[2025] SASCA 43

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE BAMPTON) [2024] SASC 67 Appellants: FRANCIS THOMAS MCDONALD AND RHODA LOUISE MCDONALD In Person Respondent: THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA Counsel: MR B GARNAUT - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 09/04/2025 File No/s: CIV-24-005708 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. MCDONALD & ANOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) (No 4) [2025] SASCA 43 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby) 17 April 2025 PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS - VEXATIOUS LITIGANT On the application of the Attorney-General (SA) (the vexatious litigant application), on 24 May 2024 Mr and Mrs McDonald (the appellants) were declared to have persistently instituted vexatious proceedings. The primary judge made the following associated orders pursuant to s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Supreme Court Act): (a) that each of Mr and Mrs McDonald is prohibited from instituting further proceedings in a prescribed court without permission of the Supreme Court, and (b) that proceedings already instituted by each or both of them are permanently stayed. These orders do not prohibit the filing of a notice of appeal against the declaration and orders. The Attorney did not argue that the appellants’ initial proceedings in 2004, the appeal to the Full Court in 2009, or the application for special leave to appeal to the High Court were vexatious. The Attorney did not rely on a number of Federal or High Court proceedings, nor attempts to file proceedings, save that these were relevant to the exercise of discretion under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. On 13 June 2024, the appellants filed a notice of appeal, relying on a written argument dated 2 December 2024 (exceeding 25 pages) and an amended notice of appeal dated 3 December 2024 (which contained over 130 separate grounds of appeal). Whether in these materials or during oral argument, the appellants devoted almost no attention to whether the primary judge made any material error of fact or law, or whether her exercise of discretion miscarried, having regard to the requirements of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. -- 1 of 55 -- Rather, the appellants demonstrated a stubborn determination to reagitate the various issues they have raised in the course of what the primary judge described as “an extraordinary number of proceedings” over a period exceeding 20 years. The appellants relied on a five-volume core appeal book and, in addition, a seven-volume supplementary appeal book which it was said demonstrated that earlier decisions were wrong. In addition, the appellants maintained that the primary judge was actually biased and that they did not accept the rulings made by the present coram that they were not disqualified on account of ostensible bias. The primary judge reviewed 25 proceedings and found that 24, where both appellants were involved in 12, satisfied the requirements of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. Her Honour considered then exercised her discretion in favour of making a declaration and orders. There were a number of applications made in the course of the appeal proceedings, some which had been ruled on and some which were yet to be ruled on. HELD (the Court) refusing leave to appeal in so far as it was required, and dismissing the appeal with costs: 1. Whether what may be described as the qualifying criteria at the first stage of s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act have been satisfied must be determined according to the “correctness standard”, whereas whether there was an error made in the exercise of the discretion at the second stage, once the qualifying criteria are made out, must be determined according to the principles described in House v The King. [196] 2. When addressing the first stage of an application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, the court is not undertaking an appeal under s 50 of the Supreme Court Act, and it does not go behind the earlier decisions. It is not reviewing whether the “proceedings” relied on by an applicant are affected by material error. Rather, the court is concerned with whether those proceedings are “vexatious” in the sense defined by s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. [33] 3. The first stage of the s 39 vexatious litigant application was satisfied and, as for the second stage, it was open to the primary judge to proceed to make the declaration and orders she made under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. The exercise of discretion was neither unreasonable nor unjust. [200] 4. The allegations of bias and procedural unfairness concerning the primary judge and the coram are rejected. [30]-[31], [49]-[50] 5. The need to preserve scarce judicial and public resources is particularly clear in a case such as this case. The appellants’ conduct during the course of these appeal proceedings has only reinforced the need for the vexatious litigant declaration and orders to be made. [201]-[203] 6. Rulings made regarding the reserved applications and reserved costs. [190]-[193] Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 21; Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 84; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 91, referred to. Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353; Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28; Attorney-General (SA) v McDonald & Anor [2024] SASC 67; Attorney-General (NSW) v Mohareb [2016] NSWSC 1823; Attorney-General (NSW) v Bar Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142; Attorney-General (NSW) v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942; Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372; Attorney-General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008; Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath [2001] VSC 269; Attorney-General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91; Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464; Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322; Commonwealth Bank v Heinrich (No 2) [2003] SASC 436; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484; Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30; Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392; Gallo v Attorney-General (Vic) (unreported, 4 September 1984); Garrett v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 117; Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47; Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375; Hoysted v Federal -- 2 of 55 -- Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 37 CLR 290; Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; Kay v Attorney-General (Vic) [2000] 2 VR 436; Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No 4) [2024] SASCA 113; Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) (No 3) [2025] SASCA 42; McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia [2015] HCASL 118; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 2) [2015] SASC 188; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia [2016] SASCFC 39; McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia ; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (2017) SASCFC 146; McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2023] SASCA 132; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) [2024] SASCA 144; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) (No 2) [2025] SASCA 1; McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia & Ors [2021] SASCA 57; McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia & Ors (No 2) [2021] SASCA 146; McDonald and Anor v State of South Australia & Others [2022] SASC 17; McDonald & Another v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43; McDonald & Another v The State of South Australia & Others [2022] SASCA 81; McDonald & Ors v The Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors [2017] HCASL 1; McDonald v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2023] SASCA 132; McDonald v Attorney-General (SA) [2024] SASCA 144; McDonald v Attorney-General (SA) (No 2) [2025] SASCA 1; McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services (South Australian Workers Compensation Tribunal, unreported ruling dated 11 March 2011); McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 18; McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 36; McDonald v South Australia [2010] HCATrans 25; McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297; McDonald v State of South Australia (2008) 172 IR 256; McDonald v The Workers Compensation Tribunal (SASC, Judge Withers, 4 December 2012); McDonald v South Australia (District Court of South Australia, Auxiliary Master Norman, 11 July 2011); McDonald v The State of SA [2012] SADC 54; McDonald v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 36; McDonald v State of South Australia [2014] SASC 120; McDonald v State of South Australia [2015] SASCFC 15; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 3) [2015] SASC 141; McDonald v The State of South Australia [2018] HCASL 43; McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297; McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 1251; McDonald v Federal Court of Australia [2017] FCA 1216; McDonald v Colbran [2019] FCA 1937; McDonald v South Australia (Supreme Court of South Australia, Slattery AJ, 11 January 2018); McDonald v Registrar [2021] SASC 57; McDonald v State of South Australia [2018] SASC 41; McDonald v State of South Australia (No 2) [2018] SASC 57; McDonald v Supreme Court of South Australia and Anor [2019] SASC 201; McDonald v Registrar of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Bochner, 16 September 2022); McDonald v Workers Compensation Tribunal [2013] SASC 34; McFarlane v The King [2023] SASCA 123; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154; Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 90; O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310; Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632; Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; Re F (2001) 161 FLR 189; Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510; State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418; Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125; Thomson v Tremco Pty Limited [2019] QCA 18; UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan and Meakes (1931) 46 CLR 73, considered. -- 3 of 55 -- -- 4 of 55 -- MCDONALD & ANOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) (No 4) [2025] SASCA 43 Court of Appeal – Civil: Livesey P, S Doyle and Bleby JJA THE COURT: Introduction 1 On the application of the Attorney-General (SA) (the vexatious litigant application), on 24 May 2024 Mr and Mrs McDonald (the appellants) were declared to have persistently instituted vexatious proceedings.1 The primary judge made the following associated orders pursuant to s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Supreme Court Act): (a) that each of Mr and Mrs McDonald is prohibited from instituting further proceedings in a prescribed court without permission of the Supreme Court, and (b) that proceedings already instituted by each or both of them are permanently stayed. These orders do not prohibit the filing of a notice of appeal against the declaration and orders. 2 On 13 June 2024, the appellants filed a notice of appeal. Ultimately, the appellants relied on a written argument dated 2 December 2024 (which exceeds 25 pages) and an amended notice of appeal dated 3 December 2024, which contains over 130 separate grounds of appeal. 3 Whether in these materials or during oral argument, the appellants devoted almost no attention to whether the primary judge made any material error of fact or law, or whether her exercise of discretion miscarried, having regard to the requirements of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. Rather, the appellants demonstrated a stubborn determination to reagitate the various issues they have raised in the course of what the primary judge described as “an extraordinary number of proceedings” over a period exceeding 20 years. 4 In one way or another, these issues have all concerned the long-standing grievances they hold about the circumstances in which Mr McDonald’s employment as a high school schoolteacher came to an end nearly 25 years ago. Since then, they have persistently litigated a range of issues, particularly concerning the identity of Mr McDonald’s employer. Clearly, the appellants are angry. As Mr McDonald explained during the appeal:2 LIVESEY P: This is all going to breach? 1 Attorney-General (SA) v McDonald & Anor [2024] SASC 67, [179] (Bampton J) (Reasons). 2 Transcript 9 April 2025, 29.10-30.37. -- 5 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 2 MR MCDONALD: Yes. This is all going to a contract of employment and the employer varying that contract under the statutory framework that he was employed at. And what this did is it went right to the root of the contract. It destroyed the contract and the contractual relationships. I was treated - I was discriminated against because I was - what shall we say - I was a migrant, I wasn't good enough, even with my qualifications. And my qualifications are equal to any of the guys sitting here today. I know that Doyle J there got himself a [degree] down the road there at [Adelaide], and he did a double degree in law with that. I know that Bleby J’s a smart guy here. He did a double degree down there, and he also did a postgraduate PhD at the University at Cambridge. Doyle J went to Oxford. Good on Doyle J. I would love to have got there myself, but I never got there. I didn't have the finances, and I didn't come from a privileged family. In fact, I came from a very poor working-class family. My father was a window cleaner. And I left school at 14 years of age, had to take over his window cleaning when I left school. My father came back in the window cleaning business when I was 17 and I had to go and work in the woollen mills. I was in there for two years and I thought this is going to kill me, I’ve got to do something with my life, so I went and knocked on the door of that local high school and asked if I could come to school. I wanted to learn, and they let me in, and I sat in with all the third and fourth- year kids and I got through some O levels at the end of the year. I wanted to go back there and do some higher, he says I can’t, ‘You have to go to Edinburgh to a proper place because they’re taking people like at your age’. So, I went off there. When I went there, I didn't even know what a university was. Didn't even know what a university was. I ended up with qualifications that I could have got into Edinburgh University, which was in the top hundred in the world. And as I say, as I went down to there. Now, I never got the benefit of my qualifications, you guys have really got the benefit of your qualifications, your annual income is about 300,000, Anderson J’s on about 600,000 a year. My income for the last 21 years has been below 20,000 a year. That's what I got from my qualifications … 5 Mr McDonald later referred to his bankruptcy proceedings, and his view that all he has left is his “good name” and that is what the Crown now wishes to take from him. Mr McDonald’s anger and frustration is both palpable and perhaps understandable. His capacity to produce written material and recall detail is, respectfully, remarkable. 6 However, when viewed as a whole, the appellants’ conduct during the course of the 25 proceedings reviewed by the primary judge (and during these appeal proceedings) has demonstrated that, unless restrained, they will continue to persistently institute proceedings to agitate issues which have been finally resolved against them across a large number of courts and tribunals. Those proceedings will, in consequence, likely be vexatious. They have, by their re-litigation and conduct, demonstrated the need for a vexatious litigant declaration and orders to be made. -- 6 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 3 7 For the reasons that follow, the appellants’ appeal and their reserved applications must each be dismissed with costs. 8 These reasons are set out as follows: Relevant background...................................................................................................................... 3 Vexatious litigant applications ....................................................................................................... 8 Observations regarding the appeal ............................................................................................... 15 The reasons of the primary judge................................................................................................. 20 The 25 particular proceedings and associated litigation .............................................................. 22 Conclusions regarding the particular proceedings ....................................................................... 35 The appellants’ notice of appeal .................................................................................................. 36 Other matters – interlocutory applications on appeal .................................................................. 38 Leave to appeal ............................................................................................................................ 39 The determination of the appeal................................................................................................... 39 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 41 Annexure 1 – Proceedings relied on by the Attorney-General .................................................... 43 Annexure 2 – Interlocutory Applications on Appeal ................................................................... 48 Relevant background 9 The appellants’ determination to re-litigate past issues and proceedings because they regard the decisions made in those proceedings as wrong and unjust, whilst perhaps in a sense understandable, necessarily conflicts with the principle of finality:3 A central and pervading tenet of the judicial system is that controversies, once resolved, are not to be reopened except in a few, narrowly defined, circumstances. That tenet finds reflection in the restriction upon the reopening of final orders after entry4 and in the rules concerning the bringing of an action to set aside a final judgment on the ground that it was procured by fraud.5 The tenet also finds reflection in the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel. Those doctrines prevent a party to a proceeding raising, in a new proceeding against a party to the original proceeding, a cause of action or issue that was finally decided in the original proceeding.6 It is a tenet that underpins the extension of principles of preclusion to some circumstances where the issues raised in the later proceeding could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.7 The principal qualification to the general principle that controversies, once quelled, may not be reopened is provided by the appellate system. But even there, the importance of 3 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, [34]-[35] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) 4 DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226. 5 DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226, 244-245 [35]-[38]. 6 See, eg, Hoysted v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 37 CLR 290; Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464; Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; Administration of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353. 7 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589. -- 7 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 4 finality pervades the law. Restraints on the nature8 and availability of appeals, rules about what points may be taken on appeal9 and rules about when further evidence may be called in an appeal (in particular, the so-called “fresh evidence rule”)10 are all rules based on the need for finality. As was said in the joint reasons in Coulton v Holcombe:11 “[i]t is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial.” (Original citations.) 10 Some of the background to this long-running series of cases will be recounted. It is not necessary to address all of it. A broad overview is sufficient. 11 After a career during the 1990’s and early 2000’s as a public high school teacher, in 2003 Mr McDonald’s employment ended and he sued for breach of contract and breach of a contractual duty of care to provide him with safe systems of work and a safe workplace. He also brought a negligence claim seeking damages for the harm and injury which he alleged was caused. Those allegations were made in what the primary judge described as the 2004 proceedings. 12 Despite initial, mixed success following a trial before a single judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Anderson J), the Full Court (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ) allowed an appeal and dismissed Mr McDonald’s cross-appeal,12 with the result that the orders made in favour of Mr McDonald were set aside and his claim for damages against the State was dismissed. 13 The Full Court found that the liability of the relevant Minister for breach of contract did not depend on the occurrence of a “compensable disability” and therefore could not be said to be “in respect of” a compensable injury, with the result that s 54(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (since repealed) (the WRC Act) did not preclude Mr McDonald’s claim for damages for breach of contract:13 The liability of the Minister for the breach of contract did not arise because of the occurrence of a compensable disability. Conduct by an employer of the general kind found by the judge in this case may be repudiatory, and give rise to a claim for damages for breach of contract, even in the absence of the occurrence of a compensable disability. … The damages awarded following an employee’s acceptance that repudiatory contract by an employer has brought the contract to an end are not assessed with a view to compensating the dismissed employee for the nature and extent of any injury suffered as a result of the 8 Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan and Meakes (1931) 46 CLR 73. 9 Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418; O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1. 10 Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632; Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510, 516-517 (Barwick CJ); Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259. 11 Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, 7. 12 State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344 (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). 13 State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, [196]-[205] (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). -- 8 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 5 repudiatory conduct. In fact, the existence of incapacity resulting from the injury may diminish the damages for wrongful termination which would otherwise have been awarded. … In summary, in our view, the liability of the Minister for breach of contract did not depend upon the occurrence of compensable disability. The damages in respect of the Minister’s breach were not to be assessed so as to provide compensation for any injury suffered by Mr McDonald. In these circumstances we do not consider that it can be said that the liability of the Minister found by the judge was “in respect of” a compensable disability suffered by Mr McDonald. Accordingly, we do not regard s 54(1) of the WRC Act as precluding Mr McDonald’s claim altogether. 14 The distinction is between those remedies available for breach of contract, and those available for loss sustained “in respect of” a compensable injury which were then barred by s 54 of the WRC Act. 15 In addition, however, the Full Court found that an implied term of mutual trust and confidence did not form part of Mr McDonald’s contract of employment. The statutory and regulatory context in which the contract of employment operated made that implied term unnecessary,14 and it was not appropriate to decide whether that term formed part of Australian employment contracts generally.15 16 Critically, the Full Court found that even if the contract of employment had contained an implied term of mutual trust and confidence, there was no repudiatory breach by the Minister:16 If, contrary to our conclusion, Mr McDonald’s contract of employment did contain an implied term of mutual trust and confidence, we doubt that it could be found to have been breached in a repudiatory way. That is because, in the determination of the nature and extent of any breach, account would have to be taken of the means of grievance resolution and appeal available to Mr McDonald. Even if he had been treated unfairly or inappropriately, the statutory and award context evinces an intention that his grievances should be addressed within the confines of the employment relationship, making use of the procedures provided. We will address later in these reasons the alternative claim of Mr McDonald that the Minister was in breach of the implied contractual duty of care. We conclude that any breach by the Minister of that implied duty was not repudiatory so as to warrant Mr McDonald treating his contract as at an end. The reasons we give for that conclusion also indicate that there had not been a repudiatory breach of an implied term as to mutual trust and confidence. 17 The finding made by Anderson J to the contrary was set aside. 14 State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, [269]-[271] (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). 15 State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, [236] (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). 16 State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, [272]-[273] (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). -- 9 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 6 18 Absent a proved breach, Mr McDonald had no claim in contract. 19 On 12 February 2010, when Mr McDonald was legally represented, his application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was heard by French CJ and Kiefel J.17 It is clear from a reading of the transcript that the Court was interested in the argument, but special leave was refused with costs, because the matter was “not a suitable vehicle” for the grant of special leave. Delivering the reasons of the Court, French CJ referred to the finding that “it was doubtful that the implied term, if it existed, had been breached”:18 The applicant, who was employed by the State of South Australia under the Education Act 1972, seeks special leave to appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The Full Court allowed an appeal against the decision of a trial judge awarding the applicant damages for breach of the contract of employment. Special leave is sought on the basis that the Full Court wrongly held that the contract of employment did not contain an implied term of mutual trust and confidence. In our opinion the conclusion of the Full Court related to the particular statutory context in which the applicant was employed. The court also held, on the basis of factual conclusions, that in any event it was doubtful that the implied term, if it existed, had been breached. The context of the court’s decision on the implied term affects the question whether that decision was correct and renders more difficult the identification of a principle of general importance and application. This matter is not a suitable vehicle for the grant of special leave for those reasons and also because, in our opinion, it does not enjoy sufficient prospects of success. The application for special leave will be refused. 20 Following that decision, in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker,19 the High Court of Australia rejected the proposition that there was a term of mutual trust and confidence to be implied by law in all employment contracts.20 That is to say, the term of mutual trust and confidence in contracts of employment which have been implied in law in the United Kingdom “ought not to be imported into the common law of Australia”.21 21 Accordingly, and by no later than 2014, an essential limb for any damages claim to be made by Mr McDonald arising out of an alleged breach of his employment contract was gone. Whereas Mr McDonald has been preoccupied with the identity of his employer, the Full Court had effectively held that this did not matter:22 From 1990 until April 2003 the respondent (Mr McDonald) held an appointment as an officer in the teaching service under the Education Act 1972 (SA) (the Act). He was appointed to that position by the Minister of Education (the Minister) (who at certain times 17 McDonald v South Australia [2010] HCATrans 25. 18 McDonald v South Australia [2010] HCATrans 25. 19 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169. 20 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169, [1] (French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). 21 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169, [115] (Gageler J). 22 State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, 348-349 [2]-[3] (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). -- 10 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 7 has also been designated as Minister for Education and Children’s Services and as the Minister for Education, Training and Employment). Hereafter we will refer to the Minister as Mr McDonald’s employer. It is not necessary to decide whether his employment contract was with the Minister or with the Crown. We will refer to the department administering the Act under the Minister’s direction as “DECS”. On 11 April 2003 Mr McDonald wrote to the Premier, and sent a copy of the letter to the Director-General of Education. In the letter he sets out complaints about his treatment as a teacher, and states “Therefore I dismiss myself from my employment”. 22 Mr McDonald has not been deterred. On occasions, Mrs McDonald has joined in her husband’s claims. As the primary judge explained:23 For over 20 years, the State of South Australia has been vexed by defending the inordinate number of proceedings commenced or attempted to be commenced by Mr and Mrs McDonald. Identifying the “true identity” of the defendant(s)24 in these proceedings has consumed Mr McDonald despite the defence having made plain that no point has, or will be, taken with the identity of the defendant, and that vicarious liability is admitted by the State. Further, as a Judge of this Court noted,25 the proper forum for the “heartland” of Mr McDonald’s claims was the Worker’s Compensation Tribunal, given that s 54 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (“the WRC Act”) operates to prevent those claims being prosecuted in this Court.26 The characterisation of his former employer and whether the “heartland” of his claims can be prosecuted in this Court are issues that have been finally determined. Regardless, Mr McDonald has wilfully sought time and time again to relitigate these settled controversies. As the years have passed Mr McDonald has broadened his complaints, making allegations of misconduct, fraud and conspiracy against former colleagues, non-parties, and legal practitioners employed in the Crown Solicitor’s Office. He has sought to set aside a Full Court judgment alleging it was obtained by misconduct that constituted actual fraud. He has also accused judicial officers of bias, fraud, misconduct, colluding with the Crown Solicitor’s Office, lacking independence, and failing to apply the law. He has alleged the Supreme Court Registrar was negligent in the management of court files. He asserts he went on a 40-day hunger strike in his quest to obtain confirmation of the identity of his employer. He has made veiled threats of using the public arena with the support of expert bloggers to release the evidence he has gathered in the event his ability to litigate is curtailed. Mrs McDonald, who is prone to accusatory, shrill outbursts during hearings, believes there is something seriously criminal going on this Court and has also threatened to go on a hunger strike with the result that I might have a death on my hands: 23 Reasons, [3]-[5]. 24 Whilst rule 1.4(4)(b) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (UCR) prescribes that, in respect of a proceeding instituted before the commencement of the UCR on 18 May 2020, a party who was a defendant is now a respondent, I use the term defendant (other than with respect to the Workers Compensation Tribunal litigation) throughout my reasons as much of Mr and Mrs McDonald’s litigation took place prior to the commencement of the UCR and the numerous judgments of this Court that have ensued use the term defendant. 25 [2016] SASC 79 at [168] (Nicholson J). 26 On the commencement of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) on 1 July 2015, ‘Workers Compensation Tribunal’ was replaced with ‘South Australian Employment Tribunal’. Schedule 9, cl 49 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA) provides ‘Part 5 of this Act does not apply to or in relation to an existing injury or the death of a worker resulting from an existing injury (and section 54(1) of the repealed Act will continue to apply in respect of such an injury or death)’. -- 11 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 8 MS MCDONALD: … if you do throw us out of this court illegally, I personally as a 70 year-old woman will go on a hunger strike and that is 100%, because I cannot believe the injustice that has taken place with my husband, watching him work and work and work, sometimes up to 1 o’clock in the morning, and he was a young man when they bullied him in school, it’s an absolute disgrace what this court has done to us, and you think we’re idiots and that we don’t see what you’re doing? Judge David should’ve allowed my husband to go through his evidence. HER HONOUR: Mrs McDonald please sit down. MS MCDONALD: I can’t stand it – HER HONOUR: Mrs McDonald – MS MCDONALD: – and you might even have a death on your hands because I have gone mental because of what this court has done to my husband. MR MCDONALD: Just stay quiet, just go quiet, go on, off you go, quiet. HER HONOUR: Okay, thank you. MS MCDONALD: I can’t stand what you have done to us, you think we’re idiots and we don’t know what should be done. We’ll get the outside people to judge you. MR MCDONALD: Yeah, so we know exactly where we are all going with this. The State of South Australia has had enough. The Attorney-General for the State of South Australia … has made an originating application under the vexatious proceedings provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) … The Attorney General seeks to satisfy the Court that Mr and Mrs McDonald have persistently instituted vexatious proceedings such that the Court should declare them vexatious litigants and make consequential orders pursuant to s 39(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. (Original citations.) Vexatious litigant applications 23 It is not necessary to address in detail the requirements for the making of a vexatious litigant declaration and orders pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. They were relatively recently addressed by this Court in Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No. 4).27 The history behind the present iteration of the South Australian vexatious litigant provision has been considered elsewhere.28 24 Section 39 of the Supreme Court Act is in the following terms: 27 Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No. 4) [2024] SASCA 113, [15]-[50] (Livesey P, Stanley and Hall AJJA). 28 Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [50]-[63] (Livesey J). -- 12 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 9 (1) If, on the application of the Attorney-General or any other interested person, the court is satisfied that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the court may make either or both of the following orders: (a) an order prohibiting the person by whom the vexatious proceedings were instituted from instituting further proceedings, or further proceedings of a particular class, without permission of the court; (b) an order staying proceedings already instituted by that person. (2) Where it appears to a prescribed court that there are proper grounds for an application under this section, it may refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration. (3) An order under this section remains in force (subject to variation by the court)— (a) if a period for the operation of the order is fixed—until the expiration of that period or the revocation of the order (whichever first occurs); (b) if no such period is fixed—until revocation of the order. (4) Where an order is made under this section, a copy of the order must be published in the Gazette. (5) For the purposes of this section, proceedings are vexatious— (a) if instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose; or (b) if instituted without reasonable ground. (6) In this section— prescribed court means— (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any other court of the State; or (c) the South Australian Employment Tribunal; and (d) any other tribunal of the State prescribed by the regulations; proceedings means civil or criminal proceedings instituted in a prescribed court. 25 A two-stage process is involved in the application of s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act:29 … At the first stage, an applicant must demonstrate that the respondent has persistently instituted “proceedings” within the meaning of s 39(6) and the proceedings are “vexatious” within the meaning of s 39(5). The concept of “proceedings” is defined by s 39(6) to mean proceedings instituted in a “prescribed court”, being one of the specified courts or tribunals of this State. 29 Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [47]-[49] (Livesey J). -- 13 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 10 When addressing this first stage, the Court cannot take into account proceedings in any other Australian court or tribunal when determining whether the requirements of the Act are satisfied. The existence or outcome of other Australian court or tribunal proceedings may, however, assist the conclusion that the local proceedings are vexatious because the point in issue has been repeatedly instituted or conclusively determined elsewhere.30 At the second stage, having determined that the respondent has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the applicant must then persuade the Court that, in all the circumstances, it is proper for the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of making an order which is within the scope of s 39(1).31 (Original citations.) 26 The first stage may be analysed and addressed by reference to the following elements:32 The discretion under s 39 is only enlivened where: 1. an application is made by the Attorney-General or any other interested person; and 2. the Court is satisfied that a person has: 2.1 “persistently instituted”; 2.2 “proceedings” in South Australian courts or tribunals; 2.3 that are “vexatious” in that; 2.3.1. they were instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose; or 2.3.2. they were instituted without reasonable grounds. The phrase “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” requires a finding to be made about each of three matters: (1) persistently instituted; (2) vexatious; and (3) proceedings. 27 At the hearing of this appeal there was no issue about the meaning of these three elements, namely, whether the appellants had (1) persistently instituted (2) vexatious (3) proceedings. 28 The second stage concerns the exercise of discretion by the court, which must be undertaken recognising that s 39 provides an extreme remedy, not granted lightly.33 At this stage, whether a declaration is made, and whether and to what extent orders should be made, are determined by reference to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 30 Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J). 31 Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 33 (Perry J); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322, [58] (Debelle J). 32 Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No. 4) [2024] SASCA 113, [18] (Livesey P, Stanley and Hall AJJA).J, citing Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [64]-[65] (Livesey J). 33 Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No. 4) [2024] SASCA 113, [47]-[48] (Livesey P, Stanley and Hall AJJA). -- 14 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 11 29 That the putative vexatious litigant is almost invariably not legally represented is a feature that requires care. It may be necessary to exercise a degree of patience and tolerance, especially where the litigant is prone to extreme language and what appears to be inappropriate behaviour. That has occurred in the course of the hearing of this appeal. On occasion, Mrs McDonald was required to leave the court room if she persisted in yelling. 30 One day after the hearing, Mr McDonald sent the following email to the Court: Dear Associates, Attorney General, CS Condoluci and CS Garnaut Asociate [sic], could you draw his Honours [sic] attention to this email. Attached is the Memorandum of Agreement, the Statement of Service of Education and Extracts of sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13 and 15 of the Education Act 1972. Material facts were extracted from these documents and proved to three different AI platforms. (The extracted facts are shown on each of the AI platforms). Check the material facts for any errors against the original documents which are attached as pdf documents. Each AI platform provided an analysis of Mr McDonald's employer/employee contractual relationship with the incorporated Minister representing the body corporate under the Education Act 1972 in the period 1988 to 2003. To date, the Court has failed to produce the transcript or judgment indicating it has heard the original claim of 16 April 2004 for breach of contract and breach of the duty of care and negligence against the incorporated Minister representing the body corporate under s 7 of the Education Act or a delegate of the incorporated Minister in the Supreme Court. At the hearing yesterday I informed the Court about the costs of litigation involving the McDonald’s over 21 years. Should it turn out that I and my wife Rhoda are declared vexatious litigants based on the false evidence produced by employees of the Attorney General we will have no choice but to defend our good names and reputation vigorously in the public arena. In the public arena we will be uploading evidence provided to the Court on several AI platforms to support our claim the Courts have failed to serve the interest of justice and the public interest and have caused a substantial injustice to Mr & Mrs Mcdonald over 21 years. We intend to show through AI platforms the Court relied on false evidence from the Crown Solicitors Office and provided perfect judgments on false evidence for the benefit of the Attorney General and his employees. I have provided you with examples of the analyses of three AI platforms. The AI analyses took about one minute to deliver the legal and material facts from extracted facts. The algorithm carries no bias or apprehended bias. It is designed or programmed only to deal with the information fed into it. If the algorithm worked out in one minute the incorporated Minister representing the body corporate under s 7 of the Education Act 1972 was the employer in a contractual relationship with Mr McDonald when appointed to the SA teaching service under s 9(4) and s 15 of the Education [sic] in the period 1988 to 2003 then why have the McDonald's been kept in Court for 21 years with judges who claim to be impartial, independent legal experts in law who have had the same extracted facts but still have failed to accept in fact and in law an employer/employee contractual relationship -- 15 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 12 existed between Mr McDonald and the Minister (a body corporate by virtue of the Education Act 1972) in the period 1988 to 2003 and McDonald's breach of contract and negligence claim has still not been heard against the incorporated Minister. Yesterday at the hearing on Appeal in action CIV-24-5708 I was bullied and obstructed by Livesey P from delivering my oral submission on the Attorney Generals s 39 application. He claimed everything I had to say had been heard before or had been provided in submissions and he did not want to hear what I had to submit. This is an official complaint of the actual bias and apprehended bias my wife and I experienced yesterday at the hearing which we regard as an obstruction of justice. Regards Mr McDonald 31 The “costs of the litigation” referred to in this email is a reference to the $4 million the appellants estimated has been spent addressing their cases. That is not an estimate made by the Attorney-General. The complaint made at the conclusion to this email is a reference to the occasions when Mr McDonald was asked in argument to address the issues arising on an appeal against a declaration and orders made on an application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, rather than re-litigate past issues, to avoid repetition, and to allow time for the respondent to present his submissions. The allegations of bias and procedural unfairness necessarily involve the entire coram,34 and they are rejected.35 32 That an unrepresented litigant is unrestrained by professional duties and obligations may serve to reinforce the need for a vexatious litigant declaration and orders to be made. 33 When addressing the first stage of an application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, it is important to recognise that the court is not undertaking an appeal under s 50 of the Supreme Court Act, and it does not go behind the earlier decisions. It is not reviewing whether the “proceedings” relied on by an applicant are affected by material error. Rather, the court is concerned with whether those proceedings are “vexatious” in the sense defined by s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. 34 Generally, that means that the court is concerned to determine whether they were “instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose”, or “instituted without reasonable ground” by the putative vexatious litigant. Whilst that determination requires that some view be formed about the merit or otherwise of the proceedings being reviewed, that is done only through the prism of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. 34 McFarlane v The King [2023] SASCA 123, [34]-[35] (Livesey P). 35 See McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) (No 3) [2025] SASCA 42 (Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA). -- 16 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 13 35 This difference between the analysis required under s 39 and an appeal under s 50 of the Supreme Court Act (or their counterparts in other jurisdictions) has been explained in a number of cases. 36 In Kay v Attorney-General (Vic), Ormiston JA explained the approach required under the Victorian vexatious litigant provision, s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic):36 Eames J conducted the hearing with exemplary care and meticulous fairness so that from his Honour's reasons it is abundantly clear why the applicant should have been declared a vexatious litigant. The judge extended considerable generosity and latitude to the applicant who appeared on his own behalf, but I would not wish it to be thought that, in every application of this kind under s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986, it was necessary to re-examine the circumstances of each proceeding upon which the Attorney-General might seek to rely to support the making of an order. If the proceedings relied upon are frivolous, vexatious or otherwise of a kind which would support the making of the order, then that ordinarily should be apparent upon a reading of the reasons and orders and, if it is not, there will be usually no sensible basis for relying upon them, except to the extent that they may form part of a relevant chain of events. The learned judge, primarily I would gather from a sense of fairness and in an attempt to discover why the applicant said that the order should not be made, went somewhat further into the reasons for the various orders, the circumstances that lay behind them and what may now be thought to be the applicant’s unreasonable attacks upon them. On other occasions, therefore, examination in such detail may properly be seen to be unnecessary, for the procedure is not to be treated as the opportunity for a second line of appeal against judgments or orders upon which reliance is placed for the making of an order under s 21. 37 Subsequently, in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski, Bleby J referred to portions of this passage with approval.37 38 In Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath, Ashley J (as his Honour then was) said that “it is not for a court considering a [vexatious litigant] application to go behind the order and go into the merits of the argument as a court of appeal would do”:38 It is one thing to know what the word “vexatious” means. It is another thing to apply s. 21(2) to the circumstances of a particular case. In the latter task the following matters are, according to the authorities, relevant: first, where an order has been made dismissing an action as frivolous or vexatious, or striking a pleading out, it is not for a court considering a s. 21 application to go behind the order and go into the merits of the argument as a court of appeal would do. Second, findings which are required do not depend on viva voce evidence or credibility of witnesses. The critical evidence is to be found in court files – documents, judgments, orders and reasons. For that reason, any hearsay material contained in an affidavit in support of an application, even though objectionable, should be treated simply as a distraction, and ignored. Third, the question is not whether the manner in which a proceeding is conducted is vexatious; it is whether, having regard to its nature and substance, it should be so characterised. Fourth, and this is a more general proposition with respect to s. 21, in determining whether the Attorney-General has made out a case, the court is not concerned with a minute individual examination of each proceeding. It must consider 36 Kay v Attorney-General (Vic) [2000] 2 VR 436, 437. 37 Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [17] (Bleby J). 38 Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath [2001] VSC 269, [28] (Ashley J). -- 17 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 14 the overall impression created by the number of proceedings, their general character and their results. (Citations omitted.) 39 This passage has also been referred to with approval.39 40 Justice Wheelahan has referred to the approach taken in Victoria and New South Wales to similar effect.40 His Honour referred to the following passage from the reasons of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, in Gallo v Attorney- General (Vic):41 I return then to the learned judge’s findings in regard to this matter. He started by saying, at page 35 of the appeal book, this: The gist of what the respondent submits is that, in each instance, the proceeding in question is a genuine proceeding brought to redress a genuine grievance or wrong. I was invited to make some investigation in detail of the cases, the subject matter of the application. However, I do not feel it necessary to do so on an application of this sort. It is sufficient for my purposes that in a large number of instances various judges and Masters of this Court have expressed opinions as to the vexatious character of the particular proceeding before them. It is perhaps desirable to make some detailed reference to the cases which fall into category one. He then dealt with those. I might say, in parenthesis, that I agree with the learned judge that where an order has been made by a Judge or a Master dismissing an action as frivolous or vexatious, or striking a pleading out, it is not to go behind that order and, as it were, go into the merits of the argument as a court of appeal would. 41 Justice Wheelahan also referred to Attorney-General (NSW) v Bar Mordecai, where Patten AJ had taken the same view regarding a vexatious litigant application made under s 84(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) (since repealed):42 It seems to me that I will need to form my own view about each piece of litigation relied upon by the Attorney-General. In doing so, however, I believe that I am entitled to have regard to the result of the proceedings and, where appropriate, the findings of, and views expressed, by the various judicial officers who dealt with them. 39 See, for example, Garrett v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 117, [7] (Pagone J); Attorney-General (Vic) v Whittingham [2021] VSC 91, [127] (Ginnane J); Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 90, [517] (Ward CJ in Eq). 40 Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30, [42]-[44] (Wheelahan J). 41 Gallo v Attorney-General (Vic) (unreported, 4 September 1984) (Starke J, with whom Crockett and Beach JJ agreed), referring to the reasons of the primary judge, Gray J. 42 Attorney-General (NSW) v Bar Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142, [5] (Patten AJ), subsequently referred to with approval in in Attorney-General (NSW) v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942, [125] (Fullerton J), Attorney-General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008, [22] (Davies J), and Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125,[50]-[53] (Beazley P, Emmett JA and Sackville AJA). -- 18 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 15 42 Although Simpson J (as her Honour then was) later held in Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Martin,43 that s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) operated as a form of fetter, preventing reliance on any judgment which found that there was an abuse of process, or a failure to disclose a cause of action,44 that provision does not apply in this Court. 43 A review of the reasons of the primary judge in this case demonstrates that though she had regard to the findings made in each of the cases relied on by the Attorney-General, her Honour appeared to form her own view about whether the requirements of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act were satisfied in relation to each proceeding. The primary judge did this without being lured into any form of de facto appeal, and without going behind what was decided.45 44 That was appropriate. Observations regarding the appeal 45 There are four initial observations to be made regarding the 25 proceedings instituted by the appellants and relied on by the Attorney-General and, in consequence, the appellants’ appeal. 46 The first is that the Attorney-General did not suggest that the 2004 proceedings, the 2009 Full Court appeal, nor the first special leave application to the High Court, were vexatious. That is important. The consequence was that the vexatious litigant application focussed on the many attempts made by the appellants to later re-litigate what was determined in that initial litigation. 47 Secondly, the Attorney-General did not rely upon the Federal Court or other High Court proceedings, or the many attempts made to file proceedings, as comprising “proceedings” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.46 Rather, these were treated as informing the exercise of the court’s discretion to make orders under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. 48 Whether it was necessary to take that view of High Court proceedings following an appeal from a South Australian court was not an issue canvassed on the hearing of this appeal. In addition, the many appeal grounds which addressed 43 Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Martin [2015] NSWSC 1372, [20], [132]-[133] (Simpson J). However, Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Mohareb [2016] NSWSC 1823, [25]-[32] (Schmidt J) is to the contrary. In Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30, [48]-[64] Wheelahan J pointed out that s 8(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) was amended with effect from 20 February 2018 so as to exclude the operation of s 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and that the approach taken in the Federal Court differed. 44 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 91: “Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding”. 45 Reasons, [46]. 46 Thereby avoiding the need to address whether an attempt to file proceedings should be considered the institution of proceedings, see Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [100]-[106] (Livesey J); Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No 4) [2024] SASCA 113, [33]-[35], [165] (Livesey P, Stanley and Hall AJJA). -- 19 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 16 the reliance placed by the primary judge on these decisions overlooked the reason why the judge had regard to them. Without acknowledging or addressing that they were only relied on in connection with the exercise of discretion, the appellants were intent on demonstrating why, for example, the ruling of Besanko J was said to be wrong. 49 Thirdly, the appellants re-agitated previous allegations of bias which concerned decisions made by the primary judge or the members of this Court in various of the proceedings relied on by the Attorney-General. It was said that, as a result, there was a “conflict of interest”. In so far as this concerned the primary judge, the allegation was one of actual bias and it was reagitated without regard to the fact that this allegation had been rejected by this Court in 2023.47 To the extent that it was pressed by reference to the decision by the primary judge to press on with the hearing of the vexatious litigant application, rather than lift the stays and hear the appellants’ applications for judicial review (see below), there is nothing in that point and her Honour’s decision did not reveal bias of any kind. That too was previously addressed by this Court. 50 In so far as the question of bias concerned this Court, it was an issue of ostensible bias, and the appellants maintained that they did not accept the rulings earlier made by this Court in late 2024 and early 2025.48 This was communicated during the course of a speech made by Mr McDonald soon after the start of his oral address. No further or renewed application was made by the appellants – this was addressed specifically – and Mr McDonald (with whom Mrs McDonald appeared to agree) said that they were not making another bias application.49 The issue may therefore be put to one side as no new allegations or applications were made. 51 Finally, and as earlier mentioned, the primary judge accepted the submission made by the Attorney-General that she need not “go behind” the judgments and findings made in prior proceedings when determining the vexatious litigant application. In circumstances where the issues raised by the appellants had been repeatedly rejected, the primary judge had “regard to the result of the proceedings and, where appropriate, the findings of, and views expressed by, the various judicial officers who dealt with them”.50 52 There is no need to repeat what has been said about the proper approach to the review of the decisions relied on for the purposes of a vexatious litigant application. The corollary of this, however, is that it was not appropriate to treat 47 McDonald v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2023] SASCA 132, [37] (Livesey P and Doyle JA). 48 McDonald v Attorney-General (SA) [2024] SASCA 144 (Livesey P, S Doyle and Bleby JJA); McDonald v Attorney-General (SA) (No 2) [2025] SASCA 1 (Livesey P, S Doyle and Bleby JJA). The question of costs was reserved to this Court in each application. 49 Transcript 9 April 2025, 11.28: “Bleby JA: This is not a new application …? Mr McDonald: No. …”. 50 Reasons, [46], citing Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30, [42] (Wheelahan J), relying on Patten AJ in Attorney-General (NSW) v Bar Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142, [5] which concerned an application made under s 84(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) (since repealed). -- 20 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 17 the vexatious litigant application as an opportunity for the putative vexatious litigant to lead further evidence, whether or not it is called “fresh evidence”, so as to “right the wrongs” of past injustices. Granted, a question of degree may conceivably be involved when the parties are at issue over whether there was a reasonable basis for instituting a particular proceeding. 53 What is not permissible is an overt frontal assault on all of the past proceedings in all courts and tribunals involved with the benefit, as here, of seven lever arch folders of materials designed only to prove that every decision made by any court or tribunal that disagreed with the appellants is plainly wrong and must be set aside for numerous reasons which included baseless assertions of fraud, jurisdictional error and a denial of procedural fairness. 54 This represents an important point of difference between the parties on this appeal. Most of the appeal grounds and arguments mounted by the appellants were directed to re-litigating past issues and decisions. 55 Indeed, one of the central complaints made by the appellants is that the primary judge erred in denying Mr McDonald procedural fairness because two of his applications for judicial review should have been heard before the Attorney-General’s vexatious litigant application, “for they would have shown Mr and Mrs McDonald were not vexatious litigants and they had sound legal reasons in the Originating Application for each Judicial Review for them to be heard”.51 Those applications for judicial review sought “de novo standard review or a de novo appeal” of the 2004 proceedings. 56 In argument, Mr McDonald admitted that he wanted to “start again” and he was critical of the refusal by the primary judge and, he inferred, by this Court to permit that to occur. There is no merit in the complaint. The appellants simply wished to use the judicial review proceedings to re-litigate past cases. The primary judge was right to refuse to allow that to happen. 57 In addition, the appellants complained that they were prevented by the primary judge from obtaining by subpoena or introducing into evidence a large volume of further material designed to demonstrate why earlier decisions were wrong and unjust.52 Indeed, in one of their appeal grounds the appellants went so far as to suggest that the Full Court’s 2009 decision should be reconsidered and re-litigated:53 Bampton [sic] erred in citing the cases from the ‘Workers Compensation Claim through to the Appellant’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from Bampton J’s recusal refusal’ as her reasons (her ratio decidendi) for favouring the Attorney Generals application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 for she failed to consider or accept Mr McDonald had the right to bring forward his case to the Appeal Court to reconsider the decision of the Full Court in 2009 for it was plainly wrong and resulted in a major injustice 51 Appeal ground 2.41. 52 See, for example, appeal ground 69. 53 Appeal ground 76. -- 21 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 18 to Mr and Mrs McDonald for it was in breach of his constitutional and statutory rights under Australian jurisprudence to have his contract claims heard against the body corporate and trading corporation under the Education Act 1972 in the jurisdiction of the SA Supreme Court. (Original emphasis.) 58 There is no merit in this complaint, either. The primary judge was right to refuse to give leave to issue subpoenas and receive a large volume of material designed to assist the re-litigation of past decisions. 59 Indeed, whilst the parties to this appeal agreed core appeal books spanning five lever arch volumes, the appellants insisted that another seven volumes of supplementary material were relevant. Whilst the Court has received that material and reviewed it, it is not relevant. It is designed only to facilitate the re-litigation of various issues and decisions which have been long resolved against the appellants. 60 That the appellants were intent on re-litigating their grievances over past issues and decisions is also made clear by the orders they sought in their notice of appeal. Order 1 is concerned with lifting the permanent stays concerning the two judicial review applications already mentioned:54 1. Order the permanent stay in action CIV-21-012132 and CIV-21-011585 is lifted and a date is set down to hear both actions. 2. Order Mr McDonald’s Appeal delivered to the Registry on 23 August 2007 against the Reasons of Judge Lunn to strike out parts of the Applicant’s Eighth Statement of Claim on 6 August 2007 in the 2004 action is heard before the Full Appeal Court according to section 17, 48 and 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1935. 3. Order the discretion to make orders under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) has not been enlivened for the Attorney General application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 for Mr McDonald had a constitutional and statutory right and right at common law to have a breach of contract and contractual duty of care personal injury claim, heard in the Supreme Court against the other party who varied his contract under the statutory framework he was employed under for the variations made to his contract which caused harm and injury to him. 4. Order each of the Respondents Mr and Mrs McDonald has not instituted vexatious proceedings for at all material times they have endeavoured to have their rights under Australia law in contract and tort constitutional right under s 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution Act 1901 and their statutory right under s 4 of the TPA 1974 to have a contract claim heard against the body corporate and trading corporation in a contract of employment with Mr McDonald under the statutory framework he was employed under in the Supreme Court. 5. Order the interest of justice was not served in the decision of Anderson J in 2009 for Mr McDonald was not in a contract of employment with DECS for DECS in not a body corporate and he did not receive a fair trial against DECS. 54 Appellants’ notice of appeal, Part 3 “Orders sought”. -- 22 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 19 6. Order the breach the Full Court in action SCCIV-04-418 should have declared a mistrial occurred in the decision of Anderson J in 2008 for DECS was not in a contract of employment with Mr McDonald in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and no implied term of mutual trust and confidence existed between Mr McDonald and DECS at any time. 7. Order the breach of contract and personal injury and contractual duty of care claim in the contract of employment between Mr McDonald had with the Minister and his employer the body corporate and trading corporation under the Education Act has not been heard under the statutory framework he was employed under which means those causes of action are not functus officio for the interest of justice has not been served on these causes of action in the Supreme Court and Mr McDonald has the right to have them heard according to the Australian law. 8. Order the Full Court Appeal Court uses its “inherent powers” and sets aside the Full Court decision in 2009 to allow Mr McDonald his substantive right under Australian jurisprudence to have his breach of contract and contractual duty of care personal injury claim heard or alternatively the Court provides a declaratory judgment in his favour. 9. Order a settlement conferences is suggested between the parties to settle all outstanding claims before the Court. 61 One of the curiosities of this appeal is that it is probably not strictly necessary to traverse each of the 25 proceedings which were instituted and addressed by the primary judge because, speaking generally, the appellants did not challenge the treatment of them by the primary judge in so far as she found that they satisfied the requirements of the first limb of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. 62 Rather, the appellants asserted that the primary judge erred because she failed to find that those decisions were wrong and unjust. For example, the appellants reagitated their contentions concerning the errors associated with the decisions of Anderson J and the Full Court, already discussed. That this was their approach was confirmed at the hearing of this appeal. 63 Annexure 1 to these reasons is a reproduction of the table used by the primary judge when addressing the 25 proceedings on which the Attorney relied for the purposes of the vexatious litigant application. 64 Annexure 2 to these reasons comprises a table of the interlocutory applications commenced by the appellants since this appeal was instituted. As will be seen, where these are capable of being viewed as “proceedings” within the first stage of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, they may have been of some relevance if it had been necessary to re-exercise the discretion available under s 39, because they tend to support the necessity for the making of orders quelling further re- litigation. 65 In some instances, findings must be made about those applications where they, or the question of costs, have been referred to this Court for determination. -- 23 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 20 The reasons of the primary judge 66 The primary judge relied on a summary given by Besanko J in McDonald v State of South Australia for the purposes of giving a general background to the appellants’ litigation.55 Though this passage was criticised by the appellants as being inaccurate, there was no material error made in referring to it. 67 The primary judge then referred to Mr McDonald’s initial proceedings for unfair dismissal commenced on 13 May 2003, and his assertion that he was told that the Commission did not have jurisdiction, and that he had to discontinue those proceedings and institute proceedings for breach of contract in the Supreme Court of South Australia.56 68 Mr McDonald commenced the 2004 proceedings against the Department of Education and Children’s Services in the Supreme Court on 16 April 2004, seeking damages in connection with allegations of breach of contract, negligence and misleading and deceptive conduct. The primary judge referred to Mr McDonald’s assertion that a Master, relying upon a submission of the Crown Solicitor, ordered that he amend the name of the defendant to the State of South Australia, after which on 27 September 2004 an amended summons and statement of claim was filed. 69 Those proceedings proceeded to trial before Anderson J over 28 days between October 2007 and February 2008. Mr McDonald was not legally represented. Anderson J expressed the view that Mr McDonald preferred to proceed as a litigant in person.57 The primary judge referred to this in her reasons. Again, Mr McDonald’s complaint that this statement was not accurate does not demonstrate material error. 70 In his judgment delivered on 21 May 2008, Anderson J upheld Mr McDonald’s claim based on an implied duty of mutual trust and confidence, finding that it had been breached, but he dismissed the claims based on deceit and for damages at common law for non-economic loss by reason of s 54(1) of the WRC Act. Anderson J awarded damages of just under $400,000.58 71 The successful appeal to the Full Court in 2009 has already been described. 72 Before those decisions, on 6 August 2007 a Master of the Supreme Court, Judge Lunn, struck out various allegations made by Mr McDonald pursuant to the WRC Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1986 (SA), the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), as well as for physical and mental harm. Despite an order extending the time for any appeal, no appeal was commenced. 55 Reasons, [6]-[7], quoting McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297, [9]-[20] (Besanko J). This passage of the primary judge’s Reasons addresses in some detail Mr McDonald’s employment as a high school teacher. For the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to address that detail. 56 Reasons, [8]. 57 McDonald v State of South Australia (2008) 172 IR 256, [466]. (Anderson J). 58 McDonald v State of South Australia (2008) 172 IR 256, [549] (Anderson J). -- 24 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 21 73 The primary judge addressed Mr McDonald’s allegation that he was denied his right to appeal the decision made by Judge Lunn on 6 August 2007. This was described as the lost appeal. The appellant’s allegations included assertions that the Registry of the Supreme Court had lost or destroyed a relevant document.59 74 An exchange between Mr McDonald and Anderson J, set out in his reasons following the trial of the 2004 proceedings, demonstrated that at the time of that exchange no notice of appeal had been commenced within time.60 75 The primary judge found that Mr McDonald’s allegations that he had filed a notice of appeal, and was denied the right to appeal the ruling made by Judge Lunn, with the result that there was a miscarriage of justice entitling him to set aside the judgment of Anderson J and proceed with a re-trial of the 2004 proceedings were “without any foundation and, in my view, scurrilous”.61 The primary judge also relied on the finding made by the Full Court to the effect that any appeal against the ruling made by Judge Lunn on 6 August 2007 had “no prospects of success”.62 76 Apart from disagreeing with these findings, and wanting to reagitate the issue regarding the lost appeal, the appellants did not identify any material error of fact or law concerning them in their appeal grounds. 77 As the primary judge explained, after the decision of the Full Court in 2009, Mr McDonald, in a number of cases with Mrs McDonald as co-plaintiff, instituted or attempted to institute proceedings in the Federal Court and then in the Supreme Court, all designed to relitigate the issues determined in the 2004 proceedings. As the primary judge explained, this led to numerous decisions:63 1. more than 30 judgments in respect of allegations made by Mr and/or Mrs McDonald, published by the Supreme and District Courts including seven judgments of the Full Court or Court of Appeal; 2. five judgments published by the Federal Court in respect of Mr McDonald’s allegations. The Federal Court has also made orders limiting Mr McDonald’s ability to litigate further; 3. four applications to the High Court for special leave to appeal brought by Mr and/or Mrs McDonald; and 4. four decisions published by the Workers Compensation Tribunal in respect of Mr McDonald’s applications. 78 The primary judge noted a submission from the Attorney-General that, in addition to the 39 decisions mentioned, Registrars of State and Federal Courts had considered voluminous materials and, on many occasions, refused to accept them 59 Reasons, [14]-[22]. 60 Reasons, [23]-[24], quoting McDonald v State of South Australia (2008) 172 IR 256, [441]-[449] (Anderson J). 61 Reasons, [25]. 62 Reasons, [25]-[26]. 63 Reasons, [28]. -- 25 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 22 for filing.64 The Attorney did not suggest that these comprised the institution of “proceedings” for the purposes of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. 79 The primary judge proceeded on the basis that the vexatious litigant application made by the Attorney-General relied on 25 proceedings instituted by Mr McDonald, where 12 were also instituted by Mrs McDonald, in a prescribed South Australian court or tribunal which it was argued satisfied the requirement of being “vexatious” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.65 80 The reasons of the primary judge show that, of the 25 proceedings addressed, her Honour found that 24 had been commenced without “reasonable ground” or, in some instances, in order to “harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose”. The 25 particular proceedings and associated litigation 81 The particular proceedings relied on by the Attorney were numbered from 1 to 25, and the reasons of the primary judge and Annexure 1 reflect that approach. 82 Proceedings numbered 1 concerned Mr McDonald’s appeal to the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal. On 11 March 2011, Hannon DPJ refused an application for an order amending the name of the respondent to his claim for compensation. Mr McDonald’s claim against the Department of Education and Children’s Services alleged that he had suffered stress, anxiety and depression as a result of bullying, harassment and discrimination whilst employed as a teacher. 83 That claim was rejected, and Mr McDonald issued a notice of dispute in the Tribunal.66 The application sought an amendment to describe the respondent as the “Department of Education and Children’s Services (DECS) in the right of the Director General of Education”. 84 Hannon DPJ had recognised that Mr McDonald’s purpose was to use any decision made as a foundation to identify various third parties against whom he wished to issue proceedings seeking damages on the basis that they were not his employer and were unable to seek protection against liability under s 54(1) of the WRC Act.67 85 The Full Bench summarily dismissed the appeal because no error had been identified and Mr McDonald simply wished to reargue his case, demonstrating his “implacable belief that the identification of the employer … is a matter of great 64 Reasons, [29]. 65 Reasons, [47], together with Annexure 2 of the Reasons. 66 Reasons, [60]-[61]. 67 McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services (South Australian Workers Compensation Tribunal, unreported ruling dated 11 March 2011 at [11], Hannon DPJ). -- 26 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 23 moment”.68 In addition, the Full Bench regarded the application to amend as an abuse of process because it was pressed for a “collateral and futile purpose”.69 86 The primary judge referred to these findings and found that Mr McDonald’s appeal was instituted without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose and it was, therefore, vexatious within the meaning of s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act. 87 Proceedings numbered 2 concerned an application for judicial review of the decision made by Hannon DPJ to strike out his compensation claim. Hannon DPJ made that order on the basis that there had been a want of prosecution. Mr McDonald had explained to Hannon DPJ that he intended to lodge a notice of discontinuance of that claim so that he could bring proceedings before the Federal Court or the Supreme Court so as to conduct a “whole retrial” and that, if his common law claim failed, he would then return to the Tribunal for the determination of his workers compensation claim.70 88 In striking out the claim, Hannon DPJ held that it was not up to Mr McDonald to decide if and when he would proceed, and it was not appropriate to allow the compensation claim to be “put in abeyance to indulge Mr McDonald’s desire to pursue proceedings elsewhere”.71 89 Following that decision, Mr McDonald commenced an application for permission to seek judicial review in the Supreme Court. Judge Withers refused permission to proceed with the judicial review on the basis that he was not satisfied that there was a reasonable basis on which Mr McDonald might establish a right to an order for judicial review.72 90 Proceedings numbered 3 concerned Mr McDonald’s appeal to a single judge of the Supreme Court against the decision of Judge Withers.73 91 On 19 March 2013, Nicholson J dismissed that appeal, finding that the application for judicial review had no prospects of success and that Mr McDonald had “not shown a reasonable basis on which he might establish a right to an order for judicial review”.74 68 McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 18, [14]-[15]. 69 McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 18, [21]-[22]. 70 Reasons, [64]-[65]., citing McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 36. 71 McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 36, [36]-[37] (Hannon DPJ). 72 Reasons, [66]-[68], citing McDonald v The Workers Compensation Tribunal (SASC, Judge Withers, 4 December 2012), [30]. 73 Reasons, [69]. 74 McDonald v Workers Compensation Tribunal [2013] SASC 34, [28] (Nicholson J). -- 27 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 24 92 The Attorney-General submitted that Proceedings numbered 2 and 3 were vexatious within the meaning of s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act because both the initial application for permission and the appeal had no reasonable basis.75 93 Despite the arguments of the appellants, the primary judge was satisfied that those proceedings, together with Proceedings numbered 1, were each instituted without reasonable ground and satisfied s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act. In addition, her Honour found that Proceedings numbered 1 were instituted for an ulterior purpose and, for this reason also, s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act was satisfied.76 94 The appellants do not appear to have made any specific submission against these findings. 95 Between 2013 and 2014, Mr McDonald and his son, with Mr McDonald as his son’s next friend, instituted proceedings in the District Court against the State of South Australia. 96 Those proceedings concerned allegations of negligence, deceit and defamation causing psychological injury, loss of dignity and reputation, as well as discrimination, concerning the education of Mr McDonald’s son at a primary school in the late 90s. Between January 2005 and August 2009, ten iterations of the statement of claim were filed. By July 2011, Master Norman refused to accept a further iteration of the statement of claim.77 The appeal from that decision was dismissed by Judge Rice on 20 April 2012.78 Following argument, the proceeding was dismissed as disclosing no cause of action on 7 August 2012. 97 Mr McDonald appealed the decision of Judge Rice made on 20 April 2012, as well as the order dismissing the claim made on 7 August 2012.79 98 Justice Nicholson allowed the appeal in respect of the order for dismissal of the claim made on 7 August 2012, permitting Mr McDonald to replead.80 Nicholson J reminded Mr McDonald that this was likely to be the last opportunity he would be given to plead his case. 99 On 18 March 2013, Master Blumberg refused three interlocutory applications made by Mr McDonald, one of which was to substitute the Minister for Education as the defendant in place of the State of South Australia. 75 Reasons, [70]. 76 Reasons, [73]. 77 Reasons, [75], citing McDonald v South Australia (District Court of South Australia, Auxiliary Master Norman, 11 July 2011) (Decision 53 of 2011, FDN 69), with amended reasons which were published on 10 November 2011. 78 Reasons, [75], citing McDonald v The State of SA [2012] SADC 54 (Judge Rice). 79 Reasons, [76]. 80 McDonald v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 36, [37]-40] (Nicholson J). -- 28 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 25 100 Proceedings numbered 4 were Mr McDonald’s appeal against Master Blumberg’s decision made on 18 March 2013. On 23 May 2013, Judge Tilmouth found that there was no utility in substituting the defendant as proposed by Mr McDonald, and noted that an application to include Mrs McDonald as a plaintiff would not be pressed until an order was made substituting the defendant.81 101 Proceedings numbered 5 concerned an appeal filed against Judge Tilmouth’s decision made on 23 May 2013. The proposed appeal required an extension of time. On 27 August 2014, Bampton J refused an extension of time in which to seek permission to appeal, finding in effect that the appeal was without merit.82 Bampton J rejected Mr McDonald’s submission that the Minister was not relevantly a part of the Crown and, in the circumstances, there was no utility in the order he sought.83 102 Proceedings numbered 6 concerned an application for permission to appeal to the Full Court made on 3 September 2014. On 24 February 2015, the Full Court refused permission, finding that the decision of Bampton J was correct and that an appeal enjoyed no prospect of success.84 103 On 13 August 2015, an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Full Court made on 24 February 2015 was dismissed. The High Court held that the decision of the Full Court was “plainly correct” and that an appeal had “no prospect of success”.85 104 The Attorney-General contended that Proceedings numbered 4, 5 and 6 were without merit and therefore vexatious within the meaning of s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act. The primary judge recorded that Mr and Mrs McDonald did not address these submissions. Rather, they attempted to re-argue the merits of each.86 The primary judge found that the each of Proceedings numbered 4, 5 and 6 were instituted without reasonable ground and therefore satisfied the requirements of s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act.87 105 The District Court proceedings were transferred to the Supreme Court on 7 November 2013 (the 2013 proceedings).88 106 On 20 November 2014, further Supreme Court proceedings were commenced (the 2014 proceedings) by Mr and Mrs McDonald and their son. The 2014 proceedings replicated the 2013 proceedings. Nicholson J was assigned responsibility for managing the 2013 proceedings and the 2014 proceedings. An 81 Reasons, [78]. 82 Reasons, [78]-[79]; McDonald v State of South Australia [2014] SASC 120, [31] (Bampton J). 83 Reasons, [80].; McDonald v State of South Australia [2014] SASC 120, [28] (Bampton J). 84 McDonald v State of South Australia [2015] SASCFC 15, [6] (Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ). 85 Reasons, [82]; McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia [2015] HCASL 118, [3] (Bell and Gageler JJ). 86 Reasons, [83]-[84]. 87 Reasons, [86]. 88 Reasons, [87]. -- 29 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 26 application that he be disqualified from managing those proceedings was dismissed on 23 September 2015.89 107 Proceedings numbered 7 concerned the application by Mr and Mrs McDonald for 12 orders in both the 2013 proceedings and the 2014 proceedings to restrain solicitors from the Crown Solicitor’s Office from acting. 108 On 1 December 2015, Nicholson J dismissed the application.90 Five of the orders sought an investigation into the conduct of the solicitors and Nicholson J held that the Supreme Court had no power to make those orders and, “more importantly”, nothing had been put forward to suggest any investigation was called for.91 109 In addition, Mr and Mrs McDonald sought an order directing the Registry to reject the notice of acting filed by a solicitor for the Crown Solicitor’s Office. Nicholson J held that no basis had been established to support the making of the order sought.92 110 Proceedings numbered 8 concerned the application brought by Mr and Mrs McDonald for permission to appeal against Nicholson J’s decision.93 On 13 April 2016, the Full Court refused permission to appeal because there was a failure to identify any error of law or fact, and no reasonably arguable ground of appeal had been identified.94 111 An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Full Court made on 13 April 2016 was refused on 2 February 2017. Again, the High Court found that the Full Court’s decision was plainly correct and that an appeal to the High Court enjoyed no prospect of success.95 112 The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 7 and 8 were commenced without reasonable ground and satisfied s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act.96 Again, no argument was put against these findings. 113 Proceedings numbered 9 concerned a decision made by Nicholson J about the 2013 proceedings: Nicholson J dismissed those proceedings and entered judgment against Mr McDonald.97 In addition, Nicholson J refused Mrs McDonald 89 Reasons, [88]-[89]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 3) [2015] SASC 141, [18] (Nicholson J). 90 Reasons, [90]. 91 Reasons, [91], McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 2) [2015] SASC 188, [22] (Nicholson J). 92 Reasons, [92]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 2) [2015] SASC 188, [22] (Nicholson J). 93 Reasons, [94]. 94 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia [2016] SASCFC 39, [11]-[13] (Sulan, Lovell and Doyle JJ). 95 Reasons, [95]; McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v The Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors [2017] HCASL 1, [1] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). 96 Reasons, [96]. 97 Reasons, [98]-[101]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79. -- 30 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 27 permission to be joined as a party.98 Nicholson J was concerned that the claim necessarily involved a reconsideration of the evidence and claims determined by Anderson J and the Full Court which “should not be permitted”, and Mrs McDonald’s claims were substantially out of time, and there was no adequately particularised application to extend time.99 114 Justice Nicholson ordered that the claim of Mr McDonald’s son in the 2013 proceedings should be remitted to the District Court and that Mr McDonald should have nothing further to do with them.100 115 Proceedings numbered 10 concerned the 2014 proceedings, and an order made by Nicholson J granting the application for dismissal with judgment against each of Mr and Mrs McDonald and their son.101 116 Nicholson J explained that Mr McDonald was concerned that the 2013 proceedings wrongly named the State of South Australia as the defendant and that he had consistently failed to obtain permission to amend the name of the defendant and, so far as the 2013 proceedings were concerned, that issue was “finally determined”. 117 Justice Nicholson was satisfied that the 2014 proceedings were commenced by way of “parallel proceedings … in direct response” to address this issue.102 Nicholson J found that the 2014 proceedings constituted an abuse of process and should be struck out.103 118 The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 9 and 10 were instituted by Mr and Mrs McDonald without reasonable ground and they satisfied s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act.104 No challenge was made to these findings by the appellants. 119 Proceedings numbered 11 concerned a notice of appeal filed on 8 June 2016 against the orders made by Nicholson J concerning the 2013 proceedings and the 2014 proceedings. The Full Court dismissed the appeal on 2 November 2017, agreeing with Nicholson J, finding that the 2014 proceedings were an abuse, and that Mr and Mrs McDonald wished to re-litigate the same arguments put to Nicholson J.105 98 Reasons, [100]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, [191] (Nicholson J). 99 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, [191]. (Nicholson J) 100 Reasons, [102]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, [198] (Nicholson J). 101 Reasons, [103]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, [200]. (Nicholson J) 102 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, [27] (Nicholson J). 103 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, [26]-[28] (Nicholson J). 104 Reasons, [105]. 105 Reasons, [106]; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia (2017) SASCFC 146, [28], [59] and [165]-[166] (Vanstone J, Slattery and Gilchrist AJJ). -- 31 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 28 120 An application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court made on 2 November 2017 was dismissed by the High Court on 21 March 2018. The High Court held that the proposed appeals did not enjoy “sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave”.106 121 The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 11 were instituted by Mr and Mrs McDonald without reasonable ground, and they satisfied s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act.107 122 The primary judge then referred to a number of Federal Court actions instituted over the last decade. These were relied on by the Attorney-General only so as to inform the exercise of the discretion of the Court to make an order under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act. The primary judge observed that there were orders made in the Federal Court prohibiting Mr McDonald from commencing proceedings in that court.108 123 Briefly, in November 2010, Mr McDonald commenced Federal Court proceedings alleging causes of action against the State of South Australia and five employees of the Department of Education and Child Services including breaches of implied terms of his contract of employment, breaches of a duty of care in tort, contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), breaches of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and a purported “action” under the WRC Act. 124 Justice Besanko struck out the statement of claim and dismissed the proceedings as an abuse of process. Amongst other reasons, Besanko J found that the claims for breach of implied terms were precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and Anshun estoppel, as were the claims in negligence.109 Besanko J held that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the finding made by the Full Court, and that it was unnecessary to determine whether Mr McDonald’s employment contract was with the Minister or the Crown.110 And, in any event, Besanko J found that issues regarding breach have been decided against Mr McDonald and any issue about the precise identity of the employer properly belonged to the Supreme Court action.111 125 An application for permission to appeal was refused by Lander J on 7 November 2011.112 Lander J held that Mr McDonald could not relitigate the matters he had brought in the Supreme Court. 106 Reasons, [107]; McDonald v The State of South Australia [2018] HCASL 43, [2] (Keane and Edelman JJ). 107 Reasons, [108]. 108 Reasons, [109]. 109 Reasons, [110]; McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297, [51]-[55], (Besanko J) citing Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589. 110 McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297, [64]-[65] (Besanko J); See State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, 348-349 [2] (Doyle CJ, White and Kelly JJ). 111 Reasons, [111]; McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297, [64]-[65] (Besanko J). 112 Reasons, [112]; McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 1251, [61]-[63] (Lander J). -- 32 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 29 126 During 2017, Mr McDonald attempted to commence judicial review proceedings in the Federal Court. These followed a direction given by Charlesworth J that the District Registrar reject an application to adduce fresh evidence in the proceedings determined by Besanko J. 127 On 10 October 2017, Kerr J summarily dismissed that application, finding that the direction given by Charlesworth J was not reviewable.113 It is clear that Mr McDonald simply wished to “start all over again”. 128 On 4 March 2019, Mr and Mrs McDonald filed an originating application in the Federal Court seeking judicial review of a Judicial Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept another originating process for filing. That process alleged that the 2011 decision made by Besanko J was obtained by fraud and should be set aside. On 29 November 2019, Charlesworth J dismissed the judicial review application.114 129 During 2013, three judges of the Supreme Court directed the Registrar to reject for filing various documents lodged by Mr McDonald, including a purported appeal from one of those directions, on the bases that they represented an attempt to re-litigate matters already finally determined or comprised an abuse of process.115 130 In January 2018, permission to file 14 documents in the 2013 proceedings and 2014 proceedings was refused by Slattery AJ for reasons which included that those proceedings had already been dismissed as abuses of process.116 131 Between April 2018 and August 2019 Mr McDonald sought to file a summons and statement of claim on at least 15 occasions and, each time, the Registrar was directed to reject the documents as an abuse by a Master or Auxiliary Master.117 132 On 28 November 2019, Peek J directed the Registrar to reject further documents lodged by Mr McDonald as an abuse of process by re-litigation for scandalous and vexatious content and as an obviously untenable claim. Subsequently, Livesey J (as he was) directed the Registrar to reject documents lodged by Mr McDonald including a purported notice of appeal from Peek J’s direction as comprising abuses of process.118 113 Reasons, [113]; McDonald v Federal Court of Australia [2017] FCA 1216, [64] (Kerr J). 114 Reasons, [114]-[115]; McDonald v Colbran [2019] FCA 1937, [98] (Charlesworth J). 115 Reasons, [116]-[118]. 116 Reasons, [119]; McDonald v South Australia (Supreme Court of South Australia, Slattery AJ, 11 January 2018). 117 Reasons, [120]. 118 Reasons, [121]. -- 33 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 30 133 On 27 July 2020, Mr McDonald filed a notice of appeal against the directions given by Peek and Livesey JJ (as well as a further decision made by Lovell J). On 21 August 2020, Kourakis CJ dismissed the appeal as incompetent.119 134 On 11 April 2021, Mr McDonald lodged a notice of review seeking to challenge the Deputy Registrar’s refusal to accept for filing a notice of appeal against Anderson J’s main judgment in the 2004 proceedings. The Deputy Registrar held that the document was “frivolous, vexatious and an abuse”, and Blue J held that the Deputy Registrar was correct to reject it.120 135 The Attorney-General relied upon the attempts made to lodge documents as informing the exercise of the discretion to make orders under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act. There was no challenge to this approach by the appellants. 136 Proceedings numbered 12 comprised an application filed on 12 February 2018, in the form of an interlocutory application, relying on “new, fresh, and compelling evidence” seeking leave to re-open the 2009 Full Court decision. On 28 March 2018 Vanstone J dismissed the application as “incompetent and an abuse of process”.121 137 The Attorney-General submitted that this interlocutory application comprised the institution of a separate proceeding which was vexatious within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. The primary judge agreed.122 The appellants did not challenge this finding. 138 Proceedings numbered 13 comprised an interlocutory application and supporting affidavit filed on 26 April 2018. These were filed following the delivery of judgment by the High Court on 21 March 2018 in Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq).123 Mr McDonald asserted that he had attempted to file originating documents seeking to set aside the final judgment entered in the 2004 proceedings in accordance with Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq), but that they had been rejected by the Registrar. 139 On 7 May 2018 Vanstone J struck out the application as an abuse of process because separate proceedings were necessary.124 140 The Attorney-General submitted that Proceedings numbered 13 were proceedings within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act and they were instituted without reasonable ground. and for an ulterior purpose 119 Reasons, [122]. 120 Reasons, [123]; McDonald v Registrar [2021] SASC 57, [1] and 23] (Blue J). 121 Reasons, [125]; McDonald v State of South Australia [2018] SASC 41, [7] (Vanstone J). 122 Reasons, [126]-[127]. 123 Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165, [61] (Kiefel CJ, Gaegler, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ), where the High Court held that an application to set aside a perfected judgment on the basis it was procured by actual fraud must be made by way of application and fresh proceedings. 124 Reasons, [128]-[130]; McDonald v State of South Australia (No 2) [2018] SASC 57, [7]-[8] (Vanstone J). -- 34 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 31 141 The primary judge disagreed, finding that she was not satisfied that the proceedings comprised “proceedings” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.125 Nonetheless her Honour was satisfied that they were commenced without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose, and that informed the exercise of the discretion to make orders under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act.126 The appellants did not challenge these findings. 142 Proceedings numbered 14 concerned a judicial review application filed by Mr McDonald on 26 July 2019 challenging a direction given by Judge Bochner on 5 March 2019 that the Registrar reject documents lodged by Mr McDonald and challenging the refusal by Judge Dart on 9 April 2019 to reduce or remit a filing fee for the judicial review application. 143 That application was dismissed by Lovell J, who held that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to judicially review decisions of members of the Supreme Court, including Masters.127 144 The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 14 comprised proceedings instituted without reasonable ground within the meaning of s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.128 The appellants did not challenge these findings. 145 On 11 December 2020, Mr and Mrs McDonald filed an originating application and statement of claim seeking to set aside Anderson J’s judgment in the 2004 proceedings on the basis of what they alleged was actual fraud (the 2020 proceedings). The issue of the correct defendant was relied on as grounds to set aside the judgment. The following year, on 16 July 2021, Mr and Mrs McDonald commenced separate proceedings seeking to set aside the judgment of Nicholson J on the grounds of actual fraud or conduct analogous to the actual fraud (the 2021 proceedings).129 146 Proceedings numbered 15 concerned a notice of appeal filed by Mr and Mrs McDonald against an order made by Hughes J on 26 March 2021, dispensing with the requirements of the defendants in the 2020 proceedings to file a defence pending the determination of an interlocutory application filed on 21 January 2021. The defendants to the 2020 proceedings had, by that interlocutory application, sought summary judgment, summary dismissal or strike out of the proceedings. Leave to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal, which found that Mr McDonald had not identified any basis upon which to doubt the correctness of the decision he sought to challenge.130 125 Reasons, [132]. 126 Reasons, [131]-[132]. 127 McDonald v Supreme Court of South Australia and Anor [2019] SASC 201, [16]-[19] (Lovell J). 128 Reasons, [134]-[135]. 129 Reasons, [136]-[137]. 130 Reasons, [138]; McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia & Ors [2021] SASCA 57, [14]-[18] (Kelly P, Lovell and Doyle JJA). -- 35 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 32 147 Proceedings numbered 16 concerned an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against orders made by David JA on 13 August 2021. Her Honour had heard argument on six interlocutory applications filed in the 2020 proceedings, and her orders included the dismissal of an interlocutory application filed on 22 July 2021. That application had requested that she tell Mr and Mrs McDonald whether she had decided to recuse herself.131 148 On 9 December 2021, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal on the basis that the complaints made by Mr and Mrs McDonald did not have “sufficient merit to warrant consideration by the Court of Appeal”.132 149 Proceedings numbered 17 concerned an order made on 23 December 2021 by David JA, staying the 2021 proceedings as an abuse because they raised substantially the same matters as the 2020 proceedings.133 150 Proceedings numbered 18 concerned the order made by David JA on 1 March 2022, summarily dismissing the 2020 proceedings.134 Amongst other matters, her Honour held that the submission that the 2004 proceedings miscarried because the proper defendant was the Minister of Education rather than the Crown or State of South Australia “was untenable”, that Mr and Mrs McDonald’s allegations of actual fraud were not supported, and therefore the claim seeking to set aside the judgment was vexatious and an abuse of process, and the allegations of fraud were not material to the 2009 Full Court decision.135 151 David JA gave reasons for her decision not to recuse herself and dismissed Mr and Mrs McDonald’s remaining applications filed in the 2020 proceedings.136 152 The Attorney-General submitted that Proceedings numbered 15 to 18 were each vexatious within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act because they were instituted without reasonable ground. The primary judge agreed with that submission, and with the further submission that Proceedings numbered 18 were instituted for an ulterior purpose.137 153 Strictly, the relevant proceedings were the 2017 and 2018 proceedings. The appellants did not challenge these findings. 154 Proceedings numbered 19 concerned an application for judicial review commenced by Mr McDonald on 14 October 2021, seeking a declaration that he was denied procedural fairness in the 2004 proceedings because of what he 131 Reasons, [139]. 132 Reasons, [141]; McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia & Ors (No. 2) [2021] SASCA 146, [24] (Lovell, Doyle and Bleby JJA). 133 Reasons, [142]. 134 Reasons, [143]. 135 Reasons, [143]; McDonald and Anor v State of South Australia & Others [2022] SASC 17, [45]-[54] (David JA). 136 Reasons, [143]; McDonald and Anor v State of South Australia & Others [2022] SASC 17, [60] and [62]-[67] (David JA). 137 Reasons, [144]-[145]. -- 36 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 33 claimed was the improper conduct of the Registrar relating to record-keeping as well as an order seeking a re-trial.138 155 Proceedings numbered 20 concerned an action commenced by Mr McDonald on 29 October 2021, seeking judicial review of the interlocutory steps taken by Anderson J and Judge Lunn in the 2004 proceedings. Again, Mr McDonald sought declarations and a re-trial. 156 On 4 March 2022, Bampton J stayed Proceedings numbered 19 and Proceedings numbered 20 until further order.139 157 The Attorney-General submitted that these proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act because the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to judicially review the impugned decisions and the applications ultimately sought the re-trial of the 2004 proceedings. The Attorney- General submitted that these proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose. 158 The primary judge was satisfied only that the Proceedings numbered 19 and 20 were instituted without reasonable ground and thereby satisfied s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.140 159 Proceedings numbered 21 concerned an appeal commenced by Mr and Mrs McDonald on 24 March 2022, against the interim injunction ordered by Bampton J on 4 March 2022, restricting their ability to file documents and commence new proceedings pending the determination of the vexatious litigant application.141 160 The Court of Appeal struck out as an abuse of process that part of the appeal by which Mr and Mrs McDonald sought to vary the interim injunction to permit the filing of a second notice of appeal against the 2009 Full Court decision.142 The Court of Appeal otherwise refused leave to appeal concerning the balance of the appeal, holding that, were it necessary to determine it, the appeal would have been dismissed as being “without merit”.143 The Court held that a reading of the voluminous grounds of appeal demonstrated that Mr and Mrs McDonald were not concerned with the merits of the interim injunction, rather, they were concerned to agitate the merits of their actions and contentions.144 138 Reasons, [147]. 139 Reasons, [146]. 140 Reasons, [146] and [149]. 141 Reasons, [150]. 142 Reasons, [150]; McDonald & Another v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43, [10]-[11] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). 143 Reasons, [150]; McDonald & Another v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43, [24] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). 144 Reasons, [150]; McDonald & Another v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43, [20] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). -- 37 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 34 161 The Attorney-General submitted that these proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose. The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 21 were instituted without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose and that they thereby satisfied the criteria in s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.145 The appellants did not challenge these findings. 162 Proceedings numbered 22 concerned an appeal against the orders made by Bampton J extending the interim injunction on 23 June 2022 pending the final determination of the Attorney-General’s vexatious litigant application.146 The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr and Mrs McDonald’s appeal filed on 15 July 2022 as being “without merit”.147 163 The Attorney-General submitted that these proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose. The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 22 were instituted without reasonable ground within the meaning of s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.148 The appellants did not challenge that finding. 164 Proceedings numbered 23 concerned the appeal lodged by Mr and Mrs McDonald on 18 March 2022, against the summary dismissal of the 2020 proceedings by David JA. Again, allegations of fraud were made in connection with the 2004 proceedings, and these allegations were said to relate to the wrong defendant. 165 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if leave were not required, it was “without merit”.149 166 The Attorney-General submitted that these proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground and for an ulterior purpose. The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 23 were instituted without reasonable ground and were vexatious within the meaning of s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.150 The appellants did not challenge those findings. 167 Proceedings numbered 24 concerned an application for judicial review made on 25 July 2022, concerning the refusal by the Deputy Registrar to accept an originating application from Mr McDonald seeking a review of the decision by Bampton J not to recuse herself, as well as a review of a decision made by Judge Tilmouth in 2013.151 145 Reasons, [152]. 146 Reasons, [153]. 147 Reasons, [153]; McDonald & Another v The State of South Australia & Others [2022] SASCA 81, [23] (Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA). 148 Reasons, [155]. 149 Reasons, [156]; McDonald & Another v The State of South Australia & Others [2022] SASCA 81, [20] (Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA). 150 Reasons, [158]. 151 Reasons, [159]-[160]. -- 38 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 35 168 Judge Bochner held that the Deputy Registrar was correct to reject the document because the injunction earlier made by Bampton J barred Mr McDonald from commencing any new proceedings, and because Bampton J’s decision could not be judicially reviewed.152 169 The Attorney-General submitted that these proceedings were instituted without reasonable ground. The primary judge was satisfied that Proceedings numbered 24 were instituted without reasonable ground and were therefore vexatious within s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.153 The appellants did not challenge those findings. 170 Proceedings numbered 25 concerned a notice of appeal filed by Mr and Mrs McDonald on 12 October 2022, seeking leave to appeal the decision made by Bampton J not to recuse herself on 9 June 2022.154 Mr and Mrs McDonald filed a second notice of appeal on 20 April 2023, seeking leave to appeal against the refusal by Bampton J on 28 March 2023 to entertain a second application that she recuse herself, together with her direction to the Registrar to not accept two further affidavits.155 171 On 30 November 2023 the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that both proposed grounds were not reasonably arguable.156 172 Although the decision of the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal with respect to both the application for leave to appeal dated 12 October 2022, and the second notice dated 20 April 2023,157 her Honour only had regard to the first, finding that it was instituted without reasonable ground and was therefore vexatious within s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.158 173 The primary judge had regard to the 20 April 2023 appeal, and the Court of Appeal’s remarks that the proposed grounds of appeal were not reasonably arguable, as relevant to the exercise of her discretion under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act.159 Conclusions regarding the particular proceedings 174 In the result, the primary judge was satisfied that 24 proceedings instituted by Mr McDonald, 12 of which were also instituted by Mrs McDonald, in South 152 Reasons, [159]-[160]; McDonald v Registrar of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Bochner, 16 September 2022) 1-2. 153 Reasons, [162]. 154 Reasons, [163]-[164]. There was some dispute about reliance upon documents filed following the notice of appeal dated 12 October 2022 and the primary judge did not receive those documents into evidence. 155 Reasons, [165]. 156 Reasons, [166]; McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2023] SASCA 132, [35] and [39](Livesey P and Doyle JA). 157 McDonald & Anor v Attorney General for the State of South Australia [2023] SASCA 132. 158 Reasons, [167]. 159 Reasons, [167]. -- 39 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 36 Australian courts and tribunals since 2011 were vexatious within the meaning of s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act.160 175 In the circumstances, the primary judge was also satisfied that the vexatious proceedings had been instituted “persistently” where the appellants had sought to appeal many first instance decisions and sought to “time and again relitigate the issues already conclusively determined against them”.161 176 After reminding herself of the principles relating to the determination of a vexatious litigant application,162 the primary judge was satisfied that if a vexatious litigant order were not made, Mr and Mrs McDonald would continue to institute proceedings and it was likely that they would be vexatious and, in addition, they would prosecute vexatious proceedings which had already been commenced.163 177 The primary judge explained her approach to the exercise of the discretion in the following way:164 The effect of the inordinate litigation on those named in the proceedings, solicitors and counsel tasked with defending the proceedings instituted by Mr and Mrs McDonald and court staff cannot be ignored. So too, the extraordinary waste of the Court’s scarce resources, as well as the public expense and resources expended in defending baseless litigation. I also note that, as at April 2023, Mr and Mrs McDonald have had the benefit of just over $100,000 in fee waivers. Other than those granted in relation to the 2004 proceedings, the balance of the fee waivers have been a further unjustifiable use of the Court’s scarce resources. Numerous orders for costs have been made against Mr and Mrs McDonald in the wake of unsuccessful litigation, which I suspect have not been complied with. (Citations omitted.) 178 As her Honour described it, despite binding decisions of courts dismissing or rejecting their claims the appellants had “belligerently continued to wage vexatious litigation”.165 The appellants did not challenge these particular findings, or explain how the exercise of discretion miscarried. The appellants’ notice of appeal 179 Appeal grounds 1.1 to 1.19 generally complained about the failure of the primary judge to consider the various arguments which have been propounded by the appellant since the 2004 proceedings. No attempt was made to challenge the findings her Honour made regarding the institution of vexatious proceedings within the meaning of s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act. 160 Reasons, [168]. 161 Reasons, [169]. 162 Reasons, [30]-[48], including the scope for the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court, [49] [50]. See also Reasons, [171]-[177]. 163 Reasons, [171]. 164 Reasons, [173]. 165 Reasons [174]. -- 40 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 37 180 Appeal grounds 2.1 to 2.39 were almost entirely devoted to complaints about the reliance placed by the primary judge on the various decisions made in the Federal Court and High Court, even though these were relied on only in connection with the exercise of the discretion. The appellants sought to re-agitate the various arguments which had been propounded and rejected in those Courts. 181 Appeal ground 2.24 complained about a finding made by Anderson J which did not advance the appeal concerning the vexatious litigant application, or the findings made by the primary judge. 182 Although appeal ground 2.39 complained that the primary judge erred in relying “heavily on decisions made in the Federal Court and High Court in her discretionary decision … under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935” and asserted that the primary judge’s decision is “unreasonable and plainly unjust”, no explanation for these assertions was provided in this appeal ground or the appellants’ written or oral submissions. 183 Appeal grounds 2.40 to 2.47 complained about a denial of procedural fairness because the primary judge refused to allow the appellants to re-litigate the judicial review applications, or various other claims, and asserted that the primary judge had a conflict and should have recused herself. 184 Appeal ground 2.47 asserted that the primary judge erred in connection with her 2014 decision. 185 Appeal grounds 3 to 24 made numerous complaints regarding the proceedings in the Industrial Tribunal in 2003, the 2004 proceedings, the trial before Anderson J, and the so-called “lost appeal”, without addressing with any specificity how those matters were relevant to the determination of the vexatious litigant application. 186 Appeal grounds 25 to 56 complained about the decision made by the Full Court in 2009 and the refusal to permit re-litigation of that decision without addressing the findings made by the primary judge to the effect that it was not the litigation of the 2004 proceeding which was vexatious, but the repeated attempts to re-litigate it thereafter. 187 Appeal grounds 59 to 76, under the heading “Applying s 39 of the Act” asserted error without addressing any of the particular findings made by her Honour regarding the vexatious nature of the 24 proceedings instituted and which she found came within s 39, or any other findings made by her Honour regarding the application of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. Broad appeals to the doctrine of precedent did not advance the appellants’ appeal. See, for example, appeal grounds 61 and 62:166 166 Appeal grounds 61 and 62. -- 41 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 38 Bampton J erred for she accepted the proceedings which followed the 2004 action before the Full Court did in many cases enliven the Attorney Generals Application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act but failed to accept the trial for a breach of contract in the 2004 action was heard against DECS but DECS was not the other party in a contract of employment with Mr McDonald under the Education Act 1972 or under CPA 1992 and DECS was not the employer who owed him a contractual duty of care at common law in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Bampton J erred in failing to accept a miscarriage of justice occurred at trial in the 2004 proceedings and there had been a mistrial and the interest of justice was not served in the 21004 proceedings in the Supreme Court. 188 The appeal grounds also pursued a theme to the effect that the primary judge should have “sent a signal to the Defendant”, and without ever grappling with the particular findings made by the primary judge.167 189 Apart from making broad assertions such as these, the appellants did not address the exercise of discretion with any precision, either. Indeed, no attempt was made by the appellants to challenge the terms in which the declaration or orders were made, assuming that the requirements of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act were otherwise made out, and that it was open to the primary judge to exercise her discretion. Other matters – interlocutory applications on appeal 190 There are, as mentioned and as is apparent from Annexure 2, reserved applications and reserved costs awards following a number of rulings made after this appeal was commenced. As will be seen, these should be dismissed with costs and any reserved costs awarded against the appellants. 191 The first reserved matter concerned the appellants’ application dated 15 July 2024 which was referred to the hearing of this appeal. That sought a lifting of the stay of the appellants’ judicial review applications, and for a “de novo standard review or de novo appeal” of the 2004 proceedings heard by Anderson J and resolved by the Full Court in 2009. That application represented a “proceeding” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act which has been commenced without reasonable ground. It must be dismissed with costs. 192 The second matter concerns costs reserved on the two applications made by the appellants to disqualify the present coram which were, respectively, dismissed on 13 December 2024 and 9 January 2025.168 The appellants must pay the Attorney’s costs of those applications. Only the second represented a “proceeding” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act which has been commenced without reasonable ground. 167 Appeal ground 56. 168 McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) [2024] SASCA 144; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) (No 2) [2025] SASCA 1. -- 42 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 39 193 The third matter is that the appellants applied on 16 December 2024 for various orders concerning supplementary appeal materials. Those materials were irrelevant to a proper determination of this appeal. The application was unnecessary. It should be dismissed with costs. It does not represent a “proceeding” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. Leave to appeal 194 Although the Attorney-General contended that a decision to make an order on a vexatious litigant application pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act was properly characterised as interlocutory in nature,169 the Attorney accepted that the declaration involved a final order. 195 For the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to determine the issue. In so far as leave is required, it should be refused. The determination of the appeal 196 The approach required of this Court on an appeal against a vexatious litigant declaration and orders was addressed in the following way in Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No 4):170 Consistently with recent authority in the High Court, whether what may be described as the qualifying criteria in s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act have been satisfied must be determined according to the “correctness standard”, whereas whether there was an error made in the exercise of the discretion conferred once the qualifying criteria are made out must be determined according to the principles described in House v The King. (Citations omitted.) 197 The Attorney-General’s vexatious litigant application adopted a discerning approach to the identification of relevant “proceedings”. Not everything that was filed or attempted to be filed by the appellants was targeted for the purposes of the application. In addition, the primary judge rejected one of the 25 proceedings relied on by the Attorney-General. 198 For the appellants, this appeal is really about another, perhaps final, attempt to re-litigate the many proceedings in which they have been embroiled over a period exceeding 20 years. 199 Although it has been necessary to review the record, no attempt was made by the appellants to impeach with any precision the particular findings made by the primary judge regarding the essential elements of the s 39 application, or the exercise of discretion made by the primary judge. The requisite persistence is clear 169 Relying on Commonwealth Bank v Heinrich (No 2) [2003] SASC 436, [15]-[16] (Debelle J). See also Kay v Attorney-General (Vic) (2000) 2 VR 436, [31]-[40] (Chernov JA) and Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153, [86]-[89]. (Jacobson, Siopis and Nicholas JJ). 170 Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No. 4) [2024] SASCA 113, [15] (Livesey P, Stanley and Hall AJA). -- 43 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 40 from the chronology, as is the desire of the appellants to continue their attempts at re-litigation in the future if permitted to do so. 200 It may be concluded that the first stage of the s 39 vexatious litigant application was satisfied and, as for the second stage, that it was open to the primary judge to proceed to make the declaration and orders she made under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act. The exercise of discretion was neither unreasonable nor unjust. 201 In Georganas v Barkla, it was observed that there had recently been a greater willingness to exercise power so as to address and respond to proceedings and applications which are without any legal merit or purpose, whether under the inherent power of the court or s 39 of the Supreme Court Act:171 The Court and its resources must be preserved and protected against the time, trouble and cost associated with addressing and responding to proceedings and applications which are without any legal merit or purpose. There has, in recent times, been a greater willingness to look to the Court’s inherent powers to protect against vexatious behaviours by a select minority of surprisingly energetic litigants. They are usually unrepresented.172 Some are best described as querulous.173 These powers ought only be exercised in clear cases, mindful of the fundamental right of access to the courts and tribunals of this State. There is however no recognised right to engage in vexatious litigation, to engage in unnecessary and threatening correspondence, or to otherwise embark on an abuse of the processes of the courts and tribunals of this State.174 That is not to deny the right of litigants to protection where they have become the targets of vexatious litigants. What it emphasises is that provisions such as s 39 of the Act and this Court’s inherent power incorporate an important public element, which looks beyond the interests of the particular parties in particular litigation. The “normative judgment” involved in the exercise of the Court’s inherent power must take into account the “public interest in the timely and efficient administration of civil justice”.175 Accordingly, and in appropriate cases, orders can be fashioned to restrain litigants from commencing litigation or applications which attack or concern specified issues or parties. To do otherwise risks an unnecessary waste of the scarce judicial and public resources available to manage and adjudicate meritorious disputes. 202 The need to preserve scarce judicial and public resources is particularly clear in a case such as this case. 203 The appellants’ conduct during the course of these appeal proceedings has only reinforced the need for the vexatious litigant declaration and orders to be made. 171 Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [18]-[19] (Livesey J). 172 Raising a series of complexities and pressures that require careful management, as has been recognised in many cases, see, for example, Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 and Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375. See Re F (2001) 161 FLR 189 regarding guidelines suggested by the Family Court. 173 See, for example, Thomson v Tremco Pty Limited [2019] QCA 18, [35]-[46] (Morrison JA, with whom Sofronoff P and Gotterson JA agreed). 174 Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484. 175 UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77, [70] (Gageler J). -- 44 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 41 Conclusion 204 The appeal must be dismissed with costs. -- 45 of 55 -- -- 46 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 43 Annexure 1 – Proceedings relied on by the Attorney-General No. Action No. Nature of proceeding Judgment date Judgment citation Judicial officer Outcome Also instituted by Mrs McDonald Finding to the effect of instituted without reasonable ground Finding to the effect of instituted for ulterior purpose 1 WCT-09-6932 Appeal to the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal 30.06.2011 McDonald v Department of Education and Children’s Services [2011] SAWCT 18 Parsons, Farrell, McCouaig DPJJ Appeal summarily dismissed No [14]-[15] [20]-[21] 2 SCCIV-12-1460 Supreme Court judicial review 04.12.2012 McDonald v The Workers Compensation Tribunal (SASC, Judge Withers, 4 December 2012) Judge Withers Judicial review permission refused No [30] 3 SCCIV-12-1460 Appeal to the Supreme Court 19.03.2013 McDonald v The Workers Compensation Tribunal [2013] SASC 34 Nicholson J Appeal dismissed No [28] 4 DCCIV-05-29 Appeal to the District Court 23.05.2013 McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia (SADC, Judge Tilmouth, 23 May 2013) Judge Tilmouth Appeal dismissed No p 3-4 (see also items 5 and 6 below) 5 SCCIV-13-1574 Appeal to the Supreme Court 27.08.2014 McDonald v State of SA [2014] SASC 120 Bampton J Extension of time to appeal refused No [30]-[31] 6 SCCIV-13-1574 Appeal to the Full Court 24.02.2015 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia [2015] SASCFC 15 Gray, Sulan and Nicholson JJ Permission to appeal refused No [6] -- 47 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 44 No. Action No. Nature of proceeding Judgment date Judgment citation Judicial officer Outcome Also instituted by Mrs McDonald Finding to the effect of instituted without reasonable ground Finding to the effect of instituted for ulterior purpose 7 SCCIV-13-1574; SCCIV-14-1564 Supreme Court application to restrain non-parties 01.12.2015 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v The Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 2) [2015] SASC 188 Nicholson J Application to restrain legal representatives dismissed Yes [21] 8 SCCIV-13-1574; SCCIV-14-1564 Appeal to the Full Court 13.04.2016 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors [2016] SASCFC 39 Sulan, Lovell and Doyle JJ Permission to appeal refused Yes [12] 9 SCCIV-13-1574 Supreme Court claim (transferred from District Court) 03.06.2016 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 3) [2016] SASC 79 Nicholson J Summary dismissal of claims by Mr and Mrs McDonald No176 [168], [186], [189]-[191], [194]-[19], [200] 10 SCCIV-14-1564 Supreme Court claim 03.06.2016 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 3) [2016] SASC 79 Nicholson J Summary dismissal of claims by Mr and Mrs McDonald Yes [168], [186], [189]-[191], [194]-[19], [200] [26]-[28] 176 Mrs McDonald was an Interested Party in this proceeding. -- 48 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 45 No. Action No. Nature of proceeding Judgment date Judgment citation Judicial officer Outcome Also instituted by Mrs McDonald Finding to the effect of instituted without reasonable ground Finding to the effect of instituted for ulterior purpose 11 SCCIV-13-1574; SCCIV-14-1564 Appeal to the Full Court 02.11.2017 McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v The Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors [2017] SASCFC 146 Vanstone J, Slattery and Gilchrist AJJ Appeal dismissed Yes [59], [165]-[166] 12 SCCIV-04-418 Supreme Court application to re-open previous appeal 28.03.2018 McDonald v State of South Australia [2018] SASC 41 Vanstone J Application dismissed No [7] 13 SCCIV-04-418 Supreme Court application to set aside final judgment 07.05.2018 McDonald v State of South Australia (No 2) [2018] SASC 57 Vanstone J Application struck out No [7] [8] 14 SCCIV-19-953 Supreme Court judicial review 26.11.2019 McDonald v Supreme Court of South Australia & Anor [2019] SASC 201 Lovell J Judicial review dismissed No [16]-[19] 15 CIV-21-002853 Appeal to the Court of Appeal 10.06.2021 McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia & Ors [2021] SASCA 57 Kelly P, Lovell and Doyle JJA Leave to appeal refused Yes [14]-[18] -- 49 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 46 No. Action No. Nature of proceeding Judgment date Judgment citation Judicial officer Outcome Also instituted by Mrs McDonald Finding to the effect of instituted without reasonable ground Finding to the effect of instituted for ulterior purpose 16 CIV-21-010167 Appeal to the Court of Appeal 09.12.2021 McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia & Ors (No 2) [2021] SASCA 146 Lovell, Doyle and Bleby JJA Leave to appeal refused Yes [14], [24] 17 CIV-21-007810 Supreme Court claim 23.12.2021 Reasons of Justice David in Supreme Court actions CIV-20-006239 and CIV-21-007810 David JA Stay of proceedings in CIV-21-007810 (stay continued by Bampton J on 4 March 2022) Yes p 6-7 18 CIV-20-006239 Supreme Court claim 01.03.2022 McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia & Ors [2022] SASC 17 David JA Summary dismissal Yes [45]-[47], [54], [59] [47] 19 CIV-21-011585 Supreme Court judicial review 04.03.2022 Bampton J Proceedings stayed No 20 CIV-21-012132 Supreme Court judicial review 04.03.2022 Bampton J Proceedings stayed No 21 CIV-22-003237 Appeal to the Court of Appeal 05.05.2022 McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43 Livesey P and Bleby JA Specified paragraphs on the Notice of Appeal struck out; leave to appeal otherwise refused Yes [10]-[11]-, [24] [20] -- 50 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 47 No. Action No. Nature of proceeding Judgment date Judgment citation Judicial officer Outcome Also instituted by Mrs McDonald Finding to the effect of instituted without reasonable ground Finding to the effect of instituted for ulterior purpose 22 CIV-22-007750 Appeal to the Court of Appeal 12.08.2022 McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia & Ors; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 81 Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA Leave to appeal refused insofar as it is required, and the appeal is otherwise dismissed Yes [20] 23 CIV-22-002819 Appeal to the Court of Appeal 12.08.2022 McDonald & Anor v The State of South Australia & Ors; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 81 Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA Leave to appeal refused insofar as it is required, and the appeal is otherwise dismissed Yes [23] 24 CIV-22-008071 Supreme Court judicial review 16.09.2022 McDonald v Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Australia Ex tempore reasons for decision of Judge Bochner Judge Bochner Application dismissed No p 2 25 CIV-23-004570; CIV-22-011442 Appeal to the Court of Appeal 30.11.2023 McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2023] SASCA 132 Livesey P and Doyle JA Leave to appeal refused Yes177 [35]-[37] [25] 177 Mrs McDonald was only an Interested Party in CIV-23-004570. -- 51 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 48 Annexure 2 – Interlocutory Applications on Appeal No. Date Filed Nature of Interlocutory Application Outcome Date Outcome Costs “Proceedings” within s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 1 25.06.2024 The appellants sought a stay of proceedings between 15 July 2024 and 15 October 2024. 12.07.2024 The matter was listed for appeal hearing on 6 February 2025. N/A Yes 2 15.07.2024 The appellants sought orders: 1. To amend the notice of appeal; 2. To file and serve electronic and physical core appeal books; 3. To lift the permanent stay in CIV-21-012132; 4. For a de novo standard review or appeal of SCCIV-04-416. 19.07.2024 The Court remarked that the appellants could file amended grounds of appeal with the written outline on 6 December 2025. The Court remarked that the filing of appeal books had been dealt with previously. The Court remarked that the applications for a lift of the permanent stay and the de novo standard review or appeal are referred to the appeal hearing. N/A Yes (orders 3 and 4) 3 22.07.2024 The appellants sought to amend the notice of appeal. 13.11.2024 The respondent advised on 13 November 2024 that it had no objection to the appellants’ application to amend the notice of appeal. N/A No 4 23.07.2024 The appellants sought a de novo standard review of the decision of Anderson J in McDonald v State of SA [2008] SASC 134 and a stay until the de novo standard review is complete. 14.10.2024 The Court dismissed the application for a stay. Ex tempore ruling delivered by Bleby JA on 11 October 2024. The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs on the standard basis. Yes -- 52 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 49 No. Date Filed Nature of Interlocutory Application Outcome Date Outcome Costs “Proceedings” within s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 5 24.07.2024 The appellants sought orders regarding the composition of the appeal coram and an order staying appeal proceeding “until a de novo standard review”. 14.10.2024 The Court dismissed the application. The Court ordered that the appellants have liberty to apply for disqualification once they are notified of the coram’s composition. Ex tempore ruling delivered by Bleby JA on 11 October 2024. The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs on the standard basis. Yes 6 9.10.2024 The appellants sought orders regarding the inclusion of certain documents in the appeal books. 14.10.2024 The Court remarked that the appellants will have an opportunity to review the Appeal Books and that, once they have that opportunity, the Court will make directions concerning acceptance for filing. Ex tempore ruling delivered by Bleby JA on 11 October 2024. N/A No 7 9.10.2024 The appellants sought discovery of transcripts and judgment. 14.10.2024 The Court dismissed the application. Ex tempore ruling delivered by Bleby JA on 11 October 2024. The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs on the standard basis. No 8 9.10.2024 The appellants sought permission to reply to the oral submissions of “QC Evans” in action SCCIV-04-418. 14.10.2024 The Court dismissed the application. Ex tempore ruling delivered by Bleby JA on 11 October 2024. The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs on the standard basis. No -- 53 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 50 No. Date Filed Nature of Interlocutory Application Outcome Date Outcome Costs “Proceedings” within s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 9 10.10.2024 The appellants sought reasons explaining why the appellant’s “breach of contract claim was heard against [the Director of Education] … at trial and then against the Minister for Education on Appeal”. 14.10.2024 The Court dismissed the application. Ex tempore ruling delivered by Bleby JA on 11 October 2024. The appellants are to pay the respondent’s costs on the standard basis. Yes 10 4.12.2024 The appellants sought an order regarding including certain documents in the core appeal book. 5.12.2024 The matter was referred to the appeal hearing. N/A No 11 4.12.2024 The appellants sought an order regarding including certain documents in the core appeal book. 5.12.2024 The matter was referred to the appeal hearing. N/A No 12 9.12.2024 The appellants filed an application seeking the disqualification of the coram for the appeal hearing. 13.12.2024 The Court dismissed the application to disqualify the coram. McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) (No 2) [2024] SASCA 144. Question of costs of the application reserved to the Court of Appeal No 13 16.12.2024 The appellants sought an order regarding including certain documents in the core appeal book. 17.12.2024 The matter was referred to the appeal hearing. N/A No -- 54 of 55 -- [2025] SASCA 43 The Court 51 No. Date Filed Nature of Interlocutory Application Outcome Date Outcome Costs “Proceedings” within s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) 14 16.12.2024 The appellants sought an order regarding including certain documents in the core appeal or supplementary appeal book. 17.12.2024 The matter was referred to the appeal hearing. N/A No 15 18.12.2024 The appellants sought an order regarding including certain documents in the core appeal book. 20.12.2024 The matter was referred to the appeal hearing. N/A No 16 19.12.2024 The appellants sought an order that the core appeal book collated by the appellant is placed on the Court file in this matter. 20.12.2024 The matter was referred to the appeal hearing. N/A No 17 24.12.2024 The appellants filed a second application seeking the disqualification of the coram for the appeal hearing. 9.01.2025 The Court dismissed the second application to disqualify the coram. McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General (SA) (No 2) [2025] SASCA 1. The Court observed that the second application repeated the earlier application to disqualify the coram. Question of costs of the application reserved to the Court of Appeal Yes -- 55 of 55 --