[2025] SASCA 129

On Appeal from LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL (MAURINE PYKE KC) LPDT 14 OF 2015 Appellant: MARSHALL FLOWERS In Person First Respondent: LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL Counsel: MS B CIANCIOSI - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Second Respondent: GREGORY FINLAYSON In Person Hearing Date/s: On the papers File No/s: CIV-25-004725 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. FLOWERS v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL & ANOR [2025] SASCA 129 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby) 17 November 2025 APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL On 26 March 2025, the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) dismissed an Originating Application (revised) filed on 20 December 2023 filed by Mr Flowers and an application by Mr Flowers for the Presiding Member to disqualify herself on the grounds of apprehended bias. The Originating Application (revised) sought to set aside a 2018 decision of the Tribunal on the basis that it was procured by fraud. Mr Flowers had previously appealed unsuccessfully against the 2018 decision. Mr Flowers filed a Notice of Appeal against the orders dismissing the applications, naming the Tribunal as the first respondent and Mr Gregory Finlayson as the second respondent. The Court is presently concerned with three interlocutory applications filed within the appeal proceedings by which: 1. the Tribunal has applied to be removed as a respondent to the appeal proceedings; 2. Mr Flowers has applied to have the Crown Solicitor disqualified from acting for the Tribunal in these proceedings; and 3. Mr Finlayson has applied for the appeal to be summarily dismissed or, in the alternative, for security for costs. -- 1 of 14 -- Held (by the Court): the Notice of Appeal amounts to nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the allegations of fraud that have been subject to final judicial determination on appeal in this Court. The Court orders that: 1. Pursuant to UCR r 22.3(a), the Tribunal is removed as a party to the proceedings. 2. Mr Flowers’ application to have the Crown Solicitor disqualified from acting for the Tribunal in these proceedings is dismissed. 3. Pursuant to UCR r 212.5(2)(c), the appeal is summarily dismissed on the bases (a) that it is incompetent and (b) that is has no prospect of succeeding. 4. Mr Flowers is to pay the respondents' costs of the interlocutory applications and the appeal on the standard basis, to be agreed or adjudicated. Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 (SA); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 17(2); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) ss 78, 82, 84, 86, 88A; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 22.3(a), 211.1, 212.5(2)(c), referred to. Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3; Flowers v Hicks & Anor [2024] SASCA 126; Flowers v Finlayson (No 2) [2023] SASCA 12; Flowers v Finlayson [2023] SASCA 9; Flowers v Finlayson [2023] HCASL 118; Flowers v Finlayson [2023] HCASL 119; Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (2016) 127 SASR 1; Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165; Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429; SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia (1999) 72 SASR 596; Keogh v The Medical Board of South Australia (No 2) [2007] SASC 421, considered. -- 2 of 14 -- FLOWERS v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL & ANOR [2025] SASCA 129 Court of Appeal – Civil: S Doyle and Bleby JJA 1 THE COURT: On 28 April 2025, the appellant Mr Flowers filed a Notice of Appeal against a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) dated 26 March 2025. By that decision, the Tribunal dismissed an application that the Presiding Member disqualify herself on the grounds of apprehended bias and dismissed an Originating Application (revised) (‘the Revised Originating Application’) filed on 20 December 2023. 2 The Notice of Appeal names the Tribunal as the first respondent and Mr Gregory James Finlayson as the second respondent. This Court is presently concerned with three Interlocutory Applications filed within the appeal proceedings by which: • the Tribunal has applied to be removed as a respondent to the appeal proceedings (FDN 6); • Mr Flowers has applied to have the Crown Solicitor disqualified from acting for the Tribunal in these proceedings (FDN 9); and • Mr Finlayson has applied for the appeal to be summarily dismissed or, in the alternative, for security for costs (FDN 14). 3 The Interlocutory Applications are supported by various affidavits. In order to address them, it is first necessary to explain the history of the proceedings involving the named parties. Background 4 The background to the substantive dispute leading to the present proceeding is set out in the judgment of the Full Court in the 2021 appeal judgment of Flowers v Finlayson.1 Mr Flowers and his wife were involved in protracted litigation in the Family Court. At some point, Mr Flowers retained Mr Finlayson to act for him. This included representing him at trial, which commenced on 15 September 2014. However, the lawyer/client relationship broke down on that first day. During the lunch adjournment, Mr Flowers terminated Mr Finlayson’s instructions. Mr Finlayson sought leave of the Court to withdraw from the case, which was granted.2 1 [2021] SASCFC 3. 2 See Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3 at [10]-[17] (Lovell J, Peek and Stanley JJ agreeing). -- 3 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 2 5 Mr Flowers filed a complaint in the Tribunal against Mr Finlayson. As the Full Court on appeal described it:3 Generally, the charges alleged that Mr Finlayson, having agreed to specific terms regarding his retainer, breached those terms and charged Mr Flowers above the agreed figure. The charges also contained allegations of incompetence in his representation of Mr Flowers, allegations of failing to comply with trust account regulations, allegations of misleading conduct and allegations of dishonesty in dealing with Mr Flowers, the Commissioner and the Tribunal. Sitting behind most, if not all of the charges, was the allegation that Mr Finlayson acted dishonestly. 6 This focus on alleging dishonesty on the part of Mr Finlayson included allegations that invoices sent by Mr Finlayson were fraudulent, as were his trust account records that matched the invoices. Thus, for example, the Full Court described Charge 6 as alleging that Mr Flowers:4 … did not authorise some of the amounts transferred from trust by Mr Finlayson and further alleged that the “invoices” sent by Mr Finlayson were fraudulent. Mr Finlayson’s trust account records matched the invoices. Of course, if the invoices were false or fraudulent then any trust account records dealing with those invoices would also be fraudulent and dishonest. 7 Following a 15-day trial, on 20 December 2018, the Tribunal found Mr Finlayson not guilty of all charges. Mr Flowers appealed to the Full Court. The Amended Notice of Appeal contained seven grounds, some of which were difficult to follow. Justice Lovell, with whom Peek and Stanley JJ agreed, summarised the grounds as alleging, generally:5 1. That the constitution of the Tribunal, and the manner in which it was selected, breached the Public Sector Honesty and Accountability Act 1995 and accordingly the members of the Tribunal were invalidly appointed and the decisions reached are void; 2. That the Tribunal failed to afford Mr Flowers procedural fairness; 3. That the Tribunal erred in failing to find that Mr Finlayson had acted dishonestly in his dealings with Mr Flowers, the Commissioner and the Tribunal and further in failing to find that Mr Flowers did not keep proper trust account records; 4. That the Tribunal erred in its adverse finding of the credibility of Mr Flowers; 5. That the Tribunal erred in reaching those conclusions in particular in reaching its conclusion as to the terms of the costs retainer. 8 On 3 February 2021, the Full Court dismissed the appeal. It observed that the Tribunal had largely disposed of the matter on credit issues. It found no reason to impugn the Tribunal’s rejection of numerous assertions by Mr Flowers of fraud on 3 Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3 at [19]. 4 Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3 at [84]. 5 Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3 at [21]. -- 4 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 3 the part of Mr Finlayson. Thus, in addressing Ground 4 of the appeal, Lovell J observed:6 The Tribunal correctly observed that determination of charges was largely dependent on the credibility of Mr Flowers and Mr Finlayson. As noted earlier the Tribunal found it could not rely on the evidence of Mr Flowers. In my view, having reviewed the transcript and exhibits, not only was that finding open to the Tribunal, it was [the] correct finding. Mr Flowers’ evidence was simply not believable and contrary to the objective evidence produced. As stated earlier Mr Flowers’ approach to the objective evidence was to doubt its authenticity and/or, without evidence, declare it fraudulent. The objective evidence included emails which he clearly received, bank account statements and also trust account records. The Tribunal did not accept Mr Flowers’ assertions that Mr Finlayson fraudulently constructed documents and a narrative to mislead the Commissioner. 9 The Court, in dismissing the appeal, concluded that the findings of the Tribunal were clearly open and were correct. 10 On 27 August 2021, Mr Flowers filed a further Interlocutory Application seeking, among other things, an order that the Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the Full Court. The President directed the Registrar to reject the Interlocutory Application as defective. On 23 November 2021, Mr Flowers filed a further Interlocutory Application seeking, among other things, an order rescinding the rejection of the earlier Interlocutory Application, and an order that that first Interlocutory Application be set down for hearing. The Interlocutory Application of 23 November 2021 asserted that the Full Court judgment had been obtained by fraud. 11 On 23 December 2021, Mr Flowers filed a further Interlocutory Application, again seeking, among other things, that the Full Court judgment be set aside as it was based on the ‘fraudulent and deceitful conduct’ of Mr Finlayson. 12 On 29 June 2022, McDonald J dismissed both Interlocutory Applications. 13 Mr Flowers has continued to attempt to find ways to prosecute his assertion that the decision of the Tribunal dismissing the complaint, or the decision of the Full Court, was procured by fraud on the part of Mr Finlayson. On 15 December 2022, he filed an Originating Application seeking orders that the Supreme Court reopen and set aside the judgment of the Full Court. The Court of Appeal dismissed that Originating Application as an abuse of process.7 On the same date, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Mr Flowers from a decision of a master summarily dismissing an amended Statement of Claim filed in the Supreme Court. The claim substantially sought to litigate the same matters as were determined by the Tribunal and the Full Court. The Court held this was precluded by issue 6 Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3 at [144]. 7 Flowers v Finlayson (No 2) [2023] SASCA 12. -- 5 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 4 estoppel and an abuse of process.8 Mr Flowers applied unsuccessfully for special leave to appeal against both decisions to the High Court.9 14 Mr Flowers has also pursued numerous other proceedings, including against his former wife and her solicitor. The various proceedings are listed in an Annexure to the judgment of this Court in Flowers v Hicks & Anor.10 The Revised Originating Application 15 On 20 December 2023, Mr Flowers filed the Revised Originating Application in the Tribunal. This sought to set aside the Tribunal’s order dismissing the charges against Mr Finlayson. On 27 February 2024, following a directions hearing before the Presiding Member of the Tribunal, Ms Pyke KC, Mr Flowers separately applied for Ms Pyke KC to be disqualified from hearing the Revised Originating Application (‘the Disqualification Application’). 16 The Presiding Member delivered reasons for her decision on 26 March 2025. She described the Disqualification Application in the following terms:11 5. The Disqualification Application sought inter alia: 6. That I comply with the provisions of Section 17 of the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act the (PSHA Act). 7. That I certify (admitted) that there is a conflict of interest in the direct statutory duty of investigative and determinative functions of the case against Mr Finlayson for unsatisfactory professional conduct and/or professional misconduct. 8. That I indicate how, when and where such conflict of interest with the practitioner, Mr Finlayson, originated, that I be disqualified based upon apprehension/perceived bias and racial discriminatory practices. 9. That I be disqualified based upon the Tribunal’s misrepresentation of facts and evidence, fraud and obstruction of justice. 17 The Presiding Member observed that when giving directions in 2018, she had indicated that she would not sit on any panel convened to hear the substantive application by which Mr Flowers made the original complaint. However, she observed that for the purposes of determining whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the Revised Originating Application, it was not necessary to make any determination about the truth or validity of the complaints against Mr Finlayson and the first Tribunal. 18 The Presiding Member concluded, on the application for disqualification, that:12 8 Flowers v Finlayson [2023] SASCA 9 at [23]. 9 Flowers v Finlayson [2023] HCASL 118; Flowers v Finlayson [2023] HCASL 119. 10 [2024] SASCA 126. 11 Reasons for Decision at [5]-[9]. 12 Reasons for Decision at [55]. -- 6 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 5 … a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question of law to be decided, that is, whether the legislative provisions of the LPA grant jurisdiction to the LPDT to set aside the Originating Application (revised). 19 As to the Revised Originating Application, the Presiding Member observed that this was not a fresh charge but, rather, a fresh attempt to appeal against the decision of the first Tribunal following the dismissal of his appeal by the Full Court.13 She observed that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to review a decision of a previously constituted Tribunal ‘in concluded and perfected proceedings’.14 20 The Presiding Member then addressed the contention of Mr Flowers that this application arose in the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal:15 The Applicant submitted that s89(1) gives the LPDT in its original jurisdiction, authority/power to recommend that disciplinary proceedings be commenced against the legal practitioner in the Supreme Court. A consideration of s89 however makes it clear that the Tribunal, after conducting an inquiry into the conduct of a legal practitioner may recommend that disciplinary proceedings be commenced against the legal practitioner in the Supreme Court. The Tribunal can only give a recommendation. The Tribunal cannot institute proceedings in the Supreme Court. That can only be done by the Commissioner, the Attorney-General or the Law Society. The Applicant referred to Clone’s case16. That case is not apposite in these proceedings. The LPDT is not a court and is a creature of the LPA. The various allegations of fraud, inappropriate behaviour and misconduct against the First Tribunal and Mr Finlayson are not new allegations and formed part of the Supreme Court proceedings which dismissed the Applicants appeal. (Footnote in original) 21 The Presiding Member concluded that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the Revised Originating Application. The Notice of Appeal 22 It is necessary to set out the Grounds of Appeal that Mr Flowers raises, in full: Ground 1- Whether the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (LPDT), the presiding member, Ms. Maureen Pyke (“the presiding member”) have jurisdiction to set aside its decision, dated 20 December 2018 and favourable to solicitor, Mr. Gregory James Finlayson (Mr. Finlayson); a decision procured by fraud by, inter alia, the Honourable Judge Lovell’s (a Supreme Court and Court of Appeal Judge) and the Tribunal’s misrepresentation of subpoenaed evidence 13 Reasons for Decision at [46]. 14 Reasons for Decision at [47]. 15 Reasons for Decision at [48]-[51]. 16 Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (2016) 127 SASR 1. -- 7 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 6 (Mr. Finlayson’s subpoenaed Commonwealth Bank Trust Account, No. Acct No. 0651251317098, 1-30 September 2014 and Internode tax invoice, 1-30 September 2014, the Tribunal’s obstruction of Justice (attached to the charges were Mr. Finlayson’s original cost disclosure evidence except the original evidence was removed and replaced with fraudulent cost disclosure, to include the Tribunal’s removal of a discovered foreign e-mail addressed to Mr. Finlayson, dated 9 March 2016 that was mysteriously attached to the original charges but removed, absent notification to the inquiry panel, by the Tribunal secretary Mr. Hean, and to include Mr. Finlayson’s presentation of fraudulent client account record (Trust account statement, general account ledger, external review, internode tax invoice), to include perjury. Ground 2- Whether in consideration of the serious breaches and compromise of professional integrity as outline in Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal and the contaminated evidence under the presiding member authority and control, whether, in truth, the presiding member, if jurisdiction is ascertain, can impartially execute her judicial responsibility and oath, respectfully, (1) due to her expressed conflict of interest with Mr. Finlayson and despite the fraudulent but damaging evidence that clouds the presiding member’s integrity and accountability. Ground 3- Whether, the fraud that procured the Tribunal’s decision (20 December 2018) is valid unless and until the Supreme Court, in its appellate and/or inherent jurisdiction grants other relief to the effect that the Tribunal’s decision was tainted by fraud? Or Ground 4- Whether the tribunal’s presiding member in her capacity, chooses to selectively ignore and/or minimize the seriousness of the tribunal’s fraudulent and contaminated evidence and thus undermine the integrity of the judicial process with public interest and great expectation of procedural fairness. Ground 5- The Presiding Member’s Reason for Decision appears prejudicial, an inaccurate decision that simply extends further into the merit of the actions than limited actions in accordance with paragraph 14 of the Reason for Decision, dated 26 March 2025 but simply alludes that Fraud by judicial officials commands no accountability, no public interest, and no resources allocated for the prejudicial and knowingly distorted truth. Ground 6- Through the Court’s (The Honourable Judge Lovell) misrepresentation of evidence, solicitor’s fraud, to include obstruction of justice, to conceal the fraud, the Appellant is racially victimized through denial of adequate legal representation and presentation of the Fraud on it merit for which appears less important to the administration of justice but concealment of judicial officials, to include the solicitor’s misconduct for steadfast perseveration of judicial public perception, appearance, and judicial integrity even when violations of judicial oath occurs that promise: “[to] do right to all manner of people according to law without fear or favour, affection or ill will”. 23 Mr Flowers seeks relief in the following terms: Fraud to Obstruct the Administration of Justice Important: That the Honourable Court exercise its authority to investigate serious misconduct; deleted evidence (oath) from transcripts, to include removal of “exhibit evidence” from official court records under control by the Legal Practitioners -- 8 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 7 Disciplinary Tribunal (LPDT 14 of 2015). Official evidence removed but replaced with knowingly false and untrue records meant to undermine my credibility and with the Chief Justice assignment (based upon information) of a single judge of the Court to hear an appeal from the LPDT but allowed the single judge to condone and misrepresent the fraudulent evidence before the Court. Also, upon inspection of the file about 21 November 2017 an unknown (e-mail to Finlayson, dated 8 March 2016) document attached to (my) evidence (charges) but removed the following day. The purpose being to pervert the course of justice. 1. That prior to hearing this Notice of Appeal that the Honourable Court in its (Supreme Court) inherent jurisdiction order an independent investigation of the facts and evidence of the Appellant’s claim of judicial misrepresentation(s) of evidence, corruption and obstruction of justice. See Affidavit attached to Originating Application, filed 20 December 2023 2. That pursuant to an investigation that the presiding member’s Order 1- the Disqualification Application filed on 27 February 2024 be set aside and in consideration of the seriousness of the tribunal’s misrepresentations of the evidence and obstruction of justice, the Presiding member’s impartiality remains in question with regard to procedural fairness and the presiding member’s ability to constitute a panel absent the Presiding member’s compliance with ss16 and 17 of Public Sector (Honest and Accountability Act 1995) (PSHA). 3. In absent of an investigation, the Court of Appeal makes and order that the Statute Amendment (Courts) Act 2004 defined the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal as a “proscribed court,” with original jurisdiction (disciplinary proceedings) enacted by complaint against a legal practitioners by way of the LPA 1981 And in cases of Fraud for the Tribunal has jurisdiction to set aside its decision based upon any fraud, whether fraud is the superior court, the Tribunal and/or the solicitor, Mr. Finlayson. Reliance is r186.1(2)(b) of the UCR for which is espoused in the case of Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] HCA 12. 4. The presiding member’s Orders 2 – that dismissed the Originating Application (Revised) filed on 20 December 2023 be dismissed but the Originating Application be reinstated with an Order from the Court of Appeal to the Presiding Member that her expressed “direct conflict of interest with the solicitor, Mr. Finlayson” requires compliance with the PSHA. 5. Due to the serious nature of the violations by judicial officials that offends the integrity of the Court, public trust and interest requires the truth, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction and should require the relevant minister to investigate and prior to any Court of Appeals’ decision have the relevant minister prepare and report its findings to the Court. 6. That the cost associated with the Tribunal’s decision and this appeal be against the Tribunal and/or the Respondent solicitor, Mr. Finlayson. 7. Any other order that the Court determines appropriate in the interest of justice. 24 A number of observations arise from these grounds and the relief sought. First, it is apparent that Mr Flowers is, by the Revised Originating Application and the Notice of Appeal to this Court, attempting to re-litigate the claims of fraud that he has previously agitated and failed to establish. Mr Flowers has not clearly identified (and has not evidenced) any claim of newly discovered fraud. -- 9 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 8 25 Secondly, the Notice of Appeal takes issue with the decision of the Full Court on appeal from the Tribunal. That decision is a final, appellate decision. It is not competent to challenge that appellate decision on a purported appeal from a decision to refuse to re-open the original decision from which that appeal was heard. 26 Thirdly, Mr Flowers seeks for this Court to order an independent investigation of his claims of fraud, prior to hearing the appeal. That is not a function of this Court. 27 Fourthly, Mr Flowers continues to agitate a claim that the Presiding Member of the Tribunal is subject to the provisions of the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 (SA). The Full Court determined that this was not the case.17 28 Fifthly, Mr Flowers seeks this Court to deem the Tribunal to be a court, so as to be able to invoke the jurisdiction to set aside a judgment on the basis of fraud, explained in Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq). 29 The reference by the Presiding Member in her Reasons for Decision to ‘Clone’s case’ should properly be a reference to the High Court decision of Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq).18 In that case, the High Court traced the history of the power of a court to set aside its own decision on the basis of fraud. That power is an equitable power of the Supreme Court, derived from the pre-Judicature Act power to set aside a decree on an original bill.19 It exists by reason of the investing in the Supreme Court with the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery.20 That power required, and requires, fraud to be pleaded clearly and proved.21 30 The Tribunal, by contrast, is an administrative tribunal, established by s 78 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (‘LPA’). Unlike the Supreme Court, it is not invested with the power to set aside a decision of itself on the ground of fraud. Section 82 of the LPA establishes its inquiry function, including its powers following the conduct of an inquiry. Section 84 sets out the Tribunal’s powers for the purpose of an inquiry. Section 86 provides for a right of appeal against a decision of the Tribunal made in the exercise or purported exercise of powers or functions under the LPA. 31 Whether the Tribunal has the power to revisit a decision made on an inquiry is a matter of construction of the provisions of the LPA.22 The question in any given case can be a difficult one. An implication of a power to reconsider would be liable 17 Flowers v Finlayson [2021] SASCFC 3 at [121]. 18 (2018) 264 CLR 165. 19 Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165 at [52]. 20 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 17(2)(a)(i). 21 Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165 at [62]. 22 See, e.g., Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429 at 443 (French J). -- 10 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 9 to invite ‘endless requests for reconsideration on new material or changed circumstances’.23 Each new decision would arguably be reviewable on administrative law grounds (or statutorily conferred appeal). 32 There is little in the LPA to suggest that the Tribunal has the power to re-open finalised proceedings. In particular, s 86 of the LPA confers a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. An appeal must be instituted within one month of the date on which the appellant is notified of the decision, unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that there is good reason to dispense with that requirement. The Supreme Court retains, in any event, its inherent jurisdiction to control and discipline legal practitioners.24 These matters suggest that the LPA is intended to codify and confine the basis on which decisions made under it are able to be reviewed. They speak against the existence of any implied power of the Tribunal to reconsider a decision made on a complaint.25 33 As Mr Flowers points out, a decision of an administrative tribunal that is obtained by fraud is a nullity.26 However, in this case, Mr Flowers has already exhausted his right of appeal to the Supreme Court. 34 Finally, Mr Flowers seeks costs against either the Tribunal or Mr Finlayson. It appears that this may be the reason for joining the Tribunal as a respondent to the appeal. 35 Having made these observations about the Notice of Appeal, it is convenient to turn to the Interlocutory Applications. The Tribunal’s application to be removed as a respondent to the appeal proceedings (FDN 6) 36 This Interlocutory Application is supported by an affidavit of Briana Cianciosi, a solicitor employed within the Crown Solicitor’s Office. Ms Cianciosi supports the application to be removed as a respondent in the following terms: The First Respondent cannot be a Respondent to these present appeal proceedings as they were not classified as such in the original jurisdiction, and there is no other contradictor for the purposes of these proceedings. In addition, there is no legal authority which suggests that the First Respondent is a proper party to proceedings involving an appeal of their own decision or that they should abide the event in order to provide assistance to the Court. 37 The Notice of Appeal discloses no proper basis for joining the Tribunal as a respondent to the appeal. The Tribunal was not a respondent at first instance. It was the decision-maker. This is not an application for judicial review, but an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has no interest in the outcome of the 23 Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429 at 443 (French J). 24 Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), s 88A. 25 Sloane v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429 at 444 (French J). 26 SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189 at [52]. -- 11 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 10 appeal. If the appeal were to be successful, the matter would be remitted to the Tribunal for it to decide the applications before it afresh. 38 While orders are sought against the Tribunal’s Presiding Member by reference to the Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995 (SA), they are misconceived, for the reasons given earlier. Insofar as the Notice of Appeal complains of error on the grounds of apprehended bias, that is a complaint of an error of law that would potentially enliven a remedy under s 86(3) of the LPA. That does not require the relevant Tribunal member, or the Tribunal, to be named as a respondent. 39 Even on an application for judicial review, costs are not usually ordered against a submitting Tribunal.27 However, more fundamentally, the Tribunal is not a proper respondent on a purported appeal pursuant to s 86 of the LPA.28 40 There is no basis for joining the Tribunal as a respondent to the appeal. Pursuant to UCR r 22.3(a), we grant the Tribunal’s application to be removed as a party to the proceedings. Mr Flowers’s application to have the Crown Solicitor disqualified from acting for the Tribunal in these proceedings (FDN 9) 41 This application is premised on the proposition that the Crown Solicitor’s Office has a conflict of interest in representing the Tribunal in this proceeding. That is on the basis that a senior solicitor in the Crown Solicitor’s Office, Ms Elizabeth Watson, represented the Public Trustee as a litigation guardian in the much earlier Family Court proceedings. The Written Submissions of the first respondent indicate that the Crown Solicitor’s office represented the Public Trustee as litigation guardian for Mr Flowers between 2008 and 2012. Mr Flowers makes various allegations about the conduct of the Public Trustee and Ms Watson with respect to discovery obligations, in particular. However, his submissions do not identify any relationship between that role and the issues arising in the current proceedings. 42 In any event, in circumstances where the Tribunal was not properly joined as a respondent to the proceedings, and should be removed, there is no utility in this application. The Crown Solicitor’s only involvement in the present matter has been to prosecute the application to remove the Tribunal as a respondent. We dismiss Mr Flowers’s application to have the Crown Solicitor disqualified from acting for the Tribunal in these proceedings. 27 El Deeb v Magistrates Court of South Australia (1999) 72 SASR 596; Keogh v The Medical Board of South Australia (No 2) [2007] SASC 421 at [8] (Doyle CJ). 28 Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), r 211.1. -- 12 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 11 Mr Finlayson’s application for the appeal to be summarily dismissed or, in the alternative, for security for costs (FDN 14). 43 This application is made pursuant to UCR Rule 212.5(2)(c). This rule permits the Court to summarily dismiss an appellate proceeding if the appellate proceeding is incompetent or if none of the grounds has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. 44 The essence of the appeal is to attempt to overturn the decision of the Presiding Member not to disqualify herself when determining that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the Revised Originating Application, and to overturn the decision that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction. Viewed in this way, if it is not arguable that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction asserted by Mr Flowers, the issue of bias of the presiding member falls away. 45 We have set out, above, the considerations that attend upon the question of whether a Tribunal has the power to revisit a decision previously made. As indicated earlier, that can be a difficult question. However, for the reasons explained above, there is nothing in the LPA to indicate that the Tribunal does have that jurisdiction. 46 Having said that, in cases where it can subsequently be shown that an administrative Tribunal’s decision was procured by fraud, that decision would be held to be a nullity. In that case, the remedy under the regime created by the LPA would likely lie in the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. 47 The difficulty in the present case, however, is this. Having perused the voluminous material that Mr Flowers has generated, the allegations supporting the Revised Originating Application are neither new nor substantiated by any new evidence. They were addressed at the original hearing of Mr Flowers’s complaint and then subjected to review by the Full Court on appeal. Mr Flowers has not identified anything that indicates that this is anything more than an attempt to relitigate those same allegations. 48 Going through the Notice of Appeal: • Ground 1 is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the allegations of fraud in respect of which Mr Flowers has been unsuccessful. It is an abuse of process; • Ground 2, which alleges bias on the part of the Presiding Member, is premised on the need to adjudicate the issues raised in Ground 1. It falls with Ground 1; • Ground 3 similarly relies on the assertions of fraud in the original Tribunal proceedings that have already been determined adversely to Mr Flowers; • Ground 4 is predicated on the same allegations of fraud; -- 13 of 14 -- [2025] SASCA 129 The Court 12 • Ground 5 is also premised on the same allegations of fraud; • Ground 6 seeks to impugn the Full Court judgment on appeal, on the basis of those same allegations of fraud that were within the contemplation of that appeal. 49 So understood, the Notice of Appeal amounts to nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the same allegations of fraud. It seeks to litigate matters that have been the subject of final judicial determination on appeal in this Court. That is an abuse of process. The appeal is, for that reason, incompetent. In any event, none of the grounds has any prospect of succeeding. Each depends on re-invigorating the fraud allegations that have been finally determined against Mr Flowers. 50 We grant Mr Finlayson’s Interlocutory Application to summarily dismiss the appeal. This appeal is just the latest attempt by Mr Flowers in a course of persistently instituting proceedings to prosecute a long-held grievance that has been finally determined, adversely to his interests. Mr Flowers’ continued efforts in this regard are vexatious. Conclusion 51 We order as follows: 1. Pursuant to UCR r 22.3(a), the Tribunal is removed as a party to the proceedings. 2. Mr Flowers’ application to have the Crown Solicitor disqualified from acting for the Tribunal in these proceedings is dismissed. 3. Pursuant to UCR r 212.5(2)(c), the appeal is summarily dismissed on the bases (a) that it is incompetent and (b) that it has no prospect of succeeding. 4. Mr Flowers is to pay the respondents’ costs of the interlocutory application and the appeal on the standard basis, to be agreed or adjudicated. -- 14 of 14 --