Endresz v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2026] QCA 2

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Endresz v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2026] QCA 2 PARTIES: ALLAN PAUL ENDRESZ (first appellant) EZYBONDS (PACIFIC) (second appellant) JEFFREY SIMPSON (third appellant) ROBYN SIMPSON (fourth appellant) v QUEENSLAND RACING INTEGRITY COMMISSION (first respondent) RACING QUEENSLAND BOARD (second respondent) FILE NO/S: Appeal No 2262 of 2025 SC No 16089 of 2024 DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2025] QSC 93 (Martin SJA) DELIVERED ON: 13 January 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 14 November 2025 JUDGES: Boddice JA, Brown JA, Henry J ORDERS: 1. Leave to file and read the affidavit of Mr Hurford sworn 2 October 2025 is refused. 2. Appeal dismissed with costs. CATCHWORDS: ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS – PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST – RACING CLUBS AND ASSOCIATIONS – DISQUALIFICATIONS – OF HORSE – where the appellants were the owners of a winning racehorse – where urine samples, taken from the racehorse after the race, revealed a prohibited substance – where a resulting stewards inquiry found both the racehorse’s trainer guilty of a breach of the Australian Rules of Racing and disqualified the horse from the race – where the appellants successfully applied to the Supreme Court for a declaration that the disqualification was void as they had not been given a right to be heard at the inquiry – where the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission instituted a second inquiry which invited the owners to be -- 1 of 13 -- 2 heard – where the owners subsequently complained to the Commission regarding the new stewards panel’s composition and jurisdiction, leading to its discontinuance – where the Commission instituted a third steward’s inquiry with a differently comprised panel – where the owners applied to the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the third inquiry was void and of no effect, whilst also seeking a restraining order preventing a further inquiry and an order that they be paid the prize-money of the race – where the application was dismissed and the owners appeal that decision – whether the inquiry was commenced within a reasonable time – whether questions of disqualification of a horse and a breach by a trainer can be decided by separate inquiry – whether there can be any appointment of stewards beyond those originally appointed for a race meeting – whether the Commission lacked jurisdiction to commence the third inquiry while the owner’s application was before the Supreme Court Racing Integrity Act 2016 (Qld), s 11 Donau Pty Ltd v ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd (2019) 101 NSWLR 679; [2019] NSWCA 185, cited Endresz v Queensland Racing Integrity Comission [2022] QSC 262, cited Endresz v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2025] QSC 93, considered Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; [2002] HCA 11, cited Nais v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470; [2005] HCA 77, cited Pegasus Leasing Ltd v Cadoroll Pty Ltd (1996) 59 FCR 152; [1996] FCA 64, cited Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Endresz; Racing Queensland Board v Endresz [2024] QCA 76, cited R v Brewer; Ex parte Renzella [1973] VR 375; [1973] VicRp 36, cited Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57, cited Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; [1979] HCA 9, cited Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491; [1988] HCA 12, cited COUNSEL: K A McGree for the appellants S A McLeod KC, with K E Slack, for the first respondent R J Anderson KC for the second respondent SOLICITORS: Dentons Australia Pty Ltd for the appellants C E Christensen, Crown Solicitor for the first respondent Clayton Utz for the second respondent -- 2 of 13 -- 3 [1] BODDICE JA: I agree with Henry J. [2] BROWN JA: I agree with the reasons and proposed orders of Justice Henry. I agree for the reasons stated by Justice Henry in [62] of his Honour's reasons that it is not in the interests of justice for this Court to allow the appellant to now raise a proposed new argument of lack of jurisdiction based on a broader interpretation of “matter” in s 11 of the Racing Integrity Act 2016 (Qld). [3] HENRY J: The first horse past the post in race 6 of the 2020 Gold Coast Magic Millions was Alligator Blood. All being well, its owners would have received the winner’s prize of nearly $980,000. All was not well. Urine samples taken from Alligator Blood on race day were revealed, by two subsequently issued certificates of analysis, to contain Altrenogest, a prohibited substance. [4] The resulting stewards’ inquiry found Alligator Blood’s trainer guilty of a breach of the Australian Rules of Racing and Alligator Blood was disqualified. [5] The owners filed an application in the Supreme Court (‘the first application’) and obtained a declaration that the disqualification was void and of no effect because they had not been given a right to be heard at the stewards’ inquiry.1 That order was affirmed on appeal (‘the first appeal’) to this Court.2 [6] The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission consequently instituted a second stewards’ inquiry and invited the owners to be heard. The owners complained to the Commission about the composition of the stewards’ panel, as well as its jurisdiction. The Commission thus discontinued that inquiry and instituted a third stewards’ inquiry with a differently composed panel. The owners nonetheless pursued a second application in the Supreme Court, contending the new inquiry was without jurisdiction. They sought a declaration that the third inquiry was void and of no effect. They also sought a restraining order preventing a further inquiry and an order that they be paid the prize-money. Their application was dismissed.3 [7] The owners now appeal that decision, on grounds that the learned primary judge erred: (1) in making the evaluative judgment that the third inquiry was commenced within a reasonable time; and (2) in construing the Australian Rules of Racing as supplying a power to inquire, hear and determine for the purposes of AR 240(1) of the Australian Rules of Racing in all the facts and circumstances.4 [8] No such errors have been demonstrated. To explain why the appeal must fail, it is convenient to do so by reference to the appellant’s four arguments against the validity of the third inquiry (and any future inquiry), namely: 1. the third inquiry was not commenced within a reasonable time; 2. the questions of disqualification and breach by the trainer cannot be decided by separate inquiry; 1 Endresz v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2022] QSC 262. 2 Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Endresz; Racing Queensland Board v Endresz [2024] QCA 76. 3 Endrez v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2025] QSC 93. 4 These reasons reverse the numbers of the grounds as they appear in the Notice of Appeal. ‘AR’ appears before each numbered rule in the Australian Rules of Racing. Likewise ‘LR’ for Local Rules of Racing. -- 3 of 13 -- 4 3. there could be no appointment of stewards beyond those originally appointed for the race meeting; and 4. the Commission lacked jurisdiction to commence the third stewards’ inquiry while the owners’ application was before the Supreme Court. The first of those arguments was advanced in support of ground (1) and the balance in support of ground (2). 1. Was the inquiry commenced within a reasonable time? [9] The learned primary judge concluded below that the jurisdiction to conduct the third panel’s inquiry was confined to it being conducted within a reasonable time of the event invoking the jurisdiction to inquire. That conclusion is not in dispute. [10] However, the owners argued below and now before this Court, that the third inquiry was invalid because it was not commenced within a reasonable time of the event invoking its jurisdiction. The owners submit that event was the return of the second of the two certificates of analysis, on 8 April 2020. [11] The power to inquire into whether Alligator Blood should be disqualified derives from AR 240(1) of the Australian Rules of Racing; rules which are contractually binding on the parties for reasons explained in the first appeal.5 Rule 240(1) provides that if a horse is brought to a racecourse and a prohibited substance is detected in a sample taken from the horse prior to or following its running in any race that day, the horse must be disqualified from any race in which it started on that day. [12] Rule 259 provides for a system by which one portion of a sample from a horse is examined by a laboratory and a second portion is examined by a second laboratory and the results detailed in certificates of analysis. If the same prohibited substance is detected in both portions, then, pursuant to AR 259(6), the provision of the second certificate of analysis, with the first, will ‘constitute prima facie evidence that the relevant sample contains a prohibited substance’. [13] The first appeal decided that the existence of such evidence does not automatically result in disqualification and that the factual conditions upon which the operation of AR 240(1) depends cannot be answered without a decision being made after a factual inquiry by stewards. [14] The Australian Rules of Racing do not mandate a time within which such an inquiry must be held. Indeed, AR 20(h) provides the stewards have power to inquire ‘at any time’ into the running of any horse within the jurisdiction of the relevant State or Territory Principal Racing Authority. The Commission submits this means, contrary to the owners’ submission, that the jurisdictional fact, marking the starting point for assessment of the reasonableness of the ensuing delay, is when the decision is made to conduct an inquiry. That submission must be rejected for there could potentially be unreasonable delay in deciding to institute an inquiry long after the receipt of the certificates of analysis provides the evidentiary capacity to conduct it. [15] The preferable view is that the relevant starting point is the time of the discovery of evidence which warrants the inquiry, which is, as the learned primary judge reasoned, 5 Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Endresz; Racing Queensland Board v Endresz [2024] QCA 76, [4]. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 the time at which capacity to undertake the inquiry is first capable of being exercised.6 That point in time will vary, depending on the information available. In this case it was reached when receipt of the second certificate of analysis provided the evidentiary capacity to conduct an inquiry. The learned primary Judge reasoned, from the nature of the stewards’ power to inquire and its potential consequences, that the inquiry had to be conducted within a reasonable time after that point. [16] The owners do not dispute that reasoning. Rather, they challenge his Honour’s conclusion that the delay after that point was not unreasonable. They do not point to any specific error in his Honour’s path of reasoning to that evaluative conclusion. Instead, they invoke the correctness standard of appellate review,7 arguing the correct conclusion is that the delay has been unreasonable. [17] The reasonableness of a delay in performing a task cannot be assessed in isolation. It is informed by context.8 In that assessment the nature of the task is relevant, as are the reasons for and consequences of the delay in performing it. But so too is the context in which the assessment is itself occurring. [18] Importantly, the Court is not here being asked to assess the delay as so unreasonable as to justify the conclusion the Court should interfere to compel the stewards to perform the task. Rather, the Court is being asked to assess the delay as so unreasonable as to justify the conclusion it should interfere to prevent the stewards from performing the task and, despite the existence of evidence that Alligator Blood raced with a prohibited substance in its body, order the winner’s prize-money should be paid to its owners. [19] It is, of course, a potentially adverse consequence of the delay in determining whether Alligator Blood should be disqualified, that the owners of Alligator Blood have been put out of the winner’s prize-money to which they would be entitled if their horse is not disqualified. However, it would be an adverse consequence for the integrity of the racing industry if the owners are paid the winner’s prize-money despite evidence their horse raced with a prohibited substance in its body and despite the absence of any decision on the merits as to whether their horse should therefore be disqualified. That would be an extraordinary outcome. Tolerance of some delay is warranted before the delay should be characterised as so unreasonable as to warrant such an outcome. [20] Turning next to the reason for the delay, most of it was, as the learned primary Judge noted, caused by the duration of the intervening court proceeding. The owners filed the first application on 28 May 2021. The decision in the first application was delivered on 23 December 2022 and the decision in the first appeal was delivered on 7 May 2024 – nearly three years after the filing of the first application. That long period was not a delay in the conduct of the inquiry. It was an incident of the litigation in which the parties were engaged against each other. [21] Events prior to the first application and after the decision in the first appeal do not suggest unreasonable delay. 6 Citing Donau Pty Ltd v ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd (2019) 101 NSWLR 679, [99]-[111]. 7 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, 551. 8 See, for example, Nais v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470, 474 [6], 494 [79]; Donau Pty Ltd v ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd (2019) 101 NSWLR 679, 703. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 [22] The race occurred on 11 January 2020. There were two urine samples tested and the results were certified on 17 March and 8 April 2020. The first stewards’ inquiry had commenced by 8 July 2020 and the stewards’ report disqualifying Alligator Blood and fining the trainer in breach was published on 23 July 2020. The result was thus finalised within about six months of the race and, more particularly, within about three and a half months of the receipt of the second certificate. Ideally the testing process which eventually invoked the stewards’ jurisdiction would have been quicker, but the time taken between then and the stewards’ decision was not so prolonged as to weigh heavily in the present assessment. [23] The ensuing delay of 10 months before the owners elected to file their first application was a materially longer period but was not a delay in the conduct of the inquiry. [24] Events after the delivery of the decision in the first appeal on 7 May 2024 do not suggest unreasonable delay either. After ensuing exchanges of correspondence, the owners were given notice of the institution of the second stewards’ inquiry on 4 July 2024. The owners submit it is a weighty consideration that there followed a further period of delay. But that ignores the influence of their own conduct in trying to resist the holding of the inquiry, via further exchanges of correspondence, including as to the composition of the stewards’ panel and its alleged lack of jurisdiction. That it took some months for the owners’ objections to be considered is scarcely surprising given that there had already been litigation. Moreover, that litigation had been about the need to extend a right for the owners to be heard at the inquiry required per AR 240(1), whereas the owners were now arguing there should be no such inquiry. This was a new turn of events which it would have taken time to consider. [25] The second inquiry was discontinued on 11 December 2024 and notice was given of the third inquiry, by a differently composed panel of stewards, on 12 December 2024. The facts compel the inference that change was made because of concerns raised by the owners about the composition of the panel. The change prompted an amendment of the application which had already been filed. The upshot is that it only took about two months after the first appeal outcome for the second stewards’ inquiry to be commenced. The ensuing delay was occasioned by debate between the parties, culminating in the second application below. [26] Even if the period after the decision in the first appeal is considered in combination with the earlier period it took to conduct the first stewards’ inquiry, it does not bespeak unreasonable delay. How then should the intervening long period of time, collectively consumed by the first application and first appeal, weigh in the assessment? [27] The delay because of court proceedings was, as the learned primary Judge observed, not a result of unreasonable delay by the Commission but a result of the owners exercising their right to have the original decision set aside. However, the owners submit it is a relevant consideration that the reason for the court proceeding, which occasioned such long delay, was the erroneous decision not to give the owners a right to be heard. [28] Accepting for present purposes that is a relevant consideration, the weight to be given to it falls to be considered in light of all the circumstances of the case. Those circumstances include that there was not unreasonable delay in the actual conduct of a stewards’ inquiry, there being no inquiry on foot during the court proceeding. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 Further, the highpoint of any evidentiary disadvantage caused by the delay is that one of two portions of the urine sample may have been compromised by an electrical failure. Even if it has been, there evidently remains another portion. Furthermore, the owners have long known of the adverse certificate results and thus long known of the need to obtain and secure evidence which may overcome the otherwise damning effect of those results per AR 259(6). The court proceeding, by which the owners successfully argued they had a right to be heard, did not preclude them from continuing to gather and preserve the evidence they would need in eventually exercising that right. [29] In short, the duration of the court proceeding, made necessary by the failure to give the owners a right to be heard, is unlikely to have had the consequence of materially disadvantaging the owners if ever they exercise their right to be heard. [30] Assessed in context, the delay complained of is not unreasonable. The learned primary judge’s conclusion was correct. 2. Can the questions of disqualification and breach by the trainer be decided by separate inquiry? [31] The owners submit the third inquiry is invalid in that it purports to decide the question of disqualification only and to treat the finding of breach against the trainer as severable. The owners submit that is impossible because a decision about disqualification and the charge is a composite decision; effectively a single decision with two parts. [32] That conclusion is said to emerge from consideration of r 240 Australian Rules of Racing which relevantly provides: AR240 Prohibited substance in sample taken from horse at race meeting (1) Subject to subrule (3), if a horse is brought to a racecourse and a prohibited substance on Prohibited List A and/or Prohibited List B is detected in a sample taken from the horse prior to or following its running in any race, the horse must be disqualified from any race in which it started on that day. (2) Subject to subrule (3), if a horse is brought to a racecourse for the purpose of participating in a race and a prohibited substance on Prohibited List A and/or Prohibited List B is detected in a sample taken from the horse prior to or following its running in any race, the trainer and any other person who was in charge of the horse at any relevant time breaches these Australian rules.9 [33] The owners submit that the same jurisdictional fact triggers the power to inquire for both subrules (1) and (2), namely the detection of a prohibited substance in a sample taken from the horse. The owners emphasise the occurrence of that jurisdictional fact triggers a need for the stewards to decide whether the same factual conditions exist. Fraser AJA explained those factual conditions in reference to AR 240(1) in the following way in the first appeal: 9 Subrule (3) has the effect of conferring a discretion on stewards to find a breach of subrule (1) or (2) has not been committed if satisfied that certain specified levels of testosterone or hydrocortisone in the sample were of endogenous origin or a result of endogenous activity. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 Rule 240(1) expresses five factual conditions upon which its operation depends: (a) The horse is brought to a racecourse. (b) The horse started a race on that day. (c) A sample is taken from the horse prior to or following its running in any race. (d) A prohibited substance is detected in that sample. (e) That prohibited substance is on the Prohibited List A or Prohibited List B (or both).10 [34] The owners make the point that the operation of subrule (2) also depends upon those five factual conditions. They argue, because of the commonality of the requisite factual conditions under subrules (1) and (2), that the inquiry for the purposes of both subrule (1) and (2) must be held concurrently to avoid inconsistent findings. The owners emphasise the decision made pursuant to the first inquiry, that the trainer breached subrule (2), remains final and conclusive,11 with the consequence, so it is said, that any second in time inquiry will have the character of a collateral review or attack upon the first in time inquiry, or alternatively will be tainted by prejudgment. Either mischief, it is submitted, would be avoided if AR 240 is construed as only permitting a single inquiry to make a composite decision by the stewards appointed to the race meeting. [35] It is uncontroversial that consistency in decision-making in respect of the same factual question is desirable. It commonly provides the justification for not splitting court proceedings which will determine the same factual question.12 But even in respect of court proceedings, the circumstances of the case sometimes make it unavoidable that the same factual question will fall for determination in more than one proceeding.13 [36] The undoubted desirability of consistency, in deciding the same factual questions, does not justify the imposition of a restriction which is not apparent from the language of AR 240 and which would fetter the discretion of racing authorities in exercising their wide-ranging powers under the Australian Rules of Racing. [37] As already mentioned, those powers include at AR 20(h), the power to inquire ‘at any time’ into the running of any horse within the jurisdiction of the same Principal Racing Authority in the State or Territory in question. Moreover, AR 22(1) relevantly provides: AR22 Investigations and inquiries (1) Without limiting any other Stewards’ powers, the Stewards have the following powers in relation to investigations and inquiries: 10 Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Endresz; Racing Queensland Board v Endresz [2024] QCA 76, [18]. 11 Per rule 6. 12 See, for example, Pegasus Leasing Ltd v Cadoroll Pty Ltd (1996) 59 FCR 152, 159. 13 For example, r 68 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Qld) permits the Court to order separate trials where the inclusion of a party ‘may delay the trial of the proceeding, prejudice another party or is otherwise inconvenient’. In a similar vein, s 597A Criminal Code (Qld) permits the Court to order separate trials for different defendants where a defendant may be ‘prejudiced or embarrassed’ in their defence or ‘for any other reason’ it is desirable to do so. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 (a) to investigate and/or inquire into any matter in connection with racing, including without limitation: (i) any matter in connection with any race meeting … (b) to hear and make a determination in relation to any matter in connection with racing, including without limitation: (i) any matter in connection with any race meeting … [38] Those powers are doubtless cast in such broad terms because there exists such a wide array of potential circumstances which may arise in connection with racing, including in connection with a horse found to have had a prohibited substance in its body. [39] As to the language of AR 240, it separates the task of determining a disqualification, dealt with in sub-rule (1), and the task of determining a breach of the rules, dealt with in sub-rule (2). It does not stipulate those tasks must be performed compositely. [40] Importantly, different persons have rights and interests in connection with the disqualification of a horse per subrule (1) as compared to establishing a breach of the rules per subrule (2). The focus of the task under sub-rule (1), deciding whether to disqualify, is also different from the task under sub-rule (2), deciding whether there has been a breach of the rules. The stewards appear to retain a discretion under AR 259(12) whether to disqualify, despite the apparently mandatory language of AR 240(1). In a similar vein there may be discretionary considerations bearing upon whether the stewards should conclude a trainer or other person has breached the rules under AR 240(2). Moreover, even if such a finding were made, a penalty consequently imposed is itself discretionary, per AR 239, and can later be annulled by the relevant Principal Racing Authority, per AR 16(e). [41] There may exist many sound reasons why stewards, in the exercise of their discretion to investigate, inquire, hear and determine any matter in connection with racing, might proceed to decide a potential disqualification pursuant to AR 240(1) but refrain from deciding a breach pursuant to AR 240(2), or vice-versa. These may include considerations relevant to persons affected under one sub-section but not the other. Such relevant considerations might include the existence of apparently exonerating information, the need for further investigation and the absence, unavailability or ill- health of persons. [42] Suppose, for example, that stewards were provided with apparently compelling evidence showing a trainer was not involved in or aware of the administration of the prohibited substance, and refrained from pursuing the trainer per AR 240(2), but proceeded with and determined the disqualification per AR 240(1). Then, suppose they later discovered the evidence exonerating the trainer was fabricated. The owners’ urged construction would have the extraordinary effect of then precluding the pursuit of the trainer under AR 240(2). [43] It would also have the extraordinary effect in this case of precluding a fresh inquiry per AR 240(1), despite the usual position being, as the learned primary judge correctly observed, that a tribunal in the position of the Commission can conduct a fresh inquiry if its initial inquiry was tainted by jurisdictional error.14 14 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 [44] The owners’ submissions must be rejected. While it may be desirable, where practicable, for an inquiry per AR 240(1) to be held with an inquiry per AR 240(2) to try to avoid the risk of inconsistent decisions about the same facts, it is not an essential requirement of AR 240’s operation. 3. Can there be any appointment of stewards beyond those originally appointed for the race meeting? [45] The owners submit the Australian Rules of Racing, together with the Local Rules of Racing, permit only one appointment of stewards for a race meeting. [46] They highlight that the Commission appointed a panel of stewards for the race meeting, namely Mr Chadwick, Mr Aurisch, Mr Zimmerman, Mr Boyle and Ms Turner. However, at the end of the first appeal the Commission appointed a second panel of stewards, namely Mr Neal, Mr Wright and Mr Larkins. Then, subsequent to representations by the owners about the composition of the second panel, it was disbanded and the Commission appointed a third panel of stewards, consisting of Mr Murrihy, Mr Cram and Mr Daly. [47] The appointment of stewards is relevantly regulated by the Local Rules of Racing, as at 16 December 2019.15 The owners effectively argue that LR 21A of the Local Rules permits the appointment of stewards of a race meeting, so that it is only the stewards who were present and acting at the race meeting in question who may exercise the power of inquiry conferred under the rules. [48] This argument was not advanced below. That would ordinarily preclude it being raised here, however, it involves a point of law in respect of uncontroversial facts. In such a situation, the High Court held in Water Board v Moustakas,16 that an appeal court may find it is expedient and in the interests of justice to entertain such a point. The point will be dealt with in these reasons, not because it is meritorious but because, with a stewards’ inquiry still pending after repeated litigation, and potentially a fourth panel of stewards needing to be appointed if members of the third panel have become unavailable, it is in the interests of justice to quell controversy about the point. [49] The owners’ argument is heavily based upon the below emphasised passage in the following reasoning of Adam J in the 1973 Victorian case of R v Brewer; Ex parte Renzella:17 What then do the rules provide relevant to the nature of a stewards’ inquiry and the principles of natural justice? It is the stewards acting at a race meeting and no others who are to exercise the powers of inquiry conferred under the rules, A.R.(8)(d), and to convict and punish offenders. The same stewards are required to attend at race meetings and to perform what in many respects resemble the function of policemen to watch and observe racing in all its aspects, on the lookout for any improper conduct on the part of participants which may be the subject of a subsequent inquiry to be conducted by themselves. (emphasis added) 15 The more recent version of the Local Rules of Racing became effective on 1 November 2024 although it made no change to rule 21A. 16 Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491, 497. 17 R v Brewer; Ex parte Renzella [1973] VR 375, 380. -- 10 of 13 -- 11 [50] That observation was made in dealing with an argument as to whether stewards, acting as both accusers and adjudicators, offended the rules of natural justice. The reference by Adam J to it being the stewards acting at a race meeting ‘and no others’ who exercised the power of inquiry went to the duality of the role of stewards as both accusers and adjudicators. It said nothing as to the possibility of appointing stewards to exercise the power to inquire subsequent to the race day. The observation cannot sensibly inform this Court’s consideration of whether, under the rules with which this Court is concerned, a panel of stewards can be appointed subsequent to a race meeting to inquire into and adjudicate upon a matter connected with that race meeting. [51] That conclusion makes the content of the rules with which Adam J was concerned irrelevant. That in turn means leave to file and read an affidavit by Mr Stephen Hurford, dealing with those rules, should be refused because it is unnecessary to refer to them. [52] The owners’ argument is not, as they contended, supported by the content of Local Rule 21A. That rule provides: LR.21A. Appointment of stewards (1) The Principal Racing Authority may appoint Stewards of such categories as it may think fit. (2) Should the Steward appointed to be Chairman of Stewards of a Race Meeting not be present at a Race Meeting or not willing or competent to act then a Steward acting at the Race Meeting shall be appointed by the Chief Steward, Director of Integrity Operations or the Stewards present as Chairman of Stewards. (3) Should an appointed Steward or Stewards not be present at a Race Meeting or not be willing or competent to act the Chief Steward, Director of Integrity Operations or the Stewards present who are willing and competent to act may appoint Deputy Stewards to act at the Race Meeting. (4) When panel of Stewards is convened unless otherwise provided for by the Rules the majority of the Stewards on that panel shall have and may exercise all the powers, duties and authorities conferred upon the Stewards by the Rules. (5) A Steward or Deputy Steward being the sole Steward at a Race Meeting shall have and may exercise all the powers vested in the Stewards under the Rules. (6) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Rules the Chief Steward of Queensland or the Senior Steward of a regional area may appoint a Steward or Stewards. (7) A Steward appointed pursuant to (1) or (7) may exercise all the powers vested in the Stewards by the Rules of racing to inquire into, adjudicate upon and deal with any matter or incident. [53] It is only sub-rule (1) which confers a general power of appointment of stewards. The appointments referred to in sub-rules (2) and (3) relate to appointments specific to the circumstances identified therein. Those sub-rules therefore do not have the effect of confining the more general power referred in sub-rule (1). Nor do sub-rules (4) and -- 11 of 13 -- 12 (5), which merely confirm the powers of stewards, or sub-rule (6), which confirms the power of the Chief Steward or the Senior Steward of a regional area to appoint stewards. This leaves sub-rule (7), which confirms the wide-ranging power of stewards appointed under sub-rule (1), ‘to inquire into, adjudicate upon and deal with any matter or incident’.18 [54] LR 21A(1) confers a power on the relevant Principal Racing Authority to appoint stewards of such categories as it thinks fit. It is not a power with temporal limitation. Nor do its terms confine the categories of potential appointees only to those who are appointed to act as stewards at the race day. To the contrary, it expressly disavows confinement of categories of appointment, allowing the relevant Principal Racing Authority to ‘appoint stewards of such categories as it may think fit’. [55] That the Local Rules are cast in such broad terms is unremarkable. It will be recalled that AR 22 confers a power to inquire into any matter in connection with racing, including, ‘without limitation’, any matter in connection with any race meeting. More particularly, AR 20(h) empowers stewards to inquire ‘at any time’ into the running of any horse within the jurisdiction of the relevant Principal Racing Authority. The potential discovery of information relevant to the running of a horse is not limited to information discovered at the time of the race day by the stewards at the race day. As much is illustrated by the potential significance of modern forms of evidence, such as scientific testing results and digital information, which may not become available until after the race day. There may be many circumstances in which information warranting inquiry emerges after the race day at which the horse ran but it is not possible, convenient or appropriate for the same stewards appointed to act at the race day to constitute the panel of stewards who should conduct the inquiry. [56] The broad terms of LR 21A(1) cater for the variable circumstances in which it may become necessary to later appoint a different panel of stewards than those who acted at a race meeting, to inquire into the running of a horse at the race meeting. This case provides an example of such circumstances. [57] There is no merit to the owners’ first new argument. 4. Did the Commission lack jurisdiction to commence the third stewards’ inquiry while the owners’ application was before the Supreme Court? [58] The other new argument of the owners is that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to convene the third stewards’ inquiry under the Racing Integrity Act 2016 (Qld). It is necessary to explain a little of this argument to demonstrate why, the argument not having been raised below, it is not in the interests of justice to entertain it here. [59] The argument relies upon s 11 of the Racing Integrity Act which provides: 11 General restriction on functions It is not a function of the Commission to investigate – (a) a matter that has already been decided by a court, a tribunal or the Racing Appeals Panel; or (b) a matter the subject of an unfinished proceeding that has started in a court, a tribunal or the Racing Appeals Panel. 18 Sub-rule (7)’s reference to stewards appointed under sub-rule (7) is likely a drafting error in that the sub-rule does not provide for appointment and rather refers to powers. In any event that curiosity does not require resolution here. -- 12 of 13 -- 13 [60] The owners emphasise that the third panel of stewards was appointed only after the owners had initiated their second application (later amended to relate to the third panel). They submit s 11 precluded that appointment because s 11 allegedly has the effect of excluding the panel’s jurisdiction to investigate the sample analysis results. [61] This newly conceived argument urges a wide interpretation of the word ‘matter’ which is not apparent from s 11. In appointing the third panel the Commission does not appear to have been doing anything literally forbidden by s 11. It was not investigating or asking the panel to investigate the matter which was the subject of the application then before the Court. The matter which was the subject of the panel’s inquiry, provoked by the evidence of the presence of a prohibited substance, was an inquiry on the merits as to whether there should be a disqualification per AR 240(1). The matter the subject of the application before the Court was not an inquiry relating to the evidence of the prohibited substance or the merits of whether there should be a disqualification because of that evidence. To the contrary, the second application was to preclude any further inquiry and entirely avoid any hearing on the merits as to whether their horse should be disqualified. [62] In any event, even if ‘matter’ were given the broad interpretation urged, there are two reasons why it cannot be in the interests of justice to entertain this new argument. The first is there is no evidence that the third panel has performed its inquiry while this proceeding remains before the Court, thus rendering the argument academic. The second is that even if the argument meant the appointment of the third panel was invalid, that would not preclude the inevitable appointment of another panel of stewards after the completion of this proceeding. All the argument would serve to do is delay the inevitable, which is not in the interests of justice. [63] It follows this second new argument should not be entertained here. Orders [64] Both grounds of appeal have failed. The Court’s orders should be: 1. Leave to file and read the affidavit of Mr Hurford sworn 2 October 2025 is refused. 2. Appeal dismissed with costs. -- 13 of 13 --