MATTHEW JAMES MORROS No Attendance v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA [2025] SASC 40

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BOCHNER) CIV-24-002165 Appellant: MATTHEW JAMES MORROS No Attendance Respondent: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA Counsel: MR J RODER - Solicitor: GADENS LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 13/03/2025 File No/s: CIV-25-000850 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. MORROS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA [2025] SASC 40 Judgment of the Honourable Justice B Doyle (ex tempore) 13 March 2025 PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - EXECUTION AGAINST PROPERTY - WARRANTS OF SEIZURE AND SALE - PROCEDURE - APPLICATION AND TIME OF ISSUE By originating application on 7 March 2024, the respondent bank (‘CBA’) sought an order for possession in respect of land located at 3 Freeman Avenue Port Lincoln (‘the Land’) pursuant to Part XVII of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA), following the applicant’s default under a loan agreement and subsequent failure to comply with a notice of default issued pursuant to s 55A of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA). An order for possession was made on 29 May 2024. A warrant of possession was issued on 1 October 2024. The applicant’s interlocutory application seeking ‘discharge of the orders and the discharge of the mortgage’ was dismissed on 6 November 2024. The applicant seeks to appeal against the order for possession and, possibly, the dismissal of his interlocutory application. Held: 1. The applicant does not have reasonably arguable prospects of successfully challenging the possession order, the issue of the warrant of possession, or the dismissal of his interlocutory application. 2. The applicant is refused an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against the possession order. 3. The applicant is otherwise granted an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal but is refused leave to appeal. -- 1 of 9 -- Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA); Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 55A; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) Part XVII; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 204.3, 213.1(1)(a), 214.1(1), referred to. Collis v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2021] VSCA 17; Connel v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2023] WASCA 84; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Wilson [2013] SASC 6; Kozisek v Australia New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2019] WASCA 71; McDonald v Attorney-General for South Australia [2022] SASCA 43; Nelson v Greenman [2024] VSC 704; Provatidis v A McFarlane & Sons Pty Ltd [2021] SASC 142; Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501, discussed. -- 2 of 9 -- MORROS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA [2025] SASC 40 Single Judge Appeal: Civil 1 B DOYLE J: The applicant is the registered proprietor of land comprised in Certificate of Title Volume 5334 Folio 930 and located at 3 Freeman Avenue Port Lincoln (‘the Land’). On or about 20 December 2012, he entered into a written agreement with the respondent bank (‘CBA’) pursuant to which CBA agreed to lend the applicant the sum of $200,000. The applicant agreed to repay the loan together with interest on the terms set out in the loan contract. In support of his obligations under the loan contract he executed a first registered mortgage in favour of CBA in respect of the Land (‘the mortgage’). An order for possession was made in CBA’s favour on 29 May 2024. Whilst the precise scope of the proposed appeal is unclear, it likely includes a challenge to that order. Procedural background 2 By originating application filed on 7 March 2024, CBA sought an order for possession in respect of the Land pursuant to Part XVII of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA). The application was an accompanied by an affidavit sworn by a bank officer.1 The affidavit deposed to the entry into a loan agreement with the applicant, the terms of the mortgage, the applicant’s default, the service upon the applicant of a notice of default pursuant to s 55A of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA), and the applicant’s failure to comply with that notice. 3 An order for substituted service was made and service was effected on 25 March 2024. The applicant filed a response document dated 27 March 2024, claiming that the applicant stopped paying one of his loans with CBA ‘after finding out the bank could be frauding [sic] me and extorting me for money’. He also stated that he had, at the start of December 2023, sent a letter to CBA’s head office requesting to see the ‘original signed wet ink signature from myself and the bank’ and had received no response. The response document went on to make assertions about the bank being a corporation and a ‘dead entity’ and the applicant being a ‘living man’, making them not of the same likeness and the contract null and void. 4 The first directions hearing on 16 April 2024 was adjourned at the applicant’s request on health grounds. A further adjournment on 29 April 2024 was granted on similar grounds. On the eve of the third hearing of the proceedings, the applicant contacted the Court stating that his wallet had been stolen and that he would not be able to attend the hearing on 15 May 2024. The Court adjourned the matter for two weeks and granted him liberty to attend by telephone. 5 On the adjourned date, 29 May 2024, Bochner AsJ made an order for possession.2 The remarks indicate that the applicant had contended that there was 1 CIV-24-002165, FDN 3. 2 CIV-24-002165, Record of Outcome dated 29 May 2024 (FDN 18). -- 3 of 9 -- [2025] SASC 40 B Doyle J 2 no contract between him and CBA and that CBA had not provided consideration for such a contract. Having regard to the evidence before the Court, her Honour rejected the contention and accepted that reliance could be placed on a copy of the original loan document. Being satisfied that the account was considerably in arrears and that there had been no payment to the account for nearly 12 months, Bochner AsJ considered that the order for possession was appropriate. 6 The form of order provided, as is conventional, that if the applicant were to pay CBA all moneys secured by the mortgage, CBA was to redeliver possession of the Land to the applicant and discharge the mortgage.3 7 On 1 October 2024, CBA made an application for a warrant of possession and the warrant was issued with an expiry date of 29 November 2024. 8 However, on 23 October 2024, the applicant made an interlocutory application seeking the discharge of orders and the discharge of the mortgage. The application contained the following statement: I followed the judges [sic] orders and tried to make payment in full but it wasn’t accepted. I followed the rules and the bills of exchange states that if payment is not accepted then the debt is discharged and no recourse is given. I just want my home and to be left in peace as I have worked hard to get my home and worked hard repairing it from when I purchased it. Thankyou. 9 The applicant’s accompanying affidavit asserted that on 3 June 2024 he had sent payment to CBA’s lawyers, Gadens, in the form of a promissory note. He deposed that the bank had refused his payment and returned the note, stating it was not accepted.4 He then apparently issued a ‘notice of dishonour and discharge’ to the bank’s representatives. 10 On 5 November 2024, CBA’s legal representatives filed written submissions addressing these contentions and explaining why the purported promissory note had not discharged the applicant’s obligations under the loan contract. An affidavit of one of CBA’s legal representatives sworn on 5 November 2024 explained that there had in fact been two purported promissory notes provided by the applicant and that neither had been accepted by CBA.5 11 The first document purporting to be a promissory note was styled ‘Promissory Note No 767-87’ and stated that the issuer, who was named as ‘Matthew James, House of Morros’, undertook to pay the bearer upon presentation of the note at the designated place and time of settlement ‘the sum of one hundred four thousand two hundred forty-three point four (104243.40) Pound Sterling as full and final payment and or discharge of their obligations under this note’. The 3 CIV-24-002165, FDN 30. 4 CIV-24-002165, FDN 31. 5 CIV-24-002165, FDN 34. -- 4 of 9 -- [2025] SASC 40 B Doyle J 3 date of settlement was a date prior to the date of issue, and the place of settlement was an address in Woodend, Victoria, styled the ‘Royal Registry De Jure’. 12 The second document was in a similar form. 13 The applicant’s application was heard and dealt with on 6 November 2024. Shortly prior to the hearing the applicant had made contact with the Court indicating that he would not be attending and that he did not accept the jurisdiction of the Court. Despite that, attempts were made to contact him by telephone and he did not answer those calls. Bochner AsJ rejected any challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction and dismissed the applicant’s application on the basis it made no legal sense. Her Honour indicated that having considered the written and oral submissions of CBA’s legal representatives she considered it appropriate that CBA commence enforcement action in the matter. 14 Apparently members of the Sheriff’s Office and South Australia Police attended the Land on 28 November 2024 but they assessed that there was too much risk to officers and occupants of the Land to proceed with enforcement.6 15 I now turn to the appeal. Appeal 16 The applicant appears to have first instituted an appeal in late November 2024, but this was treated as an appeal in the criminal jurisdiction of the court. It had the action No. SCCRM-24-046866. Following an order by a deputy registrar, noting that the application was incorrectly lodged in the criminal jurisdiction, an appeal was instituted, or perhaps taken to be instituted, in the civil appellant jurisdiction of this Court in January 2024.7 17 Because it is not apparent whether the applicant bears any responsibility for the filing of the appeal in the criminal jurisdiction, I will proceed as though the present appeal was instituted on or around 22 November 2024. 18 The notices of appeal do not clearly identify the judgment the subject of appeal. The notices of appeal state: Judgment subject of appeal Date of judgment: 1 OCTOBER 2024 says no enforcement so why are the so called sheriff trying to hand me letter and threats. Court or Tribunal: Supreme Court Judicial Officer: Katrina Bochner Case number of Court or Tribunal: CIV-24-002165 6 CIV-25-000850, Respondent’s written submissions (FDN 9). 7 CIV-25-000850. -- 5 of 9 -- [2025] SASC 40 B Doyle J 4 19 The appeal grounds describe the orders challenged as ‘Judgment of possession of property’. 20 The notice of appeal claims to be brought under a variety of legislative provisions, none of which is relevant to an appeal against either the order for possession or a challenge to the issue of the warrant for possession. 21 The subject matter of the appeal therefore remains somewhat unclear. The issue of the warrant of possession on 1 October 2024 was pursuant to s 11(1) of the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) and was in accordance with r 204.2 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), because an order for possession of land had been made or given. The real focus of the proposed appeal must therefore be either the order for possession made on 29 May 2024 or, perhaps, the refusal of the applicant’s interlocutory application on 6 November 2024 by which he apparently sought to discharge the order for possession and, possibly, although it is not clear, the warrant of possession. 22 In either case leave to appeal is required by reason of r 213.1(1)(a) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), and any appeal ought to have been instituted within 21 days of the judgment or order the subject of the appeal, by reason of r 214.1(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA). 23 Even if the appeal is taken to have been instituted on 22 November 2024, an appeal against the possession order would require a significant extension of time. 24 In considering the application for an extension of time, the length of the delay is a matter to be taken into account. Even extensive delay may not defeat an application for an extension of time if there is a good explanation for the delay and little prejudice to the respondent. It is also relevant to consider the merits of the proposed appeal.8 Further and in any event, a consideration of whether there should be a grant of leave to appeal will involve, as part of an assessment of the interests of justice, a consideration of whether there the decision under appeal is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal.9 25 I therefore turn to consider the merits of the proposed appeal. 26 The appeal grounds comprise the following. 1. Undue process. Unserved documents, giving no time to act and served documents contain fraud. 2. Perverting course of justice, withholding crucial evidence in way of discovery. 3. Lack of jurisdiction of article 1 court as I’m a living man who can only be presenting in article 3 courts. 8 See, eg, Provatidis v A McFarlane & Sons Pty Ltd [2021] SASC 142 at [36] (Hughes J). 9 See, eg, McDonald v Attorney-General for South Australia [2022] SASCA 43 at [21] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). -- 6 of 9 -- [2025] SASC 40 B Doyle J 5 4. Crime of personage attempting to join a fiction name to a living man. 5. Attempting to usurp my property causing the only loss to the only victim in this case. 27 The orders sought on appeal are: Discharge orders of possession I have declaration of sale and sealed deed with common law courts international and common law courts australia along with land title in my name claiming ownership and reserving all my rights under common law. 28 In connection with the appeal the applicant has filed an affidavit.10 The affidavit is difficult to follow. It makes reference to the failure to produce the original wet-ink signature and accounting records. It appears to allege conversion of promissory notes and appears to complain of the court’s failure to respond to the request for common law rights of the applicant. It concludes: For the final statement by Matthew-James: of the family Morros with the claim of non- consent to the fraudulent actions by the court and the Commonwealth banks representatives is with the declaration of the rights as a living man with the allegiance to the crown with the unalienable rights under common law. 29 The applicant also filed with the Court a bundle of documents purportedly created in 2023 and styled a ‘Book of Deeds Extract Sale Declaration’. They bear a logo or purported seal of the ‘Common Law Courts Great Britain & International’. The claimed effect of the documents appears to be that the Land has been ‘transferred from the statutory jurisdiction to a Common Law jurisdiction and from the legal fictions/entities to the man and woman’. 30 Finally, the applicant filed a document styled a ‘Notice of lawful challenge to the authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of South Australia’. The document amounts to a series of arguments as to why this Court lacks jurisdiction over the applicant or the Land. It contains references to the creation of a ‘Cruinn Community’, assertions that a State Court can only deal with ‘PERSONS and not living, breathing men and women’, statements to the effect that slavery is abhorrent, purported summaries of decisions of the Scottish Court of Sessions and the United States Supreme Court, references to the ‘Hague Conference on Private International Law 1951’ and the ‘United Nations Declarations of Human Rights 1948’, and contentions relating to ‘Elizabeth Alexandra Mary Battenberg’s Fraudulent Coronation’. 31 The applicant has not filed written submissions in support of his appeal, or in support of any application for leave to appeal, or any extension of time within which to do so. It is apparent from various communications he has sent to the Court and to CBA that he contests the jurisdiction of the Court in various respects and this may explain his failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules. 10 CIV-25-000850, FDN 4. -- 7 of 9 -- [2025] SASC 40 B Doyle J 6 32 The respondent to the appeal has, however, filed written submissions which respond to the main contentions that can be discerned from the documents filed by the applicant. 33 In brief overview, CBA contends, and I accept, that: (1) there was proper material before the Court to justify the possession order; (2) the contention that the loan agreement was not enforceable, or that the possession order should not have been made, without production of an original document, is baseless;11 (3) at the time the order for possession was made there was no material before the Court giving rise to an arguable defence, and so the order was properly made; (4) the subsequent reliance by the applicant upon purported and unaccepted promissory notes does not avail him, even if they are contended to comprise bills of exchange, for reasons given in numerous authorities;12 (5) the contentions to the effect that this Court lacks jurisdiction, apart from being self-defeating in respect of the proposed appeal, are without foundation, having regard to the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and the State and Commonwealth Constitutions; (6) the balance of the applicant’s contentions comprise arguments that can fairly, or even generously, be described as ‘pseudolaw’ and have been consistently rejected. For instance, the claimed distinction between the capacities or personae of the applicant has been consistently rejected.13 There is no basis to entertain a challenge to the validity of relevant legislation or the identity or status of the sovereign, and no reason to give any credence to documents purporting to emanate from ‘common law courts’ that do not form part of the integrated Australian judicial system.14 The international treaties or conventions referred to by the applicant have no relevance to the matters that arose in the course of the possession proceedings. 34 Subsequently to the filing of CBA’s written submissions, the applicant prepared a written document by way of rebuttal. The document contended, inter alia, that the appearance of a Crown Seal on court documents was fraudulent, exposing the persons responsible to criminal penalties, asserting that the Court’s 11 A contention to like effect was found not to amount to a reasonably arguable ground of appeal in Kozisek v Australia New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2019] WASCA 71 (Murphy and Beech JJA). A contention that it was necessary to produce a ‘wet ink signatured contract’ was rejected in Connel v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2023] WASCA 84 at [24] (Murphy and Mitchell JJA). 12 See, eg, ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v Wilson [2013] SASC 6 at [5]-[15] (Master Burley), Collis v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2021] VSCA 17 at [107] (Tate and Sifris JJA, Macaulay AJA). 13 See, eg, Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501 at [23] (John Dixon J). 14 Cf. Nelson v Greenman [2024] VSC 704 at [66] (Gobbo AsJ). -- 8 of 9 -- [2025] SASC 40 B Doyle J 7 failure to respond to his earlier ‘lawful challenge’ document meant that the Court lacked authority to hear the case, reiterating a request for a ‘wet ink’ document, asserting a failure by the bank to provide consideration in connection with the loan, demanding disclosure of various documents, asserting that the promissory note were a legally recognised financial instrument, and other contentions. 35 The applicant has also sent several emails to the Court. One of the points made in those emails is that the Court’s continued silence in relation to his challenges to its jurisdiction amounts to acceptance of those challenges by operation of the principles of estoppel by acquiescence. For completeness, I reject the proposition that principles of estoppel may operate against a Court in this way. In subsequent emails, the applicant points to a contended irregularity in that he was denied discovery of internal bank documents and has consistently voiced his non- consent to the proceedings. The answer to the first complaint is that as there was no reasonably arguable basis to resist the possession order, there was no occasion for an order for discovery. The answer to the second is that the applicant’s consent is not a necessary feature of possession proceedings against him. 36 It may be doubted whether a Court considering an application for leave to appeal is obliged distinctly to consider matters raised not by written submissions but by emails sent to the Court without leave. However, for the avoidance of doubt, I have read and considered the communications sent by the applicant. Oral argument 37 The matter was listed before me for hearing today, 13 March 2025, at 10:15 am. The applicant has not appeared. The matter has been called outside court twice and telephone calls have been made to the applicant’s mobile phone number in an attempt to contact him without success. Being satisfied that the applicant had proper notice of the hearing and had been given an opportunity to attend and make submissions, at around 10:50 am, I determined to proceed to hear and decide this matter. Disposition 38 Neither the grounds of appeal, the affidavits filed below or in connection with the appeal, nor the documents or emails authored by the applicant persuade me that an appeal against the possession order, a challenge to the issue of the warrant of possession, or the dismissal of the applicant’s interlocutory application on 6 November 2024, has a reasonably arguable prospect of success. 39 I would refuse the applicant an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against the possession order and would, in any case, have refused leave to appeal in relation to the appeal against that order. To the extent that the appeal challenges any other order made in the proceeding below, including the order dismissing the applicant’s interlocutory application on 6 November 2024, I would, to the extent necessary, grant an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, but refuse leave to appeal. I will hear the parties as to costs. -- 9 of 9 --