Dunstan v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2026] QSC 144

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Dunstan v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2026] QSC 144 PARTIES: TANYA FELICITY DUNSTAN (applicant) v REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS, DEATHS AND MARRIAGES (first respondent) JOHN DUDLEY NEILL (second respondent) FILE NO/S: BS No 71 of 2026 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application for review ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 22 June 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 25 March 2026; supplementary written submissions on behalf of the applicant filed 1 April 2026; supplementary written submissions on behalf of the first respondent filed 10 April 2026 JUDGE: McCafferty J ORDER: 1. The application for review filed on 12 January 2026 is dismissed. 2. The interlocutory application filed on 18 May 2026 is dismissed. 3. I will hear the parties on costs. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — JUDICIAL REVIEW — REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT — DISCRETION NOT TO ENTERTAIN APPLICATION — EXISTENCE OF OTHER REVIEW OR APPEAL RIGHTS — where the applicant and second respondent were formerly in a relationship — where there is one child of the relationship — where the applicant has a further child who is not a child of the relationship (the applicant’s child) — where the second respondent resides in New Zealand with both children — where orders of a New Zealand court recognise the second respondent as an additional guardian of the applicant’s child — where the second respondent applied to the first respondent for the birth certificate of the applicant’s child — where the -- 1 of 19 -- 2 first respondent issued the birth certificate — where the applicant applies for judicial review of the first respondent’s decision to issue the birth certificate — where there are other statutory mechanisms available for review of the decision that have not been pursued by the applicant — whether the application should be dismissed ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — JUDICIAL REVIEW — PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE — EXTENSION OF TIME — GENERALLY — where the applicant applies for judicial review of a decision by the first respondent to provide the applicant’s child’s birth certificate to the second respondent — where the application is made out of time — whether the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the delay — whether an extension of time should be granted Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld), s 44, s 44(3), s 44(3)(g), s 49 Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), s 33, s 33(d), s 33(d)(iv), s 166A, s 168, s 168(1), s 168(1)(f), s 171, s 175A, s 176, s 178 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 3, s 13, s 26, s 26(1), s 26(1)(b), s 43, s 48, s 48(1), s 48(1)(a) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 6, s 6(2), s 17 Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 31, s 50, s 51 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 439, r 567, r 415, r 415(5) Allwood v Sundin, Chung, Greaves [2020] QSC 188, cited Blundell v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QSC 58, considered Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell (2020) 5 QR 367; [2020] QCA 181, applied Chibanda v Chief Executive, Queensland Health [2018] QSC 128, applied Chief Executive, Department of Environment, Science and Innovation v Nagana Yarrbayn Wangan and Jagalingou Cultural Custodians Ltd [2026] QCA 7, cited Commissioner of Police Service v Spencer [2014] 2 Qd R 23; [2013] QSC 202, applied Hunt v Gerrard; Ishiyama v Aitken [2025] QCA 126, cited Oliver v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2025] QSC 295, considered Ren v Jiang [2014] NSWCA 1, applied Sica v Attorney-General (2021) 9 QR 543; [2021] QSC 309, cited Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Nicholls [2013] QSC 68, cited COUNSEL: The applicant appeared on her own behalf G Morgan for the first respondent -- 2 of 19 -- 3 The second respondent appeared on his own behalf SOLICITORS: The applicant appeared on her own behalf Crown Law for the first respondent The second respondent appeared on his own behalf Introduction [1] Ms Dunstan and Mr Neill were once in a relationship. The pair now live in different countries: Ms Dunstan in Australia, Mr Neill in New Zealand. There is one child of the relationship. Ms Dunstan also has another child, a son. Both children live with Mr Neill in New Zealand where there are court orders which recognise him as an additional guardian of Ms Dunstan’s child. [2] In September 2023, Mr Neill applied to the Registrar of the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages (RBDM) for the birth certificate of Ms Dunstan’s child. In October 2023, the Registrar, acting under s 44 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) (BDMR Act), issued the certificate to Mr Neill (s 44 Decision). [3] Ms Dunstan seeks review of the s 44 Decision, which she contends breached her and her son's privacy. The Registrar applies under ss 13 and 48 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (Judicial Review Act) to dismiss the proceeding. Ms Dunstan separately seeks disclosure of all correspondence between the Registrar and Mr Neill relating to her and the children. [4] For the reasons that follow, the application for review must be dismissed. It follows that the application for disclosure must also be dismissed. The relevant events [5] At the time Mr Neill applied for the birth certificate, s 44 of the BDMR Act provided: “44 Obtaining information from the registrar (1) A person or other entity may apply to the registrar, in writing, for any of the following (the requested information)— (a) a certificate or information about an event that is, or may be, in a register kept by the registrar; (b) a copy of a source document. (1A) The application may be given to the registrar electronically. (2) Unless the application relates to historical information, the registrar may refuse the application if the applicant does not have an adequate reason for obtaining the requested information. (3) In deciding whether an applicant has an adequate reason for obtaining the requested information, the registrar must have regard to— -- 3 of 19 -- 4 (a) the relationship, if any, between the applicant and the person to whom the information relates; and (b) the reason that the applicant wants the information; and (c) the use to be made of the information; and (d) the age of the entry; and (e) the contents of the entry or source document; and (f) the sensitivity of the information; and (g) any other relevant factors. (4) If the applicant is not the person who created the source document, the registrar may give the applicant a copy of the source document with information obliterated.” [6] The provision is straightforward. Any person or entity may apply for a certificate. The Registrar may refuse the application if the applicant does not have an adequate reason for obtaining the information. In determining that question, the Registrar must have regard to the matters listed in s 44(3). [7] In the present case, the Registrar relied upon the following documents to make the s 44 Decision: (i) Mr Neill’s application and correspondence between him and RBDM; (ii) Mr Neill’s birth certificate and passport; (iii) a guardianship order from the Family Court in Manukau New Zealand dated 21 August 2020 appointing Mr Neill as the additional guardian of Ms Dunstan’s son (New Zealand Guardianship Order); (iv) the child’s birth certificate; and (v) a letter from the principal of the child’s school in New Zealand, dated 25 October 2023, stating that Mr Neill had day to day care of the child. [8] Ms Dunstan became aware that the certificate had been issued to Mr Neill no later than 12 December 2023, when she lodged a complaint with the Registrar. The complaint sought an explanation as to how Mr Neill, who Ms Dunstan considered has “no lawful or legally recognised authority/guardianship of [the child] in Australia” was able to access the birth certificate. [9] On 22 December 2023, the Registrar responded to the complaint. This response included the following explanation: “When RBDM receives an application for a certificate, information or source document, it is assessed under section 44 of the BDMR Act. The test to be applied is whether the applicant has an adequate reason for obtaining the certificate, information or source document they have requested. When determining whether a person has an adequate reason, RBDM must have regard to the following factors: • the relationship between the applicant and the person to whom the information relates; • the reason the applicant wants the information; • the use to be made of the information; -- 4 of 19 -- 5 • the age of the record; • the contents of the record; • the sensitivity of the information; and • other relevant factors. RBDM has received the records relating to your son’s birth registration and associated change of name, and we do not consider that a certificate has been issued improperly.” [10] On the same day, in response to the Registrar, Ms Dunstan sought the information that was provided to the Registrar by Mr Neill and “any other agencies” to obtain the birth certificate. The Registrar provided a response on 9 January 2024. It informed Ms Dunstan that she was entitled to make a Right to Information (RTI) or Information Privacy (IP) application to receive this information. [11] On 11 January 2024, Ms Dunstan submitted an RTI request seeking “all correspondence from [Mr Neill] to the registry and back pertaining to [the child’s] birth certificate”. Ordinarily, there are processing charges associated with RTI requests. On 20 February 2024, Ms Dunstan sought a waiver of these charges. This was rejected as Ms Dunstan had not provided a concession card, a requirement for waiver under Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) (RTI Act). Ms Dunstan was invited to provide her card by 14 March 2024. She did not. [12] This did not however prevent the determination of the RTI application. On 26 February 2024, Ms Dunstan was informed that there were 26 pages of information responsive to the request and she was provided with a schedule of documents. That schedules identified that of the 26 pages of information, Ms Dunstan was granted full access to six pages, partial access to 17 pages and refused access to three pages. It is apparent that the three pages for which Ms Dunstan was refused access were Mr Neill’s passport, birth certificate and an electricity bill. Those documents to which full or partial access was given are identified in the schedule. The covering letter indicates that the decision maker decided to refuse access to certain personal information being information provided by Mr Neill to the Registrar in the responsive documents and information about the school attended by Ms Dunstan’s son. The letter also informed Ms Dunstan of her entitlement to seek an internal review under the RTI Act or an external review by the Information Commissioner (IC). A request for payment of the processing charge, which had not for the reasons explained above been waived, was also made. The processing charge was not paid. During the hearing, Ms Dunstan said she was unwilling to pay because she considered the information most relevant to her request would be withheld. [13] On 15 March 2024, Ms Dunstan applied to the Registrar to change her son’s name. This was refused on 18 April 2024. This event is relevant because the letter communicating the refusal also provided a further response to Ms Dunstan’s complaint concerning the s 44 Decision. The response was: “You have stated that RBDM’s decision to provide Mr Neill with a copy of your son’s birth certificate was unlawful, breached your son’s privacy and jeopardised your family safety. You further stated that you believe Mr -- 5 of 19 -- 6 Neill obtained guardianship and day-to-day care of your son by ‘deception’. RBDM’s decision to provide Mr Neill with your son’s birth certificate was made on the basis that Mr Neill is your son’s court appointed guardian who has day-to-day care of your son and requires his birth certificate to engage in transactions on behalf of your son. RBDM was satisfied of Mr Neill’s relationship to your son as his guardian because we received: • a copy of the guardianship order from the Family Court in New Zealand; and • a letter from your son’s school confirming that Mr Neill has day- to-day care of your son. In your previous correspondence to RBDM, you provided a link to the decision of the High Court of New Zealand in relation to your family. In this decision, the High Court dismissed your appeal and confirmed that the original parenting order from the Family Court appointing Mr Neill as your son’s guardian was appropriate. A person is permitted, by law, to obtain a child’s birth certificate from RBDM if they have an adequate reason for doing so, having regard to a number of factors set out in section 44 of the [BDMR Act]. Mr Neill met this requirement and therefore RBDM released your son’s birth certificate to him. We do not consider that the certificate was released improperly.” [14] On 27 October 2025, over two years after the s 44 Decision was made, Ms Dunstan, on behalf of her son, made a complaint to the IC under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (Information Privacy Act) over the provision of the birth certificate. The outcome sought by the complaint was the release of information between Mr Neill and RBDM that allowed him to be issued with the birth certificate, a written apology and undertaking, and compensation of $20,000 for both her and her son. [15] On 21 November 2025, the IC informed Ms Dunstan that it had declined to deal with the complaint. The reason identified was that more than 12 months had elapsed since Ms Dunstan became aware of the relevant act that formed the basis of her complaint and there was no compelling reason this timeframe should not apply. The 12-month period is provided for in ss 166A and 168(1)(f) of the Information Privacy Act. The IC also considered that Ms Dunstan’s complaint appeared to have “low merit”. Ms Dunstan was also advised that she may have a right to review the IC’s decision declining to deal with the privacy complaint under the Judicial Review Act. Ms Dunstan’s application for review refers to the refusal to deal with the complaint. The IC is not however a party to this proceeding. As the Registrar correctly submits, that decision cannot be the subject of the present review. [16] On 11 November 2024, Ms Dunstan submitted another application to change her son’s name. The email attaching the application sought, amongst other things, confirmation as to when “the FOI will be issued with the correspondence [Mr Neill] provided to QLD Government to … obtain my sons [sic] birth certificate illegally.” The attachments to the application included a handwritten letter by Ms Dunstan containing the following statements: -- 6 of 19 -- 7 “6. In 2023 or 2024 [Mr Neill] tricked someone at QLD Government into breaching my & my sons [sic] privacy giving [Mr Neill] my sons [sic] birth certificate. This has placed us both in grave danger. 7. I have requested a formal FOI request to see how this privacy breach occurred which remains withheld.” [17] On 26 November 2024, RBDM responded to Ms Dunstan. In response to the “FOI” request, RBDM attached a copy of the 9 January 2024 email, referred to above, and indicated that they were unable to assist any further with Ms Dunstan’s request. [18] RBDM was apparently unaware that Ms Dunstan had already lodged an RTI application and received a decision granting partial access. Nor did she inform RBDM that the only impediment to obtaining access was her failure to pay the processing charge. Ms Dunstan’s application for review [19] On 12 January 2026, Ms Dunstan filed this proceeding. The initiating document, which is styled as an “application for review” adopts the form applicable to an application for review under s 43 of the Judicial Review Act.1 The application does not expressly refer to s 44 of the BDMR Act or the decision made under that provision. It is not however controversial that this provision is the one upon which the Registrar made the decision and from which all Ms Dunstan’s grievances and complaints have originated. [20] The application seeks various relief: a declaration that the Registrar “acted negligently in breaching Ms Dunstan and her sons [sic] privacy in providing” the birth certificate, orders that the Registrar apologise and release documents recording communications between the Registrar and Mr Neill, and damages against both Mr Neill ($200,000) and the Registrar ($850,000). During the hearing, Ms Dunstan also identified that she was seeking an order to “quash” the s 44 Decision. [21] Much of the relief sought falls outside the remedies available under s 30 of the Judicial Review Act. However, the substance of the application is clear. Ms Dunstan seeks to challenge the Registrar's decision to provide the birth certificate to Mr Neill. As she put it during argument: “ … the fundamental point of the initial review is to have a finding that they made an error of law and judgment to issue a document, and that declaration will hopefully serve as a deterrent for them to continue to make this mistake not just with me and my children, but with any other person they hold confidential information to. And I would ask that the court consider a mandate, should they continue to make these errors, that a tort will be an automated relief available to the victims, in addition to fines, or potentially sanctions or imprisonment, whatever the court deems just or appropriate, to ensure the first respondents understand the seriousness of their privacy breaches and, in my children’s case, the very fatal risk that they have placed them in, and continue to do so.” 1 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) r 567. -- 7 of 19 -- 8 The Registrar’s application to dismiss [22] The Registrar contends that Ms Dunstan’s application should be dismissed on three grounds. The first is that the application is out of time. The remaining grounds are that there are other avenues of review open to Ms Dunstan and that the application is an abuse of process. In support of each of the grounds, the Registrar primarily relies on ss 13 and 48 of the Judicial Review Act. Application is out of time [23] Section 26 of the Judicial Review Act requires that an application for a statutory order of review be made no later than 28 days after the “relevant day” or such further time as the court allows. The relevant day is defined to mean the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision is given to the applicant. Ms Dunstan was clearly aware of the Registrar’s decision to provide the certificate to Mr Neill by no later than 12 December 2023, the day on which she made a complaint to the Registrar. The Registrar’s primary submission is that Ms Dunstan was provided with a document setting out the terms of the decision on 18 April 2024 and this date should act as the relevant day. That is a submission generous to Ms Dunstan. It might be considered that Ms Dunstan was provided with a document setting out the terms of the decision on 22 December 2023, the substance of which has been set out above. Whether the relevant day was 22 December 2023 or 18 April 2024, the application filed on 12 January 2026 was well out of time. [24] Ms Dunstan submitted that the relevant limitation period was 3 years, citing the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). Section 11 of this legislation provides that an action for damages for negligence shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action arose. But Ms Dunstan’s proceeding is not such an action. As she indicated during the hearing: “Again, I do not believe I had sufficient information at the time of my filing. Based on what they have now provided, in addition to Mr Neill’s admission in his memorandum, I believe there is sufficient evidential thresholds to proceed with a tort of a privacy breach in addition to simply stating, with the judicial review, the decision of the Officer of the Investigation – or Privacy Commission to conceal the offending of the first respondents was wrong. That decision should be quashed. The decision of the Queensland Births, Deaths and Marriages should be quashed.” [25] In these circumstances, Ms Dunstan requires an extension of time under s 26 of the Judicial Review Act. The principles relevant to whether an extension should be granted were summarised by Applegarth J in Chibanda v Chief Executive, Queensland Health2 as follows: “[19] Judicial review of administrative decisions should be undertaken promptly. The requirement to bring a proceeding within the stipulated or a reasonable time is normally essential to that outcome. As was observed in Aurukun Bauxite Development Pty Ltd v 2 [2018] QSC 128 (“Chibanda”) at [19]. -- 8 of 19 -- 9 Queensland, a party is ‘not entitled to arrogate the decision when to start a proceeding to themselves, in violation of a statutory requirement to bring it within a particular timeframe…’ Entities and individuals are entitled to proceed on the basis that a decision is not going to be the subject of a judicial review challenge if no such challenge is brought within a reasonable time. [20] Ordinarily, a proceeding commenced outside the limitation period should not be entertained, unless the applicant shows an acceptable explanation for the delay, and that it would be fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend the time. The absence of an explanation is a persuasive factor against granting an extension of time. [21] The prospects of success of an application may be a relevant factor. An application which is without prospects is unlikely to be granted an extension of time, even if there is a satisfactory explanation for delay.” (citations omitted) [26] An explanation for Ms Dunstan’s delay is identified in paragraph 6 of the application for review. It is unnecessary to reproduce this passage. It is not in any event a sworn explanation. The only possible explanation that Ms Dunstan has sworn to is as follows: “I do not believe it is reasonable to penalise me for delays in FOI requests while waiting for responses of complaints etc while managing grief, trauma, loss, court abuse and PTSD, clearly exhausting avenues and waiting for the complaints and other possible avenues to obtain this information.” [27] Accepting this statement as truthful and genuinely held, it does not explain a delay of more than 18 months. The absence of an adequate explanation strongly militates against an extension of time.3 In the circumstances I do not consider Ms Dunstan has provided an adequate explanation for her delay. This is a sufficient reason to decline an application to extend time. [28] As to the second consideration, whether an extension would be fair and equitable depends upon a wide range of circumstances. It includes prejudice to the respondents, third parties, and the public interest.4 The mere fact that there might be an absence of prejudice to the respondent is not sufficient to grant an extension.5 In my view, quite apart from the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation, the public interest is not served by granting an extension of time. The public interest is not served by encouraging delay. As Applegarth J observed in Chibanda, judicial review should be undertaken promptly. That did not occur here. [29] The prospects or merits of the application may also be a relevant factor. An application which is without merit is “unlikely to be granted an extension of time, even if there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay.”6 3 Chibanda at [20]. 4 Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Nicholls [2013] QSC 68 at [78]. 5 Allwood v Sundin, Chung, Greaves [2020] QSC 188 at [247]. 6 Chibanda at [21]. -- 9 of 19 -- 10 [30] On the clearest view of matters, the main challenge to the s 44 Decision advanced in the application for review (other than the proposition that it represented a breach of privacy) is that Mr Neill has no “legal guardianship entitlements in Australia” for her son and that Mr Neill made certain misrepresentations or concealed certain matters from the Registrar (which Mr Neill denies) to obtain the certificate. [31] This is supplemented by three further points. Two are contained within Ms Dunstan’s affidavit material. The third was advanced during oral submissions. The first point is that the Registrar should not have had regard to, or should not have accepted from Mr Neill, the New Zealand Guardianship Order. The reason why, so Ms Dunstan contends, is that this order, which is an overseas custody order, cannot be accepted unless it is registered in accordance with s 23 of the Family Law Regulations 2024 (Cth). [32] The second point is that s 33(d)(iv) of the Information Privacy Act has been breached. This provision provides: “33 Disclosure of personal information outside Australia An agency may disclose an individual’s personal information to an entity outside Australia only if— (a) the individual agrees to the disclosure; or (b) the disclosure is authorised or required under a law; or (c) the agency is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is necessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the life, health, safety or welfare of an individual, or to public health, safety or welfare; or (d) 2 or more of the following apply— (i) the agency reasonably believes that the recipient of the personal information is subject to a law, binding scheme or contract that effectively upholds principles for the fair handling of personal information that are substantially similar to the QPPs; (ii) the disclosure is necessary for the performance of the agency’s functions in relation to the individual; (iii) the disclosure is for the benefit of the individual but it is not practicable to seek the agreement of the individual, and if it were practicable to seek the agreement of the individual, the individual would be likely to give the agreement; (iv) the agency has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the personal information it discloses will not be held, used or disclosed by the recipient of the information in a way that is inconsistent with the QPPs.” [33] The third point was an assertion that s 44(3) of the BDMR Act was not complied with. As already explained, this subsection lists the matters to which the Registrar must have regard in deciding whether an applicant has an adequate reason for obtaining a -- 10 of 19 -- 11 birth certificate. Ms Dunstan asserted that she believed the registrar did not consider each of the matters in subsections (a) to (g). The submission, which did not address each of the subsections, was expressed in this way: “So I believe they did not consider the relationship between Mr Neill, who is not a biological parent of my son. They did not consider my relationship with my son being the only parent or guardian listed on the birth certificate. They did not consider (3)(b), the reason that the applicant wanted the information, which I know was to unilaterally enrol him in the school without my knowledge or consent, which is in breach of joint guardianship. … I also state that they have disregarded – when they say the age of the entry, I’m not sure whether that means the date at which it was entered, which would be the 21st of September, or the age of the person making the entry. It certainly doesn’t classify as historic, but it’s questionable and maybe they want to clarify how they interpret that particular wording. The contents of the entry or the source document. Well, the contents of the entry, per se, would be the birth certificate that John isn’t named on. Surely, they would have had my contact information, because I am. They know that he’s got it at the time. If my son was born in 2012, he was around 10, 11 at the time that Mr Neill has requested this, just before his 11th birthday. Why would Mr Neill have imagined anything would have changed to have that document and why did he need it again? Like, for anyone else that is the very definition of vexatious. It’s meritless. What’s the point? Why does he need a document he already has? … So section 44, subsection (3) we are down to (e), which was the contents of the entry or source of information. Then (f) is the sensitivity of the information pertaining to a minor in a foreign country. I would say that’s pretty significant. I’m not sure how Births, Deaths and Marriages tiers their seriousness of vulnerable adults or children, but that would be pretty sensitive. And (g) other relevant factors, which I believe to be trans- Tasman matters, compliance with international privacy legislation, the views of the other parties involved, safety issues, domestic violence orders in place, history of any abuse, which at that stage was recorded in three states. So I think the real question would be which of those sections can the first respondents satisfy the court they have complied with? Because I only need to prove they haven’t complied with one of them for this to be flawed …” [34] In my view, each of these contentions is without merit. [35] First, the allegation that Mr Neill misrepresented matters is irrelevant unless the decision-maker knew of those matters when the decision was made. There is no basis to suggest that was so. The contention that Mr Neill has no legal guardianship entitlements in Australia does not preclude him from making an application under s 44. The provision allows an application to be made by “any person”. A similar point -- 11 of 19 -- 12 applies to the New Zealand Guardianship Order. The fact that this order has not been registered does not preclude the Registrar from receiving it. The point of registration under the Family Law Regulations is to enable overseas custody orders to be enforced in Australia. It has no bearing on an agency, such as RBDM, receiving such a document in support of an application under s 44. [36] Second, Ms Dunstan’s reliance on s 33(d)(iv) of the Information Privacy Act is misplaced. Section 33 permits the disclosure of information to an entity (which includes a person7) if one of subparagraphs (a) to (d) is satisfied. That is obvious from the use of the disjunctive. Section 44 of the BDMR Act authorised the issuing of the certificate if Mr Neill had an adequate reason. If that was the case, there was no obligation on the Registrar to comply with s 33(d)(iv) as Ms Dunstan contends. [37] Third, the contention that s 44(3) was not complied with overlooks the Registrar's letter of 18 April 2024, which addresses the substance of the matters required to be considered. The arguments advanced by Ms Dunstan that the Registrar should have considered, under s 44(3)(g) as other relevant factors, “trans-Tasman matters, compliance with international privacy legislation, the views of the other parties involved, safety issues, domestic violence orders in place, history of any abuse, which at that stage was recorded in three states” are matters which the Registrar could not have regard to. The reason why is self-evident: the Registrar had no means of knowing such matters. But even more fundamentally, it is difficult to see how these matters could be “relevant factors” as to whether Mr Neill had an adequate reason for obtaining the requested information. After all, the focus of s 44 is limited to there being an adequate reason for obtaining the information. The focus is not on why the applicant should not be permitted the information. [38] In these circumstances, the refusal of an extension of time is sufficient to dispose of the application. Nevertheless, it is desirable to address the Registrar's remaining arguments. Section 13 [39] Section 13 of the Judicial Review Act provides: “13 When application for statutory order of review must be dismissed Despite section 10, but without limiting section 48, if— (a) an application under section 20 to 22 or 43 is made to the court in relation to a reviewable matter; and (b) provision is made by a law, other than this Act, under which the applicant is entitled to seek a review of the matter by another court or a tribunal, authority or person; the court must dismiss the application if it is satisfied, having regard to the interests of justice, that it should do so.” (emphasis added) 7 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), Sch 1. -- 12 of 19 -- 13 [40] The term “review” in s 13(b) is defined in s 3 of the Judicial Review Act. It includes a review by way of “reconsideration, rehearing or appeal”. [41] The argument advanced by the Registrar in reliance on s 13 is that provision was made under s 49 of the BDMR Act which entitled Ms Dunstan to seek a review in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) of the s 44 Decision in accordance with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act). No review was sought by Ms Dunstan and this Court should be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that her current application be dismissed. [42] The primary issue raised by this argument is whether s 49 is a provision under another law which entitles (or entitled) Ms Dunstan to seek a review of the Registrar’s decision. In my view, it was. Section 49, then in force, provided that a “person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the registrar may, as provided under the QCAT Act, apply to QCAT for a review of the decision.” Section 44 conferred on the Registrar the discretion to decide to provide an applicant with a birth certificate. The exercise of that discretion plainly met the description of “a decision of the registrar”. It follows that s 49 conferred jurisdiction upon QCAT to review the s 44 Decision. [43] The consequence of this was that a decision under s 44 of the BDMR Act is a reviewable decision. This term is defined in s 17 of the QCAT Act which provides: “(1) The tribunal’s review jurisdiction is the jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal by an enabling Act to review a decision made or taken to have been made by another entity under that Act. (2) For this Act, a decision mentioned in subsection (1) is a reviewable decision and the entity that made or is taken to have made the decision is the decision-maker for the reviewable decision.” [44] For the purposes of s 17 of the QCAT Act, the BDMR Act is an enabling Act.8 [45] QCAT's review jurisdiction is a merits review conducted by way of a fresh hearing directed to achieving the correct and preferable decision. The tribunal is not limited to the evidence before the decision-maker; it can receive additional evidence. On review, the tribunal has various powers: it can confirm or amend the decision; set aside the decision and substitute its own; or it may set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision maker for the decision, with the directions the tribunal considers appropriate. [46] The process of review provided for by QCAT’s review jurisdiction falls within the meaning of the concept of “review” contemplated by ss 3 and 13(b) of the Judicial Review Act.9 Section 13 requires the court to dismiss the application if it is satisfied, having regard to the interests of justice, that it should do so. [47] Ms Dunstan argues that it is not in the interests of justice to dismiss the application, a concept she contends includes: 8 QCAT Act s 6(2). 9 Blundell v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QSC 58 at [23]; Oliver v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2025] QSC 295 at [26]. -- 13 of 19 -- 14 “ … consideration of procedural fairness, public interest with adherence to safety measures, and compliance with overarching statutory rights or relief for breaches across human rights, including that to be free from discrimination, victimisation and breach of privacy – in this case, restricting freedom of movement for two children and the breach of my guardianship rights to protect my children, which is exactly what has happened.” [48] These submissions are largely conclusory. Even assuming they have identifiable content, they do not provide a compelling reason why s 13 should not operate. As a matter of principle, this Court’s jurisdiction should not be invoked in circumstances where there are other processes of review available which an applicant has not pursued. As Martin J (as his Honour then was) said in Blundell v Queensland Building and Construction Commission:10 “It has long been accepted that ‘as a general rule judicial review should not be seen as a substitute for the appellate process in the civil court.’ The same applies for review processes available through a tribunal such as QCAT.” [49] A similar observation was made by Bowskill CJ in Oliver v Queensland Building and Construction Commission:11 “QCAT is the tribunal in which disputes of this kind ought to be determined, and it is appropriate, in the interests of justice, for [the applicant] to seek review of the decision, on its merits, in QCAT, rather than invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.” [50] Consistent with this theme, judicial resources should not be consumed by judicial review proceedings where a merits review is available and has not been pursued. The fact that the time for any application to QCAT has now expired is not relevant to the operation of s 13 and the interests of justice. It has been observed that this provision should not be circumvented by a failure to utilise a remedy, the existence of which attracts its operation.12 That is plainly correct. [51] In these circumstances, Ms Dunstan had an entitlement to seek a merits review in QCAT. There is no sufficient reason, having regard to the interests of justice, not to dismiss the application under s 13. [52] It is open to argument whether s 13 captures non-JRA relief. The provision is limited to “applications” under ss 20 to 22 and 43 made in relation to a “reviewable matter”. Arguably the provision does not, on its face at least, extend to relief beyond the scope of these applications. It is not however necessary to decide the point because s 13 operates “without limiting section 48” which, for the reasons explained below, extends to non-JRA relief. Section 48 [53] Section 48 of the Judicial Review Act provides: 10 [2018] QSC 58 at [32]. 11 [2025] QSC 295 at [34]. 12 Commissioner of Police Service v Spencer [2014] 2 Qd R 23; [2013] QSC 202 at [98] (Henry J). -- 14 of 19 -- 15 “48 Power of the court to stay or dismiss applications in certain circumstances (1) The court may stay or dismiss an application under section 20, 21, 22 or 43 or a claim for relief in such an application, if the court considers that— (a) it would be inappropriate— (i) for proceedings in relation to the application or claim to be continued; or (ii) to grant the application or claim; or (b) no reasonable basis for the application or claim is disclosed; or (c) the application or claim is frivolous or vexatious; or (d) the application or claim is an abuse of the process of the court. (2) A power of the court under this section— (a) must be exercised by order; and (b) may be exercised at any time in the relevant proceeding but, in relation to the power to dismiss an application, the court must try to ensure that any exercise of the power happens at the earliest appropriate time. (3) The court may make an order under this section— (a) of its own motion; or (b) on an application by a party to the proceeding. (4) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under this section. (5) An appeal may be brought from an order under this section only with the leave of the Court of Appeal.” (emphasis added) [54] As Burns J (as his Honour then was) observed in Sica v Attorney-General:13 “Section 48(1)(a) Judicial Review Act 1991 confers a general power on the Court to stay or dismiss an application if the Court considers it inappropriate to permit a proceeding to continue or to grant the application. The power has been described as a broad one, and may be exercised by the Court on its own motion. It has been called in aid to, amongst other things, end a proceeding which concerned a decision that was not subject to the Judicial Review Act 1991 and where the Court determined that the application was ‘doomed to fail’. The provision is not to be read down by reference to paras (b), (c) and (d) of s 48(1). Instead, it should fully operate according to its terms, subject only to the constraint that the inappropriateness must relate either to the continuation of the 13 (2021) 9 QR 543 at [6]. -- 15 of 19 -- 16 proceeding or to the granting of the application. The power is not confined to cases where error is demonstrated; s 48(1)(a) can be pressed into service even if error on the part of the decision-maker is shown, for example, where there is good reason for otherwise not allowing the proceeding to continue or for not granting the relief sought. Plainly, a clear case will be required before the Court may conclude that an application should be stayed or summarily dismissed, but this is one such case.” (citations omitted) [55] The power to dismiss or stay an application under s 48 applies to applications under ss 20, 21, 22, 43 or “a claim for relief in such an application”. The plain contemplation of s 48 is that it confers power to dismiss non-JRA claims.14 The power may be exercised if the court considers that one or more of paragraphs (a) to (d) apply. The power is intended to be a broad one. That is best illustrated by the following observations made on the operation of s 48(1)(a) in Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell:15 “Because of the breadth of the power under s 48(1)(a), that provision is not confined to cases where error is demonstrated. The authorities show that s 48(1)(a) can be used, however, even if error on the part of the decision-maker could be shown, where there is good reason for otherwise not allowing the proceeding to continue or not granting the relief sought. That may include that no practical consequences would flow from the outcome or there is an alternative practicable or preferable means for addressing an applicant’s complaint which may not fall strictly within s 12 or s 13 of the Act. As the granting of any relief in respect of an application for judicial review is discretionary, it may be that where the Court foresees that in a particular case it would exercise the discretion to refuse the relief, that may also be an appropriate case for summary dismissal under s 48(1)(a). The test of ‘inappropriate’ makes the power under s 48(1)(a) ‘a broad one’.” (emphasis added) [56] The Registrar invites the exercise of the power on the basis that it would be inappropriate to allow the proceedings to continue having regard to the delay and the availability of other avenues of review. It is also submitted that Ms Dunstan’s application is being used for the purpose of obtaining documents held by the Registrar beyond the scope of what could be relevant to the s 44 decision. [57] In considering this submission, and the potential operation of s 48 to the present case, it is relevant to consider what Ms Dunstan seeks to achieve by her application. That is informed by the relief sought. It is as follows: “1. A declaration that [RBDM] acted negligently in breaching [Ms Dunstan’s] and [her son’s] privacy in providing [the] birth certificate to [Mr Neill] who is not his father or legal guardian in Australia. 14 Hunt v Gerrard; Ishiyama v Aitken [2025] QCA 126 at [113] (Bond JA); Chief Executive, Department of Environment, Science and Innovation v Nagana Yarrbayn Wangan and Jagalingou Cultural Custodians Ltd [2026] QCA 7 at [176] (Doyle JA). 15 (2020) 5 QR 367; [2020] QCA 181 (“Kadell”) at [55]. -- 16 of 19 -- 17 2. An order for [RBDM] to formally apologise to Ms Dunstan and her son in writing for this privacy breach and the extreme distress and harm this has caused them and their family. 3. A direction for [RBDM] to immediately release all records and files pertaining to this breach and all communication from [Mr Neill] to [RBDM] that allowed him to obtain confidential legal documents, and [RBDM] responses. 4. An undertaking of an external investigation and retraining of [RBDM] to protect other victims from the safe potentially fatal privacy breaches. 5. Damages awarded in [sic] the plaintiff [Ms Dunstan] and her son for: a) the first defendant of $850,000 AUD b) the second defendant of $200,000 AUD [$100,000 for Ms Dunstan and $100,000 for her son] due to this conduct being made in bad faith with malicious intent to further harm Ms Dunstan and her son.” [58] The relief sought is directed principally to what Ms Dunstan characterises as a privacy breach arising from the s 44 Decision. The Information Privacy Act provides a mechanism for addressing such complaints. Ms Dunstan knows this. She has made a complaint. It has been rejected by the IC. The IC is not a party to the present proceeding. If Ms Dunstan wishes to review the IC’s decision that is a matter for her. But this decision cannot properly be the subject of the present review. [59] For present purposes, the fact that the Information Privacy Act provides for a mechanism for privacy complaints is relevant to the operation of s 48 for the reasons identified in Kadell above. It is unnecessary to set out in detail the provisions. It is sufficient to record some salient aspects of the statutory regime created by the legislation. It requires the IC, assuming a complaint is accepted, to consider whether a resolution of the complaint could be achieved through mediation and, if so, obliges the IC to take all reasonable steps to cause the complaint to be mediated.16 There is also a procedure by which a complainant can request the IC to refer the privacy complaint to QCAT. If such a referral is made, QCAT must exercise its original jurisdiction under the QCAT Act to hear and decide a privacy complaint.17 [60] If, following the QCAT process, the tribunal is satisfied that the breach the subject of the complaint has been substantiated, it has the power to make various orders.18 These include orders that the relevant respondent not repeat or continue the act or practice the subject of the complaint or that they apologise to the complainant. The tribunal may also order payment of compensation of not more than $100,000 “for loss or damage suffered by the complainant because of the act or practice the subject of the complaint, including for any injury to the complainant’s feelings or humiliation suffered by the complainant.” 16 Information Privacy Act s 171. 17 Information Privacy Act s 175A, 176. 18 Information Privacy Act s 178. -- 17 of 19 -- 18 [61] The powers exercisable by QCAT under the Information Privacy Act for a substantiated privacy complaint are, with one exception which I detail below, near identical to the relief sought by Ms Dunstan. This is relevant because it demonstrates, to adopt the language of Kadell, that there is an alternative practicable or preferable means for addressing Ms Dunstan’s complaint. On this basis I find that the power under s 48 ought to be exercised because it would be inappropriate for the present proceeding to continue. That the IC has declined to investigate Ms Dunstan’s complaint because it was out of time is not in my view relevant to the operation of s 48 for the same reasons expressed in relation to s 13: the operation of s 48 should not be circumvented by a failure to utilise a remedy, the existence of which attracts its operation.19 [62] The exception is the relief sought in relation to disclosure of documents. This aspect of the relief is, however, precisely what the Registrar has granted Ms Dunstan access to. Her RTI application made in January 2024 sought “all correspondence from [Mr Neill] to the registry and back pertaining to [her son’s] birth certificate”. As already explained, access was granted to certain documents. The documents have not been provided because Ms Dunstan has not paid the processing charge. Ms Dunstan should not be permitted to seek relief in this Court in circumstances where she has refused to pay a processing charge which would provide to her the documents she seeks. That alone is a reason why, consistent with Kadell, it is inappropriate for the proceeding to continue. It is not relevant that access to these documents is restricted. Ms Dunstan had the right to review the decision under the RTI Act, either internally or externally, with the IC. She has chosen not to do so. That she has made this choice does not entitle her to seek to relief in the form of the current application. [63] For these reasons, the application for review is dismissed. That includes the relief sought against Mr Neill who is not, on any view, a decision maker. It follows that Ms Dunstan’s application for disclosure is also dismissed. Other matters arising [64] There are two further matters which it is necessary to address. The first concerns a subpoena for production and to give evidence issued by Ms Dunstan against Mr Neill on 20 March 2026. There are two issues with the subpoena. While it correctly stated the date, time and place to give evidence, it does not identify the documents to be produced and therefore does not meet the mandatory formal requirements of UCPR 415(5). The other issue is that Mr Neill lives in New Zealand. The consequence is that Ms Dunstan required leave of the Court to serve the subpoena. This is the consequence of s 31 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) which provides, relevantly: “31 Subpoenas not to be served in New Zealand without leave (1) If the proceeding is in an Australian court, the subpoena must not be served in New Zealand without the leave of the court. (2) If the proceeding is in an Australian tribunal, the subpoena must not be served in New Zealand without the leave of an inferior Australian court. 19 Commissioner of Police Service v Spencer [2014] 2 Qd R 23; [2013] QSC 202 at [98] (Henry J). -- 18 of 19 -- 19 (3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave under subsection (1) or (2), the court must take into account: (a) the significance of the evidence to be given, or the document or thing to be produced, by the person named; and (b) whether the evidence, document or thing could be obtained by other means without significantly greater expense, and with less inconvenience to the person named. …” [65] One week before the hearing, Ms Dunstan filed an application seeking leave for the subpoena to be issued. As at the date of the hearing, that application had not yet been dealt with by the Court. In any event, Mr Neill, who is a party, appeared at the proceedings via audio-visual link.20 It would not in the circumstances have been appropriate to grant leave to issue the subpoena. [66] Ms Dunstan sought to cross-examine Mr Neill on the basis, as she put it, of “my right to have the information that’s on the file tested” to “ensure there is not an apparent miscarriage of justice”. Mr Neill had not provided an affidavit. It follows that UCPR r 439 did not provide a basis to order that he be cross-examined. Cross-examination could therefore only occur with leave. As Leeming JA said in Ren v Jiang:21 “Cross-examination in support of an interlocutory application is not as of right but requires leave (contrary to the submissions which were initially made to me at the directions hearing), which leave is granted ‘cautiously’ and normally ‘somewhat sparingly’ … It is common practice not to permit cross-examination at all in interlocutory matters …” [67] Ms Dunstan's explanation for seeking to cross-examine Mr Neill did not justify the grant of leave to do so. [68] The second matter concerns an application foreshadowed by Ms Dunstan for leave to amend her review application. The transcript extracted above is consistent with Ms Dunstan wishing to pursue a “tort of a privacy breach”. No application to amend was made, and no proposed pleading was provided. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the matter further. The outcome of this application has not been determined on the basis of any alleged “tort of privacy”. Conclusion [69] The application for review filed on 12 January 2026 is dismissed. The interlocutory application filed on 18 May 2026 is also dismissed. [70] I will hear the parties on costs. 20 See s 51 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). In any case, if evidence was to be given by Mr Neill, the court had power, on application, to give leave under s 50, for the giving of evidence or the examination from New Zealand via remote evidence. 21 [2014] NSWCA 1 at [11]. -- 19 of 19 --