[2025] SASC 146

On Appeal from MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (MAGISTRATE JACKSON) CIV- 23-007227 Applicant: HAYLEY MAREE RUSINSKI In Person First Respondent: SHARON JAMIESON Counsel: MS A CARTER - Solicitor: LYNCH MEYER LAWYERS Second Respondent: MICHELLE LODGE Counsel: MS A CARTER - Solicitor: LYNCH MEYER LAWYERS Third Respondent: JASON WORDEN Counsel: MS A CARTER - Solicitor: LYNCH MEYER LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 05/08/2025, 12/08/2025, 18/08/2025 File No/s: CIV-25-004451 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Magistrates Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. RUSINSKI v JAMIESON & ORS [2025] SASC 146 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray (ex tempore) 18 August 2025 PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - EXECUTION AGAINST PROPERTY - WARRANTS OF SEIZURE AND SALE MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL This appeal concerns an application for an of extension of time arising out of a decision in the Magistrates Court dismissing a second application to set aside a default judgment, and a refusal to stay enforcement of that judgment. The proceedings in the Magistrates Court concern a default judgment entered against the applicant in the amount of approximately $25,000 for unpaid childcare fees owed to the respondents. The applicant, who was self-represented on the appeal, raised a number of grounds concerning a lack of procedural fairness in the Magistrates Court and a failure to have regard to the applicant’s personal circumstances. The respondents submitted that an extension of time should be refused, on account of delay, but if an extension of time was granted, that the appeal should be dismissed. Held, refusing the application for an extension of time: -- 1 of 14 -- 1. The appeal is without merit. That the delay is extensive and no sufficient reason exists to justify that delay was established. It is not in the interests of justice to allow the extension of time: [48]. Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 32.4; 203.2, referred to. Jackamarra (an infant) v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516; Kioa v West [1985] HCA 51; (1985) 159 CLR 550; Mysko v Express Cargo Services Pty Ltd [2024] SASCA 134; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1; Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors [2025] SASCA 51, considered. -- 2 of 14 -- RUSINSKI v JAMIESON & ORS [2025] SASC 146 Civil: Single Judge Appeal GRAY J (ex tempore): Introduction 1 These proceedings have a protracted history. On 16 April 2025, the applicant, Ms Rusinski, sought to appeal to this Court from the dismissal of her second application to set aside a default judgment made by a magistrate on 11 November 2024. Ms Rusinski also seeks to appeal against the refusal to further stay enforcement of a default judgment originally entered on 6 October 2023. Other orders are also challenged.1 2 By interlocutory application, Ms Rusinski also sought2 a number of orders including a request for a stay of proceedings. The interlocutory application, seeking, inter alia, a stay, was sought to be filed in this Court on 17 April 2025. It was not accepted for filing as the applicant had not complied with the request from registry to file an affidavit in support of the application. On 22 April 2025, this Court ordered that the applicant file any affidavit in support of the interlocutory application by 23 April 2025. That interlocutory application was then listed for hearing before me on an urgent basis on 24 April 2025. Whilst I directed the registry pursuant to r 32.4 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) to accept the interlocutory application and affidavit for filing, I ultimately dismissed the interlocutory application to the extent that it sought orders that “all enforcement proceedings including the current warrant for sale over 557 Milne Road, Tea Tree Gully 5091 be stayed pending further orders of the court or the outcome of the applicant’s appeal”.3 3 By application dated 29 April 2025, Ms Rusinski sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the dismissal of her application for a stay of the enforcement pending appeal.4 The Court of Appeal did not grant leave. 4 As the Court of Appeal noted, these proceedings have their genesis in a default judgment of the Magistrates Court entered against Ms Rusinski and in favour of the respondents on 6 October 2023, for an amount of approximately $25,000. The judgment sum related to fees for childcare services provided by the respondents during 2021 and 2022. The Court of Appeal held:5 Ms Rusinski subsequently made two applications in the Magistrates Court to set aside this default judgment. Both applications were beset with delays and default, and were ultimately 1 Notice of Appeal (FDN 1). 2 Interlocutory Application dated 24 April 2025 (FDN 6). 3 Ruling of Gray J in Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors (Supreme Court of South Australia, CIV-25-004451, 23 June 2025) (FDN 23). 4 Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors [2025] SASCA 51 at [1] (S Doyle and Bleby JJA). 5 Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors [2025] SASCA 51 at [3]-[4] (S Doyle and Bleby JJA). -- 3 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 2 dismissed. The second application was dismissed by a magistrate on 11 November 2024. The magistrate delivered some ex tempore reasons for dismissing the application, explaining in some detail her reasons for concluding that Ms Rusinski had both failed to provide a proper explanation for her defaults and delays, and failed to demonstrate that she had a reasonable basis for defending the claim against her. In her Honour’s view, it was not in the interests of justice that the default judgment against Ms Rusinski be set aside. Ms Rusinski was not represented during the course of the proceedings before the Magistrate, and indeed did not attend the hearing at which her second application was ultimately dismissed. However, the magistrate’s reasons set out in detail her Honour’s reasons for concluding that Ms Rusinski had had a fair opportunity to present and pursue her application. 5 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Rusinski’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 6 Following the Court of Appeal decision, Ms Rusinski sought to bring further interlocutory applications, including to injunct the sale of the property. Those applications were listed on an urgent basis on 23 June 2025. Mr Rusinski was on 23 June 2025 informed that leave to file the interlocutory application seeking to injunct the sale would not be granted.6 The applicant had not complied with the court rules for the filing of that application, nor had she complied with the timeframe provided for bringing further interlocutory applications, nor had she provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Ms Carter, who appeared for the respondents on 23 June 2025, indicated that settlement of the property occurred at 2:00pm on Friday, 20 June 2025, and funds had been distributed. 7 As a self-represented litigant, what Ms Rusinski needs to do and the issues she needs to address and the timeframes within which she needs to act, have been explained to her by this Court on numerous occasions. Ms Rusinski has simply not complied with the court processes and has not acted in a timely manner. 8 Following the hearing on 23 June 2025, the matter was adjourned until 2:15pm on Tuesday, 24 June 2025, when the application that the applicant had brought for joinder had been listed for hearing. 9 On 24 June 2025, the matter was called on. The applicant did not attend court. The remarks and orders made on that occasion record as follows:7 Remarks Ms Rusinski did not attend court today when the matter was called on at 2:15pm. The matter was called outside the courtroom on 3 occasions at 2:15pm and then called outside the courtroom on 3 occasions again at 2:30pm. 6 Ruling of Gray J in Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors (Supreme Court of South Australia, CIV-25-004451, 23 June 2025) (FDN 23). 7 Record of Outcome dated 24 June 2025 (FDN 24). -- 4 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 3 Email sent to chambers at 1:54pm indicating Ms Rusinski would not attend. The respondent makes an application for costs fixed in the sum of $350. Mr James Rusinski appears in person. Order 1. The question of costs of today’s attendance is reserved for further consideration on Tuesday 5 August 2025 at 2.15pm. 2. The matter is adjourned to Tuesday 5 August 2025 at 2.15pm. 3. Liberty to apply. 10 On 5 August 2025, the matter was called on again. Ms Rusinski did not attend. The remarks and orders on that occasion record as follows:8 Remarks Ms Rusinski did not attend court today when the matter was listed for hearing at 2:15pm. The matter was called outside the courtroom on 3 occasions at 2:34pm. Email sent to registry at 1:43pm indicating Ms Rusinski would not attend. Ms Rusinski forwarded to Registry an Interlocutory Application, an affidavit and documents seeking adjournment. A short one week adjournment will be granted. This is the second occasion Ms Rusinski has not attended. In the event of any further non-attendance in person by Ms Rusinski, the matter may be struck out for want of prosecution. It is unlikely any further application for an adjournment will be granted. Any additional materials to be filed or extension of orders for filing of material will need to be the subject of an application for leave, which can be heard on the next occasion. All parties to attend the next hearing in person. Order 1. Mr James Rusinski be excused from further attendance in this matter. 2. Leave to file interlocutory application, affidavit and documents seeking adjournment already provided to registry. 3. All parties to these proceedings are to attend in person on next occasion. 4. The applicant is to pay the respondents costs fixed in the sum of $350.00. 5. The matter is adjourned to Tuesday 12 August 2025 at 10:00am. 8 Record of Outcome dated 5 August 2025 (FDN 26). -- 5 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 4 11 Shortly prior to the hearing on Tuesday, 12 August 2025, the applicant sought to attend via telephone as she had a sick child. That application was granted. Submissions were received by both parties on that occasion in respect of all grounds of the appeal. Ms Rusinski, on that occasion, identified the five grounds that she sought to pursue on the appeal. Ms Rusinski had, on 12 August 2025, not filed any further affidavits and submissions in accordance with the previously set court timetable and did not have those documents available and finalised at or prior to Tuesday, 12 August 2025, but indicated that she would be in a position to file the further identified documents by Wednesday, 13 August 2025. No further documents were filed on 13 August 2025. An email was sent to the Registrar of the Court on 13 August 2025 indicating that further documents would be filed on 14 August 2025. No further documents were filed on 14 August 2025, and no further communication was received by the court from Ms Rusinski that has been brought to my attention prior to today’s hearing on 18 August 2025. 12 On 18 August 2025, an email was received by the court indicating that Ms Rusinski would attend court but that she was running late. When the applicant attended court on 18 August 2025, at approximately 2:30pm, she indicated she wished to give further evidence but had not been able to swear an affidavit. The applicant was sworn in to give evidence but was unable to recall what she wanted to give evidence about. Ms Rusinski was released from her oath so that she could access her electronic devices and was granted an adjournment to collect her thoughts and consider what she wanted to give evidence about. 13 The matter was recalled at 3:00pm today. Ms Rusinski was re-sworn, and she gave evidence. Ms Rusinski’s oral evidence concerned reasons why she said there were errors made in the calculations of the amount of debt. Ms Rusinski also gave evidence about her post-traumatic stress disorder and other matters she says created hardship for herself and her children. Ms Rusinski also made references to difficulties that she had in respect of attendance before the learned Magistrate on 11 November 2024. 14 As I discuss below, those matters do not explain the reason for the delay in the institution of the appeal to this Court. I have, however, had regard to all of this evidence, but I note that the evidence does not, in all respects, relate directly to the grounds of appeal that Ms Rusinski raises in respect of the appeal against the decision of the learned Magistrate. In particular, much of the evidence that the applicant gave, and her further submissions today, relate to the question of the quantum of the debt, which is not raised in the grounds before me. 15 Ms Rusinski sought to be assisted by the court as a self-represented litigant, both in relation to the matters that she needed to address and the matters of relevance to her grounds of appeal, as well as to the distinction between matters of evidence and matters of submissions. 16 Following Ms Rusinski’s evidence and her further submissions, a number of interlocutory applications were advanced, including to amend her grounds and to -- 6 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 5 further adjourn the proceedings. Those matters were the subject of ex tempore rulings read onto transcript, and they were refused for the reasons read onto transcript. Extension of time 17 The granting of an extension of time within which to appeal is an evaluative exercise. There are four matters which the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider. These are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether there is an arguable case on appeal, and the degree of prejudice to the respondents.9 The overriding consideration is the interests of justice. 18 The decision to dismiss the set aside application was made by the learned Magistrate on 11 November 2024. Pursuant to r 214.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), an appeal must be instituted within 21 days after the date of judgment or order the subject of the appeal. This appeal was lodged on 16 April 2025, being some 156 days after the dismissal decision. The appeal is out of time. 19 The applicant seeks an extension of time on the grounds that she is self-represented and lacks access to timely legal advice, she was managing multiple overlapping proceedings, she has experienced ongoing physical and mental health challenges, she made efforts to lodge an appeal at an earlier time and she considers the issues in the appeal to be substantial and to involve natural justice and other matters.10 20 The respondents submit that the applicant does not explain how her lack of access to timely legal advice explains the length of the delay in bringing the appeal. The respondents rely upon the decision of Mysko v Express Cargo Service Pty Ltd11 as supporting the proposition that a lack of representation of itself does not explain the length of delay. The respondents submit that, in respect of the other matters raised by the applicant, whilst these matters are unfortunate, they do not adequately explain, with reference to dates and events, the extent of the delay in bringing the appeal.12 The respondents indicate that the applicant has failed to demonstrate for the Court why there would be an injustice should the extension not be granted. The respondents also note that the application for an extension of time needs to be considered in the context of the learned Magistrate in making the dismissal decision, specifically granting a further seven-day stay of the warrant to allow an urgent appeal to be lodged. 21 The question of an extension of time concerns the question of whether there is an arguable case. In my view, it is convenient to consider the merits of the appeal before returning to the question of the extension of time. 9 Jackamarra (an infant) v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 519-20, [4] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J). 10 Notice of Appeal (FDN 1), ‘Part 4’. 11 Mysko v Express Cargo Services Pty Ltd [2024] SASCA 134 at [24] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). 12 Addendum Respondents’ Written Submissions (FDN 25) (‘ARWS’) at [31]. -- 7 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 6 Consideration in respect of the grounds of appeal 22 The notice of appeal filed by Ms Rusinski dated 16 April 2025 articulates some 11 grounds of appeal.13 A number of the matters raised in these grounds make complaints about the actions of certain parties, and the events which led to the initial debt being incurred. The difficulty with a number of these grounds is that they do not properly articulate the circumstances in which the learned Magistrate, in making the dismissal decision, erred, misapplied the law, acted beyond jurisdiction, and/or considered irrelevant matters or acted upon a wrong principle. I have however, read all of the materials that the applicant has filed in support of these grounds.14 23 As the respondents appropriately acknowledge, the applicant, in written submissions before the Court of Appeal15 sought to clarify the four grounds upon which it appears that the applicant relies in making a complaint against the decision of the learned Magistrate. I note that those written submissions also make complaint about my earlier interlocutory ruling concerning the stay of enforcement. However, the applicant was self-represented in this hearing, and as she submitted in the hearing on 12 August 2025, that she wished to rely, in pursuing her appeal, upon the four grounds articulated in her written submissions before the Court of Appeal, as well as an additional fifth ground, and this course was not opposed by the respondents, leave to rely upon the grounds articulated in FDN 14, and the further ground, was granted.16 24 The fifth ground which Ms Rusinski articulated on 12 August 2025 was that ‘the learned Magistrate erred in failing to apply trauma-informed domestic violence principles’.17 I propose to consider in more detail the five grounds, and whether or not those grounds have merit, before returning to the question of the extension of time. Ground 1 – denial of procedural fairness 25 The applicant submits that the learned Magistrate failed to afford her a fair hearing, contrary to common law principles of natural justice, which require that every party is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.18 The substance of the applicant’s complaint in this regard is that the applicant had made multiple requests for adjournments and raised concerns as to her capacity to adequately prepare for the hearing due to other proceedings in the Family Court. The applicant’s complaint appears to be that, notwithstanding these requests, the 13 Notice of Appeal (FDN 1). 14 Affidavit of Hayley Maree Rusinski affirmed 15 April 2025 (FDN 2); Affidavit of Hayley Maree Rusinski affirmed 23 April 2025 (FDN 7); Affidavit of Hayley Maree Rusinski affirmed 28 April 2025 (FDN 9). 15 Appellant’s Written Submissions (FDN 14) (in relation to Court of Appeal proceedings). 16 Record of Outcome dated 12 August 2025 (FDN 27). 17 Appeal Transcript (12 August 2025) 20. 18 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584-5 (Mason J). -- 8 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 7 learned Magistrate proceeded to lift the stay and permit enforcement. The orders of 11 November 2024 were made in the applicant’s absence. 26 The respondents submit that this ground of appeal should fail as the applicant’s submissions do not recognise that various adjournments and opportunities were afforded to her in the Magistrates Court so that she could participate in the set aside application and be present when the dismissal decision was made. The respondents also submit that the applicant’s submissions fail to recognise that the respondents’ rights and interests also need to be considered, including their right to procedural fairness and the avoidance of practical injustice. 27 As Gleeson CJ held in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam:19 Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice. 28 As the learned Magistrate’s decision points out, Ms Rusinski was afforded numerous opportunities in the Magistrates Court to participate in those proceedings and to file further information. The applicant was granted the opportunity to put on further information and the matter was adjourned to enable her to do so. Ms Rusinski was also granted an adjournment due to her personal circumstances. There were four separate hearings in respect of the second application for a warrant of sale. 29 It is correct that when the orders were made by the learned Magistrate on 11 November 2024, those orders were made in Ms Rusinski’s absence. It does not, however, follow from that that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. As the learned Magistrate’s reasons record,20 Ms Rusinski had requested a telephone hearing, which was granted, but she did not answer her telephone when the Court called on three occasions. That was not the first occasion on which Ms Rusinski had failed to attend a court hearing of that application. 30 Further it is relevant to note that the learned Magistrate held:21 In the circumstances it is appropriate to lift the stay of the warrant of sale. I am conscious of the respondent’s self-represented status; I have afforded her several opportunities to obtain legal advice and prepare further affidavits. However, I propose to lift the stay after seven days to enable the respondent to file an urgent review of this decision in the Supreme Court, should she choose to do so. 31 In my view, there was no denial of procedural fairness in respect of the Magistrates Court proceeding and there was no practical injustice occasioned to the applicant. I have had regard to the further oral evidence of the applicant in 19 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 at 13-4, [37] (Gleeson CJ). 20 Decision of Magistrate Jackson in Jamieson & Ors v Rusinski (Magistrates Court of South Australia, CIV-23-007227, 11 November 2024) at [14] (‘Magistrate’s Reasons’). 21 Magistrate’s Reasons at [27]. -- 9 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 8 relation to her difficulties personally and in filing documents in respect of these matters and I have considered all of these matters. I find there is no merit in ground 1. Ground 2 – legal error in the exercise of the discretion in relation to delay and hardship 32 In respect of this ground, the applicant made submissions in respect of the delay in the institution of the proceedings. I will consider these submissions in the context of the extension of time application. Insofar as the applicant’s submissions referred to delay in the Magistrates Court proceedings, that appears to be a submission to the effect that the learned Magistrate failed to have regard to the personal circumstances of the applicant including psychological trauma, unstable living conditions, and single parenting responsibilities, as well as limited access to legal support and difficulty understanding procedural requirements, continued economic abuse, and lack of access to financial records as being reasons for time being sought by the applicant in the Magistrates Court proceedings. As I understand the submission about the learned Magistrate erring in this context, the complaint focuses on the learned Magistrate ultimately determining the proceedings at a time at which the applicant did not attend. 33 In my view, whilst the personal circumstances as outlined by the applicant are unfortunate, these matters do not give rise to any error in the exercise of the discretion by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate’s decision set out the various opportunities and extensions granted to the applicant and the considerations given to the applicant’s hardship. 22 No appealable error has been identified by the applicant in respect of this ground. There is no merit in ground 2. Ground 3 – failure to consider hardship and vulnerability 34 In respect of this ground, the applicant alleges that there was a failure to consider hardship and vulnerability of the applicant. The applicant repeats many of the matters outlined in respect of ground 2 above and refers to the extensive affidavit material that the applicant has provided detailing her significant hardship and vulnerability, which can be summarised as including: 1. Her role as a sole parent to three children aged eight, seven and five, two of whom who are currently awaiting assessments for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism spectrum disorder. 2. An inability to lodge tax returns or access financial records due to coercive control and intentional conduct by her former partner designed to restrict her financial independence. 22 Magistrate’s Reasons at [8]-[14]. -- 10 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 9 3. Termination of a childcare subsidy which prevented the applicant from returning to work and an unresolved complaint to the ombudsman regarding Centrelink and subsidy issues. 4. Psychological trauma and diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from prolonged domestic violence. 5. Her efforts to navigate legal processes without representation or guidance, having received only minimal legal advice despite repeated attempts to seek assistance. 35 I have considered the submissions that the applicant makes relevant to these matters, and, in particular, the emphasis the applicant placed upon the importance of the impact of enforcement decisions on her children. The applicant also refers to the economical and emotional disadvantage that she has as a woman in a personal relationship and submits that enforcement in the face of such known vulnerability and hardship requires a proportionate and humane approach. The applicant submits that the learned Magistrate gave inadequate weight to these vulnerabilities. 36 The difficulty with these aspects of the applicant’s submissions is that whilst the applicant’s personal circumstances may create hardship for her, these circumstances do not, as the respondents point out, nullify her obligations to address her liabilities and the legal right of the respondents to take steps to recover their debt in the event that the applicant does not pay monies that she owes. 37 The applicant has failed to demonstrate that there was any error in the approach of the learned Magistrate in upholding the respondents’ rights to take steps to recover its debt. There is no legal error in the manner in which the learned Magistrate dealt with this issue and, in particular, the learned Magistrate correctly pointed out that whilst the applicant’s circumstances may give rise to sympathy and they provided the learned Magistrate with a reason for affording Ms Rusinski a number of adjournments to obtain legal advice and file additional documents, Ms Rusinski’s legal challenges and personal circumstances, however, do not address the underlying merits of the application made by the respondents. 23 38 As the learned Magistrate correctly recognised, when considering the interests of justice, it is necessary to look at the rights and interests of both parties and that the respondents to this appeal have an interest in relying upon a regularly obtained judgment. 24 39 The learned Magistrate, in my view, correctly held that any defence raised by Ms Rusinski was destined to fail and, as such, it was not in her interest to set aside the judgment and have additional costs incurred. I find that the learned Magistrate correctly concluded that the judgment was regularly obtained, that 23 Magistrate’s Reasons at [23]. 24 Magistrate’s Reasons at [24]. -- 11 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 10 Ms Rusinski did not have a reasonable basis to defend the claim, and it was not in the interests of justice to set aside the default judgment.25 It follows that, in my view, there is no merit in ground 3. Ground 4 – disproportionate and oppressive enforcement 40 Ms Rusinski submits that the enforcement steps taken by the respondents are disproportionate by reference to the quantum of the debt, Ms Rusinski’s efforts to cooperate, the timing of the eviction, the loss of reliable transport, and the significant and ongoing hardship that Ms Rusinski faces. 41 The respondents submit that as a judgment creditor, the respondents are entitled to take whatever enforcement action is considered necessary to recover a judgment debt within the parameters set out in the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) and the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).26 The Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) does not place any limitation on enforcement steps that can be taken. The only limitation within the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) is based on quantum, that is, a judgment debt which is less than $12,000 must first be enforced by way of investigation summons.27 42 I accept the respondents’ submission that the applicant has had ample opportunity to seek to resolve the default judgment and the warrant to avoid the adverse consequences associated with the sale of her property. The applicant has elected not to engage in those opportunities and has brought this appeal out of time. I have had regard to the further evidence and oral submissions advanced by the applicant at today’s hearing concerning this ground. In my view, the allegation advanced on appeal that the respondents have acted in a manner which is disproportionate to the quantum of the judgment debt and have been oppressive in seeking to enforce the judgment debt does not give rise to the identification of error in the approach of the learned Magistrate. Ground 4 of the appeal is without merit. Ground 5 – failure to follow trauma-informed domestic violence principles 43 The applicant, in advancing this ground, repeated many of the submissions made in respect of ground 3 which I have addressed above. 44 Trauma is generally regarded as an emotional or physiological response to a stressful event or prolonged exposure to abuse.28 It can occur when a person experiences a real or perceived risk to their safety. Courts have responded to the challenges posed by those experiencing trauma, including family violence, in a number of ways, including by allowing attendance by video conferencing or permitting the attendance of a support person, or making other specific 25 Magistrate’s Reasons at [25]. 26 ARWS at [70]. 27 Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 203.2(1); see further ARWS at [71]. 28 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Practice Principles: Family Violence Best Practice Principles (5th Edition), December 2024, 4. -- 12 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 11 accommodations to enable a person experiencing trauma to participate in court proceedings. 45 Other than making a complaint that the learned Magistrate failed to follow a trauma-informed approach, the applicant, in my view, does not provide cogent evidence that there was a failure to accord the applicant procedural fairness or otherwise identify error in the learned Magistrate’s approach or an outcome error in the decision reached. 46 As I have noted above, the learned Magistrate afforded the applicant numerous opportunities to participate in the proceedings in the Magistrates Court. The learned Magistrate noted the difficulties that the applicant outlined as being due to experiencing domestic violence.29 There is no basis to consider that the learned Magistrate failed to have regard to this matter. The learned Magistrate returned to consider the personal circumstances of the applicant when addressing the interests of justice prior to making the challenged orders.30 In addition, during the course of the proceedings, the learned Magistrate made numerous accommodations to assist Ms Rusinski to attend, including allowing the applicant to attend by telephone when her children were sick.31 47 I find there is no cogent evidence adduced by the applicant to show that legal process of the hearing before the learned Magistrate was procedurally unfair to the applicant and did not have regard to the concerns the applicant raised that she had experienced domestic violence. The process that the learned Magistrate adopted in making accommodations for the applicant to engage in the hearing afforded the applicant the opportunity to be heard and made accommodations for her personal circumstances. There is no error identified in the outcome of the hearing, nor is it demonstrated that the learned Magistrate failed to have regard to the interests of justice in the context of the applicant’s personal circumstances. It follows that this ground is without merit. Application for an extension of time 48 Having considered the question of the merits of the appeal, I return to consider the application for an extension of time. I note that the length of the delay is extensive. I have considered all of the reasons that Ms Rusinski has put forward for the delay. In my view, the explanations for the delay do not sufficiently explain the length of the delay. It is also relevant that the property at 557 Milne Road, Tea Tree Gully has been sold. I have considered the matters raised on the appeal, and the merits of each of the grounds that the applicant seeks to raise. I find there is no merit in the appeal or any of the grounds which the applicant has raised in respect of the learned Magistrate’s reasons.32 It follows that it is not in the interests 29 Magistrate’s Reasons at [10]. 30 Magistrate’s Reasons at [22]. 31 Magistrate’s Reasons at [13]. 32 Rusinski v Jamieson & Ors [2025] SASCA 51 at [10] (S Doyle and Bleby JJA). -- 13 of 14 -- [2025] SASC 146 Gray J 12 of justice to allow the extension of time and the extension of time should be refused. 49 I also note, although expressed in the context of a consideration of leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal also noted the absence of any apparent merit in the appeal from the learned Magistrate’s decision as the appeal was articulated by the applicant at that stage. Conclusion 50 In conclusion, the orders of this Court will be: the extension of time application is refused. I would, in any event, if it were necessary to decide, dismiss the appeal. 51 I will hear the parties as to costs. -- 14 of 14 --