MEDHAT EL-BEHIDI In Person v COMMISSIONER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS In Person [2025] SASC 182
On Appeal from SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (SENIOR
MEMBER RUGLESS) 2025/SA000506
Applicant: MEDHAT EL-BEHIDI In Person
Respondent: COMMISSIONER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS In Person Counsel: MS C HARRISON -
Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA)
Hearing Date/s: 21/10/2025
File No/s: CIV-25-009102
B
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
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EL-BEHIDI v COMMISSIONER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS
[2025] SASC 182
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray (ex tempore)
21 October 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH
AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CONVEYANCING - THE CONTRACT AND CONDITIONS OF SALE - CLAIMS
FOR COMPENSATION
This matter concerns an application for leave to appeal against a decision of a senior member of the
South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal which affirmed a decision of the respondent, the
Commissioner for Consumer Affairs, dismissing a claim under s 32 of the Conveyancers Act 1994
(SA) on the indemnity fund.
The claim by the applicant, Mr El-Behidi, arose out of a failed business transaction concerning the
sale of his business, Woodville Pizzeria, to a Mr Pericleous in November 2017.
The applicant did not identify error in the decision of the learned Senior Member. The applicant made
general complaints regarding negligence and deceptive conduct on the part of the conveyancer, and
complained of a failure by the respondent to provide assistance to him. No party disputed that at all
relevant times no monies were paid to the applicant by Mr Pericleous and no monies were held on
trust by the conveyancer.
The respondent submitted that leave to appeal should be refused as the matter was not reasonably
arguable. It was submitted that as no trust money was held by the conveyancer, the claim under s 32
of the Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA), must fail, as such a claim is founded on the occurrence of
fiduciary default by a conveyancer in relation to trust money.
Held, refusing leave to appeal:
1. No trust money was held by the conveyancer at any relevant time and a claim under s 32 of
the Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) does not arise on the facts of this case. There is no reasonably
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arguable case or matter of sufficient substance warranting consideration on appeal which
justifies a grant of leave: at [27].
Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) s 14, s 31, s 32 and s 37; Land Agents Act 1994 (SA) s 29; South
Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 37 and s 71, referred to.
Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5; Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016]
[2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57;
(2016) 125 SASR 10; Varricchio v Wentzel [2016] SASC 86; (2016) 125 SASR 191, considered.
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EL-BEHIDI v COMMISSIONER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS
[2025] SASC 182
Civil: Single Judge Appeal
GRAY J (ex tempore):
Introduction
1 This matter concerns an application by Mr El-Behidi, the applicant, for leave
to appeal against a decision of a senior member of the South Australian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’ or ‘the Tribunal’) made on 3 July 2025.
2 On 12 December 2024, the respondent dismissing a claim made by the
applicant against the indemnity fund established under Part 4, Division 3 of the
Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) (‘Conveyancers Act’),1 pursuant to s 32 of the
Conveyancers Act (‘the Commissioner’s decision’), for compensation in the
amount of $330,000.2 The applicant sought review of the Commissioner’s decision
before the Tribunal pursuant to s 37 of the Conveyancers Act.
3 The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Commissioner.3 The applicant
seeks leave to appeal from the Tribunal’s decision. The applicant also seeks orders
summonsing a number of witnesses to give evidence as to the events which are
said to have taken place.
4 The Commissioner for Consumer Affairs, (‘the respondent’ or ‘the
Commissioner’), opposes a grant of leave to appeal, on the basis that the applicant
has not established reasonably arguable grounds. In the alternative, the respondent
submits that the appeal should be dismissed because the applicant did not establish
any appellable error.
Background and nature of the appeal
5 The applicant lodged a claim with the Commissioner under s 34 of the
Conveyancers Act seeking compensation for losses he says he suffered as a result
of a transaction he entered into with a Mr Alecos Pericleous.4
6 The claim, brought by the applicant on 21 December 2020, relates to the sale
of a business that the applicant operated which traded under the name Woodville
Pizzeria. The business was located at Shop 3, 39 Woodville Road, Woodville SA
5011 (‘the business’).
1 The indemnity fund, on which claims are permitted by s 32 of the Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA), is
established pursuant to s 29(1) of the Land Agents Act 1994 (SA).
2 Appeal Book (FDN 8) at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act
1994 at 1) (‘AB’).
3 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 37(1)(a).
4 AB at 36.
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[2025] SASC 182 Gray J
2
7 The background to this claim, as appears from the decision at first instance
or the decision of the Tribunal, is as follows:
7.1. On 1 November 2017 Mr Pericleous agreed to purchase the business
for $165,000.5 Payment of that sum was to be made by 1 July 2018.6
7.2. Prior to the payment of the monies on 1 July 2018, between
1 November 2017 and 1 July 2018, Mr Pericleous agreed to pay a
monthly licence fee of $2,250 to cover rent and outgoing expenses
charged by the landlord.7
7.3. A licence agreement may have been completed for the sale by
Mr John Radovanovic, an employee of FJ & F Portelli Pty Ltd, trading
as Port Adelaide Conveyancers (‘the conveyancer’).8
7.4. Mr Pericleous failed to make the required monthly payments and the
lease agreement, which remained in the name of the applicant, was
terminated by the landlord.9 The landlord’s agent repossessed the
premises and the premises were sold at auction.10
7.5. The applicant contended that he had been scammed and Mr Pericleous
had moved into the premises, sold all goods and chattels belonging to
the applicant, paid no rent or outgoing expenses, and placed no monies
in trust with the conveyancer.11 The applicant stated that he suffered
significant pecuniary losses as a result of the sequence of events which
took place.12
8 At the hearing before this Court, the applicant also referred to, and advanced
submissions, concerning the entry into a written agreement to sell the business.
Whilst those factual matters referred to above appear from the papers, what is not
in dispute is that no monies were paid to the applicant by Mr Pericleous and no
monies were held in trust by the conveyancer at the relevant times.
9 The applicant’s claim made on 21 December 2020 to the respondent pursuant
to s 32 of the Conveyancers Act for compensation from the indemnity fund was in
the amount of $330,000.
5 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1).
6 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1)
7 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1).
8 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1).
9 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1).
10 AB at 7 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 2, [9]).
11 AB at 7 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 2, [8]-[9]).
12 AB at 7 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 2, [8]).
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[2025] SASC 182 Gray J
3
10 The respondent dismissed the claim on the basis of the evidence before the
respondent indicating that as there was no evidence to support that the applicant
had suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of a fiduciary default by the conveyancer.13
11 The applicant sought review of the Commissioner’s decision before SACAT
pursuant to s 37 of the Conveyancers Act. The learned Senior Member affirmed
the Commissioner’s decision, dismissing the claim from the indemnity fund. The
learned Senior Member identified that the issue to be determined on review was
whether a fiduciary default was committed by a conveyancer in relation to trust
money which would support a claim for compensation.14 The learned Senior
Member’s reasons record the following:15
18. There is no evidence before me on review to establish that Mr El-Behidi suffered a
pecuniary loss as a result of a fiduciary default by a conveyancer. In the applicant’s
filed written submission, he agrees with that factual finding.
19. Accordingly, there can be no indemnity for any loss suffered by the applicant for any
‘fiduciary default’ (i.e., inappropriate dealing with trust funds) under the legislation
as none exists.
20. The decision made by the Commissioner is correct at law. There is no preferable
decision because there is no discretion to be exercised on review.
21. The Tribunal only has the power to deal with a reviewable decision within the strict
terms of the relevant legislation which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal. This
means that the Tribunal can only make a decision that accords with the
Conveyancer’s Act and that the Tribunal only has the same decision-making power
as the Commissioner. Neither the Commissioner nor the Tribunal have the power to
award compensation generally to the applicant for any other losses that he may have
suffered as a result of the subject transaction outside of the terms of s 32 of that Act.
12 The learned Senior Member found that the terms of the Conveyancers Act do
not permit for an award of compensation from the indemnity fund save and except
as permitted by s 32.16
Statutory basis of the appeal and relevant principles
13 An appeal to this Court from a decision of a senior member requires leave.17
The time for instituting an appeal is one month.18
14 This Court should only grant leave to appeal from a SACAT internal review
decision where the appeal is reasonably arguable, and the subject matter is of
sufficient substance to justify consideration.19
13 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1).
14 AB at 7-8 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 2-3, [15]).
15 AB at 8 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 3, [18]-[21]).
16 AB at 8 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 3, [22]).
17 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(2).
18 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(3).
19 See, as to being reasonably arguable: Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125
SASR 1 at 5-6, [19]-[20] (Parker J); Pix v South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016)
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[2025] SASC 182 Gray J
4
15 It is important that leave is not granted as a matter of routine. SACAT is a
specialist tribunal, and the granting of leave too readily would undermine the
legislative intention to establish SACAT as a specialist tribunal.20 The overarching
consideration is the interests of justice.21
16 Should a grant of leave be given, an appeal to this Court from a decision of
SACAT is by way of rehearing.22 Inferences of fact can be drawn from evidence
and materials before the Court and further evidence or material can be submitted
to the Court if it is thought fit.23 The Court may affirm, vary or set aside the
decision of the Tribunal, and remit the matter for reconsideration in accordance
with any directions should that be considered appropriate.24
Consideration
17 The applicant does not in his grounds of appeal identify specific error in the
decision-making process of the Tribunal or in the decision of the Tribunal. Rather,
the applicant, in a lengthy document attached to the notice of appeal, makes
allegations concerning deceptive conduct and negligence on the part of the
conveyancer.25 The applicant also makes complaint as to the manner in which the
Commissioner dealt with the complaint he made about the conveyancer to the
Commissioner.26
18 As was explained to the applicant during the course of the hearing before this
Court, complaints concerning deceptive conduct and negligence not relating to
trust funds may form the basis of a civil claim. Those complaints do not identify
error in the decision of the Tribunal.27
19 In relation to the complaints advanced about the conduct of the
Commissioner, a complaint in relation to that conduct may found a civil claim or
be the basis of a complaint to the Ombudsman, but again those complaints which
do not relate to trust money do not identify error in the decision of the Tribunal.
20 Section 32(1) of the Conveyancers Act states that a ‘person who has suffered
a pecuniary loss as a result of a fiduciary default may make a claim for
compensation to the Commissioner.’ The applicant’s claim was brought pursuant
to s 32 of the Conveyancers Act.
125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing). See, as to substance:
Aldridge v Registrar of Firearms (SA) [2022] SASC 5 at [33] (Parker J).
20 Varricchio v Wentzel [2016] SASC 86; (2016) 125 SASR 191 at 198, [37] (S Doyle J).
21 Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 62; (2016) 125 SASR 1 at 5, [19] (Parker J); Pix v
South Australian Housing Trust [2016] SASCFC 57; (2016) 125 SASR 10 at 11, [3] (Kourakis CJ, with
Bampton and S Doyle JJ agreeing).
22 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(3a).
23 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(3b).
24 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(4).
25 AB at 18 (Typed note of the applicant accompanying grounds of appeal dated 24 July 2025 at 1
(‘Applicant’s Note’)).
26 AB at 19 (Applicant’s Note at 2).
27 The applicant appeared as a self-represented litigant at the hearing with the assistance of an interpreter.
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[2025] SASC 182 Gray J
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21 Although the applicant in oral submissions says to the effect that the
Commissioner should have considered his claim more broadly, the applicant
advanced his complaint as a complaint against the conveyancer and a claim on the
indemnity fund.
22 The applicant did not identify appellable error in the consideration of his
claim as being a claim brought pursuant to s 32 of the Conveyancers Act. Pursuant
to the provisions of the Conveyancers Act, fiduciary default is defined as follows:28
fiduciary default means a defalcation, misappropriation or misapplication of trust money
occurring while the money is in the possession or control of—
(a) a conveyancer; or
(b) a firm of which a conveyancer is a member.
23 The Conveyancers Act defines trust money as follows:29
trust money, in relation to a conveyancer, means money—
(a) that is received by the conveyancer when acting on behalf of another in
connection with a dealing with land; and
(b) to which the conveyancer is not wholly entitled in law and in equity,
but does not include money received by a conveyancer in the course of mortgage
financing.
24 The Commissioner, as noted above, found that there was no evidence that the
applicant suffered a pecuniary loss because of a fiduciary default by the
conveyancer.30 The Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s decision under review
to reject the claim under the indemnity fund pursuant to s 32 of the Conveyancers
Act. In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal reasoned that there was no money
held on trust by the conveyancer, and therefore so no defalcation, misappropriation
or misapplication of trust money occurred.31 The Tribunal noted that the applicant
in his filed written submission agreed with the factual finding that there was no
evidence before the Tribunal on the review to establish that the applicant suffered
a pecuniary loss as a result of a fiduciary default by a conveyancer.32 In his notice
of appeal to this Court, the applicant states, “[a]t no point did I claim that any funds
were held or transferred to the conveyancer’s trust account.”33
28 Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) s 14(1).
29 Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) s 14(1).
30 AB at 4 (Determination of Claim for Compensation under the Conveyancers Act 1994 at 1).
31 AB at 8 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 3, [16]).
32 AB at 8 (Order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 2025 at 3, [18]).
33 AB at 19 (Applicant’s Note at 2). The applicant was afforded the opportunity to seek an adjournment
of the hearing so as to obtain legal advice however he indicated he had had the opportunity to obtain
legal advice however he was not in a position to pay for legal advice. The applicant sought to proceed
as a self-represented litigant.
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[2025] SASC 182 Gray J
6
25 The applicant has not identified any material error of fact or law in the
decision of the Tribunal. Having reviewed the reasons of the Tribunal, no material
error of fact or law is identifiable. The statutory provisions of the Conveyancers
Act indicate that a claim on the indemnity fund may be made by a person who has
suffered a pecuniary loss because of a fiduciary default.34 Fiduciary default is
defined to mean a defalcation, misappropriation or misapplication of trust money.35
Trust money is defined in the Conveyancers Act.36 The applicant accepts that his
claim did not involve trust money.
26 I find that on the evidence before me, there is no claim on the indemnity fund
which relates to trust money as defined in the Conveyancers Act. I find on the
evidence before me that the applicant is not a person who has suffered a pecuniary
loss as a result of a fiduciary default within the meaning of s 32(1) of the
Conveyancers Act. As indicated above, the applicant has not identified error in the
procedure of the Tribunal or the process of reasoning adopted by the learned Senior
Member. There was no identified error in the rejection of the claim on the
indemnity fund.
27 As I have indicated, I find on the evidence before me there is no claim on the
indemnity fund which relates to trust money as defined in the Conveyancers Act.
It follows that the appeal is not reasonably arguable, and the subject matter is not
of sufficient substance to justify consideration. It is not in the interests of justice
to grant permission to appeal.
Conclusion and orders
1. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
2. The application for the summonsing of witnesses does not fall to be
determined by virtue of the application for leave to appeal having been
refused.
3. I will hear from the parties as to any further orders.
34 Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) s 31.
35 Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) s 14(1).
36 Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA) s 14(1).
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