Enever v Meyers [2026] QCA 94

[2026] QCA 94 COURT OF APPEAL MULLINS P Appeal No 54 of 2026 DC No 674 of 2022 LESLEY ELIZABETH ENEVER Appellant v SARAH DRYSDALE MEYERS Respondent BRISBANE THURSDAY, 28 MAY 2026 JUDGMENT [1] MULLINS P: The appellant sued the respondent in the District Court to recover a dog Sugar which the appellant asserted was her dog which she had lent to the respondent for breeding purposes. The respondent claimed that she had purchased Sugar from the plaintiff for $3,000. The appellant’s claim was dismissed and the trial judge declared that the respondent was the owner of Sugar: Enever v Meyers [2025] QDC 208. [2] The appellant was legally represented for the trial which took three days and those solicitors acted on the appellant’s behalf for the filing of the notice of appeal on 9 January 2026. The appellant failed to file an outline of argument for the appeal as required by the Practice Direction. Her solicitors gave notice of withdrawal as the solicitors on the record on 27 March 2026. On 11 March 2026 the respondent filed an application pursuant to r 772 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) for the appellant to pay security for the respondent’s costs of the appeal. -- 1 of 3 -- 2 [3] When this matter was reviewed by me on 17 April 2026, I listed the application for security for costs for hearing on 22 May 2026. Soon after that review, a request was made by the respondent for the date for the application to be postponed to suit the convenience of the respondent’s counsel and the date for the application was fixed at 28 May 2026. The hearing of the application was therefore listed for six days later than the date originally fixed for the hearing. No prejudice has been caused to the appellant by that change of date. [4] The appellant concedes that she is presently unable to provide security but anticipates that by 5 June 2026 she will have access to the proceeds from the sale of a litter of eight puppies which will enable her to provide security for costs. [5] On the appellant’s own material, she is currently in a poor financial position for various reasons. As the dispute determined by the trial judge depended in part on the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence of the witnesses in conjunction with their written communications, it will not be straightforward for the appellant to seek to overturn the findings of the trial judge. It is relevant that the appellant has already had her “day in court” and lost on the merits when she was legally represented. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to order security for the respondent’s costs of the appeal. [6] The appellant could have agreed to provide the security without the need for this further hearing. I had suggested to the parties when reviewing the matter on 17 April 2026 that security in the sum of $12,000 might be appropriate. I remain of that view. Even though the solicitor for the respondent estimates the respondent’s proportion of the recoverable costs of the appeal would be in the order of $20,000 inclusive of GST, the amount ordered by way of security is not intended to be a complete indemnity for the standard costs. It is to give assurance to the respondent that her costs of the appeal, if the appeal is dismissed, will be covered to some not insignificant extent. As the respondent has succeeded in obtaining an order for security for costs, it is appropriate that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of this application. In order that the costs order does not stymie the appeal, the order for costs should be in any event. [7] The orders are: 1. The appellant must give security for the costs of the appeal in the sum of $12,000 within 21 days of the date of this order by payment into the Court of the said sum or in such other form as the Registrar permits. -- 2 of 3 -- 3 2. The appeal is stayed so far as steps to be taken by the appellant until the security has been given as required by this order or further order. 3. The appellant must pay the respondent’s costs of the application for security for costs filed on 11 March 2026 in any event. 4. Liberty to either party to apply on three days’ written notice to the other. [8] APPELLANT: Thank you, your Honour. [9] MULLINS P: Thanks, Ms Enever. -- 3 of 3 --