"Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) v WesTrac Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1756

1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.437 - Application for a protected action ballot order "Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) v WesTrac Pty Ltd (B2025/958) DEPUTY PRESIDENT HAMPTON ADELAIDE, 23 JUNE 2025 Proposed protected action ballot of employees of WesTrac Pty Ltd [1] This is an application by the "Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union" known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU or Applicant) made under s.437 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) for a protected action ballot order (PABO) in relation to certain employees of WesTrac Pty Ltd (WesTrac or Employer). [2] I note that the Australian Workers Union (AWU)1 has made a separate application for a protected action ballot order in relation to the same proposed enterprise agreement. That application was granted for reasons issued on 19 June 2025.2 [3] On 20 June 2025, the Commission was advised that the Employer objected to the Application on various grounds. WesTrac contends that the bargaining it is not at a stalemate, and, in effect, the application to facilitate the taking of protected industrial action is premature. WesTrac also asserts the industries it supports in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory are currently experiencing cost pressures due to prevailing market conditions, and its priority is to focus on job security and to maintain competitiveness during this period of uncertainty. WesTrac also contended that it had been negotiating in good faith with the relevant parties. WesTrac highlighted that the WesTrac Pty Ltd (NSW and ACT Product Support) Enterprise Agreement 2022 (existing enterprise agreement) is currently in force and has a nominal expiry of 14 July 2025. [4] The AMWU contended in response that it relied on its PABO Application and associated declaration, noting that the AWU had recently been granted a PABO in similar circumstances. I observe however, that whilst sharing generally consistent bargaining processes and facing similar objections, each application has been considered on its own merits. [5] Neither party sought a hearing. In those circumstances, and noting the nature of the objections raised, I have decided to determine the matter on the papers without holding a hearing. [2025] FWC 1756 DECISION -- 1 of 7 -- [2025] FWC 1756 2 [6] Section 437 of the Act provides as follows: 437 Application for a protected action ballot order Who may apply for a protected action ballot order (1) A bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by a proposed enterprise agreement, or 2 or more such bargaining representatives (acting jointly), may apply to the FWC for an order (a protected action ballot order) requiring a protected action ballot to be conducted to determine whether employees wish to engage in particular protected industrial action for the agreement. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the proposed enterprise agreement is: (a) a greenfields agreement; or (b) a cooperative workplace agreement. (2A) Subsection (1) does not apply unless there has been a notification time in relation to the proposed enterprise agreement. Note: For notification time, see subsection 173(2). Protected industrial action cannot be taken until after bargaining has commenced (including where the scope of the proposed enterprise agreement is the only matter in dispute). Matters to be specified in application (3) The application must specify: (a) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted; and (b) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action; and (c) the name of the person or entity that the applicant wishes to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot. Note: The protected action ballot agent for the ballot must be an eligible protected action ballot agent unless there are exceptional circumstances: see section 444. (5) A group of employees specified under paragraph (3)(a) is taken to include only employees who: (a) will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement; and (b) either: -- 2 of 7 -- [2025] FWC 1756 3 (i) are represented by a bargaining representative who is an applicant for the protected action ballot order; or (ii) are bargaining representatives for themselves but are members of an employee organisation that is an applicant for the protected action ballot order. Documents to accompany the application (6) The application must be accompanied by any documents and other information prescribed by the regulations. [7] Section 438 of the Act relevantly provides: “438 Restriction on when application may be made (1) If one or more enterprise agreements cover the employees who will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement, an application for a protected action ballot order must not be made earlier than 30 days before the nominal expiry date of the enterprise agreement, or the latest nominal expiry date of those enterprise agreements (as the case may be). (2) To avoid doubt, making an application for a protected action ballot order does not constitute organising industrial action.” [8] Section 443 of the Act relevantly provides: “443 When the FWC must make a protected action ballot order (1) The FWC must make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement if: (a) an application has been made under section 437; and (b) the FWC is satisfied that each applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted. (2) The FWC must not make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement except in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1). (3) A protected action ballot order must specify the following: (a) the name of each applicant for the order; (b) the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted; (c) the date by which voting in the protected action ballot closes; -- 3 of 7 -- [2025] FWC 1756 4 (d) the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action; (e) the person or entity that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(1A), is to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot; (f) the person (if any) that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(3), is to be the independent advisor for the ballot. (3A) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(c), the FWC must specify a date that will enable the protected action ballot to be conducted as expeditiously as practicable.” [9] I observe for completeness that there are other statutory requirements for a PABO to be issued that are not in issue in this matter. Further, most of the matters raised in the provisions above were also not in dispute. [10] The AMWU must demonstrate that it has met (and where relevant continues to meet) all of these requirements. There is no dispute that the AMWU was entitled to bring the application, and a valid application has been made under s.437 of the Act. The substantive requirement that must be met is whether the AMWU has been and is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the Employer – s.443(1)(b) of the Act. [11] The approach required as to whether a party has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement has previously been summarised by the Full Bench in Esso Australia Pty Ltd v “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU); Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia; The Australian Workers’ Union.3 This includes, as relevant to this matter: • While there is a relationship between the good faith bargaining requirements in s.228 of the Act and the concept of genuinely trying to reach an agreement, it would be wrong to conflate these terms. A party may not meet a particular good faith bargaining requirement but may nevertheless be genuinely trying to reach an agreement.4 • The concept of genuinely trying to reach an agreement involves a finding of fact applied by reference to the circumstances of the particular negotiations. It is not useful to formulate any alternative test or criteria for applying the statutory test because it is the words of s.443 which must be applied. In the course of examining all of the circumstances it may be relevant to consider related matters but ultimately the test in s.443 must be applied.5 The Commission should have regard to all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.6 • It is not appropriate or possible to establish rigid rules for the required point of negotiations that must be reached. All the relevant circumstances must be assessed to establish whether the applicant has met the test or not. This will frequently involve considering the extent of progress in negotiations and the steps taken in order to try and reach an agreement.7 -- 4 of 7 -- [2025] FWC 1756 5 • The reference to the Commission being ‘satisfied’ means that whether or not the requisite circumstance exists is a discretionary decision. Section 443(1)(b) directs attention to the conduct of the applicant union. The expression ‘has been, and is’, imports temporal considerations. The Commission’s attention is thereby directed to the applicant’s prior conduct at the time the application for a protected action ballot order is determined. Given the context the reference to ‘an agreement’ is plainly a reference to an enterprise agreement within the meaning of Part 2-4 of the Act.8 [12] The expression “genuinely trying” has also been taken to be concerned with the genuineness or authenticity of the trying; that is, the efforts, by the applicant to reach the stated goal, being an enterprise agreement that meets the requirements of the Act.9 [13] The notion that an application for a PABO has been brought prematurely is one that a relatively recent Full Bench of the Commission in Kuiper Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union10 (Kuiper) has considered and relevantly stated: “[31] That is not to suggest that whether a bargaining representative has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement involves an assessment of whether the bargaining representative is “unduly rushing” to take protected industrial action. The Act expressly deals with when protected industrial action can be taken. Application for a protected action ballot order must not be made unless there has been a “notification time” (s 437(2A)) and cannot be made earlier than 30 days before the nominal expiry of an existing enterprise agreement (s 438(1)). Protected industrial action must not actually be organised or engaged in before the nominal expiry date of an existing agreement (s 413(6)) or if a suspension or termination order, Ministerial declaration or intractable bargaining declaration is in operation (s 413(7)). Otherwise, the Act does not dictate when a bargaining representative should seek a protected action ballot order. [32] The Act contemplates that an application for a protected action ballot order can be made as soon as there has been a “notification time” so long as that date is not more than 30 days before the nominal expiry of an existing agreement. The requirement, in s 443(1)(b), that an applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement does not impose a further de facto time constraint on when protected industrial action can be taken by prescribing that bargaining must have developed to some minimum stage or level. The Act does not countenance such an approach. [34] An allegation that an application for a protected action ballot order is premature does not, of itself, provide a basis for concluding that the applicant for the order has not been, or is not, genuinely trying to reach agreement. The Act envisages that protected action might be taken early in bargaining. The Commission must simply consider whether, in light of the circumstances operating at the time of its decision, the applicant has been, and is, genuinely seeking agreement. The reference to “premature applications” in Total Marine Services has been doubted or not followed in subsequent decisions, particularly JJ Richards (FWAFB), Farstad Shipping and Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [2015] FWCFB 210; (2015) 247 IR 5. Kuiper did not suggest we should follow the reasoning in the fourth and fifth sentences of paragraph [32] of Total Marine Services.” -- 5 of 7 -- [2025] FWC 1756 6 [14] In this case, the evidence before the Commission supports the notion that the AMWU has been and is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the Employer. It has also meaningfully engaged and continues to engage with the bargaining process with the genuine objective of reaching an agreement. It also remains committed to negotiating a new enterprise agreement with the Employer and its actions confirm that it is doing so genuinely. [15] To the extent that the Employer indirectly raises the notion that the AMWU may not be meeting the good faith bargaining requirements of the Act,11 this has also not been made out. In any event, I have taken into account the concerns that are directly relevant to the determination of the present matter, where supported by any evidence.12 In that regard, I observe that there is no requirement that the bargaining be exhausted before an application of this kind is made. Further, a PABO application does not stop the bargaining and the good faith bargaining obligations remain. The positions of the bargaining representatives on the proposed outcomes, provided that they are bargaining in good faith, are also not presently relevant. This is a matter for the continuing bargaining. [16] In relation to the existing enterprise agreement, under s.417 of the Act, protected industrial action cannot be taken during the nominal life of that agreement. However, as observed in Kuiper, s.438 provides, in effect, that a PABO application of this kind can be made within 30 days of the end of its nominal life. That is the case with this, and the related, matter. [17] Further, as with the related matter, I would be open to the suggestion that progress in bargaining for a new enterprise agreement in this case remains possible without recourse to protected industrial action. However, this is not the test for a PABO to be issued and protected industrial action as part of bargaining, provided that the various statutory requirements have been met, is part of the scheme of the Act. [18] On the basis of the material before me, including the declaration of Timothy Jackson, Organiser, setting out the steps taken by the AMWU in bargaining with the Employer and that it has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement with WesTrac, I am satisfied that there is a notification time in relation to the proposed agreement and that all of the requirements in s.443 of the Act and related provisions have been met and that the Commission must grant the PABO. [19] The ballot is to be conducted by Fair Vote Services Pty Ltd (Fair Vote). Fair Vote has been approved as an eligible protected action ballot agent under s.468A of the Act and consequently is authorised to conduct the ballot. [20] For the purposes of s.443(3)(c) of the Act, the Commission has determined that the date by which voting is to close is 7 July 2025.13 This also establishes the ballot period for the purpose of s.448A(2) of the Act. [21] An Order has been separately issued in PR788445. [22] This matter will be assigned to another Member of the Commission to conduct the s.448A compulsory conciliation conference along with the other related matter. That Member -- 6 of 7 -- [2025] FWC 1756 7 will issue an Order requiring the attendance of all bargaining representatives in the proposed enterprise agreement at the conference. It is likely that Directions will also be issued to ensure that the parties attend the conference ready to conduct meaningful negotiations. DEPUTY PRESIDENT Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR788446> 1 B2025/942. 2 [2025] FWC 1716. 3 [2015] FWCFB 210. 4 Ibid at [18]. 5 Ibid at [34] - drawing upon Total Marine Services Pty Ltd v The Maritime Union of Australia [2009] FWAFB 368 (Total Marine). 6 Ibid at [57]. 7 Ibid at [35] - but qualifying a further statement made in Total Marine. 8 Ibid at [54]. 9 J.J. Richards & Sons Pty Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2010] FWAFB 9963 at [89] and Kuiper at [26] to [30]. 10 [2024] FWCFB 378. 11 Section 228 of the Act. 12 Noting that the two concepts are related but should not be conflated. 13 This is, in effect, 10 working days from the making of the Order and was the period sought in the application. -- 7 of 7 --