AB (A PSEUDONYM) In Person v YZ (A PSEUDONYM) [2025] SASCA 121

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE GRAY) SCCRM-25-001318 Applicant: AB (A PSEUDONYM) In Person Respondent: YZ (A PSEUDONYM) Counsel: MS L GAVRANICH - Solicitor: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION (SA) Hearing Date/s: 16/10/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-034445 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. AB (A PSEUDONYM) v YZ (A PSEUDONYM) [2025] SASCA 121 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (ex tempore) (The Honourable President Livesey and the Honourable Justice Bleby) 16 October 2025 MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT This is an application for leave to appeal against a decision by a Supreme Court judge (the appeal judge) to refuse an extension of time, refuse permission to appeal, and dismiss an appeal against the decision of a magistrate to order a final intervention order. The applicant and the respondent are in the midst of Family Court proceedings. Soon after those proceedings commenced, the respondent reported an alleged aggravated assault of her by the applicant, after which the applicant was arrested by police. Police soon obtained an interim intervention order. The applicant challenged the police intervention order and police withdrew it and the criminal charge on 2 May 2024. The respondent then applied for an interim intervention order. An interim intervention order was made and, at subsequent hearings, the applicant did not appear. On 27 June 2024, a magistrate ordered service by email pursuant to s 21(8a)(b) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). When the matter was called on before a magistrate on 4 July 2024, service was proved and a final intervention order was made. A large number of issues were raised before the appeal judge, but ultimately the applicant conceded that he received notice of the interim intervention order as well as notice of the final intervention order confirmation hearing. The applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. -- 1 of 12 -- Held (the Court), granting leave to amend to replace the Amended appeal grounds but refusing leave to appeal: 1. At the heart of the applicant’s complaints is the proposition that he should have been afforded what he described as a full “merits hearing”, permitting him to undertake a cross-examination of the respondent, ignoring that he was given proper notice and a reasonable opportunity to appear but failed to do so. 2. The applicant has not identified any reason to doubt or reconsider the decision of the appeal judge. He has not identified any issue of principle or of general importance. He has not demonstrated that allowing the decision to stand would work substantial injustice. 3. The many complaints made by the applicant lack merit. It would not be in the interests of justice to grant leave. Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) ss 20, 21; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 213.1; Uniform Special Statutory Rules 2022 (SA) r 3.1, referred to. AB (A Pseudonym) v YZ (A Pseudonym) [2025] SASC 126; Cekan v Magiera (2023) 144 SASR 358; Commissioner of Police v Knight; Commissioner of Police v Metters [2025] SASC 72; Groom v Police (No 3) (2013) 231 A Crim R 1; ID v Police (2022) SASC 89; Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) [2025] SASCA 116; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43; Miller v Miller [2018] SASCFC 40; Peters v Commissioner of Police [2025] SASCA 95; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1; Rowe & Anor v National Australia Bank [2025] SASCA 86; Teague v SL [2021] SASC 114; Thakur v Police (2016) 125 SASR 180, considered. -- 2 of 12 -- AB (A PSEUDONYM) v YZ (A PSEUDONYM) [2025] SASCA 121 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey P and Bleby JA THE COURT (ex tempore): Introduction 1 The applicant and the respondent are in the midst of Family Court proceedings. Soon after those proceedings commenced on 12 January 2024, the respondent reported an alleged aggravated assault of her by the applicant, after which the applicant was arrested by police. Police obtained an interim intervention order. 2 The applicant challenged the police intervention order and police withdrew it and the criminal charge on 2 May 2024. 3 The respondent then applied for an interim intervention order. An interim intervention order was made and, at subsequent hearings, the applicant did not appear. On 27 June 2024 a magistrate ordered service by email pursuant to s 21(8a)(b) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) (the Intervention Orders Act). When the matter was called on before a magistrate on 4 July 2024, service was proved and a final intervention order was made. 4 On appeal to a single judge of the General Division a large number of issues were raised, but ultimately the applicant conceded that he received notice of the interim intervention order as well as notice of the final intervention order confirmation hearing.1 The appeal judge refused an extension of time, refused permission to appeal, and dismissed the appeal. 5 The applicant has now applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. For the following reasons, leave to appeal should be refused. The application for leave to appeal 6 The requirements for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal where a second appeal is in prospect are well-known.2 It is necessary for the applicant to be astute to clearly identify real doubt about the decision under appeal.3 7 The parties were given an opportunity to file short written submissions together with a brief opportunity to speak to those submissions this morning. These were directed to the applicant’s Amended appeal grounds – Revision 2, 1 AB (A Pseudonym) v YZ (A Pseudonym) [2025] SASC 126, [46] (Gray J) (the appeal judge). 2 McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43, [21] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). 3 Rowe & Anor v National Australia Bank [2025] SASCA 86, [32]-[33], (Livesey P and Stanley JA), and the cases there cited; Peters v Commissioner of Police [2025] SASCA 95, [21] (Livesey P and Stanley JA); Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) [2025] SASCA 116, [27] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). -- 3 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 2 whereas Revision 1 was the subject of an application for leave to amend dated 2 October 2025, which was granted on 9 October 2025. Revision 2 is as follows: Introduction These amended grounds are confined to errors by the single Judge. They do not re-argue the merits of the intervention-order application. They contend that the primary Judge failed to grapple with the appellant’s central submissions about the Magistrate’s conduct and the fairness of the process below, departed from earlier coordinate authorities without satisfying the ‘plainly wrong’ threshold, and did not apply the practical-injustice test to the real issues before that Appellate court. Further, these “further” Amended Appeal Grounds - Revision 2, integrate all issues raised in the comprehensive leave submissions (including Special Circumstances). Prior grounds are not abandoned to the extent consistent; these grounds supersede and refine them. A. Denial of procedural fairness (natural justice). 1. The primary judge proceeded on the incorrect premise that the Appellant was in default of the 30 April 2025 deadline and failed to regularise or consider interlocutory material lodged on 28 April 2025 and rejected by Registry on 29 April 2025, notwithstanding contemporaneous notice to Chambers on 30 April 2025. Further, the judge treated affidavit material as determinative without affording the Appellant a fair opportunity to be heard and to test that material. Notwithstanding that, final orders were upheld (in the Appellate Court) notwithstanding the absence of a merits hearing and any opportunity for cross-examination on contested credibility; the central fairness complaint was not squarely addressed by HH the Appellate Judge. 2. Inadequate reasons / failure to address a substantial, clearly-articulated issue a) The primary Judge failed to engage with the appellant’s central submission that the Magistrate, knowing the appellant had been denied any merits hearing and any opportunity to cross-examine the protected person on contested allegations, nevertheless confirmed the order. A court must respond to a substantial, clearly-articulated argument based on established facts; failure to do so is error (Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration [2003] HCA 26). b) Particulars: (i) Written/oral submissions squarely advanced that no trial on the merits occurred and credibility was decided without cross-examination. (ii) The reasons focus on notice/service and threshold issues but do not expose reasoning on whether the Magistrate’s process denied a fair hearing. (iii) The omission prevents meaningful appellate review as it does not reveal the path of reasoning on the determinative issue. 3. Failure to apply the ‘practical injustice’ analysis a) The court treated the denial of cross-examination as harmless, rather than asking whether the appellant lost a realistic chance of a different outcome with a fair hearing. -- 4 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 3 4. Procedural fairness misapplied: wrong issue addressed; wrong test applied a) The primary Judge approached the matter as a question of notice/service, rather than deciding whether the Magistrate’s process produced practical injustice by deciding disputed facts without permitting cross-examination. The correct touchstone is practical injustice (Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6). Where denial of fairness touches facts in contest, the order should be set aside and remitted (Stead v SGIC (1986) 161 CLR 141). b) Particulars: (i) No evaluation of the fairness of confirming the order without a merit hearing and without allowing cross-examination on the contested allegations. (ii) No application of the ‘practical injustice’ standard to the issue actually raised by the appellant. 5. Failure to consider orthodox relief (quash and remit) / misapplication of ‘inevitability’ (a) The orthodox remedy of setting aside and remitting for hearing according to law was not considered or was rejected without reasons; ‘inevitability’ was misapplied. 6. Error in appellate function: failure to consider appropriate relief (set aside and remit) a) Having been squarely invited to address the Magistrate’s denial of a merits hearing, the primary Judge failed to determine whether that denial required the confirmation to be quashed, and the matter remitted for a proper hearing before a different Magistrate with witnesses available for cross-examination. On established principle, where procedural unfairness affects facts in issue, the appeal should be allowed and the matter remitted for rehearing. b) Particulars: (i) No distinct consideration of the remedy of quashing and remitter to a different Magistrate for a hearing de novo. 7. Threshold error as to leave/permission (Section 42 Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA)) a) The primary Judge treated the appeal as one requiring permission and/or characterised the Magistrate’s confirmation as interlocutory. At paragraphs [25]–[30] of the Reasons, the Appellate judge did not explain why a Magistrate’s final confirmation order should be treated as interlocutory, nor why the appellant’s contrary arguments were rejected. This constitutes inadequate reasons and error of law. b) The Section 42 permission/leave gateway was not determined (or was misapprehended), vitiating the appellate pathway and relief analysis. c) Particulars: -- 5 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 4 (i) No reasons given for rejecting the appellant’s contention that the Magistrate’s confirmation was a final order. (ii) Failure to engage with established authorities requiring explicit justification when treating orders as interlocutory (White v Police [2028] SASC 123; JP v Police [2024] SASC 114; MT v SE [2025] SASCA 8; Thakur v Police [2016] SASC 75; van Reesma [2009] SASC 8; R v L, KC [2013] SASC 51). (iii) Constitutes a departure from the duty to give adequate reasons and the principles of classification. 8. Departure from coordinate authority without satisfying the ‘plainly wrong’ threshold (stare decisis) a) The primary Judge departed from, or failed to follow/distinguish, earlier single-judge authorities on the leave/permission question (Nicholson J in Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93 at [31]–[36]; Stanley J in Marley- Duncan v Police [2015] SASC 146 at [24]–[28], [34]–[35]), without demonstrating those decisions were plainly wrong or giving reasons adequate to justify non-compliance. Principles of coherence and comity require a single judge to follow a coordinate decision unless convinced it is plainly wrong; at minimum, reasons must be given for any departure (Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135]–[136]). b) Particulars: (i) Earlier single-judge decisions recognise that leave is not required under the statutory appeal pathway; the reasons below do not explain why those cases are distinguished or plainly wrong. (ii) The omission undermines consistency and predictability and constitutes an error of law and/or inadequate reasons 9. Departure from settled SA authority (including JP v Police [2024] SASC 114) without reasons a) The judgment departed from, or failed to follow and distinguish, existing SA authority (including JP v Police on forward-looking risk/appropriateness) without identifying a principled basis and without explicit reasoning. 10. Discipline of explicit reasoning when doctrinal development is attempted (Farah/Hill v Zuda) a) The court failed to follow seriously-considered High Court dicta and to adhere to the ‘plainly wrong’ discipline before departing from intermediate appellate authority; reasons did not squarely engage with existing doctrine. 11. Reliance on concealed/unavailable authority; injustice to stare decisis and procedural fairness (MT v SE [2025] SASCA 8) -- 6 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 5 a) Reliance upon redacted/unavailable reasons (including the limited public version of MT v SE) undermined stare decisis and procedural fairness because the parties could not test, distinguish or address the reasoning. 12. Failure to observe the discipline required when altering legal direction (illustrated by Commonwealth v Yunupingu [2025] HCA 6) a) If the primary Judge intended to change direction from earlier single-judge authority on the leave/permission question, the Judge was required to identify and justify that doctrinal shift expressly. The High Court’s approach in Commonwealth v Yunupingu [2025] HCA 6—where the Court expressly overruled Teori Tau v Commonwealth (1969) to correct doctrine — illustrates (as ought to have been done by the Appellate Judge in the matter on appeal) that legitimate change requires open identification of the earlier authority and a reasoned basis for departure. No equivalent reasoning is present here. b) Particulars: (i) No express engagement with, or displacement of, earlier single-judge authority; no articulation of why earlier authority is plainly wrong. (ii) Absent that analysis, the departure (if any) should not have occurred; the matter should have been decided in accordance with the earlier decisions or remitted. B. Error of law – misdirection as to the appellate task under s. 42 MCA (‘real review’). 13. The primary judge failed to conduct the required rehearing/real review, misapplied the governing legal principles, and/or treated the appeal as if confined to error on the face of the record rather than determining afresh the correctness of the Magistrates Court decision on the material. C. Jurisdictional error / decision not authorised by law. 14. By misconstruing the statutory scheme and applicable procedural regime (Special Statutory jurisdiction; USSR/UCR), and by treating the proceeding as if in a different division/jurisdiction, the primary judge constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction and/or made orders not authorised by the enactment as properly construed. D. Failure to consider relevant considerations / taking into account irrelevant considerations. 15. The primary judge failed to consider material and submissions going to: a) lack of service and ex parte confirmation; b) SAPOL’s same-day withdrawal of a police Intervention Order followed by a private Intervention Order before the same Magistrate; c) denial of file access and inability to cross-examine; and -- 7 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 6 d) the existence and bearing of concurrent Family Court proceedings and any statutory duty to inquire; and/or took into account matters that were not legally relevant. E. No evidence / insufficiency of evidence and factual error. 16. Material findings were made in the absence of any probative evidence, on a misapprehension of the evidence, or contrary to incontrovertible facts/glaring improbability; and/or affidavit material not subjected to cross-examination was treated as proven fact without adequate cautions. F. Legal unreasonableness / manifest disproportionality. 17. The decision was legally unreasonable in the sense that, having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute and the evidentiary record, no reasonable judge could or would have exercised the power in the manner adopted. G. Failure to determine material interlocutory applications / unreasonable delay. 18. The primary judge failed to determine, or to determine according to law, the Appellant’s interlocutory application lodged on 28 April 2025 (Form 61) and associated affidavit (Form 7e), and/or unreasonably delayed or declined to address those matters, thereby amounting to jurisdictional error and a denial of procedural fairness. H. Wrong turning / systemic impact 19. The approach risks entrenching final orders without merits hearing/cross- examination, diminishing the practical-injustice inquiry and orthodox remedial pathway, and causing State-wide inconsistency. I. No evidence / failure to investigate and inquire (SAPOL and Magistrate); error of law 20. SAPOL conducted no investigation of the allegations prior to initiating/pressing the application. On 2 May 2024 the HH the Magistrate failed to make proper inquiry of the protected person before issuing the interim IO; and on 4 July 2024 in confirming a final order, it was also made without sworn or reliable evidence as to present risk or appropriateness or any change in circumstances since 14th January 2024 – when the initial SAPOL interim IO was imposed. The statutory threshold was not met, and the (or any) discretion miscarried. 21. “Reasonable suspicion” requires plausible material facts with probative value — not mere conjecture — before a court may be satisfied of future risk and the appropriateness of orders (George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104); see also House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499). J. Misapprehension of jurisdiction/comity with the GCFCOA; failure to consider Family Law Act mechanisms; SAPOL initiation despite concealed divorce filing 22. The court failed to engage with the impact of the pending federal family - law proceeding (divorce filed the day before) and the Family Law Act mechanisms (ss 68Q, 68R, 69J, 114) on the ‘appropriateness’ limb, on SAPOL’s initiation, and on the risk of inconsistent orders; this amounted to error of principle – and any reasonable judicial officer who had care and conduct of the matter as late as 2 May -- 8 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 7 and 4 July 2024 – would have enquired as to any Family Law proceedings or any further developments with the matter after 14th January 2024. K. Particulars (concise summary) 23. Fairness: the appeal framed an anterior fairness error; reasons addressed outcome not process. 24. Practical injustice: denial of cross-examination in a credibility-driven dispute was inherently material; the judgment did not ask whether a fair hearing might realistically produce a different result. 25. Remedy: no analysis of quash/remit; no finding of inevitability to justify departure from the orthodox course. 26. Section 42 gateway: not determined (or misapprehended), affecting jurisdictional pathway and standard applied. 27. Stare decisis: JP v Police was not followed, distinguished, or shown to be plainly wrong; no explicit reasoning to justify departure. 28. Reasonable suspicion: must be grounded in material facts of probative value; bare assertion without investigation or sworn evidence is insufficient (George v Rockett). 29. Concealed authority: reliance on unpublished/redacted reasons (including the limited public version of MT v SE) deprived parties of equal access to the law and the chance to meet the case. 30. Federal comity: divorce filing the day before was not disclosed to SAPOL or the magistrate; failure to inquire into the existence and implications of FCFCOA proceedings; risk of inconsistent orders. 31. Wrong turning: the approach risks embedding procedure contrary to principle and efficient administration of justice. L. Orders and Relief sought 32. Grant any necessary permission/leave (to the extent required). 33. Allow the appeal. 34. Set aside the orders of the single judge made on 1 August 2025 in AB v YZ [2025] SASC 126. 35. Quash the Magistrate’s confirmation of the intervention order – made on 4 July 2024). 36. Remit the matter to a different Magistrate for a full merit hearing with the appellant permitted to cross-examine the protected person and any other relevant witnesses. 37. Directions for the filing of sworn evidence addressing present risk/appropriateness; such further or other orders as the Court thinks fit. 38. Respondent to pay Appellant’s Costs. -- 9 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 8 8 As before the appeal judge, the applicant is not legally represented. The respondent is legally represented. 9 Again, as before the appeal judge, the proposed appeal grounds are lengthy and discursive. The applicant uses a number of concepts and phrases, generally articulated at a high level of abstraction, without giving them any content. For example, the following complaint is made in connection with one aspect of proposed appeal ground 1, the asserted denial of procedural fairness: The primary Judge approached the matter as a question of notice/service, rather than deciding whether the Magistrate’s process produced practical injustice by deciding disputed facts without permitting cross-examination. The correct touchstone is practical injustice … Where denial of fairness touches facts in contest, the order should be set aside and remitted … 10 No attempt has been made to grapple with the particular findings of the appeal judge so as to demonstrate precisely what error was arguably made, having regard to the terms of the Intervention Orders Act or, for that matter, the operation of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) and r 3.1 of the Uniform Special Statutory Rules 2022 (SA). The judgment under appeal 11 The appeal judge set out in careful detail the factual background to the proposed appeal, the nature of the issues raised by the applicant and the statutory basis of the appeal and the application for leave to appeal under s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) and r 213.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).4 12 The appeal judge observed that there was a division of authority over whether an order confirming an intervention order was interlocutory or final in nature. Whilst most of the authorities suggested that the order was interlocutory in nature,5 Kourakis CJ had thought otherwise in Teague v SL.6 The appeal judge did not find it necessary to express any concluded view on that question.7 It is not necessary for this Court to address it either. 13 On the question whether the applicant had been given proper notice, the appeal judge referred to a recent decision of Commissioner of Police v Knight; Commissioner of Police v Metters,8 before addressing the terms of the Intervention 4 The appeal judge explained that, since 29 August 2022, the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) came to be governed by Part 6 of the Uniform Special Statutory Rules 2022 (SA). According to those rules, the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) apply, see r 3.1 of the Uniform Special Statutory Rules 2022 (SA); BC v MC [2024] SASC 81, [4] (McDonald J). 5 Appeal judge, [26]-[29], referring, amongst others, to Groom v Police (No 3) (2013) 231 A Crim R 1 (Sulan J); Thakur v Police (2016) 125 SASR 180, [26] (Stanley J); ID v Police (2022) SASC 89, [30]-[32] (McDonald J). 6 Teague v SL [2021] SASC 114, [8] (Kourakis CJ). 7 Appeal judge, [30]. 8 Commissioner of Police v Knight; Commissioner of Police v Metters [2025] SASC 72, [12] (B Doyle J). -- 10 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 9 Orders Act.9 The appeal Judge observed that by s 21 of the Intervention Orders Act, an interim intervention order comes into force when served, whether personally or in the manner authorised by the Court. The appeal judge also recognised that, once an interim intervention order is confirmed, only the final intervention order operates.10 14 The appeal judge then recorded the following concession by the applicant:11 The applicant ultimately, on appeal, accepted that he received on 27 June 2024 notice of the interim intervention order and notice of the hearing of the final intervention order confirmation hearing.12 In the circumstances, I reject the submission advanced by the applicant that he was not given notice of the proceedings. I find that the applicant was properly served with the interim intervention order in accordance with the statutory requirements,13 and that he had actual notice of the proceedings and was given notice prior to the confirmation hearing of that hearing.14 15 As for the allegations of procedural unfairness, the appeal judge recognised that s 20(3) of the Intervention Orders Act required that the respondent inform the Magistrates Court about the existence of any Family Court proceedings but that any failure to do so did not invalidate the interim order nor occasion any relevant procedural unfairness.15 Indeed, s 20(3) of the Intervention Orders Act explicitly recognises that, while an applicant must inform the Magistrates Court about any pending Family Court proceedings, “an intervention order is not invalid merely because the applicant fails to so inform the Court”. 16 The appeal judge addressed a number of other contentions, including an asserted lack of jurisdiction, allegations of judicial error and allegations of corrupt conduct, before rejecting what was said to be a constitutional issue.16 17 The appeal judge refused an extension of time, presumably because the proposed appeal lacked sufficient merit to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. She otherwise dismissed the appeal. The determination of the application for leave to appeal 18 Having reviewed the reasons of the appeal judge against the Amended appeal grounds, it is not immediately obvious that the appeal judge has made any material error of fact or law. To the extent any discretion was exercised, it was neither unreasonably nor unjustly exercised. The applicant has not identified any reason 9 Appeal judge, [35]-[45]. 10 Appeal judge, [25], referring to the Intervention Orders Act, s 23. 11 Appeal judge, [46]. 12 T (n 27) 2-3. 13 Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 21(8)-(8a), (8a)(b). 14 T (n 27) 4. 15 Appeal judge, [53]-[54], referring to Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, [37] (Gleeson CJ): “Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice”. 16 Appeal judge, [59]-[71]. -- 11 of 12 -- [2025] SASCA 121 The Court 10 to doubt or reconsider the decision of the appeal judge. He has not identified any issue of principle or of general importance. He has not demonstrated that allowing the decision to stand would work substantial injustice. 19 In short, whilst police abandoned an interim intervention order and withdrew the criminal charge, an interim intervention order was sought and obtained by the respondent and then, in accordance with orders made by the Magistrates Court, the applicant was properly served and given notice of the hearing at which the interim order was confirmed as a final order. 20 Although there was a failure by the respondent’s counsel to formally advise the magistrate about the extant Family Court proceedings, which was “less than ideal”,17 the appeal judge was not satisfied that this occasioned any “relevant practical injustice”.18 21 At the heart of the applicant’s complaints is the proposition that he should have been afforded what he described as a full “merits hearing”, permitting him to undertake a cross-examination of the respondent, ignoring that he was given proper notice and a reasonable opportunity to appear, but failed to do so.19 22 In those circumstances, the many complaints made by the applicant lack merit. They do not warrant a grant of leave to appeal. It would not be in the interests of justice to grant leave. Conclusion 23 Leave to amend to replace Amended appeal grounds Revision 1 with Revision 2 will be granted. The application for leave to appeal should be refused. 24 The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $1,500. 17 Appeal judge, [57]. 18 Appeal judge, [57]. 19 The importance of service within time in accordance with the court’s orders is demonstrated by cases such as Miller v Miller [2018] SASCFC 40 (Kourakis CJ, with whom Nicholson J agreed, Bampton J dissenting). The present case must be distinguished from cases such as Cekan v Magiera (2023) 144 SASR 358 (Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA) where there was evidence led to demonstrate a lack of notice, despite service, and where that together with matters such as the strength of the case to be advanced required a different approach in a different context. -- 12 of 12 --