ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v JAMIE IRVINE [2025] SASC 186

Applicant: ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) Counsel: MR C HAMRA - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Respondent: JAMIE IRVINE Counsel: MS S REID - Solicitor: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION (SA) Hearing Date/s: 06/11/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-042988 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v IRVINE [2025] SASC 186 Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Kimber 11 November 2025 CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDER This is an application by the Attorney-General seeking an order that the respondent be subject to an extended supervision order pursuant to s 7(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the Act). Given the timing of the application, made little more than three weeks before the respondent’s expiry date, the Attorney-General is seeking an interim supervision order against the respondent pursuant to s 9(1) of the Act. In this application, the central issues are whether the Attorney-General has established, on the balance of probabilities, that the conduct constituting the offence caused serious and protracted impairment of a mental function, or a risk of serious and protracted impairment of a mental function, and, if so, whether the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. To prove the first of those matters, the Attorney-General seeks to rely on conduct that is an element of an offence other than the index offence. Held: 1. While this case does not provide the occasion to determine the limits of the meaning of ‘conduct constituting the offence’, in this case the conduct that is an element of an offence other than the index offence is within the conduct constituting the index offence; and 2. The matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order; and 3. Pursuant to s 9(1) of the Act, the respondent is to be subject to an interim supervision order. -- 1 of 12 -- Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20, 21, 83D, 134, 170; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 5, 7, 9, referred to. Attorney-General (SA) v Adams [2020] SASC 58; Attorney-General (SA) v Davidson [2018] SASC 91; Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49; Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300, applied. Attorney-General (SA) v Gates (2017) 129 SASR 298; Attorney-General (SA) v Wikaire (2017) 127 SASR 565, considered. -- 2 of 12 -- ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v IRVINE [2025] SASC 186 Criminal: Application KIMBER J. Introduction 1 This is an application by the Attorney-General (the applicant) for an extended supervision order pursuant to s 7(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the Act). The respondent is Mr Jamie Irvine (the respondent). The Attorney-General seeks the making of an order pursuant to the Act before the ‘relevant expiry date’. As that date will occur before the application is determined, the applicant submits that an interim supervision order should be made pursuant to s 9(1) of the Act. 2 There are three issues in the application, all of which must be established by the applicant on the balance of probabilities. Firstly, whether the respondent is a high risk offender on the ground that the respondent committed a serious offence where the conduct constituting the offence involved serious harm to a person, or a risk of serious harm to a person. Secondly, whether the matters alleged in the material supporting the application for an extended supervision order would, if proved, justify the making of that order. Thirdly, that the discretion to make an interim supervision order should be exercised. 3 I am satisfied the relevant expiry date will expire before the application is determined; that the respondent is a high risk offender; that the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order; and that the discretion to make an interim supervision order should be exercised. My reasons follow. The timing of the application 4 Before turning to the merits of the application, it is appropriate to say something about the timing of the application. 5 Notwithstanding that the respondent is in custody; his expiry date is 12 November 2025; and an application for an extended supervision order can be made within 12 months of the expiry date,1 the application for an extended supervision order was not filed until 21 October 2025. This meant that the first return of the application was on 29 October 2025. It also meant that submissions could not be heard until 6 November 2025. As will be seen, the application raised an important issue with respect to the construction of the Act. As might be expected, that timeline presented challenges for those instructed to act for the respondent. Indeed, reasonably, the respondent could not file his final written submissions opposing the application until after hours on 10 November 2025. 1 See s 7(2) of the Act. -- 3 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 2 Those submissions addressed additional substantial matters, particularly with respect to whether the Attorney-General had met his burden of establishing that the matters alleged in the material supporting the application for an extended supervision order would, if proved, justify the making of that order. Why the application was filed little more than three weeks before the expiry date is unexplained, and I cannot identify whom, if anyone, is to blame. I emphasise that I am sure that it was not the fault of counsel for the applicant. 6 As I have observed in other applications of this type, it is of concern that applications by which the Attorney-General seeks that an order be made, before the relevant expiry date, which if made will limit in significant ways the freedoms of a respondent who has served the sentence imposed by the Court, are sometimes made at a time which might place at risk the ability of a respondent to place before the Court all that is in his interests to present. A period of about two weeks between the application being filed and submissions being heard is, for a person in custody, not a great deal of time for a respondent to instruct a solicitor; for the solicitor to peruse substantial written material; for the solicitor to take instructions about the application and that material; and for the solicitor to then make fulsome submissions about whether an interim supervision order should be granted. No doubt through the urgent work of a solicitor at the Legal Services Commission, in this case, the risk of everything that might have been said on behalf of the respondent not being before the Court before the relevant expiry date was avoided. Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that will always be the case. It also cannot be assumed that the Court will always be able to set aside other responsibilities to ensure that all material; submissions; and relevant authorities are properly considered. Further, I am unpersuaded that the risk that I have identified should ever exist given the ability of the Attorney-General to make an application within 12 months of the relevant expiry date. That is not to suggest that the Attorney-General is at fault. I do not know where the fault lies but it must lie somewhere and, respectfully, it needs to be addressed. 7 Less importantly, the above has impacted upon the detail provided in these reasons. In short, bearing in mind the matters raised by the materials and in submissions, the reasons are less detailed than they might have been. Nevertheless, it is the case that all aspects of the submissions of the respondent, written and oral, have been considered. The incident the subject of the offences 8 The respondent pleaded guilty to three offences arising from an incident that occurred on 15 April 2021 at about 9:30pm, namely: aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence, contrary to s 170 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (CLCA) (Count 1); aggravated assault, contrary to s 20(3) of the CLCA (Count 2); and theft, contrary to s 134(1) of the CLCA (Count 3). The circumstances of the offending are set out in the remarks of the Sentencing Judge. -- 4 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 3 9 In Count 1, the particulars alleged that the respondent entered or remained as a trespasser with the intention to assault and the offence was aggravated as the respondent knew, or was reckless as to, another person being present and as the respondent knew that the victim was his former spouse. It appears sufficiently clear that all those particulars were admitted when the guilty plea was entered. In Count 2, the particulars alleged that the offence was again aggravated as the respondent knew that the victim was his former spouse. In Count 3, the particulars alleged that the property taken was a pouch of tobacco, which had been on the bedside table of the victim. 10 At the time of the incident, the victim was at her home with her son, her son’s partner, and her son’s two children. The victim heard a knock on the door and saw, through the screen door, the respondent. The door cannot have been opened as the victim then observed tapping at her bedroom window, heard the window smash and saw the respondent enter the bedroom. That was the conduct the subject of Count 1. 11 Having entered the bedroom, the respondent threatened the victim saying, ‘I’m going to fucking kill you’. The respondent also lunged at her. The victim pulled the door closed and it appears that the respondent left the house soon thereafter, perhaps immediately. The threat was at least an aspect of the conduct the subject of Count 2. The pouch of tobacco the subject of Count 3 was not noticed to be missing until after the incident had come to an end. 12 The police were called and attended, but the respondent had left the house before the police arrived. 13 As a result of the three offences, on 27 September 2022, the respondent received a total head sentence of three years, four months and 26 days with a non-parole period of two years and nine months. That sentence commenced on 18 June 2022. Some further background to the incident 14 The above incident occurred against the following background as also set out in the remarks of the Sentencing Judge. 15 The respondent had been in an ‘on and off relationship’ with the victim between 2011 and 2016. During this time, the respondent would stay at the victim’s house on a regular basis. At some point in or after 2016, the respondent and the victim separated. There was sporadic contact between them that was often initiated by the respondent attending at the victim’s house uninvited. In 2019, the respondent was convicted of being unlawfully on premises and property damage. While in custody for that offending, the respondent wrote ‘insulting and demeaning communications’ to the victim. The respondent also attended at her house uninvited in late 2020 and, again, in early 2021 while intoxicated. In mid- March 2021, the respondent once again attended the victim’s property. The respondent had with him a gift intended for the victim. There was an -- 5 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 4 argument, and the respondent smashed the gift on the ground. The respondent was asked to leave and did so. The Act 16 Section 9(1) of the Act provides the Court with a discretion to make an interim supervision order. Section 9(1) provides: (1) The Supreme Court may make an interim supervision order if an application for an extended supervision order in relation to a high risk offender has been made and the Court is satisfied— (a) that the relevant expiry date for the respondent is likely to occur before the application is determined or has already occurred; and (b) that the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. 17 As mentioned, the Attorney-General seeks that an interim supervision order be made before the relevant expiry date and that date is likely to occur before the application for an extended supervision order is determined. However, the existence of the remaining jurisdictional facts is in dispute. As mentioned, they are whether the respondent is a high-risk offender and whether the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. 18 Section 7(4) of the Act provides that the discretion to make an extended supervision order is enlivened if the respondent is a high-risk offender and the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under the order. Section 7(5) provides that the paramount consideration of the Court in determining whether to make an extended supervision order must be the safety of the community. ‘High risk offender’ 19 Section 5 of the Act defines the term ‘high risk offender’ for the purposes of the Act. Relevantly for this application, s 5(d) of the Act states that ‘a high risk offender’ includes ‘a serious violent offender who is serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of a serious offence of violence’. 20 Section 4(1) of the Act stipulates that a ‘serious offence of violence’ has the same meaning as s 83D(1) of the CLCA. Section 83D(1)(a) of the CLCA defines a ‘serious offence of violence’ as a ‘serious offence where the conduct constituting the offence involves the death of, or serious harm to, a person or a risk of the death of, or serious harm to, a person’.2 In this context, a ‘serious offence’ is an ‘indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more’. There is no dispute that Counts 1 and 3 are indictable offences punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more, but it is plainly Count 2 Emphasis added. -- 6 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 5 1 that is most relevant. I will refer to Count 1 as the index offence (the index offence). It is not contended by the Attorney-General that the conduct constituting the index offence involved the death of a person nor the risk of death to a person. It follows that the issue is whether the conduct constituting that offence involved serious harm or a risk of serious harm. 21 Section 83D(1) of the CLCA provides that ‘serious harm’ is to be defined as per Part 3, Division 7A. That definition is as follows: serious harm means— (a) harm that endangers a person's life; or (b) harm that consists of, or results in, serious and protracted impairment of a physical or mental function; or (c) harm that consists of, or results in, serious disfigurement. 22 The only type of serious harm which could be relevant in this case is that which consists of, or results in, serious and protracted impairment of a mental function. The CLCA does not define ‘mental function’, but the meaning is informed from the context in which it appears. Within s 21 of the CLCA, ‘mental harm’ is defined to mean ‘psychological harm’, which does not include emotional reactions such as distress, grief, fear or anger, unless they result in psychological harm. There is no definition of psychological harm. Is the respondent a high risk offender? The position of the parties 23 The primary submission of the Attorney-General is that the respondent is a high-risk offender as the conduct constituting Count 1 caused a serious and protracted impairment of a mental function (the necessary impairment). 24 In support of that submission, the Attorney-General relies upon the victim impact statement (VIS) of the victim given 14 months after the incident on 15 April 2021. The respondent did not submit that the VIS should not be relied upon in considering whether an interim supervision order has been made. As a result, I will treat its content as credible and reliable. In the VIS, the victim described the incident as ‘still causing me to have nightmares’; as making her ‘too anxious’ to leave the house (resulting in her not going out); as making her ‘no longer feel[ing] safe’ in her home; and making her feel that she cannot move on with her life. 25 The alternative submission of the Attorney-General is that the conduct constituting Count 1 involved a risk of the necessary impairment (the necessary risk). 26 The respondent submits that the Attorney-General has not established, on the balance of probabilities, the necessary impairment nor the necessary risk. -- 7 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 6 Does ‘the conduct constituting the offence’ include the threat to kill? 27 In this case, as mentioned, the index offence is not Count 2 (i.e. – the aggravated assault, contrary to s 20(3) of the CLCA) committed when the respondent threatened the life of the victim. Count 2 is not an index offence as it is not an offence punishable by imprisonment for life or for a term of five years or more. This begs the question of whether the threat uttered can be considered in evaluating whether ‘the conduct constituting the [index] offence’ caused the necessary impairment or involved the necessary risk. If the threat cannot be considered, it must be ignored. As might be obvious, to ignore the threat might mean that the weight to be attached to the VIS might be, at least diminished, if not ignored entirely, as the impact described by the victim is likely to be the result of everything that occurred, including the threat. 28 The Attorney-General submits that the threat should be considered. As I understood the submission of the Attorney-General that approach was permitted as all three offences were part of a single incident; an element of the index offence was an intention to assault; and the intention to assault was realised when the threat was made. The Attorney-General submits that in such circumstances, the threat should not be placed beyond the bounds of ‘the conduct constituting the [index] offence’. In the alternative, the Attorney-General submits that even if the threat was disregarded, the Court should nonetheless be satisfied that there was, at least, the necessary risk. 29 Respectfully, if I understood correctly the submissions of the respondent, his submissions were somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, the respondent appeared to submit that the threat should be ignored. On the other hand, in submitting the necessary risk should not be found, the respondent also called in aid the threat. The respondent submitted that it should be inferred that the victim would have known the respondent’s history was such that he would not subject her to violence. I reject that submission as having any force. Assuming that, before the incident the subject of the index offence, the victim did not perceive the respondent as someone who would be violent to her, I am not persuaded that makes it more or less likely that she suffered the necessary impairment or any more or less likely that the necessary risk is established. 30 The term ‘the conduct constituting the offence’ is not defined in the Act. As a starting point, it is a term which encompasses conduct which goes beyond the elements of the index offence.3 However, I am not aware of any authority which has expressly determined whether ‘the conduct constituting the [index] offence’ can include conduct that is an element of an offence which is not an index offence. 31 Whether the ‘conduct constituting the offence’ should be construed as capturing conduct which is an element of an offence other than an index offence must be considered bearing in mind the object of the Act. As set out in s 3, the object is to provide the means to protect the community from being exposed to 3 Attorney-General (SA) v Davidson [2018] SASC 91. -- 8 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 7 an appreciable risk of harm posed by various serious offenders. That object is less consistent with a narrow construction of that term than it is with one which is expansive. Further, where the index offence was committed at the same time as conduct which is an element of a non-index offence (other conduct), if the conduct constituting the index offence did not permit consideration of other conduct committed at the same time, the task for the Court in evaluating the existence of serious harm would be, in some cases, artificial, if not impossible. This case provides an illustration. If the threat were ignored, it would still be open to consider everything that was done during the commission of the index offence (e.g. – the time of night; the method of entry; the relationship between the respondent and the victim; and that the respondent was behaving in a way consistent with intention to assault). At the same time, it would be necessary to disregard that the intention to assault was delivered upon when the life of the victim was threatened. 32 This case does not provide the occasion to examine the limits of the meaning of ‘conduct constituting the offence’. In my view, what is important in this case is that an element of the index offence was an intention to assault and an assault was committed at the same time as the index offence. In that circumstance, I find that the assault (i.e. – the threat) is within the conduct constituting the index offence. The necessary impairment is not established 33 The evidence in support of the primary submission of the Attorney-General does not rise any higher than the aspects of the VIS earlier set out. While for the purposes of this application, I do not doubt that the conduct constituting the index offence had the impacts described and that those impacts were still being felt 14 months after the incident, I am not satisfied that the victim suffered the necessary impairment. This is not to find that the victim did not suffer the necessary impairment. It is only to find that on the material before me, on the balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that she did. The necessary risk is established 34 In determining whether the conduct constituting the index offence involved the necessary risk, I must make an evaluative judgment which is reflective of common human experience.4 The necessary risk must be more than fanciful, theoretical or remote.5 As observed by Hinton J in Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery, while the risk must be ‘real or recognised’, it need not be substantial. A minimal risk is still a real risk.6 35 The victim experienced the respondent break into her bedroom at 9:30pm (i.e. – at night). The respondent did so by breaking the window. Having gained entry in a fashion that can only have heightened the impact upon the victim, the respondent threatened the life of the victim. This is not to overlook that the 4 Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300, [13]. 5 Ibid, [18]; Attorney-General (SA) v Adams [2020] SASC 58, [13]. 6 (2018) 130 SASR 300, [17]. -- 9 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 8 respondent did not deliver on his threat but any attempt to have physical contact with her appears to have been frustrated by the victim pulling the door closed to protect herself. As she took that protective action, I conclude that the victim at least held a fear of being physically assaulted. All this occurred against the background of the respondent having attended the home of the victim and behaving as he did on the earlier occasions. That the incident was an escalation in the seriousness of the behaviour of the respondent towards the victim weighs more in favour of the existence of the necessary risk than against it. 36 Whether the Attorney-General has established the relevant risk is relatively finely balanced. Without overlooking that each case must be determined on its own facts, this case can be distinguished from cases in which the Court has found the existence of the necessary risk when a weapon has been used.7 In this case, an allegation that the respondent was armed was not pressed by the time of the guilty pleas. It might be more likely that the necessary risk will be found when an offender is making threats while armed with a weapon. This case can also be distinguished from those cases in which an offence of violence is committed in the workplace of a victim. As has been held, it is well known that, due to serious and protracted impairment of a mental function, some people who are victims of such offences cannot return to work at all, or at least not in the same way as they once did.8 37 However, while I regard the absence of a weapon as relevant, I do not consider that the environment of the home provides any relevant distinction. While an attack in the workplace can be particularly frightening and cause a person to be unable to return to their workplace, the home is a place where people ordinarily expect to feel safe. A disturbance of that sense of safety, at night, by a person prepared to break a window to gain entry, who is behaving in a way consistent with an intent to assault and makes a threat to kill, gives rise to a risk of making the victim feel particularly vulnerable. On the other hand, while the Court has been prepared, in cases of aggravated robbery, to bring to bear its experience of victims suffering serious and protracted impairment of a mental function, I am not confident that I have the same experience in the case of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence. At least not to the same degree. This is not to suggest that such incidents might not cause vulnerability and cannot cause serious and protracted impairment of a mental function. It is just to observe that I am not confident my experience permits me to treat it as a matter which can be inferred from the experience of the Court. Relevantly, the Attorney-General did not seek to place before me the experience, if any, of other judges or magistrates. 38 That said, it is still appropriate to consider common human experience. In my view, it is a matter of common human experience that persons subjected to violent conduct are at risk of experiencing serious and protracted impairment of a 7 See, for example, Attorney-General (SA) v Wikaire (2017) 127 SASR 565; Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300; and Attorney-General (SA) v Gates (2017) 129 SASR 298. 8 Attorney-General v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300, [61]. -- 10 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 9 mental function. As examples, as found in at least one other case, perhaps post-traumatic stress disorder or an adjustment disorder with anxiety state.9 In my view, that risk is enhanced when that conduct is committed in the home and against the background of entry being forced by a window being broken. In my view, while the existence of the necessary risk might not be common, it is real and more than theoretical, remote or fanciful. 39 In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Attorney-General has established the existence of the necessary risk and that the respondent is a high risk offender. The necessary appreciable risk 40 In submitting that the necessary appreciable risk is established, the Attorney-General placed particular emphasis upon the respondent’s long history of drug use; that in 2005 Dr Raeside, a psychiatrist, opined that the respondent had an anti-social personality disorder; and that in 2022 a psychologist, Dr White, opined that the respondent satisfied the criteria for more than one diagnosis, including a mixed (antisocial/borderline) personality disorder. In addition, the Attorney-General relied upon a report about the participation of the respondent in the Domestic and Family Violence Intervention Program (DFVIP) during his current period in custody. The Attorney-General submitted that the report about the participation of the respondent demonstrated that he remained at risk of violent offending and had demonstrated an unwillingness to take responsibility for past acts of violence. For example, that report records that in the opinion of the report writers the respondent ‘appeared consistent in his limited willingness to acknowledge his use of violence and abusive behaviours’; ‘was unwilling to explore his use of violence further without justifications and minimisation’; and ‘appeared to shift the blame and minimise the experience of’ the victim of the index offence.10 The report writers also opined that the respondent has been assessed ‘to be at high risk of DV related reoffending and is considered a high harm perpetrator who is at an elevated risk/likelihood of using high impact or potentially lethal domestic and family violence in the future’.11 41 The respondent submitted the necessary appreciable risk should not be found. Among the matters emphasised by the respondent were that some of his violent offending had occurred decades ago; he was now 50 years of age; that he has demonstrated signs of commitment to rehabilitation while in custody (i.e. – that he has worked and participated in programs); that he has made efforts to address risk factors while in custody; that he has demonstrated pro-social conduct by assisting a Corrections Officer with a medical emergency in September 2024 in a way characterised by the Department for Correctional Services as being ‘exemplary’; that he has been abstinent from drugs while in custody; has pro-social relationships with some family members; due to a redress payment, is in a position to access stable accommodation in the community; has recognised a link between his 9 Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300, [61]. 10 Affidavit of Charles Bardolph Hamra made on 20 October 2025, CBH-13, page 113. 11 Ibid, page 114. -- 11 of 12 -- [2025] SASC 186 Kimber J 10 childhood trauma and his drug use; has plans to pursue a mental health care plan; intends to participate in psychological counselling in the community; and has prospects of gaining work in the community. 42 The respondent also provided detailed submissions with respect to the report with respect to his participation in the DFVIP. Among other things, the respondent emphasised his perfect attendance rate; active engagement; insights expressed about the impact of violence upon victims, even when that violence was not physical; and his openness about drug use in the community. Discussion 43 The issue is whether the matters in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. That is, relevantly, whether the matters in the material supporting the application would, if proved, establish that the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under an extended supervision order and, if so, whether it would be appropriate to exercise the discretion to make an extended supervision order. An appreciable risk is one that is capable of being estimated, perceptible, sensible and not one that is merely speculative.12 44 Notwithstanding the submissions of the respondent, I find that the matters in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. If the material supporting the application is proved, the respondent has committed offences of violence over several years; appears not to have accepted complete responsibility for his index offending; and has been assessed as being at a high risk of DV offending. On that premise, I find that the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under an extended supervision order and that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to make an interim supervision order. Orders 45 Pursuant to s 9(1) of the Act, the respondent is to be subject to an interim supervision order. 12 Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49. -- 12 of 12 --