THE KING v GRANT JOHN WITT [2025] SASCA 115

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR JUDGE FULLER) DCCRM-24-023185 Appellant: THE KING Counsel: MS S AGNEW WITH MS N PEAT - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Respondent: GRANT JOHN WITT Counsel: MR M MEAD - Solicitor: ANDREW HILL AND CO Hearing Date/s: 08/10/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-033104 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. R v WITT [2025] SASCA 115 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David) 9 October 2025 CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - APPEALS BY CROWN CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions, seeking permission to appeal sentence. On New Year’s Eve 2023, while affected by a range of illicit drugs, the respondent engaged in serious offending involving driving dangerously on busy major arterial roads, courting the risk of catastrophic harm to numerous road users. When confronted by police, and later ambulance workers, the respondent acted with violence and rage. The appellant contended that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is manifestly inadequate and that the sentencing judge erred in fact by sentencing the respondent for offending under s 20AA(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) on the basis that he did not intend to punch a sergeant of police to the head. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment of two years, 11 months and 21 days, with a non-parole period of 18 months, backdated to commence on 12 April 2024. The non-parole period expires on 12 October 2025. Held (the Court), granting permission to appeal, allowing the appeal, setting aside the sentence and re-sentencing the respondent: 1. Though this Court is conscious that offenders ought not ordinarily be twice vexed, the respondent has repeatedly been shown leniency yet continued to engage in drug-fuelled -- 1 of 16 -- offending. In these circumstances, the protection of the safety of the community and personal and general deterrence are important sentencing considerations. [63] 2. Whilst there is a specific factual error and some of the individual sentences appear to be too low, it is the overall result which is key. The final sentence is manifestly inadequate, and by a significant margin. That is in part the product of ordering an inappropriate degree of concurrence. [64] 3. This Court’s principled intervention is required in order to maintain appropriate sentencing standards in circumstances where the sentence imposed was affected by factual error and so egregiously low that intervention is necessary in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. [65] 4. The respondent is re-sentenced to five years and 12 days’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years, backdated to 12 April 2024. [76]-[77] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20AA, 29, 134; Criminal Law Consolidation (Assaults of Prescribed Emergency Workers) Amendment Bill 2019 (SA); Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 157; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 74; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) ss 46, 47, 47EAA; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 26, 114, referred to. Barry v Samuels (1975) 10 SASR 376; Birch v Fitzgerald (1975) 11 SASR 114; Branscheid v The King [2023] SASCA 103; Cruise v The King; R v Cruise [2025] SASCA 59; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvanitidis (2008) 202 A Crim R 300; Edmonds (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] SASCA 11; Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295; Gaston v Police [2004] SASC 222; Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Miller v Huffa (1980) 24 SASR 595; Re Attorney-General’s Application (No 2 of 2002) (NSW) (2002) 137 A Crim R 196; R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; R v Edigarov (2001) 125 A Crim R 551; R v Gordon (1994) 71 A Crim R 459; R v Hay [2007] VSCA 147; R v McCormack [1981] VR 104; R v Henderson (2023) 142 SASR 507; R v McNamara (2009) 105 SASR 38; R v Morse (1979) 23 SASR 98; R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63; R v Nemer (2003) 87 SASR 168; R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212; R v Perry [2022] SASCA 127; R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; R v Sadik & Anor [2025] SASCA 46; R v Sewell (1981) 29 SASR 12; R v Singh [2024] SASCA 81; R v Watkins (2013) 118 SASR 342; R v Yandle [2024] SASCA 111; Warner v The Queen (2022) 142 SASR 275, considered. -- 2 of 16 -- R v WITT [2025] SASCA 115 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey P, Bleby and David JJA THE COURT: Introduction 1 The prosecution seeks permission to appeal against sentence on two grounds. The first is that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on 25 July 2025 is manifestly inadequate. 2 The second ground is that the sentencing judge erred in fact by sentencing the respondent for offending under s 20AA of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA) on the basis that he did not intend to punch a sergeant of police to the head. The prosecution contends that this finding is inconsistent with the factual basis upon which the respondent’s guilty plea was accepted. The prosecution requires leave to amend to press this ground. 3 In broad terms, while affected by a range of illicit drugs, on New Year’s Eve 2023 the respondent engaged in serious offending whilst driving dangerously on busy major arterial roads, courting the risk of catastrophic harm to numerous road users. When confronted by police, and later ambulance workers, the respondent acted with violence and rage. 4 The respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for two years, 11 months and 21 days and a non-parole period of 18 months was fixed. The sentence was backdated to commence on 12 April 2024. The respondent’s non-parole period expires at the end of this week, on 12 October 2025. 5 The application for leave to amend should be granted. The prosecution’s application for permission to appeal against sentence should also be granted. This Court’s intervention is required in order to maintain appropriate sentencing standards in circumstances where the sentence imposed was affected by factual error and so low that intervention is necessary in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. 6 The appeal will be allowed and the respondent re-sentenced. The circumstances of the offending 7 On Sunday, 31 December 2023, the respondent drove a silver Mazda along Henley Beach Road with his domestic partner as passenger. At around 11.05 pm, the respondent’s Mazda was seen to be stopped in the middle of the intersection of Henley Beach and Marion Roads in Brooklyn Park. The Mazda was blocking two lanes of traffic travelling east on Henley Beach Road during two light cycles. The -- 3 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 2 respondent appeared to be asleep in the driver’s seat. Pedestrians attempted to assist. 8 The respondent awoke, screaming at those attempting to assist. The respondent accelerated, almost colliding with another vehicle travelling through the intersection. He then travelled in an erratic and dangerous manner east along Henley Beach Road for around 1.6 kilometres. The respondent was seen to swerve between lanes at around 55 kph. As the respondent approached the intersection with South Road, he hit the northern kerb on Henley Beach Road, narrowly missing two people on a scooter, waiting at a red light. This offending comprised the count of driving in a reckless or dangerous manner. 9 At around 11.10 pm, the respondent drove through a red light at the intersection of Henley Beach and South Roads and was T-boned by another vehicle travelling south on South Road. This offending comprised the count of act likely to cause harm. The driver of the other vehicle and his wife had been to the “Big Bash” cricket at the Adelaide Oval and the New Year’s Eve fireworks. The driver’s wife suffered a rib fracture. 10 After this collision, the respondent’s Mazda crashed into another vehicle. That vehicle had been travelling west on Henley Beach Road and was stopped at a red light. 11 As this occurred, Sergeant Damien Elliott, on solo uniform traffic duties in a Police Drug Driving truck, was exiting a service station and observed the collision. He immediately went to the scene of the collision. As he did so, he called for police assistance and an ambulance. He saw that the respondent had got out of his Mazda and was walking south across the intersection. Sergeant Elliott directed the respondent to return to his vehicle. Although he did so, the respondent was seen to be punching the steering wheel, kicking his legs and yelling that he had done “nothing wrong”. 12 Soon after, Constable Bailey arrived. Sergeant Elliott conducted alcohol and drug testing. The alcohol test was negative. Whilst the drug swipe was being analysed, Sergeant Elliott told the respondent not to smoke a cigarette. Sergeant Elliott saw the respondent lean towards his partner, punch the console of the vehicle several times and yell “fucking dog”. He then directed the respondent to get out of the Mazda. He grabbed the respondent’s arm, attempting to pull him from the Mazda. The respondent resisted. Constable Bailey assisted Sergeant Elliott to remove the respondent. This comprised the count of failing to comply with a direction to submit to test or analysis. 13 After the respondent was out of the Mazda, Sergeant Elliott was still holding the respondent’s left arm. The respondent swung his right arm with a closed fist, punching Sergeant Elliott to the left side of his head. This conduct comprised the count of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker. This incident -- 4 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 3 occurred at 11.19 pm and was captured on Constable Bailey’s body worn video camera. The Court has viewed the video footage. 14 Sergeant Elliott immediately felt pain and dizziness. He pushed the respondent backwards and they both fell to the ground. The respondent was resisting and yelling. Constable Bailey and two members of the public assisted Sergeant Elliott to restrain the respondent. 15 Soon, Sergeant Elliott became lightheaded and collapsed. His shoulder caused him great pain, and his breathing was erratic. 16 Members of the South Australian Ambulance Service arrived. They treated Sergeant Elliott for around 10 minutes. This occurred on the busy roadway for a number of minutes before the road was closed. The ambulance officers later reported that Sergeant Elliott had an elevated heart rate, angina and injuries to his head and shoulder. 17 Whilst this was occurring, the respondent continued to be aggressive. On the body worn video of Constable Bailey, the respondent can be heard to yell “you fucking dog”, “fuck off dog”, “you fucking mutts”, “fuck you cocksuckers” at police and others. This went on for more than 25 minutes. Ambulance officers sectioned and restrained the respondent on a stretcher. The respondent continued to threaten to “smash [the officers] in the face” and said he wanted a “one on one” with the officers. 18 The respondent was taken in an ambulance to the Royal Adelaide Hospital. A police officer who accompanied him heard the respondent saying “fuck SAPOL”, as well as continued abuse, calling police and ambulance officers “dogs” and “rats”. 19 Sergeant Elliott was treated at the Royal Adelaide Hospital for a dislocated left shoulder, bruising and grazes to his right knee, bruising to his right thumb, tenderness to the bone behind his left ear and a severe headache. Multiple pain relief medication was required to treat his pain. He was discharged after 12 hours. 20 Sergeant Elliott experienced an ongoing headache for three days, had two weeks off work and four to six weeks on light duties. He required physiotherapy treatment. In his victim impact statement, Sergeant Elliott said that he had never encountered an offender as violent and aggressive as the respondent in his 32 years of police service. 21 A blood sample of the respondent’s blood later revealed that he had consumed methylamphetamine, amphetamine, gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), tramadol, O-desmethyltramadol, aripiprazole and droperidol. For this consumption, the respondent was charged with driving under the influence as well as driving in a reckless or dangerous manner. -- 5 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 4 22 It was ascertained that the respondent had been unauthorised to drive, having been disqualified for driving with methylamphetamine in 2020. This conduct comprised the count of driving a vehicle unauthorised. 23 In addition to this offending, the respondent had engaged in a number of thefts. Two were committed on 18 February 2023. One was committed on 19 December 2023. That involved stealing grocery items from a service station and the earlier two involved using a stolen credit card to purchase grocery items. The offences before the court 24 The respondent was charged on four separate Informations in the Magistrates Court and pleaded guilty to the following offences: 1. One count of act likely to cause harm, contrary to s 29(3) of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty was imprisonment for five years. 2. One count of driving in a reckless or dangerous manner, contrary to s 46(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (the RTA), for which the maximum penalty was a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment for two years. 3. One count of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker, contrary to s 20AA(2) of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty was imprisonment for 10 years. 4. One count of failing to comply with a direction for the purpose of submitting to a test or analysis, contrary to s 47EAA(3) and (4) of the RTA, for which the maximum penalty was a fine of $2,900. 5. One count of driving under the influence, contrary to s 47(1)(a) of the RTA, for which the maximum penalty was a fine of between $1,900 and $2,900. 6. One count of driving a motor vehicle not authorised following a drug driving disqualification, contrary to s 74(2ac) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), for which the maximum penalty was a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment for one year. 7. Three counts of theft, contrary to s 134 of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty in each case was imprisonment for 10 years. The circumstances of the offender 25 A psychiatric report from Dr Craig Raeside dated 7 September 2020 and a psychological report from Dr Jack White dated 9 September 2024 set out in detail the history of the respondent’s mental illness, being a diagnosis of schizophrenia complicated by drug use and antisocial personality traits and a childhood history of emotional abuse by the respondent’s father. The respondent had been sexually abused when aged 11 years. -- 6 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 5 26 In addition, the respondent had an extensive criminal history including offending involving violence and driving. The respondent admitted that his past offending was “drug-fuelled”.1 The starting sentences and final sentence imposed by the sentencing judge 27 For the offence of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed worker, contrary to s 20AA(2) of the CLCA, the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months, based on a starting sentence of two years. This sentence was reduced by 25 per cent for the respondent’s guilty plea. 28 For the offence of act likely to cause harm, contrary to s 29(3) of the CLCA, the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one year, one month and 15 days, based on a starting sentence of one year and six months. This too was reduced by 25 per cent for the respondent’s guilty plea. 29 For the offence of driving in a reckless or dangerous manner, the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for four months and fifteen days, after a 25 per cent reduction was made from a starting sentence of six months. The sentencing judge ordered that this sentence be served concurrently with the sentence for the offence of act likely to cause harm. 30 For the driving unauthorised offending, the sentencing judge started with seven days’ imprisonment which, after a reduction of 30 per cent for the respondent’s guilty plea, became a sentence of four days. This too was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentences for the offences of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed worker, for the act likely to cause harm, and for driving in a reckless or dangerous manner. 31 For the earlier theft offences, the sentencing judge started with three months’ imprisonment and, after a reduction of 30 per cent for the respondent’s guilty plea, imposed a sentence of two months and three days. Relying on s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (the Sentencing Act), the respondent was sentenced for the earlier two offences of theft to a sentence of three months, reduced by 30 per cent for the respondent’s guilty pleas, to two months and three days’ imprisonment. 32 For the offence of failing to comply with a direction to submit to a test or analysis, a conviction was recorded and no further penalty imposed. For the driving under the influence offending, the respondent was fined $1,900. 33 The respondent was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for five years for the act likely to cause harm offending, for one year for the drive dangerously offending, for three years for the driving under the influence offending and for three years for the driving unauthorised offending. Partial 1 Report of Dr Jack White dated 9 September 2024, p 10. -- 7 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 6 concurrence was ordered in respect of these disqualifications, resulting in a total licence disqualification period of seven years. 34 The sentencing judge was required to deal with an application for enforcement of a partially suspended sentence bond. The respondent had three months, one week and four days left to serve on that bond. The suspended sentence was revoked, and the time already spent in custody was taken into account. Relying on s 114(5)(b) of the Sentencing Act, the sentencing judge determined that the respondent had served his suspended sentence. The principles relating to prosecution appeals 35 The Director’s right of appeal first depends upon obtaining permission to appeal pursuant to s 157(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA). 36 It is not sufficient for the prosecution to demonstrate material error pursuant to the principles described in House v The King.2 The prosecution must demonstrate that the case is sufficiently “rare and exceptional” to warrant a grant of permission to appeal, and that the public interest in favour of this Court’s intervention outweighs considerations of double jeopardy.3 37 The need to show more than error on a prosecution appeal is illustrated by the circumstances of this case. Leaving aside the question of manifest inadequacy, the prosecution contended that the sentencing judge made an error of fact insofar as she found that the respondent “did not intentionally punch Sergeant Elliott to the head”.4 Even if the prosecution succeeded in showing that this factual finding was wrong, that would not necessarily be a sufficient basis for a conclusion that this was an appropriate case in which to grant the prosecution permission to appeal against sentence. It would still be necessary to demonstrate that it was necessary for this Court to intervene. It is not normally appropriate for the prosecution to expose a defendant to the risk of re-sentence after the defendant has already been sentenced. A factual error of that kind is one made within jurisdiction. It is not the kind of error that demonstrates that the sentence was not authorised at law and contrary to Parliament’s intention.5 38 On the question of manifest inadequacy, it has been emphasised on a number of occasions that a sentence which is manifestly inadequate may not necessarily warrant granting the prosecution permission to appeal. A question of degree is 2 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). 3 R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212, 212-213 (King CJ); Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295, 299 (Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ); R v Henderson (2023) 142 SASR 507, [33]-[46] (Livesey P and David JA); R v Singh [2024] SASCA 81, [30]-[31] (Livesey ACJ, Doyle and David JJA); R v Sadik & Anor [2025] SASCA 46, [88]-[91] (Livesey P, S Doyle and David JJA). 4 Sentencing remarks, p 8. 5 Cf R v Yandle [2024] SASCA 111, [71]-[82], [87] (Livesey P, S Doyle and David JJA); Cruise v The King; R v Cruise [2025] SASCA 59, [148] (Livesey P). -- 8 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 7 involved. The sentence must be so low as to demonstrate that it risks undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.6 The determination of the application for permission to appeal against sentence 39 It is first appropriate to determine whether any error was made in connection with the exercise of sentencing discretion. Logically, it is appropriate to start with what is said to be a specific, factual error before considering whether any error may be inferred associated with the contention of manifest inadequacy. 40 The respondent was sentenced on the basis of a prosecution factual summary filed on 21 August 2024. In that summary, the prosecution alleged:7 Once removed from the vehicle, Sergeant Elliott, who had a hold of one of Mr Witt’s arms, attempted to grab his other arm. Mr Witt swung his free arm around and with a closed fist, punched Sergeant Elliott to the left side of his head causing him to feel dizzy … 41 As to this, the sentencing judge found:8 Your offending against Sergeant Elliott was also a serious example of the offence of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker. Whilst your offending was reckless, in the sense that you did not intentionally punch Sergeant Elliott to the head, you had swung your arm, having formed a close fist, in circumstances where it was inevitable that you would connect with his upper body or head. 42 The offences concerning prescribed emergency workers of relevance to this case are set out in ss 20AA(1) and (2) of the CLCA: (1) A person who causes harm to a prescribed emergency worker acting in the course of official duties, intending to cause harm, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years. (2) A person who causes harm to a prescribed emergency worker acting in the course of official duties, and is reckless in doing so, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. 43 Both of these offences require that the conduct by the defendant which caused the harm be both conscious and voluntary.9 The difference between s 20AA(1) and 20AA(2) of the CLCA is whether the defendant intended to cause harm and did so, or was reckless in doing so. 6 R v Nemer (2003) 87 SASR 168, [24] (Doyle CJ); R v Singh [2024] SASCA 81, [30]-[31] (Livesey ACJ, Doyle and David JJA); R v Sadik & Anor [2025] SASCA 46, [88]-[91] (Livesey P, S Doyle and David JJA). 7 Prosecution summary of proposed factual basis for sentencing dated 21 August 2024, [14]. 8 Sentencing remarks, p 8. 9 He Kaw The v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523, 569-570 (Brennan J): “In statutory offences, general or basic intent is an intent to do an act of the character prescribed by the statute creating the offence; special or specific intent is an intent to cause the results to which the intent is expressed to relate”. -- 9 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 8 44 In this case, the sentencing judge misunderstood either or both the factual summary and the elements of the s 20AA(2) offence. On the agreed factual basis, the respondent’s punch to the head was deliberate, and it caused Sergeant Elliott harm. However, the respondent was to be sentenced on the basis he was reckless as to whether harm would be caused by his punch. Insofar as the sentencing judge found that the respondent did not intend to punch Sergeant Elliott to the head, but was reckless, that finding was internally inconsistent and wrong,10 suggesting conduct less serious than the agreed factual basis for sentence. 45 Whilst that error is clearly material, as well as relevant to the question whether permission should be granted, standing alone, it would probably not warrant granting permission to appeal against sentence. 46 The next question concerns whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The determination of that question requires that this Court consider all of the matters relevant to the exercise of discretion to impose sentence. That requires that this Court consider the maximum sentence prescribed by law, any applicable sentencing standards, where the offending sits on the scale of seriousness for offending of its kind, together with the personal circumstances of the offender.11 47 As with manifest excess, the question of manifest inadequacy represents a conclusion which may be reached by the appeal court after a consideration of all relevant matters and without the identification of any specific error.12 48 When one has regard to the offences, the maximum penalties, the overall circumstances of the respondent’s offending, and his personal circumstances, the sentence which was imposed by the sentencing judge appears to be far too low. That impression is borne out by a consideration of each individual sentence, and the scope for ordering concurrency in connection with those sentences. 49 It is appropriate to commence with the offence of recklessly causing harm to a prescribed worker offending. Section 20AA of the CLCA was enacted for the purpose of “better protecting the State’s police, emergency services workers, front- line medical officers and other law enforcement officers from assaults”.13 As the Attorney-General explained during her second reading speech:14 10 The inconsistency arises in the following passage: “your offending was reckless, in the sense that you did not intentionally punch Sergeant Elliott to the head, you had swung your arm, having formed a closed fist, in circumstances where it was inevitable that you would connect”. To say that it was inevitable that there would be contact from the punch suggests intention, inconsistent with recklessness which does not amount to intention. 11 R v Morse (1979) 23 SASR 98, 99 (King CJ). 12 Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321, [6] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J); Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, [59] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 13 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 2 May 2019, 5649 (Vickie Chapman, Deputy-Premier, Attorney-General). 14 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 2 May 2019, 5650-5651 (Vickie Chapman, Deputy-Premier, Attorney-General), regarding the Criminal Law Consolidation (Assaults of Prescribed Emergency Workers) Amendment Bill 2019 (SA). -- 10 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 9 … This government is sending a clear message to those who are disorderly, disrespectful and violent toward our police, ambulance workers, doctors, nurses, firefighters and front-line officers that this behaviour is unacceptable and should be treated as such in the criminal law. … [O]ur most vulnerable on-duty workers will have charges appropriately sentenced, accounting for their role at work and role in protecting the community. 50 There are a number of authorities which emphasise that an important sentencing purpose for this kind of offending is the general deterrence of those who might otherwise harm or assault prescribed emergency workers acting in the course of their duties. The courts have emphasised general deterrence as a means of protecting prescribed emergency workers acting in the course of their duties.15 For example, in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvanitidis, Redlich JA explained:16 It is a serious offence to assault police officers in the execution of their duty ordinarily requiring a significant element of deterrence in the sentences to be imposed.17 The courage of police officers in protecting lives and property is something upon which the community depends. It is incumbent on the Court to impose appropriate sentences to demonstrate support for the authority of police officers who undertake a difficult, and dangerous task in the execution of their duties in maintaining law and order.18 Ambulance officers, and others performing such essential public duties, are to receive a similar measure of support and protection. Where the offender knows or ought to have known that the victim was discharging a public duty of this sort, a more severe sentence will usually be imposed to deter such persons from violent assaults on them when performing their duties.19 … (Citations in original.) 51 Clearly, the respondent’s offending represents a classical example of a case where police ought be protected from violent, drug-fuelled offending whilst acting in the course of their duties, protecting the community from harm. 52 As the sentencing judge rightly observed, this was a serious example of offending under s 20AA(2) of the CLCA. The respondent’s offending demonstrated a clear disregard for police officers undertaking the essential role of 15 Barry v Samuels (1975) 10 SASR 376, 377-378 (Zelling J); Miller v Huffa (1980) 24 SASR 595, 598 (Walters J); R v McCormack [1981] VR 104, 109 (Young CJ, Kaye and McGarvie JJ); Warrell v Kay (1995) 83 A Crim R 493, 497-498 (Owen J); Gaston v Police [2004] SASC 222, [9]-[12] (Gray J); R v McNamara (2009) 105 SASR 38, [7] (Gray J); Cruise v The King; R v Cruise [2025] SASCA 59, [142] (Kourakis CJ, with whom Livesey P and S Doyle JA agreed). 16 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvanitidis (2008) 202 A Crim R 300, [50] (Redlich JA). See also [4] (Buchanan JA). 17 R v Edigarov (2001) 125 A Crim R 551 at [42]-[43] (Wood CJ at CL); R v Stone (1995) 84 A Crim R 218. 18 R v Hamilton (1993) 66 A Crim R 575; Re Attorney-General’s Application (No 2 of 2002) (NSW) (2002) 137 A Crim R 196 at [22] (Spigelman CJ). 19 R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63 at [46]-[47] (Williams JA), at [72]-[74] (Muir J). It has been suggested that the decision in R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381 may be applicable. See Colin Howard, Australian Criminal Law (1st ed, 1965) pp 109, 116. -- 11 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 10 protecting members of the community. The enraged ranting associated with the respondent’s offending exemplified both his unacceptable attitude to police and the need for the sentencing court to take a firm approach. 53 Though the sentencing judge relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cruise v The King; R v Cruise,20 where the offender was sentenced to imprisonment for three years and three months for offending under s 20AA(1), it is obviously inappropriate in cases such as these to attempt to draw direct comparisons where the circumstances are so markedly different. Quite apart from any other distinguishing feature, the respondent’s offending came at the conclusion to aggressive and extreme driving offending, creating the need for Sergeant Elliott to quickly intervene and ensure that the respondent no longer posed a risk to other road users on major arterial roadways. 54 As might be expected, the respondent gave appropriate emphasis to his history of hardship, mental illness and drug addiction. Whilst these were clearly relevant considerations, they did not necessarily suggest scope for leniency.21 The respondent had a long-standing addiction to methylamphetamine and, most importantly, he had previously driven whilst affected by that drug. The respondent’s prior offending tended to demonstrate that his drug intoxication was, in the circumstances of this case, an aggravating feature:22 Where there is foresight as to the probability of consequences of the general type constituted by the offending conduct, the offender’s premeditation or recklessness23 may become an aggravating feature of the offence. It is the degree of deliberation or awareness that taking the drug will predispose the offender to such conduct which aggravates the offence. (Citations in original.) 55 As this Court has recently observed, police are all too often exposed to harm by offenders affected by intoxication, personal dysfunction and hostility.24 56 In all of these circumstances, the starting point of two years appears too low. It failed to adequately vindicate Sergeant Elliott’s role as a police officer entitled to protection whilst acting in the course of his duties.25 57 The circumstances of the respondent’s brazen and risk-laden driving have been described. The respondent drove whilst under the influence of a cocktail of illicit drugs late on New Year’s Eve at a time when, as might be expected, the two 20 Cruise v The King; R v Cruise [2025] SASCA 59 (Kourakis CJ, Livesey P and S Doyle JA). 21 Cf R v Perry [2022] SASCA 127, [121]-[127] (Livesey P and David JA) and the cases there cited. 22 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Arvanitidis (2008) 202 A Crim R 300, [43] (Redlich JA). 23 R v Hay [2007] VSCA 147 at [18] (Buchanan JA), and at [33] (Maxwell P); R v Coleman (1990) 19 NSWLR 467; 47 A Crim R 306; R v Gordon (1994) 71 A Crim R 459; R v Sewell (1981) 29 SASR 12 at 14-15; 5 A Crim R 204 at 207 (Zelling J). 24 Cruise v The King; R v Cruise [2025] SASCA 59, [142] (Kourakis CJ, with whom Livesey P and Doyle JA agreed). 25 Birch v Fitzgerald (1975) 11 SASR 114, 117 (Bray CJ). -- 12 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 11 major arterial roadways he used were very busy. The respondent appeared to pass out in the middle of Henley Beach Road before erupting and driving dangerously and erratically, running a red light at South Road and causing an accident involving other vehicles. It is remarkable that the consequences were not much more serious. As this Court has explained:26 … Offending of this kind is prevalent. Courts are obliged to fix sentences of sufficient severity that they will deter others from driving in a manner dangerous to the public, especially when offenders are affected by drugs and alcohol.27 (Citation in original.) 58 This was very serious offending by an offender who had previously engaged in similar offending, though admittedly that previous offending was not as serious. 59 Again, the sentencing judge rightly described this offending as sitting at the upper end of the spectrum of seriousness for offences of this kind.28 In those circumstances, the starting points of 18 months for the act likely to cause harm, and six months for the dangerous driving, combined with the decision to make these offences wholly concurrent, appears to have resulted in an inadequate sentence. 60 Whilst there was scope for significant concurrence given the course of the driving offending, it was necessary to recognise the distinct phases of the respondent’s offending: dangerous driving culminating in an accident, followed by violence directed at a police officer. The theft offending was obviously distinct. Whilst the question of manifest inadequacy must ultimately be directed to the final sentence, the combination of low sentences and the decision to order concurrency across the driving offences was problematic. In those circumstances, it was not appropriate to order complete concurrence across all of the driving offence sentences. 61 It is appropriate to consider the circumstances of the respondent and the questions of public policy raised by the application for permission to appeal. 62 Since 2020, the respondent had been sentenced to imprisonment on four occasions, two of which were suspended and, in other instances, partially suspended. Since that time, the respondent repeatedly breached the conditions of bonds, including by continuing to offend. 63 Though this Court is conscious that offenders ought not ordinarily be twice vexed, it is relevant to observe that the respondent has repeatedly been shown leniency yet continued to engage in drug-fuelled offending. In these 26 Branscheid v The King [2023] SASCA 103, [68] (Livesey P, David JA and Nicholson AJA). 27 R v Watkins (2013) 118 SASR 342, [25] Stanley J (with whom Kourakis CJ and Vanstone J agreed). 28 Sentencing remarks, p 8. -- 13 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 12 circumstances, the protection of the safety of the community and personal and general deterrence are important sentencing considerations in this case. 64 Whilst there is a specific factual error, and the sentences mentioned appear to be too low, it is the overall result which is key here. The final sentence is manifestly inadequate, and by a significant margin. That is in part the product of ordering an inappropriate degree of concurrence. 65 The final sentence of less than three years, with a non-parole period of 18 months, is so egregiously low that this Court’s principled intervention is necessary in order to maintain appropriate sentencing standards and public confidence in the administration of justice. 66 In all of these circumstances, permission to appeal should be granted and the prosecution appeal allowed. Re-sentencing the respondent 67 It is not necessary to repeat the circumstances of the offending and the circumstances of the offender. Having regard to these and the matters already outlined, it is appropriate to commence with a sentence of three years for the offending involving recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker. That must be reduced by 25 per cent for the respondent’s plea, resulting in a sentence of two years and three months. 68 For the offending of act likely to cause harm, involving driving through a red light and colliding with another vehicle at the intersection of Henley Beach and South Roads, the starting sentence should be two years and six months, reduced by 25 per cent for the respondent’s guilty plea to 22 months. 69 For the offending involving driving in a reckless or dangerous manner it is appropriate to start with a sentence of imprisonment of 8 months which, when reduced by 25 per cent for the plea, becomes a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment. For the driving under the influence (which also reflects the respondent’s decision to drive whilst intoxicated by illicit drugs), it is appropriate to impose a fine of $2,500. 70 For the offending involving driving unauthorised, it is appropriate to commence with a sentence of six months, reduced by 30 per cent for the respondent’s guilty plea, resulting in a sentence of four months and 6 days’ imprisonment. 71 For the offending of failing to comply with a direction to submit to a test or analysis, it is appropriate to record a conviction and impose no further penalty given the sentencing for the appellant’s related offending. -- 14 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 13 72 Whilst it would be appropriate to commence with the individual disqualification periods outlined by the sentencing judge, the total licence disqualification should be a period of 10 years. 73 It is appropriate to address the theft offending in the manner outlined by the sentencing judge, resulting in a combined sentence of four months and six days. Similarly, it is appropriate to address the enforcement of the partially suspended sentence in the manner outlined by the sentencing judge. 74 Whilst the separate offences which have been identified appropriately reflect the respondent’s separate incursions into criminality, it is necessary to stand back and have regard to the respondent’s criminal conduct as a whole. It is necessary to consider the extent to which each sentence successively addresses the relevant purposes of sentencing.29 75 In this way, it is appropriate to order partial concurrency in connection with the driving offending, but not the violence or theft offending, in order to arrive at a sentence which is appropriately proportionate to the circumstances of the offending and the offender. 76 The sentences, penalties and disqualification to be imposed on re-sentence may be tabulated as follows, commencing with the heaviest sentences: Offence Starting Reduction for guilty plea Re-sentence Degree of Concurrence Tally Recklessly causing harm to a prescribed emergency worker (punching a police officer to the head) 3 years 25% 2 years, 3 months None 2 years, 3 months Act likely to cause harm (driving through a red light etc at the intersection of Henley Beach and South Roads) 2 years, 6 months 25% 22 months None 4 years, 1 month 29 Cf Edmonds (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] SASCA 11 (Livesey P, S Doyle and David JJA) and Warner v The Queen (2022) 142 SASR 275 (Kourakis CJ, Livesey P and S Doyle JA). -- 15 of 16 -- [2025] SASCA 115 The Court 14 Offence Starting Reduction for guilty plea Re-sentence Degree of Concurrence Tally Driving in a reckless or dangerous manner 8 months 25% 6 months 3 months, with act likely to cause harm 4 years, 4 months Driving under the influence $2,500 None Driving unauthorised 6 months 30% 4 months and 6 days 2 months, with driving reckless or dangerous 4 years, 8 months and 6 days Failing to comply with a direction to submit to a test or analysis Record a conviction No further penalty Theft offending 6 months 30% 4 months, 6 days None 5 years, 12 days Total licence disqualification 12 years 10 years Total $2,500 licence disqualification 10 years 5 years, 12 days 77 It is appropriate to impose a head sentence of five years and 12 days, together with a non-parole period of three years, backdated to 12 April 2024. The respondent will be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for 10 years on his release. Conclusion 78 Permission to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed. The sentence imposed in the District Court should be set aside. The respondent should be re-sentenced as indicated. -- 16 of 16 --