PETER REX DANSIE v THE KING [2024] SASCA 26

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE LOVELL) SCCRM-18-261 Appellant: PETER REX DANSIE Counsel: MR S MCDONALD SC WITH MR A CULSHAW - Solicitor: NATHAN WHITE LAWYERS Respondent: THE KING Counsel: MR J PEARCE KC WITH MS I KIMBER - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 13/04/2023, 14/04/2023 File No/s: SCCRM-20-38 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. DANSIE v THE KING [2024] SASCA 26 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David) 21 March 2024 CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED The appellant, Peter Rex Dansie, was tried by judge alone in the Supreme Court of South Australia for the murder of his wheelchair-dependent wife, Mrs Dansie. On 16 April 2017, the appellant and his wife visited Veale Gardens in the South Parklands of Adelaide. There, the appellant positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock near the northern edge of a pond. He admitted pushing the wheelchair into the pond. The appellant subsequently entered the pond himself but was unable to rescue her. It was common ground during the trial, and on appeal, that Mrs Dansie died by drowning. The prosecution case was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife into the pond with the intention to kill her. The defence case was that the appellant’s actions were either accidental or, at the very least, there existed a reasonable possibility that they were accidental. The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial. The appellant did not give evidence and relied on his version of events given to emergency services personnel and during police interviews in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The trial Judge found the appellant guilty of murder, convicted him, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 25 years. -- 1 of 73 -- This appeal was remitted to the Court of Appeal following a successful appeal to the High Court against the majority judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651). The sole ground of appeal before this Court is that the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. Held, by the Court, dismissing the appeal: 1. After conducting an independent review of all the evidence presented at trial, and after considering the submissions put forward by both parties, this Court is satisfied that the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder. It was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed Mrs Dansie, seated in her wheelchair, into the pond with an intention to kill her; and to reject beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s account of having accidentally pushed her wheelchair into the pond. 2. Observations as to the correct approach by an appellate court on an unreasonable verdict ground to viewing a video recording of a defendant's police interview. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487, applied. Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; Tiwary v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 193, discussed. Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559; MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618, considered. -- 2 of 73 -- DANSIE v THE KING [2024] SASCA 26 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Kourakis CJ, Bleby and David JJA 1 THE COURT: This appeal was remitted to this Court following a successful appeal to the High Court of Australia against the judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal.1 Peter Rex Dansie (‘the appellant’) appeals against his conviction for the murder of his wife, Mrs Dansie, following a trial without a jury.2 2 The appellant and his wife had been married for almost 44 years. Mrs Dansie had a stroke in 1995, and as a result suffered from various cognitive deficits and physical disabilities. By 2015, she was living permanently in a nursing home, and was wheelchair dependent. 3 On 16 April 2017, the appellant and his wife visited Veale Gardens (‘the Gardens’). There, the appellant positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock close to the northern edge of Rockpool 7 (‘the pond’). The appellant, admittedly, was pushing the wheelchair when it entered the pond. The appellant followed his wife into the pond but was unable to rescue her. It was common ground at trial, and on appeal, that Mrs Dansie died by drowning. 4 There were two trials: an initial trial miscarried; a second trial proceeded before another Judge sitting without a jury. The evidence adduced by the prosecution was largely in the form of uncontested transcripts of evidence from the aborted trial and unchallenged witness testimony, video recordings and documentary exhibits. The appellant did not give evidence. 5 The prosecution case was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wheelchair-bound wife into the pond, intending to kill her. There was no dispute at trial, nor on this appeal, that the appellant pushed his wife, seated in her wheelchair, into the pond, where she drowned. The defence case was that his actions were either accidental, or that at least there existed a reasonable possibility that they were accidental. Defence counsel relied on the various accounts given by the appellant to ambulance officers and police in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The prosecution case was circumstantial. 6 The issues at trial involved what inferences were able to be drawn from the largely unchallenged evidence. The ultimate issue was framed by the trial Judge as whether the prosecution could prove that Mrs Dansie was murdered thus excluding accidental drowning as a reasonable possibility.3 1 Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651. 2 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215. 3 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215. -- 3 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 2 7 On 20 December 2019, the trial Judge found the appellant guilty of murder, and provided reasons for his verdict. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Full Court of the Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Appeal. The grounds of appeal included, inter alia, that the verdict could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal, by majority (Parker and Livesey JJ, Nicholson J dissenting), rejected that ground of appeal and dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the High Court on the sole ground that the majority erred in its approach to the ground that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and remitted the matter to this Court. 8 Accordingly, the sole ground of appeal before this Court is that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. The task to be undertaken by this Court, in considering whether the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, is as stated by the High Court in M v The Queen:4 Where, notwithstanding that as a matter of law there is evidence to sustain a verdict, a court of criminal appeal is asked to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory, the question which the court must ask itself is whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. But in answering that question the court must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations. (citations omitted) 9 What is required is independent consideration by each member of the Court of whether, applying the test in M v The Queen and assessing the whole of the evidence adduced at trial, there was no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. As part of that task, the appeal court must form its own views on what inferences should be drawn from the evidence, even if they might be characterised as jury questions. 10 The reference to whether the verdict is ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ in M v The Queen is to be taken as ‘equivalent to the statutory formula referring to the impugned verdict as “unreasonable” or such as “cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence”’.5 Further, the approach outlined in M v The Queen is to be followed ‘in exactly the same way where the trial has been a judge alone as where the trial has been by jury.’6 4 (1994) 181 CLR 487 at [493] per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ. 5 MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606 at [58] per McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. 6 Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [15] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ citing Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47 at [12] per French CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ, [82] per Gageler J. -- 4 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 3 11 The case against the appellant was largely a circumstantial one. In such a case, a jury or trial Judge sitting alone cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of guilt if there is a rational inference or hypothesis consistent with innocence open on the evidence. The correct approach to a circumstantial case is well-settled and ‘neither at trial nor on appeal, is a circumstantial case to be considered piecemeal.’7 Given the evidence at trial was largely uncontested, and the appellant did not give evidence, the advantage of directly observing and hearing the witnesses, which the trial Judge enjoyed, ‘must be slight’.8 12 The ultimate question for this Court is not whether error can be identified in the reasons of the trial Judge or whether there is a pathway to proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; rather, each member of this Court is required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence, both as to its sufficiency and quality, and determine whether it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt, and whether the trial Judge must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt as to the appellant’s guilt.9 13 The appellant contended that this Court should conclude that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; namely, that the appellant pushed his wheelchair-bound wife into the pond with the intention of killing her. The appellant submitted that his account of what occurred at the pond, as conveyed in his 000 call to ambulance officers and during his police interviews, is a reasonable possibility. Before this Court, the appellant largely adopted the analysis undertaken by Nicholson J (in dissent) in the Full Court.10 14 On the other hand, the respondent contended that when the prosecution case is considered as a whole, including the appellant’s version of events and denials, this Court can be satisfied that there is no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence and it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt. The evidence adduced on the prosecution case 15 The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial and, for the most part, the evidence was not in dispute at trial; rather, defence counsel challenged the inferences sought to be drawn from the evidence. The appellant largely accepted the factual findings made by the trial Judge but contended that the incriminatory inferences drawn by the trial Judge should not be made by this Court upon an independent review of all the evidence. This Court is entitled to treat findings of fact made by the trial Judge about which no issue is taken in the appeal as an accurate reflection of so much of the evidence as bore on those findings.11 7 R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618 at [48] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 8 Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [15] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ. 9 Libke v The Queen (2007) 230 CLR 559 at [113] per Hayne J. 10 Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103 at [358]-[385] per Nicholson J. 11 Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [16] per Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ. -- 5 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 4 General background 16 The appellant and his wife married in 1973 and, at the time of her death, had been married for about 44 years. They jointly owned a home at Waterfall Gully and two commercial rural properties in the South-East of South Australia. Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke in 1995, resulting in various physical and cognitive disabilities that required the use of a wheelchair. Subsequently, the Public Advocate, along with the appellant, became her joint guardian and administrator. In his reasons for verdict, the trial Judge outlined the largely unchallenged evidence as to a dispute regarding the most appropriate place of residence for Mrs Dansie after her stroke, heard before the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). His Honour said:12 In 1995, Mrs Dansie suffered a life-threatening stroke. A lengthy stay in hospital was followed by many months of rehabilitation. Unfortunately, Mrs Dansie did not make a full recovery and was left with permanent cognitive deficits and weakness in her right leg. Her permanent disabilities meant she could not return to work. Mrs Dansie’s contributory superannuation policy entitled her to access a defined benefit pension for life. Mr Dansie became the full-time carer for Mrs Dansie. They lived in the Waterfall Gully residence built by Mr Dansie. Statements by Mr Dansie to the police suggest that he continued to work for at least part of the time he was caring for Mrs Dansie. Due to her cognitive problems, the Public Advocate was, in 2004, made a limited and joint guardian with Mr Dansie. They were to make decisions about her residential and care requirements. The joint guardianship ceased in 2009; Mr Dansie again became her sole carer. In 2015, Mrs Dansie contracted a serious illness (E. coli infection), requiring admission to the Royal Adelaide Hospital and then the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. On discharge in September 2015, Mrs Dansie was admitted to the Nursing Home in respite care. In November 2015, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were again appointed joint guardians. Mr Dansie wanted her to return to the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate considered that the premises were unsuitable. The dispute was to be determined in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). In September 2016, Mr Dansie conceded that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home. Mrs Dansie’s status at the Nursing Home then changed from being in respite care to becoming a permanent resident. This change had financial ramifications for Mr Dansie. For reasons not fully explained, Mr Dansie and his son Grant became estranged not long after Mrs Dansie returned home after completing her rehabilitation in 1996. In 2000, Grant left home while in his final year at school. After finishing school, Grant studied at Griffith University in Brisbane and then in Copenhagen. Since 2001, he has lived overseas and currently lives in Norway. Grant always attempted to maintain a loving and caring relationship with his mother despite that, after her stroke in 1995, she was a “different person”. Grant considered that Mr Dansie deliberately obstructed him from having access to, and contact with, his mother. He also became concerned that Mr Dansie was not providing Mrs Dansie with adequate or appropriate care. Grant was not able to ascertain how his mother’s finances were organised. Ms Ginny Giorgio, a neighbour and friend of Mrs Dansie, had similar concerns. It appears that Mr Dansie, from 1995, controlled 12 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [26]-[32] per Lovell J. -- 6 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 5 Mrs Dansie’s finances. Mr Dansie always denied suggestions that he did not appropriately care for his wife or that he did not look after her finances properly. The relevance of the evidence, whether the allegations be right or wrong, is that the concerns of Grant and Ms Giorgio led to a number of contested applications before the Guardianship Board (later the SACAT) commencing in December 2005. The applications and decisions are summarised in Exhibit P39. I discuss the relevance of the applications later in these reasons. By way of agreed background, I note the following: • On 9 December 2005, the Guardianship Board ordered that the Public Advocate be appointed “limited guardian” for Mrs Dansie in relation to whom Mrs Dansie had contact. Grant’s application for an administration order was dismissed. Mr Dansie continued to look after the finances without supervision. • On 24 October 2007, Mr Dansie was formally appointed administrator; this required him to file a yearly financial report of Mrs Dansie’s finances. • On 14 May 2009, the Office of the Public Advocate ceased acting as a limited guardian for Mrs Dansie. • Mrs Dansie inherited $46,686.00 following the death of an uncle. After deducting approximately $7,000 (being a deficit in her accounts), Mr Dansie invested the remaining amount in the home. • Between 2010 and 2014, the financial examiner at the Public Trustee examined the financial reports filed by Mr Dansie and found them to be satisfactory. • On 20 November 2015, SACAT appointed Mr Dansie and the Public Advocate (represented by David Cripps) as joint guardians for Mrs Dansie. The SACAT also made a finding that Mrs Dansie had a “mental incapacity”. • Between January 2016 through to June 2016, the Public Advocate and Mr Dansie were in dispute as to whether Mrs Dansie should return to live at the Waterfall Gully residence. The Public Advocate had concerns about the suitability of the premises. • On 20 June 2016, the Public Advocate applied to review the Guardianship Order as the joint guardians were “unable to act jointly” about the suitability of the premises. • On 5 September 2016, the Public Advocate withdrew the application for sole guardianship as Mr Dansie had agreed that Mrs Dansie should stay at the Nursing Home rather than reside at the Waterfall Gully residence. • On 1 March 2017, Suzanne Rozman replaced David Cripps as the Public Advocate. • On 6 March 2017, Ms Rozman raised with Mr Dansie the possibility of a review of the administration order and an investigation into Mrs Dansie’s finances. • On 27 March 2017, Grant Dansie and Ms Giorgio filed applications to review the appointment of Mr Dansie as administrator and joint guardian. The application was listed for hearing in July 2017. In general terms, at the time of Mrs Dansie’s death, Mr Dansie remained in sole control of Mrs Dansie’s finances and was a joint guardian with the Public Advocate; applications to -- 7 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 6 review both matters were before the SACAT. I deal in more detail, later in these reasons, with the Public Advocate’s contact with Mr Dansie leading up to the death of Mrs Dansie. 17 The appellant challenged the validity of those ‘concerns’ expressed by his neighbour Ms Giorgio and Grant Dansie. The trial Judge made no finding as to their accuracy and found that the appellant ‘performed the role of carer adequately’13 and that ‘he did provide an adequate standard of care’.14 Mental and physical condition of Mrs Dansie 18 Before this Court, the appellant accepted the largely unchallenged evidence as to Mrs Dansie’s physical and mental condition at the relevant times. This body of evidence encompassed CCTV footage showing the appellant, unassisted, transferring Mrs Dansie from her wheelchair to the front passenger seat of his car on the afternoon of 16 April 2017. The trial Judge found that the footage established the following matters:15 • To transfer Mrs Dansie, Mr Dansie put his right arm around, and to some extent, under Mrs Dansie’s left shoulder. • At that time, Mr Dansie’s right arm was obscured in the video but it appeared to be, to some extent, around her right shoulder as well as her left. • Mrs Dansie was then lifted by Mr Dansie out of the wheelchair. Mrs Dansie, as she began to move out the wheelchair, placed her right hand on the roof of the car immediately above the front passenger seat. • Mrs Dansie then appeared to be upright and supported by Mr Dansie’s left arm and her right hand was still on the roof of the car. • Mrs Dansie appeared to shuffle to her right, assisted by Mr Dansie’s right arm. His left arm was then visible and was not supporting Mrs Dansie at all. • As Mrs Dansie moved towards the passenger seat her right hand moved down the roof to the left windscreen strut and Mr Dansie appeared to still be supporting her with his right arm and hand. • Mrs Dansie bent a little to ensure her head cleared the roof of the car and became seated in the car. 19 The trial Judge also made the following findings based on uncontested evidence as to Mrs Dansie’s physical and mental condition:16 • Mrs Dansie, as a result of her stroke in 1995, was left with permanent residual weakness on her left side. • Mrs Dansie also suffered permanent short-term memory loss. 13 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [35] per Lovell J. 14 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [35] per Lovell J. 15 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [50] per Lovell J. 16 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [52] per Lovell J. -- 8 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 7 • Over the years, Mrs Dansie’s mobility became more restricted, including restrictions in all limbs but more pronounced on the left side. • After her hospital admission in 2015, Mrs Dansie’s mobility worsened and she became wheelchair bound. • Over the years, there was slight deterioration in Mrs Dansie’s already compromised cognitive abilities. • As at April 2017, Mrs Dansie was unable to stand unassisted; with assistance she could weight bear for a short period of time. • Mrs Dansie retained some strength to hold herself upright by holding onto a fixture, for example, a car door. • Mrs Dansie’s strength in her arms had reduced in the months before her death but she retained some capacity to assist her carers with transfers and support, to an extent, her weight. • Mrs Dansie had impaired dexterity and required assistance with hygiene tasks; she lacked insight into her need for care. • Mrs Dansie could not manage sustained or repeated movement of her limbs due to fatigue and weakness. • Mrs Dansie’s flexibility was severely restricted but she maintained reasonable balance when sitting in her wheelchair. • Mr Dansie was physically capable of lifting Mrs Dansie from the seated position to the standing position with some assistance from Mrs Dansie. Layout and topography of the Gardens and the pond 20 It was common ground between the parties that on the afternoon of 16 April 2017, the appellant visited his wife at her nursing home and took her on an outing to various locations in Adelaide before travelling to the Gardens. There, he positioned his wife in her wheelchair on a rock at the edge of one of the many rockpools in the Gardens. He admitted pushing Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair, with her seated in it, into the pond where she drowned. The appellant made a 000 call to emergency services shortly before 6:30pm. Ambulance officers arrived a short time later, followed by police officers. Mrs Dansie was located lying face down in the pond. The wheelchair was also in the pond. The appellant was observed as wet to his ‘belly button’. 21 There were no eyewitnesses to what had occurred at the pond. 22 As to the layout and topography of the Gardens and the pond, the appellant accepted the accuracy of the trial Judge’s summary of the evidence. The pond in which the deceased drowned was one of several rockpools situated in the Gardens. In relation to the layout of the Gardens, the prosecution relied upon an aerial -- 9 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 8 photograph,17 a plan,18 and a bundle of eight photographs taken by a drone showing various areas, including the pond.19 23 At its widest point, the pond was approximately six metres wide, with a depth ranging from approximately 1.1 metres to 1.15 metres at its deepest point. Near the northern edge, the pond was approximately one metre deep. The southern edge of the pond was shallower but exiting the pond from that end was not possible. The side of the pond was constructed of stacked stone, and the base was made of solid concrete, although it was covered in silt and mud. 24 Sealed paths run in an approximately east-west direction on either side of the pond. The distance from the northern edge of the pond to the northern path was approximately 10 metres. The area around the pond was not flat. To approach the pond from the southern end required walking up a mound with the southern end of the pond nestled into that mound. Practically speaking, access to the pond was only possible from its northern edge. 25 The northern side of the pond was bordered by rocks around its perimeter. While the southern side of the pond had a safety fence, there were no barriers on the northern edge. The pond can be accessed from the northern side of the Gardens via an area of grass located between the pond and a sealed footpath running in a roughly east-west direction through the Gardens. To access the pond from the northern end required leaving the sealed path and travelling across the grassed area. There was a slight incline from the path for about four to five metres, followed by a slight decline for a similar distance, leading to the northern edge of the pond. 26 During the trial, a bundle of photographs was tendered, including images of three of the rocks (marked A, B, and C) bordering the northern edge of the pond.20 Rock B was particularly significant as the appellant told police that he placed the wheelchair on it, positioned sideways to the pond and facing east; that is, not towards the water. It was from this position that the appellant claimed he accidentally pushed the wheelchair, in which Mrs Dansie was seated, into the pond. 27 There was evidence that Rock B was approximately 1600 millimetres in length21 and approximately 800 millimetres wide at its widest point.22 While relatively flat, Rock B had a higher point in the centre, with a section of approximately 300 millimetres where the rock slopes down from the high point to the dirt. Rock C was immediately to the east of Rock B, and there was a depression 17 Trial Exhibit P3 – Aerial view of Veale Gardens. 18 Trial Exhibit P4 – Plan of Veale Gardens note tendered at the original trial. 19 Trial Exhibit P5 – Bundle of eight photographs of Veale Gardens taken by drone. 20 Trial Exhibit P6 – 24 pages of photographs (‘Trial Exhibit P6’). 21 In the east-west direction, that is, running along the edge of the pond. 22 In an approximate north-south direction. -- 10 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 9 between them, visible in the photographs.23 The width between the base of the rear wheels of the deceased’s wheelchair was 560 millimetres, and the distance from the front to rear wheels ranged from 420 millimetres to 495 millimetres, depending on the orientation of the front wheels. 28 There was CCTV footage showing Mrs Dansie’s body in the pond.24 The footage depicted the police locating the wheelchair in the pond and removing her body from the pond. The trial Judge made the following unchallenged observations about the video material, which can be taken to accurately reflect the evidence:25 • Initially the fountain was still operating and water was being projected from near the top of the rocks on the southern edge and landing towards the northern end of the pond. • At approximately one minute and 26 seconds, the rocks identified as A, B and C can be clearly seen. • At approximately one minute and 50 seconds, Mrs Dansie’s body is adjacent to, but partially to the east, of Rock C. The water is lapping over the edge of Rock C and the rock immediately to the east of Rock C due to the action of the fountain. • The fountain, when the body was removed from the pond, was no longer operating. • At one minute and 30 seconds, the water level is overlapping the edge of Rock C and to a lesser extent the rock immediately to the east of Rock C. While there were two police divers in the pond, which would raise the water level, it must be remembered that Mr Dansie, who weighed 130 kg at the time, stated he had been in the pond attempting to save Mrs Dansie. • At two minutes and 18 seconds, Mrs Dansie’s body was rotated by the police divers and placed on a stretcher. The rotation was performed easily. • At two minutes and 30 seconds, Mrs Dansie’s body was removed from the pond over the top of Rock C. This action required the least amount of lifting due to the water being, on the edge at least, at the same level as Rock C. 29 It was agreed at trial that: the air temperature at Kent Town at 6:00pm on 16 April 2017 was 20 degrees Celsius; the minimum temperature was 13.7 degrees Celsius and the maximum was 23.9 degrees Celsius; sunset was at 5:50pm; and civil twilight was from 6:14pm to 6:16pm. There was also uncontested evidence that on 18 April 2017, at around 2:50pm, police measured the water temperature of the water in the pond. It registered 18.5 degrees Celsius. At the time, the air temperature at Kent Town was 28.5 degrees Celsius. 30 The evidence also revealed that the appellant’s height ranged between 182 centimetres and 185 centimetres. If standing straight, the water level of 23 Trial Exhibit P6; Trial Exhibit P23 – Booklet of six photographs of the rockpool said to have been drained; Trial Exhibit P30 – Booklet of photographs relating to Mr McKenzie’s evidence. 24 Trial Exhibit P16 – Disk showing removal of deceased from pond. 25 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [85] per Lovell J. -- 11 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 10 1.1 metres in the pond would reach just above his stomach and below his shoulders. If his knees were bent, the water level would be close to his chest. Wheelchair and tyre marks 31 Police officers located Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair at the bottom of the pond in the southwestern section, approximately two to three metres from the northern edge (the accessible side of the pond). The wheelchair was removed from the pond and subsequently examined by Mr Sage, a vehicle examiner for the Major Crash section of the police, on 24 April 2017. Mr Sage observed that both brakes were in the ‘off’ position. The pneumatic rear tyres of the wheelchair were underinflated, with the recommended pressure for the tyres being 60 pounds per square inch (‘psi’). The left tyre was inflated to 18.5 psi and the right tyre to 22 psi. Mr Sage tested the operation of the brakes independently and collectively. To engage a brake, a lever is pushed forward, lowering a knurled bar against the tyre. The pressure of the bar against the tyre prevents it from turning. Mr Sage was able to push the wheelchair with no difficulty. An identical wheelchair with tyres inflated to 60 psi was also tested. With the brakes operating, he was not able to move that chair. Mr Sage accepted, however, that he had not tested the brakes on the original wheelchair with anyone sitting in it. 32 Brevet Sergeant White, a crime scene investigator, took photographs relevant to the investigation.26 They included tyre marks he observed near the pond, travelling in a north-south direction. 33 Sergeant Veldhoen, an officer attached to the Forensic Response Section and expert in tool, shoe and tyre mark comparison, used the photographs taken by Brevet Sergeant White to conduct a physical comparison between the photographic images of the tyre marks and the tyres of Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair. Sergeant Veldhoen gave unchallenged evidence that at least three separate actions of the wheelchair tyres were necessary to create the tyre marks. One explanation could be that the same tyres made all three marks by the wheelchair being pushed forward, brought back and then pushed forward again; or alternatively, another wheelchair with the same brand of tyres may have contributed to the marks. He was unable to say anything about the direction of travel of the wheelchair at the time it made the tyre marks. The appellant’s version of events 34 The only direct evidence of what may have occurred at the pond immediately before Mrs Dansie drowned was from the appellant in various recorded interviews with emergency services and police. Those recordings included: a 000-emergency call; conversations with ambulance officers and police officers at the scene; a police interview at the Grenfell Street Police Base; an interview during the search 26 Trial Exhibit P6. -- 12 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 11 of his Waterfall Gully residence; and an interview upon his return with police to the Gardens. 35 On the prosecution case, the appellant’s account given in the aftermath of his wife’s death was implausible. Furthermore, it was submitted that he deliberately told untruths, which significantly undermined his credibility. The prosecution also contended that the appellant’s demeanour, or the way in which he gave his account, and the lack of distress he displayed in the aftermath of his wife’s death also adversely affected his credibility. It was submitted by the prosecution that the appellant’s demeanour in providing his account and his lack of distress was so unusual, and contrary to the expected human response to the circumstances he faced, it pointed towards him having committed a deliberate act of murder rather than accidentally pushing his wife into the pond. The 000 call 36 The appellant made a 000 call to emergency services on 16 April 2016 at about 6:26pm. The call lasted six minutes and 40 seconds. The prosecution tendered a disk containing audio of the call27 and a transcript of the audio.28 During that call, the appellant stated that he pushed his wife into the pond. He said, ‘[m]y wife is in a wheelchair’ and ‘we were just turning around to go home and it was getting dark’ and ‘we, ah, um, I couldn’t move her, I said take the, take the brake off and she did and all of a sudden she, she ah, ah, all of a sudden she, ah, wasn’t there anymore.’ 37 The operator then asked, ‘where is she now?’ to which the appellant responded, ‘[s]he’s still in there, I cannot get her out’. 38 The appellant said that he had been ‘in there for about a quarter (inaudible) … trying to get her out’. When the operator suggested he try and lift her head out of the water, or ‘sort of tilt her head back’, the appellant said, ‘look I just about couldn’t get out of the pond myself, I’ve got [back] problems with bad legs from diabetes’ and ‘the first thing I did was chucked the phone’. The operator encouraged him to ‘try and lift her head’, ‘try and lift her up’, ‘try and float her up’, ‘push her towards the edge of the pond’ and ‘push her up against the edge just to try and get her head out of the water to try and help her there’. The appellant responded by saying that he had tried those actions, but she was ‘too heavy’ and ‘she’s really heavy’. He indicated that she had been under water for approximately 10 minutes. The operator also suggested that he ‘try and roll her onto her back, when she’s under water she will be quite buoyant ... just try and roll her’. It was at this point that the ambulance officers arrived at the pond. 39 The prosecution alleged that there was a lack of urgency in the appellant’s call to the operator; that he expressed no distress at all; and he did not immediately alert the operator to the fact his wife was still in the pond. The trial Judge noted 27 Trial Exhibit P1 – Disk containing 000 call made by the appellant on 16 April 2017. 28 Trial Exhibit P2 – Transcript of exhibit P1. -- 13 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 12 (and it was not challenged) that it was approximately one minute and 10 seconds into the phone call that the operator was made aware of the fact that Mrs Dansie was still in the pond. On the prosecution case, the reason why the appellant expressed no interest in getting back into the pond or in attempting to keep his wife’s head above water, while waiting for the ambulance officers to attend, was to ensure that enough time had elapsed so that Mrs Dansie could not be resuscitated. Ambulance officer Mr Giles 40 Ambulance officers arrived at the pond at about 6:29pm. They observed the appellant standing on the north-west side of the pond. As they approached, he turned and pointed at the pond and said, ‘in there.’ Mr Giles, one of the ambulance officers who attended the scene, gave evidence that the appellant told him that it was his wife who was in the pond and that she had been in the pond for about 25 minutes. He said that he had been in the pond trying to get her out but was unable to. The appellant explained the circumstances of how his wife came to be in the pond, in similar terms to his explanation during the 000 call. Mr Giles gave evidence that the appellant said ‘he tried to turn the wheelchair around, he wasn’t able to. He asked the patient to take the brakes off. As she’d done that, the wheelchair had rolled into the pond and he’d been unsuccessful in trying to get her out.’ Mr Giles said the appellant also told him that ‘she was wheelchair-bound and that she’d been strapped into the wheelchair.’ Mr Giles observed that the appellant was wet ‘up to his belly button’, that he appeared ‘quite calm, didn’t appear too upset or too panicked. Almost looked a little bit deflated, like he was exhausted’. 41 The evidence of Mr Giles was only challenged to the extent that he asserted that the appellant said Mrs Dansie was ‘strapped into the wheelchair.’ The trial Judge did not accept the evidence of Mr Giles on this topic, as the wheelchair did not have straps and the appellant ‘at no stage during lengthy interviews with the police, made such a suggestion.’29 We have also proceeded on the same basis, as this alleged comment is inconsistent with other evidence indicating that the wheelchair had no straps. Additionally, nowhere else in his extensive interviews did the appellant make any such comment. 42 On the prosecution case, the appellant’s conversation with Mr Giles was relevant to demonstrate the appellant’s lack of urgency at contacting emergency services after his wife entered the pond. The prosecution sought to draw this inference from the fact that he told Mr Giles that his wife had been in the pond for about 25 minutes. Considering the arrival time of the ambulance officers, this implied that Mrs Dansie was in the pond for about 15 to 20 minutes before the appellant made the 000 call to emergency services, which was relevant to show the appellant’s lack of urgency in his efforts to rescue his wife. 29 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [164] per Lovell J. -- 14 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 13 Police interviews 43 Sergeant Clague (‘Clague’) was the first police officer to attend at the Gardens. He arrived at about 6:34pm and spoke to the appellant. The evidence of Clague was not disputed at trial nor on appeal. He said the appellant told him they had come to the Gardens to ‘see the ducks or feed the ducks’ and ‘she leaned down and took the handbrake off’. The appellant said that he had hold of the wheelchair when she ‘fell in’, and he tried to remove her from the pond but found her ‘too heavy’. The appellant insisted that it was an accident. 44 The appellant then pointed to a tree, asking Clague if he could ‘get those things’. Clague instructed Mr Dansie to leave them there, later finding that those items were a sheet, a mobile phone case, a sandal and a set of car keys. 45 Clague observed that the appellant was wet, appeared ‘unfazed by it all’ and calm. 46 A short time later, Constable Senior (‘Senior’) arrived at the Gardens, and Clague requested that he take a ‘last to see, first to find’ statement from the appellant (as required by the Coroner in relation to any death). Senior commenced taking a notebook statement in narrative form from the appellant. During this process, another police officer requested that she also video record the statement. Accordingly, from 6:57pm, the latter part of the statement was recorded by video in addition to being reduced to writing. The appellant signed the written statement, and a copy was tendered to the Court.30 A copy of the video recording of the statement was tendered,31 and a transcript of the recording provided as an aide-memoir.32 47 In his signed written statement, the appellant provided the following account of how his wife came to be in the pond, and his actions in trying to rescue her. He said: It was about 6.00 pm when we went to leave. The wheelchair was resting on a flat rock. I told Helen to take the brakes off but she took them off a bit quick for me. I was already pushing against the chair because I thought it was stuck and didn’t realise the brakes were on, so when Helen took off the brakes the chair rolled into the water face first and her head was down. I grabbed my phone and keys out of my pocket and threw them aside. I got into the water which came up to my chest, I tried to roll her over but wasn’t able to. I pushed her closer to an edge to try and get her in a position that I could get her out but I couldn’t. I could feel her arms moving but I don’t really recall much else that happened. I was in the water trying to help her for maybe 15 – 20 minutes when I then got out of the water and called 000 and asked for the ambulance. I waited on the side of the water until the ambulance and police arrived. Helen was no longer moving. The guy on the phone asked me to get back into the water but I was worried if I did I wouldn’t be able to get out. I remained on the phone the whole time. 30 Trial Exhibit P10 – Copy of statement taken by Senior Constable dated 16 April 2017. 31 Trial Exhibit P8 – Three disks labelled A, B and C relating to conversations with Mr Dansie on 16 April 2017. 32 Trial Exhibit P9 – Transcript of disks P8A, B and C. -- 15 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 14 48 The appellant also said that when he placed the wheelchair on the flat rock, his wife was facing down the side of the pond (that is, in an easterly direction) rather than facing towards the pond (that is, in a southerly direction), and the rock could have been wet. He also indicated that prior to going to the pond, he and his wife engaged in the following activities: they visited an IGA on Hutt Street to purchase snacks; went for a drive down to Henley Beach and along the Esplanade to Outer Harbour; went to Semaphore to drop off some Easter eggs to his godson’s children; parked at the Bunnings store on Port Road for a 30-minute ‘snooze’; and attended the car wash at On The Run (‘OTR’). He said they then attended the Gardens at about 4:00pm where they spent one and a half to two hours ‘looking at the gardens’ and ‘watching all the … ducks.’ 49 After signing his written statement and while being transported back to Grenfell Street Police Base, the appellant continued to discuss other largely extraneous topics. These included: his vehicle (a grey/silver Mercedes); his relationship with his son; his role in looking after some Chinese wine-making students, although he commented that most had returned to China; his resistance to cold weather; a policeman at Beachport whom he described as ‘the biggest crook he knew’; details about his sister and her personal circumstances; a city in China (Sheyang) he visits annually; various work projects he has completed for police; and details of a ‘break-in’ at one of his commercial properties in the South-East. 50 Relevantly, he also said that he needed to retrieve some warm clothes from his car, stored in a ‘[woolies] bag in the back seat,’ as he usually ‘[leaves] in shorts in the morning’. The appellant also referred to the fact his wife had a stroke 20 years ago, stating that he expected to lose her then. He said, ‘you know, the last … twenty-odd years it’s just been … a bonus.’ He remarked, ‘Helen’s one of those … those people that … everybody likes.’ Interview at the Grenfell Street Police Base 51 Upon arriving at the Grenfell Street Police Base, the appellant commenced a video-recorded interview with Brevet Sergeant Munn (‘Munn’). The interview commenced at 8:55pm. A copy of the recorded interview was tendered,33 with a transcript provided as an aide-memoir.34 The interview concluded the following morning at 12:12am, lasting over three hours, albeit with periods of silence. 52 During the interview, the appellant raised many topics extraneous to the allegations to which we will not refer in any detail. Relevantly, the appellant was questioned as to the events at the pond. In relation to how Mrs Dansie entered the pond, the appellant gave the following explanation: 33 Exhibit P11 – Four disks recording conversation between Brevet Sergeant Munn and the appellant at Grenfell Street Police Station on 16 April 2017. 34 Exhibit P12 – Transcript of disks P11 1-4. -- 16 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 15 • He thought the water features in the Gardens were all a foot deep as he had previously ‘poked a stick in to see how deep they were’ to measure the risk as there were ‘no rails or anything there’. • He parked the wheelchair side-on to the pond (facing east) on a ‘huge flat rock,’ which was ‘big enough for the wheelchair to sit on it’. He thought it was a ‘stable platform’ for the wheelchair. • While preparing to leave, he encountered difficulty moving the wheelchair; attempting to push it, he thought it was stuck against a rock so he instructed Mrs Dansie to ‘take [her] brakes off’, which she did, resulting in the wheelchair ‘disappear[ing] into the pond’. • He still had hold of the wheelchair at this point because he was pushing it. • He was unsure whether she released the brakes on one or both sides but was surprised because it moved ‘pretty quickly’. He did not know whether the chair lunged forward or how it happened. • He was pushing the wheelchair ‘fairly hard’ because he thought it was obstructed ‘by a piece of rock or something’. • He could not explain why the wheelchair ended up in the pond instead of moving ‘straight ahead,’ but thought perhaps ‘she took one side off before the other,’ acknowledging that this was ‘purely surmising’. • He was uncertain if the wheelchair ‘toppled over’, he described it as ‘just there and then not there’. • Tossing his belongings ‘against the tree’, he ‘hopped in’ to try and support her. He described ‘pulling and pushing carrying on,’ as he noticed ‘further rocks getting close to the water’. He clarified that this was the path he took to get out, and where ‘Helen was when your guys came’. • He agreed he managed to ‘drag her to some degree’. • Although he could see her when she first fell in, he could not see the wheelchair because the water ‘was pretty deep’. • He struggled to ‘[come] to grips with the fact that ... we could have been put in that … situation’. He emphasised the depth of the pond and the absence of fences or railings, mentioning that some areas do have railings at the top, which he was familiar with because ‘we walked all through these … [paths]’. 53 Munn then asked the appellant about his actions after Mrs Dansie entered the pond. He said: -- 17 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 16 • He could not confirm if she was face down when she entered the pond. At one point, he observed ‘the back of her head’. He struggled to recall whether he could see her face or not. Eventually he said that he could not remember. • He dragged her to the side of the pond, but it was no shallower there. • Anticipating the need to call for help and aware that his phone, keys, and glasses were not waterproof, he threw them next to a tree. His initial focus was on trying to ‘stabilise’ his wife before calling for help on his phone. • While acknowledging that it might sound ‘cold and clinical,’ he attributed it to his experience as a ‘commercial pilot,’ where he was required to make decisive decisions. • Once in the water, the biggest struggle was the cold and the depth. • He thought Mrs Dansie was struggling as she was clutching onto him with her hands. He described the subsequent events as ‘a blur,’ emphasising his efforts to try and ‘move her over to where [he] could get her out’ but said he had trouble doing so. • He could not remember whether she was trying to twist herself over. • Trying to extract her from the pond was made more difficult by jets of water, which he described as being ‘bloody cold’, hitting him whenever he attempted to ‘try and do something’. • When asked if he attempted to turn her onto her back, he said that his focus was on trying to move her over to the other side. He acknowledged that, in hindsight, turning her would have been ‘a great thing to get [done]’. He wanted to get her out of the water. • He estimated spending about 20 minutes in the water trying to get Mrs Dansie out of the pond. Failing to do so, he eventually decided to exit the water himself. 54 Munn then questioned the appellant about his actions after he exited the pond. He said: • After finding his glasses, he dialled 000 straight away. • He admitted that his conversation might have been ‘pretty garbled’. • He informed the 000 operator, ‘my wife has fallen in ah I’m at Veale Gardens ah my wife has fallen into a little pond, I can’t get her out’. While uncertain about his exact words, he believed it was ‘something like that’. -- 18 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 17 • Within a few minutes, he saw ambulances traveling down South Terrace and over the hill, prompting him to call out to them. • He knew the other waterways were only about a foot deep as he had poked a stick into them during a previous visit a couple of weeks ago to see how deep they were. He assumed this pond’s depth would be similar. • He described Veale Gardens as a ‘very relaxing place’ and mentioned that he and his wife usually ‘call in there on the way to somewhere else’. 55 In response to further questioning by Munn, the appellant shared the following information: • A bag of his clothes was in the car, as sometimes when they go out, ‘things happen and we want to stay longer’. • His wallet and an Armani watch were in the car. The watch had been there ‘for a couple of days’, as he had been working on his old ute and was ‘careful about taking it off now before I work.’ • He thought his wallet might be in the centre console of his car. • He had taken his wife’s spare clothes out of the car with the intention of doing something else with them, although he ‘forgot what’. 56 At this stage of the interview, Munn informed the appellant that she would type the information he had provided to her into a formal statement. While this occurred, the appellant spoke of various extraneous matters. Munn received a phone call and left the room at which time another police officer, Senior Constable Finne (‘Finne’), entered and remained in the room with the appellant. Before leaving, Munn told the appellant that she was going to ‘try and speed type a bit’ to which he replied that he had been through this once before when his wife had her stroke and it nearly drove him mad, but he had his work to throw himself into. He then engaged in conversation with Finne, again about largely unrelated matters. It was at this point of time, he said that his wife has ‘just taken up more and more of my time’ but ‘you know I don’t begrudge her’ and ‘you get married not for the good times but for all times’. 57 Munn returned to the interviewing room and advised the appellant that police intended to search his residential premises. The appellant indicated that his wife had not been there for ‘at least 12 months’. Munn asked the appellant if he was in a relationship with anyone else now. The appellant responded by saying: • He has never been involved in a romantic relationship with anyone else. During visits with friends overseas, they often take him to restaurants and show him around, but ‘there’s … never been any sex’. -- 19 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 18 • Chinese women often approach him on Facebook or similar platforms. They are either older ladies seeking marriage or younger girls in the 18 to 25 year-old age group who typically seek assistance with English and job opportunities. • Currently, there is one lady, Sophia from China, who he has not met but ‘sounds like an interesting person’. He clarified that by ‘interesting’ he did not mean ‘to get into bed with’. He said he told her that obtaining a visa is unlikely. • He has to decide whether to maintain communication with her, in which case, when he visits ‘she’ll show [him] around and have good fun’ or discontinue contact. He stressed that, at this stage in life, he needs the friends. • He described the woman in question as 58 years old without her own business and emphasised that she is unlikely to secure a visa to come to Australia. He said he has told her this but ‘she won’t listen’. • Referring to her as ‘hardly a spring chicken,’ he acknowledged that some of their conversations have been ‘steamy’. However, he reiterated that he has ‘never met her and that’s all I can say’. 58 Next, Detective Brevet Sergeant Cox (‘Cox’) entered the interview room and explained the search warrant to the appellant. As part of his explanation, Cox told him that police would be looking for computers or electronic equipment. During this discussion, the appellant voluntarily disclosed having a ‘number of overseas friends’. He again referred to a ‘58-year-old lady from China,’ acknowledging that their conversations over the internet were occasionally ‘risqué’. He reiterated that he had never met her and that he had never had sex outside of his marriage. He said his conversations with her could be described as ‘steamy’ and mentioned that ‘she’s after a husband,’ but clarified that he told her ‘she will never get a visa to Australia’. He attributed his online interaction with her to boredom and explained that he had not been with his wife for 18 months, saying, ‘so you know the conversation was risqué’. He spoke of plans to visit friends in China, where he would ‘be expected to see her’ as well. 59 When expressly asked about the content of the computers, the appellant specified, ‘this lady that I talked about is the only one.’ 60 Cox also raised the topic of returning the appellant’s wallet. In response, the appellant said that his watch was also in the ‘centre bit’ of his car because he had been ‘doing some work on the ute.’ Search of the Waterfall Gully premises 61 Police then transported the appellant to his home at Waterfall Gully where they conducted a search of the premises late on 16 April 2017 and into the early hours of 17 April 2017. Police engaged in conversation with the appellant during -- 20 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 19 the search, which was recorded on video and tendered as evidence.35 During the search, the appellant referred to his ongoing dealings with SACAT. He discussed a letter from the Public Advocate, recounting a past issue with a new staff member. He said: Now, she’s new this year, um about five years ago I had a, a problem with another new girl and I finished up getting together one of the senior guys there, and um, it was sorted out um and everything she’d raised as a problem … was discounted … um now this one should happen the same way. 62 Despite police officers indicating that there was no need, the appellant went into considerable detail explaining financial statements created for the Public Trustee, stating that unless he explained, police would not understand. 63 After the search was completed, Detective Brevet Sergeant Newbury (‘Newbury’) along with Sergeant Ward (‘Ward’) and Munn accompanied the appellant back to the Gardens. As they were travelling there, the appellant inquired about what arrangements he should make for his wife. Munn advised him, ‘there’s no reason that you couldn’t start making some enquiries or some phone calls with some funeral homes’. The appellant responded: … a couple of months ago … I was sick of getting these phone calls, people try to sell me insurance, um so I went down to that ah the funeral home on ah Greenhill Road … And um, ah I found out the, level cover I wanted was about $3,000 … Um so, um I sort of, well no I didn’t, I didn’t get a full quote or anything but … Um at least I got a start. 64 At the time of this conversation, they were passing a funeral home on Greenhill Road. 65 After arriving at the Gardens, and while police were trying to locate the area where the appellant had parked his car, there was the following exchange between the appellant and Munn about the Gardens: Q Cos you go, you go there quite a bit really, you were saying. You said, you used to go there quite a bit. A Only, only probably for the last two weeks. Q Yeah. A Um you know ah, I always knew it was there but. Q Used to always drive past it. A Ah yeah, had never been there. Q Yeah. 35 Trial Exhibit P19 – Four disks numbered 1-4 Newbury (Trial Exhibit P19); Trial Exhibit P20 – Transcript of part of the four disks comprising P19 (aide-memoir) -- 21 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 20 A And Helen was talking about, about ah seeing some gardens. Q Yeah. A And ah, she’s often been to the botanical gardens and um I just did a bit of research and said “hey what about going there for somewhere new”. Q Yep. A Wish I’d never heard of the bloody place. 66 While the police car was being parked at the Gardens, the appellant again discussed his dispute with SACAT over his wife’s care and made comments denigrating his neighbours, the Giorgios. After a pause, the appellant added, ‘the only positive thing was that it was quick and she didn’t suffer’. Interview back at the Gardens 67 Upon returning to the Gardens, police continued to interview the appellant, and the conversation was recorded and tendered as evidence.36 The appellant retraced his movements from earlier in the day. By this time, it was about 3:00am and dark. He indicated that he parked his vehicle opposite 124 South Terrace and then entered the Gardens with his wife in her wheelchair. The wheelchair had been in the boot of his vehicle. He said that he was the only person at the nursing home who could manoeuvre his wife in and out of a vehicle without assistance. He said that they always used the same route to enter the Gardens and that he had visited there on approximately three or four occasions but could not recall the exact number. That afternoon, they walked around and made a few stops, including at a few other rockpools in search of ducks. They spent about two hours in the Gardens before reaching the pond. He indicated that some of the bridges over the creek now had water flowing over them. In reference to one specific bridge, he said, ‘… the next one up looks suspect because it’s under flowing water … so I just grabbed a stick and poked it in to see how deep it was … When we first came out here’. 68 The appellant led police to the pond and pointed out where he positioned the wheelchair before it entered the pond; that is, on the rock subsequently referred to at trial, and on this appeal as Rock B. He said, ‘It wasn’t pointing in, it was pointing to the side … I thought it was wider than that. I thought both wheels were on there. But apparently not’. He agreed that it was not wide enough to accommodate two wheels of the wheelchair. 69 As to what occurred after he positioned the wheelchair on Rock B, he said: • It was starting to get dark, and everyone had left, so they decided to leave. He began pushing the wheelchair (indicating that he used both hands and moved in a west to east direction) and instructed his wife to release the brakes, ‘so she took the brakes off and all of a sudden she disappears’. 36 Trial Exhibit P19; Trial Exhibit P22 – Transcript relating to conversation at Veale Gardens. -- 22 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 21 • He described the water as ‘bloody deep’, with ‘sprays that were coming down into it’. • He tossed his phone, keys and glasses towards a tree and jumped into the water. His wife was in the water for about 10 seconds before he entered. • Describing the situation, he said, ‘she sort of rolled over and I sort of jumped in and it was a lot deeper than I expected it to be. The jets of water were bloody freezing, um, and like I said I couldn’t get her out of there so I tried to move her up there’ (motioning towards the eastern end of the pond) ‘which looked a bit lower but I couldn’t get her out there either. I finished up coming out of the water.’ • Although he could not say with any certainty that once in the water she rolled over, he thought she did. He recalled seeing the back of her head at one point and the side of her face at another. He did not know which direction she rolled (whether from her back to her front, or vice versa, or from her side to her back) but that was not important for him to remember, as his primary concern was getting her out of the pond. • He thought she was tangled up in the wheelchair – he was pushing and shoving her towards the end (indicating in an easterly direction). 70 In relation to his initial approach to the pond, the appellant said that he travelled along the sealed bitumen path and then pushed the wheelchair through the grass, opting for the ‘the shortest distance’ to the pond. Upon reaching the pond, he turned the wheelchair sideways and positioned it on the rock (Rock B). He agreed that the wheelchair was facing slightly downhill. He said that he brought her over to view the water, explaining, ‘in previous visits we’d seen, um, seen ducks diving in the, you know you could get up really close to them. Whereas out on the, by the river, by the creek as soon as you go near them, they’d shoot off’. 71 The appellant also told police that: • As he was concerned about the possibility of Mrs Dansie releasing the brakes, he avoided positioning the wheelchair pointing towards the pond and instead turned it sideways. He thought it would be safe, having previously tested the water in the creek and assuming a similar depth in the pond. There were no guard rails. • He thought he would have told her to apply the brakes, as that was something he typically did, and he usually watched while she did so. • He thought it was a ‘safe bet’ that the water in the pond was shallow. • As it started to get dark, he decided it was time to leave. When attempting to move her, he seized control of the handles but encountered resistance. He -- 23 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 22 instructed her to ‘take the brakes off’, which she did. He said she must have taken them off quickly because ‘the wheelchair just went phoom and it was gone’. • He was pushing the wheelchair forward, facing in an easterly direction, but because it was getting dark, did not see the ‘hollow’ between Rock B and Rock C to the east. He turned the wheelchair in a northly direction, pushing her forward instead of pulling her back. He could not explain why he did not pull the wheelchair backward, except to say that he underestimated the turning circle. • The wheelchair fell about one metre from the flat of Rock B, east of the drainpipe, as shown in the video recording.37 • He said he thought the rock might have been slippery due to water. • He was unable to say whether he let go of the wheelchair with his wife in it or after she had fallen out. 72 The appellant was asked whether he was ‘a hundred per cent sure’ that was how it happened. He responded, ‘No, no. I’m just … trying to work it out in my own mind whether, whether that was what happened and I can’t see an alternative thesis’. When Newbury suggested to him that his version of events seemed implausible, given that the wheelchair was facing east, and he purportedly moved it in an easterly direction before turning it in a northerly direction, yet she was ejected in a southerly direction into the pond, he explained, ‘it’s really impossible for me to remember how quickly I turned off of this rock. You know, one minute she was there and the next minute she wasn’t’. He clarified that he was pushing forward and ‘thought there was some obstruction, some problem in the rock’. He added: Well it’s not a flat rock, is it. But, but this is a, this is a normal situation when she leaves the, leaves the brakes on. Um, you, you gotta push her in the direction you want to go but when you can’t move, so tell her to take the brakes off and she does and away you go. 73 When questioned by Ward, ‘Would you normally get her that close to … the water’, the appellant remarked, ‘What’s the best way to answer that’ and then did not provide a response. He said that he held onto the wheelchair as it went into the pond until he could no longer maintain a grip on it. 74 The appellant was asked if he was directly behind her while pushing the wheelchair to leave. In response, he stated that he would have had to step to one side (that is, to the right and closer to the water) to turn the wheelchair. He then said, ‘I can see the problem’ – indicating that taking one step to the right would have placed him in the pond. He continued, saying, ‘… I’ve thought about it and I cannot, well the only thing I can come up with is that, that she took the brakes off 37 Trial Exhibit P19. -- 24 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 23 quickly and, choooh’. He then said, ‘Oh it’s got to the stage now where my suppositions are mixed up with any recollections’. 75 As to his personal items, the appellant said: • He had his phone and car keys in his pocket and he tossed them towards the tree. His glasses were also tossed in that direction. He then jumped into the pond. • He did not have a watch on. He had been working on the old ute, replacing a fan belt. Earlier that day, he had purchased replacement belts and planned to fix them before picking up Helen. Consequently, he took his watch off and placed it in the car. 76 In relation to his actions after entering the pond, the appellant provided the following account: • He slid into the water about 10 seconds after his wife fell in, expecting it to be shallower. He entered the water at the same spot where she had fallen in. • His immediate concern was to extract her from the water. • He attempted to manoeuvre her hips around the pipe to facilitate her removal but was unsuccessful due to its height. • He traversed the pond’s edge in search of a suitable place to get her out, but he was unable to do so. He tried moving her along but found it impossible to lift her over the edge, so left her in the position she was eventually found by ambulance officers. • He was able to intermittently lift her head above water, but his primary focus remained on removing her from the pond. • He rolled her over to bring her closer to the edge. She encountered considerable difficulty, exhibiting signs of distress, including ‘gulping and gasping’. Her head remained above water for a period. • She was trying to move herself towards the edge. • He acknowledged seeing her face at one point, suggesting she must have been ‘face up’ at some stage. • He encountered trouble negotiating the bottom of the pond, not only due to its depth but also because of an icy cold jet of water hitting him. Although his head and shoulders remained above water, the slippery conditions posed additional difficulties. -- 25 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 24 • He agreed that he could have supported her head to keep her face out of the water, but said his focus was on getting her out of the water. He decided not to stay in the pond because he thought she would not ‘last very long in that sort of climate’. His ‘primary thought was she’s in the water, I’ll get her out of the water and then we can work on everything else … But just remember at that stage I hadn’t, hadn’t called any assistance on the phone … so, you know, the buck stops here. I had to get her out of the water’. • Before calling 000, he yelled out, even though he had observed everyone leave the park. He called out multiple times but found himself running out of breath. • He proceeded to exit the pond and dial 000. The operator urged him to return to the water, but he declined because he was concerned the ambulance officers would not be able to locate the pond. He also expressed concern about re-entering the water, given the initial difficulty he had getting out. He did not continue yelling for help as he was having a lot of trouble finding his breath at that stage. • His wife was not positioned right up against the eastern edge of the pond, but she was not too far out either. After exiting the pond, he reached in and attempted to pull her out, but he found it impossible to do so. • She did not splutter or move around for very long. By the time he managed to bring her to the eastern end of the pond, there was no sign of movement; she was 'just dead weight.’ • While he was in the pond, she tried to hold onto his arm. He could not recall if it was one arm or both arms. 77 When directly questioned by Newbury about whether he had deliberately pushed his wife into the pond, he denied it. He explained: Helen’s family... has put both Helen and I through hell to try and get their hands on Helen’s mother, ah money. Helen’s mother is 90, 91, I’m, I’m sure she’s left nothing to Helen and myself. I couldn’t wait for her to die and make a claim against her estate, because Helen’s a, an invalid, to try and recoup some of that money that they have cost us... for both Helen and myself. You know her, you know, her fees in the nursing home are quite high, while I’m wealthy um ah this would have been in my view poetic justice to be able to claim that back.... Now with Helen dead, that option’s gone. Secondly, when Helen, Helen had her stroke 22 years ago I left my job in the ABS and spent the next 22 years looking after her. You know this isn’t just looking after her, this is 24/7, the old, I’ve travelled extensively with her, I’ve, I’ve looked after her. Now I didn’t do this under sufferance, I did this because I wanted to. I, I wouldn’t see any benefit in then going and killing her. 78 As to any suggestion that there was a suicide pact, he said: Helen’s not like that, she’s a nice person. You know, she just is a nice person. I [imagine] you’ll go out to Valley View and talk to the people out there … They’ll tell you the same thing, everyone loves her. And I loved her, I, you know, we’ve been married 44 years. -- 26 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 25 Prosecution submissions at trial that the appellant’s account be rejected 79 It was the prosecution case at trial that the appellant’s version of events (as provided in the 000 call, discussions with ambulance officers, and police interviews) should be rejected as implausible. 80 More specifically, in relation to the appellant’s decision to position the wheelchair on Rock B, the prosecution submitted that there was no innocent reason for placing it so close to the water’s edge. It was unnecessary to do so to ‘see the ducks’. Further, given the appellant’s description of Rock B being sprayed by water jets and slippery, his decision to place the wheelchair on Rock B was inconsistent with his claim of being ‘safety conscious’. 81 As to the appellant’s explanation of how the wheelchair entered the pond, the prosecution submitted that it was inherently implausible. It contended that by moving the wheelchair in an easterly direction and then turning it north (or to the left), it was unlikely that the appellant caused the wheelchair to fall in a southerly direction (or to the right) and into the pond. Moreover, the appellant’s account that Mrs Dansie releasing the brakes caused the wheelchair to suddenly move was inconsistent with the evidence that both brakes were either inoperable or at least not functioning effectively; thus, releasing the brakes would have little impact on the movement of the wheelchair. 82 Finally, the prosecution submitted that the appellant’s account of his conduct after his wife entered the pond and the reasons behind his inability to save her from drowning lacked cogency. The prosecution emphasised that, during police interviews, the appellant stated that he did not attempt to keep her head out of the water as he was concentrating on getting her out of the pond. It was submitted that even if he was genuinely unable to get his wife out of the pond, alternative options were available. He could have supported her, kept her head above water and guided her to the edge, where she could have held onto a rock while he telephoned for assistance. The prosecution stressed that there was evidence that Mrs Dansie could bear weight. 83 For the prosecution, it was also submitted that it was improbable that the appellant was unable to roll over his wife, as he claimed in his interviews. This was contrary to the ease with which police divers were able to turn her body over, as depicted in the video recording. Mrs Dansie’s weight would not have impeded this action, given the evidence of the pathologist that a person is more buoyant in water. Additionally, the appellant, being an able-bodied man who, for example, was able to assist his wife in and out of his vehicle without aid, undermined the credibility of his claim. 84 It was not the prosecution case that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder by omission by reason of his failure to save Mrs Dansie once she entered the pond. However, the prosecution did rely on his failure to rescue her as circumstantial evidence in support of the prosecution case that the appellant deliberately pushed her into the pond with an intention to kill her. -- 27 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 26 85 The prosecution also alleged that the appellant displayed an absence of any discernible urgency during the 000 call, consistent with his purported desire that his wife not be resuscitated, and a lack of distress when speaking with ambulance officers and police in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The prosecution contended that, during his lengthy conversations with police, the appellant spoke about many trivial or extraneous matters and in doing so, demonstrated little emotion about the sudden loss of his wife. It was the prosecution’s submission that, even allowing for the vagaries of personality, the appellant’s demeanour was inconsistent with a man who had accidently and tragically caused the death of his wife; and was consistent with, if not supportive of, a deliberate act of murder or, at the very least, consistent with a possible motive to kill his wife. Lies 86 On the prosecution case, the appellant’s credibility was undermined by several lies he told in the aftermath of his wife’s death. The purported lies were not relied upon as evidence of guilt but as relevant to the appellant’s credibility. They were as follows: • During police interviews, the appellant was asked why he left his watch in the vehicle. He claimed, on three separate occasions, that he had removed his watch because he needed to work on his vehicle. He told Munn that his watch had been in his car ‘for a couple of days’. He said that it was an Armani watch, and he was ‘careful about taking it off before I work’. Later in the same interview, he said that it was in the car ‘because I was doing some work on the ute’. When questioned about his watch by Ward, and after explaining how the fanbelts in his car had broken, he said ‘today I got replacement belts and, um, I was going to fix those before I picked Helen up so I took my watch off and put it in the car’. There was evidence of CCTV footage from the nursing home which showed the appellant wearing his watch upon arrival. Additional CCTV footage obtained from the OTR store at Woodville captured him wearing his watch at 3:39pm that day, after collecting his wife from the nursing home. It was uncontested that the appellant was wearing his Armani watch after picking up his wife that afternoon, rendering his explanation to police as to the circumstances in which he left it in the car plainly untrue. On the prosecution case, the appellant’s repeated false explanations to police on three separate occasions constituted a deliberate untruth or lie. • The appellant downplayed the nature of his relationship with Sophia. He initially told police that Sophia was an ‘interesting person’ but ‘not to get into bed with’. This assertion appears to be contradicted by the content of his QQ messages with her (discussed later). • The appellant failed to disclose his messages with ‘Rose’, falsely asserting that Sophia was the only woman he communicated with online. -- 28 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 27 • The appellant falsely described his treatment by police to various individuals, including journalist Ms Alice Monfries. Ms Monfries was employed as a television reporter. On 19 April 2017, she approached the appellant at his home. The appellant agreed to speak with her but not to have the interview recorded. He spoke about the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence and provided details largely consistent with his police interviews. He also spoke about his poor treatment by police. At trial, defence counsel accepted that his statements regarding police mistreatment were inconsistent with other evidence and untrue. Additionally, the appellant told Ms Monfries that when he entered the pond, the water reached up to his chin. However, this assertion was contradicted by both the evidence of the pond’s water depth and the observations of ambulance officers who noted that he was wet up to his stomach. • The appellant failed to disclose the full extent of his searches concerning funeral costs. 87 The prosecution alleged that the appellant’s lies undermined the credibility of his claim that he accidently pushed the wheelchair into the pond. Other evidence 88 The prosecution also relied on the following bodies of circumstantial evidence in support of their case: evidence of premeditation and the appellant’s motives to commit the offence. Evidence of premeditation 89 The prosecution alleged that the offending was premeditated. Specifically, the prosecution relied on the appellant’s actions in leaving his watch, wallet (containing $400) and dental plate in his car prior to taking his wife to the pond. Additionally, he brought a spare set of clothes for himself that day, but not for his wife, which he stored in his vehicle. The prosecution alleged that his decision to leave his belongings in the vehicle and have a spare set of clothes, exclusively for himself, suggested a pre-meditated plan to kill his wife as he anticipated getting wet that afternoon or evening and wanted to avoid damaging his possessions or feeling cold. 90 The prosecution also relied on a log of recorded outings from the nursing home spanning from 12 November 2015 to 16 April 2017.38 The accuracy of the log was not challenged. It established that from 25 August 2016 to 16 March 2017, the appellant took his wife on only one outing. Yet, from 17 March 2017 to 16 April 2017, the appellant took his wife out of the nursing home on eight occasions. The prosecution alleged that the increased number of outings was consistent with the appellant looking for a place to commit the offence. Defence 38 Trial Exhibit P48 – Recorded outings Mrs Dansie from Valley View Nursing Home. -- 29 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 28 counsel at trial submitted that it was open to the trial Judge to find that the appellant’s limited outings with his wife during this period were due to the heat. However, the prosecution noted that the log also indicated that during a comparable period the previous year, from November 2015 to the end of February 2016, the appellant took his wife out of the nursing home on nine occasions. The prosecution submitted that the appellant’s renewed interest in taking his wife on outings from 17 March 2017 onwards must also be considered in the context of his previous visits to the Gardens. During those visits, he admitted to testing the depth of various rockpools and creeks, consistent with him exploring how and where to kill his wife. 91 There was also evidence that in the days and weeks preceding Mrs Dansie’s death, the appellant conducted several internet searches on ‘Bing’ about funerals. On 12 March 2017, he undertook multiple internet searches using terms such as ‘cheap funerals’ and ‘cheap funerals Adelaide’. In relation to the timing of those searches, they were conducted four days after the Public Advocate advised the appellant that she was considering moving his wife to a more expensive nursing home. 92 On 18 March 2017, at 1:10:29 am, the appellant searched for ‘blackwell funerals glenside.’ This was done less than two minutes after he had been searching for ‘sexy 6-inch stiletto heel shoes for sale.’ It was common ground that in March 2017, Mrs Dansie was in relatively good health and there was no reason to believe that she was likely to die of natural causes in the immediate future. It was submitted that the appellant’s internet searches in relation to ‘cheap funerals’, and a funeral home in Glenside, was evidence that he was contemplating his wife’s demise in the weeks preceding her drowning, in circumstances where there was no reason to consider her death imminent. On the prosecution case, the evidence was relevant to prove that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with the specific intention of killing his wife. Motive 93 The appellant is alleged to have had two motives to kill his wife: first, that his relationship with his wife had deteriorated and he wished to pursue a sexual relationship with other women, in particular a woman named Sophia; and secondly, a financial motive. 94 There was evidence that the appellant’s feelings towards his wife had diminished. He told Finnie that the deceased had taken up ‘more and more’ of his time. To that end, the prosecution emphasised his lack of distress in police interviews. It was alleged that as the appellant’s feelings for his wife began to diminish, he became increasingly interested in pursuing an intimate relationship with other women, in particular a woman named ‘Sophia’; and his relationship with his wife became an impediment to him. 95 Police seized several computers from the appellant’s residential premises at Waterfall Gully on 17 April 2017. From an Asus Laptop, there were messages -- 30 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 29 extracted between the appellant and ‘Sophia’ from 6 April 2017 to 15 April 2017. Those messages were admitted as agreed facts at trial and are as follows:39 QQ messages to ‘Sophia’ from the appellant 6 April 2017 and 15 April 2017 Messages to Sophia hello Sophia Do you have a friend in mind who you want to play with us I am glad that you are happy for me to use my penis as well as fingers and mouth to satisfy you. I was not trying to be indelicate, but just trying to avoid an inappropriate action. And if you love sex, then your statement about loving porn must be true also. I will have to think up some more interesting scenarios for our games. wait till we meet, then i am a bad boy we make a good couple, me handsome and you beautiful Hey, when i say to you that i like leather tights or black stockings, i am not hinting to you to go out and buy them. I would prefer to buy them as a gift to you I like anything skin tight on a woman playing comes first, then husband You really do have some very sexy underwear QQ messages received by the accused from ‘Sophia’ between 6 April 2017 and 15 April 2017 Messages from Sophia Do you know the Liaoning Hotel What time do you decide to come to Shenyang I am slim 96 Police also extracted messages from the Asus laptop from the appellant to a person by the name of ‘Rose’. The messages could not be dated except to the extent that they were sent before 17 April 2017. They were as follows: 39 Trial Exhibit P43 – Document headed ‘QQ messages from Mr Dansie’s laptop; Trial Exhibit P45 – Statement of agreed facts (‘Trial Exhibit P45’). -- 31 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 30 QQ messages sent by the accused to ‘Rose’ Messages to Rose Hi Rose, I would like to catch up with you on my next trip to China. I am intrigued by the photos you have sent me, and I would like to see more of you. I think you know the shots I mentioned which captivated me. If you are interested please get back in touch and we can work something out Please send me some more photos of you in bra and panties, different ones. Also of you in the shower and you getting out of bed. If you don’t want to, then that is ok too, but you look good like that, And i love you wearing those low cut dresses. 97 Police also extracted the internet search history from the Asus laptop which revealed numerous searches for ‘sexy shoes’ during March and April 2017 (before Mrs Dansie’s death) and, as discussed earlier, searches for information relating to funerals. In that regard the following charts were tendered as agreed facts:40 ‘Bing’ Internet Searches Search queries Date and time Guilin Chinas 15/04/2017 at 02:29:46 AM sexy 6 inch stiletto shoes for sale 10/04/2017 at 11:45:39 AM blackwell funerals Glenside 18/03/2017 at 01:10:29 AM sexy 6 inch stiletto heel shoes for sale 18/03/2017 at 01:08:45 AM sexy stiletto hell shoes for sale 18/03/2017 at 01:06:04 AM sexy one piece swimming costumes for sale 18/03/2017 at 01:03:56 AM market in Shenyang for shoes and clothes 16/03/2017 at 09:35:20 AM Sale Over the Knee Boots 14/03/2017 at 11:17:24 PM Cheap Clearance Over Knee Boots 14/03/2017 at 11:16:56 PM Thigh High Boots Cheap Sale 14/03/2017 at 11:15:10 PM Visa for China Canberra 12/03/2017 at 5:02:35 AM cheap funerals 12/03/2017 at 12:23:13 AM cheap funerals Adelaide 12/03/2017 at 12:22:26 AM 40 Trial Exhibit P41 – List of ‘Bing’ internet searches (‘Trial Exhibit P41’); Trial Exhibit P42 – Document headed ‘Internet Explorer History’ (‘Trial Exhibit P42’); Trial Exhibit P45. -- 32 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 31 white lady funerals 12/03/2017 at 12:17:50 AM clothes/shoe markets in Shenyang 11/03/2017 at 09:46:56 AM role playing for sex 11/03/2017 at 03:13:14 AM sexual role playing games 11/03/2017 at 02:58:48 AM role playing games 11/03/2017 at 02:56:50 AM Singles Fushun China 28/02/2017 at 03:41:04 PM Fushun Women 28/02/2017 at 03:40:32 PM China Liaoning Fushun 28/02/2017 at 03:38:31 PM Qq 28/01/2016 at 02:37:22 AM 98 99 There was also evidence of the appellant’s travel arrangements after Mrs Dansie’s death including: four telephone enquiries between 28 April and 1 May 2017 as to the availability of flights to China between mid-May 2017 to early June 2017; and an intercepted telephone conversation between the appellant and his sister during which he asked her to contact Sophia on his behalf as he 41 The trial Judge assumed this was a typographical error and the date refers to 2017. 42 The trial Judge assumed this was a typographical error and the date refers to 2017. ‘Internet explorer’ history Website accessed Date and time http://www.lovelywholesale.com/womens+clothing+c156.html 27/03/201341 at 11:49:47 AM http://www.lovelywholesale.com/wholesale- fashion+round+toe+back+lace- up+stiletto+super+high+heels+black+pu+slip+on+over+the+knee+boots- g87443.html 27/03/201342 at 11:48:31 AM http://www.seniors.com.au/funeral-insurance/request-a-quote 12/03/2017 at 12:16:35 AM http://www.whiteladyfunerals.com.au/ 12/03/2017 at 12:18:40 AM http://www.whiteladyfunerals.com.au/arranging-funeral/funeral- berfore.during-and-after 12/03/2017 at 12:19:17 AM http://www.funeral-arrangements.com.au/adelaide-funeral-quotes- online.html 12/03/2017 at 10:53:40 AM -- 33 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 32 ‘didn’t want her to feel that I wasn’t … I was upset with her and I wasn’t talking to her anymore’. 100 The appellant also communicated directly with Sophia through text messages and phone calls from 7 May 2017 to 16 May 2017. During these communications they discussed the appellant visiting Sophia in China. A chart setting out the relevant messages and phone calls was admitted as an agreed fact.43 Call number Date/Time SMS/Call Direction Content of SMS/Summary of call 140 7 May 2017 6:48pm Call Accused – Sophia Accused tells Sophia about his travel plans to China and refers to booking them into a hotel. Sophia tells the accused “Miss you I’m thinking you”. The accused responds “Ah, we’ll get there” 193 9 May 2017 5:12pm SMS Sophia – Accused I come back soon after a meeting. don't lisstion you call me. if you will arrive at Liaoning hotel NO.18 on Shenyang. give me a phone 269 14 May 2017 2:43pm Call Accused – Sophia Accused and Sophia make arrangements for Sophia to pick the accused up from the airport or hotel when he arrives in China. Discuss flight times and airline. 312 16 May 2017 3:09pm SMS Sophia – Accused Hello, Peter Ticket, flight, tell me I do not know. What time do I pick you up at the airport? 313 16 May 2017 3:17pm SMS Sophia – Accused You sent it to my mailbox You can send me messages too Do you need me to meet you at the airport? 318 16 May 2017 4:32pm SMS Accused – Sophia About 12.30 at the airport would be good thanks SOPHIA 319 16 May 2017 4:44pm SMS Sophia – Accused Peter, number 18, see you at 12.30 noon flight number 43 Trial Exhibit P45. -- 34 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 33 320 16 May 2017 8:10pm SMS Accused – Sophia NO no. 12.30 in the middle of the night. Midnight plus half an hour. Actually half an hour into Friday. 322 16 May 2017 8:16pm SMS Sophia – Accused I leave my home at 10am and travel for 10 hours 324 16 May 2017 8:22pm SMS Accused – Sophia You have dinner in Shenyang then drive to the airport to collect me 326 16 May 2017 8:25pm SMS Sophia – Accused Actually I travel for 14 hours 327 16 May 2017 8:34pm SMS Sophia – Accused Airline tickets, flights 328 16 May 2017 8:38pm SMS Accused – Sophia I arrive midnight NOT midday You have dinner then collect me from the airport 329 16 May 2017 8:39pm Call Accused – Sophia Arrangements for Sophia to pick up the accused from the airport. Sophia makes kissing noises on phone to accused when they are saying goodbye. 101 Further, during a search of the appellant’s home on 16 April 2017, police located a travel bag containing several condoms and Viagra tablets. They were not seized. Police re-attended at the appellant’s home on 17 May 2017 in relation to an unrelated matter and conducted another search of the premises. In a bedroom, they located a suitcase inside of which were several female items of clothing including a black corset, two black G-strings, a lingerie suspender, a black leather dress, a leather skirt. It also contained sexual toys. In a small plastic bag next to the suitcase, were various medications and another sexual toy. In a backpack on a chair next to the suitcase, police located a passport photograph of the appellant, a new memory card for a camera, a map of Beijing, eight condoms, and a packet of Viagra tablets. Underneath the backpack was another sex toy.44 The female items of clothing were not located by police during the earlier search in April 2017. 44 Trial Exhibit P44 – Booklet of photographs taken by Mr Taylor. -- 35 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 34 102 In relation to a financial motive to commit the offence, there was evidence that the appellant had become increasingly concerned about the cost of care for his wife, and consequently, his dealings with the Public Advocate had become increasingly strained. As discussed earlier, from December 2005 to May 2009, the Public Advocate was appointed as a joint guardian with the appellant for Mrs Dansie. On 20 November 2015, the Public Advocate (then Mr Cripps) was once again appointed joint guardian with the appellant. 103 Mrs Dansie was admitted to a nursing home for respite care in September 2015. While the appellant wanted her to return to live at home, the Public Advocate expressed concerns about the layout of the Waterfall Gully premises, a split-level home that could prove challenging for Mrs Dansie to negotiate given her restricted mobility. In 2016, the Public Advocate informed the appellant of his intention to apply to SACAT for sole guardianship. Negotiations between the parties proved unsuccessful, leading the Public Advocate to apply to SACAT to vary the Guardianship Order. 104 At a SACAT hearing on 19 August 2016, the Tribunal granted the appellant an opportunity to obtain an occupational therapist’s report. The appellant, without obtaining a report, conceded that his wife should remain permanently living at the nursing home. The change in her accommodation from respite care to permanent care resulted in an increased daily fee of $49 to $100 (although this was paid from Mrs Dansie’s pension). Additionally, the appellant could no longer claim a carer’s benefit, and if the Public Advocate became the sole guardian of Mrs Dansie, he would lose control of her finances. 105 Ms Rozman assumed the role of Public Advocate from Mr Cripps on 19 December 2016. As the delegated joint guardian with the appellant, she was required to consult with him about issues regarding Mrs Dansie’s care and welfare. It was the prosecution case that the appellant’s dealings with Ms Rozman in the months preceding his wife’s death was inconsistent with a loving relationship and revealed that he considered her a financial burden. This, in turn, was relevant to establishing a financial motive for the offence. 106 The evidence of Ms Rozman was not challenged at trial, nor in this Court; rather, it was the inferences to be drawn from that evidence that were in dispute. Given the importance of the evidence to the question of motive, it is convenient to set out the trial Judge’s summary of the uncontested evidence which bore upon this issue:45 Ms Rozman first became aware of issues concerning Mrs Dansie when she received a telephone call from Ms Giorgio on 25 January 2017. Questions relating to Mrs Dansie’s health and living arrangements were raised. Ms Rozman arranged to visit Mrs Dansie on 1 March 2017. Prior to visiting Mrs Dansie, Ms Rozman was advised by Ms Giorgio, on 27 February 2017, of the death of Mrs Dansie’s brother. 45 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [287]-[307] per Lovell J. -- 36 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 35 When Ms Rozman visited Mrs Dansie at the Nursing Home on 1 March 2017, Mrs Dansie indicated that she would like to attend her brother’s funeral. Ms Rozman asked the staff at the Nursing Home to arrange an access cab with a support worker to accompany Mrs Dansie to the funeral. Ms Rozman then attempted to contact Mr Dansie. On 1 March 2017, she left a voicemail message on the telephone of Mr Dansie and also sent him an email. The email was in the following terms: Hi Peter, I’ve taken over from David Cripps as the joint guardian for Helen. I have just left a voicemail on your phone introducing myself. I have been to visit Helen today to introduce myself. I am aware that Helen’s brother Robert passed away suddenly on Sunday night. Helen would like to go to the funeral and so I have asked the staff there to arrange an Access cab with a support worker to accompany her. I’d love to chat with you to learn more about Helen and discuss her needs with you. Please call me when convenient so that we can chat. Kind regards, Suzanne On 3 March 2017, Ms Rozman received advice from the Nursing Home that there was an issue in relation to payment for Mrs Dansie to attend the funeral. She was also advised by Ms Giorgio that Mrs Dansie’s cousin, Barry Tugwell, had also passed away. She was advised that Mrs Dansie wished to attend that funeral. Ms Rozman then made the same arrangements with the Nursing Home as she had for Mrs Dansie’s brother’s funeral. On 6 March 2017, Ms Rozman spoke to Mr Dansie by telephone. Ms Rozman advised Mr Dansie that she had spoken to Mrs Dansie, and that Mrs Dansie wanted to attend both funerals. She advised him that an access cab and carer were required. Mr Dansie offered to take Mrs Dansie himself to the funerals but Ms Rozman advised him that Mrs Dansie’s family had indicated he was not welcome at the funerals. Mr Dansie told Ms Rozman that Mrs Dansie did not have any money and therefore the family should pay for the access cab and the carer. Mr Dansie told her that Mrs Dansie should be living with him. Ms Rozman advised that that would only be possible if he moved into a house that was accessible and safe for Mrs Dansie. She asked him whether he would consider purchasing a suitable property so that Mrs Dansie could move back in with him. Mr Dansie replied no, as he had already spent $40,000 modifying the current home. During this telephone conversation, Ms Rozman informed Mr Dansie that another application to the SACAT might be required in order to investigate Mrs Dansie’s finances if he continued to maintain that Mrs Dansie did not have any money; her family were adamant that she did. Ms Rozman also raised the question of whether the Nursing Home was suitable for Mrs Dansie. A friend of Mrs Dansie’s had suggested that a facility with a garden to walk in and a cat would be ideal as Mrs Dansie did not get the stimulation that she required at the Nursing Home. Mr Dansie informed Ms Rozman that Mrs Dansie had gone to the Nursing Home three or four times over an eight-year period for respite and was always happy to go back. Ms Rozman also discussed the question of a physiotherapy referral for Mrs Dansie to improve her mobility. Mr Dansie did not agree, and stated that Mrs Dansie was now “institutionalised” and that he had arranged intensive physiotherapy for her when she was to come home but that there was no need for it now. Following a conversation with Ms Giorgio on 6 March 2017 relating to payment for the funeral, there was a second phone call on 6 March 2017. Ms Rozman spoke again to Mr Dansie about the question of who would look after Mrs Dansie at the funerals. Ms Rozman advised that the information she had been given was that there was no option but to pay for a carer to accompany her as, without this, Mrs Dansie would not be able to attend. Mr Dansie complained that he was supposed to be a joint guardian and that his view was not being taken into consideration. Ms Rozman then advised that if Mr Dansie refused to pay and maintained that Mrs Dansie had no money, she would have to apply to the -- 37 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 36 SACAT for a review of the administration order to determine exactly what finances were available and whether another administrator needed to be appointed if the current administrator was not paying for Mrs Dansie’s needs. Mr Dansie agreed to pay for the carer and the access cab for Mrs Dansie to attend her brother’s funeral. The question of payment for Mrs Dansie to attend Mr Tugwell’s funeral was not resolved at that stage. On 7 March 2017, Ms Rozman had a conversation by telephone with Ms Giorgio relating to the funerals of both Mrs Dansie’s brother and her cousin. Ms Rozman then called Mr Dansie and left a message for him to ring her. On 8 March 2017, Ms Rozman had a meeting with Ms Giorgio and John and Peter Shannon, Mrs Dansie’s other brothers. Various topics relating to Mrs Dansie’s health and living arrangements were discussed, including access to medical tests and other needs. Ms Rozman also spoke to Mr Dansie by telephone on 8 March 2017. She advised Mr Dansie that Mrs Dansie wanted to attend the funeral the next day and she asked for payment to the Nursing Home so that an access cab and carer could be provided. Mr Dansie responded that he had spoken to his wife the previous day and that she did not want to attend the funeral. Ms Rozman advised Mr Dansie that the staff at the Nursing Home had told her that Mrs Dansie had enjoyed the family contact at her brother’s funeral the day before and that she wanted to attend Mr Tugwell’s funeral. Mr Dansie said he would pay for the access cab and not the carer and offered to take Mrs Dansie himself. He said he had spoken to the site manager at the Nursing Home who said it was “fine” for him to take Mrs Dansie to the funeral. After some discussion, Mr Dansie agreed to make the payment. Following the meeting on 8 March 2017 with Ms Giorgio and Mrs Dansie’s brothers, Ms Rozman specifically raised the issue that she was considering moving Mrs Dansie to another facility where she had a garden to visit, a cat and more stimulating activities or a diversion and/or therapy program. She did not name the alternative facility. Mr Dansie responded by informing Ms Rozman that if Mrs Dansie moved nursing homes he could not visit her and he was the only one who visited her. He told Ms Rozman that Mrs Dansie should still be living at home with him. Again, Ms Rozman advised Mr Dansie that that would only be possible if he moved into a house that was accessible and safe for Mrs Dansie. She asked whether Mr Dansie would consider purchasing a suitable property so that Mrs Dansie could move back in with him but he declined, saying he had already spent $40,000 modifying the current home. Ms Rozman told Mr Dansie that they would discuss those matters at the meeting the following day and that she had made no decision with regards to moving Mrs Dansie. Later that day, there was another call between Ms Rozman and Ms Giorgio where Ms Rozman understood “that the issues of finances for the funeral still hadn’t been resolved”. Ms Rozman met with Mr Dansie on 9 March 2017. A number of topics were raised and discussed. Ms Rozman raised the topic of Mrs Dansie residing at the Nursing Home. Mr Dansie advised her that Mrs Dansie was happy there. When asked whether he thought she needed more stimulation, Mr Dansie replied that she did not as, during the day, she does crosswords, puzzles and attended bingo. Ms Rozman asked whether he thought Mrs Dansie would like to reside at a facility with a garden. Mr Dansie replied that people in nursing homes did not need gardens as there would not be staff to take them there anyway. Mr Dansie advised her that Mrs Dansie interacted with staff and that she enjoyed that more than interacting with the residents. -- 38 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 37 Ms Rozman raised the question of an alternate nursing home at Lockley’s, which had a garden and a resident cat. Mr Dansie advised Ms Rozman that he was the only one who visited Mrs Dansie and that if Mrs Dansie shifted to another facility, he would not visit her. Ms Rozman advised Mr Dansie that the time taken to visit the current nursing home compared with Lockley’s was approximately the same and there should be no reason that he could not visit. This was the only matter on which she was challenged in cross-examination, namely whether Mr Dansie said he would not visit Mrs Dansie if she shifted nursing homes. It was suggested that Mr Dansie had said that it would be more difficult for him to visit her, not that he wouldn’t. Ms Rozman did not accept that variation to her evidence and remained steadfast. I accept her evidence that Mr Dansie said he would not visit Mrs Dansie if she was placed in a different nursing home. Ms Rozman advised Mr Dansie that she had agreed to Ms Giorgio applying to the SACAT for a variation of the guardianship order to seek that the Public Advocate be the sole guardian and that the Public Trustee be the administrator of Mrs Dansie’s estate. She further informed Mr Dansie that she would investigate the Lockley’s nursing home, as it offered facilities in line with Mrs Dansie’s wishes. On the question of physiotherapy, she informed Mr Dansie that she had asked the Nursing Home to organise a physiotherapy assessment for Mrs Dansie to determine what she could and could not do and to make recommendations about ongoing therapy. Mr Dansie stated he would not pay as he had paid for intensive physiotherapy when Mrs Dansie was to return home from hospital but now that she was placed in a nursing home he considered there was no point. Ms Rozman advised Mr Dansie that the SACAT hearing was likely to be in June 2017. Ms Rozman also questioned Mr Dansie about money. Mr Dansie said that he was a wealthy man and that he should not have to spend his money on Mrs Dansie and that the only money she had was the $50,000, which she had inherited, and he had invested that in the farm. He advised Ms Rozman that Mrs Dansie’s superannuation went into an account that only she could touch so that her family could not get their hands on it. He advised Ms Rozman that Ms Giorgio interfered because she was jealous that Mrs Dansie was still happily married. On 27 March 2017, Ms Rozman sent Mr Dansie an email. She raised with him health issues of Mrs Dansie. In particular, she raised issues such as whether Mrs Dansie needed glasses to watch the television, required an eye examination, required a medical check on conditions such as diabetes, breast cancer and possibly a dental check. Ms Rozman was not clear whether Mrs Dansie was receiving those various medical treatments. She asked Mr Dansie whether he would consent to her asking the nurse at the Nursing Home whether those issues could be followed up with the doctor. Mr Dansie responded to Ms Rozman by email dated 29 March 2017 being sent at 1.47 am. This document was tendered. The document obviously speaks for itself. In summary, Mr Dansie did not support any of the suggestions of Ms Rozman. In particular he questioned the motives of the others (Ms Giorgio and Mrs Dansie’s brothers but not Ms Rozman) and suggested that the tests were not necessary. Ms Rozman agreed that during the meeting on 9 March 2017, Mr Dansie suggested that members of the family wanted to move Mrs Dansie to another nursing home in order to get him out of the picture. (citations omitted) 107 There was also evidence that the appellant, upon his wife’s death, would receive a significant financial benefit, including: -- 39 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 38 • A life pension of two-thirds of that payable to his wife (at the time of the trial amounting to $32,615 per annum). On 8 May 2017, the appellant spoke to an employee of the Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation and informed her of his wife’s death. The appellant was advised that, under the terms of the policy, he qualified for a spousal benefit of 67 per cent of the pension that his wife would have received had she not died. On 26 May 2017, the appellant made a claim. The prosecution alleged that he would have been aware of the spousal benefit before his wife’s death, given that he managed her finances from about 2005. • He could claim $15,000 from Freedom Insurance. On 15 August 2016, the appellant took out a policy for funeral insurance which covered both himself and his wife. There was no cost for the first 12 months, and the policy could be cancelled after that period. The insurance company approached the appellant, having obtained his details from a competition. After some further telephone correspondence, the appellant signed up for the policy. After his wife’s death, the appellant made a claim on the policy on 20 April 2017. • The house at Waterfall Gully was held by the appellant and his wife as joint tenants and would revert, on his wife’s death, to him alone. 108 The prosecution submitted that the appellant’s financial motive to commit the offence should be considered in the context of the evidence indicating a hardening attitude toward his wife and his desire to pursue a sexual relationship with Sophia and/or other women. 109 In summary, it was the prosecution case at trial that the appellant’s account of how his wife entered the pond was inherently implausible. Considering the topography of the pond, the evidence of premeditation, along with his personal and financial motives to commit the offence, the only rational inference to be drawn from the all the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife into the pond with the intention to kill her. Defence submissions at trial 110 The appellant did not give evidence at the trial. As discussed earlier, much of the primary evidence was not in dispute. Rather, it was the inferences the prosecution sought to draw from the evidence that were contested. Defence counsel submitted that the prosecution had not proved its case and the appellant’s version of events, as provided in his interviews, was a reasonable possibility. Thus, there existed a rational explanation consistent with his innocence. 111 There was no dispute at trial, nor on appeal, that the appellant pushed his wheelchair-bound wife into the pond where she drowned. The actus reus of the offence was conceded. The defence case was that there was at least a reasonable possibility that it was an accident. In his dissenting judgment, Nicholson J referred to numerous considerations relied upon by defence counsel in support of their case that it was a reasonable possibility that Mrs Dansie’s death was an accident. In this -- 40 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 39 Court, the appellant referred to Nicholson J’s summary as accurately and comprehensively reflecting defence counsel’s submissions at trial and as ultimately supporting the appellant’s contention that the evidence left open a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence. For those reasons, it is necessary to set out this portion of Nicholson J’s dissenting judgment in full:46 A summary of considerations to be arrayed against the findings in support of the prosecution case and propounded by the appellant as tending towards accidental death being a reasonable possibility is as follows. (i) The appellant’s inability to give plausible or sensible explanations for how the incident unfolded, in the circumstances that confronted the appellant both when at the pond and when with the police, is not inconsistent with an accident having occurred in sudden and shocking circumstances. Indeed, it might be expected. (ii) Given the circumstances, the appellant’s inability to recall detail should not be surprising if it had been an accident with short term resultant panic leading to illogical or irrational reactions. (iii) The uncertainty as to how the incident occurred and inability to give a coherent explanation was consistent with an unexpected accident and inconsistent with premeditation. The appellant was not unintelligent — it should not have been beyond him to devise, in advance, a more coherent story, unless the decision to kill Mrs Dansie arose spontaneously on arrival at the pond which was not the prosecution case. (iv) The finding of lack of distress, given: the traumatic circumstances; the fact that people are known to react differently; the appellant’s very unusual personality; the fact that the nature of the marital relationship necessarily changed dramatically at the time of the stroke; and the fact that the appellant had been caring for his disabled wife for more than 20 years, should be given very little weight. (v) In any event, the perceived absence of distress was equivocal, just as displays of distress and emotion can be seen as equivocal. The apparent lack of distress should be given little weight for this reason as well. (vi) The extent and nature of the appellant’s cooperation with the police was inconsistent with a guilty mind. Throughout the nine hours or so with the police, there was nothing by way of defensiveness, obstruction, or indications of consciousness of guilt. In particular, the appellant volunteered information including that he was pushing and, in effect, in control or in charge of the wheelchair at the time of entry into the water. This was obviously a potentially very damning admission. The fact that this was volunteered, rather than some other exculpatory story, is entirely consistent with a genuine belief in innocence. (vii) The weight to be given to a financial motive or that the appellant was, in fact, motivated by financial considerations should be very limited, for the reasons earlier discussed including the evidence that indicated that the appellant was financially quite comfortable and considered himself a “wealthy man”. (viii) The evidence of a change in the relationship from the appellant’s perspective after Mrs Dansie entered Valley View full time was weak, for the reasons earlier 46 Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103 at [357] per Nicholson J. -- 41 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 40 discussed. The indications of the appellant becoming callous and no longer caring for Mrs Dansie were equivocal and to be considered in the context of the appellant’s ongoing antipathy towards the Public Advocate and Mrs Dansie’s family (but not to her) and of his unusual personality. Further, there were indicators in the police interviews probative of the appellant having positive feelings for Mrs Dansie and the Valley View records disclosed regular visiting. (ix) The evidence from witnesses associated with the nursing home supported a finding that the appellant and Mrs Dansie were happy in each other’s company. (x) The deterioration in relationship evidence had to be considered in the context of the background of the appellant’s care for his disabled wife for more than 20 years. It is difficult to place oneself in the position of a person who has lived that experience. The ultimate effect on the appellant might be described as becoming callous and uncaring or the situation might also be one of simply losing commitment to the relationship. However, people in this situation rarely go on to commit murder, particularly as in this case where the deceased’s full time care has become the responsibility of a residential care facility. (xi) The evidence that the appellant was, in fact, motivated by wanting to have a relationship with Sophia was weak, for the reasons earlier discussed. In particular, the appellant already had sufficient freedom to pursue a lifestyle such as that indicated by the evidence. Any such potential motivation had been removed by Mrs Dansie’s permanent placement in Valley View as from September 2015. (xii) The appellant’s continued preoccupation with the Public Advocate issues and the SACAT proceedings during the police interviews after the drowning was inconsistent with premeditation. (xiii) There was no evidence of financial mismanagement nor had the appellant been removed as guardian. (xiv) The appellant was frank with the funeral insurer, when he contacted it four days after Mrs Dansie died, in advising it that a police investigation was underway. This was inconsistent with any consciousness of guilt. (xv) There were other possible explanations, consistent with innocence, for the evidence relied on by the Judge as adversely affecting the appellant’s credibility. One must be careful not to impose such a demanding standard of accuracy and full disclosure that to require a person, in the appellant’s position and in the immediate aftermath of such an event, to meet it becomes unrealistic. (xvi) The presence of the watch, wallet and clothes in the car is equivocal for the reasons earlier explained. In my view, the finding of the clothes carries little weight. The appellant gave a respectable explanation — he left early that autumn day in shorts and a T-shirt apparently expecting that he might stay out until evening. The keeping of a change of clothes (long trousers and a jumper) in the car was a regular thing. It would appear that spare clothes for Mrs Dansie were also often brought along. The appellant said that he had taken her clothes out at some time but had forgotten why. As it happened, the appellant did not use the change of clothes as part of the “plan”. At the first interview in the Gardens, the appellant was sitting with a blanket around him; he did not ask to go and get his dry clothes. Further, if guilty, a successful defence would require the appellant to have jumped into the pond. If -- 42 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 41 guilty, it would generate suspicion if the appellant appeared to the police dry clothed: either he did not try to rescue or he came “prepared” with dry clothes. The argument in favour of the dry clothes being probative would appear to require the following quite detailed planning: leave the house in the morning wearing T-shirt and shorts rather than warm clothes to start with, be prepared to get wet and feign a rescue attempt, stay cold and wet for when the police arrived but have warm clothes available in the car in case (as it happened) the appellant was held up by the police for a long period of time. However, the watch and the wallet with $400 also provided support for the inference of premeditation relied on by the prosecution. If premeditated, the appellant would have need of his phone; there was no sense in leaving his phone in the car. But why leave the wallet and watch one asks rhetorically? Whilst probative of premeditation, there is also an available explanation consistent with no premeditation — the appellant had no need for them and they would be secure in the locked car. Further, in circumstances where a person has planned to commit such a serious crime as murder, the loss of or damage to a watch, even an Armani, might seem to that person to be a less than important consideration. In any event, it would be a simple task to take the watch off and throw it, with the wallet for that matter, onto the grass with the phone and keys before entering the water. The appellant did not present as unintelligent or impulsive. The prosecution case speaks of elaborate premeditation. To leave the watch and wallet in the car might strike someone like the appellant, when planning the event, as leaving an obvious clue for the police. (xvii) Any reliance on the evidence of Mrs Dansie’s physical capabilities and the appellant’s physical capabilities, in controlled situations on land, to infer what actions and reactions by the appellant would have been possible when confronted with the sudden, traumatic events in the pond, is risky. It imports an element of quite unreliable speculation. And particularly so when the appellant’s age, weight of 130 or so kilograms and own physical difficulties (swollen legs from diabetes and obvious mobility issues) are taken into account. (xviii) The behaviour of the appellant during the house search in insisting that the police consider his correspondence in relation to the SACAT proceedings just hours after the drowning was consistent with or a function of the appellant’s very unusual, at times obsessional, personality and inconsistent with a guilty mind. (xix) There was an absence of evidence of malice or ill will directed towards Mrs Dansie (notwithstanding the finding that the appellant resisted spending money said by others to be for her benefit). (xx) Whilst there was no direct evidence explaining the appellant’s purpose in searching for funeral information, defence counsel proffered at trial an alternative inference. Only weeks before the searches there had been two deaths and funerals in Mrs Dansie’s wider family. This, together with both the appellant’s and Mrs Dansie’s respective ages and infirmities, might naturally invoke curiosity as to what could be arranged and the costs thereof, so as to know what could be had for the $15,000. The mere fact that some of the searches were very proximate to searching for “sexy shoes” does not necessarily indicate any link. The appellant was on the internet at the time and, as people do, may simply have searched different matters of interest, not related. -- 43 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 42 112 In summary, defence counsel submitted at trial that the appellant’s version of the events at the pond was, at the very least, a reasonable possibility; his lack of distress and peculiar demeanour was attributed to his ‘unusual’ personality; and the evidence of premeditation and any financial or ‘relationship’ motive to commit the offence was weak and provided little or no support for the prosecution case. It was submitted that the prosecution had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offence of murder. The trial Judge’s findings 113 It is useful to briefly outline the findings made by the trial Judge, as the appellant urged this Court, upon its independent review of the evidence, to depart from some of the trial Judge’s reasoning and to form a different view on certain material matters. To set out the trial Judge’s findings does not reflect a deference to any aspect of them. 114 The trial Judge made the following findings as to the appellant’s credibility: • That the appellant’s credibility was adversely affected by reason of deliberate untruths he told during police interviews, including his explanation for his watch found in the car and his treatment by police. Those lies demonstrated ‘he is prepared to embellish matters if he considers it is in his interests to do so’.47 • That the appellant was not forthcoming about his relationship with Sophia in China and his messages with ‘Rose’, and those matters ‘individually and collectively, adversely affect Mr Dansie’s credit’.48 115 The trial Judge rejected the following aspects of the appellant’s account: • How Mrs Dansie entered the pond, although accepting his statement (made against interest) that he was holding the wheelchair when Mrs Dansie entered the pond. His Honour reasoned:49 I find that his explanation that he turned the wheelchair in a north-easterly direction and Mrs Dansie and the wheelchair, which he had hold of, apparently travelled in a southerly direction, is inherently implausible. Mr Dansie, when confronted by the police at the Gardens with the implausibility of his version of events, clearly had no answer. Mr Dansie, as can be seen from the video, hesitates and pauses for significant periods of time as he attempts to answer the questions. He admits that he cannot account for the difficulties in his version of events. Mr Dansie was unable to give a plausible account as to how Mrs Dansie came to be in the water. It is not his demeanour; it is his inability to give a sensible explanation that is relevant. I reject Mr Dansie’s explanation that in some way the release of the brakes on the wheelchair led to the wheelchair falling into the pond. Mr Dansie told the 47 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [370] per Lovell J. 48 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [374] per Lovell J. 49 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [378]-[379] per Lovell J. -- 44 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 43 000 operator, Constable Senior and Brevet Sergeant Munn that the release of the brakes led to the wheelchair moving quickly and unexpectedly. The evidence of Mr Sage contradicts Mr Dansie’s explanation. The brakes were largely, although not totally, ineffective. Further, even if the brakes were operating effectively, taking them off unexpectedly would not account for the wheelchair falling into the pond as described. • The appellant’s explanation for placing the wheelchair on Rock B, finding that, ‘there was simply no reason for (the appellant) to put Mrs Dansie in a place which was clearly unsafe’.50 • The appellant’s account as to what occurred once he entered the pond to rescue Mrs Dansie, rejecting the appellant’s claims that Mrs Dansie was too heavy to get out of the water and that he was unable to keep her head above water. His Honour said:51 I reject Mr Dansie’s explanation that Mrs Dansie was “too heavy” to get out of the water. He gave the police no detail of what actually prevented him getting her out other than the suggestion she was too heavy. The video of the removal of Mrs Dansie’s body established that the water laps over the edge of Rock C. Mrs Dansie, as can be seen in the video and consistent with the evidence of Professor Byard, is “buoyant”. To get Mrs Dansie into a position to lift her out of the pond would be comparatively easy. The bottom of the pond was concrete although covered with some silt. Mr Dansie, on his own admission, and as seen on the CCTV footage from the Nursing Home, was capable of lifting Mrs Dansie, with some assistance from her, out of her wheelchair and into a car. Although not seen on the CCTV footage, he must have been able to lift her out of the car and into her wheelchair. That required reasonable strength. Mr Dansie claimed he was still capable of looking after Mrs Dansie in the house at Waterfall Gully. The vertical lift required to move Mrs Dansie over and out of the pond adjacent to Rock C cannot be determined precisely but it is relatively slight. Even if it was not possible to roll or lift Mrs Dansie onto or over Rock C, I reject his explanation that he was unable to keep her head above water. At no stage does he suggest that he tried to get Mrs Dansie to stand in the pond. The water at its deepest was 1.1 to 1.15 metres and shallower in other parts. The measurement from Mrs Dansie’s foot to her hip, taken by Professor Byard, was 90 cm. Mrs Dansie was not out of her depth. Neither of course was Mr Dansie. She could weight bear with assistance as seen in the CCTV footage taken earlier that day. Given her buoyancy, Mr Dansie should have been able to assist her to stand more easily in the water than out of it. As mentioned the bottom of the pond was made of concrete. It was open to Mr Dansie to have Mrs Dansie hang on to Rock C and support herself. Alternatively, he could have got out of the pond, retrieved his phone, and got back in to support her while telephoning for assistance. It was open for him, given he admitted manoeuvring Mrs Dansie to be adjacent to Rock C to get out of the pond and drag Mrs Dansie over Rock C, or at least her upper half. There were many options available to Mr Dansie in that 20 minute period 50 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [377] per Lovell J. 51 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [388]-[390] per Lovell J. -- 45 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 44 (or less). His response to the police was that he was focussed on “getting her out” so he didn’t try anything else. I reject that explanation as implausible. 116 The trial Judge made further findings to the effect that: the appellant showed no urgency or distress during the 000 call, commenting that ‘[i]t is remarkable that it takes over a minute for Mr Dansie to tell the operator that Mrs Dansie is still in the pond’;52 and the appellant’s behaviour during the 000 call evinced a lack of desire for Mrs Dansie to be resuscitated. His Honour also considered that the appellant exhibited a lack of distress during his police interviews and in the aftermath of Mrs Dansie’s death. 117 The trial Judge then made an intermediate finding that it was ‘highly unlikely that Mrs Dansie drowned accidentally in the pond’.53 118 In relation to the evidence regarding the appellant’s premeditation and motive to commit the offence, his Honour concluded that the appellant leaving his watch, wallet, and a spare change of clothes, for himself but not Mrs Dansie, in the car was ‘consistent with and supportive of an expectation on the part of Mr Dansie that he was going to get wet while in the Gardens’.54 The trial Judge found that the evidence of the appellant’s internet searches regarding funerals, ‘indicates that in the lead up to Mrs Dansie’s death, Mr Dansie had been contemplating the arrangements that would need to be made in the event of her death despite the fact that she appeared to be in good health … consistent with and supportive of the prosecution case’.55 119 The trial Judge accepted that the appellant had a ‘dual motive’56 to commit the offence; namely, a financial motive and a ‘relationship motive’57 – that is, the pursuit of a sexual relationship with ‘Sophia’ in the context of the deterioration of his relationship with Mrs Dansie. 120 In finding the offence proved, the trial Judge concluded:58 I have had regard to all of the evidence. I have considered all of the submissions of Mr Mead SC. Taking all of the evidence into account, I find that the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. that Mr Dansie committed an act or acts that were voluntary, conscious and deliberate, namely pushing Mrs Dansie, who was seated in her wheelchair, into the pond; 2. that the act or acts committed by Mr Dansie caused the death of Mrs Dansie; 52 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [399] per Lovell J. 53 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [402] per Lovell J. 54 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [405] per Lovell J. 55 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [408] per Lovell J. 56 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [421] per Lovell J. 57 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [409] per Lovell J. 58 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [422]-[424] per Lovell J. -- 46 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 45 3. that at the time Mr Dansie committed the act which caused the death of Mrs Dansie, Mr Dansie had a specific intention to kill Mrs Dansie; and 4. that the act which caused the death of Mrs Dansie was unlawful. I find that the prosecution has proved all four elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. To put it another way, I find that Mr Dansie, deliberately and with intent to kill Mrs Dansie, pushed her wheelchair, in which she was sitting, into the pond in the Gardens. As a result of that action, Mrs Dansie drowned in the pond. I find that not only is this finding of guilt a rational inference, I find that it is only rational inference available on the evidence. Parties’ contentions 121 The appellant contended that, following the approach mandated by M v The Queen, this Court should find the appellant’s account as to what occurred at the pond to be at least a reasonable possibility. The appellant expressly relied upon the dissenting judgment of Nicholson J, as a comprehensive and accurate analysis as to why this Court should conclude that the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally pushed his wife into the pond with the intention to kill her. By reason of the fact that the appellant explicitly relied upon and adopted Nicholson J’s analysis and conclusions in support of their sole ground of appeal, except in relation to several distinct matters, it is necessary to set out Nicholson J’s ultimate analysis in full. His Honour reasoned as follows:59 The drowning of an elderly, wheelchair bound, woman in a pond in the Gardens is an extraordinary event; but extraordinary events do happen. Nevertheless, I start with the proposition that, according to the ordinary experience of human affairs, it is highly unusual for a husband in his late 60s, having been married to his wife for more than 40 years and sole or primary carer for his wife over the previous 22 years or so, to murder her in this way or at all. The observation of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, although given in a civil litigation context, remains apposite and a fortiori in the criminal context. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. This is an unusual case and unusual in a way that adds to the difficulty of arriving at a decision of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The only issue in dispute is the appellant’s state of mind which can only be discerned by inference. So often in a murder case the principal issue is did a particular accused commit the act (usually violent) known or found to have caused death. Thereafter, the question of specific intent is something to be inferred from all the circumstances including the now known or proved violent acts of the accused. How often is a jury pressed, in this context, with a submission that actions can speak louder than words. In the present case, the actus reus, has been conceded and is consistent with accident or murder. The appellant’s actions in causing the death are of greatly reduced assistance in proving a specific intent. The trier of fact is left with other circumstances having no or little direct connection with the events at the pond. 59 Dansie v The King [2020] SASCFC 103 at [358]-[385] per Nicholson J. -- 47 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 46 For the reasons earlier given, I accept that, if the appellant had positioned the wheelchair on Rock B in the manner indicated, his accidentally pushing the wheelchair into the pond when attempting to leave was objectively possible. On the assumption that the wheelchair had been so positioned, I do not find the appellant’s explanation of what occurred when he tried to leave, limited to its essentials, to be inherently implausible. Whether or not the brakes had any influence on the outcome, there are other reasons, arising from the topography of Rocks B and C and the immediate surrounds, that could explain why, whilst the appellant was pushing an apparently impeded, occupied wheelchair, “all of a sudden ... she wasn’t there anymore”. Where an event such as this takes place, one must be careful to resist insisting upon an understanding of all the details before being able to assess whether or not an innocent explanation is a reasonable possibility. The appellant, notwithstanding extensive questioning, including cross-examination by the police, was unable to give details of what occurred satisfactory to the police, the prosecutor and ultimately the Judge. However, it was for the prosecution to refute, as a reasonable possibility, that the wheelchair somehow accidentally went into the pond from Rock B; it was not for the appellant to explain how. I agree with the Judge’s finding that Rock B was unsafe. I agree that it was quite unwise to position the wheelchair there, essentially for the reasons his Honour gave – it was not entirely flat (although, “flattish”), it was unnecessarily close to the water, it would present difficulty when leaving (at least, with hindsight) and it appeared to offer no obvious advantages (for duck seeing or otherwise) over the immediately adjacent grassy verge. Criticisms concerning the proximity of Rock B to the edge of the pond assume greater weight, given the depth of the pond and the risk it posed for drowning if an elderly, disabled person were to fall in, but only if that depth had been appreciated. However, the appellant said that he had investigated the depth of other water features (not this pond) and found them to be shallow and safe. He said he assumed the pond was also shallow and safe. The appellant said this to the police. Q. Okay so you made the assumption based on the creek that this would be very shallow as well. A. Be the same, yeah. You know, there’s no, there’s no guard rails and there’s always kids here. Oh Christ. The prosecution sought to use the “concession” that the appellant had investigated depths against him as evidence of premeditation. However, the evidence is equivocal. If the appellant was genuine in his thinking, his positioning of the wheelchair on Rock B was not to his mind particularly unsafe nor quite so unwise as it otherwise might appear. In any event, people do unwise, even foolish and reckless, things. Many people do not fully assess or attend to risks that might discourage others from taking the same course of action. At the end of the day this was a relatively stable wheelchair with a relatively stable, somewhat inert passenger, whom the appellant was well experienced in pushing around. It would not be so surprising if the appellant, when positioning the wheelchair, gave little thought to any risks posed by the apparently benign environment in which they were in or to how he would leave from Rock B when it came time to go. The activities of pushing, locating and manoeuvring a wheelchair, for the experienced, can become, to a degree, automatic and unthinking after a time. -- 48 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 47 The appellant was cooperative on the night. It is apparent from the transcripts that he was quite willing to assist the police during the immediate investigation over nine hours or so that night. It is apparent from the transcript of the “walkthrough” interview at the pond that the appellant was struggling to explain how the drowning happened (see, for example, Appendix C). Many of his answers and concessions are consistent with bewilderment. The appellant did not resist the police cross-examination but attempted to answer the many challenges put to him and acknowledged the difficulties that the topographical and other physical features presented for his account. The appellant volunteered that he was holding the wheelchair handles and pushing at the time it went into the water. The appellant engaged in extensive conversation with the various police officers with the apparent mutual intention of trying to establish the detail of what had happened. At no time did the appellant depart from the essentials of his account – he positioned the wheelchair facing east on Rock B (which, but for a gap, abutted Rock C), he experienced no problem until he tried to leave at which time he felt the wheelchair to be impeded before it suddenly went into the water. If this is what occurred, the appellant may well not have understood at the time how it came about. If an accident, it would have been a most shocking event (no matter how the appellant might have truly felt about his wife) and it would not be surprising that he was unable to clearly explain what took place when the wheelchair went in or during his rescue efforts afterwards. The appellant had sufficient insight during the pond interview to acknowledge that “it’s got to the stage where my suppositions are mixed up with any recollections” (emphasis added). None of the interviews, including in particular that at the pond, presents the appellant as trying to convince the police with a pre-prepared explanation. He was criticised by the prosecution for making it up as he went along. An alternative inference is that, if innocent and not having any understanding of the detail as to how it all happened, he was thinking on his feet and trying to reconstruct what must have occurred. For a person who, according to the prosecution case, had planned the murder to the extent of reconnoitring the Gardens to locate the one pond deep enough and secluded enough to effect a drowning, the absence of a prepared coherent explanation for an accident is striking. There is no doubt that the appellant’s inability to rescue Mrs Dansie, given the topographical and other physical features of the pond is surprising. However, the appellant was elderly, obese and not a fit or able-bodied man. He told the police that Mrs Dansie was, at first, tangled in her wheelchair and she also was a very large woman. The submissions of the prosecution and the findings of the Judge as to actions that could or should have been undertaken but evidently were not, necessarily involve, as submitted by the appellant, elements of speculation. Nevertheless, the fact is that the appellant failed to save his wife in circumstances where many men of his size would have been able to do so. When this is considered together with the 000 call, the prosecution submission is that the appellant evinced no interest in saving or intention to save Mrs Dansie. There is force in these submissions. For the reasons earlier given, I would place no weight on the existence of the change of clothes. The evidence concerning the watch and the wallet is more probative of pre-meditation but for the reasons earlier given it is not inconsistent with innocence. The evidence of the funeral searches although also capable of innocent explanation, is more probative. It was a strange thing to be doing at that time in all of the circumstances. The fact that the appellant tested the depth of other water features on earlier occasions is equivocal for the prosecution at best. The appellant said that he picked up a stick and made random checks. Furthermore, on the prosecution case the appellant’s purpose was to identify the most suitable location to effect a drowning without being seen. If so, one asks -- 49 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 48 rhetorically, why would he volunteer to the police that he had investigated water depths during his previous visits and give them a head start to this line of enquiry. The evidence indicative of lack of distress or suitable emotion must be given weight in the prosecution case although this evidence is also open to innocent explanation. The interviews reveal the appellant to be a very unusual person; preoccupied with his own issues and concerns and very self-absorbed. For reasons earlier suggested, he may not have been or felt distressed over his wife’s accident or may simply be one of those persons who does not reveal his emotions. Similarly, the evidence indicating a change in the nature of the relationship from the appellant’s perspective must be accorded some weight and notwithstanding that there may be quite understandable reasons for this; such a long period of being sole carer for a physically and cognitively disabled wife is very likely to have a detrimental impact on the carer’s own quality of life and come to be resented. Again, to put it bluntly, if a person is capable of murder, they are more likely to murder someone they do not love or have ceased to love than someone they do love. However, once Mrs Dansie went into full time care, any motivation to be extricated from such a detrimental relationship (from the appellant’s perspective) by taking such an extreme step as murder, surely would have been diminished. The evidence of the two motives (relationship with Sophia and financial) must also be given weight, but for reasons already given, I do not regard this evidence, at least considered in isolation, as particularly powerful. It is the ordinary experience of human affairs, at least given the cultural and legal environment surrounding marriage in modern times, that many persons pursue extra-marital relationships, some quite elaborate, but do not murder their life partners. Similarly, many people would be financially better off alone but do not murder their life partners. The fact that these two motive strands existed at the time of the drowning might simply be coincidental. I do not overlook that the “motive” argument for the prosecution gains strength from the fact of the two strands, together with the evidence suggesting a decline in the appellant’s love and concern for Mrs Dansie and suggesting that he was finding her a burden. Also, the motive evidence must be assessed in the context of the whole of the circumstantial case. One does need to be careful when approaching the ultimate issue, bearing in mind the concern advocated by the appellant and by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Tiwary that presenting the issue in the binary form – was the pushing of the wheelchair into the water deliberate or accidental, might obscure the correct question – has the prosecution proved its case. To this point, I have resisted expressing as a preliminary view whether or not accidental entry into the pond was “highly unlikely”. I prefer to address one question at the conclusion of my review of the whole of the evidence. Ultimately, this question becomes, is the appellant’s account of what happened, stripped to its essentials – positioning of the wheelchair on Rock B with difficulties experienced on leaving such that the appellant lost control of the wheelchair and it entered the water by accident, a reasonable possibility? In other words, has the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant’s account of an accident was false. The appellant’s concession that he caused the wheelchair and Mrs Dansie to enter the pond should be accepted. The much more difficult question of the nature of his state of mind at the time depends on an assessment of his account given in the interviews and the whole of the circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution. The question becomes does all of the circumstantial evidence relied on by the respondent cause me to reject beyond -- 50 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 49 reasonable doubt the appellant’s account of positioning the wheelchair on Rock B or, even if so positioned, to reject its accidental entry into the pond as described. These two issues are questions of fact which I must decide having made my own independent assessment of the evidence. At one level, the various considerations relied on by the defence (and the prosecution for that matter) and discussed thus far might be characterised as “jury points” to be assessed by the jury or, in this case, the Judge when addressing the overall strength of the prosecution case. But this is an unhelpful and potentially misleading approach when deployed at the appeal stage. It can encourage the wrong question on appeal – was there evidence to support the verdict. Rather, they are matters to be weighed by each Judge on appeal as part of their own independent assessment of the evidence. A court of criminal appeal must pay due regard to the trial court’s verdict with respect to its evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses and of other evidence and with respect to inferences drawn from the evidence as a whole when assessing the strength of a circumstantial case, as here. Further, the appeal court must pay due deference to the trial court’s experience of human affairs, but particularly in the case of a trial by jury which offers the combined thinking and human experience of 12 persons from diverse backgrounds. Following my review of all the evidence, after having proper regard for and giving respect to the Judge’s view and reasons for it and after giving due weight to the submissions put in favour of both prosecution and the defence analyses, the prosecution case lacks probative force in such a way as to cause me to doubt that the appellant murdered his wife. I find the appellant’s account of having positioned the wheelchair on Rock B to have been a reasonable possibility and his essential account of what occurred when attempting to leave also to be a reasonable possibility. I am not able to reject the essentials of the appellant’s account beyond reasonable doubt. In this respect, and with respect, I do not agree with the Judge that the appellant’s explanations of what occurred at the pond are inconsistent with proven facts. Furthermore, I am not satisfied that the advantage (as earlier described) available to the Judge from seeing and hearing the appellant during his recorded interviews when compared with my position in assessing the evidence, is capable of resolving or allaying this doubt. To use the more stark language employed in circumstantial evidence cases, I am not satisfied that the guilt of the appellant is the only rational inference available on the whole of the evidence. With great respect to the Judge, the doubt I experience is one that any trier of fact must have experienced. That is not because I am to be seen as better able to evaluate factual issues of the type involved here but because of the strength of my own conviction and because I see no reason in the circumstances of this matter to depart from the plurality’s injunction in M v The Queen. In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only when a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. In my view, it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to allow the verdict of guilty of murder to stand. (citations omitted) -- 51 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 50 122 Drawing extensively from Nicholson J’s analysis, the appellant contended that this Court should conclude that the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally pushed the deceased into the pond with the intention of killing her. However, in relation to several discrete matters, the appellant urged this Court to depart from Nicholson J’s analysis. In particular, the appellant contended that a different approach should be adopted in evaluating the video recordings of the appellant’s interviews with police. The correct approach to the appellant’s recorded interviews 123 Both parties asserted that this Court, as part of its independent review of the entire evidence, should listen to the 000 call and view the recordings of the appellant’s police interviews and then form its own assessment of the appellant’s account, including his demeanour during the interviews. 124 In the reasons of the Full Court, Nicholson J set out four legitimate uses of the appellant’s interviews. It was common ground between the parties that the recordings could be used in each of these four ways. These uses are as follows:60 125 As to the video recording of the appellant’s interview at the pond (after returning there in the company of police): • To obtain a proper understanding of the topography of the pond and the surrounding terrain as identified in the objective evidence and summarised in the reasons of the trial Judge. • To obtain a proper understanding of the appellant’s explanations given by reference to various topographical features of the pond. 126 As to the 000 call to emergency services and all other police interviews: • As pertinent to assessing whether the trial Judge’s factual findings as to the appellant’s delay in answering questions and formulating questions were open. • As relevant to the question of whether the appellant failed to display a level of appropriate emotion and distress after the death of his wife (which is to be distinguished from the question of demeanour). 127 Both parties submitted that this Court should also have regard to the appellant’s demeanour during the interviews as relevant to his credibility in considering his explanation. The appellant contended that Nicholson J, in his reasons, was unduly deferential to the trial Judge’s findings, and this Court should adopt a different approach. Specifically, the appellant submitted that Nicholson J reasoned that it was open to the trial Judge (and thus to be deferred to) to find that the appellant demonstrated a lack of emotion during the interviews. Furthermore, 60 Dansie v The King [2020] SASCFC 103 at [322]-[326] per Nicholson J. -- 52 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 51 it was open to the trial Judge (and thus also to be deferred to) to infer from his lack of emotion that the appellant had a ‘lack of care and empathy for his wife and a preoccupation or obsession with money’.61 The appellant submitted that this Court should not defer to the trial Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s demeanour but should conduct its own independent review of the interviews and form its own conclusion on the inferences to be drawn from the appellant’s demeanour, or the way he gave his account, in the recorded interviews. 128 In support of this submission, the appellant emphasised that the video material is not a recording of testimonial evidence given at trial; rather, it comprised ‘real evidence’ of mixed statements by an accused person containing both admissions and exculpatory statements. The appellant urged this Court to proceed on the basis that a consideration of the recordings of his interviews, and his demeanour therein, should form part of its own assessment of the whole of the evidence. 129 The appellant sought to distinguish the authorities of SKA v The Queen62 (‘SKA’), Pell v the Queen63 (‘Pell’), and Tiwary v The Queen64 (‘Tiwary’). 130 In SKA, the High Court considered whether the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in its consideration of a ground of appeal alleging that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence by failing to watch a video recording of the complainant’s evidence in chief. The High Court held that an appellate court will not usually view a ‘recording of evidence’. The majority referred to the fact that the recording was only part of the complainant’s evidence in chief, therefore potentially providing a distorted view of the evidence. 131 The appellant sought to distinguish SKA on the basis that it applied to recordings of evidence rather than a defendant’s police interview, which the appellant submitted is ‘real evidence’. Further, and in any event, SKA indicates that a recording of a complainant’s testimony can and should be considered by an appellate court if ‘a purpose for the viewing may be clearly discerned’65, as it was in the present case. 132 In SKA, no reason was advanced as to why it was necessary for the Court of Appeal to view the recording of the complainant’s evidence in chief. As stated in the majority judgment, ‘the applicant has not pointed to any circumstance in this case which would have necessitated the viewing of part of the complainant’s evidence by the Court of Criminal Appeal.’66 61 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [145] per Lovell J. 62 (2011) 243 CLR 400. 63 (2020) 268 CLR 123. 64 [2012] NSWCCA 193. 65 SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at [34] per French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ. 66 SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at [35] per French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ. -- 53 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 52 133 Pell involved an appeal to the High Court following the appellant’s convictions for child sexual offences. That matter involved two trials. During the first trial, a jury were unable to reach a verdict. The complainant’s evidence during the trial was video recorded. The video recording of the evidence was played at a re-trial. The appellant was convicted. When considering whether the verdicts were unreasonable, the Court of Appeal watched the recording of the complainant’s evidence. In their reasons, the High Court referred to the majority judgment in SKA and rejected the Crown submission that the mere availability of a video recording of a witness’ evidence at trial meant that the proper discharge of the function of the appellate court, to make its independent assessment of the evidence, necessitated a viewing of the recording. The High Court explained:67 There may be cases where there is something particular in the video-recording that is apt to affect an appellate court's assessment of the evidence, which can only be discerned visually or by sound. In such cases, there will be a real forensic purpose to the appellate court's examination of the video-recording. But such cases will be exceptional, and ordinarily it would be expected that the forensic purpose that justifies such a course will be adopted by the parties, rather than upon independent scrutiny by the members of the court. Secondly, the assessment of the credibility of a witness by the jury on the basis of what it has seen and heard of a witness in the context of the trial is within the province of the jury as representative of the community. Just as the performance by a court of criminal appeal of its functions does not involve the substitution of trial by an appeal court for trial by a jury, so, generally speaking, the appeal court should not seek to duplicate the function of the jury in its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses where that assessment is dependent upon the evaluation of the witnesses in the witness-box. The jury performs its function on the basis that its decisions are made unanimously, and after the benefit of sharing the jurors' subjective assessments of the witnesses. Judges of courts of criminal appeal do not perform the same function in the same way as the jury, or with the same advantages that the jury brings to the discharge of its function. It should be understood that when the joint reasons in M v The Queen spoke of the jury's “advantage in seeing and hearing the witnesses” as being “capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal” as to the guilt of the accused, their Honours were not implying that it was only because there were, at that time, no practical means of enabling a court of criminal appeal to see and hear the evidence of the witnesses at trial that the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses was of such potentially critical importance. The assessment of the weight to be accorded to a witness' evidence by reference to the manner in which it was given by the witness has always been, and remains, the province of the jury. Rather, their Honours in M were remarking upon the functional or “constitutional” demarcation between the province of the jury and the province of the appellate court. That demarcation has not been superseded by the improvements in technology that have made the video-recording of witnesses possible. The function of the court of criminal appeal in determining a ground that contends that the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, in a case such as the present, proceeds upon the assumption that the evidence of the complainant was assessed by the jury to be credible and reliable. The court examines the record to see whether, notwithstanding that assessment – either by reason of 67 Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123 at [36]-[39] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ citing SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at [30]-[31] per French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ, [116] per Crennan J. -- 54 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 53 inconsistencies, discrepancies, or other inadequacy; or in light of other evidence – the court is satisfied that the jury, acting rationally, ought nonetheless to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of guilt. 134 The appellant submitted that the observations of the High Court in Pell do not directly apply to this case. The appellant emphasised that the reasoning in SKA and Pell was limited to the video recording of testimonial evidence given at, and in the context of a trial. It was not said that the principles of appellate restraint extended to a video recording of an out-of-court interview with a defendant, which was itself part of the evidence tendered at trial. 135 In Tiwary, the appellant was convicted of murder. He appealed against his conviction, inter alia, on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The appellant was alleged to have murdered his two co-tenants at their residential premises. He did not give evidence at trial. He participated in two video records of interview; during the latter he ‘walked through’ the crime scene while being questioned by police.68 The Court of Appeal (NSW) viewed the video recording of the ‘walk-through’ and explained its approach to the evidence in the following way:69 There were a number of parts of the appellant’s account and the manner in which it was told in the “walkthrough” which the jury could well have thought either implausible or reflecting badly on his version of events, such as the description of holding the knife while checking for Mr Tay’s pulse, the long pauses sometimes made in evident difficulty in fixing sequence and the inconsistencies in sequence. We have taken into account that a jury could have taken that view as part of seeing and hearing all the evidence in context. Notwithstanding that, and taking it into account, we are still left with a doubt as to the verdicts. We have not ourselves taken our own impressions of the appellant’s attitude and demeanour in the walkthrough into account. In respect of this evidence, we note the caution referred to by French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ in SKA v R [2011] HCA 13; 243 CLR 400 at 410–411 [29]–[31] in an appeal court viewing a video recording of a complainant’s evidence. Similar caution is appropriate here about drawing any adverse inference from the impression created by the video recording of the “walkthrough”. The need for caution is reinforced because we cannot say that we all had the same impression of the “walkthrough”. 136 In this way, and without further analysis, the Court of Appeal appeared to apply the reasons given in SKA more broadly to a video recording of a defendant’s police interview. 137 For the reasons which follow, we consider there is a distinction to be drawn between the approach to be taken by an appellate court to a video recording of a witness’ testimony admitted as evidence at a subsequent trial, on the one hand, and statements made by a defendant during a police interview admitted as statements against interest or mixed inculpatory and exculpatory statements, on the other. In relation to the latter category, there is unlikely to be any restraint on an appellate court watching a video recording of a defendant’s interview with police and 68 Tiwary v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 193 at [97] per Bathurst CJ, Allsop P and Fullerton J. 69 Tiwary v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 193 at [99] per Bathurst CJ, Allsop P and Fullerton J. -- 55 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 54 reaching its own conclusions as to the person’s demeanour during the interview. That is so for the following reasons. 138 First, it is necessary to emphasise that the video recording is an item of real, and not testimonial evidence, and the admissible evidence is the video recording of the interviews rather than the transcript usually prepared by a police officer. The transcript of a video recording is generally admitted only as an aide-memoir to the video itself. There may be some occasions when the transcript is also tendered as an exhibit (usually for the jury’s convenience), with a direction given to the jury that if there is any discrepancy between the video recording and the transcript, the former is to be preferred. However, the fact remains that the admissible evidence is usually the video recording of the interview. The appellate court may undertake its review of the whole of the evidence by viewing the video recording or by reading the transcript depending on the forensic issues and the submissions of the parties. An appellate court is not required in every case, when considering an unreasonable verdict appeal ground, to watch the whole of every recorded interview. Each case will depend on the relevant arguments put forth by counsel on the appeal and, of course, on the content and significance of the interviews to the respective cases. 139 Second, a defendant’s police interview is usually tendered as an admission against interest, an exculpatory statement, or a mixture of both. The appellate court’s task in assessing an out-of-court statement, such as a recorded police interview, is a qualitatively different task than the assessment of a recording of a defendant’s evidence given in the context and atmosphere of a trial. For the reasons articulated by the High Court in SKA and Pell, the latter task remains the province of a jury or trial judge sitting without a jury. 140 When assessing a defendant’s police interview, an appellate court is often considering the person’s account and demeanour when first taxed with the allegations. The persons demeanour and other features of the way in which his or her account is given may affect the weight to be given to the admission or exculpatory statement, but only in a loose way might the task be described as an assessment of the person’s credibility or reliability. 141 Third, an appellate court is in as good a position as a jury or trial judge sitting without a jury to assess the features of a police interview which might affect the weight to be accorded to the person’s extra-curial statements; it is not a recording of evidence that needs to be considered in the context and atmosphere of the trial, and in particular the examination and cross-examination of a witness. 142 In the present case, as outlined earlier, it was the joint position of the parties that this Court should listen to the 000 call and view the video recordings of the police interviews conducted in the aftermath of Mrs Dansie’s death. Those recordings commenced very shortly after her drowning and continued over the course of the following 24 hours. The appellant’s account in the recordings included both inculpatory and exculpatory statements, which were of considerable -- 56 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 55 significance to the parties’ respective cases. Notably, the appellant did not give evidence at trial, and his exculpatory statements in the 000 call and police interviews were central to defence counsel’s submissions. We accept the appellant’s submission that the relevant ‘real forensic purpose’ of listening to the 000 call and viewing the police interviews is to enable this Court, consistently with its obligation on appeal, to make its own assessment of the evidence. This includes forming its own view as to what inferences it should draw from the appellant’s demeanour and to take those inferences into account when determining for itself whether, on all the evidence, each member of this Court entertains a reasonable doubt as to guilt. 143 For those reasons, we consider it is appropriate to listen to the 000 call and view the appellant’s police interviews. We have done so for the four purposes set out earlier. Additionally, we have considered the appellant’s demeanour, or the manner in which he gave his explanations, as part of our independent assessment of the evidence. This extends to determining the inferences we are prepared to draw, or not draw, from the appellant’s account and his demeanour, in assessing whether we are satisfied that the trial judge, acting rationally, ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt. 144 We now return to the appellant’s contentions. 145 It was common ground between the parties that there was, in fact, an absence of distress and lack of emotion shown by the appellant in the aftermath of Mrs Dansie’s drowning. However, the appellant submitted that this is a factor which supports the defence case; it is to be expected that a person who had committed a premeditated murder of his wife of 44 years, which he asserted was an accident, would likely feign distress at his wife’s death to convince others that he had not intentionally drowned her. Thus, the absence of distress, when other aspects of the offence were allegedly planned, is in fact a circumstance militating against the prosecution case that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife into the pond intending to kill her. Rather, it is a piece of circumstantial evidence pointing positively towards innocence. 146 The appellant urged this Court to depart from the approach of Nicholson J, who considered that ‘(t)he evidence indicative of lack of distress or suitable emotion must be given weight in the prosecution case although this evidence is also open to innocent explanation’.70 Contrary to this approach, the appellant submitted that the evidence was not merely capable of innocent explanation, such as to reduce the weight it should be given on the prosecution case, but was, in fact, more consistent with innocence than with guilt. In this way, it was evidence in favour of the defence case of an accident. 147 In relation to the 000 call, the appellant contended that this Court, upon its own review of the evidence, should not reach the same unfavourable conclusions 70 Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103 at [374] per Nicholson J. -- 57 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 56 as the trial Judge, and to which the appellant submitted Nicholson J appeared to defer, when his Honour found: • the appellant expressed no urgency or distress during the call; • the appellant refused to get back in the pond and help his wife, demonstrating ‘a lack of any genuine intention or desire to help’ her;71 and • it was remarkable that the appellant took more than a minute to tell the operator that his wife was still in the pond. No urgency or distress and refusal to get back in the pond 148 The appellant contended that this Court should not find that there was displayed a lack of urgency and distress in the 000 call, or that the appellant refused to get back into the pond. On the contrary, it was submitted that the appellant breathed heavily during the call (consistent with distress), gave specific directions as to how the paramedics might find his location, sounded keen for them to arrive at the scene as soon as possible, and sounded relatively agitated for a man who appeared to display little emotion. The appellant submitted that during the call, he sounded ‘somewhat shaken’, yet also resigned to the fact that he was powerless to assist, having already unsuccessfully tried for some time to do so. 149 As to the trial Judge’s characterisation of the appellant’s response as a refusal to enter the pond, the appellant submitted that his conduct and demeanour during the call were equally consistent with a belief that it was no longer realistic for his wife to be saved, at least by him. The appellant submitted that during the 000 call, he was not refusing to get into the pond; he was telling the operator he had already tried to do those things suggested by the operator. ‘Delay’ in mentioning his wife was in the pond 150 The appellant submitted that this Court should not reach the same conclusion as the trial Judge that it took ‘over a minute’ to tell the operator that his wife was in the pond.72 First, the appellant appeared to have provided information to somebody, other than the operator, before the recording commenced. For example, the operator knew the appellant’s first name, despite him not having said it on the recording. The appellant submitted that the evidence does not establish that he had not told another person, before the recording commenced, that his wife was in the pond and the evidence does not permit a finding that there was any undue delay by the appellant in mentioning that his wife was in the pond. 151 Second, the appellant submitted that even if this Court concludes that there was a delay in telling the operator Mrs Dansie was in the pond, no adverse inference should be drawn from the delay as the appellant was simply responding to the operator’s direct questions. More broadly, his conduct needs to be viewed 71 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [400] per Lovell J. 72 R v Dansie [2019] SASC 215 at [399] per Lovell J. -- 58 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 57 in the context of the traumatic circumstances he found himself in, and it was plausible that he might overlook telling the operator a fact that was readily obvious to him. 152 In relation to motive, the appellant submitted that the evidence of alleged dual motives to commit the offence were not strong or ‘particularly powerful’.73 The appellant relied on the approach of Nicholson J to the evidence of motive, as set out earlier in these reasons. Further, the appellant submitted that the evidence of his post-offence conduct is probative of innocence. The evidence demonstrated that the appellant knew his wife’s death was the subject of a police investigation and that police suspected him of murder. Despite that knowledge, the appellant, rather than attempting to hide or minimise a possible motive to commit the offence, acted in a manner that was apt to draw attention to him. In particular: • The appellant made a claim for the spousal benefit relating to his wife’s pension on 26 May 2017.74 • The appellant filed a claim against the funeral insurance, during which he advised them that a police investigation was underway into his wife’s death. • In his police interviews, the appellant repeatedly volunteered information about the SACAT proceedings and discussed them extensively. • The appellant arranged to travel to China to meet up with Sophia. 153 The appellant submitted that his post-offence conduct, in drawing attention to the financial benefit he would receive after his wife’s death, and his interest in pursuing another relationship, supported a finding that he was not in fact subjectively motivated to commit the offence for financial or relationship reasons (otherwise why draw attention to it); and the evidence of motive should be considered a ‘neutral consideration’. 154 As to the events at the pond, the appellant again relied on the reasoning of Nicholson J in his dissenting judgment but made the following additional points as to why this Court, on its independent review of the evidence relating to the deceased’s entry into the pond, considered with all the other evidence, should find the trial Judge ought to have had a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s innocence. The positioning of the wheelchair 155 The appellant submitted that this Court should accept the appellant’s admission that he placed the wheelchair on Rock B but nonetheless should not draw any adverse inference from that factual finding. The evidence of the wheelchair tyre marks at the scene is consistent with the appellant’s account that he positioned his wife’s wheelchair on Rock B, facing northeast. In his interviews, 73 Dansie v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 103 at [375] per Nicholson J. 74 See Trial Exhibit P45 at page 11. -- 59 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 58 the appellant asserted that he did so to provide his wife with a vantage point to watch the ducks. The appellant submitted there were no obviously superior vantage points: the grassed area near the pond was heavily sloped and unsuitable for placing the wheelchair; the width of the dirt verge between the grass and Rock B appeared to have been no wider than Rock B itself; and Rock B was almost large enough to wholly accommodate the wheelchair and provided a firm and relatively flat surface. The appellant submitted that in those circumstances, the inference that he placed his wife on Rock B for the purpose of giving himself a plausible explanation of accident when he murdered his wife was weak; and the alternative proposition, that he placed his wife on Rock B to view the ponds and ducks, was plausible. The appellant submitted this was a neutral consideration which did not support the prosecution case. The entry of Mrs Dansie into the pond 156 In this Court, the appellant adopted the analysis of Nicholson J, as set out earlier in these reasons, and added the following submissions. • The drop in elevation from the eastern edge of Rock B (next to Rock C) made the unbalancing of Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair as it was pushed off the rock plausible. • The wheelchair’s tyres were flat, and Mrs Dansie was a heavy woman; it was not surprising that the appellant had to push the wheelchair hard to move it from a stationary position. In those circumstances, the appellant may have thought the brakes were engaged, and told his wife to take the brakes off, as he asserted in his interviews, irrespective of whether that was, in fact, the case. • Even if the release of the brakes was rejected as the cause of sudden movement, this should not lead this Court to reject the appellant’s explanation that a sudden movement did, in fact, occur in the general way he described, for whatever reason. Conduct after entering the pond 157 The appellant reiterated his submissions on the question of the inferences properly to be drawn from the 000 call. The appellant contended that upon a proper analysis of the 000 call, it was afforded undue weight by the trial Judge, and Nicholson J in support of the prosecution case. The appellant submitted that the following matters militate against this Court rejecting the appellant’s account that he was unable to save his wife from drowning: • He was obese and unfit; he referred in the 000 call to having difficulty getting out of the pond. • Mrs Dansie was heavy; he mentioned this in the 000 call when explaining why he was unable to save her. -- 60 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 59 • The appellant’s ability to transfer his wife to the car, as depicted in the CCTV footage, was not without difficulty. Further, that he was able to do so in a different context could have little weight on the prosecution case, and to suggest that one was easier or harder than the other involved speculation. • If Mrs Dansie’s entry to the pond and subsequent death was an accident, it followed that the appellant would likely experience a degree of panic that might inhibit his ability to later give a complete or coherent account of events. This may also lend itself to illogical or less than rational reactions by the appellant, such as not having the presence of mind to keep her head out of the water. 158 The appellant submitted that this Court should conclude that he subjectively attempted to do all he thought he could to save his wife. Whether there was more that objectively could have been done is not to the point, except insofar as it bears on his intention. The appellant accepted that his failure to save his wife weighed in favour of the prosecution case but contended that it does not add much weight to the case, given the above considerations. 159 As to premeditation, the appellant submitted that the absence of a ‘pre-planned explanation’ for his wife’s death points towards accidental drowning; and is evidence incongruous with the prosecution case of a planned, premeditated murder. The appellant contended that the appellant not having a pre-planned explanation for his wife’s entry into the pond was inconsistent with the prosecution case of premeditated murder. 160 In summary, the appellant contended that, for the reasons given by Nicholson J, except where expressly departed from, each member of this Court should experience doubt as to the appellant’s guilt; the advantage the trial Judge might have over this Court was not such as to be capable of resolving such a doubt. 161 On the other hand, the respondent relied on the prosecution case, as outlined earlier in this judgment, and submitted that an independent review of the evidence revealed the inherent implausibility of the appellant’s version as to how Mrs Dansie entered the pond and should be rejected as a reasonable possibility. This was due to the lack of a cogent explanation for why he placed her wheelchair on Rock B; the inherent unlikelihood of the wheelchair entering the pond in the manner he described; that he could not save her from drowning; the appellant’s proven lies undermining his credibility; evidence of premeditation; and his personal and financial motives to commit the offence. The respondent contended that the only rational inference on all the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed his wife into the pond with the intention to kill her. Analysis 162 We turn now to directly consider whether, based on our independent assessment of the whole of the evidence adduced at trial, it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the -- 61 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 60 offence of murder; that is, the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with the intention of drowning his wife and, if not so satisfied, whether the trial Judge’s finding of guilt can be attributed to some advantage held by the trial Judge in assessing the evidence. 163 In this case, the advantage held by the trial Judge over the appellate court by reason of having seen and heard the evidence was limited. The prosecution case was circumstantial, and the evidence adduced by the prosecution was, for the most part, not in dispute. Much of the unchallenged evidence came before the trial Judge in the form of transcripts of evidence from an aborted trial, video recordings of interviews, physical exhibits and agreed facts. Furthermore, the appellant did not give evidence at trial. 164 The central issue in dispute, both at trial and on appeal, was whether the prosecution had proved the appellant’s specific intent; namely, whether he deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with the intention of killing his wife, thus excluding accidental drowning. 165 The appellant made admissions that Mrs Dansie entered the pond while he was holding the handles of the wheelchair and attempting to push the wheelchair away from the pond. There was unchallenged evidence from a pathologist, Professor Byard, that Mrs Dansie died from drowning. The appellant, in effect, admitted to the actus reus of the offence. This concession was supported by other objective evidence, including the presence of tyre marks, consistent with having been left by Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair, leading up to Rock B at the pond. 166 As outlined earlier, there were no eyewitnesses to the incident. The only direct evidence as to what occurred at the pond came from the appellant’s version of events, recounted in a 000 call to emergency services and during police interviews. At trial, the prosecution put its case against the appellant on the basis that he pushed the wheelchair into the pond intending to kill Mrs Dansie. The prosecution sought to exclude, as a reasonable possibility, the appellant’s account that he had accidentally caused his wife’s death. The prosecution did not put an alternative path to liability. For example, there was no suggestion that the appellant accidentally caused the wheelchair to enter the pond but then let his wife drown, or that after he accidentally pushed her wheelchair in to the pond, he followed her into the water and drowned her. Nor did the prosecution allege, in the alternative to murder, that the appellant committed an unlawful and dangerous act resulting in death (manslaughter). 167 The parties at trial, and on appeal, presented the contested issues in an almost binary fashion. That being so, it is important to recognise that should this Court, upon an independent assessment of all the evidence, reach the conclusion that it was open to the trial Judge to reject the appellant’s account as a reasonable possibility, it does not necessarily follow that it was open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt. It is still necessary for this Court to be satisfied on an independent assessment of the evidence, including -- 62 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 61 the appellant’s version of events and denials, and submissions put on his behalf, that the prosecution negated beyond reasonable doubt any rational hypothesis consistent with innocence. 168 It is also important to bear in mind that the evidence adduced in proof of the appellant’s specific intention to kill his wife was wholly circumstantial. A circumstantial case is not to be considered in a piecemeal fashion. All the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in determining whether there is a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence. 169 We begin our consideration of whether the verdict was unreasonable with an analysis of the appellant’s version of events as provided during the 000 call and police interviews. As submitted by the appellant in his written submissions, the events at the pond can be distilled into three phases: the appellant’s decision to place Mrs Dansie’s wheelchair on Rock B; her entry into the pond; and the appellant’s conduct after Mrs Dansie entered the pond. 170 In relation to the positioning of the wheelchair, the appellant’s admission during the 000 call and police interviews that he pushed the wheelchair into the pond should be accepted. The evidence of the wheelchair tyre marks at the scene is consistent with the appellant’s account that he positioned his wife’s wheelchair on Rock B. It is also unlikely that the wheelchair would have simply rolled into the water without any external force being applied to it. There was not a sufficient decline in the area leading from Rock B to the pond for that to have realistically occurred. 171 The appellant asserted that he positioned the wheelchair on Rock B to provide Mrs Dansie with a vantage point to watch the ducks. This seems an improbable explanation for the appellant’s decision to position the wheelchair so close to the pond. On the appellant’s version, he had been at the Gardens for several hours before he decided to approach the pond; there had been plenty of opportunities to view the ducks. It was becoming dark when he placed the wheelchair on Rock B. He told Munn that he thought Rock B was a ‘nice stable platform’ to position the wheelchair. However, there was evidence that Rock B was not entirely flat and not large enough to accommodate all four wheels of the wheelchair. It was also perilously close to the water’s edge. The appellant later conceded in his interview with Newbury that Rock B was, in fact, not a stable platform to position the wheelchair. 172 The appellant chose to position the wheelchair in an obviously unsafe place, despite there being a bitumen pathway a short distance away, from which Mrs Dansie would have had a clear view of any ducks in the pond. Whilst it is to be accepted that Rock B was closer to the water (indeed it was right at the water’s edge) and, as the appellant submitted, an ‘obviously superior vantage point’, it remains unclear why Mrs Dansie would need to have such a close view of the ducks. -- 63 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 62 173 Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, his admitted actions in placing the wheelchair on Rock B were not a ‘neutral consideration’. Rather, it was an item of circumstantial evidence which supported the prosecution case for two related reasons. The first is that the appellant manoeuvred the wheelchair with its deflated tyres, and carrying the weight of his wife, onto an unsafe platform close to the pond. The second is that so positioning the wheelchair was necessary if one were planning to stage a murder as an accidental drowning. In the absence of any persuasive reason to innocently expose his wife to that risk the second inference is a reasonable one. However, whether or not it is ultimately drawn must await on evaluation of the totality of the prosecution case. 174 As to the way in which the wheelchair entered the pond, the appellant did not provide a cogent explanation for how this occurred. The appellant said he was holding the handles and attempting to move the wheelchair away from the pond in a north-easterly direction when the wheelchair suddenly moved in a southerly direction and into the pond. Thus, he provided the inherently unlikely explanation that by applying force to the wheelchair in a north-easterly direction, he caused it to topple in a southerly direction. When confronted by Newbury with the difficulties in this version of events, the appellant was unable to provide any explanation as to how the wheelchair ended up in the water. 175 While it is to be accepted that the appellant was being questioned in the aftermath of a traumatic event and may well have been suffering from tiredness and confusion, the fact remains that his account did not withstand scrutiny. 176 The appellant’s explanation that Mrs Dansie, by releasing the brakes, caused the wheelchair to move quickly and fall into the pond was also contradicted by the evidence relating to the condition of the wheelchair. Since the wheelchair’s brakes were effectively inoperative, their release could not cause the wheelchair to move suddenly or contribute to its descent into the pond. It is plausible that the appellant had to exert some force to move the wheelchair from a stationary position due to its underinflated tyres and his wife’s weight. In those circumstances, the appellant may have had the impression that the brakes were engaged, leading him to instruct his wife to release them, as he asserted in his interviews. However, irrespective of whether that was in fact the case, it remains unlikely that the application of force in a north-easterly direction would have caused the wheelchair to fall in a southerly direction and into the pond. 177 In support of the submission that there was an innocent explanation for how the appellant accidentally pushed the wheelchair into the pond, the appellant relied on the analysis by Nicholson J, where three scenarios were outlined. They were as follows:75 • If the front wheels of the wheelchair had been positioned on Rock B, and the appellant pushed the wheelchair to the east before turning in a 75 Dansie v The King [2020] SASCFC 103 at [348]-[350] per Nicholson J. -- 64 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 63 north-easterly direction, the front wheel would have had to negotiate a gap between Rock B and Rock C, along with a drop in elevation. This might have impeded the left-hand front wheel and caused the right-hand front wheel to drop off the edge of Rock B into the gap between it and Rock C, causing the wheelchair to de-stabilise while the appellant was pushing it. • One of the front wheels could have been suddenly prevented from moving (presumably, because it was wedged or stuck in the gap between the two rocks) while the other front wheel remained free to move. This could have occurred as the appellant pushed the wheelchair, causing the rear of the wheelchair to yaw towards the pond whereupon the rear wheels might have slid on the wet rock, resulting in the wheelchair toppling, rear wheels first, into the pond. • The right front wheel was wedged between the rocks, causing resistance when the appellant pushed the right-hand side of the wheelchair. Simultaneously, the left-hand wheel may have encountered less resistance, leading the appellant to push on the left-hand side with less hindrance. This imbalance could have caused the wheelchair to topple to the right and into the pond. 178 It should be noted that the appellant did not describe any of these scenarios when attempting to explain the wheelchair’s entry into the pond to police. The only mention was at one point when he said that he ‘thought [the wheelchair] was … wedged under [the] rock’. Nor were any of the above-mentioned scenarios put by defence counsel in his closing address to the trial Judge. However, they were pressed upon this Court as part of the appellant’s broader submission that upon this Court’s independent review of all the evidence there was a rational hypothesis consistent with innocence and it was not open to the trial Judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt. 179 The gap between Rock B and Rock C was estimated by Newbury to range between 10 and 15 centimetres. This was not a relatively large gap and there was no significant decline in elevation. Mrs Dansie weighed 117 kilograms. The scenarios described by Nicholson J, and expressly adopted by the appellant, are to our minds unlikely, albeit possible. The appellant would still have to exert considerable force to make the wheelchair, with Mrs Dansie weighing 117 kilograms seated in it, topple over in the opposite direction from his intended direction of travel and into the pond. There were also the adverse inferences to be drawn from the appellant’s decision to place the wheelchair on Rock B, perilously close to the water’s edge, despite there being safer spots available from which Mrs Dansie could have viewed ducks. Moreover, he purportedly left the pond and Rock B by pushing the wheelchair in a west-east direction across the gap between Rock B and Rock C, when a simpler alternative would have been to pull the wheelchair back and move it east (or left). The scenarios also had to be considered in light of the appellant’s subsequent failure to save his wife from drowning, which we turn to next, along with other evidence adduced on the prosecution case. -- 65 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 64 180 It is important to recognise that that the evidence as to how the wheelchair entered the pond was but one body of evidence put against the appellant. The evidence was not to be considered in a piecemeal fashion; rather, it was necessary for this Court to consider all the evidence presented by both the prosecution and defence. This includes, of course, the appellant’s denials, innocent explanations, and any submissions put forward on behalf of the appellant as to a hypothesis consistent with innocence. 181 It is difficult to give the appellant’s exculpatory account to police of his conduct after entering the pond, and his attempts to save his wife from drowning any weight. The appellant explained that he was in the water for 20 minutes ‘trying to get her out’ of the pond. Yet, he is unable to account for much of the time he spent in the water. Some allowance must be made for panic, and it is feasible that, in the aftermath of such an event, he may have struggled to articulate his actions with any specificity. However, he does not account during the 000 call or police interviews for much of the 20 minutes he says he spent trying to rescue his wife from drowning. 182 As for the factors the appellant said precluded him from saving Mrs Dansie from drowning, his explanations were directly contradicted or undermined by other objective evidence. He said that the ‘biggest struggle’ was the ‘cold and depth’ and mentioned that he dragged Mrs Dansie to the side but it ‘wasn’t any shallower’. He described facing jets of water, noting that every time he would ‘try and do something’, he was met with ‘getting hit by jets of water. They were bloody cold’. There was uncontested evidence that the pond’s depth at its deepest point ranged from 1.1 metres to 1.15 meters. Mr Giles, the ambulance officer, observed the appellant, measuring between 182 centimetres and 185 centimetres in height, and noted that he was only wet up to ‘about his belly button’. Considering the water temperature on the following day was about 18 degrees Celsius, it was unlikely to be ‘freezing’ or extremely cold. Additionally, the water from the jets landed in a small and confined area, some distance from Rock C, near where the appellant said he tried to save Mrs Dansie. 183 The appellant also said that his ‘first thought’ and primary concern was to get Mrs Dansie out of the pond, and this was the central focus of his efforts to save her. He said he was trying to ‘move her over to where I could get her out and in fact I couldn’t I had trouble getting out of there’. Although he acknowledged he could have supported her head to keep it above water, he explained that he was concentrating on getting her out of the pond. 184 The appellant told police that he did not remain in the pond attempting to keep her face out of the water because he thought Mrs Dansie would not ‘last very long in that sort of climate’. According to the appellant, Mrs Dansie was ‘too heavy’ to get out of the pond. 185 Mrs Dansie was not completely physically incapacitated; she could stand with assistance. Further, the appellant had experience assisting her, as seen in the -- 66 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 65 CCTV footage taken at the nursing home earlier that day depicting the appellant getting her out of her wheelchair and into his vehicle. While the evidence from the CCTV footage revealed the physical capabilities of Mrs Dansie and the appellant, in the context of a ‘controlled situation’ on land without any of the attending elements of panic or stress, the evidence still undermined the cogency of the appellant’s account. Mrs Dansie was physically capable, with assistance, of bearing weight, and the appellant was aware of that fact. 186 Moreover, the bottom of the pond was concrete, albeit with some ‘silty mud covering it’. It did not provide a particularly unstable platform for the appellant or Mrs Dansie to stand. The pond’s small circumference meant that the appellant did not need to move Mrs Dansie far, wherever she was positioned in the pond, to place her near its edge. According to the unchallenged evidence of the pathologist, she would have also been more buoyant in the water. The water lapped at the edge of the pond meaning it would not have been difficult to roll or lift Mrs Dansie from the water over the edge of the pond once at its edge. 187 More significantly, it was not necessary for the appellant to get Mrs Dansie out of the pond to prevent her from drowning. There were other options readily available to the appellant, and to our minds, obvious to any person faced with his situation. Those options included keeping her head above water, while he pulled her the short distance to the edge of the pond where she could hold onto the edge while he exited the pond and called emergency services. Importantly, the appellant did not give an account of attempting to hold his wife on her back so that her mouth and nose were above the water. It can be inferred that he did not do so, from his statements that he did not remember seeing his wife face up and that it did not occur to him to give his wife CPR. His failure to do so stands in stark contrast with his claims to police to have the capacity to act decisively in emergencies, which he attributed to his training as a commercial pilot. 188 The pond was not deep, and there was no reason Mrs Dansie could not stand in it while holding onto the edge. The bottom of the pond was a stable concrete platform, and she was not out of her depth or completely physically incapacitated. 189 Notwithstanding the appellant’s explanations, his failure to save his wife from drowning supported the prosecution case that he had deliberately pushed her wheelchair into the pond with the intention of killing her. Otherwise, why not save her? In reaching that conclusion, we have not overlooked the appellant’s submissions on this topic that he was obese and unfit and had difficulty himself getting in and out of the pond. Notwithstanding those submissions, we consider his poor physical condition would not have significantly undermined his ability to enter the water, move his wife to the side of the pond, or keep her head above water. Furthermore, it was a small pond; the water, even with knees flexed, would not have been above his shoulders, and the floor of the pond was made of concrete. Additionally, while Mrs Dansie was a heavy woman, she would, in fact, be more buoyant in water. -- 67 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 66 190 We have also considered the appellant’s submission that if Mrs Dansie’s entry into the pond and subsequent death was an accident, it followed that the appellant would likely experience a degree of panic. This panic may lend itself to illogical or less than rational reactions by the appellant, such as not having the presence of mind to keep her head out of the water. It might also impair his ability to later give a complete or coherent account of events. That may be so, but what was required from the appellant to save his wife involved rudimentary actions that would not demand a high level of ‘presence of mind’ from someone familiar with her physical capabilities. 191 We have also considered the appellant’s submission that whether there was more that could objectively have been done by him to save his wife is not to the point, except insofar as it bears on his intention. So much is true, however, as discussed above, the appellant’s explanations for why he did not do more to save his wife from drowning are undermined by other objective evidence. Further, his failure to take obvious and straightforward actions which would have saved his wife from drowning reflects adversely on his state of mind and the question of whether he deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with the requisite specific intention to kill his wife. Lies 192 Upon our independent review of the recordings of the police interviews, we are satisfied that the appellant told several false statements that were deliberate untruths or lies. First, he lied about the circumstances in which he left his Armani wrist watch in the vehicle. The appellant said during his interview with Munn that he took off his watch to work on his vehicle. Later, during his interview at the Gardens with Newbury, he said that ‘today I got replacement belts … I was going to fix those before I picked Helen up so I took my watch off and put it in the car’. While it is true that earlier that morning, on 16 April 2017 at 11:49am, the appellant purchased two fanbelts at Supercheap Auto, the CCTV from the nursing home showed that he was wearing a watch when he collected Mrs Dansie from the nursing home on the afternoon of 16 April 2017. Additionally, CCTV footage from the OTR store at Woodville from 3:39pm on that day showed the appellant wearing a watch. We are satisfied that the appellant’s untrue statements about his watch were deliberate given he provided essentially the same false explanation to two police officers during separate interviews. Moreover, he was being questioned about an event that had only recently occurred, which makes it unlikely that he simply forgot he removed his watch after collecting Mrs Dansie or was confused about when he took it off. The appellant’s lie about his watch and the method and timing of its telling, immediately after describing that he had left his watch in the car, combine to deny his exculpatory accounts of any appreciable weight. 193 The appellant also told a deliberate untruth as to being treated poorly by police when speaking with Ms Monfries. As much was conceded at trial, and his account of his poor treatment by police was detailed and contradicted by the evidence of his police interviews. -- 68 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 67 194 The evidence that the appellant deliberately minimised his relationship with ‘Sophia’ was also convincing. Initially, he said that she was ‘an interesting person and by interesting I mean ... not to get into bed with’. This statement was contradicted by the QQ messages between the appellant and Sophia, as well as his travel arrangements which indicated he intended to meet up with her after Mrs Dansie’s death, and his travel bags which contained items indicating he intended to pursue an intimate relationship with her. The appellant’s latter concession that some of his conversations with Sophia were ‘steamy’ or ‘risqué’ was not made until after police told him they intended to search his home for items including his computers. By this stage, it must have been obvious to him that an examination of his computers by police would inevitably reveal the content of the messages between himself and Sophia. 195 Furthermore, the appellant told police that Sophia was ‘the only one’ he was speaking with, yet he was also communicating with someone named ‘Rose’. To that extent, the appellant understated his interest in pursuing other sexual relationships. The fact that the appellant lied to police and minimised his relationship with Sophia, as well as his interest in pursuing other relationships, also deny his exculpatory accounts any material weight. 196 It was not suggested at trial, nor on appeal, that the appellant’s lies were evidence of his guilt and we have not used the evidence for this purpose. The appellant’s demeanour 197 We have listened to the recording of the 000 call and watched the video recordings of all the police interviews in their entirety. It was common ground at trial, and during this appeal hearing, that the appellant was largely unemotional during the police interviews and displayed an absence of distress about Mrs Dansie’s death and his role in it. That much is clear from the recordings. The stark nature of his failure to display any genuine emotion was compounded by his lengthy discussions of various extraneous matters, which often seemed tangential or entirely irrelevant to the questions asked by police. 198 The prosecution alleged that the appellant’s demeanour during the police interviews was ‘unusual’ and was not what might normally be expected from a person who had accidentally caused the death of his wife; and to that extent it supports the case of murder. Upon our independent review of the evidence, we are not prepared to draw any adverse inference against the appellant from his demeanour during the 000 call or the police interviews; that is, from the absence of any distress or by his discussion of various extraneous matters in the aftermath of his wife’s death. There exists a broad spectrum of human responses to the death of a family member or spouse, making it impossible to define what reaction is ‘unusual’ or to be ‘expected’. Some persons reveal their emotions more readily than others. Some persons may also have a delayed reaction to a traumatic event. There may be a vast array of different responses to any one traumatic event. We do not think the appellant’s lack of distress is a matter which supports the -- 69 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 68 prosecution case, even when viewed collectively as part of a broader body of evidence adduced to show the deterioration in the appellant’s relationship with his wife. It is simply too difficult to determine how a person would normally react in these unusual circumstances to draw any adverse inference from the appellant’s lack of emotion or discussion of various extraneous matters in the aftermath of his wife’s death. Anticipatory Conduct 199 There was a significant body of evidence of the appellant’s conduct leading up to April 2017 which suggests that the appellant had anticipated the death of his wife. 200 First, the unchallenged evidence that the appellant searched the internet seven times on 12 March 2017 and once on 18 March 2017 about funerals76 was of some significance. This occurred about one month prior to Mrs Dansie’s death, and when she was in relatively good health. This was not a single internet search but numerous searches on the internet, relatively close in time to her death and undertaken during a period when the appellant was under pressure from the Public Advocate, and at a time when he was searching the internet for items associated with a new sexual relationship. We do not consider persuasive the defence submission at trial, reiterated on appeal, that only weeks before the searches there had been two deaths and funerals in Mrs Dansie’s wider family, and that this provided an explanation for the appellant’s interest in funerals. Nor do we consider that this fact alone, or in combination with the appellant and Mrs Dansie’s respective ages and infirmities, might naturally invoke an interest by the appellant in funeral arrangements. 201 The timing of the internet searches is important. On 18 March 2017, the appellant searched for ‘sexy 6-inch stiletto heel shoes for sale’ about one minute before searching for ‘blackwell funerals glenside.’ The searches were in relatively quick succession suggesting both matters were on his mind at relatively the same time indicating there was a connection between the two topics. 202 The evidence of the appellant’s searches for ‘funerals’ shows that in the month preceding Mrs Dansie’s drowning, the appellant was contemplating her death at a time when there was no medical reason to do so. It supports the prosecution case that the appellant’s actions in pushing the wheelchair into the pond were deliberate. 203 Second, the evidence that after leaving the OTR convenience store and entering the Gardens with Mrs Dansie, the appellant removed his watch and left it in the car along with his wallet containing about $400 must also be given weight in support of the prosecution case. He also had a change of clothes in his car for himself but not Mrs Dansie. The appellant gave no explanation for why he left his watch in the car. As to his clothes, he said that he left his home early that day in 76 See Trial Exhibit P41; Trial Exhibit P42. -- 70 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 69 shorts and a T-shirt, expecting to stay out until evening. He said that keeping a change of clothes (long trousers and a jumper) in the car was a regular practice for him. Notwithstanding this explanation, the finding of all the items in his vehicle, with no explanation for why he left his watch in the vehicle, suggests that the appellant believed he was going to get wet while in the Gardens. 204 Third, there was evidence that the appellant had tested the water depth of all other rockpools in the Gardens; it was only the water depth of the pond that he had not tested. The water in the pond in which Mrs Dansie drowned was of the greatest depth of all rockpools in the Gardens. Additionally, there was evidence that from 17 March 2017, the appellant took his wife out more regularly than during the corresponding period in the previous year. This body of evidence supports the inference that he was considering a location and opportunities to kill his wife prior to 16 April 2017. We have not overlooked the appellant’s submission that if he was taking his wife on outings for this purpose, he would hardly make a record of it. However, countering that submission is the fact that the nursing home strictly enforced a requirement for outings be recorded in a written log, and the appellant may well not have given sufficient thought to how these records might be perceived later. 205 As to the appellant’s submission that the absence of a pre-planned explanation for his wife’s death, in which he would have feigned distress, pointed towards accident and is inconsistent with the prosecution case of a planned, premeditated murder, we do not consider this submission persuasive. It is important to recognise that the appellant did provide an explanation for his wife’s drowning; it was simply that police challenged the details of his account whereupon it became increasingly apparent to both police and the appellant himself that his version of events did not withstand scrutiny. For example, he acknowledged the difficulties with his explanation of how he pushed the wheelchair into the pond, admitting, ‘I see the problem’. 206 To our minds, the fact the appellant gave a flawed explanation to police in which he displayed limited emotion and ultimately failed to provide a coherent or convincing explanation does not undermine the prosecution case of a premeditated murder. Instead, it is equally consistent with a person who, due to an arrogant disposition or an unfounded confidence in his own ability to deceive, did not fully appreciate the difficulties with his version of events until it was tested by police during numerous interviews. Motive 207 The appellant had two clear motives to commit the offence. First, the appellant had a financial motive to kill his wife. The evidence on this topic needs to be viewed in the context of his increasingly strained relationship with the Public Advocate. By mid-March 2017, the Public Advocate had advised him that she may review the administration order and undertake an investigation into Mrs Dansie’s finances. An application was filed with SACAT to vary the Guardianship Order to -- 71 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 70 make the Public Advocate the sole guardian and have the Public Trustee appointed to manage her finances on 28 March 2017, listed for hearing in July 2017. Additionally, the appellant was aware by mid-March that the Public Advocate was considering moving Mrs Dansie into a different nursing home, at increased cost. 208 After Ms Rozman assumed the position of Public Advocate, there was increased focus on the appellant’s treatment of his wife. He was challenged by the Public Advocate about his refusal to pay for the cost of her attending the funerals of her brother and cousin. Additionally, her need for eyeglasses and physiotherapy were raised with him. The Public Advocate was giving consideration to moving her to a more comfortable nursing home at an additional cost. Furthermore, there was the prospect, if unsuccessful in the SACAT proceedings, that he would lose sole control of her finances to the Public Trustee. 209 While it is to be accepted that there was no evidence that the appellant did not provide an adequate level of care to his wife, there was evidence that there was an increasing level of scrutiny of Mrs Dansie’s care and living conditions in the months and weeks preceding her death. The matter was to be the subject of litigation, which would have cost implications for the appellant and could result in him losing control of her finances. Moreover, if moved to another nursing home, there would be additional costs. 210 The appellant was preoccupied with his dispute with the Public Advocate (whom he referred to as the ‘new girl’), as shown in his ongoing discussion of the topic during the police interviews. He repeatedly returned to the issue, often in a non-responsive way to the questions asked of him. Mrs Dansie’s death put an end to his dispute with the Public Advocate and removed the cost of legal proceedings in SACAT, as well as the potentially adverse financial implications of an unsuccessful result. 211 The appellant also stood to receive significant financial benefits upon Mrs Dansie’s accidental death. These included: being able to claim $15,000 from Freedom Insurance; receiving a pension for the term of his life equivalent to two-thirds of that payable to his wife had she lived; and the three properties held in joint names would revert to him. We have not overlooked the submissions that the appellant considered himself a ‘wealthy man’ and had no obvious need for an injection of money. However, the financial benefits he stood to receive upon his wife’s death were relatively significant. Furthermore, her death put an end to SACAT proceedings, which would have potentially resulted in additional costs and a loss of his control over her finances. 212 The appellant also had a relationship motive to commit the offence; that is, his interest in pursuing a sexual relationship with other women, in particular ‘Sophia’. The content of the messages between the appellant and Sophia, combined with his internet searches for ‘sexy heels’, revealed the intimate nature of their association. Furthermore, the appellant had his sister maintain contact with Sophia after his wife’s death, and he arranged to travel to China to meet up with -- 72 of 73 -- [2024] SASCA 26 The Court 71 her. The contents of his travel suitcase support the inference that his interest in Sophia was sexual. As to the appellant’s submission that he did not need to kill his wife to pursue extra-marital affairs, and many persons conduct such liaisons without resorting to murder, so much is true, but it would have been difficult for the appellant to pursue a sexual relationship with a woman who lived in China while remaining the husband, carer, and legal guardian of his wife. Moreover, divorcing his wife would have had financial implications, and to that extent, the financial and relationship motives are interconnected. 213 We have considered the appellant’s submission that if he was subjectively motivated to commit the offence for financial and personal reasons, he would not have engaged in post-offence conduct which drew attention to those motives. However, contrary to this submission the appellant’s post offence conduct in making his insurance claims and arranging to travel to China in fact underscored his motives to commit the offence. 214 Following our independent review of all the evidence, including the appellant’s denials and version of events provided to emergency services personnel and during the police interviews, and after having regard to the submissions of both parties, we are satisfied the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence of murder. We are satisfied as a result of our own assessment of the whole of the evidence adduced at trial that the only rational inference available on the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with an intention to kill his wife. Conclusion 1. We grant permission to appeal but dismiss the appeal. -- 73 of 73 --