STEPHEN GROOM In Person v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2023] SASCA 83

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE BLUE) [2023] SASC 18, CIV-21-010913 Appellant: STEPHEN GROOM In Person Respondent: ATTORNEY-GENERAL Counsel: MR B GARNAUT - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 22/06/2023, 01/08/2023 File No/s: CIV-23-002407 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. GROOM v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2023] SASCA 83 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (ex tempore) (The Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice Bleby) 1 August 2023 APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - GENERALLY PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS A domestic violence restraining order was imposed against the appellant in 2011. On 10 February 2023, pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, Justice Blue ordered that Mr Groom be prohibited, without the prior leave of this Court, from instituting proceedings in a prescribed court in relation to the domestic violence restraining order. The appellant appeals that decision, as well as Justice Blue's dismissal of the appellant's interlocutory application seeking a stay of the s 39 proceedings. Held, per the Court, refusing leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal: 1. The appellant was unable to point to any error in Justice Blue's reasons. The grounds of appeal have no merit. 2. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to be agreed or taxed. Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39(1), referred to. Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18, considered. -- 1 of 7 -- -- 2 of 7 -- GROOM v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2023] SASCA 83 Court of Appeal – Civil: Lovell and Bleby JJA 1 THE COURT: In 2011, a domestic violence restraining order was imposed against the appellant, Mr Groom, in the Magistrates Court (the intervention order). The gravamen of Mr Groom’s complaints flow from that decision. He has sedulously sought to overturn that decision but has been unsuccessful despite numerous proceedings and appeals. 2 The Attorney-General commenced proceedings pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Act) seeking to declare Mr Groom a vexatious litigant. The Attorney-General identified at least eight proceedings in connection with the intervention order since 2011, that were instituted by Mr Groom without reasonable grounds. 3 On 10 February 2023, after hearing the application, Blue J ordered that pursuant to s 39 of the Act, Mr Groom be prohibited, without the prior leave of this Court, from instituting proceedings in a prescribed court in relation to the intervention order. Mr Groom appeals against that decision, as well as the dismissal of his interlocutory application seeking a stay of the vexatious litigant proceedings. Background and procedural history 4 The background and procedural history are set out in judgment of Blue J.1 Relevant to this appeal is that, following a referral from the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General commenced the vexatious litigant proceedings on 23 September 2021 pursuant to s 39(1) of the Act. 5 On 3 March 2022, Mr Groom filed an interlocutory application seeking a stay of the vexatious litigant proceedings and a series of declarations in relation to the asserted invalidity of the intervention order. 6 On 26 May 2022, Kourakis CJ directed that the interlocutory application be heard together with the trial of the vexatious litigant application. Mr Groom also appeals that decision. 7 On 28 November 2022, following the hearing of submissions, Blue J gave ex tempore reasons for dismissing the stay sought by the appellant. In his reasons, Blue J identified that the appellant would need to demonstrate that he was bound to succeed on his arguments that the intervention order was invalid before it could follow that a stay should be granted. 1 Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18. -- 3 of 7 -- [2023] SASCA 83 The Court 2 8 Blue J ordered, by consent, that the declarations sought by the appellant in his interlocutory application be treated as a cross-action.2 Blue J proceeded to hear the application to declare Mr Groom a vexatious litigant. 9 On 10 February 2023, Blue J published his reasons for judgment and made the orders the subject of this appeal. In summary, Blue J held: • The intervention order first made on 19 October 2011 was not invalid by reason of any of the matters raised by the appellant.3 • Mr Groom persistently instituted 11 vexatious proceedings between 2014 and 2020 and each was without reasonable grounds.4 • It was appropriate to exercise the Court’s discretion to make an order pursuant to s 39 of the Act as sought by the Attorney-General.5 10 It followed that the application for a stay had no basis. Appeal grounds 11 The appellant’s grounds of appeal are as follows: 1. The judicial officer HH Chief Justice Kourakis in failing to address the Urgent Interlocutory application placed before the court on the 3rd March 2022, and addressing it on the 26th May 2022 at a Directions hearing where he made Orders that the interlocutory be heard together with the Trial for the Vexatious litigant order denied the respondent natural Justice by way of allowing no time for a defence or further action to be taken upon the outcome of the interlocutory, had placed the respondent in a position of disadvantage and denied him natural justice. 2. The Chief Justice HH Chris Kourakis made an error of law in stating that the hearing of a interlocutory related to the criminal section of the court was heard in the civil section of the court. 3. HH Justice Blue Made a error in failing to Adhere to the Magistrate court Act Statutory requirements in upholding that the Magistrates court is a "Court of record" in making his assumptions as to evidence contained or not contained in the court file, The Record shows no sealed complaint and that No trial occurred at the first return and that there is no reason adequate or otherwise for the Adjournment to a PTC some 7 weeks in advance. These assertions amount to a denial of natural Justice for the respondent, and placed the respondent in a position of disadvantage. 4. HH justice Blue made an error at law by failing to address the interference of the court file and evidence therein making the court file "Fatally flawed" 2 Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [74] (Blue J). 3 Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [147] (Blue J). 4 Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [273] and [276] (Blue J). 5 Attorney-General v Groom [2023] SASC 18 at [280] (Blue J). -- 4 of 7 -- [2023] SASCA 83 The Court 3 and reported in the second affidavit of the respondent attached to the interlocutory application. 5. HH Justice Blue erred in failing to request evidence of the viewing of the court file by a Lawyer Casey Isaacs who viewed the court file in 2018 and reported That he could find "no reason for the placing of the order in the first instance" 6. HH Justice Blue erred in failing to correctly interpret the word adequate in section 9 (5) (b) of the DV ACT 1994 and the statutory interpretation of S 9(6) (a) (b) of the DV Act 1994 the matter of the dismissing of the court file if not confirmed 7. HH Justice Blue erred in failing to give weight to the lack of evidentiary material proffered by the CSO in response to the interference of the court file and proof that any sealed complaint existed or reasons for its disappearance from the court file, (ie notes or written records of support) as no evidence was forthcoming then the matter should have been settled in the respondents favour. 8. HH Justice Blue erred in making a Judgement when, following verbal statements had been made from the bar table by the respondent questioning (a) Who was responsible for the Missing evidence from the court file and its effect on any decision forthcoming, (b) that within the court file and discussed in the court there are records of indictable offences (the PPs 2nd Affidavit and that of her Co-worker Perjury) the failure of police to answer court ordered subpoenas (contempt) and interference of the court file by a person or persons unknown (interference with evidence) and (c) the position of the police and CSO in perusing the rebuttle of the applications to revoke and the appeals in regard to their Positions as Premier litigants and agents of the court in the knowledge that the for- mentioned indictable offences had occurred. Can it be assumed that the respondent could ever receive a fair hearing, and natural justice, and were the actions of the Police and CSO malicious? 12 The appellant’s grounds of appeal, as far as they can be understood, can be summarised as follows: 1. Kourakis CJ erred in making a direction on 26 May 2022 that the appellant’s interlocutory application be referred to the hearing listed for trial; 2. Blue J erred by failing to find that the original Magistrates Court file contains no sealed (original) complaint; 3. Blue J erred by failing to find that there was no adequate reason for the adjournment by the Magistrate on 26 October 2011 and therefore in finding that the intervention order continued in force; and -- 5 of 7 -- [2023] SASCA 83 The Court 4 4. Blue J erred in failing to find that the original Magistrates Court file has been interfered with (including by failing to request evidence of a witness who is said to have previously viewed the Court file and failing to give weight to the lack of evidentiary material proffered on behalf of the Attorney-General on this issue) and therefore the appellant has failed to receive a fair hearing. Appellant’s submissions 13 Mr Groom is clearly unhappy with the judicial process and the fact that he has been unsuccessful in challenging the original intervention order despite numerous challenges. Mr Groom, in resisting an order pursuant to s 39, appears to believe it is open to him to re-argue all the unsuccessful appeals in this matter. His submissions on this appeal were almost entirely, if not totally, focussed on all of the factual and legal matters which he had previously challenged, and lost. His submissions before this Court were little more than a re-agitation of finalised matters. 14 Following oral submissions, Mr Groom filed a further affidavit on 24 July 2023, which we accept as further written submissions. Paragraphs 53 and 54 provide: These submissions and undisputed facts along with the interlocutory of the 3rd march 2022 the second affidavit of the 4th July 2022 the appeal of the 3rd March 2023 and the affidavit of the 5th April 2023 now become the basis for the appeal court to adjudicate upon I submit that as without clear recorded facts and records the case of MCPAD 11-6004 and the vexatious litigant application CIV 21-010-913 cannot be decided and therefore the interference of the court file and the criminal actions of the PP and SAPOL members deny the parties any chance to prove what happened, and the court to decide that a that a miscarriage of Justice did or did not occur. This leads to the conclusion that the application for the Vexatious litigant order is a nullity and that the interim order issued on the 19th oct 2011 is "Null and Void Ab initio". Subsequent to the loss of the evidence from within the court file there is the matter of deliberate criminal action by The PP Ms Butler, her co-worker Jones (Police officers) and members of SAPOL it is my submission that upon the undisputed facts that the Crown solicitor should in the interests of justice concede that a Miscarriage of justice had occurred and withdraw their claim. 15 The further written submissions are, in our view, no more than a re-agitation of the matters Mr Groom argued in his previous oral and written submissions before this Court. Respondent’s submissions 16 The respondent submitted that the appellant’s grounds of appeal had no merit. The respondent also submitted that the appellant has not asserted, nor indeed demonstrated on appeal that Blue J erred in finding that the 11 proceedings alleged to be vexatious by the Attorney-General were instituted by the appellant without -- 6 of 7 -- [2023] SASCA 83 The Court 5 reasonable grounds within the meaning of s 39 of the Act, nor that Blue J erred in exercising the discretion to make the prohibition order. Discussion 17 Blue J gave clear and cogent reasons for all of his findings. Mr Groom was either unwilling, or more likely unable, to point to any error in Blue J’s findings other than asserting that he was “wrong”. 18 The Court has taken into account all of the submissions of Mr Groom and the respondent. The respondent’s submissions must be accepted. The appellant was unable to point to any error in Blue J’s decisions other than he did not agree with them. Not liking a Judge’s decision on an issue does not make out a ground of appeal. 19 Grounds 1 and 2 are not arguable. Blue J determined the interlocutory matter before trial. His findings after the full hearing demonstrate that the interlocutory application was doomed to fail. 20 In relation to Grounds 3, 4 and 6, apart from complaining about the decision, Mr Groom was unable to point to any error in the trial Judge’s reasons or reasoning. The grounds have no merit and should be dismissed. 21 Grounds 5, 7 and 8, as far as they can be understood, are simply the appellant complaining that Blue J did not accept his submission that the Court file had been ‘interfered with’. Blue J gave cogent reasons for all of his findings. The appellant was unable to point to any error. The grounds have no merit. Orders 22 Insofar as leave is required for any ground leave to appeal is refused. The other grounds of appeal are dismissed. 23 The appeal is dismissed. 24 The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal to be agreed or taxed. -- 7 of 7 --