THE KING v RAINA JANE CRUISE [2025] SASCA 59

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR JUDGE DEUTER) DCCRM-22-937; DCCRM-24-018630 Appellant/Respondent: RAINA JANE CRUISE Counsel: MR A GRAHAM - Solicitor: VADASZ LAWYERS Respondent/Appellant: THE KING Counsel: MR W SCOBIE WITH MR G DUDZINSKI - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 18/03/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-24-023726; SCCRM-24-049778 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. CRUISE v THE KING; R v CRUISE [2025] SASCA 59 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable President Livesey and the Honourable Justice S Doyle) 2 June 2025 CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - VERDICT - GENERALLY CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEALS BY CROWN - EXERCISE OF DISCRETION CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE This is an appeal against conviction by the appellant heard concurrently with an appeal against sentence by the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘Director’). Shortly after midnight on 17 October 2021, Constables Spiniello and Beck were on duty and were tasked to attend a disturbance at the Exeter Hotel on Rundle Street. At that time, COVID-19 regulations mandated the wearing of face masks in public places. When the constables arrived, two security guards, informed them that a woman and her two male companions were asked to leave the Exeter because they were pulling down the face masks worn by other patrons. The security guards informed the constables that in the course of removing them they were assaulted by a woman and that, upon leaving the hotel, the group had walked westward along Rundle Street. After a short while they saw three persons walking towards them on Rundle Street who matched the descriptions they had been given. Those persons were later identified to be Ms Cruise and her male companions, Mr Priest and Mr Cross. As the group approached, Constable Spiniello asked them to stop, saying that he needed to talk to them about what had happened at the Exeter. Constable Spiniello described their responses as verbally aggressive. Constable Beck gave a similar account of the events up to that point and testified that Ms Cruise and her companions appeared to be intoxicated and that they were immediately -- 1 of 44 -- aggressive. Multiple exchanges ensued, recorded by bodycam footage of Constable Beck and Spiniello, which ended in a physical altercation between the appellant and Constable Beck. The appellant was charged with the offence of intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker and charged with two counts of aggravated assault of the security officers contrary to s 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The circumstance of aggravation on each count was that as a security officer in a licensed premises the victims were in a position of particular vulnerability because of the nature of their employment. The Judge sentenced the appellant for those offences together with the offence of intentionally causing harm to Constable Beck. Finally, the Judge sentenced the appellant for earlier, unrelated offences on which she had been convicted by a Magistrate but released on a bond which she breached by committing the assaults. The Judge imposed a single sentence of imprisonment for three years and eight months on all three offences pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘Sentencing Act’). The Judge then suspended the sentence upon the appellant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of three years. The relevant question is not whether it was proved that the offence of failing to produce identification had been committed prior to the purported arrest. Rather, the question is whether or not Constable Beck was acting in the course of her duty when she requested the identification of the appellant and attempted to give Ms Cruise notice of the arrest. The answer to that question depends on whether Constable Beck reasonably suspected that that, or another, offence had been committed. The appellant appeals against her conviction on the following grounds: 1. The verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory in that it was not open to the learned Trial Judge to find that Constable Beck was acting in the course of her lawful duty when: i. Constable Beck threatened to arrest the appellant for failing to produce her identification (an offence which could not possibly have been committed) immediately prior to the purported arrest; and ii. Constable Beck failed to inform the appellant of both the fact of, and reason for the purported arrest. 2. The Director appeals against the sentence on the grounds that: a. the sentence was manifestly inadequate; b. the Judge erred in imposing a sentence, pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act, which was less than the notional sentence that her Honour indicated would have been imposed in respect of the offence against Constable Beck alone; and c. the Judge erred in determining not to impose any penalty on the offences the subject of the good behaviour bond, which was extant at the time of the assaults. Held, by Kourakis CJ (Livesey P and S Doyle JA agreeing): 1. Permission to appeal against conviction is granted, but the appeal is dismissed. 2. Permission to appeal against sentence is granted, the appeal is allowed and the sentence set aside. i. There was no valid basis on which a sentence for all three assaults could be imposed which was less than the sentence the Judge would have imposed if sentencing for the offence of intentionally harming Constable Beck alone. ii. It is necessary to allow the appeal in order to maintain a proper level of sentencing for the offence of intentionally causing harm to prescribed emergency workers. Though the term of imprisonment imposed for intentionally causing harming was longer than the Court would have imposed, the appeal against sentence is allowed because the -- 2 of 44 -- suspension of the sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending that it requires correction in the public interest. 3. In place of the sentences of the District Court, the following sentences are imposed: i. Three years and three months for the offence of intentionally causing harm to Constable Beck. ii. Nine months and two weeks in respect of each of the assaults against the security officers (each reduced by five percent by reason of the appellants guilty pleas from a sentence of ten months). Those terms of imprisonment be served concurrently as between themselves but commence three months before the expiry of the sentence of three years and three months for intentionally harming Constable Beck. iii. The resulting head sentence is three years, nine months and two weeks. A non-parole period of two years is fixed. iv. On the offences of disorderly behaviour and resist police, upon which the appellant had been released on a bond, a fine of $500 is imposed. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20AA(1), 20(3), 5AA(1)(k); Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 157(1)(a)(iii), 158(1)(a); Police Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 75; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 5, 23(1)(a), 26, 96, 97, 97(1)(c), 114; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74A, 74A(1), 74A(5), 75, referred to. Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573; The Queen v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; The State of South Australia v Crossley [2020] SASCFC 128, applied. Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvantidis (2008) 202 A Crim R 300; R v Cruise [2024] SADC 40; The Queen v Greengrass (2009) 104 SASR 262; The Queen v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392, discussed. Birch v Fitzgerald (1975) 11 SASR 114; Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 60 FLR 124; Edmonds (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] SASCA 11; Harrison v The Queen [2022] SASCA 35; Hull v Nuske (1974) 8 SASR 587; Johnson v Northern Territory [2016] NTSC 49; Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; R v Khem [2005] SASC 178; R v Tipping (2019) 133 SASR 58; R v Yandle [2024] SASCA 111; Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 441; Tipping v The King (2023) 142 SASR 379, considered. -- 3 of 44 -- -- 4 of 44 -- CRUISE v THE KING; R v CRUISE [2025] SASCA 59 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Kourakis CJ, Livesey P and Doyle JA 1 KOURAKIS CJ: This is an appeal by Ms Cruise against her conviction by a Judge of the District Court, sitting without a jury, for intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker, Constable Beck, acting in her capacity as a police officer, contrary to s 20AA(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’). The maximum penalty for that offence is 15 years imprisonment. Ms Cruise’s appeal was heard concurrently with an appeal brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘Director’) against the sentence imposed on Ms Cruise. 2 Ms Cruise appeals against her conviction on the following grounds: 1 The verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory in that it was not open to the learned Trial Judge to find that Constable Beck was acting in the course of her lawful duty when: i. Beck threatened to arrest the appellant for failing to produce her identification (an offence which could not possibly have been committed) immediately prior to the purported arrest, and; ii. Beck failed to inform the appellant of both the fact of, and reason for the purported arrest. 3 I would grant Ms Cruise’s permission to appeal against her conviction but would dismiss the appeal against conviction. 4 The relevant question is not whether it was proved that the offence of failing to produce identification had been committed prior to the purported arrest. Rather, the question is whether or not Constable Beck was acting in the course of her duty when she requested the identification of Ms Cruise and attempted to give Ms Cruise notice of the arrest. The answer to that question depends on whether Constable Beck reasonably suspected that that, or another, offence had been committed. Constable Beck gave evidence, correctly accepted by the Judge, that she suspected Ms Cruise of having assaulted the security guards and of having committed the offence of failing to provide her personal details, and that she arrested her for those offences. Accordingly, it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that Constable Beck was empowered to arrest Ms Cruise when she did and was acting in the course of her official duties as a police officer. 5 Constable Beck accepted that she did not inform Ms Cruise of the fact of, and reasons for, the arrest. However, Constable Beck testified that she had intended to do so but that, before she could, Ms Cruise violently attacked her in such a way as to prevent her from doing so. Again, on an independent review of the evidence, the Judge was correct to accept Constable Beck’s evidence. It follows that the arrest of Ms Cruise was not invalidated by the circumstance that she was not informed of the reasons for her arrest. -- 5 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 2 6 The offence of intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker was committed shortly after Ms Cruise had been evicted by two security guards from the Exeter Hotel (the ‘Exeter’) for pulling down the COVID-19 mandated face masks of other hotel patrons. Ms Cruise assaulted the two security officers whilst they were evicting her by punching and grabbing them. Ms Cruise was charged with two counts of aggravated assault of the security officers contrary to s 20(3) of the CLCA. The circumstance of aggravation on each count was that as a security officer in a licensed premises the victim was in a position of particular vulnerability because of the nature of his employment. The maximum penalty for that offence is three years. The Judge sentenced Ms Cruise for those offences together with the offence of intentionally causing harm to Constable Beck. Finally, the Judge sentenced Ms Cruise for earlier, unrelated offences on which she had been convicted by a Magistrate, but released on a bond which she breached by committing the assaults. 7 The Judge indicated that, if she had sentenced for each offence separately, she would have imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment in respect of the offence of intentionally harming Constable Beck and 11 months, one week and six days imprisonment for each of the assaults on the security guards. 8 Contrary to that intimation, the Judge imposed a single sentence of imprisonment for three years and eight months on all three offences (‘the sentence’) pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘Sentencing Act’). The Judge then suspended the sentence upon Ms Cruise entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of three years. 9 The Director appeals against the sentence on the grounds that: • the sentence was manifestly inadequate; • the Judge erred in imposing a sentence, pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act, which was less than the notional sentence that her Honour indicated would have been imposed in respect of the offence against Constable Beck alone; • the Judge erred in determining not to impose any penalty on the offences the subject of the good behaviour bond, which was extant at the time of the assaults. 10 I would give permission to the Director to appeal against sentence because there was no valid basis on which a sentence for all three assaults could be imposed which was less than the sentence the Judge would have imposed if sentencing for the offence of intentionally harming Constable Beck alone. It would seriously undermine confidence in the administration of the criminal law if such a fundamental error were not corrected. In addition, I would grant the Director permission because it is necessary to do so in order to maintain a proper level of sentencing for the offence of intentionally causing harm to prescribed emergency -- 6 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 3 workers. The suspension of the term of imprisonment resulted in an egregiously inadequate sentence. Even though the term of imprisonment imposed for intentionally harming Constable Beck was a little longer than I would have imposed, I would allow the appeal against sentence because the suspension of the sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending that it requires correction in the public interest. 11 I would allow the Director’s appeal. I would set aside the sentence and impose instead a sentence of three years and three months for the offence of intentionally causing harm to Constable Beck. I would impose a sentence of nine months and two weeks in respect of each of the assaults against the security officers (each reduced by five percent by reason of her guilty pleas from a sentence of ten months). I would order those terms of imprisonment be served concurrently as between themselves but commence three months before the expiry of the sentence of three years and three months. The resulting head sentence is three years, nine months and two weeks. I would fix a non-parole period of two years. 12 On the offences of disorderly behaviour and resist police, upon which Ms Cruise had been released on a bond, I would impose a fine of $500. 13 I elaborate on my reasons below. The evidence 14 Shortly after midnight on 17 October 2021, Constables Spiniello and Beck were on duty, stationed at the Hindley Street Police Station, when they were tasked to attend a disturbance at the Exeter on Rundle Street. 15 At that time, COVID-19 regulations mandated the wearing of face masks in public places. When the constables arrived, two security guards, Mr Tarawneh and Mr Wearn, informed them that a woman and her two male companions were asked to leave the Exeter because they were pulling down the face masks worn by other patrons. The security guards informed the constables that in the course of removing them they were assaulted by the woman and that, upon leaving the hotel, the group had walked westward along Rundle Street. Constables Spiniello and Beck left the Exeter and walked in the same westward direction along Rundle Street. After a short while they saw three persons walking towards them on Rundle Street who matched the descriptions they had been given. Those persons were later identified to be Ms Cruise and her male companions, Mr Priest and Mr Cross. 16 As the group approached, Constable Spiniello asked them to stop, saying that he needed to talk to them about what had happened at the Exeter. Constable Spiniello described their responses as verbally aggressive. Constable Beck gave a similar account of the events up to that point and testified that Ms Cruise and her companions appeared to be intoxicated and that they were immediately aggressive. Constable Beck gave evidence that she strategically positioned herself alongside Constable Spiniello so that they were well placed to protect themselves from the -- 7 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 4 group’s aggressive behaviour and to engage with them, for the purpose of obtaining their personal details. 17 Constable Spiniello’s bodycam footage was received into evidence. It showed Constable Spiniello asking Mr Cross for his personal details whilst Constable Beck is standing nearby. Both Constable Spiniello and Constable Beck are wearing masks. 18 The exchange between Constable Spiniello and the group proceeded in this way:1 6. SPINIELLO Hey guys, I’m just gonna have a chat what’s happened at the Exeter 7. CROSS Yeah 8. SPINIELLO Yeah 9. CRUISE Yeah what’s happened? 10. CROSS Don’t touch me, yeah 11. SPINIELLO Yeah 12. CROSS Don’t touch me 13. SPINIELLO Well you’re trying to walk past me 14. CROSS I’m not, I’m not 15. PRIEST One point five, one point five, please stand back 16. ALL Inaudible 19 The bodycam footage from Constable Beck’s camera shows that during that exchange Constable Spiniello raised his hand and placed it between himself and Mr Cross whilst Mr Cross continued to approach him. At about that time, Mr Cross said ‘don’t touch me’ as his jacket brushed against Constable Spiniello’s raised hand. 20 The inaudible conversation noted at line 16 of the transcript from Constable Spiniello’s bodycam included an exchange which was recorded on Constable Beck’s bodycam, between her and Ms Cruise. 21 At about the same time, Ms Cruise moved in closer to Constable Spiniello but was stopped by Constable Beck who, while asking the group to ‘step back’, placed her hands on either side of Ms Cruise’s arms and turned her around, prompting Ms Cruise to exclaim ‘excuse me, don’t touch me’. Constable Beck 1 A transcript of the exchange was provided as an agreed aide memoire (MFIP2) to facilitate a viewing of the video footage. The account in these reasons is taken from that transcript. All alphanumeric numbers which appear in the transcript in these reasons are from my perusal of the video evidence, being Exhibits P1 and P4. -- 8 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 5 then pushed Mr Cross away from Constable Spiniello by placing her hand on his chest before moving to a position alongside Constable Spiniello to his left. Constable Beck accepted that at that point she was standing in the way of Mr Cross and touched Ms Cruise. 22 The transcript of the exchange which followed, taken from Constable Spiniello’s bodycam, records: 17. PRIEST I’ll break your fucking nose, you step back 18. SPINIELLO Step back 19. PRIEST Step the fuck back 20. CRUISE You’re being rude to us 21. SPINIELLO Do not, do not I just want to have a chat with you about it 22. CRUISE She’s being really rude 23. PRIEST You guys have some fucken serious issues 23A. CRUISE Excuse me darling… don’t be so rude to us 24. ALL (Inaudible) 25. SPINIELLO One five can we have another patrol here please 26. PRIEST Don’t fucken touch me, don’t fucken touch me 26A BECK You’re staying 27. CRUISE We will sit and listen to these dictators for a little while 28. SPINIELLO Alright well you are causing dramas at the Exeter alright 29. CRUISE No, we didn’t 30. BECK Yes you are 31. SPINIELLO You did, you are pulling everyone’s masks down and causing, you’ve had a punch up with security 32. CRUISE No they have not 33. PRIEST Have a look at the camera footage please mate, have a look at the camera footage please 23 I interrupt the transcript at this point to make five observations. -- 9 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 6 24 First, when Constable Beck was cross-examined, she accepted that Mr Priest’s exclamation at line 26 was in response to her standing in this way and pushing him back:2 Q Now, do you agree with me that just before the point we paused the footage, Priest tries to walk around you on the footpath. A He does. Q You step to the side, step in front of him and push him back. A Yes. Q So you had to step to the side to put your body between him and where he wanted to go. A He was to trying to walk through us. He was aggressive. Q He wasn’t trying to walk through, was he, he was trying to walk around you. A He was aggressive. He would have walked in - he was trying to get away from us, didn’t want to talk to us. Q I agree with you that he was trying to walk away, but he wasn’t trying to walk through you as in walk over the top of you, was he. A He would have knocked into us, but yes, I understand what you’re saying. Q Didn’t you have to you step to the side to block his path. A Slightly. Q You extended your arms and pushed him back. A Yes. 25 When Constable Beck was asked in cross-examination by what authority she had stood in the way of and touched Mr Priest she answered: A We were investigating an offence. I required him to provide his details. I suspected him of committing an offence and I require his personal particulars. 26 Secondly, it is plain that Ms Cruise and her companions became agitated when questioned by the constables and challenged their authority to engage them in conversation. 27 Thirdly, even though the constables stood in the path of Ms Cruise and her companions as they walked east and down Rundle Street, it does not necessarily follow that they were assaulted or that the constables detained them. Constables Spiniello and Beck may have had a lawful excuse for engaging in that conduct to 2 Transcript of Proceedings, R v Raine Jane Cruise (District Court of South Australia, DCCRM-22-937, Deuter J, 17 October 2023) 64 (‘T’). -- 10 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 7 the extent that it was reasonably necessary to ensure that the group understood that the constables were discharging their duties, and exercising powers, as police officers investigating suspected offending. 28 I address this issue in greater detail below in the context of the power conferred on police officers pursuant to s 74A of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) (the ‘SO Act’). 29 Fourthly, during that exercise Constables Spiniello and Beck appear to be addressing Ms Cruise and her companions. Ms Cruise and Mr Priest purported to deny the allegations on behalf of all of them. 30 Returning to the interaction on Rundle Street, Constable Spiniello next attempted to exercise the power conferred by s 74A of the SO Act by speaking directly to Mr Priest: 34. SPINIELLO Sir, I want your personal particulars do you have any ID on you please? 35. PRIEST No 36. CRUISE Who are you? 37. SPINIELLO What’s your, what’s your name? 38. PRIEST I don’t have to give that to you legally 39. SPINIELLO You’ve committed an offence of fighting in public… 39A. CRUISE What is the offence 39B. SPINIELLO …I now require you to give your personal particulars 40. CRUISE Wow…you guys are so amusing ALL (Inaudible) 41. SPINIELLO If you do not you are committing an offence 41A. BECK Grab your ID out guys. 41B. CRUISE You’re so funny 42. PRIEST I understand what you are saying but I don’t have to 42A. CRUISE I don’t have my ID darling 43. SPINIELLO I’m going to give you the opportunity to give me your name please 44. PRIEST I understand what you think you are saying but that’s not the law, so I don’t have to give you anything I’ve done nothing wrong -- 11 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 8 45. SPINIELLO Well I’m telling you I’m a police officer I’m telling you that under the law… (inaudible) 46. CRUISE Aww aww aww fucking fucking obey 47. SPINIELLO Yeah that’s right 48. CRUISE Oh well …(inaudible) 49. PRIEST So you tell me what you are going to do 50. SPINIELLO You have committed an offence 51. ALL (Inaudible) 52. SPINIELLO Of fighting in public 53. BECK If you don’t get your IDs out 54. SPINIELLO I believe, I believe that you have committed an offence 55. BECK You are gonna be arrested for failing to give us your ID 56. SPINIELLO I now require you to tell me your personal particulars 56A BECK So grab your ID out 57. CRUISE Are you like Nazi Germany don’t touch me 31 Again, I pause to make the following observations. First, it is of no significance that Constable Spiniello used the word ‘particulars’ instead of the word ‘details’ as it appears in s 74A of the SO Act. The term ‘personal details’ is defined by s 74A(5) of the SO Act to mean, among other things, the persons full name, date of birth and address. That is how both the word ‘particulars’ and the word ‘details’ would ordinarily be understood. 32 Secondly, I acknowledge that, at that point, it appears that Constable Spiniello is addressing Mr Priest. However, Ms Cruise was actively intervening in the conversation. Moreover, at line 51, the group as a whole interrupted Constable Spiniello. From Constable Beck’s perspective it might well have appeared that the personal details had been requested from all three members of the group. Indeed, Constable Beck’s statements at lines 41A, 53 and 55 manifest exactly that understanding because she uses the term ‘ID’in the plural. Constable Beck’s evidence-in-chief was also to that effect:3 A Well, we’ve said ‘Hey guys, we need to talk’, or Spiniello say ‘Hey, guys, we need to talk about what’s gone on at the Exeter’ and they are like argumentative. They’ve actually stepped around - they kind of, in the first 15 seconds they kind of ignored me and they’ve actually sort of stepped around Spiniello right up in his person. We’ve tried to ask them some questions and at that point Mr Priest is actually trying to walk like I would say through us, away from us. I tell him that he has to stop. We 3 T 43-46. -- 12 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 9 need to - ‘I need some ID. We need to talk about what’s happened at the Exeter. There’s been reports of dramas at the Exeter’. …. A So we’re – Spiniello has asked them for their name and details, asked the group for particulars. They’re refusing. They’re rambling. Ms Cruise especially is sort of rambling about Nazi Germany and making ‘Obey, obey’, making all these like gestures. They’re walking towards us and every time we try and speak especially me I felt, I was cut off immediately with them shouting in my face… 33 Constable Beck disagreed with the proposition put to her in cross-examination that Constable Spiniello was only speaking to Mr Priest. She agreed that video footage taken from Mr Priest’s phone did not show Constable Spiniello addressing the others.4 However, she maintained that Constable Spiniello did ask all three persons for their personal details.5 34 Thirdly, at line 54 Constable Spiniello informs all three members of the group that he believed that they had committed the offence of fighting in public. 35 Constable Beck’s account of the movement and conduct of Ms Cruise and her companions at this time was as follows:6 A At that point of the incident Mr Priest has got his phone out and he’s actually - and I’ve now got my colleague with his back to me and he’s dealing with the quite extreme behaviour of Mr Priest and I’ve got Mr Cross and Ms Raina Cruise in my face. I step backwards, they step forward. I’ve moved to the side. They follow me and they’re shouting at me. I’m trying to say things like ‘We are trying to investigate an offence’ or ‘There’s been fighting in public, like please get your ID out’. I’m like ‘Please get your ID out’. I’m like ‘Please get your ID out’. You know, they’re not following any sort of instructions. They’re not really responding to anything I’m saying. They’re just sort of spewing a verbal tirade over me. … A Yes. I’m sorry, he [Mr Cross] has his ID in his hand and he’s offering it and then pulling it back like and I’m reaching for it and (INDICATES) at that point I reach for it. I sort of nearly touch it and then Ms Cruise starts screaming at me that I’m stealing. Q At this point in the interaction, how were you feeling. A I’m very, very concerned. I’m aware on my radio that the Security 100 are like, have put a call out on the radio that we needed assistance. I’m concerned the behaviour of these people. I’m expecting that I’m about to be assaulted and I’m hoping that back-up is on its way. 4 T 72, line 17. 5 T 73. 6 T 44-45. -- 13 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 10 36 Constable Spiniello then warned that it was an offence not to provide their personal particulars: 58. SPINIELLO If you don’t, you are committing an offence of failing to supply your personal particulars … 75. PRIEST And we have done nothing wrong and now you are trying to tell me I have done something wrong 76. SPINIELLO You have 77. PRIEST When I haven’t 78. SPINIELLO You have 79. PRIEST I haven’t 80. SPINIELLO I believe you have 81. PRIEST No mate I’m not going to give you any ID to incriminate myself or help you incriminate me 82. SPINIELLO You are required by law to supply. 83. PRIEST You are not going to incriminate me 84. SPINIELLO Your personal particulars 85. PRIEST I am not going to incriminate myself 86. SPINIELLO If you do not you are committing an offence 87. PRIEST I understand …(inaudible) 88. SPINIELLO You will be arrested do you understand that? 89. PRIEST What I do 90. CROSS Oi, oi 91. PRIEST Don’t fucking touch me 92. PRIEST What exactly 93. CROSS Do not 94. CROSS AND PRIEST (Inaudible) 95. SPINIELLO Get the fuck back 96. CRUISE Let him fucking go mate 97. SPINIELLO Get off, off her -- 14 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 11 98. UNKNOWN MALE You filming … 37 Constable Spiniello’s command to ‘Get off, off her’ was directed to Ms Cruise who at this time was in a struggle with Constable Beck. The footage from Constable Beck’s bodycam more clearly shows and records her exchanges with Ms Cruise leading up to that point. A transcript of that exchange was provided as an aide memoire (MFIP8). I set out those parts of the transcript which takes up from about line 33 of the transcript from Constable Spiniello’s bodycam:7 71. SPINIELLO You, You did, you were pulling everyone’s mask down and you’ve had a punch up 72. CROSS Have a look at the camera footage. 73. BECK We have looked at the camera footage 74. SPINIELLO Sir I want your personal particulars do you have any ID on you please 75. PRIEST No 76. CRUISE Who are you 77. SPINIELLO What’s your name? 78. PRIEST I don’t have to give that to you legally 79. SPINIELLO You committed an offence 80. PRIEST I wasn’t fighting in public 80A CRUISE What is the offence 81. ALL (Inaudible) 82. SPINIELLO I now require you to give your personal particulars 83. CRUISE Wow how how 84. SPINIELLO Now if you do not (inaudible) 85. CRUISE You guys are so amusing 86. PRIEST I understand what you are saying 87. CRUISE You’re so funny 88. PRIEST I don’t have to give my ID 7 MFI P8. -- 15 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 12 89. CRUISE I don’t have my ID darling 90. BECK Yeah you do 38 I make these points about the exchange so far. First, at line 76, Ms Cruise interjected herself into the request made of Mr Priest. Secondly, from the responses at lines 83, 85, 87 and 89, it appears that Ms Cruise understood that request made at line 82 applied to her. Thirdly, Constable Spiniello’s statements at line 71 again objectively communicated to Ms Cruise and her companions that they were suspected of committing an offence or offences at the Exeter. 39 The exchange between Constable Beck and Ms Cruise continued as follows: 100. BECK If you don’t get your IDs out, you are going to be arrested for failing to produce your IDs 101. ALL (Inaudible) 102. BECK So grab your IDs out … 107. CROSS Wait, if I produce my ID, 108. BECK Further investigation may happen and if you’ve been and we decide … 117. BECK Can you grab your ID out please 118. CRUISE Seriously why do I have… 119. BECK Because you’ve been suspected of committing offences 120. CRUISE What offence 121. BECK Someone said a woman, this person (*while pointing at Cross) 122. CROSS So what if I suspect someone else of committing an offence 122A CROSS Don’t steal my ID 123. CRUISE Don’t touch us, get your fucking hands off of us 124. CRUISE AND CROSS (Inaudible) 125. CRUISE Get your filthy hands away from us 126. BECK Grab your ID out 127. CRUISE Get your filthy hands away from us 127A. CROSS My ID is out -- 16 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 13 128. BECK Grab your ID out 129. CRUISE You are disgusting 129A CROSS Mine’s out 130. BECK You have been fighting in public 131. CRUISE Get your filthy hands 132. BECK Alright 40 Constable Beck’s statements at lines 108, 119 and 130 show that she told Ms Cruise that she was suspected of committing the offence of fighting in public. Ms Cruise’s abuse at lines 123, 125, 127, 129 and 131 reveal her escalating hostility to Constable Beck. 41 Constable Beck testified that immediately after telling Ms Cruise that she has been ‘fighting in public’ (line 130), and saying ‘alright’ (line 132), she placed her hand on Ms Cruise. 42 Constable Beck gave the following account of Ms Cruise’s reaction:8 A Well, it all happens - this is a very fast altercation. Ms Cruise is in my face. She sort of gestures her hand towards me and at that point I say ‘All right’ and I take my hand on her shoulder effecting an arrest which - do you want me to continue? Q Yes, continue. A I put my hand on her shoulder and she hits me across my face, cutting my face with her rings, knocking my hat off. I then tried to push against the wall attempting to try to control her. From that point she grabs a handful from the top of my head like this (INDICATES) and she drops her weight. 43 It will be observed that Constable Beck readily volunteered that she attempted to push Ms Cruise up against a store front after putting a hand on her shoulder but explains that she did so in an attempt to control Ms Cruise who was first ‘in her face’ and then subsequently hit her across the face. 44 In cross-examination, Constable Beck described her conduct in effecting Ms Cruise’s arrest as follows:9 A I touched her on the shoulder, she raised an arm at me, I then took hold of part of her arm and attempted to push us to the front storefront, it all happened in very quick succession, it was all right, and then it was trying - she raised her hand, so I was trying to take control of her hands or her arms as she raised them towards me. 8 T 45-46. 9 T 88. -- 17 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 14 45 Constable Beck testified that she intended to inform Ms Cruise that she was being arrested for failing to provide her details, for disorderly behaviour, assault, and fighting in public in respect of the Exeter incident:10 Q At the start you mentioned that you were trying to effect an arrest when you put your hands on her, what were the crimes you were arresting her for. A At that point disorderly behaviour. I was investigating behavioural crimes so in my mind behavioural crimes being was it an assault, was it a fight in public? Q Does that relate to the - A To the incident up there and then of course for the assault on myself. Q What about in relation to your questions for ID. A That’s true. I also arrest her for failing to state, as I had warned - I did say a few times ‘If you don’t produce your ID, you will be arrested’. That as well was in my mind when I arrested her. … 46 In the course of her cross-examination, Constable Beck gave the following reasons for deciding to arrest Ms Cruise:11 A I decided to arrest her because she was disorderly. She was in my face. She was getting closer and closer to me and I imminently thought I was going to be assaulted by her. She was getting closer and closer. I was aware that she had not provided her details to verify her, but there was a lot of things going on in these seconds. Q Isn’t it the case that you arrested her for failing to produce her identification. A I arrested her for assault, disorderly behaviour, fail to state personal details, fighting in public, assault emergency service worker, behavioural offences. Q When you first made contact with her shoulder, it wasn’t your intention to arrest her for assaulting a prescribed emergency worker, was it. A No, it was for assaulting security staff. Q You didn’t warn her that she was going to be arrested for assaulting security staff, did you. A I warned her about fighting in public. I was trying to talk to her. Every time I opened my mouth, someone yelled over me so I do warn her about a variety of things. Q Wasn’t it the case that the only thing you warned her about was the fact that she’d be arrested if she failed to produce her identification. 10 T 48. 11 T 60.25 - 61.14. -- 18 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 15 A That’s the first full sentence, but I said ‘We’re here investigating offences including a fight at the -’. I said ‘We’re here investigating offences. You’ve been fighting in public’. … 47 It can be accepted that immediately before the arrest Constable Beck was asking Ms Cruise to produce evidence of identification. It does not follow that she had it in mind to arrest her for that offence alone. That offence is only committed where a person fails to produce evidence, upon request by a police officer, that their personal details are correct and the requesting police officer reasonably suspects that the details provided are false. Constable Beck could not have had that belief because no personal details had been provided by Ms Cruise. Constable Beck may have asked about evidence of identification because she mistakenly believed she had the legal power to do so or because, exasperated by the repeated failure to provide them, she thought that the production of the identification might achieve the same result. As we shall see, Constable Beck was within the scope of her duty in arresting Ms Cruise for the offences she identified. 48 Constable Beck was challenged in cross-examination as to why she did not tell Ms Cruise that she was under arrest before making physical contact:12 Q Constable Beck, when you said ‘All right’ and then made physical contact with Ms Cruise, why didn’t you say these words ‘You’re under arrest’. A I said ‘All right’ and made physical contact with the accused and as I did that, she swung up and punched me in the face and then grabbed my hair and dropped me to the ground and beat me. So unfortunately her reaction to my touching her was so sudden and immediate and violent that I didn’t have the opportunity. Q Why didn’t you say ‘You’re under arrest’ before you made physical contact with her. A Because I had - I started the sentence with ‘All right’ and I got two syllables out and it was fighting. Q Isn’t it the case that you said ‘All right’ because you were frustrated with Ms Cruise. A No. Q You said that in a tone of frustration. A I think I said that in the tone of intimidation. Q You didn’t put your hand on her shoulder, what you did is you grabbed hold of her arm, isn’t that correct. A I put my hand on her shoulder. Q You didn’t grab hold of her forearm. 12 T 58. -- 19 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 16 A I did grab her forearm. After she hit me in the face, I grabbed hold of her forearm and tried to take it to the wall. Q I put it to you that you grabbed her forearm and attempted to walk her to the wall and that was your initial contact with Ms Cruise. A I appreciate that that’s what I wrote in my first statement, but I have since clarified. Q So you’ve obviously read your statements before you came to court today. A I did. Q Re-watched your body-worn footage. A I have. Q And watched the PSSB footage. A I have. 49 I interpolate here that there is no requirement that the words which ordinarily must accompany the physical act of arrest be uttered before the physical detention of a suspect. The precise order of the communication of the fact of an arrest, and its grounds, will be dictated by operational contingencies. As we shall see, save for exceptional circumstances, the words of arrest must be uttered at a time when there is a sufficient temporal connection for arrested persons to understand the grounds for their detention. The purpose of the rule is to guard against the arbitrary exercise of the power of arrest and against the appearance that it has been so exercised. The purpose served by the requirement is to allow the arrested person, and the public generally, to make informed judgments on the propriety of the exercise of the power. The law does not demand any stricter sequence than that. The Judge’s findings 50 The Judge found that Ms Cruise was asked for her personal details:13 In the circumstances, I find that the accused must have reasonably understood the general nature of the offence as it related to a failure to provide particulars. She knew that her conduct was being investigated, and a request was made for her to provide her ‘personal particulars’. It is reasonable to infer that when she was told that, she was being asked to provide her ID, and that a request was being made for her name. 51 The Judge’s factual finding is not attended by any error. It is consistent with the observations made on the evidence in [32] above. 52 The following findings of the Judge made on her viewing of the CCTV footage describes the events immediately before and after the arrest:14 12:27:25.5AM • The accused moves towards Beck 13 [2024] SADC 40, 19 [100]. 14 [2024] SADC 40, 26 [124]. -- 20 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 17 12:27:26.02AM • Beck moves towards the accused (view is slightly obscured) 12:27:26.14AM • Both the accused and Beck move together slightly backwards towards the shopfront 12:27:26.82AM • The accused swings her arm at Beck’s head, knocking her police cap off her head 12:27:27AM • Beck has a hold of accused’s arm as they move closer to the shop front 12:27:28AM • Camera pans and Spiniello, who was speaking with Mr Cross and Mr Priest, moves over to assist Beck 12:27:29AM • Spiniello pushes Mr Cross away from Beck and the accused 12:27:30AM • Spiniello grabs and pushes Mr Cross again as Mr Priest approaches the group 12:27:30.42AM • Camera pans over as the altercation between Beck and the accused commences • They are moving left across the screen, the accused’s open hand is pushing against Beck’s face pushing her away from her 12:27:3.14AM • The accused grabs a fistful of Beck’s hair, near the top of her head, with her right hand 12:27:32AM • The accused yanks Beck to the ground by her hair, they fall to the ground together 53 The Judge found that Constables Beck and Spiniello acted reasonably and proportionately in addressing the conduct of Ms Cruise and her companions:15 All the evidence supports a finding that the accused, who had already been involved in assaulting security guards at the Exeter Hotel, was aggressive and then violent towards Beck as soon as she was approached by police. I am satisfied upon all the evidence that Beck acted lawfully in her interactions with the accused as she attempted to interact with her … Upon confronting the accused, Mr Priest and Mr Cross, the accused immediately became aggressive and confrontational. I am satisfied on the evidence of Beck, Spiniello and as shown on the CCTV footage that the accused immediately moved forward in a confrontational manner. She began shouting and abusing the police officers. In making this finding, I pause to note that I found both Spiniello and Beck to be witnesses who were credible and reliable. They impressed as young police officers who were doing their best to control an explosive situation involving persons who were not responding to their requests for their personal particulars. Beck in particular gave evidence in a calm manner without trying to embellish her version of events. She also made appropriate concessions. When Spiniello left to deal with Mr Priest and Mr Cross, Beck was faced with the aggression and violence of the accused. I accept her evidence that she was concerned for 15 [2024] SADC 40 at [128]-[135]. -- 21 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 18 her safety. Again, the CCTV footage supports Beck’s evidence regarding the threats of the accused. I reject the defence’s submission that Beck’s actions were not reasonably proportionate to the threat posed by the accused. This is simply not borne out by the CCTV footage or the body-worn footage. I find that the evidence establishes that the accused, by her actions and verbal threats, made it impossible for Beck to fully inform of the reason for her arrest. The delay in Beck obtaining the accused’s details was justified as a result of the accused’s violent and aggressive response to being approached by police. The accused would have been well aware of what had happened at the Exeter Hotel and why police would want to speak to her. Her aggressive and challenging response then quickly became violent as she grabbed Beck’s hair and pulled her to the ground. These actions were consistent with the earlier threats to ‘smash’ Beck. I am satisfied that Beck attempted to inform the accused why she was being arrested (for failing to provide her personal particulars/ID), but that her aggressive response meant that Beck immediately encountered a situation where she had to physically manage the accused’s attack upon her… Upon a review of all the evidence, including the extensive video and CCTV footage, I am satisfied that the actions of Beck were not unlawful. As a result, I find that the actions of the accused in response to Beck’s approach was unlawful. (Footnotes omitted) 54 Again, the findings are not attended by any material error. They are consistent with the observations I have made on the evidence. Views may differ as to whether or not Ms Cruise, Mr Priest and Mr Cross were immediately aggressive and confrontational. However, the evidence shows that they acted in that way so very soon after Constables Beck and Spiniello attempted to engage with them. The precise timing is of no legal significance. The Enlivening and Limits of Police Powers 55 It remains to consider the law which is to be applied to the Judge’s properly made findings of fact. 56 Section 74A of the SO Act provides: 74A—Power to require statement of name and other personal details (1) Where a police officer has reasonable cause to suspect— (a) that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, an offence; or … the officer may require that person to state all or any of the person’s personal details. (2) Where a police officer has reasonable cause to suspect that a personal detail as stated in response to a requirement under subsection (1) is false, the officer may require the -- 22 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 19 person making the statement to produce evidence of the correctness of the personal detail as stated. (3) A person who— (a) refuses or fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement under subsection (1) or (2); or (b) in response to a requirement under subsection (1) or (2)— (i) states a personal detail that is false; or (ii) produces false evidence of a personal detail, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: $1 250 or imprisonment for 3 months. … (5) In this section— personal details, in relation to a person, means— (a) the person’s full name; and (b) the person’s date of birth; and (c) the address of where the person is living; and (d) the address of where the person usually lives; and (e) the person’s business address; and … 57 Section 74A(1) is expressed in terms of empowering police officers to require persons to furnish their personal details if they entertain either of the enlivening suspicions. Of course, any person can ask another for his or her personal details. The legal significance of s 74A(1) of the SO Act is that on the making of a request which is authorised by that section, a person who refuses or fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the requirement commits an offence. The statutory power conferred is, therefore, a legal capacity to bring about a circumstance which constitutes an element of the offence constituted by s 74A(3) of the SO Act. 58 However, the terms of sub-s (1) have a broader practical legal effect which extends beyond defining the factum on which the offence provision operates. Obtaining the personal details of a person suspected of committing an offence serves the important public purpose of facilitating the investigation of suspected offences and, potentially, the apprehension of those suspected of committing the offences. By vesting the request of a police officer with the authority explained in -- 23 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 20 the last paragraph, it implicitly gives a police officer a lawful excuse to engage in conduct which is reasonably appropriate and proportionate to effecting the request. The kind of conduct I have in mind is, for example, touching a person on the shoulder if they are walking away from the officer in order to bring the person’s attention to the making of the request. Equally, an officer may have a lawful excuse for stepping in a person’s way, if reasonably necessary to do so, to maintain the person’s attention long enough to make the request. 59 If conduct of that kind by a police officer were not protected, police officers would lack the capacity to fully effectuate the request. A defence, or reasonable excuse, for failing to provide personal details could easily be established by ignoring and walking away from a police officer before the question could be fully asked. The public interest in the investigation of offences would thereby be undermined. Conduct by the police officers of the kind I have described therefore falls within the class of social and public interactions which are accepted as necessary parts of living in a civil and ordered society. They are akin to the jostling which occurs in a crowded public place, the touching of a person to bring their attention to a matter of mutual concern or interest, or to avert a risk to personal or public safety. 60 However, in the absence of the conferral of any express power by s 74A of the SO Act, a police officer is not authorised to detain persons, or to engage in conduct which harms them, for the purpose of obtaining their personal details. Conduct of that kind is not part of the socially acceptable interaction between the public and investigating police officers. 61 Applying that principle, the conduct of Constable Spiniello in standing in the way of Mr Cross and raising his hand, creating a reasonable buffer zone between himself and Mr Cross during the initial exchange, appears to be reasonably proportionate to the exercise of the power conferred by s 74A of the SO Act. Constable Beck’s later conduct in moving slightly to stand in Mr Priest’s way and to push him back approaches the limits of what can be done to lawfully effectuate the request. Accepting, as the Judge did, Constable Beck’s testimony as to her belief and motivation for acting in that way, a finding can be properly made that she did not assault Mr Priest. More importantly, her conduct in respect of Mr Priest does not leave any doubt over whether she was acting in the course of her duty when arresting Ms Cruise. 62 Accepting, as the Judge did, Constable Beck’s evidence explaining why she placed her hands around Ms Cruise’s arms and pushed Mr Cross backwards soon after they first met on Rundle Street, a finding can properly be made that her actions were a proportionate defensive action in the circumstances as she reasonably perceived them to be. 63 Those acts did not render the requests for the personal details of Ms Cruise and her companions unlawful. On the contrary, Constables Spiniello and Beck were acting in the course of their respective duties in doing so. Certainly, the -- 24 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 21 conduct was not such as to take Constable Beck out of the course of her duty when she later arrested Ms Cruise. 64 The evidence shows, and the Judge found, that Ms Cruise and her companions chose to stay and engage in a heated exchange with Constable Spiniello and Constable Beck. They did not, for example, turn on their heels and walk westward back along Rundle Street or walk across the road. If they had done so, the constables would have had to do their best to keep up with them whilst making the request, and, if they were not given the personal details they requested, to then decide whether or not to arrest them for that offence. Having stayed and engaged the Constables in a challenge to their authority, the conduct of Constables Spiniello and Beck was either proportionate as defensive action or conduct which was necessary to effectuate their requests for personal details. It was, therefore, lawful. 65 Section 75 of the SO Act provides: 75—Power of arrest A police officer, without any warrant other than this Act, at any hour of the day or night, may apprehend any person whom the officer finds committing, or has reasonable cause to suspect of having committed, or being about to commit, an offence. 66 The enlivening conditions of the power to arrest is ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ the commission of an offence. A police officer exercises the power to arrest whenever the police officer reasonably suspects an offence was committed by the person detained. The arrest is therefore not invalidated because the police officer purports to arrest a person for other offences in respect of which his or her suspicions were not reasonably based. That, it seems to me, follows from the undoubted proposition that there is only one physical act of detention, and that detention is lawful if the power to arrest has been enlivened. No authority to the contrary was cited. It could not be otherwise. It would have a chilling effect on police officers attempting to maintain public order if it were so. For sound legal policy reasons therefore, such a rule should not be accepted. 67 It is also bad in legal theory. As a general rule, and absent a contrary statutory stipulation, the exercise of a power is valid if it is supported on any ground even if the officer exercising the power did not have that ground in mind. I acknowledge that the arrest may not be lawful if the grounds given for the arrest do not include the offence of which the person is reasonably suspected. I acknowledge too that in an exceptional case, an improper purpose may invalidate an arrest or at least take the officer outside of the performance of his or her duty. 68 However, that is not this case. Constable Beck had a reasonable suspicion that Ms Cruise committed all of the offences which she had in mind, and of which she would have informed Ms Cruise if given the chance. The arrest of Ms Cruise was, therefore, lawful. In addition, because Constable Beck did not announce that -- 25 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 22 a ground for Ms Cruise’s arrest was the failure to provide her personal details or identification, any deficiency as to that ground of arrest must be immaterial. 69 Next it will be observed that the section does not prescribe any conditions precedent or subsequent on the power of arrest other than that the police officer has reasonable cause to suspect a person of having committed or being about to commit an offence. In particular, there is no express stipulation that the police officer must state the fact of arrest or the reasons for the arrest and, in particular, the offences the officer suspects. 70 In Hull v Nuske,16 Walters J doubted, but ultimately did not decide, that the rule in Christie v Leachinsky17 (the ‘arrest announcement rule’) applied to s 75 of the SO Act because of the absence of any express condition of that kind in the statutory conferral of power. In that respect, it should be emphasised that Christie concerned the exercise of the common law power to arrest without warrant, a case in which it was accepted that the pre-conditions to the exercise of another, otherwise applicable, statutory power, were not satisfied. 71 However, in The Queen v Stafford,18 Bray CJ held that for an arrest made pursuant to the power conferred by s 75 of the then Police Offences Act 1953 (SA) to be lawful, it was necessary that the police officer inform the person apprehended of the fact and the grounds of the arrest. Bray CJ explained his conclusion in this way:19 I think that the principles laid down in Christie v Leachinsky apply in South Australia. I see no reason why they should not. In other words, s 75 enlarges the common law power of arrest without warrant, but does not detract from the conditions laid down by the common law for the exercise of that power. 72 It is now well accepted in South Australia that the arrest announcement rule is a precondition to a valid exercise of the power conferred by s 75 of the SO Act.20 However, and with respect, I find the conception of s 75 of the SO Act as a statutory enlargement of a common law power problematic. On its face, s 75 of the SO Act is complete without any reference to the common law power. Indeed, it is, in my opinion, a clear and unequivocal statutory conferral of a power which necessarily abrogates the common law power to arrest without warrant. My preferred explanation for the applicability of the arrest announcement rule is that the principle of legality requires the implication of a term to that effect as a safeguard against the unwarranted deprivation of liberty. 16 (1974) 8 SASR 587. 17 [1947] AC 573 (‘Christie’). 18 (1976) 13 SASR 392. 19 Ibid 400. 20 The State of South Australia v Crossley [2020] SASCFC 128,[19]-[20] (Peek J). -- 26 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 23 73 The justification for that implication was persuasively explained by Deane J in Donaldson v Broomby:21 Arrest is the deprivation of freedom. The ultimate instrument of arrest is force. The customary companions of arrest are ignominy and fear. A police power of arbitrary arrest is a negation of any true right to personal liberty. A police practice of arbitrary arrest is a hallmark of tyranny. It is plainly of critical importance to the existence and protection of personal liberty under the law that the circumstances in which a police officer may, without judicial warrant, arrest or detain an individual should be strictly confined, plainly stated and readily ascertainable … 74 A construction of the power conferred by s 75 of the SO Act, which subjects it to the arrest announcement rule, is further supported by the imputed knowledge of Parliament of the common law rule. 75 In The State of South Australia v Crossley,22 I explained the rationale for the rule in these terms: On ground 2, I wish to draw attention to an important aspect of the obligation to announce the charge on which a person is arrested. Advising a person that he or she is under arrest, and the reason for it, allows the arrested person to make an informed decision about his or her response to the foreshadowed loss of liberty. It also allows the arresting officer to assess that response for the purpose of determining the degree of force which is reasonably required to effect the arrest. In this case, on any view of the evidence, Mr Crossley was not told he was under arrest until after the capsicum spray was first used. 76 However, the underlying purpose for the requirement should not be conflated with the content of the implied term. Nor should the implied term be expanded indefinitely to more completely meet the mischief which might be identified. No greater limit can be implied into s 75 of the SO Act than the incorporation of the arrest announcement rule. That rule is that the person arrested must ordinarily be informed of the true ground, or grounds, for arrest. 77 There are two long established exceptions to that rule. The first is where the arrested person must know the general nature of alleged offence for which he or she is detained by reason of the surrounding circumstances known to him or her. The second is where the arrested person has produced the situation which makes it practically impossible for the police officer to explain the fact of, and the grounds for, the arrest. 78 The arrest announcement rule and its exceptions must be applied against the many exigencies which may arise when an arrest is attempted. Quick decisions are often required to deal with emergencies and to avoid dangerous escalations.23 79 Both exceptions to the rule are applicable to the circumstances of Ms Cruise’s arrest. The first because Ms Cruise was told she was suspected of fighting in 21 (1982) 60 FLR 124, 126. 22 [2020] SASCFC 128, 2 [2] (‘Crossley’). 23 Johnson v Northern Territory [2016] NTSC 49, 140 [274] (Blokland J). -- 27 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 24 public before, and at a time proximate to, her arrest. However, it is the second rule which was the primary focus of the submissions on the appeal. 80 Constable Beck maintained that she intended to inform Ms Cruise of the grounds for her arrest immediately after using the word ‘alright’. It is inherently plausible that Constable Beck should commence the process of arrest by using that word given the protracted efforts which had been made to obtain the personal details of Ms Cruise and her companions. In that context, the word ‘alright’ suggests that more will be said. Moreover, it is clear from the footage and indeed accepted by Ms Cruise’s counsel on the appeal, that the time which elapsed between Constable Beck commencing the process and when she was struck in the face was in the order of a second or less. Constable Beck’s conduct at the time is consistent with the detention of Ms Cruise, unlike her earlier attempt to put some distance between Mr Priest and herself and Constable Spiniello. 81 It must be accepted that in effecting the arrest Constable Beck took hold of Ms Cruise and was attempting to confine her in a position close to the shopfront. That degree of force may be more than Constable Beck at first acknowledged in her testimony. However, the Judge did not entertain any doubt about Constable Beck’s credibility or reliability. The Judge has not been shown to have erred in that respect. 82 As to the force which can lawfully be applied, an arresting officer is entitled to use such force as in the circumstances he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest. A police officer is not entitled to use force which a reasonable person in his or her position would consider to be disproportionate to that end.24 Again, on the Judge’s findings, which were properly supported by the evidence, Constable Beck used no more force than that which was reasonably necessary. 83 I have no doubt that the force used by Constable Beck in effecting the arrest was reasonable and proportionate having regard to the hostility with which Constable Beck and Constable Spiniello were confronted. It was also reasonable, not only because of how Ms Cruise and her companions had behaved to that point but also because of the information given to Constable Beck about Ms Cruise’s attacks on the security guards. 84 Even if it were accepted that Constable Beck had no reason to believe that Ms Cruise had been asked to supply her personal details, the arrest can be supported on other grounds. It cannot be doubted that Constable Beck had reasonable grounds to suspect that Ms Cruise had committed an offence or offences against public order; be it fighting in public, disorderly behaviour, or assault. Constable Beck had reliable information to that effect from the security guards. She had also been informed that the offenders had walked west along Rundle Street and the group who then approached her and Constable Spiniello 24 Slaveski v State of Victoria [2010] VSC 441 per Kyrou J; Crossley (n 23). -- 28 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 25 from the west fitted the descriptions of the persons who had been at the Exeter. Constable Beck clearly had those offences in mind in the exchanges with Ms Cruise and her companions. 85 The arrest was therefore valid. There was no contention that Ms Cruise had any basis for a defence of self-defence if the arrest was valid. Ms Cruise’s appeal against her conviction must therefore be dismissed. The sentence appeal 86 At the time of her sentencing for the offence of intentionally causing harm to Constable Beck, Ms Cruise was also sentenced on two counts of aggravated assault in respect of the assaults on the security guards at the Exeter Hotel. Ms Cruise was sentenced to a single sentence pursuant to s 26 of the Sentencing Act of three years and eight months’ imprisonment which was suspended on her entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of three years. 87 The Director appeals on the following grounds: 1. The sentence imposed for the offences of aggravated assault and intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker is manifestly inadequate. 2. The Judge erred in her application of s 26 and the principle of totality for the offences of aggravated assault and intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker. In particular: i. the Judge’s “notional” sentence for the offence of intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker, for which the respondent was not entitled to any sentencing discount, was four years imprisonment. That notional sentence had to be considered alongside the notional terms of imprisonment of one year for each of the other offences of aggravated assault for which the respondent was entitled to a discount of up to five per cent. ii. notwithstanding those notional starting points, the Judge then imposed a single sentence (taken to reflect the proportionate sentence for all of the offences) of three years and eight months, some four months less than the single notional sentence for the offence involving a prescribed emergency worker, and wholly subsuming both notional sentences for the aggravated assaults. 3. The Judge erred in determining that it was appropriate to impose no penalty beyond estreating the amount of the bond, pursuant to s 23(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), for the offending subject of the bond to be of good behaviour that the respondent breached in committing the instant offences. In particular: i. the Judge did not consider, or determine, whether the offending was so trifling that it was inappropriate to impose a penalty, as required by s 23(1). -- 29 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 26 Ground 2 88 It is convenient to start with ground 2. 89 The Judge arrived at the sentence imposed by first indicating notional sentences she would have imposed on each individual count. In respect of the offences of aggravated assault on the security guards, the notional sentences indicated by the Judge were one year’s imprisonment on each count, reduced by five per cent to 11 months, one week, and six days by reason of Ms Cruise’s plea of guilty. The Judge’s notional sentence on the offence of assaulting Constable Beck in the course of her duty as an emergency worker was four years’ imprisonment. The Judge observed that the total of those notional sentences was five years, 10 months, and 26 days. From that observation, it appears that the Judge intended that the notional sentences imposed for the aggravated assaults on the security guards should be served cumulatively. 90 Having indicated the notional sentences that her Honour would have imposed on the individual offences, the Judge then continued: The total of these sentences is five years, 10 months and 26 days, however as your offending occurred on one day and as part of one event arising from your behaviour at the Exeter Hotel, I utilise s.26 of the Sentencing Act to sentence you to one term of imprisonment of three years and eight months. The Judge then set a non-parole period of two years. 91 It can be accepted that the sentences imposed for multiple offences which occur within a short period of time and as part of one event may justify an order that each of the sentences be served concurrently. However, there is no principle which allows for a sentence less than the highest sentence that would have been imposed for any one of the offences; in this case, a term of four years imprisonment. Indeed, any such principle would be irrational. Nor is there any statutory warrant for such a reduction in s 26 of the Sentencing Act. 92 It follows that the sentence imposed by the Judge was affected by error. The error was either an error of law concerning the proper scope and extent of the power conferred by s 26 of the Sentencing Act, or an error of law as to ordinary sentencing principles concerning concurrency. Alternatively, it may be that the Judge, at some point, had considered imposing a sentence of four years and not three years and eight months on Ms Cruise’s conviction for intentionally harming Constable Beck. If that is so, then there is an incoherence between the identification of a notional sentence of four years and the sentence imposed of three years and eight months, which, as I earlier observed, could not be less than the highest sentence imposed on any of the other convictions. 93 Any one of those errors is sufficient to vitiate the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Moreover, it would undermine confidence in the administration of the criminal law if such a fundamental error were not corrected. As a result, permission to appeal should be granted and the sentence must be set aside. This is -- 30 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 27 not a case in which the exercise of the discretion to suspend the term of imprisonment pursuant to s 96 of the Sentencing Act can be immunised from the error as to the head sentence. The considerations affecting the fixing of the head sentence are closely interrelated to any decision to suspend that sentence of imprisonment. In resentencing Ms Cruise, this Court must consider for itself the proper exercise of that discretion. 94 Moreover, the Judge’s explanation for fixing a head sentence, which reflected, at the very least, total concurrency, is affected by error. The offences were plainly not part of the same incident. The conduct at the Exeter Hotel preceded, and had no relevant connection to, the offence committed against Constable Beck. The offending at the Exeter is the reason for the Constables speaking to Ms Cruise and her companions. However, some time had elapsed between the commission of the offences at the Exeter and the commission of the offence against Constable Beck. The offences were distinct criminal escapades. No more than some partial concurrence, on the grounds that the root causes of Ms Cruise’s hostility were the same, and to reflect the combined penal and deterrent effect of the sentence, was warranted. 95 As the bodycam records of the incident show, there was a significant lead up to the assault on Constable Beck which was marked by open hostility and aggression to the police officers. Having acted disruptively by challenging the authority of the COVID-19 regulations, Ms Cruise again aggressively and violently challenged the lawful authority of police officers sworn to embrace the law. The decision to persistently challenge the authority of the police in a very different context to the eviction from the Exeter did not call for the leniency of concurrent sentences. On the contrary, a strongly deterrent sentence was called for. Ground 3 – disposition of the bond 96 On 12 August 2020, a Magistrate sentenced Ms Cruise for offences of disorderly behaviour and resisting police committed in a hotel. The Magistrate imposed convictions on both counts. He released Ms Cruise on a bond to be of good behaviour for a period two years in the amount of $500, with a condition of the bond that Ms Cruise return to be sentenced in the event that she breaches them. 97 The offences of which Ms Cruise was convicted, and for which she was sentenced by the Judge, breached that bond. The Judge estreated the amount of the bond, which was in the sum of $500. The Judge determined not to impose any further penalty. The reasons given by the Judge for taking that course were: I find that your actions that breached the bond were not trivial, nor are there proper grounds to excuse your breach. However, given the time passed since the bond was ordered I will not impose any further sentence beyond the $500 penalty for the breach. That sum must be paid by you. -- 31 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 28 98 The ‘$500 penalty’ to which the Judge referred was the estreatment amount of the bond, and not the imposition of a sentence. 99 The order of the Magistrate convicting Ms Cruise and discharging her without imposing any other penalty on condition that she enter into a bond was made pursuant to s 97 of the Sentencing Act. Section 97 provides: 97—Discharge of other defendants on entering into good behaviour bond (1) If a court finds a person guilty of an offence, the court may, if it thinks that good reason exists for doing so, discharge the defendant with or without recording a conviction, and without imposing any other penalty, on condition that the defendant enter into a bond— (a) to be of good behaviour; and (b) to comply with the other conditions (if any) included in the bond; and (c) if the terms of the bond so require, to appear before the court for sentence, or conviction and sentence, if the defendant fails during the term of the bond to comply with a condition of the bond. (2) However, if the defendant is not to be so required to appear before the court, the court cannot impose any conditions under subsection (1)(b). (3) If a defendant is discharged on a bond under this section— (a) no fresh prosecution may be commenced in respect of the offence; and (b) the defendant will only be liable to sentence, or conviction and sentence, if the defendant fails to comply with a condition of the bond and the terms of the bond require the defendant to appear before the court for sentencing in that event. 100 Section 5 of the Sentencing Act provides that sentence means: (a) the imposition of a penalty; or (b) the decision of a court to offer a defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond; or (c) the fixing, extending or negating of a non-parole period; or (d) the making of any other order or direction affecting penalty, including the decision of a court to discharge a defendant— (i) without imposing a penalty; or (ii) without recording a conviction; 101 In the context of that definition, the imposition of a penalty must refer to the imposition of a fine, a term of imprisonment, home detention or an intensive correction order. A court cannot offer a defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond unless it has determined not to impose any other penalty. -- 32 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 29 102 It will be observed, however, that the imposition of a bond pursuant to s 97 is the imposition of a sentence within the meaning of the definition in s 5 of the Sentencing Act. This is because the imposition of a bond is a decision which offers a defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond. That observation exposes a paradox. If the bond on which a defendant is released includes the condition ‘to appear before the court for sentence, or conviction and sentence’, the very offering of the opportunity to enter into the bond is, in itself, a sentence. Moreover, if the court offering a defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond has not recorded a conviction, pursuant s 97(1)(c), the term of the bond must require the person to appear before the court for conviction and sentence in the event of breach.25 If the Magistrate has recorded a conviction, the term of the bond must require the defendant to appear for sentence. To avoid the paradox, the word ‘sentence’ in the condition of a bond to appear for sentence must mean a penalty of a kind which the Magistrate was precluded from imposing by reason of the exercise to offer the defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond. Accordingly, the definition of ‘sentence’, as it appears in s 5 of the Sentencing Act, is modified within s 97 of the Sentencing Act to the extent required to ameliorate the identified paradox. 103 On the sentencing of an offender, a Judge or Magistrate has a discretion to find that the offence was trifling and, for that reason, it is inappropriate to impose a penalty. In such a case, the Court may decline to record a conviction and dismiss the charge in accordance with s 23(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act or record a conviction and discharge the defendant without penalty pursuant to s 23(1)(b). The former power was not available to the Judge in this case because the Magistrate had imposed a conviction and discharged Ms Cruise on a bond to return for sentence in the event of breach. The latter power to convict but discharge without penalty may have been available to the Judge in this case if the power conferred by that subparagraph can be split between the judicial officer, who imposes the bond, and the judicial officer who is later called upon to sentence in the event of breach. I doubt that that is so because in ordering that Ms Cruise enter into a bond the Magistrate must have determined not to discharge Ms Cruise pursuant to s 23 of the Sentencing Act. The Magistrate determined instead to offer Ms Cruise an opportunity to enter into a bond to appear for sentence in the event of breach. The discretion not to exercise the power conferred by s 23 of the Sentencing Act has been judicially exercised. The Magistrate must have placed Ms Cruise on a bond, instead of discharging without penalty, because in the exercise of his Honours discretion he considered that if the bond was breached a penalty should be imposed. Be that as it may, the Judge found that the offence was not trivial. Presumably, the Judge also considered that it was not trifling. Accordingly, the powers conferred by s 23(1) of the Sentencing Act were not available to the Judge. Nonetheless, the Judge’s formal orders on application to enforce the bond were: Count 6 25 Sentencing Act, s 97(3)(b). -- 33 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 30 No further penalty 3. No further penalty be imposed in relation to the application for enforcement of the breach. Estreatment 4. The defendant to pay estreatment in the sum of $500.00. Her Honour does not impose any further sentence beyond the $500 penalty for the breach of the good behaviour bond. Counts 7-8 Discharged without penalty 5. Pursuant to s 23(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act the Defendant be discharged without further penalty. 104 Pursuant to s 23(2), a court may, if the defendant has spent time in custody on that offence, or if the Court is satisfied that there is good reason not to impose any further penalty, dismiss the charge without recording a conviction or discharge the defendant without further penalty on recording a conviction. The former order was not available to the Judge because the Magistrate had recorded a conviction. The latter order might have been available, but the Judge did not record satisfaction with any of the preconditions to the exercise of the power conferred by s 23(2) of the Sentencing Act. There was no material before the Judge which showed that Ms Cruise had spent time in custody on those offences. Nor did the Judge express satisfaction that there was good reason not to impose any further penalty. Finally, it will be observed that the formal order was not endorsed pursuant to s 23(1)(b). 105 In any event, the powers of a court which is satisfied that a probationer has failed to comply with a bond are found in s 114 of the Sentencing Act. It relevantly provides: 114—Orders that court may make on breach of bond (1) If the court is satisfied that the probationer has failed to comply with a condition of the bond, the court— (a) may, if the bond requires the probationer to pay a sum in the event of non compliance with a condition of the bond, order the probationer to pay the whole or a part of that sum; or (b) may order a guarantor to pay the whole or a part of the amount due under the guarantee; or (c) may, if the probationer has not been sentenced for the original offence and the terms of the bond require the defendant to appear before the court for sentencing in the event of failure to comply with a condition of the bond— (i) sentence the probationer for the offence, or convict and sentence the probationer for the offence, as the case may require; or -- 34 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 31 (ii) if the court is satisfied that the failure of the probationer to comply with the conditions of the bond was trivial or that there are proper grounds on which the failure should be excused, refrain from taking any action in respect of the failure; or (d) if the probationer has been sentenced to imprisonment for the original offence and that sentence has been suspended—must, subject to subsection (3), revoke the suspension and order that the sentence be carried into effect. (2) The court may not order a person to pay an amount pursuant to subsection (1)(a) unless the court is satisfied that— (a) the person has, or will within a reasonable time have, the means to pay the amount; and (b) payment of the amount would not unduly prejudice the welfare of dependants of the person. 106 The order that Ms Cruise pay $500 was an order estreating the bond made pursuant to s 114(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act; it was the enforcement of the promise to forfeit $500 if the bond was breached. It was not a penalty, nor a decision to offer a defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond. Nor did it fall within subparagraph (d) of the definition of ‘sentence’. An order affecting a penalty is an order ameliorating, or ancillary to, a penalty. 107 Importantly, pursuant to s 114(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act, because Ms Cruise had already been convicted, the Judge was required to sentence Ms Cruise unless the Judge was satisfied that the failure of Ms Cruise to comply with the conditions was trivial. Plainly, the Judge was not so satisfied. 108 Section 5, like all interpretation sections, commences with the words ‘in this Act, unless a contrary intention appears’. It is unlikely that the word ‘sentence’ in s 114(1)(c)(i) carries the same broad meaning as the defined term. It should bear the same meaning it has in s 97 of the Sentencing Act because the sentence which the Court imposes pursuant to s 114(1)(c)(i) is the sentence contemplated by the condition of the bond to appear for sentence in the event of breach. Furthermore, subparagraph (c) commences with the words ‘may, if the probationer has not been sentenced for the original offence’. As we have seen, every probationer discharged on a bond pursuant to s 97 of the Sentencing Act falls within subparagraph (b) of the definition of sentence. Sentence therefore must bear a different meaning in s 114(1)(c)(i) to that of s 5 because it would otherwise be semantically contradictory. Therefore, s 114(1) and s 97(1)(c)contemplate the imposition of a penalty. 109 In this respect, s 114(1) may be compared with s 114(3) which governs the enforcement of a bond pursuant to which a term of imprisonment has been suspended. There is no power to extend the period of a s 97 bond which requires a defendant to appear for sentencing, as there is in the case of a suspended sentence bond. Moreover, in the event of a breach of a suspended sentence bond, power is expressly conferred on a court by s 114(3)(c) of the Sentencing Act to require the -- 35 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 32 probationer to enter into a further bond, the term of which must not exceed 12 months (s 114 (3)(c)) in the event of the expiry of the bond. 110 I acknowledge that the power to sentence, if given its full defined meaning for the purposes of s 114 of the Sentencing Act, would empower a court enforcing a bond to offer a probationer the opportunity to enter into a further bond. Nonetheless, the omission of an express power to do so from the powers to deal with a probationer who has failed to comply with a condition of a bond is striking. 111 It is problematic to attribute Parliament an intention to empower a court enforcing a breached bond to offer the probationer yet a further opportunity to enter into a bond pursuant to s 97 of the Sentencing Act. Even though extending that opportunity is within the definition of sentence, it is the very sentence imposed pursuant to s 97 of the Sentencing Act which included a condition to appear for sentence in the event of breach.26 112 The terms of s 114(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act also seem to preclude the exercise of the powers conferred by s 23 of the Sentencing Act because it provides that the power of the court is to ‘sentence the probationer for the offence or convict and sentence the probationer for the offence as the case may require’. The words ‘as the case may require’ are a strong indication that, on satisfaction that there has been a non-trivial breach, the court must record a conviction if the probationer has not yet been convicted. If that is the case, the power to sentence pursuant to s 114(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act must be confined to the power to convict but discharge the defendant without penalty. However, it is an improbable construction that Parliament intended only one part of the sentencing powers conferred by s 23 to be available for the purposes of s 114(1)(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act. The more likely construction is that in requiring a conviction to be recorded, Parliament intended to preclude a court enforcing a s 97 bond from exercising the leniency allowed by s 23 of the Sentencing Act. 113 The improbability that there would be any factual circumstances which would justify an exercise of the discretion to dismiss without conviction, or to convict and discharge without penalty, in dealing with a non-trivial breach of a bond, when the original sentencing court was not disposed to do so, supports the conclusion that Parliament did not intend to leave the exercise of the s 23 powers to a court enforcing a breach. 26 In The Queen v Greengrass (2009) 104 SASR 262, Sulan and Layton JJ observed in passing that a probationer called up for sentencing for breaching a bond to appear for sentencing in the event of breach ‘faces the same range of penalty as does the person appearing before a sentencing court for the first time in relation to that offending’. It appears that their Honours construed the words ‘sentencing’ as it was defined in s 6 of the Sentencing Act. For that reason, their Honours also observed that the then applicable provision, s 58(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act, allowed a further bond to be imposed upon a probationer where a previous bond had expired but noted that an expired bond could not be extended. The last observation is probably an acceptance that in the absence of an express provision, such as that which applies to a suspended sentence bond, there was no power to extend a bond in the case of a simple bond to reappear for sentence. -- 36 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 33 114 For the above reasons, I would read down the word ‘sentence’ in s 114(1)(c)(i) to mean a penalty. I acknowledge that the proper construction of the section is difficult and problematic. It is deserving of Parliament’s attention. 115 The appeal against the orders of the Judge on the enforcement of the bond warrants a grant of leave for several reasons. First, the Judge did not address the terms of s 114 of the Sentencing Act. It is necessary to emphasise that the sentencing of a probationer pursuant to s 114(1)(c)(i) must give substantial weight to the failure to comply with the terms of the bond. Secondly, discharging Ms Cruise without imposing ‘any further sentence’, to use the Judge’s term, or ‘without imposing any other penalty’, to use the terms of s 97(1) of the Sentencing Act, was manifestly inadequate. The circumstances in which the breach was committed could not reasonably be considered to be trivial. Far from it, the breach was serious. 116 Thirdly, the proper enforcement of community-based orders which are breached is a matter of substantial public interest. Discharging Ms Cruise without any further penalty manifestly fails to enforce the bond on which she was placed in the hope of her rehabilitation. The justification for community-based sentences rests in large part on what has been described as the ‘Sword of Damocles’, which is brought down if the promise to be of good behaviour is not kept. It has been observed that the prospect of enforcement of a breached bond is better described as the ‘sword of justice’. In order to maintain public confidence in community-based orders, a serious breach of the condition to be of good behaviour should generally attract a penal sanction. 117 Notwithstanding my construction of the word ‘sentence’ in s 114 of the Sentencing Act, I proceed on the assumption that the powers conferred by s 23 and s 97 of the Sentencing Act are available. On that assumption, the Judge’s order is nonetheless manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of Ms Cruise’s breach. I would have imposed a period of two weeks imprisonment were it not for the Director’s tacit agreement of the submission made by Ms Cruise’s counsel to the Judge that the Director did not seek a period of imprisonment. 118 Accordingly, on sentencing Ms Cruise pursuant to s 114(1)(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act, I would impose a fine of $500. Ground 1 – manifest inadequacy 119 In the course of the Second Reading Speech on the Bill to enact s 20AA of the CLCA, the Honourable Attorney-General explained:27 Our most vulnerable on duty workers will have charges appropriately sentenced, accounting for their role at work and role in protecting the community. 27 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 2 May 2019, 5649-5652 (Vickie Chapman, Attorney-General). -- 37 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 34 120 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvantidis, Redlich JA said:28 It is a serious offence to assault police officers in the execution of their duty ordinarily requiring a significant element of deterrence in the sentences to be imposed. The courage of police officers in protecting lives and property is something upon which the community depends. It is incumbent on the Court to impose appropriate sentences to demonstrate support for the authority of police officers who undertake a difficult, and dangerous task in the execution of their duties in maintaining law and order. Ambulance officers, and others performing such essential public duties, are to receive a similar measure of support and protection. Where the offender knows or ought to have known that the victim was discharging a public duty of this sort, a more severe sentence will usually be imposed to deter such persons from violent assaults on them when performing their duties. (Footnotes omitted) 121 Moreover, the substantial weight which is given to the objective of personal deterrence when sentencing for offences of violence, even in the case of first offenders, was explained long ago by Bray CJ in these terms:29 Nevertheless there are offences in which, as it seems to me, the deterrent purpose of punishment must take priority. When people act under the influence of liquor, passion, anger or the like so as to constitute themselves a physical danger or potential physical danger to other citizens it may well be that a sentence of imprisonment will be appropriate, even in the case of a first offender of good character, in order to impress on the community at large that such behaviour will not be tolerated … It may be that the incidence of such violence will be reduced if it is brought home to those likely to resort to it that if they do they may very well be punching, striking, butting or kicking themselves into gaol. 122 Ms Cruise’s offending was calculated to maximise the pain she could inflict on Constable Beck. It was motivated both by spite and a pathological antipathy to authority. Moreover, it arose out of a more widespread political opposition to the government’s response to the COVID-19 epidemic. Only the circumstances that it was spontaneous, and fortunately did not result in permanent serious injury, saved it from characterisation as one of the more serious examples of this offending. 123 On the other hand, it must be accepted that Ms Cruise’s personal tragedies properly excite some sympathy. Ms Cruise was 41 years of age at the time she was sentenced. She was one of six children. Her mother passed away in 2023 from cancer which was diagnosed in 2021, just several months before the offences were committed. 124 Ms Cruise has suffered more bereavements in her life than many could bear. When she was 13, her friend was riding in the back of a utility driven by her brother and was killed when the vehicle overturned. On her brother’s 18th birthday, he too 28 (2008) 202 A Crim R 300 at [50]. 29 Birch v Fitzgerald (1975) 11 SASR 114, 116-117; R v Khem [2005] SASC 178; Harrison v The Queen [2022] SASCA 35. -- 38 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 35 was killed in a car accident. Two other occupants of the car also died. Ms Cruise was then just 16 of age. 125 At about the same time, her close friend went missing after a night out with Ms Cruise and others. She was subsequently found dead, having been murdered by a man who had raped her. 126 Ms Cruise’s high school sweetheart and later, husband, died in a car accident when he was just 25 years of age. Ms Cruise was left with the care of their four young children. Three of her daughters still reside with her. Tragically, her son died at the age of two months in 2003. The death was attributed to Sudden Death Infant Syndrome. It left her with a distrust of vaccinations. The psychologist, Mr Balfour attributed Ms Cruise’s radicalisation into the anti-vaccination movement to three powerful psychological processes connected with the death of her son: misattribution, targeted blame and confirmation bias. 127 Misattribution is erroneously assigning blame for her son’s death to vaccinations because of the difficulty in coming to terms with the sudden and unexplained death. Such misattributions can lead to intense guilt, strained relationships and psychological distress. 128 Targeted blame is also connected to the sudden infant death syndrome. It refers to the blaming of the parent by others, or the grieving parent feeling that he or she is blamed for the death of the child. The blame exacerbates the trauma, the grief of loss, and contributes to feelings of guilt and shame. 129 Confirmation bias is the tendency of individuals who are sceptical of vaccines to seek out and trust only information that aligns with their fears or doubts. 130 Mr Balfour assessed Ms Cruise to have entrenched anti-vaccination beliefs that are not amenable to rational persuasion. She perceives the government’s attempts to contain COVID-19 through vaccinations and mandatory mask wearing to be authoritarian, oppressive and autocratic. That background provided important context for Ms Cruise’s offending. 131 However, Mr Balfour also observed that Ms Cruise had anger management problems that manifest when she is intoxicated by alcohol. As much is evident from some of Ms Cruise’s prior offences. 132 On 27 January 2005, she was convicted of assaulting a police officer. A conviction was imposed and Ms Cruise was placed on a good behaviour bond. 133 On 16 November 2010, Ms Cruise was convicted of an assault which occurred in the early hours of the morning of 23 May 2019 at a hotel. Ms Cruise was evicted; she fell into an argument with a security officer and then punched somebody. There were no injuries. When later spoken to about the offences, she could not recall the incidents. She was sentenced on the basis that she had no prior -- 39 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 36 convictions despite the conviction recorded in 2005. No conviction was recorded and Ms Cruise entered into a bond. 134 On 12 August 2020, Ms Cruise was sentenced by a Magistrate for offending in a public place, namely a hotel. The offence occurred in 2019. She had five previous offences for behavioural conduct. The Magistrate convicted Ms Cruise but released her on the bond which was the subject of the enforcement application by the Judge. 135 In her testimony on the trial, Constable Beck described her injuries in this way: I had a fair bit of hair removed from the top of my head which was bleedy and weepy and horrible. My knee was terrible grazed. My face was swollen, especially my forehead and my chin and I had a massive sort of scratch on my neck and face (INDICATES). My hands were swollen. My whole body felt like I had been hit by a truck pretty much, but significantly the very large about 50 cent piece of hair missing from the top of my head and a couple of small bald patches which were bleedy and really sore. 136 Constable Beck was pregnant at the time of the assault. Her victim impact statement focussed heavily on her concern and anxiety about the assault on her yet to be born child. Her statement included the following: The assault was awful, and I didn’t deserve it. I was doing my job. When you kicked me, you kicked my baby. No one deserves that. I wish you’d owned up. I could respect that. I am not dragging you through this. I transcribed the interaction, pregnant. I wrote statements, pregnant. I went to briefings, pregnant. I went to the court proofing with a newborn. I was supposed to be on maternity leave. Instead, I was talking about you. You have coloured my pregnancy. 137 The competing considerations bearing on the term of imprisonment which must be imposed on Ms Cruise are not easily weighed. Moreover, in fixing that term it must be understood that within the maximum penalty the sentencing for offences committed in a wide range of circumstances must bear a proportionate relativity. 138 When Mr Wearn was attempting to restrain one of Ms Cruise’s companions at the Exeter Hotel, Ms Cruise punched Mr Wearn twice landing a blow on his forehead and just below his left ear. Mr Wearn explained in his victim impact statement that the incident had caused him to re-evaluate his position as a security officer. He said: -- 40 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 37 The incident had a profound impact on my life. The event, where I did no wrong and was wronged for simply doing my job and protecting others from the excessive actions of another, lead to both injury and time away from work. Because of this incident and its impact upon my life, I decided it was not in my best interests to continue working in the security industry. 139 The other security officer, Mr Tarawneh, was assaulted by Ms Cruise whilst he was removing Mr Priest. Ms Cruise jumped on him, punched him repeatedly including landing a blow on his throat and grabbed his throat with both hands. In his victim impact statement Mr Tarawneh explained: It was deeply shocking and sad remembering how she was repeatedly trying to snap my windpipe. Then landing big hits on my colleague, then later the officers. … I hesitate now taking my family anywhere near the city. I lack the motivation to go out overall. She contributed to my anxiety and depression. Conclusion 140 I would allow the appeal against sentence. I would impose instead a sentence of three years and three months for the offence of intentionally harming Constable Beck. I would impose a sentence of nine months and two weeks in respect of each of the assaults against the security officers (each reduced by 5 percent by reason of her guilty pleas from a sentence of ten months). I would order that those terms of imprisonment be served concurrently as between themselves but order that they commence three months before the expiry of the sentence of three years and three months imposed on the offence of intentionally harming Constable Beck. I would fix a non-parole period of two years. 141 I would impose a fine of $500 on Ms Cruise’s convictions for the offences of disorderly behaviour and resist arrest on which Ms Cruise was released on a bond. 142 The sentence must be served in prison. A suspension of the terms of imprisonment would utterly fail to enforce those laws which Parliament has enacted to protect emergency workers and frontline security officers. Those laws reflect the entrenched values of the South Australian community. Unfortunately, intoxication, personal dysfunction and hostility all too frequently lie behind the risks that first responders face. As a result, these personal circumstances can be afforded relatively little weight. Moreover, Ms Cruise has chosen not to respond positively to the community-based sentences she has received in the past. 143 The orders of the Court are: 1. Appeal against conviction dismissed; 2. Permission to appeal against sentence granted; 3. A fine of $500 is imposed; -- 41 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Kourakis CJ 38 4. Sentence of the District Court set aside; and 5. In place thereof, the following sentences are imposed: a. Three years and three months for the offence of intentionally causing harm to Constable Beck. b. Nine months and two weeks in respect of each of the assaults against the security officers (each reduced by 5 percent by reason of Ms Cruise’s guilty pleas from a sentence of ten months in respect of each assault). c. The terms of imprisonment in (b) above to be served concurrently as between themselves but commence three months before the expiry of the sentence in (a) for the offence of intentionally harming Constable Beck. d. A non-parole period of two years is fixed. 144 LIVESEY P: For the reasons given by Kourakis CJ, I agree that Ms Cruise (the appellant) should be granted permission to appeal against her conviction for the offence of intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker (a police officer) but that her appeal should be dismissed. 145 The verdict was not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence within s 158(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) (the CPA). As Kourakis CJ has explained, Constable Beck was acting in the course of her duties when she requested the appellant’s personal details under s 74A(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) (the Summary Offences Act) because she had reasonable cause to suspect that the appellant had committed the various offences she described in her evidence. 146 In addition, and for the reasons given by Kourakis CJ, Constable Beck attempted to inform the appellant of the reasons for her arrest, but she was unable to do so because of the conduct of the appellant. Respectfully, it is not necessary to decide whether s 75 of the Summary Offences Act represents a statutory conferral of power which abrogates the common law power or whether, as was held in The Queen v Stafford,30 that provision enlarges the common law power of arrest without warrant without detracting from the conditions laid down by the common law for the exercise of that power, including the need for police to announce the reason for an arrest.31 30 The Queen v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392, 400 (Bray CJ, with whom Hogarth J agreed); See also R v Tipping (2019) 133 SASR 58, [144] (Peek J), [163] (Blue J); Tipping v The King (2023) 142 SASR 379, [42] (Livesey P, Bleby and David JJA). 31 The State of South Australia v Crossley [2020] SASCFC 128, [19]-[20] (Peek J, with whom Kourakis CJ agreed). -- 42 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 Livesey P 39 147 As for the Director’s application for permission to appeal against sentence pursuant to s 157(1)(a)(iii) of the CPA, I agree that permission should be granted and the appeal allowed. 148 The sentence imposed was affected by the error that the sentencing judge imposed an overall sentence which was less than the highest of the notional, individual sentences contemplated in this case. Ordering concurrency or applying s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (the Sentencing Act) cannot result in a sentence which is less than the highest of the notional sentences of imprisonment. That vitiated the exercise of the sentencing discretion because it resulted in a sentence which was not authorised by law.32 That is an important factor in favour of granting permission to appeal against sentence. 149 In connection with sentencing for the offence of intentionally causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker, contrary to s 20AA(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA), for which the maximum penalty is 15 years’ imprisonment, a sentence of imprisonment will often be appropriate in order to “impress on the community at large that such behaviour will not be tolerated”.33 150 Quite apart from the appellant’s prior record, this offending was preceded by the two counts of aggravated assault of the security officers, contrary to s 20(3) of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty is three years’ imprisonment. The circumstance of aggravation was the fact of their vulnerability as security officers (see s 5AA(1)(k) of the CLCA).34 151 The appellant’s history of alcohol fuelled violence and prior offending, despite her tragic personal circumstances, represented a very serious impediment to suspension. Having regard to the circumstances of the offending and the circumstances of the offender, the suspension of the term of imprisonment resulted in a sentence which was manifestly inadequate. 152 Apart from the imposition of a sentence that was contrary to law, the overall sentence was so manifestly inadequate as to warrant a grant of permission to appeal. There is the need for this Court’s principled intervention so as to maintain proper sentencing standards concerning sentencing for assaults on police officers and security officers. The need for this Court’s intervention overcomes considerations of double jeopardy and the apparent harshness of requiring that the appellant be incarcerated. As the High Court said in Munda v Western Australia, “to decline to intervene would have been to perpetuate a manifest injustice”.35 32 R v Yandle [2024] SASCA 111, [87] (Livesey P, S Doyle and David JJA). 33 Birch v Fitzgerald (1975) 11 SASR 114, 117 (Bray CJ); See Harrison v The Queen [2022] SASCA 35, [19] (Livesey P and David JA). 34 That is, “the victim was, to the knowledge of the offender, in a position of particular vulnerability at the time of the offence because of the nature of his or her occupation or employment”. 35 Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600, [76] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ), albeit in connection with the residual discretion. -- 43 of 44 -- [2025] SASCA 59 S Doyle JA 40 153 On re-sentence, this is a proper case in which to order a degree of concurrence.36 I agree with the sentences proposed by Kourakis CJ. 154 I also agree, for the reasons given by Kourakis CJ, that the powers conferred by s 23(1) of the Sentencing Act were not available in connection with the prior offending which was subject to a bond. Section 114 of the Sentencing Act required that, having breached her bond, the appellant had to be sentenced for that offending unless there was a finding that the failure of the appellant to comply with the conditions of the bond was trivial or that there were proper grounds on which the failure to comply should be excused, and no finding of that kind could be made. I agree that the problematic use of the word “sentence” in s 114 warrants Parliamentary attention. 155 Whilst permission to appeal should be granted and the appellant re-sentenced in respect of the breach of bond, I agree that the conduct of the prosecution before the sentencing judge is relevant on re-sentence and that a fine of $500 should be imposed pursuant to s 114(1)(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act. 156 I agree with the orders proposed by Kourakis CJ. 157 S DOYLE JA: I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice, and with the orders and resentencing he has proposed. 36 Edmonds (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] SASCA 11, [78] (Livesey P, Doyle & David JJA). -- 44 of 44 --