MARIYA SHMANDIY In Person via AVL v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2024] SASCA 90

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MCINTYRE) SCCRM-24-000504 Applicant: MARIYA SHMANDIY In Person via AVL Respondent: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Counsel: MR S RANIERI - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 26/07/2024 File No/s: SCCRM-24-026411 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. SHMANDIY v POLICE (No 2) [2024] SASCA 90 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (ex tempore) (The Honourable Acting Chief Justice Livesey and the Honourable Justice David) 26 July 2024 TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - ALCOHOL AND DRUG RELATED OFFENCES APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - REPORT OF TRIAL JUDGE, APPEAL BOOK, TRANSCRIPT ETC The applicant seeks leave to appeal the decision of a single judge (the appeal judge), which dismissed her appeal for want of prosecution, against a conviction by a magistrate for driving a motor vehicle whilst there was a prescribed concentration of alcohol in her blood, contrary to s 47B(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA). On 30 January 2021 the applicant was stopped by police whilst driving a motor vehicle and subjected to an alcotest and then breath analysis test which yielded a positive reading of 0.51 grams of alcohol per 100ml of blood. The applicant requested a blood test kit and the blood sample taken contained not less than 0.027 grams of alcohol per 100ml of blood. The applicant maintained that where the only analysis of her blood gave a reading beneath the prescribed concentration, proof of the blood test result was, without more, sufficient to see her acquitted. The magistrate rejected this approach as misapprehended. The applicant failed to appear or explain her non-appearance before the appeal judge. As a result, her appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. The applicant is not legally represented and raised six grounds of appeal. Each ground complained of error by the magistrate. Although the applicant was given the opportunity to identify grounds which related to the decision of the appeal judge, she did not do so. -- 1 of 12 -- Separately, the applicant applied for the audio recordings of the hearings before the appeal judge which she did not attend. The applicant was provided with the transcript of these hearings and invited to explain why the audio recordings were sought, as they are not routinely supplied, and where the transcripts were not accurate. The applicant refused to do so. HELD (the Court) dismissing the application for the audio recordings, and refusing permission to appeal with costs: 1. There is nothing in the correspondence or other matters relied on by the applicant which demonstrates that there is any tenable basis to go behind the transcript of the hearings requested by the applicant. 2. Audio recordings are typically made so as to assist in the preparation of a transcript. They remain the property of the Court. It should not be assumed that there will be any material difference between an audio recording and the transcript of a hearing. Audio recordings do not come within s 131(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and are not to be supplied to enable an applicant to discover whether there is a point to be made. The applicant has failed to demonstrate any legitimate forensic purpose in obtaining the audio recordings of the hearings she did not attend. Her application must be dismissed. 3. It was appropriate for the appeal judge to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution in the absence of any explanation from the applicant for her failures to appear. 4. The applicant has not identified any point of law or principle of general importance, nor has she demonstrated that a clear injustice has occurred. Importantly, the applicant has not demonstrated any arguable basis for finding that the appeal judge erred in dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution, or in failing to find error in the approach of the magistrate. Permission to appeal must be refused. District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 54; Joint Criminal Rule 2022 (SA) rr 185.3, 188.3, 196.2; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 51; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 47B; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) ss 50, 131; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 1.6, 2.1, referred to. Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404; Brawn v The King (2022) 141 SASR 465; Carter v Hayes (1994) 61 SASR 451; Draoui v Le & Ors [2021] SASCA 33; DT v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection [2022] SASCA 59; Gassy v The King [2023] SASCA 90; Hunt v De Pinto (1995) 63 SASR 402; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; Martincic & Anor v Ethnic Broadcasters Inc [2024] SASCA 33; Oatley v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] SASCA 108; Police v Shmandiy [2023] SAMC 166; Registrar v Channel 9 South Australia Pty Ltd [2001] SASC 3; Sambastian v Police [2024] SASCA 79, considered. -- 2 of 12 -- SHMANDIY v POLICE (No 2) [2024] SASCA 90 Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey A/CJ and David JA THE COURT (ex tempore): Introduction 1 The Court has before it two matters. The first is an application dated 1 July 2024 by which the applicant seeks audio recordings for hearings before a single Judge on 29 April and 17 May 2024. On those dates a single judge heard the applicant’s appeal from a conviction entered by a Magistrate for driving a motor vehicle whilst there was a prescribed concentration of alcohol in her blood, contrary to s 47B(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA).1 2 It will be necessary to return to those hearings. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the applicant failed to attend them and, on 17 May 2024, the appeal judge dismissed the matters before her, including the appeal. 3 The second matter before this Court is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the appeal judge dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution. The appeal to the Court of Appeal is only by permission.2 An extension of time is required. Despite being given an opportunity to address the appeal and the question of permission in writing, the applicant refused, insisting on her right to receive the audio recordings. Nonetheless the Court had the benefit of the applicant’s oral submissions today. 4 For the following reasons, the application must be dismissed and permission to appeal refused. The application for audio recordings 5 The application dated 1 July 2024 is said to be made pursuant to the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) but no particular rule is relied on. The affidavit affirmed by the applicant in support dated 29 June 2024 merely asserts that the applicant is entitled to these recordings because she was provided with similar material by the Magistrates Court. The applicant also says that “a precedent has been set by a lower court” and that the “courts have made their own admission by providing me with … an audio recording”. 1 Decision of Magistrate Sale delivered on 15 December 2023, Police v Shmandiy [2023] SAMC 166. 2 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 50(4)(a)(ii) and the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA), r 196.2(2)(b). Under the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), rr 1.6 and 2.1, this is an “excluded proceeding” which includes a criminal proceeding against a person for an offence. As for the requirements for permission to appeal, see Sambastian v Police [2024] SASCA 79, [4] (Livesey A/CJ and Bleby JA); Oatley v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] SASCA 108, [39] (Livesey P, Lovell JA and Stanley AJA). -- 3 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 2 6 The applicant’s affidavit records that she was advised by the Acting Criminal Appeals Coordinator that audio recordings are not made available. 7 Before the hearing of this application the applicant was given assistance concerning her application and her appeal. In particular, on 2 July 2024 the applicant was asked to address the following matters in writing: 1. The reason why the audio recordings are sought, as they are not routinely supplied. 2. Whether the attached transcript [of the hearings on 29 April and 17 May 2024] is sufficient for your purposes and, if not, why not. 3. Whether an appeal is to be pursued and, if so, the likely grounds of appeal. 8 In addition to the transcript, the applicant was provided with a settled version of the appeal judge’s reasons which were delivered ex tempore on 17 May 2024. 9 In response to this correspondence, the applicant filed her grounds of appeal (addressed later in these reasons) and gave the following response: The grounds for requesting the audio recordings are sought because I believe that the transcript provided is not true and not accurately reflecting what happened in the court room as identified to me by the witnesses attending the court hearings on those dates. I will also require these hearings to be able to prepare for my appeal to ensure that I am not disadvantaged as a Self Represented Litigant, and furthermore to be certain that the judicial code of conduct was upheld by both parties to ensure a fair trial. 10 The applicant also referred to her affidavit dated 29 June 2024, which has already been addressed. As the applicant was unrepresented, further assistance was given in the form of further questions which the applicant was invited to address. Those questions were sent to the applicant on 4 July 2024: 1. Are you in a position to provide particulars or evidence addressing what you say represent the instances (if any) where the transcript is not accurate? If so, what is the evidence and what are those instances? 2. Your grounds of appeal address errors by the magistrate. The grounds do not suggest error on the part of the appeal judge. If an error is alleged, what is that error? 11 In sending this correspondence, the Court was minded to assist an unrepresented litigant whilst, at the same time, refrain from advising the litigant or undermine the need for the Court to maintain its impartiality.3 The applicant’s response was as follows: 1. I am not at liberty to disclose anything outside of the courtroom, including statements from the witnesses who were present at the specified hearings. 3 Martincic & Anor v Ethnic Broadcasters Inc [2024] SASCA 33, [21]-[24] (Livesey P) citing Gassy v The King [2023] SASCA 90, [33]-[37] (Livesey P, David JA and Stein AJA). -- 4 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 3 Your persistent avoidance to release public information that lawfully belongs to me as a defendant (court hearing audio to replace defective transcript provided by the court) further suggests a probable cause of internal cover up and lack of fundamental transparency and principles of fairness that, I say, is undermining public confidence in the judicial system. Otherwise please provide me with the relevant statute that you are relying on to withhold court hearing audio recordings from me, by preventing me from building my defence as a Self-Represented litigant. 2. My Grounds of Appeal are already addressed in Form 183De which was submitted to the court on 18 June 2024, please refer to this application for the complete argument. I also reserve my right to amend this application and Form 183Se after I receive the audio recordings for the requested hearings which have still not been provided to me by the court up to this date. On the grounds of this, I cannot provide any further details. 12 The applicant has failed to demonstrate any tenable basis to go behind the transcript of the hearings on 29 April and 17 May 2024. Those were hearings which, it will be recalled, the applicant did not attend. 13 Audio recordings are made so as to assist in the preparation of a transcript. They remain the property of the Court. They are only kept for a closed period, typically twelve months. In lower courts and tribunals transcripts are not routinely prepared and so audio recordings may be made available instead of a transcript of evidence.4 Nonetheless, audio recordings do not form part of the formal record of the Court. Unlike a transcript or any process forming part of the court’s record, audio recordings are not available on application by any member of the public. They fall outside the scope of s 131(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and, like the material addressed in s 131(2), will only be supplied with the permission of the Court:5 131—Accessibility to court records (1) Subject to this section, the court must, on application by any member of the public, allow the applicant to inspect or obtain a copy of— (aa) any process relating to proceedings and forming part of the court’s records; (a) a transcript of evidence taken by the court in any proceedings; (b) any documentary material admitted into evidence in any proceedings; (c) a transcript of submissions by counsel; 4 Alternatively, on an appeal the parties may identify the parts of the transcript of evidence required for the purposes of an appeal, following which the Principal Registrar will request the court of first instance to produce a transcript: Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA), rr 188.3 and 185.3(1)(h). 5 See, to similar effect, the District Court Act 1991 (SA), s 54, and the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 51, and Registrar v Channel 9 South Australia Pty Ltd [2001] SASC 3, [43]-[44] (Gray J), a case involving contempt of court. -- 5 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 4 (d) a transcript of the judge’s summing up or directions to the jury, in a trial by jury; (e) a transcript of reasons for judgment (including remarks made by the court on passing sentence); (f) a judgment or order given or made by the court. (2) A member of the public may inspect or obtain a copy of the following material only with the permission of the court: (a) material that was not taken or received in open court; (b) material that the court has suppressed from publication; (ba) sensitive material in the custody of the court; (c) material placed before the court during sentencing proceedings; (d) documentary material filed in connection with committal proceedings; (e) a transcript of any oral evidence taken at committal proceedings; (f) a photograph, slide, film, video tape, audio tape or other form of recording from which a visual image or sound can be produced; (fa) a report prepared to assist the court in determining a person’s eligibility for, or progress in, an intervention program (within the meaning of the Bail Act 1985 or the Sentencing Act 2017 or the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009); (g) material of a class prescribed by the regulations. (3) The court may permit inspection or copying of material referred to in subsection (2) subject to any of the following conditions: (a) a condition that material that is sensitive material will be available for examination under the supervision of the court at a place specified in the notice and at a time to be arranged; (b) a condition limiting the publication or use of the material; (c) any other condition that the court considers appropriate. (4) A decision by the court on an application under this section is administrative and is final and not subject to any form of review. (4a) Despite the preceding subsections, if 100 years have passed since the end of the calendar year in which material referred to in this section became part of the court’s records— (a) in the case of records that have been delivered into the custody of State Records—section 26 of the State Records Act 1997 applies (to the exclusion of this section) to the giving of access to the records; and -- 6 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 5 (b) in any other case—a member of the public may, without any requirement to seek permission of the court, be given access to the records. (5) The court may charge a fee, fixed by regulation, for inspection or copying of material under this section. (6) In this section— sensitive material—see section 67H of the Evidence Act 1929. 14 It should not be assumed that there will be any material difference between an audio recording and the transcript of a hearing notwithstanding that, from time to time, typographical errors may be apparent. Audio recordings are not to be supplied to enable an applicant to discover whether there is a point to be made. This is not a case where, for example, an identifiable and specific issue has arisen in connection with the transcript of ex tempore reasons.6 15 Whilst the position is not precisely the same, there is some analogy to be drawn with the circumstances in which a court will consider whether there is a legitimate forensic purpose in obtaining identified documents on subpoena.7 In this case the applicant has not demonstrated that she is doing any more than speculating about or “fishing” for whether there is any disparity between the audio recording and the transcript of the hearing. That inference is strengthened by the applicant’s refusal to lead or particularise the evidence that she says is available to her regarding those hearings. The Court’s limited resources are not to be expended in connection with what amounts to speculation. 16 The applicant has failed to demonstrate any legitimate forensic purpose in obtaining the audio recordings of the hearings she did not attend. The applicant has the transcript and the settled ruling concerning those hearings. It is not in the interests of justice to go any further. There is no basis for any assertion that public information is being withheld. In those circumstances, the application dated 1 July 2024 must be dismissed. The appeal against the dismissal for want of prosecution 17 By her appeal grounds dated 4 July 2024, the applicant relies on the following grounds of appeal: 1. The appellant’s (amended) appeal is based on the primary grounds, that: a) the Magistrate erred in finding that the evidence of Prosecution was sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the Defendant (Appellant); and 6 Cf Oatley v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] SASCA 108. 7 Cf Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 469, 414-415 (Gibb CJ); Carter v Hayes (1994) 61 SASR 451, 453 (King CJ, with whom Bollen and Mullighan JJ agreed); Hunt v De Pinto (1995) 63 SASR 402, 412 (Perry J); Brawn v The King (2022) 141 SASR 465, [53]-[55]. -- 7 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 6 b) the Magistrate erred in reversing the onus of proof onto the defendant (Appellant) to prove that the breath analysis device was not in proper order and/or operated properly; and c) the Magistrate misled himself as to his functus officio powers to re-open the Prosecution’s case, and; d) that no evidence was presented by Prosecution to show or demonstrate that any documents tendered as ‘evidence’ complied with Schedule 1 of the Regulations e) the Magistrate misled himself as to his position as the presiding judicial officer, when in fact HH was acting as the de facto prosecutor during the trial, and/or f) the evidence provided by the defendant (Appellant) was sufficient to shift the balance of probabilities to establish that at the time of driving that she did not exceed the minimum lawful limit. 18 The applicant contends that this Court should find as follows: 2. Appellant submits that (the Court, in allowing the appeal) ought to find: a) There was insufficient evidence to establish the prosecution had established that the breath analysis device used, had been correctly applied to the appellant’s testing: first ground of conviction is not established. b) The Magistrate erroneously reversed the onus of proof onto the defendant to prove that the breath analyser was not properly operated: first ground is not established. c) There was no evidence as to the operation or proper operation of the breath analyser and it was not open to the Magistrate to find the charge proved. d) An acquittal – must be substituted for the conviction, rather than remittal back to the Magistrates Court for a fresh trial. 19 Though the applicant has not sought permission to appeal, her materials must be treated as an application for permission to appeal.8 The issue for this Court is whether permission to appeal should be granted. That must be determined recognising that this is a second appeal.9 Broadly, it is necessary for the applicant to identify a point of law or principle of general importance or, in exceptional cases, that a clear injustice has occurred. 20 The applicant was invited to identify appeal grounds specific to the ruling made by the appeal judge. Despite having been given that opportunity, she declined to provide any further grounds concerning the ruling made on 17 May 2024. Whilst in many cases the failure by an appeal judge to detect and correct 8 The respondent submitted that even if the appeal judge’s decision was not an interlocutory decision, leave to appeal would be required, Draoui v Le & Ors [2021] SASCA 33, [58]-[59] (Doyle JA, with whom Lovell JA agreed) and the authorities cited in fn 11. 9 Sambastian v Police [2024] SASCA 79, [4] (Livesey A/CJ and Bleby JA). -- 8 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 7 error in the court below is a matter that can be raised in this Court, the starting point remains the detection of error in the decision of the appeal judge. Where an applicant seeking permission to pursue a second appeal fails to identify error by the appeal judge, it will usually be difficult to demonstrate that the case warrants a grant of permission to appeal. The identification of error or injustice is critical to the success of any appeal. 21 As might be expected, the magistrate at first instance proceeded on the basis of statutory presumptions and certificates. That was done in an orthodox manner. The evidence included a certificate of record from the Adelaide Magistrates Court, demonstrating that the applicant had previously been found to have driven with excess blood alcohol which was dealt with on 7 August 2018. This was tendered only to explain why the current alleged offence was not expiated.10 22 The magistrate explained that the unrepresented applicant appeared to be operating under a misapprehension where the alcotest returned a blood alcohol concentration of 0.051 grams, whereas the blood test returned a reading of not less than 0.027 grams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood:11 Throughout the course of the trial and prior to the trial it was apparent that the defendant was labouring under the misapprehension that as the offence charged a prescribed concentration of alcohol in her blood and the only analysis of her blood gave a reading beneath the prescribed concentration, proof of the blood test result was, without more, sufficient to see her acquitted. Throughout the trial the Court attempted to explain the effect of s 47EB, 47K(1) and (1a) to the defendant. The first two create a presumption that once certain procedural conditions are met, the breath analysis concentration of alcohol becomes the blood alcohol concentration. The latter creates a limited means by which the breath analysis concentration can be challenged, namely by a combination of evidence as to the blood alcohol concentration as well as evidence the breath analysis concentration was exaggerated. 23 The magistrate recorded that he explained the effect of the legislation and various authorities, and offered the applicant an adjournment if she wanted to call expert opinion evidence on topics such as whether a “count-back” based on the results of a blood test might shed doubt on the breath analysis evidence. The applicant declined the invitation.12 Respectfully, the magistrate’s approach was considered, careful and fair. 24 As for the operation of the various statutory presumptions and certificates, it was for the applicant to displace their operation by leading or identifying evidence to the contrary:13 There was no evidence placed before me which constituted evidence to the contrary in relation to any of the certificates tendered by the prosecution. I find beyond reasonable doubt that the requirements in s 47K(1) have been met and the presumption that the 10 Police v Shmandiy [2023] SAMC 166, [14] (Sale SM). 11 Police v Shmandiy [2023] SAMC 166, [19] (Sale SM). 12 Police v Shmandiy [2023] SAMC 166, [19]-[21] (Sale SM). 13 Police v Shmandiy [2023] SAMC 166, [39] (Sale SM). -- 9 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 8 concentration of alcohol of 0.051 grams was the concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s blood in the three hours prior to this reading being obtained, which includes her observed driving. As I have previously noted, while there is evidence before me of the analysis of a sample of blood taken in accordance with Schedule 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 there is no evidence before me which would allow me to conclude that the breath analysing instrument gave an exaggerated reading. 25 The applicant appealed, as was her right, to a single judge of the Supreme Court. Her grounds were similar to those earlier set out. 26 The appeal judge recorded that the appeal was initially listed before her on 15 April 2024 to enable an application for disqualification of the appeal judge and an application for an adjournment of the appeal (set for 29 April 2024) to be heard. Those applications were opposed by the respondent. Argument proceeded on 15 April 2024 and the application for disqualification was dismissed. The application to adjourn was deferred to 29 April 2024 to enable the parties to consider audio recordings which had been provided by the Magistrates Court. The parties were advised that if the application for an adjournment was not granted the appeal would proceed, as listed, on 29 April 2024. 27 None of these decisions is the subject of criticism, nor an application for permission to appeal. 28 The applicant was given a copy of the ruling on the disqualification application on 15 April 2024 and, in addition, she was granted leave to appear from Queensland by an audio-visual link. A Webex link was provided by email on 23 April 2024. The applicant did not respond to that email, nor to a further email sent subsequently. 29 The applicant did not attend the hearing on 29 April 2024, whether in person or using the audio-visual link provided. She did not respond to email correspondence nor to calls made to her mobile telephone before that hearing. After the matter was called on, a further unsuccessful attempt was made to contact the applicant. There was no appearance by the applicant. At that hearing orders were made dismissing the application for an adjournment but, paradoxically, the adjournment was effectively granted because the appeal was re-listed for hearing the following month, on 17 May 2024. 30 The applicant was advised of the adjourned hearing date, ordered to attend in person and advised that, should she fail to attend, the appeal would likely be dismissed. A copy of the orders made was sent by email correspondence on 29 April 2024. 31 No response was received from the applicant. Likewise, no response was received to a second email reminding the applicant about the need to attend, the issues which were to be addressed and advising that failure to attend in person would likely result in the appeal being dismissed. -- 10 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 9 32 At the hearing on 17 May 2024 the appeal judge recorded that the applicant had appeared in the Supreme Court by audio-visual link in another matter the previous day.14 However, the applicant did not attend the hearing on 17 May 2024, nor did she provide any explanation for her failures to attend. 33 On 17 May 2024, the appeal judge had the benefit of written submissions provided by the parties (the applicant’s were filed on 15 April 2024). The appeal judge concluded that, in the absence of an explanation from the applicant for her failures to attend, it was appropriate to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. Her Honour added that, having read the grounds of appeal and the written submissions, she took the view that the appeal lacked merit and the prospects of success were minimal. An order for costs was made pursuant to r 191.3(2)(b) of the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA). 34 Today, the applicant has explained that she did not appear before the appeal judge in April or May 2024 because the Elders of this land told her that they would manage her appeal. She said that they had higher jurisdiction over this Court than the colonials do. She said that the appeal judge could not rule on the merits of the appeal because the applicant did not attend the hearing. It may be that the applicant overlooked that the appeal judge had the benefit of her written submissions. 35 This Court has explained that an appeal must usually be pursued with reasonable expedition.15 That was not done here. The applicant has not identified any error by the appeal judge. That conclusion is reinforced by the absence of any arguable appeal ground to demonstrate that the magistrate erred or, more importantly, any arguable basis to demonstrate that the appeal judge erred in dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution, or in failing to find error in the approach of the magistrate. 36 The applicant has not identified any point of law or principle of general importance. She has not demonstrated that a clear injustice has occurred. In all of these circumstances, the applicant has failed to demonstrate any proper basis upon which permission to appeal could be granted. Conclusion 37 The application to obtain the audio recordings of the hearings before the Supreme Court on 29 April and 17 May 2024 is dismissed. 38 The application for permission to appeal the order made by the appeal judge on 17 May 2024, that the appeal to her Honour should be dismissed for want of prosecution, is dismissed. 14 Before Stanley J by AVL in relation to separate judicial review proceedings instigated by the applicant against the Magistrates Court of South Australia. 15 Draoui v Le & Ors [2021] SASCA 33, [78] (Doyle JA, with whom Lovell JA agreed), [127] (Livesey JA). -- 11 of 12 -- [2024] SASCA 90 The Court 10 39 In consequence, there is no utility in granting an extension of time.16 There will be an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $750. 16 Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, 521 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J); DT v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection [2022] SASCA 59, [32] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). -- 12 of 12 --