Adrianna Permus v Avid Holding Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 2702

1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy Adrianna Permus v Avid Holding Pty Ltd (U2025/17411) COMMISSIONER SLOAN SYDNEY, 20 JULY 2026 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – applicant declined to participate in the hearing – consequently no evidence led or submissions made in support of application – application determined on respondent’s evidence and submissions – application dismissed Introduction [1] On 15 October 2025, Avid Holding Pty Ltd as Trustee for Avid Holding Unit Trust dismissed Adrianna Permus from her employment as an Electrical Apprentice. Ms Permus subsequently commenced proceedings against Avid Holding by filing an application under section 394 of the Fair Work Act 20091 (UD Application). [2] The UD Application was listed for hearing on 28 May 2026. In the circumstances I will come to describe, Ms Permus elected not to participate in the hearing. The hearing proceeded in her absence. As a result, the only material before me is the uncontested evidence and submissions of Avid Holding. [3] For the following reasons, I have determined to dismiss the UD Application. Procedural history [4] To provide context to what follows, it is necessary to provide a chronology of the relevant procedural history of the matter: (1) On 24 March 2026, Ms Permus filed an application seeking that I recuse myself from these proceedings on the ground of apprehended bias (Recusal Application). (2) The Recusal Application was listed for hearing on 30 April 2026. At the conclusion of that hearing, I reserved my decision on the Recusal Application. In discussion 1 In this decision, references to “sections” are to sections of the Fair Work Act. [2026] FWC 2702 DECISION -- 1 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 2 with the parties at that time, I conditionally listed the UD Application for hearing on 28 May 2026, subject to the outcome of the Recusal Application. (3) On 5 May 2026, I dismissed the Recusal Application (Recusal Decision).2 (4) On 12 May 2026, I arranged for an email to be sent to the parties confirming that the hearing of the UD Application would take place on 28 May 2026. (5) On 27 May 2026, my Chambers was copied into an email that Ms Permus sent to the Commission seeking to appeal the Recusal Decision.3 I arranged for an email to be sent to Ms Permus at 9.39am (AEST) that day which stated in part: “If you wish to the appeal [sic] the Commissioner’s decisions, please follow the process stated on our website: The appeals process | Fair Work Commission. In the absence of an appeal being filed in accordance with that process, and a stay of the proceedings being ordered, the hearing will proceed as listed at 12:00PM (AEST) tomorrow, 28 May 2026.” (Hyperlink removed) (6) In the morning of 28 May 2026, I saw an email that Ms Permus had sent to my Chambers at 11.47pm (AEST) on 27 May 2026. The email stated that Ms Permus had “appealed through the website appeal process on the 26.05.26” and attached a Form F7 – Notice of Appeal in respect of the Recusal Decision. (7) At 10.48am on 28 May 2026, I arranged for an email to be sent to the parties, which stated: “Dear Parties, Commissioner Sloan has seen Ms Permus’s email and the attached Forms F7. It remains the position that unless a stay of the proceedings is granted by the Commission (which is not a decision for Commissioner Sloan to make), the hearing at 12:00PM (AEST) today, 28 May 2026 will proceed.” (Emphasis in original) (8) At 11.36am (AEST) on 28 May 2026, my Chambers received an email from Ms Permus, which stated: “Dear Commissioner, I have just called the Commission. They have mentioned they have received the appeals and will be contacting you soon. 2 Adrianna Permus v Avid Holding Limited as Trustee for Avid Holding Unit Trust [2026] FWC 1612 3 Ms Permus separately sought to appeal my decision to permit Avid Holding to be represented by a lawyer at the hearing. That issue is not germane for present purposes. I note it to explain the references to appeals in the plural in the correspondence which follows. -- 2 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 3 I have lodged an appeal in time and correctly. I can’t attend today’s hearing.” (9) At 11.48am (AEST) on 28 May 2026, I arranged for an email to be sent to Ms Permus in these terms: “Dear Ms Permus, The Commissioner’s position remains unchanged – unless and until a stay of the proceedings is granted, today’s hearing will proceed. As to your professed inability to attend today’s hearing, the Commissioner observes that the matter was listed for hearing today, to accommodate your availability (as communicated in your email to us of 22 April 2026). The parties were informed on 30 April 2026 that the matter had been conditionally listed for hearing today, pending the Commissioner’s decision on your recusal application. On 12 May 2026 the listing was confirmed. In the absence of compelling reasons – supported by evidence – of your inability to attend today’s hearing, the matter will proceed as scheduled.” The hearing on 28 May 2026 [5] The hearing proceeded on 28 May 2026. It was conducted by videoconference using Microsoft Teams. It commenced with the following exchanges:4 THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning to you all. Ms Permus, I understand that you are on the line representing yourself today. MS A PERMUS: No. I want to say something. Can I say something, please. THE COMMISSIONER: Can you please turn on your camera. MS PERMUS: Yes. Can I say something. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Ms Permus. MS PERMUS: Yes. This hearing can’t happen. I don’t think it’s legal. I appealed correctly and on time. I don’t want to be part of this hearing today. You wrote yesterday if appeal is filed, a statement [sic – stay] of proceedings will be ordered. For this reason, my support person and my witnesses are not available today. I won’t be part of today’s hearing, sorry. Is there anything else? THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Permus, let me respond to some of that. The email – so start again. Yesterday, we received an email from you attaching some documents suggesting that you were appealing against my decision to refuse your application that I recuse myself from the proceedings. I note that decision was handed down on 5 May 4 Transcript PN1-PN18 -- 3 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 4 2026, and your email also said that you were appealing my decision to grant the respondent, Avid Holding, permission to be legally represented at today’s hearing. That decision was contained in an email that I sent to the parties on 6 May. The communication that was sent to you did not say that if an appeal was granted, an application would – sorry, if the appeal was made, the stay would be granted. My email made it clear that if the appeal were properly made and a stay was granted, then the matter would have to be adjourned. There has been no stay granted, and as I indicated my email earlier today – sorry, in the email from chambers earlier today, there has been no stay ordered by the Commission. I have seen that your forms F7, but as things stand, no stay has been granted by the Commission. That is not a decision for me to make, and my position remains the same: that the matter must proceed. Now, before I go any further, I think as a matter of good order, I should indicate for the sake of the record, Mr Hodge, you are on the line representing Avid Holding. Correct? MR K HODGE: Thank you, Commissioner. Yes, I am. THE COMMISSIONER: Just to confirm, as I just outlined, for the sake of the transcript, Mr Hodge was granted permission to appear today for the reasons set out in my email to the parties of 6 May. Ms Permus, today’s hearing has been known to you and Mr Hodge since about 30 April. While admittedly the first listing was a conditional listing subject to me making a determination on your recusal application, on 12 May, that listing was confirmed as being final. You and your witnesses have had plenty of time to make yourselves available today. It is a matter for you whether you participate or not, but I intend to proceed - - - MS PERMUS: So I have appeared [sic – appealed?] correctly and on time. I just don’t want to be part of this hearing today, sorry. I don’t want to - - - THE COMMISSIONER: Ms Permus, that’s a matter for you, but I am proceeding with today’s hearing. MS PERMUS: I’m not part of this hearing today, sorry. THE COMMISSIONER: Then, again, that’s a matter for you, Ms Permus, but I am proceeding with today’s hearing. MS PERMUS: Sorry, but I’m disconnecting. Sorry. Bye. THE COMMISSIONER: I note for the record that Ms Permus has just disconnected from the call. …” -- 4 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 5 [6] Several minutes later, Robert Permus, who I understand to be Ms Permus’s father and who had been acting as her support person in the proceedings, joined the hearing. After some discussion, I adjourned the hearing for a short period to give Mr Permus a chance to speak to Ms Permus, to see if she wished to change her mind and take part in the hearing. After that short adjournment, Mr Permus stated: “I was not able to speak with Adrianna. I just spoke with her mother, and I just – as far I know, she has to make the decision and doesn’t want to change the decision.”5 Mr Permus left the hearing a short while later. [7] As I had told Ms Permus I would do, I proceeded to hear the matter in her absence. That involved taking the evidence and submissions of Avid Holding on the UD Application. [8] Ms Permus filed a number of documents in the proceedings. These included a statement she had made, and two statements from former co-workers, Jonathan Cagara and Jace Wheaton. Ms Permus’s decision not to participate in the hearing meant that she did not seek to tender any of those documents into evidence. In other words, she did not advance an evidentiary case. I have had no regard to the material she filed. [9] I further observe parenthetically that over the course of the proceedings I had made directions requiring the parties to file and serve the evidence on which they sought to rely by particular dates. I had also directed that if a party wished to cross-examine a witness of the other party, they were to inform that other party of that at least seven days prior to the hearing, and that if that notice was given, the witness was required to attend the hearing. Avid Holding had requested that Ms Permus and Mr Cagara be available for cross-examination on their statements. To state the obvious, they were not so available. In addition, Avid Holding had objected to Ms Permus being able to rely on Mr Wheaton’s statement as it had been filed out of time. I had deferred a determination of that objection to the hearing. In the circumstances, even were I to consider that I should accept Ms Permus’s filed material into evidence (and I do not), I would give it no weight. [10] It follows that I am left to determine the UD Application based on the evidence led by Avid Holding, which I must regard as uncontested, and the submissions it made in reliance on that evidence. Avid Holding’s evidence [11] Avid Holding relied on statements by Shane Arkinstall, Avid Holding’s Human Resources & Corporate Services Lead, and David Hindley, who until 11 February 2026 was Avid Holding’s Electrical Workshop Supervisor. Their evidence included the following: (1) Ms Permus commenced employment with Avid Holding on 13 January 2025. She was employed as an Electrical Apprentice at a site in Kewdale, Western Australia (Site). (2) Ms Permus’s start time was 7.00am. She was expected to arrive at the Site in time to commence work at 7.00am. This was important as the electrical team at the Site, which included Ms Permus, conducted daily “pre-start meetings” that started “stringently” at 5 Transcript PN80 -- 5 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 6 7.00am.6 The pre-start meeting was used to inform employees of critical health and safety information, and of any operational or production issues of which they needed to be aware. Avid Holding required employees to be on time and in attendance at the pre- start meeting at 7.00am, not just arriving and clocking in at the entrance door at that time. (3) On 18 July 2025, Avid Holding’s Electrical Manager “formally explained the required start times to the entire electrical team”.7 The members of the team were required to sign a document confirming their “agreed start time”.8 The document records Ms Permus confirming her start time of 7.00am. (4) The requirement for employees at the Site to arrive in time to commence at their start times was reinforced several times at monthly toolbox meetings. At such a meeting on 21 July 2025, at which Ms Permus was present, employees were informed that clock-in times were being closely monitored, and that “they were all being put on notice as a group due to poor commitment to agreed start/commencement times”.9 (5) On 19 August 2025, Mr Arkinstall gave Ms Permus a letter titled “First and Final Written Warning – Timekeeping”. The letter stated in part:10 “This letter serves as a First and Final Written Warning regarding your repeated lateness in commencing your rostered shift on time. It has been observed on multiple occasions that you have swiped in to commence work on of [sic] after your commencement time of 7.30am,11 including: [Here the letter contained a table revealing that between 30 June 2025 and 8 August 2025, Ms Permus had clocked in late 18 times and at precisely 7.00am on 8 occasions.] … Expectation: As outlined in your employment contract and our workplace policies, you are required to be ready to commence work at your scheduled start time (7.00am as agreed with Naish Patel). This means being at your designated work location, ready to work, when your shift begins. We expect an immediate and sustained improvement in your punctuality. 6 Statement of Shane Arkinstall, 8 April 2026, par 19 7 Statement of Shane Arkinstall, 8 April 2026, par 6 8 Statement of Shane Arkinstall, 8 April 2026, Annexure SA-01 9 Statement of Shane Arkinstall, 8 April 2026, par 13 10 Statement of Shane Arkinstall, 8 April 2026, Annexure SA-02 11 Mr Arkinstall stated, and I accept, that this was a typographical and should have read 7.00am. I do not consider that this error is material or could have confused Ms Permus as to the effect of the letter. -- 6 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 7 You are required to: 1. Arrive at the workplace with sufficient time to be ready to start work at your rostered commencement time. … Please be aware that any further failure to meet these expectations may result in additional disciplinary actions, up to and including termination of employment.” (Bold in original) (6) From 2 September 2025, Mr Hindley was Ms Permus’s supervisor. (7) On 11 September 2025, Mr Hindley spoke to Ms Permus about “her late attendance at work”.12 (8) On 13 October 2025, Ms Permus did not attend the pre-start meeting. When Mr Hindley asked Ms Permus later that morning why she had failed to attend, she stated that she had been outside. Mr Hindley told Ms Permus that she was expected to attend pre-start meetings. Ms Permus “just shrugged her shoulders”.13 (9) At 8.04am on 13 October 2025, Mr Hindley sent an email to Mr Arkinstall, which stated: “Can I please have a report for last week’s times, and also todays [sic]. As you are aware, I am having issues with Adrianna. She did not attend my pre-start this morning. When I asked her why she did not attend she said she was outside!! I said I always have a pre-start meeting to which she just shrugged her shoulders.” (10) On 15 October 2025, Mr Hindley and Mr Arkinstall had a “Show Cause discussion” with Ms Permus.14 (I understand from common usage that “show cause” refers to an employee being invited to provide their employer with reasons as to why their employment should not be terminated.) She was accompanied by her parents as support persons. In the meeting, Mr Arkinstall raised with Ms Permus the concerns Mr Hindley had regarding the need for her to attend work in time for the 7.00am pre- start meetings. Ms Permus was “quiet and unapologetic regarding her late attendance and was unable to articulate any reasonable explanations as to why she had been unable to improve”.15 12 Statement of David Hindley, 9 April 2026, par 8 13 Statement of David Hindley, 9 April 2026, par 10 14 Statement of David Hindley, 9 April 2026, par 11 15 Statement of David Hindley, 9 April 2026, par 13 -- 7 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 8 (11) Later on 15 October 2025, Avid Holding sent a letter to Ms Permus titled “Notice of Termination of Employment – Timekeeping”.16 The letter referred to the warning of 19 August 2025 and Ms Permus’s conversation with Mr Hindley on 11 September 2025, and stated that Ms Permus had “still not met the required expectations”. The letter stated that since 1 September 2025, Ms Permus had been late to work three times and had clocked in at exactly 7.00am on 11 occasions. The letter stated that Ms Permus’s employment was terminated “effective today 15th October 2025”, and that she would receive a payment in lieu of notice. Threshold questions [12] Before considering the merits of Ms Permus’s application, I am required to decide four matters.17 I find as follows: (1) Ms Permus was dismissed on 15 October 2025 and filed the UD Application on 3 November 2025. This was within the statutory time period;18 (2) Ms Permus was a person protected from unfair dismissal;19 (3) Avid Holding is not a small business employer.20 It follows that the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code is not applicable; and (4) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.21 The dismissal was not unfair [13] A person will have been unfairly dismissed if the Commission is satisfied of four things:22 (1) the person has been dismissed; (2) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; (3) the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code; and (4) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy. [14] Consistent with my findings above, I am satisfied that Ms Permus was dismissed; that the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code was not applicable; and that the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy. The only matter left to be determined is whether Ms Permus’s dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. 16 Statement of Shane Arkinstall, 8 April 2026, Annexure SA-03 17 Section 396 18 As prescribed by section 394(2) 19 Within the meaning of section 382 20 As defined in section 23 21 Within the meaning of section 389 22 Section 385 -- 8 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 9 [15] In determining that question, I am required to have regard to certain criteria, namely:23 (1) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to Ms Permus’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); (2) whether Ms Permus was notified of that reason; (3) whether Ms Permus was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to her capacity or conduct; (4) any unreasonable refusal by Avid Holding to allow Ms Permus to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; (5) if the dismissal related to Ms Permus’s unsatisfactory performance – whether she had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; (6) the degree to which the size of Avid Holding’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; (7) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and (8) any other matters that the Commission considers relevant. [16] At the hearing, Avid Holding put its case in these terms:24 “The applicant repeatedly failed over a long period from July to October 2025 to adhere to the commencement time, and we submit, Commissioner, that that was a sound, defensible and well-founded reason for the applicant’s dismissal. If the Commission is satisfied that there was a valid reason for dismissal, then the matters that need to be considered are contained within section 387 of the Act in order to assess whether that dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In short, Commissioner, we would submit that the requirements for the applicant to attend promptly the workplace at the 7 am pre-start meeting each day were reasonable, and they were necessary for the daily operation and work objectives to communicate. Those meetings, as today’s proceedings, they commence at a set time. That was 7 am. That was understood by all. There were discussions on important operational matters but also very importantly work health and safety challenges, and those would vary from day to day, subject to the requirements of the respondent’s business. The applicant’s failure to attend on time and attend these meetings meant that she was placing herself and her colleagues at a disadvantage, and we submit that that is a well- founded reason for her dismissal. This was a business-wide program where they looked at attendance, and you will see from Mr Arkinstall’s statement that a number of employees were spoken to about that, and we would submit that the applicant’s excuses 23 Section 387 24 Transcript PN94-PN100 -- 9 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 10 for failing to attend work at those scheduled commencement times between July and October are not a valid explanation for her conduct. And, Commissioner, just in concluding and looking at the criteria in section 387 that the valid reason for the dismissal, as I’ve said at the beginning, was her failure to comply with the 7 am start times. The applicant was notified of those reasons, and for the record, Commissioner, those occasions occurred on 18 July in discussions with the electrical team and the electrical manager, where the employees, including the applicant, signed a document committing to their start times. That was then followed with a toolbox meeting on 21 July, where everyone was informed that start times were being monitored; continuing on on [sic] 19 August, when the written warning was issued to the applicant about her start times; and then to the supervisor on 11 September, where he had a discussion with the applicant; and then again on 13 October, where there was a discussion, and according to the email of the supervisor, David Hindley, the applicant shrugged her shoulders at the question of why she was attending work late; to finally, the show cause meeting on 15 October, where the applicant was given an opportunity to explain her actions. So 387(a) and (b) are satisfied, and (c), in terms of being given an opportunity to respond, there was no denial of support person. The company enabled the applicant to have a support person, and 387(e), the dismissal, she had been warned, both in writing and verbally, that failure to attend on time could lead to her termination. So, Commissioner, taking all those considerations under 387 into account, we would submit that the termination was not harsh, unjust or unfair in the circumstances…”. [17] I will address the statutory criteria in turn. Whether there was a valid reason for dismissal [18] In order to be a valid reason, the reason for the dismissal should be sound, defensible or well founded. It should not be capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced.25 However, the Commission will not stand in the shoes of the employer and determine what the Commission would do if it were the employer.26 [19] Avid Holding bears the evidentiary onus of proving that the conduct on which it relies took place. The Commission must make a finding on the evidence as to whether, on the balance of probabilities, the conduct occurred.27 [20] There is no question that Ms Permus was aware that she was required to be on Site and ready to commence work at 7.00am. To the extent that Avid Holding needed a legitimate operational reason for imposing that requirement, it is to be found in the daily pre-start 25 Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371 at 373 26 Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 681 at 685 27 King v Freshmore (Vic) Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Ross VP, Williams SDP, Hingley C, 17 March 2000) Print S4213 at [24] -- 10 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 11 meetings. Ms Permus had received a warning for being late to work, and put on notice that her employment might be terminated if she continued to fail to arrive at the Site in time to commence work at 7.00am. She did not heed that warning, despite Mr Hindley speaking to her about her tardiness on 11 September 2025. Her response to Mr Hindley on 13 October 2025 demonstrated supreme indifference to her employer’s requirements and the directions she had received. [21] I am mindful that for the vast majority of times that Ms Permus was late to work, it was by a matter of a few minutes only. However, in the context that I have described, this does not offer an excuse. [22] I have also given thought to whether Avid Holding could properly censure Ms Permus for clocking in at 7.00am, given that was her rostered start time. However, I think it was a reasonable requirement that Ms Permus be present at the commencement of the pre-start meeting. Avid Holding stated that the location of the meetings was only a 30-second walk from the “clock in clock”.28 It would have imposed little hardship on Ms Permus to time her arrival to allow her to be present at the start of the meeting. [23] In conclusion, Ms Permus demonstrated a history of tardiness and of not complying with Avid Holding’s directions. Her continued non-compliance after having been warned, her response to Mr Hindley on 13 October 2025 and her attitude at the meeting on 15 October 2025 could have given Avid Holding no comfort that her conduct would improve. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to Ms Permus’s conduct. Notification of reason and opportunity to respond [24] Procedural fairness requires that an employee be notified of the reason for which their employer is considering dismissing them – that is, the valid reason to which the first criterion refers29 – and be given an opportunity to respond before the decision to dismiss is taken. To give an employee an opportunity to respond after a decision had been taken to dismiss them would be “like shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted”.30 [25] On the available evidence, the only occasion on which Ms Permus was notified of the reason for which Avid Holding was considering terminating her employment was at the “Show Cause discussion” on 15 October 2025. The details of that meeting are meagre, but I am satisfied from Mr Hindley’s statement that Ms Permus was given an opportunity to respond to that reason, directly and through her support persons. 28 This evidence was given “from the bar table”. However, Avid Holding’s representative stated that Mr Arkinstall was available to confirm the evidence if required, and that it was something that he had intended to put to Ms Permus in cross-examination. I have determined to accept the evidence. 29 Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd v Thomas, Print S2679 (AIRCFB, McIntyre VP, Marsh SDP, Larkin C, 2 February 2000) at [41]; Read v Cordon Square Child Care Centre [2013] FWCFB 762 at [48]-[49] 30 Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137 at [73], a decision of the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission dealing with a relevantly analogous provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996. -- 11 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 12 [26] There is a slight irregularity, in that the letter informing Ms Permus of her dismissal was dated 14 October 2025, the day before the meeting. This might suggest that the outcome of the meeting was a forgone conclusion. [27] However, although the letter is dated 14 October 2025, it refers to the termination taking effect “today 15th October 2025” (my emphasis). Further, Mr Hindley stated that it was only after the meeting on 15 October 2025 that Avid Holding decided to issue the termination letter to Ms Permus. Even were I to infer that the letter had been drafted in advance of the meeting, there is no proper basis for me to conclude that the opportunity that Avid Holding gave to Ms Permus to “show cause” was not a genuine one; that is, that nothing Ms Permus said could have changed the outcome. Any unreasonable refusal to allow Ms Permus to have a support person [28] Avid Holding did not refuse to allow Ms Permus to have a support person at the meeting on 15 October 2025. Whether Ms Permus had been warned prior to the dismissal [29] This criterion is arguably not relevant, as Ms Permus was dismissed for her conduct as opposed to her performance. That said, she had clearly been warned on 19 August 2025 that if she continued to fail to arrive at the Site in sufficient time to start work at her rostered commencement time, her employment might be terminated. That warning needs to be read in light of the clear evidence that Ms Permus had been told what was expected of her before and after that warning was issued. The size of Avid Holding’s enterprise, and access to dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise [30] There is no basis on which I could find that any unfairness in the dismissal could be attributed to, or ameliorated by, Avid Holding lacking the necessary resources or expertise. Avid Holding did not suggest otherwise. It recognised that Mr Arkinstall provides dedicated in- house human resources support. Any other relevant matters [31] There are no other relevant matters. Consideration [32] Avid Holding had a valid reason to terminate Ms Permus’s employment. She was notified of that reason and given an opportunity to respond to it. There is no evidence of any matter that would lead me to conclude that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. [33] I find that Ms Permus’s dismissal was not unfair. The UD Application is dismissed. -- 12 of 13 -- [2026] FWC 2702 13 COMMISSIONER Appearances: Ms A Permus appearing on her own behalf. Mr K Hodge of Sparke Helmore Lawyers appearing with permission for the respondent Hearing details: 28 May 2026 Video via Microsoft Teams Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR812229> -- 13 of 13 --