Alicia Beik v Community Housing (Vic) Ltd [2026] FWC 2620

1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.394—Unfair dismissal Alicia Beik v Community Housing (Vic) Ltd (U2025/12769) DEPUTY PRESIDENT BELL MELBOURNE, 13 JULY 2026 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - dismissal a genuine redundancy - dismissal not unfair - application dismissed. [1] Ms Alicia Beik’s employment was terminated at her employer’s initiative effective 25 July 2025, for reasons expressed to be a redundancy. Ms Beik challenges that dismissal as being unfair. The employer, Community Housing (Vic) Pty Ltd, states that the dismissal was one of ‘genuine redundancy’, as that term appears in section 389 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Act). [2] Many, although not all, of the facts were largely unchallenged or not in dispute. Ms Beik gave evidence on her own behalf and also filed a witness statement for Ms Danielle How. Ms How was Ms Beik’s former direct manager with the employer. Ms How was made redundant as part of the same process that saw Ms Beik’s employment terminated. The employer called as its witnesses Ms Caitlin Gibbs, a General Manager for the respondent, and Ms Cathy Dillon, a human resources employee for the respondent. [3] Community Housing (Vic) Pty Ltd is a subsidiary of the not-for-profit group Community House Limited (CHL). The broader CHL group is a regulated provider of community housing, operating across Australia. Relevant to the present proceeding is a program called the ‘Ground Lease Model’ program or ‘GLM program’. Ms Beik worked within that program as Senior Property Manager. [4] It is necessary to say something of the structure of the Ground Lease Model program, as is relevant to this proceeding. The Ground Lease Model program is a public-private partnership under which the State Government of Victoria, through Homes Victoria, grants a long-term ground lease to a private consortium to finance, construct, operate and maintain ‘mixed-tenure housing’ across various designated sites. The respondent is a member of the consortium. [2026] FWC 2620 DECISION -- 1 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 2 [5] The employer’s role in the consortium is operator. The Ground Lease Model program commenced with phase ‘GLM 1’, which was constituted of apartment buildings located in Brighton, Flemington and Prahran, each in Victoria. Those apartments commenced operation in about July 2024. [6] One aspect of the respondent’s role in the Ground Lease Model program was complying with contractual obligations it was required to meet for (among other matters) tenancy rates. Specifically, the respondent was obliged to ensure minimum tenancy rates across the GLM1 properties of 96%. As at June 2025, the respondent was falling slightly short of its contractual target (being 92% in June 2025) and had also fallen short in the four preceding months. The employer was anxious to remedy these short-falls. [7] Additionally, the Ground Lease Model program was to be commencing phase GLM 2, which was due to commence with tenancy in 2026 with additional properties. The commencement of GLM2 involved a significant scale-up of the Ground Lease Model program. [8] It is with that background that, by around 22 May 2025, the Chief Operations Officer had determined to conduct a review of the existing operations to find any improvements and to ensure that the program would be meeting its contractual obligations, particularly having regard to the foreshadowed increase in the program scope. In a meeting on that day which Ms Dillon attended, the COO indicated there might be significant changes to the program. [9] In June 2025, Ms Gibbs was engaged as a General Manager for the respondent. Her employment commenced on 23 June 2025. Ms Gibbs had responsibility for the Ground Lease Model program and her duties included, among other things, ensuring the program was meeting its contractual obligations such as tenancy rates. She initially reported to the COO. [10] On Ms Gibbs’ commencement as General Manager, she was asked by the COO to review the structure and performance of the Ground Lease Model program. That is what she did. [11] At that time, Ms Beik’s role as a Senior Property Manager required her to supervise two Property Managers. Those two property managers covered work for the three geographic sites between them that were part of GLM 1 at the time. [12] Ms Gibbs considered that a more effective use of the Property Managers was to make them site-specific. There were various reasons for that, which are unnecessary to describe in detail, although I accept that they reflected changes Ms Gibbs sought to make. [13] One consequence of Ms Gibbs’ review was that an additional Property Manager would be required (i.e. there would be a Property Manager for each of the three properties in GLM1). A second consequence, directly relevant to Ms Beik, was that her position would be removed. The Property Managers would, on Ms Gibbs’ view, then report directly to Ms Gibbs. The management layers comprising both Ms Beik’s role and Ms How’s role would be removed. There were other aspects of the proposal that are unnecessary to detail. -- 2 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 3 [14] One final facet of Ms Gibbs’ review involved the temporary addition of a ‘Senior Leasing Consultant’. That role had similarities to Ms Beik’s role but also differences. It was also temporary, being three months’ duration at the outer limit. [15] The Senior Leasing Consultant role was, as its title suggests, primarily a consultancy role. With that said, an important aspect of the role included operational matters, encompassing the Property Manager work at one of the three properties in GLM1. The two remaining Property Managers would also briefly report to the Senior Leasing Consultant during the period of the consultancy. However, the principal purpose of the role was to make findings and recommendations as to various operational matters, including the identification of any pressing issues and making quick decisions or recommendations. [16] Returning to the timing of events, the review being undertaken by Ms Gibbs had progressed. Ms Dillon’s evidence includes a meeting she attended on 11 July 2025 with Ms Gibbs and the Chief Operations Officer, where those two outlined proposed changes to the GLM Program's operations, including the potential redundancy of the role of Senior Property Manager and Ground Lease Model Operational Manager. Ms Dillon’s role in these discussions and more generally was to provide HR support, guidance, and advice about the process of implementing any potential restructures from a compliance perspective. [17] By 16 July 2025, Ms Dillon was advised by Ms Gibbs that a decision had been made to proceed with restructuring the property management team within the GLM Program. That decision required formal approval from the Chief Executive Officer. Approval from the CEO was given on 21 July 2025. [18] On 21 July 2025, Ms Gibbs sent Ms Beik a meeting invitation, scheduled for 4pm on 22 July 2025, titled “Discussion regarding GLM Team Structure”. The invitation indicated that Ms Dillon would be joining. [19] The meeting on 22 July 2025 went ahead. Ms Dillon’s summary of it, which is clearly based on her notes and which I accept, is that Ms Gibbs explained the structural changes planned and the reasons behind them. I do not consider it is necessary to set out the detail. At the meeting, Ms Gibbs also states that, under the restructure, Ms Beik’s role as Senior Property Manager would become redundant on 25 July 2025 and that CHL was consulting with her about the impact of the changes on her employment. [20] Shortly after that meeting, Ms Dillon sent Ms Beik an email containing a letter and various attachments confirming the essential details of the meeting just held. Among other matters, the letter confirmed the employer’s intention that Ms Beik’s role would be made redundant effective 25 July 2025. The letter also stated that the employer had considered whether any vacancies currently available within CHL Group aligned with Ms Beik’s skills and experience and informed her the employer had not identified any such position. Nonetheless, a list of current vacancies was attached. [21] Ms Beik was given special paid leave until Friday, 25 July 2025 to consider her options, during which she was under no obligation to work. A meeting was scheduled for 3pm, on 24 July 2025 to discuss the progress of Ms Beik’s consideration and her options further. These matters were also raised at the earlier meeting. -- 3 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 4 [22] Ms Beik reviewed the list of vacancies provided to her. She formed the view that none were suitable. However, the list of current vacancies attached to the letter sent to Ms Beik on 22 July 2025 did not include reference to the Senior Leasing Consultancy position. I return to this matter below. [23] Later that night on the same date, Ms Beik sent Ms Dillon a reply email. It stated: “Hi Cathy, Thanks for your email and forwarding the documents following today's meeting. After some reflection, I've decided not to pursue further employment within CHL. As such, I won't be attending the follow-up meeting scheduled on Thursday. However, I do want to express my disappointment with how poorly this situation has been handled, particularly given the circumstances and recent challenges. It's been a pleasure working with you Cathy, and I wishing you all the best” [24] The following day, being 23 July 2025, Ms Beik booked flights to travel overseas, in which she would be leaving on 26 July 2025. There is no dispute that the meeting scheduled for 24 July 2025 did not go ahead. [25] On 25 July 2025, Ms Beik’s employment was terminated on the basis of redundancy, effective that day. A letter was sent to Ms Beik to that effect. [26] Ms Beik says that the short-term Senior Leasing Consultancy position should have been offered to her. I do not accept that proposition. [27] While there were aspects of this temporary role that Ms Beik plainly could have performed, the strategic element was essential and Ms Beik was not suited to that aspect. So far as the role encompassed the duties of a Property Manager, that is a clear example of functions Ms Beik could have performed. [28] In her oral evidence, Ms Beik acknowledged there was a difference between operations - meaning what happens day to day in an enterprise like CHL - and the idea of strategy, which is a higher level or more removed viewpoint. It was put to Ms Beik that, based on her CV and her experience at CHL, she hadn’t led any kind of strategic review of a project like GLM. Ms Beik disagreed with this and said she had been involved “with lots of reporting”. However, when Ms Beik was asked whether she had any experience with designing the process or potentially changing it as opposed to using the system that’s already in place, Ms Beik agreed she did not have that experience. -- 4 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 5 [29] I note that Ms Beik relied upon opinion evidence from Ms Daniel How (her former line manager) that Ms Beik’s duties were directly aligned with the Senior Leasing Consultancy role. Ms How did not attend to give evidence. Although her statement was tendered, I place little weight upon it. Most of it was argumentative, in the nature of submission, and also appeared to reflect Ms How’s own unhappiness with the redundancy process. Mr How’s statement also does not address the matters that Ms Beik acknowledged in her oral evidence. [30] Ms Beik also challenges the bona fides of Ms Gibbs’ desire to have an independent person performing that role. I accept Ms Gibbs’ evidence on this issue. In doing so, I also note that Ms Gibbs herself was new to her role. She was being asked, at relatively short notice, to finalise a review and make recommendations that might have enduring impact where a significant scale-up of operations was on the cards. True it is that further changes could always be made but it is clear that Ms Gibbs was looking to bed down a structure for both current and future needs. A part of that involved Ms Gibbs wanting someone with ‘fresh eyes’ to work in, review, and make recommendations for an important part of the Ground Lease Model program. An organisation obtaining external assistance for a review is not novel. Ms Gibbs’ preference was also for someone to step in immediately with experience, which she considered could be more readily achieved with a short-term contract. In any case, it was not a role Ms Beik was suitable for. [31] Ms Beik says that the employer made a “deliberate decision” not to offer her that position. In that context, Ms Beik is indicating the employer improperly failed to offer that position to her as part of a scheme “engineered to exclude her from redeployment consideration.” Ms Beik describes this a “deliberate omission” and “misrepresentation”. I reject that submission. I accept the evidence of each of Ms Gibbs and Ms Dillon on this broader issue. It is correct that the position was not offered to Ms Beik but it was not offered to her because the employer’s belief was that Ms Beik did not have a sufficient skill set to perform the strategic elements of the consultancy role. First, I accept that belief was sincerely held and, second, it was objectively sound for the reasons summarised above. Consideration [32] Ms Beik was a person “protected from unfair dismissal” for the purposes of s 382 of the Act and therefore entitled to bring an unfair dismissal application. There is no issue that her application was brought within the 21-day period of s 394. There was also no dispute that she was “dismissed” at the employer’s initiative for the purposes of s 385(a) and the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code was not engaged for the purpose of s 385(c). [33] The two issues in dispute were, firstly, whether the dismissal was a case of “genuine redundancy” and, if not, whether the dismissal was otherwise “harsh, unjust or unreasonable”. Was the dismissal a case of genuine redundancy? [34] By s 389(1) of the Act, a person’s dismissal is a case of genuine redundancy if: (a) the person’s employer no longer required the person’s job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise; and -- 5 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 6 (b) the employer has complied with any obligation in a modern award or enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the redundancy. [35] However, by section 389(2) of the Act, a person’s dismissal will not be a case of genuine redundancy if it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to have been redeployed with the employer’s enterprise or within an associated enterprise. [36] An oft-cited explanation of the operation of s 389(1)(a) was given by a Full Bench in Ulan Coal Mines Ltd v Howarth (2010) 196 IR 32. Section 389(1)(a) requires that a “job” is no longer required to be performed. The Full Bench noted, with evident approval, the observations of Ryan J in Jones v Department of Energy and Minerals (1995) 60 IR 304 that a job involves “a collection of functions, duties and responsibilities entrusted, as part of the scheme of the employees’ organisation, to a particular employee”. Ryan J in that case considered a set of circumstances where an employer might rearrange the organisational structure by breaking up the collection of functions, duties and responsibilities attached to a single position and distributing them among the holders of other positions, including newly-created positions. [37] In the present case, the description given by Ryan J aptly describes the scenario before me: the various duties that comprised Ms Beik’s job were being broken up and distributed to (primarily) the more junior Property Manager roles and the more supervisory functions assigned to the General Manager. Ms Beik’s job – and another job to whom she previously reported – were no longer required to be performed by anyone and the reason for that was because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise. The requirements of s 389(1)(a) are satisfied. [38] For section 389(1)(b) of the Act, it was agreed that the Real Estate Industry Award 2020 (Award) applied. Clause 26 of the Award required consultation about various major changes that are likely to have a significant effect on employees. Termination of employment is expressly stated to be a significant effect. [39] The consultation follows the making of a “definite decision” about those changes. A definite decision was made on 21 July 2025, which was to make Ms Beik’s position redundant. [40] Clause 26.1(a) of the Award required the employer to give notice to affected employees of the changes. Ms Beik was notified on 22 July 2025, both verbally and in writing of the change – i.e. the redundancy. Clause 26.1(b) requires the employer to discuss the introduction of the changes, the likely effect of the changes, and measures to avoid or reduce the adverse effects of the changes. I am satisfied that the employer did discuss each of those matters, which are reflected in the evidence of Ms Gibbs, Ms Dillon and are also recorded in Ms Dillon’s notes. The employer did so as soon as practicable after the definite decision was made: Award, cl 26.1(c). I do not consider there were any matters that arose for specific further consideration for the purposes of cl 26.4. -- 6 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 7 [41] The employer must also give, in writing, all relevant information about the changes including their nature, expected effect and any other matters likely to affect the employee: cl 26.2. The employer did provide that material in writing. In short, the nature of the change was a restructure, the expected effect was the loss of Ms Beik’s position and the termination of her employment, and there were unfortunately for Ms Beik other matters the employer was capable of providing in a positive sense (noting that it had advised that it did not consider there were any available positions elsewhere that might affect Ms Beik). [42] Ms Beik says, in substance, that the discussion was perfunctory and not a consultation. There are aspects of this that are clearly understandable and reflect her evident distress arising from being made redundant but this misunderstands the obligations. The employer was not required to consult about whether the redundancy should occur or whether some other restructure could have been adopted. The consultation is following a “definite” decision that the redundancy will go ahead. In that respect, it is understandable that Ms Beik felt (for example) the process lacked “transparency, procedural fairness and basic respect” although I do not accept that conclusion. [43] One particular issue pressed by Ms Beik concerned the Senior Leasing Consultant position. While the employer’s decision not to inform Ms Beik about the proposed Senior Leasing Consultancy role on 22 July 2025 was not improper, with hindsight it would have been prudent for them to have done so. From Ms Beik’s point of view, this has clearly affected how she saw things, particularly after learning of them belatedly. If the details of the proposed consultancy position, the shortness of its duration, and the reasons for Ms Beik’s unsuitability were flagged at the time, it is possible that Ms Beik might not have felt about the issue the same way. Notwithstanding, I am satisfied the employer complied with its obligation in the Award to consult about the redundancy. [44] Finally for the purposes of s 389 of the Act is section 389(2), which asks if it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to have been redeployed with the employer’s enterprise or within an associated enterprise. None of the positions in the list given to Ms Beik were suitable (a matter Ms Beik acknowledged). The Senior Leasing Consultancy role was also not suitable for the reasons I have given above. No other position was identified that would have been reasonable to redeploy Ms Beik into. [45] The dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy for the purposes of sections 385(d) and 389 of the Act. It follows that Ms Beik was not unfairly dismissed for the purposes of section 385. Was the dismissal otherwise harsh, unjust or unreasonable? [46] In the event that I did not consider the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy, I consider the dismissal was fair because the dismissal was not otherwise harsh, unjust or unreasonable. I will briefly explain why. [47] Ms Beik was not dismissed because of her capacity or conduct: s 387(a). To the contrary, the employer made it clear that the dismissal was not about performance. Section 387(a) is not applicable. -- 7 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 8 [48] The matter that is required to be taken into account under s.387(b) of the Act is whether the employee “was notified of that reason”. Contextually the reference to “that reason” is the valid reason found to exist under s.387(a),1 which I have concluded is not applicable. As neither s.386(a) or s.386(b) are applicable, similar considerations apply for s.386(c), which concern the opportunity to respond to the reasons relating to the “conduct or capacity” of the employee and also for s.387(e). Notwithstanding, I consider that matters concerning notification of reasons for dismissal and opportunity to respond are matters that may (although not always must) be capable of consideration under s.387(h). I am satisfied that Ms Beik was notified of the reasons for her dismissal – i.e. the redundancy associated with the restructure – and was given an opportunity to respond, which included a period of special leave. I treat these factors neutrally. [49] For section 387(d), where an employee protected from unfair dismissal has requested a support person be present to assist in discussions relating to the dismissal, an employer should not unreasonably refuse that person being present. There is no positive obligation on an employer to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person. In the present case, Ms Beik was not refused the opportunity to have a support person at the initial meeting, although it might also be observed that the opportunity did not meaningfully arise for that first meeting. She was positively offered to bring a support person for the second scheduled meeting (although this ultimately did not go ahead). I treat this factor neutrally. [50] For the purposes of sections 387(f) & (g), the employer is a sufficiently large employer with dedicated human resources management expertise. Having regard to the procedures followed, I consider sections 387(f) and (g) are neutral factors. [51] For the purpose of section 387(h), the Commission is required to consider any other matter relevant to the dismissal. Although I observed early that, with hindsight, it might have been prudent to have specifically alerted Ms Beik to the employer’s intention to engage a short- term Senior Leasing Consultant, I do not consider this rises to any level rendering the dismissal unfair. The impact of the redundancy on Ms Beik and the suddenness are factors in Ms Beik’s favour of an overall finding of harshness. However, I do not consider they rise to a level that would make the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable taking into account all matters, including that Ms Beik’s position was factually redundant and there was no suitable alternative role. The employer was not required to hold Ms Beik’s position open for some extended period of time in circumstances where it had made a legitimate and definitive operational decision that Ms Beik’s position was no longer required. [52] Having regard to all the factors in s 387 of the Act, the termination of Ms Beik’s employment by way of redundancy was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Remedy [53] It is unnecessary to consider Ms Beik’s claim for compensation for 26 weeks’ pay. 1 Reseigh v Stegbar Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 533, [55]. -- 8 of 9 -- [2026] FWC 2620 9 Disposition [54] Ms Beik’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy must therefore be dismissed. An order2 to that effect will be issued separately with these reasons. DEPUTY PRESIDENT Appearances: A. Beik on her own behalf. B. Murphy of Counsel, instructed by B. Silverman of Kingston Reid, for the Respondent. Determinative conference details: 2025. Melbourne: November 27. Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR811975> 2 PR812022. -- 9 of 9 --