Attorney-General v Tiers [2026] QSC 164

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Tiers [2026] QSC 164 PARTIES: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (applicant) v ALGANA TIERS (respondent) FILE NO/S: BS 7580/10 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application filed 16 June 2026 (CFI 315) ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 26 June 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 26 June 2026 JUDGE: Kelly J ORDER: 1. The application for a Division 4A order (CFI 315) be set for hearing at 10am on 20 October 2026. 2. Pursuant to ss 19D(1) and 8(2)(a) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders Act) 2003 (Qld), the respondent undergo examination by two psychiatrists, being Dr Elizabeth McVie and Dr Anna Lenardon who are to prepare reports in accordance with ss 19D(1)(f) and 11 of the Act. 3. The application be listed for review at 9.15am on 8 October 2026. 4. Pursuant to s 19D(2) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders Act) 2003 (Qld), the respondent be subject to the requirements of the supervision order made 25 May 2020 (CFI 258), as amended on 21 May 2021 (CFI 272), and as further amended on 9 April 2026 (CFI 314) until the final determination of the application filed 16 June 2026 (CFI 315). DIRECTION: 1. Pursuant to s 39PB(3) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), the Court directs that Dr Scott Harden, Dr Elizabeth Mc Vie, and Dr Anna Lenardon give -- 1 of 12 -- 2 oral evidence to the court other than by audio visual link or audio link. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – GENERALLY – where the respondent is subject to a soon to expire supervision order – where the applicant seeks an order pursuant to s 19D and s 8 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) and together with an order that the respondent be assessed by two psychiatrists in advance of a further application by the applicant for an order that the respondent be subject to a further supervision order – whether the Court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for believing the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a Division 3 order Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DBJ [2017] QSC 302 Attorney-General v Fardon [2019] 2 Qd R 487; [2018] QCA 251 COUNSEL: J Rolls for the applicant C Tessmann for the respondent SOLICITORS: Crown Law for the applicant Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent [1] The Attorney-General has applied for orders pursuant to ss 19D and 8 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders Act) 2003 (Qld) (“the Act”). By virtue of s 19D, s 8 of the Act applies to this application. Section 8 of the Act may be set out as follows: “(1) If the court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for believing the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order, the court must set a date for the hearing of the application for a division 3 order. (2) If the court is satisfied as required under subsection (1), it may make— (a) an order that the prisoner undergo examinations by 2 psychiatrists named by the court who are to prepare independent reports; and (b) if the court is satisfied the application may not be finally decided until after the prisoner’s release day— -- 2 of 12 -- 3 (i) an order that the prisoner’s release from custody be supervised; or (ii) an order that the prisoner be detained in custody for the period stated in the order.” [2] It should be observed that, by reason of this application occurring as a combination of ss 19D and 8 of the Act, it is only supervision that is to be considered on any application for a further order. In Attorney-General v Fardon [2019] 2 Qd R 487 at [11] (“Fardon”), the court relevantly observed: “The practical effect of s 8 is to provide a threshold to be met by applicants for Division 3 orders, as a prerequisite for being able to seek those orders at a final hearing. If the threshold is passed, it allows the application to proceed to a final hearing and, in the meantime, s 8 allows the court to make orders, including that the prisoner undergo a psychiatric examination.” [3] It will be apparent from what I have already said that on this type of application the court, before orders of the kind sought can be made, must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the prisoner is a “serious danger to the community” in the absence of orders made under the Act for the prisoner’s ongoing supervision. The subject matter of the belief is that the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order. A prisoner is a serious danger to the community if there is an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if released from custody or released without a supervision order being made. [4] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DBJ [2017] QSC 302 at [12]– [15], Bowskill J, as the Chief Justice then was, observed: “[12] As to what constitutes an ‘unacceptable risk’, that is ‘a matter for judicial determination, requiring a value judgement as to what risk should be accepted against a serious alternative of the deprivation of a person's liberty’. The test is not satisfied by evidence of any risk that the released prisoner may commit a further serious sexual offence. What must be established by the Attorney-General, to the requisite standard, is an unacceptable risk, the determination of which involves a balancing of competing considerations. The notion of an unacceptable risk recognises that some risk can be acceptable consistently with the adequate protection of the community. [13] In considering whether a risk is unacceptable it is necessary to take into account, and balance, the nature of the risk and the -- 3 of 12 -- 4 degree of likelihood of it eventuating, with the seriousness of the consequences if the risk eventuates. … [14] As observed in Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2013) 41 VR 359 at [6]: ‘Whether a risk is unacceptable depends upon the degree of likelihood of offending and the seriousness of the consequences if the risk eventuates. There must be a sufficient likelihood of the occurrence of the risk which, when considered in combination with the magnitude of the harm that may result and any other relevant circumstance, makes the risk unacceptable.’ [15] For present purposes, what is required is an assessment of the risk of the released prisoner committing a serious sexual offence in the absence of a further supervision order. Relevantly, the object of the Act is to ensure adequate protection of the community (s 3(a)). That does not mean the purpose of the legislation is to guarantee the safety and protection of the community. If that were the case, every risk would be unacceptable.” (footnotes omitted). [5] In terms of the respondent's history under the Act, some matters may relevantly be observed. [6] On 3 December 2010, Justice Martin ordered the respondent be released pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Act, subject to a supervision order until 8 November 2015. On 6 September 2011, there was a contravention hearing. It was found that a condition in the respondent's supervision order had been breached. He was ordered to be released to an amended supervision order. On 17 April 2012 there was another contravention proceeding, a breach was found and the respondent was released pursuant to an amended supervision order. On 11 March 2013 there was a further contravention proceeding. Contraventions were established involving a failure to comply with a curfew (clause 5), a breach of the requirement to abstain from the consumption of alcohol (clause 26), and a breach of a prohibition in respect of visiting licenced premises without permission. The respondent was released under a further amended supervision order. On 17 November 2014 the respondent was found to have ingested synthetic cannabinoids in breach of a requirement of the order. When the respondent was found to have tested presumptively positive to an illicit substance, he decamped from his accommodation in breach of a curfew direction. Despite those contraventions, he was ordered to be released subject to a -- 4 of 12 -- 5 further amended order and the duration of the order was extended so that it would expire on 17 November 2019. [7] On 22 June 2015, the respondent was found to have breached his amended supervision order by ingesting synthetic cannabis. He was released on an amended order. On 2 October 2015, he was arrested on the basis that he was likely to contravene his order. There was an application on 26 October 2015 made by the Attorney-General for relief under s 22 of the Act which was dismissed. The respondent was released pursuant to an amended supervision order. On 12 November 2015, he was arrested pursuant to s 20 of the Act, and there were allegations of breaches of requirements 5, 12 and 16 of the then supervision order. On 11 April 2016 Holmes CJ found the respondent had contravened his order by not complying with a curfew and the directions of his supervising officers. The supervision order was rescinded and he was indefinitely detained pursuant to s 22(2) of the Act. On 9 May 2017 he applied to have the continuing detention order reviewed pursuant to s 27 of the Act. On 21 June 2017, Justice Boddice affirmed the decision that the respondent was a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order pursuant to Division 3 of the Act but ordered the continuing detention order made on 11 April 2016 be rescinded. The respondent was released from custody subject to requirements until 20 June 2022. There was a requirement that he abstain from the consumption of alcohol for the duration of the order (requirement 28). [8] On 14 November 2017, the respondent was arrested for allegedly breaching requirement 28 of the order and he was detained in custody. He filed an application pursuant to s 22 of the Act on 3 October 2018. Justice Bowskill, as the Chief Justice then was, ordered that the supervision order made on 21 June 2017 be rescinded and the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for care, control, and treatment. On 27 February 2020 there was an application made for the review of the continuing detention order. On 25 May 2020 Justice Applegarth ordered that the respondent be released from custody and made subject to a supervision order to be enforced until 25 May 2025. [9] On 23 December 2020, the respondent was arrested and it was alleged that he had breached requirement 26 of his supervision order, which concerned alcohol, and he -- 5 of 12 -- 6 was ordered to be detained in custody. There was then an application for relief pursuant to s 22 of the Act. On 21 May 2021, it was found that the respondent had breached his supervision order as alleged, but he was released from custody subject to an amended order. In March 2022, he was brought before the court after the execution of a warrant alleging a breach of his supervision order by consuming cannabis and obtaining an unapproved smartphone. On 9 June 2022, the contraventions alleged were established and the respondent was released from custody subject to the existing supervision order. [10] On 11 October 2023, the respondent was brought before the court as a result of the execution of a warrant under s 20 of the Act. It was alleged that he had breached his supervision order by consuming amphetamines and methylamphetamines. On 8 March 2024, it was found that those contraventions were established. The respondent was released from custody subject to a supervision order which was amended so that the period of supervision expired on 10 May 2026. On 5 February 2026, he was brought before the court as a result of the execution of a warrant under s 20 of the Act. It was alleged that he had breached the supervision order by consuming amphetamines and or methylamphetamines. On 9 April 2026, it was found that those contraventions were established. He was released from custody subject to a supervision order. The supervision order was amended so that it expires tomorrow. [11] Dr Hardin has provided a report on the respondent dated 17 March 2026. Dr Hardin notes that the respondent was first placed on a supervision order at the end of 2010 and has been reincarcerated on approximately 12 occasions. At the time of his report, Dr Hardin was aware of the most recent breach concerning amphetamines. [12] The respondent is a 39-year-old man who, whilst intoxicated at the age of 15, committed a single sexual offence against a four-year-old stranger female child in her residence, which resulted in serious genital and non-genital injuries to the child. That offending was obviously extremely serious in nature and resulted in a separate conviction for grievous bodily harm. Dr Hardin observes that on reviewing the circumstances and the medical evidence, the outcome could easily have been significantly worse for the child. -- 6 of 12 -- 7 [13] The offending I have just described occurred approximately 24 years ago. Dr Hardin says that it is most likely that that sexual offending occurred as a result of a combination of factors, including a sense of sexual entitlement, drug and alcohol intoxication and abuse, antisocial attitudes, and an opportunistic exploitation of the availability of a victim. Dr Hardin does, however, note that there is no information to suggest that there was a paraphilic component to the offending. Dr Hardin notes that that serious offending I have just described is, “one catastrophic sexual offence committed a long time ago.” [14] The respondent has a significant juvenile history of other criminal offences such as robbery, breaking and entering, wilful damage, stealing and breaches of community-based orders. He grew up in an environment which was characterised by significant violence, physical abuse and neglect. He experienced significant instability, struggled educationally, and developed at an early age a range of criminal behaviours. Dr Hardin opines that the respondent's compliance with supervision in the community seems to have improved over time. He notes that the respondent started from a low base where he had frequent breaches of his orders in years gone by. Dr Hardin relevantly opines, “he seemed to be able to maintain himself in the community over progressively longer periods on supervision. I would regard the most recent use of methamphetamine as part of this pattern, but not indicative of increased risk of sexual offending.” [15] In terms of Dr Hardin's risk assessment, he relevantly opines as follows: “When dealing with only one catastrophic sexual offence committed a long time ago, the error of measurement in any comments on risk must of course be greater than usual (that is there is a greater than usual chance that the likelihood of reoffending could be either greater or less than that stated in my opinion). Taking into account all the available information, his current risk of sexual re-offending is now low. There has been significant decline in risk of sexual offending in the 24 years since his only offence. The risk of sexual reoffending is, in my opinion, no longer further reduced by a supervision order. That is, the risk of sexual reoffending with and without a supervision order at the current time is in the low range. At the time of the expiration of the supervision order, the risk of future serious sexual offence will be in the low range, with or without a supervision order at that time. In my opinion, a supervision order is no longer required to manage the risk of future serious sexual offence.” -- 7 of 12 -- 8 [16] In the course of his report, Dr Hardin also refers to an opinion of Dr Madsen as to the recent incident involving the use of methamphetamine. He notes that Dr Madsen was of the opinion that the use of methamphetamine was associated with heightened anxiety about the end of the order and fears of homelessness and lacking independent living skills. [17] Counsel for the Attorney-General and counsel for the respondent has referred me to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Fardon, to which I have earlier referred. In Fardon at [47]–[48], the court relevantly observed as follows:– “[47] …the existence of countervailing evidence supporting a countervailing belief does not per se mean the grounds supporting the belief contended for by the Attorney-General are not reasonable. There may potentially exist reasonable grounds for rival beliefs. “[48] It must be remembered we are not here concerned with whether we are satisfied the respondent is in fact a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order. We are only concerned at this point with whether we are satisfied there are reasonable grounds for believing he is such a danger. It is not to the point that the positive indicators of the last five years might provide reasonable grounds for a rival belief. The nub of the matter is whether the force of those recent indicators so detracts from the force of the historically sourced grounds relied upon by the appellant that those grounds are not presently reasonable grounds.” [18] I am conscious that each case must very much depend on its own factual circumstances. I have read the particular facts of Fardon and note that they are quite different facts to the facts presently before me. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern from those paragraphs of Fardon statements of principle which are applicable to this application. The respondent’s written submissions advanced the proposition that there was no “merit” in the application. That reference to “merit” appears to have been to an earlier single-instance decision of a judge of this court, which referred to the present application process as being, at least in part, to filter out unmeritorious applications. The respondent's written submissions emphasised that the only expert evidence was to the effect that the respondent's risk of committing a serious sexual offence without a supervision order was low. It was also noted that the risk level was not said to be higher than if he were to be kept on a supervision order. It was submitted that there was no basis upon which this court could conclude within the -- 8 of 12 -- 9 meaning of ss 8(1) and 19D of the Act that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent was a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order. The respondent’s written submissions at [7]–[11] emphasised the concept of serious danger to the community, what constituted an unacceptable risk, and the approach to be taken in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe. [19] The respondent identified a number of features of the present application which it was submitted ought to be determinative of the question whether this court could be satisfied of reasonable grounds for the requisite belief. [20] First, it was emphasised that the respondent's criminal history contained only the one episode of sexual offending. That was a historical offending which occurred when the respondent was 15 years old. It was emphasised that the respondent is now 39 years old. It was noted that his criminal history contains no repetition or pattern of sexual offending. [21] Second, it was stated that the matter of “greatest weight” was Dr Hardin's opinion as to the risk of committing a sexual offence in the future. [22] Third, it was said that the respondent's conduct on the supervision order supported the conclusion that he was a low risk. It was said that he engaged in regular treatment with psychologists, including most recently Dr Rowe in Townsville and Dr Madsen in Brisbane. Whilst it was accepted that he had breached conditions in the past, he had never been found to have committed a further sexual offence or attempted to do so. [23] Fourth, it was submitted that the period of time in detention or prison of some eight years and the further 16 years under orders would have provided a real deterrent to the respondent. [24] Fifth, it was noted that if the application is refused, the respondent would be still subject to significant reporting obligations under the Child Protection (Offender Reporting and Offender Prohibition Order) Act 2004 (Qld). -- 9 of 12 -- 10 [25] Sixth, it was said that whilst the index offending was very serious, there was no psychiatric evidence before the court that if the respondent were likely to reoffend, it would be in as serious a manner as the index offending. [26] Seventh, it was emphasised that the cost to the respondent's liberty would be very significant if it were kept on an order. This was said to be a powerful feature of the application. The material established that the respondent had certain plans about how he would transition into the community. [27] Having given careful consideration to the respondent's evidence, particularly the evidence provided by the report of Dr Hardin, and the careful and forceful submissions made on behalf of the respondent, I am ultimately satisfied that on this present application there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a supervision order. I have formed that view essentially by reference to the following matters, which I have considered in their totality. [28] First, it is noteworthy that the respondent’s submission was to the effect that the matter of “greatest weight” was Dr Hardin's opinion. I have read Dr Hardin's opinion with some care, and it is an opinion which, in my consideration, is significantly qualified. The qualification, which I have already set out, is to the effect that because Dr Hardin was dealing with only one catastrophic sexual offence committed a long time ago, “the error of measurement in any comments on risk must of course be greater than usual (that is there is a greater than usual chance that the likelihood of reoffending could be either greater or less than that stated in my opinion).” I read that qualification as meaning that in Dr Hardin' s view there is a greater than usual chance that the likelihood of reoffending could, relevantly, be greater than that stated in his opinion. [29] I have also had regard to the offending itself, which I have already described. It was extremely serious sexual offending which occurred in opportunistic circumstances whilst the respondent was intoxicated. I note the historical nature of that offending, but the circumstances in which it occurred, whilst the respondent was intoxicated and its opportunistic nature, are matters which are noteworthy. Whilst it may be said that there has been no further sexual offending committed by the respondent, that result falls to be considered in a context where the respondent has for a very -- 10 of 12 -- 11 significant period of time been either in incarceration or on supervision. By reason of those features, the respondent has had a very significantly reduced opportunity to engage in sexual offending. [30] I have had careful regard to the respondent's history on the various orders. It is a history which, adopting the characterisation of the Attorney-General's counsel, reflects chaotic episodes and regular non-compliance, including regular disregard of requirements in relation to alcohol and illicit drugs. I am also conscious that, according to Dr Hardin, it is uncontroversial that the respondent meets diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder, alcohol abuse disorder, marijuana abuse disorder, inhalant abuse disorder and opiate abuse disorder. Acknowledging that views might differ as to the satisfaction of the existence of reasonable grounds, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the belief required by s 8(1) of the Act. As matters presently stand, without an order, the respondent is to go out into the community with identified diagnoses of, inter alia, alcohol abuse, marijuana abuse, inhalant abuse, and opiate abuse disorders in circumstances where his most recent episode of consumption of an illicit drug or substance in disregard of a requirement of his order involved amphetamines. He would go into the community with no supervision, where that recent use of amphetamines was apparently caused by anxiety he was experiencing as a result of the prospect of his release into the community. The existence of alcohol and cannabis abuse disorders, in my consideration, are relevant to the assessment or consideration of reasonable grounds. In the community without supervision, suffering from those disorders, the respondent would have increased opportunities to be exposed to cannabis and alcohol, and increased opportunities to offend. The catastrophic sexual offence, albeit historical, was offending which was opportunistic and which occurred whilst he was intoxicated. Viewing all of these matters cumulatively and noting what I regard to be a significant qualification contained in Dr Hardin's opinion, I have reached the level of satisfaction I have earlier outlined in relation to the requirements of s 8(1) of the Act. [31] I have decided to exercise my discretion to make an order in terms of the draft provided by the Attorney-General’s counsel. In terms of the interim order, I consider that such an order, amongst other things, provides an ongoing framework through which the respondent can receive assistance to remain abstinent from -- 11 of 12 -- 12 alcohol and drugs with a view to his reintegration into the community. I accept the Attorney-General's counsel’s submission that in those respects this type of order reflects the proper exercise of my discretion in the circumstances of the case. I will make an order as per the draft order provided by the Attorney-General’s counsel. Orders 1. The application for a Division 4A order (CFI 315) be set for hearing at 10am on 20 October 2026. 2. Pursuant to ss 19D(1) and 8(2)(a) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders Act) 2003 (Qld), the respondent undergo examination by two psychiatrists, being Dr Elizabeth McVie and Dr Anna Lenardon who are to prepare reports in accordance with ss 19D(1)(f) and 11 of the Act. 3. The application be listed for review at 9.15am on 8 October 2026. 4. Pursuant to s 19D(2) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders Act) 2003 (Qld), the respondent be subject to the requirements of the supervision order made 25 May 2020 (CFI 258), as amended on 21 May 2021 (CFI 272), and as further amended on 9 April 2026 (CFI 314) until the final determination of the application filed 16 June 2026 (CFI 315). Directions 1. Pursuant to s 39PB(3) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), the Court directs that Dr Scott Harden, Dr Elizabeth Mc Vie, and Dr Anna Lenardon give oral evidence to the court other than by audio visual link or audio link. -- 12 of 12 --