ALDAW -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 95

[2026] WASCA 95 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : ALDAW -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 95 CORAM : ARCHER JA SWEENEY JA SEAWARD JA HEARD : 19 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 22 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 124 of 2025 BETWEEN : MELES AHMAD ALFEKI ALDAW Appellant AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : RENTON DCJ File Number : IND 751 of 2024 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Comparative 'culpability' - Manifest excess -- 1 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 Page 2 Legislation: Nil Result: Leave to appeal granted Appeal dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : G C R Yin Respondent : N R Sinton Solicitors: Appellant : Scerri Legal Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Dunbar v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 90 Gleeson v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 100 GNO v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 111 Grenfell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 31 GUE v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 121 Hodges v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 136 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 Moiler v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 63 Oxenham v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 30 Ratcliffe v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 75 The State of Western Australia v Darroch [2018] WASCA 114 The State of Western Australia v Khasay [2014] WASCA 58 Thompson v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 68 Trompler v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 265 Zhang v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 121 -- 2 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 3 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: Introduction 1 Just after midnight on 7 August 2023, the appellant and his associates went to Pot Black in Cannington, intending to commit a serious assault. Two of the appellant's associates were armed, one with a hatchet and the other with a machete. The armed men chased and savagely attacked the complainant. The complainant suffered significant injuries, including that his arm was nearly severed from his body by one of the machete strikes. 2 The appellant was convicted after a five-day trial of unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 294(1) of the Criminal Code (WA). He was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment. 3 The appellant appeals against his sentence on two grounds. Ground 1 alleges that the learned sentencing judge erred by finding that the appellant was no less 'culpable' than the offenders who caused the injuries. By ground 2, he alleges that the sentence is manifestly excessive. 4 For the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal. The sentencing The offending 5 The learned sentencing judge found as follows.1 6 Shortly before midnight on 6 August 2023, the appellant, who was with another person, saw the complainant and his friends in Pot Black in Cannington. There was some grievance between the appellant's associates and the complainant and his friends. The appellant and his companion left Pot Black and went to a residence, where he or his companion told several of their associates that the complainant and his friends were in Pot Black. The appellant and his companion then went to the appellant's home, and the rest of the group arrived soon afterwards. By this time, there was a plan to seriously assault a member of the complainant's group. While it was not the appellant who formed that plan, he willingly and intentionally joined with it. 1 WAB 70 - 74. -- 3 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 4 7 The appellant drove four of his associates to Pot Black, in his mother's SUV, a Nissan Qashqai. One of his associates had a hatchet and another had a machete. The appellant knew this. 8 When they arrived at Pot Black, the appellant and the rest of the group got out of the car wearing coverings to conceal their faces. The two weapons were being openly displayed. The learned sentencing judge found that the brazen way in which the weapons were being carried, despite the presence of multiple CCTV cameras, showed a clear intention to engage in violence and confidence that their identities were concealed. His Honour said that this demonstrated not only coordination among the appellant's group, but also 'a shared understanding of what was to occur'.2 9 The appellant's group walked towards the entrance to Pot Black and positioned themselves to the left of the entrance. 10 When the complainant and his friends began to exit Pot Black, the appellant's group let some of the complainant's friends walk unimpeded to their car. When the complainant exited, the armed members of the appellant's group ran after him. The appellant and one of his associates chased after the car containing the complainant's friends as it drove away. 11 The complainant tried to get into his friends' car, but they drove away in fear. The complainant then tried to run to the police station 800 m away. However, the two armed men caught up to him before he could get there. The man with the machete savagely swung it, striking the complainant around his right knee. The complainant started to limp off, but was then felled by a second machete strike to his ankle. The force of this blow caused the machete to fly out of the assailant's hand. The assailant ran to retrieve it and then returned to strike a third blow, as the complainant lay defenceless on the ground desperately raising his arm to protect himself. The third blow struck the complainant's right elbow, with such force that his arm was nearly severed from his body. 12 Around this time, the man who was armed with a hatchet arrived and kicked the complainant's head several times, before both men fled and regrouped with the appellant and the others. 13 The appellant then drove the group back to his house in his mother's Qashqai. Later that day, the appellant and one of his 2 WAB 71 - 72. -- 4 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 5 associates cleaned the Qashqai to remove potential forensic evidence that might have linked him or another member of the group to the attack.3 14 No one else was convicted for the offending.4 15 The learned sentencing judge noted that, as a result of the attack, the complainant suffered serious, ongoing, and likely permanent injuries. The attack also caused mental harm and great disruption to aspects of the complainant's life, including financial, personal and vocational aspects. 16 This was a high-level summary of the impact on the complainant. In his victim impact statement, the complainant said that he suffered a fractured elbow, fractured right knee and tendon damage, lacerations to his right thigh and a complete severing of his left Achilles tendon. He was hospitalised for over two and a half months, and bedridden for 16 weeks. He underwent surgery to repair the injuries to his elbow, Achilles, thigh and knee. When discharged from the hospital, he was wheelchair bound for several months while he underwent rehabilitation. 17 The complainant said he continues to suffer ongoing pain and restriction of movement of his right elbow and knee. He now walks with a limp. He has extensive scarring. He has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder and anxiety. He has been told that he will have long-term restrictions in his capacity for work. Personal circumstances 18 The appellant was 24 years old at the time of offending and 26 years old at the time of sentencing. He is of Sudanese background and moved to Australia with his mother when he was six months old. 19 The appellant's stepfather physically assaulted him until he was around 11 years old. 20 The appellant completed schooling to year 10, before undertaking a spray-painting apprenticeship. He was subsequently employed as a spray painter for several years. 3 WAB 73. 4 WAB 76. -- 5 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 6 21 He lived with his mother and half-brother prior to his arrest. At the time of sentencing, the appellant was single and had a two-year-old daughter, who he spent time with once a month. 22 The appellant used cannabis from the age of 15 years and cocaine occasionally from the age of 21. 23 The appellant has a lengthy adult criminal record, predominantly for cannabis-related offending, breaches of protective bail conditions, and driving related matters. On 10 July 2020, he was sentenced to a conditionally suspended imprisonment order for an aggravated burglary offence. He later breached that order, being convicted on 11 May 2021 of four offences, including possessing a controlled weapon on 12 October 2020. However, the court sentencing him for the breach ordered that the conditionally suspended imprisonment order continue. Aggravating factors 24 The sentencing judge found the following factors to be aggravating. 25 The offending had an element of premeditation, and the attack was unprovoked. 26 Dangerous weapons capable of inflicting serious injury or death were used. 27 There were multiple offenders present. 28 The complainant was struck repeatedly with the machete, including a blow which nearly cut his arm off (while he was on the ground, having been felled by earlier strikes), and he was kicked to the head while defenceless. 29 The complainant suffered serious injuries which were ongoing and likely permanent. Mitigating factors 30 The sentencing judge found the following factors to be mitigating. 31 The appellant was only 24 years old at the time of offending. 32 The appellant, after being convicted by the jury and late in the sentencing hearing, eventually accepted he had been involved in the offending. However, the sentencing judge said he had 'great difficulty' -- 6 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 7 in accepting the appellant's version of his involvement, because the appellant had given deliberately false evidence in the trial.5 33 The appellant had been in custody for an extended period, during which the conditions in prison were 'far from ideal'.6 The sentence 34 His Honour sentenced the appellant to a term of 8 years' imprisonment, backdated to commence on 11 August 2023 to take into account his time spent in custody. He was made eligible for parole. Ground 1 - Did the sentencing judge err by finding that the appellant was no less culpable? 35 Ground 1 asserts that the sentencing judge erred by finding the appellant was no less culpable than the offenders who caused the injuries. 36 The expression 'culpability' is not always used with precision. During the hearing, the appellant confirmed that ground 1 was intended to allege that the sentencing judge erred by finding the appellant's offending was as objectively serious as the offending of those who inflicted the injuries, given what the appellant knew and what he did. 37 Having regard to the relevant context, we do not accept that the learned sentencing judge made this finding. What was the context? 38 Prior to the sentencing hearing, the parties filed written sentencing submissions. In the appellant's written submissions, he relevantly wrote (original emphasis underlined, added emphasis in italics and bold): 13. It is submitted that the court ought to find the culpability of the offender to be: a. That he aided the other persons knowing they would seriously assault the victim without the use of weapons (use of the vehicle). b. That any planning, in which the offender was involved, did not include a plan to injure with weapons. This is because the first evidence, in time, to suggest the 5 WAB 76. 6 WAB 76. -- 7 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 8 presence of weapons is the CCTV footage captured shortly before the victim was attacked. c. That the first time it is open on the evidence to infer that the offender could expect a probable consequence involving wounding type injuries is shortly before the attack. On that basis, the offender's criminal liability arises by virtue of section 8 [Criminal Code] at that late stage only. The offender contends this to be significant because it is distinguishable from situations where it is plain from the outset that the intention of the principal offenders involves the use of a firearm or a cutting implement etc. d. Because of the matters raised above, the offender submits that he ought not be culpable to the same extent as someone who used the weapons and in fact caused the injuries. 39 At the sentencing hearing, counsel for the appellant developed these submissions orally. 40 Defence counsel said that the CCTV camera which showed the car arriving at Pot Black was 'obscured by a bush' and so there was no footage showing the men getting out of the car.7 Accepting that the appellant was one of the two men who ran after the car containing the complainant's friends, defence counsel submitted that there was no basis upon which the appellant would have been 'aware of the significance of those two that were brandishing the weapons, in terms of what their mindset was'8 and that 'the first time we were able to see the weapons was just before the attack'.9 He submitted that the appellant's knowledge changed at a stage at which it would have been difficult for him to withdraw from the plan.10 41 In an attempt to support this submission, defence counsel sought to contrast the appellant's 'culpability' from the 'culpability' of a getaway driver in a bank robbery. He said (emphasis added):11 The difference there is - and the salient point is, if the getaway driver is in the car, and they see their associate with the balaclava and the shotgun, it's trite what's about to occur. And the possibility that 7 WAB 49. 8 WAB 47. 9 WAB 47. 10 WAB 47. 11 WAB 47 - 48. -- 8 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 9 someone may grab the gun and the gun goes off, or whatever is the case, is there. That's not the case here. It's significantly different. The very serious aspects of this occur right at the end of the narrative. And on that basis, the defence position is that puts him in a less culpable position. I'm not suggesting it's mitigating, but it's certainly not aggravating, and he ought not be treated as though he knew from the outset that someone would use a weapon. But it's fair to say, it seems to be consistent that there [was] some sort of a plan, probably to use feet and - I'm guessing, fists and feet perhaps, but it's difficult - - - 42 In response to counsel's submission, his Honour said (emphasis added):12 I think there are a lot of difficulties with that submission … the coordinated nature of the activities; the fact that they are all masked, or wearing coverings over their face; the open and brazen manner in which the weapons are being carried. There's been no attempt made to conceal. They're not small items by any stretch. The size of the items on the video, the machete at least was close to being a forearm's length, the hatchet similar in length. The Qashqai is a small vehicle. There is nothing to suggest, in the movement of any of the individuals, anything to suggest surprise, reluctance, or reticence from the moment they are seen on the CCTV. There is nothing to suggest to me any reason to conceal the weapons from your client, given his role in the offending. So I think there is some difficulty in saying that he only acquires the pertinent points of information right at the end. 43 Later, defence counsel returned to his theme of comparative 'culpability'. This time, he sought to contrast the appellant's position with the position of a person who hires a hitman:13 I make the point that it's probably not the sort of matter where he is culpable to the extent - as someone who inflicts the injuries, and the reason I say that is this: I realise there are situations where someone can have no involvement and still be culpable. The analogy that comes to mind, perhaps, is someone who conspires to have another person murdered, for example, the quintessential situation where they may engage the commonly termed hitman, so to speak. That person, we would all imagin[e], knowing that the person - person A knowing that person B is going to commit an unlawful killing is in - effectively up their perennial eyeballs. This is a situation where, in my respectful submission, it could be accepted that at the time that [the appellant] makes that tip-off, if that's what you're 12 WAB 48. 13 WAB 50 - 51. -- 9 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 10 going to find, things effectively get probably beyond what was initially planned. And it is the case that the law says in for a pound in that sense, only in terms of it snaring you as being culpable, but it is still to be distinguished from a situation where someone says, 'I want a particular level of harm to occur', i.e. a death or something of that nature. I think it would be common amongst us all to say it's likely to have been a plan to commit a serious assault. 44 The effect of the appellant's submissions to the sentencing judge was that: 1. The weapons were only apparent to the appellant at some time after the appellant and his associates got out of the Qashqai at Pot Black and only just prior to the attack upon the complainant; 2. Therefore, the appellant's criminality relative to his co-offenders was different to that of a getaway driver in a bank robbery who sees a co-offender with a gun, or a person who hires a hitman; 3. Rather, the appellant's criminality was primarily that of an aider who had no knowledge that weapons would be involved and that, by the time the appellant saw the weapons, there was nothing he could have done to stop what happened. 45 Relevantly to these submissions, the learned sentencing judge found:14 1. At least by the time the group arrived at the appellant's home, a common unlawful purpose had been formed to seriously assault a member of the complainant's group. 2. While it was not the appellant who formed that plan, the appellant willingly and intentionally joined with it. 3. The appellant drove the group to and from Pot Black in the Qashqai (his mother's car). 4. The machete and hatchet were not being concealed from the appellant while the group assembled at the appellant's home, and he was aware that they were brought to be used in the intended assault. 14 WAB 71 - 72. -- 10 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 11 5. It was a probable consequence of the intended assault that the weapons would be used and could well have caused an unlawful wounding given their nature. 6. The appellant got out of the Qashqai with the others in his group. All were wearing coverings to conceal their faces. 7. The appellant was one of the two men who chased after the car containing the complainant's friends as it drove away. 46 The statement the subject of the appellant's complaint in this ground (marked in italics below) was said by his Honour when describing the seriousness of the offending:15 Taking into account all the circumstances, your offending on this occasion was extremely serious. Whilst not the organiser of the plan or the one who struck the blows, you were responsible for the original tip-off and you provided transport there and back again, knowing what was intended to be done and what could well have occurred. You played a central and important role in the offence coming about, notwithstanding you were not the one to strike the blows. Notwithstanding that you didn't strike the blows, you nonetheless share responsibility for them and for the injuries that were caused. Accordingly, I reject the submission on your behalf that you ought be treated on some less culpable basis. The photo of the injuries shows how serious and grave it was, severing flesh, muscle and bone. [The complainant] has been left with ongoing and likely permanent injuries as a result. 47 Later, the sentencing judge noted that parity was not an issue, because no one else had been convicted of the offence.16 What did it mean? 48 The State submits that, by the impugned phrase, the learned sentencing judge was rejecting the appellant's submission at sentencing that he did not know that weapons would be involved until after he and his associates got out of the Qashqai at Pot Black, and that therefore he should be sentenced on the basis that he was primarily an aider who had no knowledge that weapons would be involved until it was too late to stop what happened. 15 WAB 74. 16 WAB 76. -- 11 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 12 49 The appellant contends that, by the impugned phrase, the sentencing judge was saying that he did not accept that the appellant's offending was less objectively serious than the offending of those who caused the injuries. 50 The appellant notes that the impugned phrase was spoken at a time considerably after the sentencing judge had said that he was satisfied that the appellant had known about the weapons before the group left the appellant's home to go to Pot Black. 51 We do not accept that this supports the appellant's contention. 52 The learned sentencing judge's remarks followed a clear structure. His Honour set out the facts that he found, including that the appellant had known about the weapons before the group left the appellant's house to go to Pot Black. His Honour then identified the factors he considered aggravated the offending. Having found the facts and identified the aggravating factors, his Honour then characterised the appellant's offending as extremely serious and summarised why he had reached that view. It was in that summary that his Honour used the impugned phrase. It was unnecessary, and would have been unhelpful, for his Honour to repeat the factual findings he had made earlier. The summary was self-evidently based upon those factual findings. After concluding his discussion of the seriousness of the offending, his Honour moved to the appellant's personal circumstances and the mitigating factors. 53 The appellant further submits that his contention is supported by the sentencing judge's use of the word 'notwithstanding' twice in the two sentences prior to the sentence containing the impugned phrase. 54 We do not accept that this supports the appellant's contention. 55 The appellant properly concedes that there was nothing objectionable about the sentences in which his Honour used the word 'notwithstanding'. He accepts that it was open to his Honour to find that he 'played a central and important role in the offence coming about, notwithstanding [he was] not the one to strike the blows' and that, '[n]otwithstanding that [he] didn't strike the blows, [he] nonetheless share[d] responsibility for them and for the injuries that were caused'. The appellant concedes his complaint is limited to the impugned phrase. -- 12 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 13 56 In the impugned phrase, the learned sentencing judge said that he was dealing with a submission made on the appellant's behalf that he should be 'treated on some less culpable basis'. As recorded above, the appellant's written and oral submissions at sentencing advanced an argument that the weapons were only apparent after the appellant and his associates got out of the Qashqai at Pot Black, and that therefore the appellant's criminality relative to his co-offenders was different to that of a getaway driver in a bank robbery who knows his co-offender has a gun, and different to a person who hires a hitman. The appellant submitted at sentencing that his criminality was primarily that of an aider who had no knowledge that weapons would be involved, and that by the time the appellant saw the weapons, there was nothing he could have done to stop what happened. The appellant submitted at sentencing that, for these reasons, 'he ought not be culpable to the same extent as someone who used the weapons and in fact caused the injuries'. He submitted that 'on that basis, the defence position is that puts him in a less culpable position'. 57 Having regard to the context, we consider that, by the impugned phrase, the learned sentencing judge was rejecting these assertions. As noted above, his Honour did not accept that the weapons were apparent to the appellant only after he and his associates got out of the Qashqai at Pot Black and only at some point just prior to the attack, and made specific findings about what the appellant knew and when, and his involvement. In later explaining why he characterised the appellant's offending as extremely serious, his Honour included that the appellant knew what was intended to be done and what could well have occurred (which in context meant that, given the weapons and the plan, serious injuries could be caused). In our view, by the impugned phrase, his Honour was also including in that explanation his rejection of the submission that the appellant should be sentenced on the basis that he had no knowledge that weapons would be involved until some point after the group got out of the Qashqai at Pot Black. 58 In our view, the sentencing judge did not find that the appellant's criminality was the same as that of the two men who wielded the weapons. Rather, his Honour refused to find (as urged by the appellant) that the appellant's criminality should be assessed on the basis that he did not know about the weapons until after the group got out of the Qashqai at Pot Black and only just prior to the attack. -- 13 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 14 Conclusion on ground 1 59 For these reasons, while we would grant leave to appeal on ground 1, we would dismiss the ground. Ground 2 - Was the sentence imposed manifestly excessive? 60 By ground 2, the appellant alleges that the sentence imposed on him was manifestly excessive when regard is had to all the circumstances of the case. 61 The general sentencing principles applicable to a ground of appeal that alleges that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive are well established.17 62 We have already discussed the seriousness of the offence, the mitigating and aggravating factors, and the personal circumstances of the appellant. 63 The maximum penalty for the offence of grievous bodily harm with intent is 20 years' imprisonment. Comparable cases 64 Offences of causing grievous bodily harm with intent are committed in a wide variety of facts and circumstances.18 In sentencing for such offences, relevant factors include the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the type of act which caused the injury, and the circumstances of the offending, including the context in which it occurred.19 65 The appellant accepts his offending was a serious instance of an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The State accepts that, while it was serious, it was not in the worst category of cases of such offences. 66 The appellant cites four cases20 in support of this ground of appeal. In two of those cases,21 the offender sought leave to appeal on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, but leave 17 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21]. 18 Dunbar v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 90 [86]. 19 Trompler v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 265 [9] - [11]. 20 Grenfell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 31; Oxenham v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 30; Zhang v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 121; Thompson v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 68. 21 Thompson; Oxenham. -- 14 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 15 to appeal was refused. Where leave to appeal has been refused, the total effective sentence under appeal was not even arguably excessive. In those circumstances, the sentence imposed does not provide any marker as to the upper limits of the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion.22 In our view, cases in which leave to appeal was refused are generally of no utility in considering whether a sentence is manifestly excessive.23 67 The two remaining cases cited by the appellant are the 2013 decision of Zhang v The State of Western Australia and the 2018 decision of Grenfell v The State of Western Australia. 68 In Zhang, this court allowed an appeal against a sentence of 10 years and 6 months' imprisonment imposed after trial for an offence contrary to s 294(1) of the Code. Mazza JA (with whom McLure P and Buss JA agreed) reviewed sentencing cases involving offences of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, which were serious but not in the worst category. His Honour concluded that, as at that time, the range of sentences customarily imposed after trial for that type of offending had not exceeded 8 years' imprisonment.24 The court resentenced the offender to 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment. 69 It is unnecessary to set out the circumstances of the offending in Zhang, other than to note that we accept that it was objectively more serious than the offending in the present case.25 However, since 2013, when Zhang was decided, sentences have been firming up for this type of violent offending.26 70 In 2018, in The State of Western Australia v Darroch,27 this court allowed a State appeal against a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment for an offence of doing, with intent to harm, an act as a result of which the life, health or safety of a person was, or was likely to be, endangered, contrary to s 304(2) of the Code. This court substituted a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, following a 25% discount for an early plea.28 22 Hodges v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 136 [74] point 7; GNO v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 111 [82]; GUE v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 121 [59]. 23 Ratcliffe v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 75 [59]. 24 Zhang [61]. 25 See the summary in Moiler v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 63 [472] - [473]. 26 Moiler [468]; Dunbar [86]. 27 The State of Western Australia v Darroch [2018] WASCA 114. 28 The offender had also received an additional 12 months' imprisonment for an offence of assaulting a public officer causing bodily harm. For totality reasons, this court ordered that the 12 month term for that offence be served concurrently with the new 10 year sentence for the offence contrary to s 304(2). -- 15 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 16 71 Further, in 2020, in Dunbar v The State of Western Australia,29 this court upheld a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment for an offence contrary to s 294(1) of the Code, following a 20% discount for an early plea. In the course of so doing, this court expressly observed that there had recently been a firming up of sentences for s 294 offences, particularly in relation to those cases at the upper end of the spectrum of seriousness, although below the worst case category.30 72 The second of the two cases cited by the appellant in which leave to appeal was granted is the 2018 case of Grenfell. In that case, this court noted that offences of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent, not falling within the worst category of cases, commonly led (as at that time) to sentences within the range of 4 years 6 months' to 8 years' imprisonment.31 However, the actual sentences imposed on Mr Grenfell are not useful comparators. Mr Grenfell was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment on his plea of guilty to six offences, five of which were committed during a home invasion. None of the offences were contrary to the same section of the Code as the offence committed by the appellant, s 294(1). The closest offence was an offence of aggravated grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 297(3) of the Code, which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. The aggravating feature was that children were present. For that offence, Mr Grenfell was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment. The offence committed by the appellant, an unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to s 294(1) of the Code, is subject to a significantly higher maximum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment. 73 For these reasons, we do not accept that the cases cited by the appellant support a contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive. 29 Dunbar v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 90. The offender was also sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment for an assault occasioning bodily harm, to be served cumulatively on the 10 year sentence. 30 Dunbar [86]. 31 Grenfell [62]. -- 16 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 17 74 The State refers to two further cases, namely The State of Western Australia v Khasay32 and Gleeson v The State of Western Australia.33 However, these were offered merely as examples of cases in which similar sentences had been imposed for a single offence contrary to s 294(1) of the Code. Neither are factually similar to the present case. Conclusion 75 The appellant submits that his criminal responsibility was derived from the tip-off, being a party to the plan and providing transport. To this list, we would add that the appellant, like the others, wore a covering to conceal his face, got out of the Qashqai with the others, walked to the entrance to Pot Black with the others, took up a position to the left of the entrance with the others, and was one of two to chase after the car containing the complainant's friends. 76 The sentencing judge found that the appellant knew of the weapons, which were not concealed from him at the time the group gathered at his home, knew the weapons were brought to be used in the assault, and willingly and intentionally joined in a plan to seriously assault a member of the complainant's group. The sentencing judge found that, not only did the appellant know what was intended to be done, he also knew what could well have occurred. The appellant accepts that it must have been expected that the complainant and his group were unlikely to be armed. The appellant accepts that there was an intention to use a significant level of violence. In our view, what actually occurred was entirely consistent with the plan, the expectation and the intention. 77 We agree with his Honour that the appellant played a central and important role in the offending, notwithstanding he was not the one to strike the blows. 78 The attack was premeditated, brutal and sustained. It continued after the complainant was utterly defenceless on the ground. The complainant suffered serious physical injuries, mental harm and great disruption to his life. He has been left with permanent injuries. It is also likely that the psychological impact on him will be significant and enduring. 79 Apart from the appellant's youth, there was little to mitigate his offending. 32 The State of Western Australia v Khasay [2014] WASCA 58. 33 Gleeson v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 100. -- 17 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 95 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 18 80 The maximum penalty for this offence is 20 years' imprisonment. 81 The cases said to be comparators do not support a contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive. 82 We accept that the appellant's sentence may be described as firm, given he did not himself inflict the injuries. However, we are not satisfied that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. While we would grant leave to appeal on this ground, we would dismiss the ground. Orders 83 For these reasons, we would make the following orders: 1. Leave to appeal is granted. 2. The appeal is dismissed. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. NC Associate to the Hon Justice Archer 22 JULY 2026 -- 18 of 18 --