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Amit Parwar v Olympus Australia Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 2116

Case law · Commonwealth · 2026
1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.394—Unfair dismissal Amit Parwar v Olympus Australia Pty Ltd (U2026/5457) COMMISSIONER FOX MELBOURNE, 15 JUNE 2026 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – out of time – no exceptional circumstances – application dismissed [1] On 11 May 2026, Mr Parwar made an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act). The Respondent to Mr Parwar’s application is Olympus Australia Pty Ltd (Olympus). [2] On 20 May 2026, Olympus filed a Form F3 in which it raised two jurisdictional objections, being that the application is out of time, and that the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. [3] Section 394(2) of the Act states that an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, or within a further period as the Commission allows pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act. Mr Parwar’s Form F2 states that his dismissal was effective from 13 March 2026. Mr Parwar has filed his application 38 days late. [4] The relevant period required to be considered under s.394(3)(a) is the period after the 21-day timeframe for lodging the application, being 3 April 2026 to 11 May 2026. However, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered in order to determine whether there is a reason for the delay beyond the 21-day period and ultimately whether that reason constitutes exceptional circumstances. [5] For the application to proceed, Mr Parwar requires the Commission to grant a further period of time within which to bring his application. The Commission has discretion to provide Mr Parwar with an extension of time if satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist. [6] Parties were provided an opportunity to file any material in support of their position as to whether an extension of time should be granted, and a Determinative Conference was conducted on 2 June 2026. [7] For the reasons given below, I have determined not to grant Mr Parwar an extension of time. [2026] FWC 2116 DECISION AND ORDER -- 1 of 5 -- [2026] FWC 2116 2 Background [8] In November 2025, Olympus underwent a global restructure which resulted in a global headcount reduction of 2000 employees. [9] Mr Parwar was employed by Olympus as an Associate Product Manager – ET role in the ET/Uro Business Unit before subsequently being made redundant. After a consultation period, his employment was terminated on 12 March 2026, with his last day of employment being 13 March 2026. [10] In May 2026, Mr Parwar discovered that Olympus had advertised for an Associate Product Manager role in the Urology/ Gynaecology Business Unit. The position description for the role was dated April 2026. Mr Parwar says that this was a similar role to his, and that this shows his redundancy was not genuine. Consideration [11] The Commission can grant an extension of time for the lodging of an unfair dismissal application under s.394(2)(b) of the Act if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. [12] The test to determine whether there are exceptional circumstances is a ‘high hurdle,’ and one that involves the exercise of discretion.1 The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered and summarised by the Full Bench in Nulty v Blue Star Group:2 “In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.” [13] In considering whether there are exceptional circumstances, the Commission must take into account the following: (a) the reason for the delay; (b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; (c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; (d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); (e) the merits of the application; and (f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.3 Reason for the delay [14] Mr Parwar’s says the reason for the delay is that seven weeks after his role was made redundant, he came across an advertisement for an Associate Product Manager on Seek and Olympus’ website. Mr Parwar says that Olympus deliberately made his role redundant; did not redeploy him; and then created the same role in April, which was not advertised until after the 21 days had elapsed. -- 2 of 5 -- [2026] FWC 2116 3 [15] Mr Parwar says that in learning this information, he contacted the Commission and sought legal advice before making his unfair dismissal application. [16] At the Determinative Conference, it was Mr Parwar’s evidence that he felt the redundancy process was rushed, and that he had doubts as to whether the redundancy was genuine. He says that he raised his concerns with the General Manager and asked whether the removal of his role was due to concerns he had raised about bullying, harassment and intimidation between May 2025 and February 2026, by some colleagues in the Medical and Scientific Affairs (MSA) department. Mr Parwar also felt that there were racial and gender biases in the redundancy decision-making process. [17] There have been circumstances similar to Mr Parawar’s in which the Commission has found there are exceptional circumstances where a job advertisement for the redundant role has been later discovered.4 However, in these cases considerable weight is given to whether the application was made immediately and without delay after discovering that their former job appeared to have been advertised. In Mr Parwar’s case, he discovered the advertisement on 5 May 2026 and made his application 6 days later. It was Mr Parwar’s evidence that when he discovered the advertisement, he rang the Commission the same day to seek assistance. He says he then sought legal advice which took some days before he could secure an appointment. After attending the appointment, he then filed his application later that same day. [18] I consider Mr Parwar did not act with sufficient urgency in making his application, instead preferring to wait for legal advice before taking any further action. In my view, there is no reason why Mr Parwar needed to wait for legal advice before making his application and I do not consider it a plausible reason for delay. There is ample information available on the Commission website to assist parties to make an application. I also consider that if Mr Parwar had concerns about the genuineness of the redundancy from the outset, then he could have made an application at that time. [19] I do not consider the reasons for the delay constitute exceptional circumstances. This factor weighs against a finding of exceptional circumstances. Whether Mr Parwar became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect [20] It is not contented by either party that Mr Parwar became aware of his dismissal after it had taken effect. Consultation commenced in early March 2026, and Mr Parwar received a letter dated 12 March 2026 confirming that Olympus had been unable to identify suitable redeployment opportunities, and that his role was redundant as of 13 March 2026. I consider this factor to be neutral. Action to dispute the dismissal [21] As to whether Mr Parwar took any action to dispute the dismissal, Olympus submits that whilst Mr Parwar expressed a desire to remain employed, he did not take any action to dispute the dismissal. It says there was no action taken by Mr Parwar to contact Olympus upon discovering the job advertisement, and that Olympus was not aware of any of Mr Parwar’s concerns until receipt of the Form F2. -- 3 of 5 -- [2026] FWC 2116 4 [22] Mr Parwar did not make any submissions on what action, besides the filing of the Form F2, he took to dispute the dismissal. I consider this a neutral factor. Prejudice to Olympus [23] I consider the prejudice to Olympus to be no more than what would be suffered had the application been filed on time. This is a neutral consideration. Merits [24] As to the merits, Mr Parwar submits that his redundancy was not genuine because Olympus advertised a similar role to his only weeks after he was made redundant and that he was never given the opportunity to undertake that role. [25] Olympus maintains that the dismissal was a genuine redundancy due to operational changes and the new corporate strategy which resulted in changes to the APM role in the ET business unit. It says that suitable redeployment opportunities were considered, Mr Parwar was treated consistently with others impacted by the restructure and there was no bias in the decision-making process of the restructure. Olympus says that role advertised is held by another employee who has been seconded to a role for a parental leave replacement. The advertised role is a fixed term role designed to cover this employee, while in the seconded role. The employee remains in her role as a substantive employee and will return to that role when the secondment ends. [26] Given the nature of the matter and the contested facts of the dispute, I am unable to make a full assessment on the merits of the case without hearing all the evidence. As such, I consider this a neutral factor. Fairness between Mr Parwar and other persons in a similar position [27] No relevant matters were drawn to my attention concerning fairness between Mr Parwar and other persons in a like position. I consider this a neutral consideration. Conclusion [28] Taking into account all the matters in s.394(3) of the Act, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which would warrant an extension of time. Mr Parwar’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy is therefore dismissed, and an Order5 to this effect is issued with this Decision. -- 4 of 5 -- [2026] FWC 2116 5 COMMISSIONER Appearances: A Parwar, Applicant A Van Gils, Respondent Hearing details: 2026 2 June By video using Microsoft Teams Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR810810> 1 Bilkis v Commonwealth of Australia, represented by Services Australia [2020] FWCFB 4859 [6]. 2 [2011] FWAFB 975 at [13]. 3 s394(3) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 4 Smith v Penrite Oil Company T/A Penrite [2020] FWC 3446, Perret v Ayers Real Estate [2020] FWC 2981 5 PR810810. -- 5 of 5 --