ROBERT MURRAY ANDREWS v THE KING [2025] SASCA 135

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR JUDGE TRACEY) DCCRM-22-007385 Appellant: ROBERT MURRAY ANDREWS Counsel: MS H LUU - Solicitor: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION (SA) Respondent: THE KING Counsel: MS L DUONG WITH MS S HENNIGS - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 18/11/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-24-018710 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ANDREWS v THE KING [2025] SASCA 135 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice Stanley) 27 November 2025 CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION RECORDED ON GUILTY PLEA CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST PEACE AND PUBLIC ORDER - OFFENSIVE WEAPONS - FIREARMS - POSSESSION This is an appeal against conviction. The appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of possessing a prescribed firearm without a licence, contrary to s 9(1) of the Firearms Act 2015 (SA) (‘the Firearms Act’). While in custody for unrelated offending, the appellant saw advertised a general amnesty found in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act. He informed a corrections officer that he was in possession of a firearm which he wished to surrender under the general amnesty. The unauthorised firearm was secreted in a vehicle left unattended at a COVID checkpoint. The corrections officer reported the matter to police. Later that day police officers conducted a search of the vehicle, seized the unauthorised firearm and took it to the Mount Gambier Police Station. He was later charged with the firearms offence. The appellant received legal advice that the general amnesty provision was not available to him. On the basis of that legal advice, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to the firearms offence. The appellant now appeals his conviction on the ground that there has been a miscarriage of justice. -- 1 of 13 -- This appeal raises the question of whether the general amnesty found in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was available to the appellant notwithstanding he did not personally bring the unauthorised firearm to the Mount Gambier Police Station and surrender it. Held, per the Court, granting an extension of time, granting permission to appeal, allowing the appeal, and quashing the conviction: 1. The words “brings the unauthorised item to a police station” in s 64(1) are to be construed as including circumstances where a third-party agent acts on behalf of another to bring and surrender a firearm to a police station or another approved location. 2. There is no textual support for excluding a police officer or government employee from the class of persons who can act on behalf of another person to bring an unauthorised firearm to a police station or other approved location and surrender it. 3. In the circumstances of this case, the general amnesty found in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was available to the appellant. When pleading guilty, the appellant relied on incorrect legal advice that the general amnesty provision was not available to him. Had the appellant not received this incorrect legal advice, he would not have entered a guilty plea. Accordingly, the guilty plea was not an informed admission of guilt and there was a miscarriage of justice. Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 158(c); Firearms Act 2015 (SA) ss 3, 9(1), 64; Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA); Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) ss 14(1), 16(1); Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 50; Statutes Amendment (Firearms Offences) Bill 2015 (SA), referred to. McFarlane v The Queen [2022] SASCA 46; Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; R v Ganderton (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 17 September 1998). ; R v Hawker [2005] NSWCCA 118; R v Knudson [2021] QCA 267 ; R v Marafioti (2014) 118 SASR 511; R v Wilkes (2001) 122 A Crim R 310; Shah v Trenerry [1998] NTSC 11; Verban v The King [2025] SASCA 14, considered. -- 2 of 13 -- ANDREWS v THE KING [2025] SASCA 135 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey P, David and Stanley JJA 1 THE COURT: The appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of possessing a prescribed firearm without a licence, contrary to s 9(1) of the Firearms Act 2015 (SA) (‘the Firearms Act’). The appellant was legally represented at the time of entering his guilty plea, and his solicitor made submissions on his behalf. 2 On 9 May 2023, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for two years, 10 months and seven days, with a non-parole period of 21 months’ imprisonment. The sentence was backdated to commence on 26 October 2022. The appellant has completed his head sentence which expired on 2 September 2025. 3 The appellant now contends that a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned after having entered a guilty plea in circumstances where: • he relied on legal advice that a general amnesty provision was not available to him; • the legal advice about the availability of the general amnesty provision was incomplete and incorrect; • in the circumstances, he cannot be taken to have intended to admit he was guilty of the charged offence, nor can his plea be taken as an admission attributable to a genuine consciousness of guilt; and • on the facts, he could not in law have been guilty of the offence. 4 This appeal raises issues of statutory construction relevant to the amnesty from prosecution for serious offences under s 64(1) of the Firearms Act. 5 For the reasons which follow, we grant an extension of time, permission to appeal and allow the appeal, and quash the conviction. Factual circumstances of the alleged offending 6 On 12 September 2021, police attended the Glenelg Highway, Glenburnie because the appellant had failed to stop at a COVID border checkpoint. Following police checks, the appellant was arrested and taken into custody for outstanding warrants, breaching the Emergency Management Act 2004 (SA) (‘the EMA’) and failing to comply with his bail agreement. He was taken to the Mount Gambier Prison. 7 The appellant’s vehicle remained on the side of the highway, near the COVID checkpoint. The vehicle was not searched by police, and it was locked. There is no evidence to suggest that it was going to be searched, or that the appellant was told that it might be searched. -- 3 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 2 8 On 16 September 2021, whilst the appellant was still on remand at the Mount Gambier Prison, he had the following conversation with a corrections officer: Appellant: I saw a gun amnesty ad a week ago and I need to tell the police I have a gun in my car. Corrections Officer: Where is it? Appellant: In my car. The police would have it and know where it is. It’s in the back of my station wagon 4WD. You have to climb through the front doors to get into the back and it’s hidden under a grey bag with some clothes. It’s a .22 with a pistol grip with green tape. It’s not loaded. I was coming to Mount Gambier to swap/sell it for ice. 9 Following this conversation, the corrections officer took the appellant back to his cell and reported the matter to police. The same day, police attended the Glenburnie COVID checkpoint and searched the appellant’s vehicle. Police observed a grey coloured bag in the rear of the vehicle. Within the grey bag, police located a non-functioning homemade .22 single shot bolt action sawn-off rifle. The firearm was not marked with any serial or product numbers. It was crudely constructed, with the receiver and bolt being sourced from general hardware items. Both the muzzle end and the chamber end of the barrel had been cut down. The barrel and receiver were secured onto the stock with metal sheeting, adhesive glue and electrical tape. To function, the metal spring had to be replaced, and the firing pin modified. 10 The police officers took the firearm to the Mount Gambier Police Station. 11 Between 12 September 2021 and 12 November 2021, the appellant remained in custody serving a sentence for breaches of the EMA and other unrelated offending. 12 The appellant was arrested for possessing a prescribed firearm without a licence, contrary to s 9(1) of the Firearms Act (‘the firearms offence’) on 23 January 2022. 13 On 7 March 2023, the appellant was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the firearms offence. It was not disputed before the sentencing Judge, nor on this appeal, that the appellant did not hold a firearms licence. 14 Sentencing submissions proceeded on 2 May 2023. The appellant’s solicitor, Mr Russell Cole, submitted that the appellant had been living in Hamilton, Victoria for a period of 12 months before returning to Mount Gambier. He was stopped at the COVID checkpoint and arrested. Whilst in custody, the appellant saw televised advertising regarding a firearms amnesty. He told a corrections officer that he was in possession of an unauthorised firearm (in the terms set out earlier), which led to the police searching his vehicle and locating the firearm. The appellant submitted -- 4 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 3 that the firearm was given to him as a gift by a stranger in Hamilton, and he was taking the firearm to Mount Gambier to give it to an elderly woman with whom he was hoping to obtain accommodation. The appellant described the firearm as being an ornamental, ‘wall-mounted’ replica firearm. 15 The appellant’s account was not accepted by the sentencing Judge. 16 On 9 May 2023, the appellant was sentenced as a ‘serious firearms offender’ pursuant to s 50 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), having committed the offence whilst on bail. The sentencing Judge adopted a starting point of three years’ imprisonment which was reduced to two years, 10 months and seven days’ imprisonment on account of his guilty plea. A non-parole period of 21 months’ imprisonment was fixed. The sentence was backdated to commence on 26 October 2022, following the completion of a sentence imposed for unrelated offending. The appeal to this Court 17 The appellant was originally unrepresented during these proceedings. He filed an appeal against sentence, out of time, on 21 May 2024. In support of his application, the appellant filed an affidavit sworn on 24 February 2025. By reference to the appeal grounds and his affidavit, the appellant’s essential complaints were that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, and that his solicitor ‘forced’ him to plead guilty and ‘entered submissions of guilt in my absence and against my instructions’. The appellant asserted that he had a ‘defence’ available to him by reason of the general amnesty found in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act. 18 In response, the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) (‘the Director’) filed an affidavit from Mr Cole, sworn on 7 March 2025. Relevantly, the Director challenged the appellant’s assertion that the guilty plea was anything other than an informed admission of guilt, as well as the appellant’s contention that the general amnesty provision was available to him. 19 At the appeal hearing on 11 March 2025, the appellant remained unrepresented. Counsel for the Director called Mr Cole to give evidence by reference to his case file. Prior to Mr Cole assuming conduct of the file, the appellant had been represented by another solicitor. Mr Cole gave evidence that upon receiving the appellant’s case file, he reviewed it and read the email correspondence between the Director and the appellant’s former solicitor. This correspondence indicated that the Director had rejected a submission that the appellant had a ‘defence’ based on the amnesty in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act. 20 Mr Cole gave evidence that he had a telephone conference with the appellant on 8 February 2023 (‘the telephone conference’) during which the appellant instructed Mr Cole that he wished to plead guilty to the firearms offence. Mr Cole accepted, and there was no dispute, that prior to 8 February 2023, the appellant had always expressed an intention to plead not guilty. -- 5 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 4 21 Mr Cole said that during that telephone conference he ‘took [the appellant] through the relevant evidence’ and advised him that he ‘could not see any available defence open’. He said that the telephone conference concluded with the appellant agreeing to plead guilty and telling him to ‘just do your best’. 22 While Mr Cole, at times, suggested that he could remember what passed between he and the appellant during the telephone conference, the better view of his evidence is that he had little actual recollection and he was reliant on his file, together with his ordinary practice. More particularly, it was not suggested that Mr Cole had independently considered the amnesty provision in s 64(1), still less that he gave the appellant any detailed advice about its potential operation in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, Mr Cole had no record of having given the appellant any advice on this topic. The only advice he recalled having given the appellant was during the telephone conference when he told him that he was ‘doomed’ and that the argument that there was an amnesty defence, ‘had no legs’. 23 Mr Cole’s affidavit said that the appellant became belligerent during the telephone conference. Although Mr Cole suggested that the appellant may have been belligerent before and whilst Mr Cole gave him advice, the better view of the evidence is that Mr Cole explained his view that the appellant’s defence was ‘doomed’, after which the appellant became belligerent before he finally accepted Mr Cole’s advice that he should plead guilty. 24 The appellant’s former solicitor did not give evidence and there is no evidence as to the reason why she abandoned her argument that the appellant was covered by the amnesty provision in s 64 of the Firearms Act. There is no evidence explaining why she discontinued an application for a stay of proceedings which was based on the availability of the general amnesty. There is no evidence to suggest that she gave the appellant any detailed or considered advice on the topic. 25 Following the evidence of Mr Cole, the appeal hearing was adjourned for the Legal Services Commission to consider whether it was prepared to act for the appellant given the general importance of the operation of s 64 of the Firearms Act. 26 The Legal Services Commission agreed to fund the appeal and the appellant was subsequently represented by counsel. 27 On 20 May 2025, the appellant filed an amended notice of appeal against conviction which alleged the sole complaint that a miscarriage of justice had been occasioned by reason of his guilty plea having been entered in circumstances where the appellant relied on incorrect or inappropriate legal advice that the general amnesty in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was not available to him. 28 The questions for this Court are whether the appellant’s guilty plea constituted an admission attributable to a genuine consciousness of guilt, or whether the general amnesty provision under s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was -- 6 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 5 available to the appellant, and he received incorrect legal advice about whether he was guilty of the firearms offence and entered his guilty plea on the basis of that legal advice. General principles concerning an appeal following a guilty plea 29 In McFarlane v The Queen (‘McFarlane’)1 this Court discussed the different approaches which have been taken to a challenge to a conviction following the entry of a guilty plea. The Court referred, amongst other authorities, to R v Knudson,2 where the Queensland Court of Appeal referred to three circumstances where a miscarriage of justice can be demonstrated: (1) where an offender did not understand the nature of the charge or did not intend to admit guilt; (2) where an offender could not in law have been guilty of the offence; and (3) where the guilty plea was obtained by improper inducement, fraud or intimidation. 30 Ultimately, the Court in McFarlane found that the relevant question was whether there had been a miscarriage of justice within s 158(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA). Miscarriage of justice 31 The appellant’s complaint devolves to the question of whether there has been a miscarriage of justice because his guilty plea was based on ‘imprudent or inappropriate advice’,3 was not attributable to a consciousness of guilt4 and, on the admitted facts, he could not have been guilty of the offence in law.5 32 The Director contends that the general amnesty provision in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was not available to the appellant, and accordingly the advice he received was not incomplete or incorrect, and there was no miscarriage of justice. The general amnesty provision 33 Section 64 of the Firearms Act relevantly provides: (1) If a person who has unauthorised possession of a firearm or ammunition, or a firearm part, prohibited firearm accessory, sound moderator or a restricted firearm mechanism, (an “unauthorised item”) brings the unauthorised item to a police station, or to another location approved by the Registrar, and surrenders it to the Registrar, no action is to be taken against the person in respect of any offence relating to the unauthorised possession of the item by that person. 34 It is the appellant’s contention that he brought the unauthorised firearm to a police station and surrendered it, albeit through third parties (the corrections officer 1 [2022] SASCA 46 at [43]-[66] (Livesey P). Cf Verban v The King [2025] SASCA 14 at [5]-[9] regarding leave to withdraw a notice of discontinuance of a conviction appeal. 2 [2021] QCA 267 at [43] (Kelly J, with whom Fraser and Bond JJA agreed). 3 R v Wilkes (2001) 122 A Crim R 310 at 315; R v Hawker [2005] NSWCCA 118. 4 R v Wilkes (2001) 122 A Crim R 310 at 315; R v Ganderton (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 17 September 1998). 5 R v Wilkes (2001) 122 A Crim R 310 at 315. -- 7 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 6 and then a police officer) and it did not matter that he did not personally bring the firearm to a police station to surrender it. Accordingly, the general amnesty was available to the appellant, and he entered his guilty plea on the basis of incorrect legal advice. 35 The Director initially submitted that, to avail himself of the general amnesty, the appellant was required to personally (rather than by a third-party agent) bring the firearm to a police station and surrender it. However, the Director’s position changed during the subsequent appeal hearing, and it is now conceded that the words ‘brings the unauthorised item to a police station’ can be construed to include a person who surrenders a firearm by having a third-party bring the unauthorised firearm to a police station, or another location approved by the Registrar. However, the Director contends that for the purpose of this provision the third-party cannot be a police officer or a government employee. 36 There was some discussion during the appeal about whether the corrections officer, who was an employee of a contractor, could for these purposes be regarded as a government employee. Who was or was not captured in the term ‘government employee’ remained unclear. 37 If the Director’s construction of s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was correct, the appellant could not avail himself of the general amnesty provision because he did not personally bring the firearm to the Mount Gambier Police Station but used the combination of a corrections officer and a police officer to do so on his behalf. He may not have been able to do so for so long as he remained in prison. Had the appellant waited until his release from prison, and then personally attended a police station to surrender the unauthorised firearm, he would have had the protection of the general amnesty. Equally, had the appellant had access to a friend or other associate (who was neither a police officer nor a government employee) to go to his vehicle and take the firearm to a police station and surrender it, he would have had the protection of the general amnesty. 38 It is against this factual background that the question arises as to the appropriate construction of s 64(1) of the Firearms Act. 39 It is well accepted that the correct approach to construing a statutory provision is to interpret the provision in a manner that gives the words a meaning consonant with the purpose or object of the legislation in which the provision is found. That task involves looking to the general purpose and policy of the provision, the surrounding statutory provisions and the statute as a whole. 40 In Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority,6 the plurality explained that the primary object of statutory construction was to construe the 6 (1998) 194 CLR 355. -- 8 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 7 relevant provision in a manner consistent with the language and purpose of all of the statutory provisions:7 The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all of the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined “by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole”....“[T]he context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed”. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed. (Citations omitted.) 41 The purposive approach to construing legislation is reflected in s 14(1) of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA), which provides: 14(1) In interpreting a provision of an Act or a legislative instrument, the interpretation that best achieves the purpose or object of the Act or the instrument (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or instrument) is to be preferred to any other interpretation. 42 The objects and purpose of the Firearms Act can be drawn from other provisions of that Act. Section 3 sets out the principles and objects of the Act. Relevantly, it provides: 3 – Principles and objects of Act (1) The underlying principles of this Act are– (a) … (b) To improve public safety– (i) by imposing strict controls on the possession, use, acquisition, supply and manufacture of firearms; and (ii) by promoting the safe and responsible storage, transport and use (whether for recreational or other purposes) of firearms; and (c) to facilitate a nationally consistent approach to the control of firearms. (2) The objects of this Act are as follows: (a) … (b) … (c) …. (d) … 7 Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). -- 9 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 8 (e) to reduce the number of firearms that are in unlawful possession in the community through a general amnesty; (f) to prevent or restrict persons and organisations from accessing, possessing or using firearms for criminal purposes; (g) to minimise the risk of persons becoming victims of crimes involving the use or threatened use of firearms; (h) to minimise the risk of persons causing injury or harm (including psychological harm) to themselves or others by the use or threatened use of firearms. 43 In addition, it is permissible to have regard to extrinsic materials to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision, taking into account its context and the purpose or object underlying s 64(1) of the Firearms Act.8 44 Section 64 was introduced into the Firearms Act by the Statues Amendment (Firearms Offences) Bill 2015 (SA). The Second Reading Speech concerning the Bill relevantly stated:9 Increase functionality of the Act The Bill intends to create a more efficient and effective regulatory framework for firearms control, that is easy to understand, use and comply with. Important reforms contained within the proposal aim to maximise the functionality of the Act by: - Including a provision prohibiting a person from being granted a firearms licence if the applicant has been found guilty of an offence prescribed by the Regulations (disqualifying offences); - Implementing a general and ongoing firearms amnesty to allow a person who has unauthorised possession of a firearm (or firearm related item such as ammunition or sound moderator) to surrender the item at a police station; and - Enabling the Registrar to exempt a person from a provision of the Act, creating significant administrative flexibility of the legislative scheme. 45 By reference to the surrounding provisions of the Firearms Act, as well as the extrinsic materials, it is evident that the purpose of the Firearms Act is to protect the safety of the community by creating an efficient and effective regulatory framework for closely regulating the possession of firearms,10 and for removing as many as possible from the community. It is as a part of this broad statutory scheme designed to closely regulate and control the possession and use 8 Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) s 16(1)(a), “to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision (taking into account its context in the Act or instrument and the purpose or object underlying the Act or instrument…”. 9 Parliament of South Australia, House of Assembly, Hansard, 24 September 2015, 2779. 10 R v Marafioti (2014) 118 SASR 511 at [24] (Kourakis CJ, with whom Vanstone and Stanley JJ agreed). -- 10 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 9 of firearms, that the purpose of the general amnesty is to encourage the surrender of unauthorised firearms to the relevant authorities, without fear of prosecution. 46 The general amnesty provision seeks to address the mischief of unauthorised and dangerous firearms circulating within the community by implementing a scheme which is easy to understand, use and comply with, whereby unauthorised firearms are surrendered and returned to the custody of police at a police station, where police are able to safely dispose of those firearms or arrange for the authorisation of their possession. 47 Accordingly, to give effect to the purpose of the general amnesty provision, and the broader mischief which it seeks to address, the words ‘brings the unauthorised item to a police station’ should not be construed narrowly, but in accordance with their ordinary meaning and so as to recognise that the bringing and surrendering of unauthorised firearms may be effected through a third-party agent. 48 That construction of s 64(1) of the Firearms Act gives effect to the purpose and intent of the general amnesty by ensuring that those who, for various reasons, cannot personally bring a firearm to a police station (or another approved location) can still surrender a firearm with the assistance of a third-party without fear of prosecution. That construction would best facilitate, and not undermine, the objects and purpose of the statutory provision by facilitating the removal of unauthorised firearms from the community. 49 As for the Director’s contention that s 64(1) of the Firearms Act does not extend to a case where a police officer or government employee acts on behalf of a person to bring an unauthorised firearm to a police station (or another approved location) in order to surrender it, it is said that to allow otherwise would place an unwarranted, added burden on police officers to bring unauthorised firearms to a police station or an approved location in order to affect their surrender. It was contended that this may, in some circumstances, require a police officer to search for and locate a firearm after the receipt of scant information, and that this undermined the operation of the general amnesty provision. 50 There is no textual basis for the Director’s construction of s 64(1) of the Firearms Act. The issues raised by the Director represent policy considerations which may or may not be thought relevant. They are far from incontestable. Some might think that police are in fact best placed to safely manage unauthorised firearms. We were told about a provision in the Northern Territory which permitted those with unregistered firearms to take advantage of an amnesty where they handed them in to police or told police of their whereabouts.11 11 Shah v Trenerry [1998] NTSC 11 (Martin CJ), regarding the terms of a notice published by the Commissioner of Police under the Firearms Act 1992 (NT), s 4(6)(b). -- 11 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 10 51 Importantly, however, it remains that the issues raised by the Director find no textual support in the provision or the Act when read as a whole. 52 In addition, by excluding police officers or government employees from the class of persons who can act as a third-party agent on behalf of a person in possession of a firearm, the operation of the provision would be limited in a way which undermined the very outcome which the amnesty was intended to achieve. For example, the Director’s construction could prevent those who are incapacitated or in a hospital or, as in this case, remanded in custody, from surrendering unauthorised firearms. It is not hard to imagine that people in these situations may not be in a position to request anyone apart from a police officer or a government employee to act as their agent to bring an unauthorised firearm to a police station in order to affect its surrender. 53 Equally, one can imagine a range of situations where, for reasons of public safety, it would not be appropriate for anyone other than a police officer to bring a firearm to a police station in order to surrender it. It is difficult to see why people in situations such as these ought not be able to avail themselves of the general amnesty where it is their intention to surrender possession of an unauthorised firearm. 54 As there is no textual support for the Director’s construction, and it would not give proper effect to the purpose and object of the general amnesty provision, it should be rejected. Rather, a purposive approach to construing the provision should be preferred. The words ‘brings the unauthorised item’ should be interpreted so as to include a person bringing and surrendering a firearm to a police station, or another approved location, personally or by a third-party agent, including by a police officer or government employee. The determination of the appeal 55 There was no dispute before the sentencing Judge or on appeal that the appellant saw a televised advertisement regarding the general amnesty and then asked a corrections officer to tell police about the firearm in his vehicle. The ordinary implication of this evidence is that the appellant was seeking assistance in order to surrender the firearm. 56 By reason of the correctional officer’s subsequent conduct, police officers retrieved the unauthorised firearm from the appellant’s locked vehicle and took it to the Mount Gambier Police Station, where the firearm was surrendered. In acting in this way, the corrections officer and police acted on behalf of the appellant. This occurred at a time when he remained in custody. 57 In the circumstances of this case, the fact that the police officers had the power to seize the unauthorised firearm does not preclude a finding that they were acting on behalf of the appellant when bringing the firearm to a police station and surrendering it. It is to be remembered that the appellant explicitly referred to the -- 12 of 13 -- [2025] SASCA 135 The Court 11 general amnesty when he asked the corrections officer to tell police about the location of the firearm and, by implication, to take it to a police station and surrender it. Accordingly, the general amnesty provision in s 64(1) of the Firearms Act was available to protect the appellant from prosecution. 58 It follows that Mr Cole’s legal advice to the appellant to the effect that he could not rely upon the general amnesty provision to defend the charge was incorrect. In his affidavit material, the appellant said that he pleaded guilty only because he was advised by Mr Cole that he did not have a defence. The appellant said that he would have maintained a not guilty plea had he been advised ‘that the general amnesty was arguable as a defence to the charge’. Had it not been for the incorrect legal advice given to the appellant, he would not have entered a guilty plea. 59 In all of these circumstances, this is not a case where the appellant made a fully informed decision to plead guilty. The appellant’s guilty plea to the firearms offence was not an admission attributable to a genuine consciousness of guilt, and there was a miscarriage of justice. 60 For those reasons, we grant an extension of time, grant permission to appeal, allow the appeal and quash the conviction. -- 13 of 13 --