in themselves, but as
(usually) reliable indicators of the location of the mechanism or facility which
accommodates the process of rivalry and matching essential to the concept of a
market. In this regard, it is the substitutability of services as the driver of the
rivalry between competitors to which s 4E of the TPA looks to identify a market,
not the circumstances of the act of substitution itself. The place where the act of
substitution occurs does not necessarily locate the geographical area of the
rivalry which precedes that act of substitution. Where the service being supplied
is the transport of goods between two countries, the place at which the act of
substitution is recorded or formalised may say little about where the interplay of
supply and demand, driven by the conditions of substitutability, has occurred.
Thus, for example, contracts for air freight from Hong Kong to Sydney may be
signed at the head office of the airline based in Europe, but that does not locate
the geographical dimension of the market in Europe.
29 In the present case, while the circumstance that contracts for supply of air
cargo services were made and the performance of those services commenced at
locations outside Australia may tend to suggest that suppliers were competing in
a market of which these overseas locations are a feature, it does not, of itself,
accurately describe the geographical dimension of the market; much less
establish that Australia was not within that market. Given that the services to be
supplied by the airlines were destined for ports in Australia in answer to demand
generated in Australia, it does no violence to the language of s 4E of the TPA to
say that, as a matter of commerce, the geographical dimension of the market that
accommodates the interplay of that supply and demand includes Australia.
30 That having been said, too much should not be made of the circumstance
that the services provided by Air New Zealand and Garuda terminated at
destination ports in Australia. For the majority of the Full Court, it was
important that "a significant and important part of the operation of the 'suite of
services' being provided was in Australia"33. But it is not necessarily the case
that the place where a freight delivery service terminates identifies the market in
which the carrier competes to supply the service. The place of delivery may
simply be the "end of the line" of a service supplied from a market in which the
ultimate destination has little bearing on the interplay of the forces of supply and
demand which generate the service and fix its price. For example, the infrequent
and irregular delivery of air freight to an Australian scientific research facility in
Antarctica would not be regarded as the supply of services in a market in
33 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 231 [164].
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10.
Antarctica. In this example, the interplay of the forces of supply and demand
which generate the service and fix its price would take place, geographically
speaking, entirely outside Antarctica.
31 In the present case, Australia was not merely the end of the line for
services generated by an interplay of forces of supply and demand occurring
outside Australia. The primary judge's findings of fact demonstrate that shippers
in Australia were a substantial source of demand for the airlines' services, and
that the airlines engaged in rivalrous behaviour seeking to match the supply of
their services with that demand. The primary judge found that the airlines
appreciated that the large shippers who required air cargo services to ports in
Australia were the "economic foundation of the market"34. And importantly, the
primary judge found that the airlines tussled to obtain the custom of shippers in
Australia who were substantial importers35, and whom the airlines regarded as
the ultimate source of their business36. To speak of suppliers tussling to obtain
orders is to describe the rivalrous behaviour which is the essence of competition.
32 The circumstance that the demand from Australian shippers was usually
articulated to suppliers in Hong Kong by freight forwarders does not deny that,
as a matter of commerce, the interplay of the forces of supply and demand
encompassed Australia. That this was so is confirmed by the fact that, as the
primary judge found, the airlines pursued sales and marketing strategies in
Australia promoting their services to shippers in competition for orders to
provide freight for their cargo37. As McHugh J explained in Boral Besser,
34 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 451 [287].
35 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 455 [313]-[314].
36 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 439 [221], 449 [272], 451-452 [291]-[292], 453 [299].
37 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388 at 449 [272]-[274], 452 [293].
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11.
customer attitudes are relevant to market definition38 because they bear upon the
substitutability of the services of a competitor39.
33 In the present case, the primary judge's findings establish that the airlines
conducted their businesses in a way which recognised the economic reality that
Australia was not merely the end of the line for their air cargo services but was
also a vital source of demand for those services from customers who were
regarded as important to the profitability of their businesses. As a practical
matter of business, the rivalrous behaviour in the course of which the matching
of supply with demand occurred was in a market which, speaking
geographically – as s 4E of the TPA requires – included Australia; and that was
so even if the market might also have been said to be in Singapore, Hong Kong
or Indonesia.
34 As noted above, a practical focus on the issue is required because the TPA
operates upon those engaged in commerce40. The airlines were actively engaged
in attempting to capture the demand for services emanating from shippers in
Australia as an integral part of their business. The airlines' deliberate and
rivalrous pursuit of orders emanating from Australian shippers was compelling
evidence that they were in competition with each other in a market that was in
Australia.
35 For these reasons, we conclude that the airlines' price fixing conduct took
place in a market in Australia.
The subsidiary issues
36 We agree with the reasons given by Gordon J on the issues of foreign state
compulsion and alleged inconsistency.
Orders
37 The appeals should be dismissed with costs.
38 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(2003) 215 CLR 374 at 456 [253]-[254]; see also Re Queensland Co-operative
Milling Association Ltd – Proposed Merger (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 517.
39 See Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 456 [253].
40 Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(2003) 215 CLR 374 at 455-456 [252].
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Nettle J
12.
38 NETTLE J. I agree with Gordon J, for the reasons her Honour gives, that the
appeals should be dismissed; but I wish to add the following.
39 As the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court (Dowsett and
Edelman JJ) recognised41, market definition is a question of fact. More precisely,
it involves "a fact-intensive exercise centered on the commercial realities of the
market and competition"42. And, as a consequence, the definition of a market is
liable to vary according to the purposes of the exercise undertaken43.
40 In some cases, a geographic market may logically be understood as the
area in which potential buyers look for sellers to supply goods and services, as
opposed to the area in which sellers look for buyers to purchase goods and
services44. That may be so where sellers do not "market" their goods and
services, or perceive themselves to be competing45, outside the area in which they
as sellers are located. The facts of Tampa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co
provide the paradigm46. By contrast, where sellers are engaged in marketing
their goods and services, or perceive themselves to be competing, in areas
beyond the area in which they are located, commercial reality is likely to dictate
that the market includes those further areas47.
41 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 219-220 [104]-[106], [109].
42 EI du Pont de Nemours and Co v Kolon Industries Inc 637 F 3d 435 at 442
(4th Cir, 2011). See Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc 504 US
451 at 481-482 (1992) per Blackmun J (Rehnquist CJ, White, Stevens, Kennedy
and Souter JJ agreeing); Todd v Exxon Corporation 275 F 3d 191 at 199-200
(2nd Cir, 2001).
43 See Singapore Airlines Ltd v Taprobane Tours WA Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 158 at
175, 178 per French J (Spender J and O'Loughlin J agreeing at 159, 185).
44 Tampa Electric Co v Nashville Coal Co 365 US 320 at 327, 331-333 (1961);
United States v Grinnell Corp 384 US 563 at 571-573 (1966); Tunis Bros Co Inc v
Ford Motor Co 952 F 2d 715 at 726 (3rd Cir, 1991). See generally Boral Besser
Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 215
CLR 374 at 455-456 [252] per McHugh J; [2003] HCA 5.
45 See generally Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australia and
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107-108 [138].
46 365 US 320 at 327, 331-333 (1961).
47 EI du Pont 637 F 3d 435 at 442-443, 444-447 (4th Cir, 2011).
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13.
41 In cases of the latter kind, it is accepted in United States anti-trust
jurisprudence that the geographic market consists of the smallest area of overlap
of sellers' and buyers' locations in which sellers are able to increase prices or
reduce supply without purchasers turning to alternative suppliers beyond that
area48. A similar concept has been recognised in Europe49. And despite
differences between competition law in the Unites States, Europe and Australia,
the area of a geographic market is essentially an economic concept and therefore
logically to be determined according to similar considerations in each
jurisdiction50.
42 Counsel for Air New Zealand Ltd and PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd (together,
"the airlines") called in aid the idea of substitution recognised in Re Queensland
Co-operative Milling Association Ltd
Proposed Merger51:
"Within the bounds of a market there is substitution substitution
between one product and another, and between one source of supply and
another, in response to changing prices."
It was submitted that, because all of the existing suppliers of the relevant cargo
services, and all of the possibilities for substitution, were located outside
Australia, it necessarily followed that the market was outside Australia.
43 So to conjecture, however, overlooks that, in these appeals, the airlines
marketed their services in Australia to potential customers in Australia, and
48 In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation 739 F 3d 262 at 277 (6th Cir, 2014);
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice,
2nd ed (1999) at 113 §3.6.
49 See Decision 1999/243/EC relating to a proceeding pursuant to Articles 85 and 86
of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/35.134) at [519]; Atlantic Container Line AB v
Commission of the European Communities [2003] ECR II-3298 at II-3577-II-3578
[858].
50 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia)
Pty Ltd (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,243 [429]; Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 297 at 344 [244]
per Yates J (Finn J agreeing at 300 [1]); ACCC v ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236
FCR 78 at 107-108 [136]-[138]; Donald and Heydon, Trade Practices Law, (1978)
at 92-94.
51 (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 517. See also Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken
Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 188 per Mason CJ and Wilson J,
199 per Dawson J, 210 per Toohey J; [1989] HCA 6.
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perceived themselves to be competing for Australian customers in Australia52.
Certainly, as the airlines emphasised, each contract of carriage was entered into
in Singapore or Hong Kong through one or other freight forwarder acting as a
principal. Hence, as was concluded53 by the primary judge, and by Yates J in the
Full Court, Singapore and Hong Kong were the places where the so-called
"switching decisions" (that is, decisions to choose one airline over another or to
substitute one airline's service for another's) were executed or given effect. But,
equally, at least in some cases, those decisions were the result of determinations
previously made by Australian customers in Australia in response to the airlines'
marketing activities in Australia54.
44 Counsel for the airlines conceded that the area of a geographic market is
not necessarily determined by the place where contracts for the sale of goods and
services in the market are entered into. That concession was rightly made. In
international commerce, the place of entry into a contract of purchase and sale
may be entirely fortuitous and, hence, essentially irrelevant to the location of the
geographic market in which goods and services are offered and purchased.
Likewise here, at least in those instances where Australian customers were
directly involved in making the so-called switching decisions, the place of
execution of those decisions could not be determinative and was no more
important than the rivalrous behaviour of the airlines to which the
decision-makers were subject in Australia.
Conclusion and orders
45 In the result, the appeals should be dismissed with costs.
52 ACCC v Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 210-211 [59]-[63], [65] per Dowsett and
Edelman JJ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New
Zealand Ltd (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 449-451 [272]-[287], 455 [313]-[314].
53 ACCC v Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 291 [675]; ACCC v Air NZ (2014) 319
ALR 388 at 457 [323].
54 See ACCC v Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 447 [263]-[264].
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46 GORDON J. The appellants, Air New Zealand Ltd ("Air NZ") and PT Garuda
Indonesia Ltd ("Garuda"), operated international air services and carried on
business in Australia. Part of their business was to supply unidirectional air
cargo services from ports of origin in Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia to
destination ports in Australia ("the air cargo services"). Their conduct within and
outside Australia55 was subject to Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
("the TPA").
47 At the relevant times, s 45(2) of the TPA, read with ss 4E and 45(3) of the
TPA, relevantly provided that a corporation must not arrive at an understanding,
or give effect to a provision of an understanding, if a provision of the proposed
understanding has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect,
of substantially lessening competition in a market, in Australia, in which a
corporation that is a party to the understanding supplies, or is likely to supply,
services. Section 45A relevantly provided that certain provisions of
understandings in relation to prices were deemed, for the purposes of s 45,
to have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.
48 At trial, Air NZ and Garuda were found to have arrived at, and in most
cases given effect to, several understandings containing provisions to impose
various surcharges and fees on the supply of the air cargo services56. For the
purposes of s 45, those provisions were deemed, by s 45A of the TPA, to have
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition because
the provisions had the purpose, effect or likely effect of controlling the price for
the air cargo services, which were supplied by the airlines in competition with
the other parties to the understandings.
49 The primary judge (Perram J) found that if the airlines had competed in a
market in Australia, each understanding would have contravened s 45(2)(a)(ii)
(about arriving at an understanding) and most of the understandings would also
have contravened s 45(2)(b)(ii) (about giving effect to a provision of an
understanding). However, his Honour found that there was no contravention of
s 45(2) because the purpose, effect or likely effect of each impugned provision
was not to substantially lessen competition in a market in Australia within the
meaning of s 4E57.
55 See s 5(1) of the TPA. Parts IVA, V (other than Div 1AA), VB and VC of the TPA
also extended to their conduct outside Australia.
56 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (2014)
319 ALR 388; [2014] FCA 1157.
57 At all relevant times, s 4E provided that "[f]or the purposes of this Act, unless the
contrary intention appears, market means a market in Australia and, when used in
relation to any goods or services, includes a market for those goods or services and
(Footnote continues on next page)
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50 His Honour concluded that the market was not in Australia but in the
place where the "switching decision" – the choice of airline – was given effect,
and that was where the cargo was delivered to the airline at the port of origin58.
That is, "[t]he competition which occurred between the airlines and which the
surcharges interfered with was competition in markets in Hong Kong, Singapore
and Indonesia and not competition in any market in Australia"59. In his Honour's
view (which the airlines supported on appeal to this Court), a market for the
purposes of s 4E of the TPA was to be defined by considerations of
substitutability, and because substitution between competing sources of supply
could only occur at the port of origin, the place where the complete suite of
services that constituted the relevant product was acquired and obtained60,
the market was at the port of origin, not in Australia.
51 The respondent in each appeal, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission ("the ACCC"), appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court of
Australia61, which, by majority (Dowsett and Edelman JJ, Yates J dissenting),
allowed the appeal. In respect of the market issue, the majority held that defining
a "market" for the purposes of the TPA involved a "flexible assessment"62 of
various matters that were not limited to questions of substitutability, and that the
better approach to determining whether a market was "in Australia" for the
purposes of s 4E was "to 'visualise' the metaphorical market, having regard to all
of its dimensions and its content, and then to consider whether it is within
Australia, in the sense that at least part (perhaps a substantial or significant part)
of it must be in that 'location'"63.
52 On appeal to this Court, the principal focus of the parties' argument was
upon the process of market identification and, in particular, the process of
identification of a market "in Australia". The findings of the primary judge that
other goods or services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with,
the first-mentioned goods or services."
58 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 447 [264], 456-457 [321]-[323].
59 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 393 [20].
60 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 456-457 [319]-[323], 459 [336]-[338].
61 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd
(2016) 244 FCR 190; [2016] FCAFC 42. A full report of the case appears at
(2016) 330 ALR 230.
62 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 215 [81].
63 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 230 [156].
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Air NZ and Garuda arrived at, and in most cases had given effect to, several
understandings containing provisions that controlled the price the airlines
charged for the air cargo services, and that those provisions were deemed to have
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition for the
air cargo services, were not in dispute. The principal issue was whether the
impugned provisions, which were deemed to have substantially lessened
competition for the supply of the air cargo services, did so in a market
"in Australia". The short answer to that question ("Issue 1 – Market in
Australia") is "yes".
53 If the answer was "yes", then the airlines submitted that they were
nevertheless exculpated from liability under Pt IV of the TPA. The first basis on
which Air NZ and Garuda submitted they were exculpated was that they did not
arrive at, or give effect to, certain of the impugned understandings within the
meaning of s 45(2) of the TPA because the Air Transport (Licensing of
Air Services) Regulations (Hong Kong) ("the Hong Kong Regulations") and the
administrative practices of the Hong Kong regulator, the Hong Kong Civil
Aviation Department ("the HK CAD"), compelled each of them to arrive at,
or give effect to, those impugned understandings ("Issue 2 – Foreign state
compulsion"). That submission should be rejected. Neither foreign law nor
foreign practice compelled the airlines to arrive at or give effect to the
understandings to impose approved surcharges. Each airline acted in the way
that contravened s 45(2) because it wanted to, and not because a foreign regulator
required it to act in that way.
54 Garuda (but not Air NZ) further submitted that if the impugned provisions
substantially lessened competition for the air cargo services in a market in
Australia, then ss 12 and 13 of the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth) – read with
Art 6 of the 1969 Air Services Agreement between Australia and Indonesia64
("the Australia-Indonesia ASA"), which provided for tariff fixing between
international airlines for scheduled international air services over and into
Australian territory – and the prohibition in ss 45 and 45A of the TPA on arriving
at or giving effect to understandings (or both) concerning prices with competitors
were practically and operatively inconsistent, so that ss 45 and 45A of the TPA
"did not reach to any of Garuda's conduct" when it carried cargo into Australia in
accordance with the Australia-Indonesia ASA ("Issue 3 – Alleged
inconsistency"). That submission should also be rejected. The alleged
inconsistency between the Air Navigation Act, read with Art 6 of the
Australia-Indonesia ASA, and the TPA did not arise. Article 6 was concerned
64 Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia for Air Services Between and Beyond
their Respective Territory [1969] ATS 4.
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with setting minimum tariffs. Unlike the TPA, it was not concerned with
imposing tariffs that would be charged or with imposing fixed tariffs.
55 Each of the three issues being answered adversely to the airlines, both
appeals should be dismissed with costs.
56 Each issue will be considered in turn.
Issue 1 – Market in Australia
(1) Approach to market identification
57 Market identification is not a task undertaken at large, or in a vacuum.
The task, and the extent of the task, are tailored to the conduct at issue and the
statutory terms governing the contravention65. The need to identify the market
arises only in the context of determining whether the conduct constitutes a
particular contravention of the TPA66. That is, the question of whether there is a
market "in Australia" is to be asked and answered in the statutory context in
which that question arises. It is not to be asked or answered in isolation from that
context or by looking only at what appears in s 4E of the TPA.
58 The first step is to identify "precisely what it is that is said to have been
done in contravention of the section"67. As has been rightly said in the Federal
Court of Australia, the court begins with the problem at hand and asks "what
market identification best assists the assessment of the conduct and its asserted
anti-competitive attributes"68. Identifying a market is a "focusing process"69
which is "to be undertaken with a view to assessing whether the substantive
65 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group
Ltd (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [69]; 339 ALR 242 at 258; [2016] HCA 49. See
also Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1989)
167 CLR 177 at 195, 198; [1989] HCA 6; Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade
Practices Commission (1989) ATPR ¶40-932 at 50,091, 50,104.
66 See Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 195, 200.
67 Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 195.
68 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty
Ltd (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,244 [437]. See also Brunt, "'Market Definition'
Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation", (1990) 18
Australian Business Law Review 86 at 123.
69 Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [69]; 339 ALR 242 at 258 quoting
Singapore Airlines Ltd v Taprobane Tours WA Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 158 at 178.
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criteria for the particular contravention in issue are satisfied, in the commercial
context the subject of analysis"70 (emphasis added).
59 That approach recognises that the concept of a "market" is "not
susceptible of precise comprehensive definition"71. It recognises that market
identification is an economic tool, or instrumental concept, that uses and
integrates those legal and economic concepts best adapted to analyse the asserted
anti-competitive conduct72. It recognises that market identification is "not an
exact physical exercise to identify a physical feature of the world"73 and that
there is often little or no utility in debating or identifying "the precise physical
metes and bounds of a market"74. It recognises that market identification is
"not a physical thing, or essence, which can be identified in a manner divorced
from the relevant context"75. And it recognises that market identification
depends upon the issues for determination76 – the impugned conduct and the
statutory provision proscribing anti-competitive behaviour that the conduct is
said to contravene.
60 That is not to say that a market can be identified arbitrarily77. It must be
based on findings of fact78. "The premise of that proposition", as the Full Court
70 Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [69]; 339 ALR 242 at 258 quoting
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Ltd (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107 [137].
71 Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 195.
72 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,243 [429]; Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 297 at 344 [244];
ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107 [136].
73 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,243 [429]; Metcash (2011) 198 FCR 297
at 344 [244]; ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107 [136]. See also
Breyer, "Five Questions About Australian Anti-Trust Law", (1977) 51 Australian
Law Journal 28 at 34.
74 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,243 [430].
75 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,245 [438].
76 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,244 [437].
77 See Brunt, "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade
Practices Litigation", (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86 at 126.
78 ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107-108 [138] citing Singapore
Airlines (1991) 33 FCR 158 at 174.
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of the Federal Court said in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, is that the identified market
"has economic and commercial reality"79:
"It must accordingly not be artificial or contrived. Economists frequently
construct economic models to analyse complex commercial or economic
events or scenarios. But a model is unlikely to be a useful analytical tool
if based on unrealistic assumptions that materially depart from the real
world facts and circumstances involving commercial behaviour in which
the events to be analysed occur."
61 The identification of the market must therefore "accurately [and]
realistically describe and reflect the interactions between, and perceptions and
actions of, the relevant actors or participants in the alleged market, that is, the
commercial community involved"80.
62 Embedded in the "focusing process" is the recognition that the substantive
criteria for a particular contravention in issue will depend on the particular
statutory provisions. That process "may lead to the drawing of different lines in
different circumstances depending upon the purpose of the provision in
question"81. In turn, that process may "lead to different market definitions in
relation to the same industry"82 or even different markets within the same case.
That potential was recognised more than 25 years ago by Professor Brunt,
who wrote that "[t]here can be more than one 'relevant market' for a particular
case, in the sense of markets that will attract liability"83. There is nothing odd
about that conclusion. As Professor Brunt pointed out, it reflects the fact that
market identification "is but a tool to facilitate a proper orientation for the
79 (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 108 [138]. See also Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at
156 [70]; 339 ALR 242 at 258.
80 ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 108 [138].
81 Singapore Airlines (1991) 33 FCR 158 at 175 citing Breyer, "Five Questions About
Australian Anti-Trust Law", (1977) 51 Australian Law Journal 28 at 34.
82 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,245 [439].
83 Brunt, "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices
Litigation", (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86 at 127.
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analysis of market power and competitive processes – and should be taken only a
sufficient distance to achieve the legal decision"84.
63 Recognising that market identification is an economic tool has other
important consequences. Economics is a social science and "does not furnish a
body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method
rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking, which
helps its possessor draw correct conclusions"85.
64 The nature of economics as a social science is often highlighted by the
existence of conflicting expert opinions about the identification of a relevant
market. Deane J acknowledged as much in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, when his Honour said86:
"The economy is not divided into an identifiable number of discrete
markets into one or other of which all trading activities can be neatly
fitted. One overall market may overlap other markets and contain more
narrowly defined markets which may, in their turn, overlap, the one with
one or more others."
65 When a court is required to draw its own conclusions about market
identification, it is therefore inherent in that task – being one founded on
economics as a social science – that the court will be required to make "value
judgments about which there is some room for legitimate differences of
opinion"87. As a result, "[m]arket identification and definition is not an exact
science. It is rooted in the analysis of commerce as an aspect of human
behaviour"88.
66 This approach has been referred to as the "functional", "purposive" or
"instrumental" approach to market identification. In Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Travel Group Ltd, Kiefel and Gageler JJ
84 Brunt, "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices
Litigation", (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86 at 126-127 quoted in
Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 328.
85 Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,308 [838].
86 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 196.
87 Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 196.
88 ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107 [135].
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22.
noted that there are limits to this approach89. It should not be taken beyond its
justification by, for example, using analysis of competitive processes
"to construct, or deconstruct and reconstruct, the supply of a service in a manner
divorced from the commercial context of the putative contravention which
precipitates the analysis"90.
(2) Statutory framework
67 It is therefore necessary, in these appeals, to start with the statutory terms
governing the impugned conduct which was said to contravene the TPA –
ss 45(2) and 45A within Pt IV.
68 The statutorily defined object of the TPA is "to enhance the welfare of
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision
for consumer protection"91. In other words, the purpose of the TPA is
"to promote competition, not to protect the private interests of particular persons
or corporations"92. It is the "flow-on result that is the key – the effect on
consumers, not the effect on other competitors"93.
69 Part IV of the TPA broadly manifests legislative concern with injury to
competition by practices apt to keep up prices. And, accordingly, Pt IV of the
TPA proscribes various practices in respect of pricing which merit the label
"restrictive" in the heading for Pt IV94.
70 Section 45 is concerned with contracts, arrangements or understandings
that restrict dealings or affect competition. These appeals are concerned with the
latter – several understandings that contained a provision which had the purpose,
89 (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [70]; see also at 165 [123], 171 [150]; 339 ALR 242 at
258, 270, 278.
90 Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [70]; 339 ALR 242 at 258.
91 s 2 of the TPA. See also Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 429 [159], 458-459 [260]-[261];
[2003] HCA 5.
92 Boral (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 411 [87]; see also at 429 [160]. See also Melway
Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 at 13 [17];
[2001] HCA 13 citing Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 191.
93 Boral (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 459 [261]; see also at 431 [164].
94 Boral (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 428 [158]; Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 175
[184]; 339 ALR 242 at 284.
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effect or likely effect of "substantially lessening competition" because it had the
purpose, effect or likely effect of fixing prices.
71 As in force at the relevant times, s 45(2) relevantly provided:
"A corporation shall not:
(a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if:
…
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or
understanding has the purpose, or would have or be likely to
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition; or
(b) give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or
understanding, … if that provision:
…
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of
substantially lessening competition." (emphasis added)
72 The ACCC relied upon the deeming provision in s 45A(1), which
relevantly provided:
"Without limiting the generality of section 45, a provision of [an] …
understanding … shall be deemed for the purposes of that section to have
the purpose, or to have or to be likely to have the effect, of substantially
lessening competition if the provision has the purpose, or has or is likely
to have the effect, … of … controlling … the price for … services
supplied … by the parties to the … understanding … in competition with
each other." (emphasis added)
73 That is, for the purposes of s 45, s 45A(1) deemed a provision of an
understanding to have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially
lessening competition where, relevantly, two conditions were satisfied. First,
the provision had the purpose, effect or likely effect of controlling the price for
services supplied by one party to the understanding. Second, the services in
relation to which the price was controlled were supplied "in competition" with
the other party (or parties) to the understanding. There is no dispute in these
appeals that both conditions were satisfied in the case of the impugned provisions
of each of the several understandings.
74 For the purposes of both s 45 and s 45A, "competition" in relation to an
understanding was defined in s 45(3) relevantly to mean:
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"competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party to the …
understanding … supplies … services." (emphasis added)
75 For the purposes of s 45(3), the focus is on "competition in [a] market",
not competition for a market, and it is not necessary for all parties to the
understanding to supply services in a particular market. It is sufficient if one of
them does.
76 "Competition" was not otherwise relevantly defined in the TPA95.
Like "market", "competition" is a term which is difficult, if not impossible,
to define precisely or comprehensively. It is "a very rich concept and there are
shades and differences of meaning in customary usage", even by economists96.
77 However, s 45(3) does explicitly link the concept of "competition" to the
concept of "market", as does the definition of "market" in s 4E when it speaks of
goods and services being "otherwise competitive". "[W]hether firms compete is
very much a matter of the structure of the markets in which they operate"97.
One cannot be understood without reference to the other98. As Burchett J
explained in News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd99:
"The term 'market' encapsulates the area within which competitive
forces operate upon an undertaking (the subject of the inquiry), and its use
implies the deployment of a method of economic analysis for the better
understanding of those forces in order to solve the problem at hand. Just
because it is of this nature, the concept can only be understood in relation
to the idea of competition, itself a complex notion in this field of law and
economics."
95 Section 4(1) of the TPA provided that competition "includes competition from
imported goods or from services rendered by persons not resident or not carrying
on business in Australia".
96 Brunt, "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices
Litigation", (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86 at 98-99. See also
Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd – Proposed Merger (1976)
8 ALR 481 at 514.
97 QCMA (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 516. See also Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v
Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 667 at 669-670.
98 cf Australian Gas Light Company v Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 417 [350].
99 (1996) 58 FCR 447 at 477.
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25.
78 Or, as was noted by the Trade Practices Tribunal in Re Queensland
Co-operative Milling Association Ltd – Proposed Merger, competition is a
dynamic process, rather than a situation, which expresses itself as "rivalrous
market behaviour" – behaviour that involves "independent rivalry in all
dimensions of the [service] offered to consumers"100. Competition is the means
to protect the interests of consumers, not competitors. This is why it has been
rightly said, in later decisions in the Federal Court, that competition may take
many forms101 and that the way competitors behave is likely to tell you
something of the market102. As has been explained, the functional approach to
market identification requires consideration of the alleged anti-competitive
conduct. Considering "competition" and identifying the "market" are thus part of
the same process; "it is for the sake of simplicity of analysis that the two are
separated"103.
79 Reference should be made to two further sections of the TPA. At all
relevant times, s 4E provided that:
"For the purposes of this Act, unless the contrary intention appears,
market means a market in Australia and, when used in relation to any
goods or services, includes a market for those goods or services and other
goods or services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with,
the first-mentioned goods or services." (emphasis in unbolded italics
added)
It was common ground that, for the purposes of s 4E of the TPA, the relevant
market may be "in Australia" if it is wholly or partly in Australia.
80 Section 4(1) contained two further definitions of present relevance.
"[S]upply", when used as a verb in relation to services, was defined to include
"provide, grant or confer"104 and "services" was relevantly defined to include any
rights or benefits that are, or are to be, provided in trade or commerce including
the rights or benefits that are, or are to be, provided under a contract for or in
relation to the performance of work105.
100 (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 515.
101 See Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2009) 182 FCR 160 at 307 [670].
102 See Liquorland (2006) ATPR ¶42-123 at 45,246 [443]-[444].
103 Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 187.
104 par (b) of the definition of "supply" in s 4(1) of the TPA. See also s 4C of the TPA.
105 par (a)(i) of the definition of "services" in s 4(1) of the TPA.
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81 The provisions in Pt IV of the TPA contain varying tests that refer to
"competition" or "market power". As Professor Brunt explained, the "unifying
subject-matter is market power (or 'monopoly power') and its antithesis, effective
competition"106. Section 45(2) does not refer to market power or constraints on
power107. It refers to competition.
82 Thus, the present appeals were concerned with identified anti-competitive
behaviour – arriving at and giving effect to understandings that fixed the price of
the air cargo services – which had the deemed purpose, effect or likely effect of
substantially lessening competition for those services.
83 In these appeals, the task of the Court is to identify where at least one
airline that was a party to the impugned understandings (one or more of Air NZ
and Garuda) was in competition, or competed, to supply the air cargo services.
In particular, did it compete to supply those services in a market in Australia?
Or to ask the same questions differently – what was the "area of effective
competition in which the [airline] operate[d]"108; what was the "area or space" for
the occurrence of the relevant transactions109?
84 Before turning to consider those questions, it is necessary to refer to three
matters that were addressed by the parties in argument – substitutability,
the ACCC's submission that market identification involved a two-stage approach
and the effects doctrine in the United States.
(3) Substitutability
85 As s 4E of the TPA relevantly provided, a market in relation to services
includes a market for those services as well as other services that are
substitutable for, or "otherwise competitive with", those first-mentioned services.
86 In QCMA, the Tribunal said that "[w]here the defining feature of a market
is the existence of close substitutes (whether in demand or supply), the defining
feature of a sub-market is the existence of still closer and more immediate
substitutes"110 (emphasis added). In Queensland Wire, Mason CJ and Wilson J
106 Brunt, "'Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices
Litigation", (1990) 18 Australian Business Law Review 86 at 93.
107 cf s 46 of the TPA. See Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 187.
108 Australia, Trade Practices Commission, First Annual Report, (1975) at 60 quoted
in QIW Retailers Ltd v Davids Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (1993) 42 FCR 255 at 267.
109 Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [66]; 339 ALR 242 at 257.
110 (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 517.
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referred to that oft-cited passage in QCMA as explaining that "the defining
feature of a market is substitution"111.
87 There are a number of points to be made about that statement in
Queensland Wire. First, as the Tribunal itself recognised in QCMA, the existence
of close substitutes is not the defining feature of every market. Second,
as Dawson J pointed out in Queensland Wire, "[i]mportant as they are,
elasticities and the notion of substitution provide no complete solution to the
definition of a market"112. Focusing too closely on the concept of substitutability
can obscure the proper identification of the market and undermine the purpose of
the relevant statutory provisions113.
88 As noted earlier, s 45 is concerned to promote competition. Relevantly,
it is concerned to proscribe contracts, arrangements or understandings that
contain a provision which has the purpose, effect or likely effect of "substantially
lessening competition" by, for example, controlling the price for services
supplied by a party to that contract, arrangement or understanding. And the
competition that is to be promoted is competition in any market in which a
corporation that is a party to the contract, arrangement or understanding supplies
those services. In that context, questions of substitutability may be relevant but
are unlikely to be determinative in the process of market identification114.
89 The proposition that questions of substitutability are not determinative is
not limited to s 45. In the context of s 50 of the TPA, a substantial lessening of
competition is assessed by reference to a range of matters. The extent to which
substitutes are available is just one of those matters115. Other matters relevant to
an assessment for the purposes of s 50 include the height of barriers to entry to
the market116, the degree of countervailing power in the market117 and dynamic
111 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 188.
112 (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 199.
113 cf Arnotts (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 329, 332.
114 See Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 199.
115 s 50(3)(f) of the TPA.
116 s 50(3)(b) of the TPA.
117 s 50(3)(d) of the TPA.
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characteristics of the market such as growth, innovation and product
differentiation118.
90 What will be determinative are the conduct at issue and the statutory terms
governing the contravention, which together provide the necessary focus for the
process of market identification.
(4) Rejection of the ACCC's two-stage approach to market identification
91 The ACCC submitted that, in identifying the market, s 4E operates only
after the market identification process has occurred. That is, only when the
market has been identified does one ask, for the purposes of s 4E, whether that
market can be characterised as "in Australia".
92 That submission should be rejected. First, as just noted, the process of
market identification starts with the conduct at issue and the statutory terms
governing the contravention. In the context of ss 45 and 45A, that necessarily
requires reference to s 4E. Section 4E is not excluded, or delayed from
consideration, by those sections; rather, it is included, from the outset, as a
critical part of the process.
93 Second, and in any event, s 4E offers no textual support for undertaking a
two-stage analysis. In its terms, it identifies that it is part of the exercise to be
undertaken in the process of market identification.
(5) Effects doctrine in the United States
94 The "functional", "purposive" or "instrumental" approach to market
identification, and, relevantly to these appeals, identifying whether the impugned
provisions substantially lessened competition for the air cargo services in a
market in Australia, is substantively different from the "effects doctrine" in the
United States of America.
95 No party contended that this Court should adopt any form of the effects
doctrine or consider whether persons in Australia are or might be adversely
affected by the impugned conduct outside Australia. That is unsurprising.
The applicable statutory framework in Australia is different and, since the
doctrine was first propounded by Judge Learned Hand in United States v
Aluminum Co of America119, not only has the statutory framework in the United
States been amended to clarify uncertainty and address divergence in the
118 s 50(3)(g) of the TPA.
119 148 F 2d 416 at 443-444 (2nd Cir 1945).
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application of the doctrine120, the justification for and breadth of the doctrine has
been questioned121, and the courts have not consistently described or applied the
doctrine122.
(6) Relevant factual findings
96 On appeal to this Court, particular findings by the primary judge were not
challenged. The facts found are considered under the following headings:
(a) the air cargo services; (b) the understandings; (c) other aspects of
the impugned conduct; and (d) demand in Australia for the air cargo services and
the airlines' response to that demand.
(a) The air cargo services
97 The air cargo services were unidirectional and route-specific – from
specific ports of origin in Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia, to specific
destination ports in Australia. They comprised a suite of services that
included123:
"(1) transport services, including special handling requirements,
timetabling and also whether or not delivery was by direct or
indirect flight;
(2) ground handling services at points of origin and destination; and
(3) enquiry services at airports, noting that the airlines might supply
the services themselves, or contract them out to third parties,
possibly using an airline based at the airport in question."
For the purposes of market identification, each limb is equally significant.
120 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 USC §6a.
121 See, eg, F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA 542 US 155 at 165-167 (2004).
122 See, eg, Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of America, NT & SA 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir
1976); Mannington Mills Inc v Congoleum Corporation 595 F 2d 1287 (3rd Cir
1979); Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California 509 US 764 (1993);
Hoffmann-La Roche 542 US 155 (2004); United States v LSL Biotechnologies 379
F 3d 672 (9th Cir 2004).
123 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 201 [22] citing Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at
445-447 [253]-[265]. See also Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 401 [27], 455 [313],
456 [320].
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(b) The understandings
98 Air NZ and Garuda were parties to several understandings containing
provisions to impose surcharges and fees for carriage of air cargo from ports of
origin in Hong Kong124, Singapore125 and Indonesia126 to destination ports in
Australia. Four different kinds of charges were involved: a fuel surcharge, an
insurance and security surcharge ("ISS"), a customs fee and a freight charge127.
(c) Other aspects of the impugned conduct
99 Air NZ and Garuda did not act alone; they acted in the company of a large
number of other international airlines which carried air cargo from ports of origin
in Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia to destination ports in Australia128. Each
of those international airlines, including Air NZ and Garuda, was a member of
separate industry bodies in Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia129.
100 In Hong Kong, the relevant industry body was the Hong Kong Board
of Airline Representatives, which established a Cargo Sub-Committee
124 2002 Hong Kong Lufthansa Methodology Understanding (Air NZ only); Hong
Kong Imposition Understanding; First Hong Kong Surcharge Extension
Understanding (Garuda only); October 2001 Hong Kong Insurance Surcharge
Understanding; December 2002 Hong Kong Insurance Surcharge Understanding.
The understandings are referred to in this footnote and elsewhere in this judgment
in accordance with how they were described in pleadings and in the courts below.
125 Singapore ISS Understanding (Air NZ only).
126 October 2001 Fuel Surcharge Understanding; April 2002 Fuel Surcharge
Understanding; June 2002 Fuel Surcharge Understanding; September 2002 Fuel
Surcharge Understanding; January 2003 Fuel Surcharge Understanding; May 2003
Fuel Surcharge Understanding; September 2004 Fuel Surcharge Understanding;
April 2005 Fuel Surcharge Understanding; July 2005 Fuel Surcharge
Understanding; October 2001 Security Surcharge Understanding; January 2003
Security Surcharge Understanding; May 2003 Security Surcharge Understanding;
September 2004 Security Surcharge Understanding; July 2005 Security Surcharge
Understanding; October 2001 Air Freight Rate Understanding; May 2004 Customs
Fee Understanding (all Garuda only).
127 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 391 [2], 393 [15]-[17].
128 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 391 [1], [6], 392 [8], 451 [291], 507 [559],
525 [660]-[661].
129 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 391-392 [6]-[7], 479 [429], 614 [1133]-[1134].
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("the HK CSC"). In Singapore, the industry body was the Singapore Board of
Airline Representatives, which established a Cargo Sub-Committee.
In Indonesia, the industry body was the Air Cargo Representative Board
("the ACRB").
101 Although the personnel who represented the airlines on these bodies and
the internal mechanics in each jurisdiction were not identical130, the primary
judge found that each industry body or its relevant sub-committee was a forum in
which member airlines engaged in price fixing with respect to the imposition of
surcharges and fees for the air cargo services131.
102 In relation to the fuel surcharges, the HK CSC and the ACRB used what
was referred to in the parties' pleadings as the "Lufthansa Index", which was
coupled with a "methodology" as varied or adapted from time to time.
The Lufthansa Index was a fuel price index, initially based on an earlier index
published by the International Air Transport Association and reflecting the
average of five spot prices for aviation fuel (Singapore, US Gulf, US West Coast,
Rotterdam and Italy). The index level was expressed as a percentage of a
specified baseline price. The accompanying methodology, which took different
forms at various times, specified particular levels of fuel surcharge depending
upon the level of the Lufthansa Index. The Lufthansa Index, and the
methodology drawing upon it, facilitated price fixing of fuel surcharges by
international carriers.
103 In relation to fuel surcharges on air cargo routes between Hong Kong and
ports in Australia, the primary judge found that Air NZ was a party, with a large
number of other airlines, to an understanding reached at a meeting of the
HK CSC in Hong Kong on 23 July 2002 to the effect that they would impose fuel
surcharges on the supply of air cargo services from Hong Kong in accordance
with the then form of the Lufthansa Index and methodology ("the 2002 Hong
Kong Lufthansa Methodology Understanding"), the imposition of which had
been previously approved by the HK CAD. Garuda was not a party to that
understanding.
104 The terms of the HK CAD's approval required the HK CSC (which
included Air NZ and Garuda) to inform the HK CAD of each change in the fuel
surcharge mechanism, which fluctuated depending on the price of aviation fuel.
In the years that followed the 2002 Hong Kong Lufthansa Methodology
Understanding, the HK CSC would write to the HK CAD, informing it of the
130 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 392 [9]; see also at 497 [508]-[510], 532-533
[706]-[713], 613-614 [1129]-[1132].
131 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 392 [8]. See also Garuda (2016) 330 ALR 230 at
313 [354], 323 [403]-[404], 326 [421], 335 [461], 337 [470], 338-339 [478]-[480].
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amount and date of imposition of the fuel surcharge, and the airlines would
impose the surcharge in accordance with the amount and date as notified.
This was described as the "Hong Kong Imposition Understanding" (to which
both Air NZ and Garuda were parties).
105 The primary judge and the Full Court focused their analysis on air cargo
routes between Hong Kong and ports in Australia. It was common ground that
the reasoning about the understanding affecting those routes applied equally to
the other air cargo routes. The understandings that were made about fuel
surcharges, together with the other understandings about other charges,
controlled the price of the air cargo services on routes from Hong Kong,
Singapore and Indonesia to destination ports in Australia.
106 By reason of s 45A of the TPA, the impugned provisions were deemed to
have the purpose, effect or likely effect of controlling the price the airlines
charged for the air cargo services and thereby substantially lessened competition
for those services.
(d) Demand in Australia for the air cargo services and the airlines' response to
that demand
107 The primary judge concluded that freight forwarders, large importers or
shippers in Australia and exporters in Hong Kong participated in or provided,
and affected, the demand for the air cargo services132. The primary judge found
that large importers or shippers or exporters were those whose size and volume
of cargo signified that they were "substantial economic actors"133.
Indeed, his Honour concluded that the evidence "strongly suggested that airlines,
in general, regarded significant importers and exporters both as targets for their
marketing activities and also as the ultimate source of business"134.
108 Other characteristics of these large shippers, and the airlines' behaviour in
relation to them, are relevant to the process of market identification in these
appeals.
109 There were large or substantial shippers in Australia135. Those large
shippers were regarded by the airlines as not only a potential source of demand,
but the ultimate source of demand, for their supply of the air cargo services from
132 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 447 [263].
133 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 448 [270].
134 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 449 [272].
135 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 455 [313]-[314].
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ports in Asia to ports in Australia136. Certain shippers had particular preferences
and were able to influence the choice of airline and flight137. As a result,
the issue of which airline to use need not have arisen at the port of origin;
the decision of the large shippers in Australia was likely to be made in
Australia138.
110 Freight forwarders offered to supply and, when engaged, did supply
consignors or consignees (or both) with services associated with the transport of
cargo from a place of origin to a place of destination139. But, the primary judge
concluded, as a matter of economic substance, the freight forwarders were
intermediaries having only fluctuating control over the cargo whose carriage they
arranged140. The airlines entered into tripartite arrangements with freight
forwarders and shippers; typically such arrangements referred to specific
products and would identify the carrier, shipper and freight forwarder, and
provided for meetings between the airline and shipper and for the shipper to
provide to the airline projected tonnages and frequencies141. For example, in a
letter from Singapore Airlines to WDM International dated 28 September 2000,
the airline said that it was "more than happy to sit down and discuss set
contracts/rate with [the] shippers" and that it could "lock in said contracts for a
6 or 12 month period however this must be agreed and signed by all parties"
including the shippers142.
111 The airlines regarded the cargo as belonging to the shippers143 and
considered that they were carrying loads or volumes for particular shippers144.
Thus, the airlines competed for the custom of particular shippers, and the
136 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 450 [284].
137 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 451 [290].
138 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 447 [264], 454 [309].
139 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 403 [38].
140 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 447 [263]-[264], 451 [290], 453 [299]; Garuda
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 209 [54].
141 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 452 [294].
142 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 452 [296].
143 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 453 [300]; Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at
209 [54].
144 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 449 [274], 453 [300].
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evidence led at trial included several internal reports of various airlines referring
to the airline losing custom from one shipper to another airline145.
112 In addition, the airlines designed their unidirectional air cargo services
according to the demand for particular scheduling, handling and storage
requirements of specified shippers146.
113 As the primary judge found, the airlines recognised that the large shippers
were the "economic foundation of the market"147. Where the shippers or
importers were in Australia, the airlines took note of the shippers' businesses148.
The airlines actively followed the position of shippers in various ways, including
by receiving regular cargo reports and cargo information, albeit how the
information was obtained was not clear on the evidence149.
114 So, to take one example, an internal Air NZ memorandum dated 11 March
2003 from the Manager of Global Cargo Sales stated150:
"Many major exporters have stated that volumes will diminish if the
surcharge in [sic] instated on top of current rates ... [Air NZ] is currently
viewed as playing our part and taking responsibility in assisting exporters
through tough times ... Many exporters have passed comment regarding
[net profit results in press] and I believe that it will be extremely difficult
to justify a surcharge on the back of our half year profit statement."
115 In the Full Court, the majority considered evidence given by
representatives of four market participants – Robert Bosch (Australia) Pty Ltd,
Qantas, BAX Global and Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd – in relation to the
interactions between airlines, shippers and freight forwarders. Their Honours
said151:
145 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 452 [298].
146 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 451 [289], 455 [313].
147 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 451 [287].
148 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 450 [283]; Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at
210 [57].
149 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 450-451 [283]-[285].
150 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 452 [295].
151 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 210-211 [60]-[63].
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"There was evidence from the Customs and Shipping Manager of
Robert Bosch (Australia) Pty Ltd who was responsible for monitoring the
performance of Robert Bosch's freight forwarders. He said that where
perishables needed to be shipped within a tight timeframe, Robert Bosch
would enter into tri-partite arrangements with its freight forwarder and the
airline in the form of a memorandum of understanding which would
guarantee Robert Bosch its required capacity on a particular airline and
priority over other shippers' cargo.
The former Group General Manager (Freight) at Qantas, also
described the existence of some tri-partite arrangements between Qantas,
freight forwarders and shippers. These arrangements were usually
recorded in memoranda of understanding after face-to-face meetings
attended by all three parties. Negotiations related to price, capacity and
service standards. The Group General Manager (Freight) observed that
the memorandum of understanding allowed Qantas to, 'establish a
relationship directly with a shipper. Qantas Freight would then be in a
position to use its relationship with the shipper to reduce the risk of the
freight forwarder taking the shipper's freight to another airline'.
Evidence from one freight forwarder, Burlington Northern Air
Freight (subsequently BAX Global), by the State Manager of its Perth,
Adelaide and Sydney offices, … was also that:
'BAX Global's major multi-national customers would regularly
hold meetings with employees of BAX Global and representatives
of the airlines to review our performance against these KPI's and to
ensure that there was sufficient airline capacity available. In order
to maintain the relationship, it was necessary for there to be
dialogue between all three parties, so that the airline knew when the
customer was likely to require capacity and so the customer knew
of any expected capacity constraints on the airline.'
There was also evidence from Ms Cluff who was employed by
Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd as a Logistics Import Specialist. … [S]he
said that, 'On occasions, there have been tri-partite discussions between
Toshiba Australia, the freight forwarder and Qantas'. She also said that on
numerous occasions she liaised with Qantas directly." (citations omitted)
116 In short, the evidence to which the primary judge and the majority in the
Full Court referred showed that the airlines dealt directly with some shippers and
sought to establish and maintain relationships with those shippers152. As the
152 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 210 [59]. See also Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at
450-451 [285].
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primary judge said, "there were substantial importers in Australia whose custom
the airlines [tussled] to obtain"153. The airlines physically competed in Australia
to obtain the custom of these shippers154. And the airlines marketed their
unidirectional air cargo services to these large shippers in Australia155.
117 As the primary judge concluded, the airlines competed against each other
in providing the air cargo services and that competition physically took place in
Australia156 in the sense that representatives of the airlines met with
representatives of Australian users of the air cargo services to discuss the terms
on which the airlines would provide the services. Although the contracts of
carriage were entered into in Hong Kong by freight forwarders with a particular
airline, as a practical matter substantial importers in Australia both sought, and
had the capacity, to influence and in some cases direct the decision about which
airline was to be used157.
118 As a result, although the supply of the air cargo services usually involved
participation by a consignor, an origin freight forwarder, an airline, a destination
freight forwarder and a consignee, participation was not always vertical158. Large
shippers or importers would often instigate a particular shipment and could
influence or direct which airline would provide the air cargo services for that
shipment159.
(7) Market identification
119 In relation to the impugned provisions of each understanding,
the questions posed by the interaction of s 45(2) with ss 4E, 45(3) and 45A are:
what were the services supplied or to be supplied; and what was the market in
which each airline competed to provide those services? The services have been
153 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 455 [313].
154 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 455 [313].
155 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 449 [273], 449-450 [277]-[279], 450 [284],
452 [293], 453 [301]. See also Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 210-211 [60]-[63].
156 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 455 [313].
157 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 455 [314].
158 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 448 [268]-[269].
159 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 448 [268]-[269], 451 [290]. See also Garuda
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 211 [64].
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identified – namely, as unidirectional air cargo services from ports of origin in
Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia to destination ports in Australia160.
120 If "competition" can be seen as the "striving or potential striving of two or
more persons or organisations against one another for the same or related
objects"161, did the airlines compete to supply the air cargo services in a market in
Australia?
121 The identification of a market in Australia for the supply of the air cargo
services accurately and realistically describes and reflects the interactions
between, and perceptions and actions of, one or more of the relevant actors and
participants in the market for those services162. The interactions between, and
perceptions and actions of, one or more of the relevant actors and participants in
the market in Australia for the air cargo services included that:
(1) there was an economically significant demand for the air cargo
services, in the form of demand from large shippers, and that
demand physically existed in Australia163;
(2) the airlines met, negotiated and partnered directly with shippers in
Australia164;
(3) the airlines tracked the shippers' activities in the market for
provision of the air cargo services from Asia to Australia165;
(4) the airlines marketed the services to large importers in Australia
(as well as to large exporters from Asia) because the airlines
regarded those significant importers (and exporters) both as targets
160 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 455 [313], 459 [336].
161 Australia, Independent Committee of Inquiry, National Competition Policy, (1993)
at 2 quoting Dennis, 'Competition' in the History of Economic Thought, (1977).
162 See ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 108 [138].
163 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 451 [287]-[289], 453 [305], 454-455 [311],
455 [313]-[314], 457 [325]-[326]; Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 203 [28],
205 [33], [35], 207-208 [45].
164 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 451-452 [291]-[293].
165 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 449 [272], 451 [287].
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for their marketing activities and also as the ultimate source of
business166; and
(5) the airlines designed their products according to the demand for
particular scheduling, handling and storage requirements of
specified shippers167.
That list is not exhaustive. But it is sufficient to demonstrate that the airlines, as
parties to the several understandings, were in competition. And it is sufficient to
demonstrate that they competed to supply the air cargo services in a market in
Australia. Or, to put the matter differently, in relation to the air cargo services,
an "area of effective competition in which [each airline] operate[d]"168 was in
Australia and the airlines engaged in "rivalrous market behaviour" in Australia –
behaviour that involved "independent rivalry in all dimensions of the [services]
offered to consumers"169.
122 That conclusion is unsurprising when set against the purposes of the TPA.
The purpose of the TPA is to "enhance the welfare of Australians through the
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer
protection"170. The TPA seeks in Pt IV to protect Australian consumers from
restrictive trade practices. Air NZ and Garuda carried on business in Australia
and their impugned conduct substantially lessened competition for the air cargo
services – services that customers in Australia (large shippers) used and paid for
at a price fixed between those who would otherwise have competed on price as
well as quality.
(8) Inflexible aspects of the market
123 Air NZ and Garuda placed considerable emphasis on what they described
as "inflexible aspects" of the market as found by the majority in the Full Court,
in support of their submission that there was not a market in Australia for the
purposes of s 4E of the TPA. Air NZ referred to the fact that "[a]ll sources of
supply were located at the port of origin … [and] the only places at which
substitution between competing suppliers could occur was in those places. There
166 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 449 [272], 451 [289], 452 [293], 453 [301]; Garuda
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 204 [31], 211 [65], 231-232 [167]-[168].
167 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 451 [289].
168 QIW (1993) 42 FCR 255 at 267.
169 QCMA (1976) 8 ALR 481 at 515.
170 s 2 of the TPA.
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was no place in Australia to which any person wishing to acquire relevant air
cargo services could turn to acquire those services".
124 Garuda referred to several features of the dealings between the actors:
the demand from shippers was for door to door delivery; that demand was
satisfied by freight forwarders, which paid the airlines for delivery whether or not
the freight forwarders had been paid by the shippers; the airlines regarded the
freight forwarders, not the shippers, as customers; and, finally, freight forwarders
and shippers had differing roles.
125 As the process of market identification in these appeals has revealed,
the facts and matters relied on by Air NZ and Garuda are not irrelevant. But they
are not determinative. Having regard to the impugned anti-competitive
behaviour and the terms of ss 45(2) and 45A, the facts and matters relied on by
Air NZ and Garuda do not, standing alone, "accurately or realistically describe
and reflect the interactions between, and perceptions and actions of, the relevant
actors or participants in the alleged market, that is, the commercial community
involved"171.
126 Once all of the facts and matters that do describe and reflect the conduct
of the airlines in the air cargo services market are identified, those facts and
matters demonstrate that the airlines, as parties to the several understandings,
were in competition, and competed, to supply the air cargo services in a market
in Australia. It is necessary to explain why that is so.
(9) Other market indicia
127 A market is commonly described by reference to four dimensions –
product (here, the types of services supplied), function (where within the supply
chain the services are supplied), geography (the physical area in which the
services are supplied) and time (the period in which the supply occurs)172. Those
dimensions, and that form of analysis, are tools. They are not the starting point
of the process of market identification for the purposes of considering the
application of particular provisions of the TPA. A court begins with the problem
at hand (the impugned conduct) and asks: what market identification best assists
in the assessment of that conduct and its asserted anti-competitive attributes?
What process best assists in that assessment is determined by "the substantive
171 ANZ Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 108 [138].
172 Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [67]; 339 ALR 242 at 257.
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criteria for the particular contravention in issue … in the commercial context the
subject of analysis"173.
128 The significance of one or more of the four identified dimensions
(product, function, geography and time) in that process of market identification
will necessarily vary depending on the impugned conduct, the asserted
anti-competitive attributes of that conduct, the statutory criteria for the alleged
contravention and the factual and legal issues in dispute. That is shown in these
appeals.
129 For example, the services at issue in this litigation have geographical
characteristics: they are the services of providing carriage of cargo by air from
one place to another. Those geographical aspects of the services may suggest
that there might be a market for provision of the services at either or both of the
places of intended dispatch and intended receipt. But the geographical
characteristics of the services did not and could not conclude the question
whether, in these cases, there was a market, in Australia, for the air cargo
services to Australian destinations from one or more places in Asia.
That question required consideration of whether a party to the impugned
understandings (a supplier of the services) competed, in Australia, to provide the
services to those who wished to acquire the services.
130 To look at the matter from another perspective, the conclusion that there
was a market in Australia for the air cargo services says nothing about the metes
and bounds of the market for those services, or whether there were other markets
for those services. Those questions are not relevant for the purposes of s 45(2).
The question posed by s 45(2) was whether one party to the impugned
understandings competed to supply the air cargo services in Australia. Was there
an Australian demand for the air cargo services and, if so, did one party to the
impugned understandings compete to secure that Australian demand for those
services? As the factual analysis above demonstrates, the answer to each of those
questions is "yes".
131 Observing that there are places outside Australia where suppliers or
acquirers of the air cargo services competed to provide or acquire the services
does not deny that there is a market in Australia. It shows only that there were
perhaps also markets for the air cargo services in places outside Australia or that
there was a market partly in and partly outside Australia. That is, contrary to a
premise implicit in much of the airlines' arguments in this Court, and in the
courts below, a finding that there was a market in Hong Kong (or elsewhere in
Asia) in which the airlines competed for the provision of the air cargo services
173 Flight Centre (2016) 91 ALJR 143 at 156 [69]; 339 ALR 242 at 258 quoting ANZ
Banking Group (2015) 236 FCR 78 at 107 [137].
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from places in Asia to places in Australia does not demonstrate that there was not
a market in Australia for the provision of those services.
132 A similar limitation can be seen in the interaction of the geographical
dimension with the product dimension – the air cargo services, which comprised
a suite of services174. Given the nature of those services, there was no necessary
direct or perfect correlation between the location of the services and the location
of the buyers of those services. Demand for those services could be located
anywhere around the world. And, as seen earlier, there was no necessary
correlation between the location of the services and the location of the field of
transactions between buyers and sellers in respect of those services175.
(10) European authorities
133 The majority in the Full Court referred to a number of European
authorities176, including a decision of the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities (Third Chamber) in Atlantic Container Line AB v Commission of
the European Communities177 concerning sea-transport services between ports in
northern Europe and ports in the United States and Canada.
134 On appeal to this Court, the airlines and the ACCC each submitted that the
decision in Atlantic Container, and in particular the following passage
concerning the geographical scope of the services, supported their respective
submissions as to the process of market identification178:
"[The] question [of the determination of the points of origin and of
destination of the transport services] is separate from the question of the
definition of the relevant geographic market, ... which is intended to
determine the territory on which the undertakings concerned are engaged
in the supply of the services in question, on which conditions of
competition are also sufficiently homogeneous and which may be
distinguished from neighbouring geographical areas because, in particular,
the conditions of competition there are significantly different".
174 See Section (6)(a) above at [97].
175 See also Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 283 [637].
176 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 227-228 [140]-[147], 232 [169].
177 [2003] ECR II-3298.
178 Atlantic Container [2003] ECR II-3298 at II-3576 [853].
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135 The anti-competitive conduct and the applicable regulatory framework in
Atlantic Container were different. At its highest, Atlantic Container
demonstrates that, not unlike the process of market identification necessary in
these appeals, the question of market identification in Atlantic Container could
not be concluded solely by reference to the geographical component or
characteristics of the services in question.
(11) Conclusion on Issue 1
136 For those reasons, the impugned provisions substantially lessened
competition for the air cargo services in a market "in Australia".
Issue 2 – Foreign state compulsion
137 The airlines submitted that where particular conduct is compelled by a law
or valid administrative practice of a foreign state, a person acting in accordance
with that law or practice cannot make "a contract or arrangement", or arrive at an
"understanding", having the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially
lessening competition for the purposes of s 45(2) of the TPA.
138 In particular, the airlines submitted that they did not arrive at, or give
effect to, certain impugned understandings179 within the meaning of s 45(2) of the
TPA because the Hong Kong Regulations and the administrative practices of the
HK CAD compelled each of them to arrive at, or give effect to, those impugned
understandings.
139 The airlines' submissions were based on the premise that establishing a
contravention of s 45(2) required demonstrating that the airlines chose to engage
in the impugned conduct, and that the question of compulsion had to be
addressed at the point at which the airlines sought to pursue an "otherwise lawful
and legitimate objective" – being the charging of a fuel surcharge calculated by
reference to an index mechanism. The airlines' submission was that, at the point
at which they decided to pursue the lawful objective, they did not have any
choice as to whether to comply with the relevant legal obligations.
140 Those submissions were rightly rejected by the primary judge180 and by
the majority in the Full Court181.
179 2002 Hong Kong Lufthansa Methodology Understanding (Air NZ only); Hong
Kong Imposition Understanding (Air NZ and Garuda); First Hong Kong Surcharge
Extension Understanding (Garuda only).
180 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 483-484 [447]-[448]; see also at 470-483
[390]-[446].
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141 The submissions are contrary to the unchallenged findings of the primary
judge that: first, foreign law or administrative practice did not impose any
requirement on the airlines to impose or agree to impose a fuel surcharge;
second, foreign law or practice did not impose any requirement on the airlines to
impose or agree to impose an approved fuel surcharge; and, finally, foreign law
or practice did not impose any requirement on the airlines seeking approval of an
index mechanism for a surcharge to file a joint application with the HK CAD182.
142 This section of the judgment will consider the relevant foreign law
(the Hong Kong Regulations) and the relevant practices of the HK CAD and
address, in each context, the airlines' contentions that their conduct was not
voluntary but compelled by foreign law or practice.
(1) The Hong Kong Regulations
143 Regulation 3(1) of the Hong Kong Regulations relevantly prohibited a
person from using an aircraft for the carriage of air cargo between Hong Kong
and other places "except under and in accordance with" the provisions of an
operating permit.
144 Each airline's operating permit was granted subject to a condition, among
others, that the airline could charge only those tariffs for which approval had
been obtained from the HK CAD183. It was not in dispute at trial that "tariff"
took its meaning from the relevant Air Services Agreements ("ASA")184:
the Hong Kong-New Zealand ASA for Air NZ185; and the Hong Kong-Indonesia
ASA186 and the Australia-Indonesia ASA187 for Garuda. On appeal to the Full
Court and to this Court, it was accepted that a fuel surcharge, the subject of each
of the three impugned understandings, was such a "tariff"188.
181 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 249-250 [242]-[251]; see also at 246-249
[231]-[241].
182 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 483 [446]-[447].
183 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 470-471 [395]-[396].
184 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 471 [396]-[399].
185 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 471-475 [401]-[412].
186 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 475-477 [413]-[414].
187 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 477 [415]-[417].
188 See Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 247 [236(1)].
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145 The primary judge's findings were that, under the Hong Kong
Regulations, if the airlines were going to impose a fuel surcharge, they needed to
obtain approval from the HK CAD and that the only surcharge that could be
imposed would be the one approved by the HK CAD189.
146 The airlines accepted that the Hong Kong Regulations did not impose any
requirement on the airlines to impose, or agree to impose, a fuel surcharge and
that the Hong Kong Regulations did not impose any requirement on the airlines
to impose, or agree to impose, an approved fuel surcharge. As the ACCC
submitted, there was no compulsion. There could be no compulsion where the
airlines could choose not to impose a fuel surcharge at all or could choose to seek
approval from the HK CAD for a surcharge but choose not to impose the
approved surcharge190. The airlines chose to do both – to seek approval to
impose a surcharge and to impose that approved surcharge – and to do so
collectively.
147 That the only surcharges that could be imposed by an airline were those
that had been approved by the HK CAD191, and that an airline that had obtained
approval from the HK CAD to charge a fuel or other surcharge was required to
charge the approved amount and was not permitted to charge a lesser192 or
different amount, are conclusions that do not assist the airlines. They do not
assist because the Hong Kong Regulations did not impose any requirement on
the airlines to impose (or agree to impose) a fuel surcharge or to impose (or agree
to impose) an approved fuel surcharge. The airlines' contention that an airline
that had obtained approval from the HK CAD to charge a fuel or other surcharge
was required to charge the approved amount specifically, and was not permitted
to charge a lesser amount, proceeds on two false premises – that approval for a
fuel surcharge had to be obtained and that an approved fuel surcharge had to be
imposed. Both were contrary to the facts. Each airline had to decide whether to
apply for approval of the surcharge and, once the surcharge was approved, to
decide whether to impose the approved surcharge. At both stages, each airline
decided "yes".
189 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 477 [418]-[419]. See also Garuda (2016) 244
FCR 190 at 247 [236(2)-(3)].
190 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 479 [426], 511 [578], 524 [653].
191 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 477 [419]; Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at
247 [236(3)].
192 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 478-479 [425]; Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at
247 [236(4)].
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(2) The HK CAD's practices
148 The airlines further contended that it was a "requirement" of the HK CAD
that all airlines seeking approval of a fuel index mechanism file a joint
application. That contention is incorrect.
149 In relation to the 2002 Hong Kong Lufthansa Methodology
Understanding, the primary judge found that193:
"each airline, including Air NZ, had decided to use the ... Lufthansa
methodology because they actively wished to do so; that the HK CAD
approval did not require them to levy the surcharge; that the decision to do
so was a collective one between the airlines; and that the approval had
bound them, once that decision was made, to do no more than they wished
to do. ... Firms who procure the creation of foreign legal requirements as
a cloak for their own motives do not take themselves outside of s 45".
150 In relation to the Hong Kong Imposition Understanding, the primary judge
found194:
"Air NZ was not compelled to do anything. It did not have to include
itself within the HK CAD filing. It chose to do that because it wished to
impose the surcharge using the index mechanism. The HK CAD approval
thereafter merely provided it with the permission to act in accordance with
its own desires.
... Rather than being the entity which made the arrangement,
the application to the HK CAD was the device by which the airlines
facilitated their own collusive behaviour."
151 His Honour concluded195:
"The process revealed by the various changes in index levels does
not reveal a group of airlines slavishly obeying the dictates of a regulator.
Rather, it reveals a group of airlines using the notification process as the
springboard for collusive behaviour."
193 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 514 [598].
194 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 524 [651]-[652].
195 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 525 [657].
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152 In relation to the First Hong Kong Surcharge Extension Understanding,
the primary judge found196:
"[T]he initial approval of the … Lufthansa methodology … expired on
19 July 2003. As the time of expiry approached it became necessary for
the airlines to seek to extend its operation. …
...
On 5 June 2003, as the end of the 1 year approval approached,
the chair of [the HK CSC] wrote to the members of [the HK CSC]
indicating that the approval was soon to expire and that if a justification
for an extension in its duration could be worked out a meeting would be
called to consider whether to apply for it. … Thereafter, on 9 June 2003,
the airlines were summoned to a meeting to be held on 12 June 2003.
The topics to be discussed included extending the fuel surcharge approval
granted on 19 July 2002."
153 The primary judge found that, at a meeting on 12 June 2003, the airlines
that were present agreed they would submit an application to the HK CAD to
extend the current fuel surcharge mechanism197. The primary judge found that
Garuda was present at that meeting, but Air NZ was not198. His Honour found
that the First Hong Kong Surcharge Extension Understanding was reached.
His Honour concluded199:
"It was an agreement to apply to the HK CAD but that was not
inconsistent with also being an agreement to fix or control prices. In truth,
it was both.
…
I also conclude that Garuda gave effect to the understanding by
subsequently implementing fuel surcharge increases and decreases in
accordance with the ... Lufthansa methodology during the extended
period."
154 None of these findings were contested in this Court.
196 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 525 [659], 526 [662].
197 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 526 [664].
198 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 526 [664].
199 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 526 [665], [667].
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155 The airlines' contention that it was a "requirement" of the HK CAD that
all airlines seeking approval of a fuel index mechanism file a joint application is
inconsistent with those uncontested findings of the primary judge as well as the
following uncontested findings:
(1) The HK CAD did not require the airlines to submit a joint
application for any fuel index mechanism200. There was never any
written requirement to do so. The HK CAD encouraged such an
approach, but did not require it201.
(2) The HK CAD's processes of accepting individual applications for
static surcharges and joint applications for surcharges using a fuel
index mechanism were no more than a matter of convenience202 –
there was never any direction to lodge joint applications but,
practically, it was "ungainly" for the HK CAD "to have to deal with
more than one fuel index and it would [have] perhaps promote[d]
confusion among the shippers"203.
(3) Although there was an informal "practice" on the part of the
HK CAD to proceed on the basis of a single application submitted
by all airlines in relation to a fuel index mechanism, this was an
informal policy incapable of rising to the level of a mandatory
requirement204 and, as the majority in the Full Court noted, there
was nothing preventing the HK CAD from departing from it205.
156 The primary judge also found that the airlines were "free to lodge
individual applications albeit there may have been commercial reasons why they
did not wish to"206. But, again, the fact that it might have been commercially
inconvenient for each airline to individually apply to the HK CAD for approval
200 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 479 [428], 483 [446].
201 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 483 [446].
202 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 482 [443], 483 [446].
203 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 482 [441]. See also Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at
247-248 [237].
204 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 482 [443], 483 [446]. See also Garuda (2016) 244
FCR 190 at 247 [236(6)], 248 [238], 249-250 [247], 250 [250].
205 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 250 [248].
206 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 481 [436].
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cannot and does not elevate an administrative practice to a requirement that
compelled an airline to do anything.
157 As the majority in the Full Court stated207, the administrative practice of
the HK CAD was not tantamount to a requirement to do anything. Rather, it was
accepted, as a matter of Hong Kong domestic law, that: (a) if the airlines were
going to impose a fuel or insurance surcharge or a customs fee, they needed to
obtain approval; and (b) the only surcharges that could be imposed were the ones
that had been approved by the regulator208. Neither of those matters imposed any
requirement on an airline, in seeking approval of an index mechanism for a
surcharge, to file a joint application with the HK CAD.
158 Contrary to the submissions of the airlines, there was no point at which a
requirement or compulsion to make any application, let alone a joint application,
was ever imposed by the HK CAD on the airlines. Put another way, at all
relevant times, each airline was able to pursue the otherwise lawful and
legitimate objective of imposing a surcharge, without acting in contravention of
the TPA, so long as it applied on its own to the HK CAD for approval of its own
lawful and legitimate objective. Neither airline did so.
(3) Conclusion on Issue 2
159 Neither foreign law nor foreign regulatory practice required the conduct
constituting the contraventions, namely the understandings to impose approved
surcharges. Each airline acted in the way that contravened the TPA because it
wanted to and not because of the requirements of a foreign regulator.
Issue 3 – Alleged inconsistency
160 At all relevant times, s 12(2) of the Air Navigation Act relevantly
provided that an international airline licence could not be granted to an
international airline of a country other than Australia unless that country and
Australia were, among others, parties to "some other agreement or arrangement,
whether bilateral or multilateral" (ie, an ASA) under which scheduled
international air services of that other country could be operated over or into
Australian territory.
161 When the TPA was enacted, the Australia-Indonesia ASA was one of a
number of ASAs that provided for tariff fixing between international airlines for
scheduled international air services over and into Australian territory.
207 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 249-250 [247].
208 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 477 [418]-[419]; Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190
at 247 [236(3)].
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162 Garuda submitted that the TPA did not apply to the Australia-Indonesia
ASA. It further contended that the Air Navigation Act and the prohibition in
ss 45 and 45A of the TPA on making agreements concerning prices with
competitors were practically and operatively inconsistent. As a result,
it contended that ss 45 and 45A of the TPA "did not reach to any of Garuda's
conduct" when it carried cargo into Australia in accordance with the
Australia-Indonesia ASA209.
163 International air transport of passengers and goods has been the subject of
many international agreements over many years. Reference was made by Garuda
in argument in this Court to some of these arrangements and their history210.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to focus on Garuda's conduct (and that of the
airlines who acted with Garuda) and the terms of the Air Navigation Act and the
Australia-Indonesia ASA. It is that conduct and those instruments that are
determinative of this issue.
164 This section of the judgment will deal first with the Air Navigation Act
and the Australia-Indonesia ASA, then with the decisions below and finally with
the parties' arguments in this Court.
(1) The Air Navigation Act
165 In 1974, when the TPA was enacted, the Air Navigation Act contained
ss 12211 and 13 as follows:
"12. International airline licences.
(1) An international airline of a country other than Australia
shall not operate a scheduled international air service over or
into Australian territory except in accordance with an
209 Garuda could only fly to Australia pursuant to the Australia-Indonesia ASA. When
it carried cargo from Hong Kong to Australia, it flew from Hong Kong to Denpasar
pursuant to the Hong Kong-Indonesia ASA, then from Denpasar to Australia
pursuant to the Australia-Indonesia ASA. See also Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at
471 [397], [399].
210 See, eg, Agreement between the Governments of Australia and Canada for Air
Services between Australia and Canada [1951] ATS 17; Agreement between the
Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of New
Zealand relating to Air Services [1961] ATS 19. See also Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR
388 at 418-423 [131]-[148].
211 Subsequent amendments to s 12 are not material or relevant and may be put to one
side: see, eg, Sched 1 to the Air Navigation Act 1974 (Cth).
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international airline licence issued by the Director-General
in accordance with the regulations.
(2) An international airline licence shall not be granted to an
international airline of a country other than Australia unless
that country and Australia are parties to the Air Transit
Agreement, or to some other agreement or arrangement,
whether bilateral or multilateral, under which scheduled
international air services of that other country may, subject
to the agreement or arrangement, be operated over or into
Australian territory.
13. Suspension or cancellation of international airline licences.
The Minister may suspend or cancel an international airline licence
issued to an international airline of a country other than Australia if
and only if—
(a) the airline or any aircraft operated by the airline fails to
comply with a provision of this Act or the regulations or the
terms of its licence; or
(b) the airline fails to conform to, or comply with, any term or
condition of the relevant agreement or arrangement referred
to in the last preceding section." (emphasis added)
(2) The Australia-Indonesia ASA
166 The Australia-Indonesia ASA was an "agreement or arrangement"
within the meaning of ss 12(2) and 13(b) of the Air Navigation Act.
The Australia-Indonesia ASA relevantly provided the rights for designated
airlines (including Garuda) to make stops in cities (including Darwin, Sydney
and Melbourne) for the purpose of putting down and taking on international
cargo212.
167 Article 6 of the Australia-Indonesia ASA provided:
"(1) The tariffs on any agreed service shall be established at reasonable
levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors including cost
of operation, reasonable profit, characteristics of service (such as
standards of speed and accommodation) and the tariffs of other
airlines for any part of the specified route. These tariffs shall be
fixed in accordance with the following provisions of this Article.
212 Art 2 of, and s II of the Annex to, the Australia-Indonesia ASA.
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(2) Agreement on the tariffs shall, whenever possible, be reached by
the designated airlines concerned through the rate-fixing machinery
of the International Air Transport Association. When this is not
possible, tariffs in respect of each of the specified routes shall be
agreed upon between the designated airlines concerned. In any
case the tariffs shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical
authorities of both Contracting Parties.
(3) If the designated airlines concerned cannot agree on the tariffs, or if
the aeronautical authorities of either Contracting Party do not
approve the tariffs submitted to them in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, the aeronautical
authorities of the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reach
agreement on those tariffs.
(4) If agreement under paragraph (3) of this Article cannot be reached,
the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of
Article 9 of this Agreement.
(5) No new or amended tariff shall come into effect unless it is
approved by the aeronautical authorities of both Contracting Parties
or is determined by a tribunal of arbitrators under Article 9 of this
Agreement. Pending determination of the tariffs in accordance
with the provisions of this Article, the tariffs already in force shall
apply."
168 "Tariff" was not defined in the Australia-Indonesia ASA. The primary
judge's findings that "tariff" included the fuel surcharges relevant in these
appeals213 and that "tariffs" are the minimum amounts that can be charged214 were
not contested on appeal.
169 Article 9 of the Australia-Indonesia ASA relevantly provided:
"(1) If any dispute arises between the Contracting Parties relating to the
… application of the present Agreement, the Contracting Parties
shall in the first place endeavour to settle it by negotiation between
themselves.
213 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 477 [415]-[417]. See also Garuda (2016) 244 FCR
190 at 234 [180].
214 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 477-478 [421], 478-479 [425]. See also Garuda
(2016) 244 FCR 190 at 247 [236(4)].
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(2) If the Contracting Parties fail to reach a settlement by negotiation,
the dispute may at the request of either Contracting Party be
submitted for decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators …
(3) The Contracting Parties undertake to comply with any decision of
the tribunal given under paragraph (2) of this Article."
(3) Decisions below
170 The primary judge relevantly held that the practical operation of ss 12 and
13 of the Air Navigation Act, operating with the Australia-Indonesia ASA,
was to require Garuda "to comply with the terms of any relevant ASA"215 and to
"require collusive behaviour by [Garuda] of the very kind prohibited by Pt IV" of
the TPA216. As a result, the primary judge held that the Air Navigation Act and
the prohibition in ss 45 and 45A of the TPA on arriving at understandings
concerning prices with competitors were inconsistent in their practical
operation217. That inconsistency, according to the primary judge, was to be
resolved by construing s 13 of the Air Navigation Act so as not to authorise the
relevant Minister to cancel or suspend an international airline licence for breach
of an ASA where the conduct constituting the breach was required by Pt IV of
the TPA218.
171 On appeal to the Full Court, the majority219 agreed with the primary judge
that there was no inconsistency in the terms of the Air Navigation Act and
the TPA220 but held that there was no conflict between the terms of the TPA and
the effect or operation of the Air Navigation Act because of Art 6(2) of the
Australia-Indonesia ASA221. Their Honours held that Art 6(2) of the
Australia-Indonesia ASA did not require the airlines to engage in price fixing,
that the risk that their licences would be cancelled under s 13 of the
215 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 424 [152].
216 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 427 [165].
217 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 427 [165].
218 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 431 [185] citing Commissioner of Police (NSW) v
Eaton (2013) 252 CLR 1 at 18-19 [45], 19-20 [48]; [2013] HCA 2.
219 Yates J did not address this issue: see Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 293
[682]-[683].
220 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 237 [188], [191].
221 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 239-240 [198]-[205]. cf Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR
388 at 427 [165].
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Air Navigation Act did not arise and that, in any event, it would not be
reasonable for the Minister to cancel an airline's licence under s 13 of the
Air Navigation Act for failure to comply with Art 6(2) of the Australia-Indonesia
ASA where the failure was required by Australian law222.
(4) Alleged inconsistency does not arise
172 The alleged inconsistency between the Air Navigation Act, read with the
Australia-Indonesia ASA, and the TPA does not arise.
173 As has been seen, it was not contested on appeal that Art 6 of the
Australia-Indonesia ASA was concerned with reaching agreement on tariffs,
which included fuel surcharges, and that a tariff was the minimum amount that
could be charged. Put another way, Art 6 of the Australia-Indonesia ASA was
concerned with setting minimum tariffs, not imposing fixed tariffs.
174 But that was not the conduct the subject of the contraventions under the
TPA. The impugned understandings the subject of the contraventions under the
TPA were understandings arrived at in Hong Kong and Indonesia containing
provisions to charge specific fuel surcharges, not agreements or understandings
to set tariffs by way of minima under the Australia-Indonesia ASA.
175 So, what was the conduct and what were the relevant findings of the
primary judge? They may be summarised as follows.
176 As noted above, Garuda (along with Air NZ and other international
airlines) was a member of industry representative bodies in Hong Kong and
Indonesia, being the HK CSC and the ACRB respectively223. Garuda
participated in various meetings of the HK CSC and the ACRB, at which Garuda
and other airlines engaged in price fixing to fix fuel and other surcharges224.
177 Next, and no less importantly, the primary judge found that the airlines did
not engage in that conduct at those meetings pursuant to the tariff procedures in
any ASA, but engaged in that conduct at those meetings independently of any
tariff procedures or requirements. The airlines did not understand themselves to
be engaged in tariff procedures under any ASA at those meetings of the HK CSC
or the ACRB; rather, they understood only that they were attending meetings of
222 Garuda (2016) 244 FCR 190 at 239-240 [200]-[203].
223 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 391-392 [6]-[7], 479 [429], 614 [1133].
224 See footnotes 124 and 126 above.
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the HK CSC or the ACRB225. Those findings were not challenged on appeal to
this Court.
178 The conclusion that the airlines were not making tariff agreements under
any ASA is fortified by another of the primary judge's findings concerning an
authorisation granted by the Trade Practices Commission to Qantas226 under s 88
of the TPA, which permitted Qantas to give effect to existing tariff arrangements
Qantas had reached with particular airlines and to make tariff arrangements of a
like type with other airlines227. That authorisation drew a distinction between an
agreement on a tariff (which was permitted) and an agreement to impose a tariff
or to impose a tariff in a particular amount (which was not permitted). Qantas'
authorisation was granted on condition that there was "no requirement on carriers
or agents … to charge the fares (or pay the commissions) in Australia that [had]
been set by the agreements" and "no requirement on carriers or agents … not to
advertise in Australia tariffs they [were] actually charging"228.
179 The alleged inconsistency between the Air Navigation Act, read with
Art 6(1) of the Australia-Indonesia ASA, and the TPA does not arise. They were
dealing with different subject matters. Article 6(1) was concerned with setting
minimum tariffs. It was not concerned with imposing tariffs or imposing fixed
tariffs. Garuda's appeal grounds should be rejected.
(5) No textual or other inconsistency
180 Given that the alleged inconsistency does not arise, it is unnecessary to
address the aspects of the parties' arguments that were predicated on this Court
concluding that Art 6(1) of the Australia-Indonesia ASA was concerned with
imposing fixed tariffs.
Conclusion and orders
181 For those reasons, each appeal should be dismissed with costs.
225 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 639 [1257], 641 [1268].
226 Qantas Airways Ltd (1987) ATPR (Com) ¶50-056.
227 See Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 640 [1261]-[1262].
228 Air NZ (2014) 319 ALR 388 at 640 [1261].
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