ELIANA SAJE AND LISA SAJE -v- THE OWNERS OF 36B THIRD AVENUE, MOUNT LAWLEY STRATA PLAN 21602 [2026] WASC 294

[2026] WASC 294 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : ELIANA SAJE AND LISA SAJE -v- THE OWNERS OF 36B THIRD AVENUE, MOUNT LAWLEY STRATA PLAN 21602 [2026] WASC 294 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 20 JULY 2026 DELIVERED : 24 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : GDA 6 of 2026 BETWEEN : ELIANA SAJE AND LISA SAJE Appellants AND THE OWNERS OF 36B THIRD AVENUE, MOUNT LAWLEY STRATA PLAN 21602 First Respondent HARRY BIGELMAN Second Respondent FILE NO/S : GDA 7 of 2026 BETWEEN : ELIANA SAJE Appellant AND DANIELLE SAMPSON First Respondent CHRISTINE BEVANS Second Respondent -- 1 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 Page 2 WAYNE MARRIOTT Third Respondent FILE NO/S : GDA 8 of 2026 BETWEEN : ELIANA SAJE Appellant AND WAYNE MARRIOTT First Respondent DANIELLE SAMPSON Second Respondent CHRISTINE BEVANS Third Respondent ROBIN LEEN Fourth Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: For File No : GDA 6 of 2026 Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL Coram : MEMBER E CADE File Number : CC 736 of 2024 For File No : GDA 7 of 2026 Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL Coram : MEMBER R PETRUCCI & MEMBER C BARTON File Number : CC 494/2023 and CC 43/2024 -- 2 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 Page 3 For File No : GDA 8 of 2026 Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL Coram : MEMBER C BARTON File Number : CC 99 of 2024 Catchwords: Strata titles - Appeals from the State Administrative Tribunal - Whether questions of law identified - Whether extensions of time ought be granted - Turns on own facts Legislation: State Administrative Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 105 Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), s 47, s 197, s 200 Result: Directions to be made in GDA 6. Extensions of time in GDA 7 and GDA 8 refused and appeals dismissed. Category: B Representation: GDA 6 of 2026 Counsel: Appellants : In Person First Respondent : In Person Second Respondent : In Person Solicitors: Appellants : In Person First Respondent : In Person Second Respondent : In Person -- 3 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 Page 4 GDA 7 of 2026 Counsel: Appellant : In Person First Respondent : In Person Second Respondent : J Burton Third Respondent : In Person Solicitors: Appellant : In Person First Respondent : In Person Second Respondent : Cullen Macleod Lawyers Third Respondent : In Person GDA 8 of 2026 Counsel: Appellant : In Person First Respondent : In Person Second Respondent : In Person Third Respondent : J Burton Fourth Respondent : In Person Solicitors: Appellant : In Person First Respondent : In Person Second Respondent : In Person Third Respondent : Cullen Macleod Lawyers Fourth Respondent : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Engwirda v Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 [2019] WASCA 190 Lourey v LSCC [2023] WASCA 90 Medical Board of Australia v GLP [2025] WASCA 87 Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97 -- 4 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 Page 5 Saje [2026] WASAT 62 Saje and Sampson [2023] WASAT 101 Saje and The Owners of 36B Third Avenue, Mount Lawley Strata Plan 21602 [2026] WASAT 52 Silkchime Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2023] WASCA 114 -- 5 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 Page 6 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 7 Background to the appeals.......................................................................................................... 7 Initial directions hearing ............................................................................................................. 9 The statutory framework .......................................................................................................... 11 GDA 6 of 2026 ......................................................................................................................... 13 Background ........................................................................................................................... 13 Whether leave ought be granted ........................................................................................... 16 GDA 7 of 2026 and GDA 8 of 2026 ........................................................................................ 17 Background to GDA 7 .......................................................................................................... 17 Background to GDA 8 .......................................................................................................... 20 Whether an extension of time ought be granted ................................................................... 22 Conclusion and orders .............................................................................................................. 25 -- 6 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 7 LUNDBERG J: Introduction 1 These reasons concern whether the court should grant an extension of time to the appellants in respect of appeals GDA 7 and GDA 8, both of which have been brought out of time, and whether a question of law has been sufficiently identified for the purposes of appeal GDA 6. The requirements for leave, and for an extension of time, are found in s 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). 2 For the following reasons, I will refuse an extension of time in respect of GDA 7 and GDA 8, and dismiss those appeals. 3 As to GDA 6, I will list that appeal for a further directions hearing to programme the matter to a substantive hearing, with the question whether leave to appeal should be granted being held over to be determined at the final hearing. Background to the appeals 4 The present appeals, which were all initiated on 15 May 2026, concern Strata Plan 21602 (the Strata Plan), which comprises a two storey building situated at 36B Third Avenue, Mount Lawley. It consists of four ground floor residential units (being Lots 1 to 4) and four first floor residential units (being Lots 5 to 8), together with common property. The owners of the lots are identified below. Lot Owner Party 1 Mr Wayne Marriott Respondent in GDA 7 and GDA 8 2 Mr Haim (Harry) Bigelman Respondent in GDA 6 3 Dr Saje and Ms Saje Appellants 4 Ms Danielle Sampson Respondent in GDA 7 and GDA 8 5 Mr Peter Phoenix Not named as a respondent 6 Ms Robin Leen Respondent in GDA 8 7 Ms Christine Bevans Respondent in GDA 7 and GDA 8 8 Ms Leanne Slater Not named as a respondent -- 7 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 8 5 The appellants in these appeals are Dr Eliana Saje and her daughter, Ms Lisa Saje, who are the owners as joint tenants of Lot 3, having purchased that lot on 30 May 2018. Dr Saje is an appellant in each of the appeals (which I will refer to as GDA 6, GDA 7 and GDA 8), while Ms Saje is an appellant in GDA 6 only. 6 It is evident the appellants have, since acquiring Lot 3, initiated numerous applications in the State Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal), raising a broad range of grievances against the strata company and the owners of the other lots, under the provisions of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act). For example, the Member in one of the underlying matters the subject of this appeal stated that: Between March 2022 and February 2024, the first applicant commenced eight other proceedings in respect of the strata plan, these being CC 387/22, CC 549/22, CC 787/22, CC 494/23, CC 1188/23, CC 43/24, CC 99/24 and CC 100/24: Saje and The Owners of 36B Third Avenue, Mount Lawley Strata Plan 21602 [2026] WASAT 52. 7 In broad terms, these disputes have focused on whether long- standing alterations to the common property of the strata complex were properly authorised, but the scope of the various disputes has over time travelled much wider than this. 8 Each of the present appeals involve a challenge to decisions made by the Tribunal in which the underlying applications were brought by the appellants. The details of the appeals and of the proceedings below are identified in the following table: Appeal Tribunal Proceeding Description of the Proceedings GDA 6 CC 736/2024 An application made by Dr Saje and Ms Saje for the resolution of a scheme dispute under s 197(4) of the SAT Act, with the respondent being the strata company. The application was broad ranging, with a focus on brick piers and other works constructed around Lot 2, the hot water system, the bathroom tile replacement costs in Lot 6, and the repair of a garage door in Lot 7, among other matters. See the decision of the Member delivered on 14 May 2026: [2026] WASAT 52. -- 8 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 9 Appeal Tribunal Proceeding Description of the Proceedings GDA 7 CC 494/2023 and CC 43/2024 An application made by Dr Saje under s 47(3) of the ST Act for the enforcement of the scheme by-laws. The initial application concerned the wooden slats or screens built in the courtyard to Lot 4. See the decision of the Member delivered on 31 October 2023: [2023] WASAT 101. See further the decision of the Member delivered on 31 October 2024. GDA 8 CC 99/2024 An application made by Dr Saje for the resolution of a scheme dispute under s 197(4) of the SAT Act with the respondents being the seven other owners of lots in the strata scheme. The application seeks repayment by the strata company of a special contribution levy. See the decision of the Member delivered on 4 July 2024. 9 The proceedings in the Tribunal which are the subject of GDA 6 (being CC 736/2024) were dismissed on 14 May 2026. The proceedings which are the subject of GDA 7 and GDA 8 were determined much earlier, in October 2023 and October 2024, and it may be inferred that the dismissal of CC 736/2024 on 14 May 2026 prompted the appellants, on the following day, to file an appeal against the earlier dismissals as well. 10 However, the appeals in GDA 7 and GDA 8 are well out of time and an extension of time is required in respect of both matters. Initial directions hearing 11 Given the nature of the appeals, the fact the appellants are unrepresented, and the additional documents filed by the appellants soon after they were initiated, the court directed that an initial hearing be scheduled to address certain preliminary issues. 12 On 30 June 2026, the court provided the parties with a communication which indicated that the initial hearing would address a -- 9 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 10 number of matters, including the extension of time application in respect of GDA 7 and GDA 8, the appellants' application in GDA 6 to permit Dr Saje to represent Ms Lisa Saje, and an identification of the 'question of law' said by the appellant(s) to arise in GDA 6, GDA 7 and GDA 8.1 13 The initial directions hearing was held on 20 July 2026. 14 At the hearing Dr Eliana Saje appeared and made submissions on her behalf and on behalf of her daughter. I granted leave for Dr Saje to do so, in the circumstances although, as I indicated at the hearing, that should not be taken as a standing grant of leave for Dr Saje to represent her daughter's interests, bearing in mind her daughter is an adult and has legal capacity. 15 I also heard submissions from several of the respondents, namely from counsel who appeared for Ms Bevans, who has been the owner of Lot 7 since around 1991, and from Mr Bigelman (who purchased Lot 2 in 1991) and Mr Marriott. Both Mr Bigelman and Mr Marriott were unrepresented. Ms Sampson and Ms Leen were present in court but did not formally appear. 16 Subsequent to the hearing, in accordance with directions made by the court, Dr Saje filed statements in each appeal setting out the proposed question or questions of law, which I have now reviewed. The documents were filed on 21 and 22 July 2026. In addition, earlier this morning, the court received a further email communication from Dr Saje clarifying her position in relation to the appeals and as to the orders she had sought by her minute of proposed orders dated 15 July 2026, which narrows the scope of the appeal grounds. Dr Saje's email includes the following statements concerning GDA 6: The appellant is writing to request to withdraw proposed order 2 and leave Mr Bigelman as the respondent, because only Mr Bigelman made submissions and arguments regarding orders 2 and 3 in the Tribunal proceeding. The appellant finds it would be unfair to involve parties who remained silent at the Tribunal. The appellant also requests to withdraw the addition to the Notice of Appeal to include order 6 regarding Lot 7 garage door, so as to reduce any distress for Ms Bevans. Lot 3 owners are not directly affected by the Tribunal's decision. 1 Email from Associate to Justice Lundberg to parties sent on 30 June 2026. -- 10 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 11 The statutory framework 17 Pursuant to s 105 of the SAT Act, appeals such as the present ones can only be brought on a 'question of law' and only if this court gives leave to appeal. Further, an extension of time will be required where an appeal against a decision of the Tribunal is not brought within 28 days of the decision being given, or as indicated by s 105(5)(b) of the SAT Act. 18 Section 105 relevantly states: 105. Appeal from Tribunal's decision (1) A party to a proceeding may appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in the proceeding, but only if the court to which the appeal lies gives leave to appeal. (2) The appeal can only be brought on a question of law. … (5) An application for leave to appeal has to be made in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court and within the period of 28 days after — (a) the day on which the Tribunal's decision is given; or (b) if the Tribunal gives its decision without giving written reasons for its decision and the party then requests it to give written reasons under section 78, the day on which the written reasons are given to the party. (6) If leave is granted, the appeal has to be instituted in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court and within the period of 21 days after the day on which leave is granted. (7) The court to which the appeal lies may extend a time limit fixed by this section, and the extension may be given even though the time limit has passed. 19 The principles governing the grant or refusal of leave to appeal are well established: Medical Board of Australia v GLP.2 The Court of Appeal recognised in that case that the ultimate issue is whether the grant of leave is in the interests of justice, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. However, in many cases it may be necessary for an applicant for leave to appeal to show that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the Tribunal's decision to justify 2 Medical Board of Australia v GLP [2025] WASCA 87 [39] - [41]. -- 11 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 12 the grant of leave to appeal, and that to allow the error to go uncorrected would impose substantial injustice. 20 In Silkchime Pty Ltd v Valuer-General,3 the Court of Appeal explained the nature of an appeal on a question of law as follows: As has been explained in many cases, while termed an appeal, the 'appeal' is in the nature of judicial review. The function of the court is, and is only, to examine what the Tribunal has done for legal error. Where, as here, an appeal lies 'on a question of law', the question (or questions) of law is the entirety of the subject matter of the appeal. If, on proper analysis, the question raised by a litigant is not a question of law, linguistic gymnastics in the formulation of the grounds of appeal cannot convert it into a question of law. 21 The Court of Appeal then referred to the principles set out by Buss JA, as his Honour then was, in Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board,4 which it noted had been adopted on numerous occasions since that decision: (1) A question of mixed fact and law is not a question of law within s 105(2). (2) A ground of appeal which asserts the decision is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence does not raise a question of law. (3) A tribunal does not commit an error of law merely because it finds facts wrongly or upon a doubtful basis. (4) A ground of appeal that a tribunal has made a finding which is manifestly unreasonable, in the sense that no reasonable tribunal could have made that finding, alleges an error of law. (5) A ground of appeal that a tribunal has failed to take into account a consideration which, in the circumstances, it was bound to take into account alleges an error of law. 22 As for the granting of an extension of time, the Court of Appeal outlined the test in this regard in its decision in Engwirda v Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 as follows:5 3 Silkchime Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2023] WASCA 114 [71]. 4 Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97 [53] - [57] (Buss JA, Wheeler and Pullin JJA agreeing) (Paridis). 5 Engwirda v Owners of Queens Riverside Strata Plan 55728 [2019] WASCA 190 [97] (Engwirda). -- 12 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 13 The power to grant an extension of time is a broad one to be exercised in the interests of justice having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Those circumstances are often, but not exclusively, organised around the factors of: 1. the length of the delay; 2. the reasons for the delay; 3. the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal; and 4. the extent of any prejudice to the respondent. 23 The above principles must be applied by this court in considering the present appeals. Before I turn to apply the principles, it is necessary to set out some background to the three appeals. GDA 6 of 2026 Background 24 On 15 May 2026, Dr Saja and Ms Saje filed an appeal notice against a decision of a Member in the Tribunal in matter CC 736/2024, which was delivered on 14 May 2026: Saje and The Owners of 36B Third Avenue, Mount Lawley Strata Plan 21602 [2026] WASAT 52. 25 The named respondents to the appeal are the Owners of Strata Plan 21602 and Mr Bigelman. 26 The Member dismissed the application, which had been brought under s 197(4) of ST Act. The grounds reveal that the appellants were aggrieved by a brick structure allegedly built by Mr Bigelman on common property, by the installation of a hot water system, by the use of strata company funds to pay for the replacement of bathroom tiles, an alleged 'hidden insurance matter', and the repair of a garage door, among other matters. Various relief was sought including orders for removal of structures, substantial compensation, and the transfer of proceedings to a court for criminal charges to take their course. 27 The Member found that the authorising resolutions required by the ST Act were absent in respect of certain items which were the subject of complaint by the appellants. The Member referred to four items in this regard: the pantry, the enclosed front porch, the brick pillar separating Lots 2 and 3, and the steel and glass roof above the Lot 2 courtyard which rests on common property (see [83]). -- 13 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 14 28 The Member then proceeded to consider whether, in the exercise of his discretion under s 200(1) of the ST Act, he should make the orders sought by the appellants (see [84]). 29 In assessing whether to exercise the discretion, the Member observed at [87] of his reasons that: [87] The nature of the four items listed above is said to be that the applicants are in dispute with the company as the company is ignoring its statutory duties under the ST Act through tolerating the unauthorised alteration of common property by the owner of lot 2. For the reasons set out above, I have found that the company did not properly authorise certain alterations to common property but with respect to the four items … I would not go so far as to say the company is ignoring its duties or is tolerating the unauthorised alteration of common property. It is my belief that at the time of the final hearing of this proceeding the company believed that it had complied with its statutory duties under the ST Act as it thought, wrongly as it turns out, that the alterations to common property made by the owner of lot 2 had been properly authorised. 30 The Member then examined the other salient features of the case, as part of the assessment of the discretionary power, including the detriment to the owner. The Member concluded in this regard that the nature of these disputes involve issues which do cause detriment to the appellants and which do derogate from their proprietary rights. Further, and importantly, the Member referred to the signed agreements which he admitted into evidence. Those agreements were signed following a mediation in 2022. The Member was satisfied the agreements between Dr Saje and Mr Bigelman constituted an agreement by Dr Saje (at [102]): …to make a final settlement as to the glass roof enclosing the courtyard of lot 2; a walk-in pantry constructed in the courtyard of lot 2; the enclosure of a porch at the entrance of lot 2; the placement of the lot 3 hot water system in the courtyard of lot 2; the lattice in the courtyard wall that separates lot 2 and lot 3 and as to the construction of a brick pillar in the courtyard of lot 3 and that the agreements are binding on both the first applicant and the second applicant in this proceeding. 31 The Member ultimately found that, while many of the factors he considered weighed in favour of making the orders sought by the appellants (concerning the four disputes in ground 2), he would not make the orders sought. The Member gave significant weight in this regard to the fact that the appellants and Mr Bigelman entered into a final settlement of their dispute. -- 14 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 15 32 The Member concluded it would be unjust to now permit the appellants to put aside their earlier agreements because they now want them to be settled in a different way. 33 The Member then proceeded to examined, and reject, grounds 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the application (having struck out some other grounds raised by the appellants and having granted leave for particular grounds to be withdrawn). 34 The Member's conclusions at [138] and [139] of his reasons are as follows [138] For the reasons given above, I would dismiss proceeding CC 736/25 in respect of each of the grounds 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. However, on doing this there would be no grounds remaining in the proceeding. Therefore, the order I will make is to dismiss the proceeding. [139] I am aware that my dismissal of this proceeding will do nothing to make regular the unauthorised alterations the owner of lot 2 has made to the common property. As the applicants have observed, the strata company itself can review the soundness of the alterations (such as by requiring or obtaining an engineering report) and then at a general meeting consider whether to pass the appropriate resolutions to authorise the alterations or to require their removal. Given the company is now aware these alterations are not authorised under the ST Act I expect they will quickly move to engage in this process and I can see no reason why the Tribunal should interfere with the internal management of the company at this time. 35 The appeal notice, which was noticeably filed the day following the Member's decision, asserts that 'many mistakes of law were made'. The following matters are stated as the grounds of appeal: - SAT Act s 55 was used against applicant, but the applicants did not consent to anything disclosed from a previous mediation. The applicants specifically wrote they do not consent regarding SAT Act s 55. - The decision allowed Lot 2 owner to keep his structures on common property, which the Strata Titles Act WA does not allow; for this, previous documents were misinterpreted. The enabling Act has no provision for an owner to build on common property. - Lot 2 owner was permitted to build in Lot 3, which the applicants objected to. -- 15 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 16 - Lot 3 owners were denied their right to a utility duct for a hot water system which Lot 2 owner 'stole' from Lot 3 and keeps for storage space. - The decision unfairly ignored Lot 2 owner's agreement to remove what he had built in Lot 3. - The Tribunal member used 'discretionary powers' for his decision, and these 'discretionary powers' breached the enabling Act severely, resulting in a decision that was unfair and wrong at law. 36 The appellants have sought to add to these grounds, by including order 6 from CC 736/2024, which reads: 'CoO directs Christine Bevans to return to the strata company the amount of $1,625 charged to the strata company under a hidden arrangement between Zoe Maxwell and Christine Bevans in May 2023'. Whether leave ought be granted 37 As earlier noted, the appellants require leave to appeal in respect of GDA 6, such leave being confined to a question of law. 38 In the communication from the court to the parties sent on 30 June 2026, I had noted that it was essential that the 'question of law' relied upon by the appellant be identified with precision. The relevant question of law was not simply to be distilled from the grounds of appeal and any submissions: Lourey v LSCC.6 39 Further, I had indicated that, as matters then stood, I had been unable to readily discern a 'question of law' in the materials filed by the appellant. I invited the appellants, prior to the first hearing, to give consideration to this question and be in a position at the hearing to articulate the nature of the 'question of law' in respect of which leave was to be sought. That was not done with any precision. 40 I have now received a detailed statement from the appellants which purports to identify questions of law for the purposes of this appeal. Many of the questions described by the appellants are self-evidently not questions of law or are merely characterisations of factual issues to clothe them with the appearance of questions of law. 41 The only grounds which might arguably provide a basis for the grant of leave is the contention that the Tribunal misapplied s 197(1) of 6 Lourey v LSCC [2023] WASCA 90 [9] and [21]. -- 16 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 17 the ST Act or identified the wrong issue. These matters are the subject of points 1 and 2 on pages 1 and 2 (which concern ground 2 below), of the statement filed by the appellants on 21 July 2026 (Folio 13). Those grounds read as follows: 1. Order 2 dismissal was wrong at law. The applicants brought the matter to the Tribunal under s 197 Scheme disputes, where subsection (1) provides for a resolution by the Tribunal. That means the Tribunal must resolve the dispute. … Because Tribunal found order 2 had the substantial merits of the case, it could not dismiss it without breaching the main objectives of the Tribunal. 2. The decision regarding order 2 amounts to mere legal advice given, yet the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to give legal advice. In this regard, the Tribunal misapplied s 197 (1). The only valid option for the Tribunal was to make orders for the strata company and Mr Bigelman to remove Mr Bigelman's … unauthorised buildings and structures. 42 I will make directions to confine the substantive appeal to a consideration of the above matters (the merits of which can be addressed by the parties at the appeal hearing). The balance of the grounds will be dismissed as being without merit in that they cannot arguably amount to questions of law (and bearing in mind that Dr Saje has this morning narrowed the scope of the appeal by way of her email). Making directions to this effect will also assist in focusing the parties' preparation for the hearing and reduce the costs and time required for the ultimate hearing. GDA 7 of 2026 and GDA 8 of 2026 Background to GDA 7 43 On 15 May 2026, Dr Saje filed an appeal notice against a decision of a Member of the Tribunal made on 31 October 2024 in matter CC 43/2024. However, it appears in substance to be a challenge to a decision made by the Member much earlier, on 14 August 2023, in CC 494/2023. 44 The respondents to this appeal are Ms Sampson, Ms Bevans and Mr Marriott. Dr Saje proposes that the strata company be added as a respondent. -- 17 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 18 45 The supporting affidavit sworn by Dr Saje explains that she is 'very much aware the application for appeal is out of time, but I have asked the respondents in the strata council to take action, but they will not'. The affidavit contains argumentative and objectionable material, but it is useful to set out some of the matters to which Dr Saje has deposed to put the appeal in context. 46 Dr Saje deposed that the matter concerns 'unlawful structures Danielle Sampson of Lot 4 … refuses to remove from common property brick wall around her Lot 4'. Dr Saje notes that she 'filed an application on 10 April 2023, requesting to have the structures removed, and that matter was CC 494/2023 with a final hearing in July 2024'. Dr Saje says the 'defendants filed a 'licence' for Ms Sampson to occupy the common property around Lot 4'. 47 It is evident that a decision of a Member of the Tribunal was made on 31 October 2023, dismissing Dr Saje's application: Saje and Sampson [2023] WASAT 101. Within the Member's reasons, the basis of the application was described as follows: [4] On 10 April 2023, Dr Saje commenced proceedings in the Tribunal under s 47(3) of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) for the enforcement of the scheme by-laws. Dr Saje alleges that Ms Sampson is in breach of the ST Act because the wooden slats or screens that are approximately 2.8 metres in height that are affixed to the brick walls which surround Ms Sampson's courtyard and the wooden door (wooden screens and door) were not approved by The Owners of 36B Third Avenue, Mt Lawley Strata Plan 21602 (the strata company) by way of resolution without dissent. 48 The Member found, among other matters, that:7 (a) Since 24 May 2023, the council comprises Ms Sampson, Ms Bevans and Mr Marriott. (b) The strata complex comprises two levels. Dr Saje owns Lot 3 and Ms Sampson owns Lot 4 which are both on the ground level (c) Each of Lot 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the ground level have a 'courtyard' shown as a part lot on the strata plan. The courtyard for Lot 4 is 34m2. (d) The brick wall surrounding the courtyard of Lot 4 was not in place when the strata plan was registered in 1991. However, the brick 7 at [33]. -- 18 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 19 wall surrounding the courtyard of Lot 4 (and Lots 1, 2 and 3) was constructed pursuant to a building licence on or about 29 April 1991. (e) Ms Sampson purchased Lot 4 on 23 December 2022. (f) Prior to the ownership of Lot 4 by Ms Sampson, horizontal wooden slates of approximately 2.8 metres in height (the wooden screens) were installed on top of, or affixed to the brick wall surrounding the courtyard of Lot 4. Further, prior to the ownership of Lot 4 by Ms Sampson, the brick wall was cut and a wooden door which blends in with the wooden screens was affixed to the brick wall surrounding the courtyard of Lot 4 without approval of the strata company by way of resolution without dissent. (g) Only the owner of Lot 4 has a key that opens and locks the wooden door. (h) The brick walls that surround the courtyard of Lot 4 support the wooden screens and door. (i) Roof tops are visible looking into the distance from the outside of each of Lot 3 and Lot 4. 49 The reasons record that Dr Saje was pressing for an order that Ms Sampson remove the structural alterations built on the common property brick wall surrounding her courtyard within 14 days. 50 The Member dismissed the application under s 47 of the ST Act for the enforcement of the scheme by-laws. The Member found the application was misconceived. The Member concluded that the application should be dismissed as there was no basis to say there had been a breach of any of the scheme by-laws (noting that the application sought the enforcement of sch 1 by-laws 6, 9 and 10 and sch 2 by-law 13). 51 Dr Saje then filed fresh proceedings in the Tribunal, being CC 43/2024, which was heard by another Member. Dr Saje says she brought that further proceeding, which was lodged on 23 January 2024, 'for the Tribunal to make orders for Ms Sampson and the defendants to remove the structures'. 52 The second Member determined that application on 31 October 2024, and ordered, pursuant to s 200(2)(n) of the ST Act, that the strata company is taken to have passed an exclusive use by-law titled 'Exclusive use by-law – Lot 4' as a resolution without dissent. -- 19 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 20 53 The appeal notice articulates the grounds of appeal as follows: 1. The decision is very wrong at law and continues to fester at the strata company with a highly dysfunctional and corrupt strata council. 2. The respondents continue to ignore the Strata Titles Act WA (1985) after repeated requests from the applicant, and the enabling Act does not allow an owner building on common property. 3. Danielle Sampson's Lot 4 is next door to the appellant's property, and the ugly sight of the unlawful screens rising to the height of ca. 2.7 metres detrimentally affects the applicant's prospects of selling her property and the price her property would attract. 4. Yes, the application is out of time, but the applicant requests an extension of time to try and bring the strata company into legal compliance, so as not to suffer a financial loss when selling her property. Background to GDA 8 54 On 15 May 2026, Dr Saje filed an appeal notice against a decision of a Member of the Tribunal made on 4 October 2024 in matter CC 99/2024, in which the application was dismissed. The matter was heard by the Tribunal on 4 July 2024.8 55 The respondents to this appeal are Mr Marriott, Ms Sampson, Ms Bevans and Mr Leen. 56 Dr Saje explains in her supporting affidavit that she initiated that proceeding in the Tribunal to seek an order that: The amount of $9,271 + interest since 16/02/2021, illegally forced from the applicant and her daughter with extortion, must be returned onto Lisa Saje's bank account from which the payment came, and any claim of the applicant having a 'debt' must be removed. 57 Dr Saje complains that the Member dismissed the application but says the decision was wrong in law. The appeal notice asserts the following as the grounds of appeal: 1. The matter continues to fester at the highly dysfunctional and corrupt strata company. 8 See transcript of CC 43/2024 (4 July 2024). -- 20 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 21 2. The applicant's Lot 3 has suffered a financial loss of ca $13,000. 3. There is no justice in Member Barton's decision which she did not take time to write, only giving it orally in breach of the SAT Act for a reserved decision. 4. The appellant has asked at several general meetings since that the monies be returned to her, because the respondents are fully aware several breaches of the Strata Titles Act WA (1985) were breached with the alleged decision made, yet they refuse. The appellant did not owe the amount to the strata company, nor was she responsible for the damage caused to the common property. 5. The matter continues to be held against the appellant, and it was again mentioned against the appellant in the respondent's submission in March 2026. 58 It is evident that Dr Saje has recently sought to again agitate this matter in the Tribunal. I refer to the decision of President Glancy in Saje [2026] WASAT 62, in which the President observes: [1] Dr Saje has made an application under s 49 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) for leave to commence a proceeding which has been resolved in this Tribunal in matter CC 99 of 2024. It involves a claim that a strata company be ordered to repay to her a special contribution levy which she paid in 2021. 59 Her Honour concluded that the fresh application made by Dr Saje for leave to bring the proceeding should be dismissed because the application was misconceived. Her Honour explained that: [3] …This is because, in making the order dismissing the application in respect of which Dr Saje wishes to bring fresh proceedings, the Tribunal dealt with the merits of the application and did not dismiss it under s 46, s 47 or s 48 of the SAT Act. As a result, s 49 of the SAT Act does not apply. … [29] It is clear that Dr Saje's application for an order for the repayment of the special contribution levy was finally determined by the Tribunal on its merits on 4 October 2024 and that a subsequent attempt to relitigate that issue was struck out as an abuse of process. Given that the claim for an order for repayment of the special contribution levy was not dismissed under any of sections 46, 47 or 48 of the SAT Act, I cannot make the order sought under s 49 of the SAT Act. -- 21 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 22 Whether an extension of time ought be granted 60 The appeals in GDA 7 and GDA 8 are well out of time. 61 Dr Saje, who is the appellant in these appeals, requires an extension of time in both matters, pursuant to s 105(7) of the SAT Act. 62 In relation to GDA 7, the underlying decision was made on 14 August 2023, meaning that any appeal ought to have been filed by 12 September 2023. The appeal was filed 2 years and 9 months out of time. However, if the appeal is in substance against the decision of the Member given on 31 October 2024, it is 1 year and 8 months out of time. On either case, the appeal has been filed extremely late. 63 In relation to GDA 8, the decision which is challenged was made on 4 October 2024, so the appeal is around 1 year and 8 months late. As with GDA 7, this appeal has been filed extremely late. 64 In considering these factors, and whether an extension ought be granted, I have had regard to the materials filed by Dr Saje, the underlying proceedings in the Tribunal, as well as the submissions advanced by the respondents. In this regard, I have been assisted by the outlines of submissions filed on behalf of Ms Bevan in both GDA 7 and GDA 8. 65 Counsel for Ms Bevan submitted that no question of law arises in the appeals and that, in any event, the decisions below disclose no error of law. As to the asserted failure of the Member in the proceedings which are the subject of GDA 8 to provide written reasons, Ms Bevan's counsel points to the terms of s 74, s 78, s 79 and s 81 of the SAT Act, and submits it was open for the appellant to request the Tribunal to provide written reasons pursuant to s 78, which she failed to do. 66 Counsel for Ms Bevan submitted, in GDA 7, that:9 It would not be in the interests of justice to grant the Appeal. It would not be an efficient use of Court resources to deal with an appeal from the Tribunal that, properly viewed, has no prospects of success. 67 Counsel for Ms Bevan further submitted, in GDA 8, that:10 9 Cullen Macleod outline of submissions in GDA 7 [30]. 10 Cullen Macleod outline of submissions in GDA 8 [11] - [12] and [21]. -- 22 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 23 [11] None of the Appellant's four grounds of appeal disclose any error of law let alone the necessary precision required to satisfy section 105 (2) of the SAT Act. [12] Rather, they are properly characterised as a set of unsubstantiated complaints and allegations against the strata company, which is not actually a party to this appeal. … [21] The Appellant's options lay to the Tribunal within 90 days of the decision to request reasons in writing. There is no error of law identified or open to the Appellant, it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the appeal and the Supreme Court is not the appropriate forum for the Appellant's complaints. 68 As earlier noted, following the hearing on 20 July 2026, Dr Saje has filed a statement of the proposed questions of law in GDA 7 and GDA 8, which I have now reviewed. 69 In GDA 7, Dr Saje contends the Tribunal's jurisdiction has been exhausted, the tribunal was functus officio, the tribunal erred in its application of s 200(2)(n) of the ST Act, the Tribunal erred in deciding that an exclusive use by-law would allow the lot owner in question to 'keep her existing screens and door on common property', there is a 'lack of legal reasonableness', and the Tribunal failed to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration concerning the role of the strata council members who are said to have failed in their statutory duty. 70 In the document filed on 22 July 2026 in GDA 7, Dr Saje also explains, to put her delay in context, that she had 'appealed and tried to have the matter re-addressed by the Tribunal several times', noting that she 'appealed many times, in the wrong place and in wrong ways'. I have referred above to the recent proceedings before the President in this regard. 71 In GDA 8, Dr Saje contends the Tribunal failed to comply with the applicable legislation, failed to comply with the terms for holding a general meeting, there was no evidence to support a fact, there is 'legal unreasonableness', the Tribunal failed to consider budgetary constraints in rule 81, failed to identify an essential issue, failed to consider the expenditure was illegal, failed to give adequate reasons, and the decision was so unreasonable no reasonable decision maker would make it. 72 In the document filed on 22 July 2026 in GDA 8, as with GDA 7, Dr Saje has sought to further explain the delay in filing the appeal. I have -- 23 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 24 reviewed that material. It is unnecessary to recite the details in these reasons. Dr Saje in part makes reference to the possibility of criminal proceedings being initiated by reason of the conduct of the strata company. With respect, that is an unhelpful submission at best and inflammatory at worst. 73 Having regard to this material, an analysis of the factors identified in Engwirda points overwhelming against the grant of an extension of time to Dr Saje in respect of these appeals. Indeed, in my respectful view, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to permit Dr Saje to ventilate these matters after such a significant lapse of time, and to require the respondents to have to respond to the claims she has advanced on a further occasion. 74 The delay since these matters were addressed by the Tribunal is egregious in the circumstances. The explanation for the delay is, in substance, that she has acted in good faith, has had some health issues, and that the appellants have raised these matters (or sought to raise these matters) in other ways, including by filing incorrect challenges including to the President of the Tribunal. That provides a partial explanation but it does not wholly excuse or explain the significant delay which has occurred. I should also observe that the appellants have, in the past, been legally represented for some period. They have not been wholly without legal advice. 75 Further, the matters which Dr Saje wishes to raise on appeal must be said to enjoy poor prospects of success on the merits, even if those matters were sufficient to disclose a question or questions of law, which I presently cannot discern. Recognising that Dr Saje is presently unrepresented, I acknowledge that some leeway ought be given to her in assessing the manner in which she has formulated her challenge. That leeway can only go so far, however, and should not be allowed to trump the legitimate interests of the respondents, many of whom are unrepresented as well, nor to permit a litigant to too readily bypass the gateway requirement of leave under s 105(7) of the SAT Act. 76 Finally, the delay in prosecuting these appeals gives rise to a significant prejudice to the respondents, being the strata company and the owners of the other lots. That prejudice can safely be inferred by the court from all the circumstances. The respondents should not be required to respond to these matters after such a delay, having organised their affairs over the period since the decisions were pronounced by the Tribunal on the basis identified by the decisions of the Tribunal. -- 24 of 25 -- [2026] WASC 294 LUNDBERG J Page 25 77 For these reasons, the extension of time sought in respect of the appeals in GDA 7 and GDA 8 will be refused. Conclusion and orders 78 For the foregoing reasons, I will make directions to list GDA 6 for a further hearing and I will refuse the extensions of time sought in respect of the appeals in GDA 7 and GDA 8. The appeals in GDA 7 and GDA 8 will accordingly be dismissed. 79 I will grant leave to the parties to seek any orders consequent on these orders, including as to costs. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. IR Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg 24 JULY 2026 -- 25 of 25 --