Adrian Biddle v Miele Australia Pty. Limited [2023] FWC 1972
1
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Adrian Biddle
v
Miele Australia Pty. Limited
(U2023/6230)
COMMISSIONER MIRABELLA MELBOURNE, 15 AUGUST 2023
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – unfair dismissal application filed out of time –
circumstances not exceptional – application dismissed.
[1] This decision concerns an application made by Mr Adrian Biddle (the Applicant) for an
extension of time to make a claim for unfair dismissal outside of the 21-day period required by
s.394(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act).
[2] On 10 July 2023, the Applicant made an application to the Fair Work Commission
(Commission) for an unfair dismissal remedy. The Applicant alleges he was unfairly dismissed
by Miele Australia Pty. Limited (the Respondent) on 24 April 2023.
[3] This decision concerns whether I should exercise my discretion to allow the Applicant
a further period of lodgement of his application.
[4] After taking into account the views of the Applicant and the Respondent regarding
whether a hearing would be the most effective and efficient way to resolve the matter, I
considered it appropriate to hold a determinative conference for the matter.1
[5] At the determinative conference on 14 August 2023, both the Applicant and Respondent
were self-represented.
[6] The Applicant gave evidence on his own behalf.
When did the dismissal take effect?
[7] It is not in dispute, and I so find, that the dismissal took effect on 24 April 2023.
[8] On 10 July 2023, the Applicant applied for an unfair dismissal remedy. Applications of
this kind must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect or if there are exceptional
circumstances, such further period as the Commission allows.2
[2023] FWC 1972 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2023/5225) was
lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 16 October
2023 [[2023] FWCFB 187] for result of appeal.]
DECISION
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[9] To have filed his application within the 21-day period, the Applicant had to have done
so before midnight on 16 May 2023.
Extension of time
[10] Additional time can be allowed under s.394(3) of the Act if there are exceptional
circumstances. These are circumstances that are “out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or
special, or uncommon” but that “need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare”.3
[11] In deciding whether I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, I must
consider:
• The reason for the delay,
• Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect,
• Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal,
• Prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay),
• The merits of the application, and
• Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
Relevant factors
[12] Reason for the delay: The Act does not specify what reason for delay might tell in favour
of granting an extension; however, decisions of the Commission have referred to an
“acceptable” or “reasonable” explanation. The absence of any explanation for any part of the
delay will usually weigh against an applicant in the assessment of whether there are exceptional
circumstances, and a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in the
applicant’s favour; however, all of the circumstances must be considered.4
[13] In his Form F2 application and outline of submissions, the Applicant says the reason for
his delay in lodging the unfair dismissal application was that he had initially pursued a general
protections application, which was lodged with the Commission on the Applicant’s behalf by
his legal representatives, A Whole New Approach Pty Ltd (AWNA), on 9 May 2023.
[14] The Applicant says that in his initial discussions with AWNA, he was presented with
the choice between filing an unfair dismissal application or general protections application. He
says he decided to proceed with a general protections application and said at the determinative
conference words to the effect of he made this choice because he “felt that unfair dismissal was
not going to be the best remedy for [him]”.
[15] The Applicant says he ceased engaging AWNA’s services on 5 July 2023 because he
believed AWNA did not adequately address his concerns regarding disability discrimination in
the Form F8 application lodged with the Commission. He says these were “critical errors”
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which caused two barristers to evaluate his general protections claim as being without merit.
He received this advice from counsel, firstly from Mr Conrad Banasik on 11 May 2023 and
from Mr Kurt Esser on 4 July 2023.
[16] The Applicant says he disagreed with Mr Banasik’s advice that he did not have an
arguable case regarding the general protections application. The Applicant also disagreed with
Mr Esser who concurred with Mr Banasik’s conclusions regarding the viability of the
Applicant’s general protections application.
[17] At the determinative conference, the Applicant gave evidence that he decided to submit
his application for an unfair dismissal remedy on 9 July 2023 when he realised he was not able
to explain to people the nature of a general protections application as it pertains to his
circumstances. He said words to the effect of “the difficulty is I lack the ability right now in
those complex matters to be able to articulate … the precise circumstances and how they relate
to my situation, it’s something that is because of the impairments I have”.
[18] The Applicant gave evidence that subsequent to being granted a s.368 certificate at the
Commission, he wished to proceed to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(FCFCOA) and that there was delay in communication between him and AWNA.
[19] The Applicant says that rather than lodging his general protections application in the
FCFCOA, the deadline to do so being 10 July 2023, he lodged this application with the
Commission.
[20] In response, the Respondent submits that in cases involving late lodgement of unfair
dismissal applications and alleged representative error, there is a distinction between delays
caused by the representative where the employee is blameless and when the employee has
contributed to the delay.5
[21] The Respondent submits that the Applicant has not offered any explanation as to the
reason for the delay in relation to the period from 5 July 2023 to 10 July 2023.
[22] The Respondent further submits that the Applicant has not demonstrated that AWNA
made any “critical errors” as alleged, and that the Applicant was able to competently instruct
AWNA who carried out his instructions without error. The Respondent submits that the delay
in filing this application cannot be attributed to representative error by AWNA because the
Applicant had not instructed AWNA to file an unfair dismissal claim.
[23] The Respondent submits that AWNA’s advice to lodge the general protections
application could not be characterised as a critical error because AWNA had not yet seen the
Respondent’s response to the application.
[24] The Respondent submits that even if AWNA’s advice were to be regarded as erroneous,
the Applicant nonetheless still had the benefit of advice from counsel from 11 May 2023 and
from 4 July 2023.
[25] The Respondent asserts that the reason for the 56-day delay in filing the unfair dismissal
application was, rather than poor legal advice, that the Applicant had instructed AWNA to lodge
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the general protections application under the belief it was a more suitable claim and had a
subsequent change of heart.
[26] The Respondent submits that the Applicant clearly contributed towards the delay in
filing the unfair dismissal application when he disagreed with advice from counsel on both
occasions.
[27] The delay required to be considered is the period beyond the prescribed 21-day period
for making an application. It does not include the period from the date of the dismissal to the
end of the 21-day period. However, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be
considered when assessing whether there is a credible reason for the delay, or any part of the
delay, beyond the 21-day period.6
[28] The Applicant says that the reasons for the delay were that:
• He had initially pursued a general protections application to dispute his dismissal, and
• Because of an illness from which he was suffering, he did not believe he would be
able to explain to his representatives the nature of the Respondent’s alleged
discriminatory conduct towards him so as to allow those representatives to properly
advocate for him in the general protections application.
[29] The test for representative error is not whether the Applicant received good or bad
advice, it is whether his representative’s action or inaction caused the delay.7
[30] The general protections application was lodged on 9 May 2023 and at least from 11 May
2023 when the Applicant says he received counsel’s advice that his general protections
application was without merit, he had an additional 4 days within which to lodge an unfair
dismissal application so that it could be lodged within time. The Applicant did not do so.
[31] In this matter, the Applicant did not instruct his representative to file an unfair dismissal
application. The Applicant gave evidence that he was of the initial view that a s.394 application
would not provide the best remedy for him. The Applicant contends that representative
incompetence and poor legal advice caused a substandard general protections application to be
lodged on his behalf, therefore delaying the lodgement of an unfair dismissal application.
[32] I find that the Applicant did not agree with legal advice he received regarding his general
protections application, decided that he could not explain to his legal representatives how such
an application could succeed and accordingly changed his mind and decided to file an unfair
dismissal application.
[33] I find that the Applicant was not blameless and contributed to the delay in lodging the
unfair dismissal application.
[34] For the reasons above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant provided an acceptable or
reasonable explanation for the delay.
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[35] The absence of an acceptable explanation weighs against a conclusion that there are
exceptional circumstances.
[36] Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect: The
Applicant was notified of the dismissal on the same day that it took effect and, therefore, had
the full period of 21 days to lodge the unfair dismissal application. This factor does not weigh
in favour of a grant of additional time to make the application.
[37] Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal: At the determinative conference,
the Applicant gave uncontested evidence that from the date his employment was terminated, he
made it clear that he disagreed with the termination.
[38] In particular, he submits that he took action to dispute the dismissal by retaining the
services of AWNA on 24 April 2023 and instructing them to lodge a general protections
application on his behalf.
[39] The Respondent submits that although the Applicant took steps to dispute his dismissal
by lodging the general protections application, he took no steps between 5 July 2023 and 10
July 2023 to contest the dismissal which they say should weigh against the Applicant.
[40] I consider that the action taken in lodging a general protections application constitutes
action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal.
[41] This weighs in favour of granting an extension of time.
[42] Prejudice to the employer: The Applicant submits that the Respondent would not suffer
prejudice if an extension of time were granted because they would have been aware due to his
general protections claim and resulting negotiations that the matter of his dismissal was not
resolved.
[43] The Applicant does concede that the Respondent may be prejudiced if the Commission
were to order reinstatement in the substantive matter due to the time which has elapsed, but that
any unfairness to the Respondent would be mitigated by their alleged conduct.
[44] The Respondent makes no submissions as to prejudice.
[45] In all the circumstances, I do not find that any material prejudice would be suffered by
the Respondent if an extension of time were granted. I consider this to be a neutral
consideration.
[46] Merits of the application: The Act requires me to take into account the merits of the
application in considering whether to extend time. The competing contentions of the parties in
relation to the merits of the application are set out in the materials that have been filed and I do
not repeat them here.
[47] Having examined these materials, it is evident to me that the merits of the application
turn on contested points of fact which would need to be tested if an extension of time were
granted and the matter were to proceed. It is not possible to make any firm or detailed
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assessment of the merits. The Applicant has a prima facie case, to which the Respondent raises
an apparent defence. I do not consider the merits of the present case to tell for or against an
extension of time. I consider the merits to be a neutral consideration.
[48] Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position: The Applicant
in making submissions on this factor stated he took the necessary steps to provide instructions
to AWNA to lodge a general protections application, but that AWNA made several errors in
drafting the application, leading to two barristers advising the Applicant he did not have an
arguable case.
[49] The Respondent submitted that it is not aware of decisions made by the Commission
which contain factual resemblance to this case and that, therefore, this factor should be weighed
neutrally.
[50] The matters raised by the Applicant are not relevant matters in considering fairness as
between him and other persons in a similar position.
[51] This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or to matters
previously decided by the Commission. It may also relate to the position of various employees
of an employer responding to an unfair dismissal application. However, cases of this kind will
generally turn on their own facts. In the present case, neither party brought to my attention any
relevant matter concerning this consideration and I am unaware of any relevant matter. I,
therefore, consider this to be a neutral consideration.
Conclusion and disposition
[52] Having regard to the matters I am required to take into account under s.394(3), and all
of the matters raised by the Applicant, I find that there are no exceptional circumstances in this
case, either when the various circumstances are considered individually or together. Because I
am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, there is no basis for me to allow an
extension of time. I decline to grant an extension of time under s.394(3). Accordingly, the
application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed.
[53] An order to this effect will be issued with this decision.
COMMISSIONER
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR765005>
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1 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.399.
2 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.394(2).
3 Nulty v Blue Star Group (2011) 203 IR 1 at [13].
4 Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 901, [39].
5 Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital Print P5279 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Drake DP, Deegan C, 22 September 1997),
[(1997) 74 IR 413, at pp. 418‒420]; Davidson v Aboriginal & Islander Child Care Agency Print Q0784 (AIRCFB,
Ross VP, Watson SDP, Eames C, 12 May 1998), [(1998) 105 IR 1]; cited in McConnell v A & PM Fornataro T/A
Tony’s Plumbing Service [2011] FWAFB 466 (Lawler VP, O’Callaghan SDP, Bissett C, 31 January 2011) at para.
35, [(2011) 202 IR 59].
6 Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287, [12]; Ozsoy v
Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149, [31]; Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a
Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349, [29]-[31].
7 McConnell v A & PM Fornataro T/A Tony's Plumbing Service (2011) 202 IR 59.
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Official source: https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/decisionssigned/pdf/2023fwc1972.pdf