Churchie Foundation Limited and St Aidan’s Foundation Limited as trustee for the St Aidan’s Foundation School Trust v Crouch [2026] QSC 127

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Churchie Foundation Limited and St Aidan’s Foundation Limited as trustee for the St Aidan’s Foundation School Trust v Crouch [2026] QSC 127 PARTIES: CHURCHIE FOUNDATION LIMITED (ACN 010 918 966) AND ST AIDAN’S FOUNDATION LIMITED (ACN 089 460 542) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ST AIDAN’S FOUNDATION SCHOOL TRUST (applicants) v TIMOTHY MICHAEL HENRY CROUCH (respondent) FILE NO/S: BS 4992/25 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 12 June 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 22 May 2026, further written submissions provided 3 June 2026. JUDGE: Treston J ORDER: 1. By 4:00pm on 26 June 2026, the respondent must: (a) comply with paragraph 9 of the Orders of Crow J made on 2 December 2025 (Crow J Orders) by transferring all estate funds in his possession or control, and/or the possession or control of the firm of which he is a director, to the trust account of Cornford-Scott Lawyers: (i) including any interest accrued thereon; and (ii) without first deducting any sum for his professional or other fees or outlays, whether incurred, billed, recorded, assessed, or invoiced before or after 2 December 2025. (b) comply with paragraph 10 of the Crow J Orders by delivering a complete copy of all estate documents in his possession or control and/or the possession or control of the firm of which he is a director to the office of Cornford-Scott Lawyers; -- 1 of 13 -- 2 (c) provide copies of all bank statements relevant to the investment of any estate funds from 2 December 2025 to the date of closure of the relevant account/s; and (d) reimburse the estate, by way of payment to the trust account of Cornford-Scott Lawyers, the sum of $6,996.67 which was paid from estate funds. 2. The respondent shall personally bear: (a) any penalties or charges incurred as a result of withdrawing any estate funds, in order to comply with paragraph 9 of the Crow J Orders and paragraph 1(a) above; (b) any costs or charges incurred as a result of any need by the respondent to uplift the file from any cost assessor to whom the respondent has provided the estate file, in order to comply with paragraph 10 of the Crow J Orders and paragraph 1(b) above. 3. The respondent shall personally pay any interest on any part of the estate funds not transferred in accordance with paragraph 1(a) above at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, from 26 June 2026 to the date payment is received into the trust account of Cornford-Scott Lawyers. 4. Pursuant to s 6 of the Succession Act 1981, the Administrator is directed that, for the purposes of complying with paragraph 12 of the Crow J Orders, she is justified in requiring a long form costs assessment of the respondent’s professional costs and outlays of the administration of the estate from 4 April 2017 to 2 December 2025. 5. Subject to s 342 of the Legal Profession Act 2007, the costs of the assessment in paragraph 4 are to be paid from the estate. 6. The Administrator’s costs of this application are to be paid by the respondent personally fixed in the sum of $40,555.17. 7. The respondent shall bear his own costs of this application and not be indemnified from the estate for such costs, or any costs of complying with these orders or the Crow J Orders. 8. Pursuant to s 6 of the Succession Act 1981, the Administrator is directed that she is justified in setting off any amount payable by respondent pursuant to -- 2 of 13 -- 3 these orders, and the Crow J Orders, against any amount payable to the respondent from the estate. CATCHWORDS: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – LIENS – POSSESSORY LIENS – WHEN ARISES – where defendant appointed executor pursuant to a Will, for which probate was granted on 27 July 2017 – defendant removed by order of Supreme Court on 2 December 2025 and replaced by an independent administrator – defendant now relies on a solicitor’s possessory lien to resist production of documents and funds held by the defendant on behalf of the estate – whether a solicitors’ lien available to resist a claim for production to an independent administrator – where lien inapplicable at law, or otherwise extinguished by waiver, conduct or order – where lien inoperative or extinguished CIVIL PROCEDURE – COSTS – INDEMNITY COSTS – FIXED OR LUMP SUM COSTS – POWER TO ORDER – where defendant wholly unsuccessful in resisting application to enforce previous orders made by the court – where legal position clear, and defendant’s opposition untenable – whether indemnity costs should be ordered – where costs ordered – where fixing costs would save the imposition of the time, trouble and delay of an assessment – where interests of remainder beneficiaries relevant – where application follows the removal of an executor of an estate not finalised after nine years, and the incurring of legatee interest – whether appropriate to fix costs ordered – whether sufficient evidence placed before the court so as to allow an assessment of quantum – where fixed costs ordered Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 342 Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 6 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 681, r 687 Anderson v Lockhart [1991] 1 Qd R 501, cited Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3–Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] 2 Qd R 298, cited Barratt v Gough-Thomas [1951] Ch 242, cited Bechara t/as Bechara & Co v Atie & Anor [2005] NSWCA 268, considered Belaney v Ffrench [1873] LR. 8 Ch. 918, applied Boughton v Boughton [1878] 23 Ch. D. 169, applied Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, applied Hughes v Hughes [1958] 3 All ER 179, cited In the estate of Margaret Ann Cervo (Administrator Pendente Lite Appointed) [2024] ACTSC 253, considered Leeper v Primary Producers Bank of Australia Ltd (In Vol Liq) (1935) 53 CLR 250, cited Ly Ty Tran, Re; Ex Parte Dixon v Ly Ty Tran Cao (1995) 62 FCR 432, cited -- 3 of 13 -- 4 Moloney and Anor v Marler and Darvall [2004] QCA 310, cited Re a Barrister and Solicitor; Re Legal Practitioners Ordinance 1970 (ACT) (1979) 40 FLR 26, cited Re Clark; ex-parte Newland (1876) 4 Ch D 515, cited Re: Dunstan (No. 2) (2000) 155 FLR 189, considered Re Weedman [1996] FCA 1112, cited Stark v Dennet [2008] 2 Qd R 72, cited Trouton v Trouton (No. 2) [2023] QSC 29, considered COUNSEL: KJ Kluss for the independent administrator SB Whitten for the respondent SOLICITORS: Cornford-Scott Lawyers for the independent administrator Crouch & Co for the respondent No appearance for the applicants [1] On 2 December 2025, Justice Crow made an order removing Timothy Michael Henry Crouch, the respondent to these proceedings, as the executor of the estate of John Arthur Gradwell (the 2025 Orders). [2] Mr Gradwell had died on 4 April 2017. His last will, drafted by the respondent, was dated 23 April 2013. [3] When the 2025 Orders were made removing the respondent as the executor, conventional orders were made for the respondent’s removal and the vesting of the estate into the hands of an independent Administrator, Angela Cornford-Scott. I will return to the form of the orders. [4] Having been removed as executor, the Administrator called upon the respondent to transmit all the assets of the estate to the Administrator, and otherwise to provide the respondent’s file so that the Administrator could attend to the final administration of the estate. The respondent refused to comply with that request primarily on two bases: (a) he claimed that the sum of $300,000 which he held on investment, and the file, were subject to a lien in favour of his professional costs; and (b) he suggested that there were certain limitations on the 2025 Orders such that it was unnecessary to provide all the documentation pertaining to the administration which the respondent had been attempting to carry out over a period of nine years. The respondent asserted that the 2025 Order did not override his lien over the file or estate funds to cover his costs.. [5] The Administrator attempted to negotiate with the respondent to no avail, and ultimately brought this application. [6] At the hearing of the application, the respondent abandoned his resistance to providing the file to the Administrator, he having satisfied himself with the explanation provided by the Administrator as to why the entirety of the file was -- 4 of 13 -- 5 relevant. He maintained however his right to hold the estate funds of $300,000 on the basis of his asserted lien. [7] The Administrator applies pursuant to s 6 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) (the Act) for a variety of orders to compel compliance with the 2025 Orders, and costs. [8] For the reasons which follow, the Administrator ought to have the orders sought. Legal Principles [9] A solicitor’s retaining (or general) lien arises as a matter of common law between a solicitor and their client in respect of any papers or other chattels that are the property of the client and that have come into the solicitor’s possession in the course of their business in a professional capacity,1 until their costs have been paid.2 The retaining lien does not entitle a solicitor to refuse to produce documents or property that their client would otherwise be obliged to produce to a third-party.3 [10] The right to retain documents and property of the client until a solicitor’s bills are paid has been described as a passive and possessory right,4 that “exists for the protection of the solicitor’s claim for costs and disbursements, and for no other purpose …”.5 It is not of the character of an encumbrance or equitable charge.6 The right operates “till [the solicitor] is satisfied”,7 and is not extinguished by allegations of professional negligence (though this may be a basis to obtain delivery, subject to terms which protect the lien). [11] A lien may be extinguished where the interests of justice require it to prevent harm to the client (such as is commonly observed in the case of pressing litigation or criminal proceedings),8 where possession of the relevant documents has been relinquished by the solicitor,9 on payment of the outstanding fees or an equivalent security being provided by the client,10 or by agreement or conduct that amounts to waiver or relinquishment.11 [12] Aside from questions of extinguishment, a general lien is not available at law in certain other circumstances relevant to the disposition of this application. [13] The intervention of the court and the appointment of its officers, is an exceptional circumstance which has been held to suspend the possessory features of the solicitor’s general lien.12 It was observed by James L.J in Belaney,13 in a context similar to the 1 Leeper v Primary Producers Bank of Australia Ltd (In Vol Liq) (1935) 53 CLR 250, 261 (Starke J). 2 Hughes v Hughes [1958] 3 All ER 224, 227 – 228 (Hodson L.J, Morris and Sellers L.J.J agreeing). 3 Anderson v Lockhart [1991] 1 Qd R 501, 504. 4 Barratt v Gough-Thomas [1951] Ch 242, 250 (Evershed MR). 5 Bechara t/as Bechara & Co v Atie & Anor [2005] NSWCA 268, [47] (McColl JA, Ipp and Tobias JJA agreeing), citing Re a Barrister and Solicitor; Re Legal Practitioners Ordinance 1970 (ACT) (1979) 40 FLR 26, 39. 6 Barratt, 250. 7 Bechara, [47] citing Robins v Goldingham (1872) LR13Eq 440, 442 (Malins VC). 8 Stark v Dennet [2008] 2 Qd R 72, [41], citing Re Weedman [1996] FCA 1112 (Drummond J). 9 Ly Ty Tran, Re; Ex Parte Dixon v Ly Ty Tran Cao (1995) 62 FCR 432 (Beazley J). 10 Bechara, [64] – [66]. 11 Hughes v Hughes [1958] 3 All ER 179. 12 Belaney v Ffrench [1873] LR. 8 Ch. 918. 13 Ibid. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 present one, that a solicitor who claims a lien for costs incurred on behalf of trustees of an estate: “… cannot embarrass a suit by keeping papers which belong to an estate which is being administered by the Court, and cannot use that means of obtaining payment. There is no foundation for such a claim to lien, and it cannot be allowed.” [14] Belaney was followed by Fry J in Boughton v Boughton.14 In coming to his conclusion to order delivery of the solicitors’ file, Fry J, being bound by the conclusion in Belaney, observed that: “… there [were] creditors of the intestate still unpaid. Their rights of action are suspended by the pendency of this action, and they have a right to have the proceedings in it continued.” [15] In each of Belaney and Boughton, the ‘suit’ or ‘proceedings’ in question was the due administration of the estate, and followed the intervention of the court by appointment of its officers. Factual background [16] By his last will the deceased : (a) appointed the respondent as executor; (b) gifted his superannuation in 10 parts to a number of beneficiaries; (c) gifted specific gifts in the total sum of $117,000 to a number of beneficiaries; and (d) gifted the residuary estate to the named applicants, subject to a hotchpot amount, in equal shares as tenants in common. [17] Probate of the will was granted to the respondent on 27 July 2017. [18] When the estate administration had not progressed after nine years, the named applicants made an application to remove the respondent. Those applicants were the only remainder beneficiaries. [19] The basis for the application was complaints regarding delay in the administration of the estate and included: (a) non-payment of specific gifts until six years after death, and the resultant accrual of legacy interest, which is to be borne by the remainder beneficiaries; (b) failure to lodge taxation returns in a timely manner; (c) delays in the assessment and payment of professional fees and outlays; and (d) delays in the making of interim distributions to remainder beneficiaries. [20] The 2025 Orders provided as follows: 14 [1878] 23 Ch. D. 169. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 (a) by paras 1, 2 and 3, orders that the respondent be removed as executor, the grant of probate be revoked and a direction that the original grant be returned to the Registry within seven days; (b) by para 4, an order that a grant of letters of administration be made to the Administrator; (c) by paras 5, 6, 7 and 8, general orders relating to advertising and remuneration for the Administrator; (d) by para 9, a vesting order: “Pursuant to s 45(4) of the Act, any property of the deceased shall vest in the Administrator and be deemed to have so vested on the date of the deceased’s death.”; (e) by para 10, an order regarding the provision of information: “All certificates of title and other estate documentation and information relevant to the issues outstanding in the administration of the estate, which are in the possession or control of Timothy Michael Henry Crouch or the firm of which he is a director or which he has engaged shall be delivered to the Administrator’s office within 14 days of the date of these orders.”; (f) by para 11, a costs order in favour of the named applicants, paid from the estate; (g) by paras 12 and 13, orders that: “12. Subject to order 13 below, the respondent’s professional costs and outlays of the administration of the estate from 4 April 2017 to 2 December 2025 be assessed by a registered costs assessor. 13. The respondent shall not be indemnified from the Deceased’s estate for his costs of the application.”; and (h) otherwise, orders as to liberty to apply and costs orders generally. [21] On 6 January 2026, a grant of letters of administration with the will issued to the Administrator. On 6 February 2026, the Administrator requested that the respondent provide a copy of the entire file for the administration of the estate, a copy of the respondent’s costs assessment, and transfer “all funds held on behalf of the estate” to the Administrator’s trust account. [22] The respondent refused to provide the Administrator with either a complete copy of the estate file or the remaining funds totalling $300,000 held in his trust account. On 30 April 2026, the Administrator filed the current application. Conclusions on the respondent’s position [23] The nature of the lien claimed by the respondent is a general lien arising from his position as a solicitor executor, appointed to administer Mr Gradwell’s estate. The deceased’s Will permitted the respondent to charge “[the respondent’s] usual professional fees and outlays” in a charging clause that appears at clause 7(f) of -- 7 of 13 -- 8 Mr Gradwell’s Will. It was submitted that such a lien entitled the respondent to a possessory right to estate funds and documents, which had not been waived or relinquished by the respondent’s conduct. [24] Little needs to be said in respect of the provision of documents. On the return of the application, the respondent identified a willingness to provide his file, notwithstanding that he asserted “… his general lien over the documents and information.”. [25] In respect of the respondent’s assertion that he was entitled to retain a lien over $300,000 of estate funds as security for the payment of his costs and outlays, the position is inconsistent with authority commencing in the 1870’s as set out at para [13] to [15] above. [26] Even were that not the clear legal position, a lien can cease, be extinguished or lost, when the solicitor’s costs are paid or “satisfactory arrangements are made to secure the solicitor’s costs entitlement”.15 Satisfaction may take a number of forms, including payment of money into court or giving other security. Alternatively, a lien may cease where a court order requires production, or where the interest of justice require it, and on conditions designed to protect the solicitor as far as possible.16 [27] Solicitors are, of course, entitled to be paid by the clients for whom they act, but it is a mistake to assume that translates to an unfettered right to keep clients’ documents or assets until they get paid.17 Thus is particularly so in the circumstances where, as here, there has been: (a) an order of the Supreme Court removing the solicitor as executor; (b) a vesting order (affecting, at least, the $300,000); and (c) an order for the provision of documentation (affecting, at least, the administration files). [28] Any lien which the respondent had was extinguished by the combination of those features. [29] Were that not enough, the further combination of order 12 and order 13, that the respondent was entitled to have his costs and outlays for a specified period assessed but was not entitled to be indemnified for his costs of the removal application made it plain that he retained his indemnity for costs reasonably and properly incurred in the estate administration in the identified period. The respondent’s submission that order 12 was an order for costs to be assessed but not paid does not withstand scrutiny. The Administrator is bound by the nature of the appointment to pay estate liabilities, reasonably and properly incurred. [30] The respondent submitted that if the terms of order 12 had been drafted as an order to pay those costs, rather than have them assessed, only that would rise to the level of satisfying the respondent’s lien, by securing payment. I doubt that such an order is ever likely to be made given it would remove the obligation of an administrator to 15 In the estate of Margaret Ann Cervo (Administrator Pendente Lite Appointed) [2024] ACTSC 253, [42]. 16 Bechara v Atti [2005] NSWCA 268, [47]-[50], [58] and [69]. 17 Re: Dunstan (No. 2) [2000] ACTSC 33; 155 FLR 189, [10]. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 assess costs for reasonableness. But that does not mean that “satisfactory arrangements” had not been made to secure the respondent’s costs entitlement. Those arrangements provided by the terms of the 2025 Orders were, at least, satisfactory; in my view, they were all but secured. [31] Even were the respondent still in doubt about the security for his fees by the 2025 Orders, there were three occasions upon which the respondent was given letters of comfort from the Administrator: (a) on 27 March 2026, the Administrator wrote to the respondent advising, amongst other things, that “[t]o progress the issue of payment of your fees pursuant to the Court Order of Justice Crow dated 2 December 2025, please issue us with your tax invoice for consideration.”; (b) on 16 April 2026, the Administrator wrote to the respondent and stated, in asserting that the respondent’s lien had ceased, that “… by paragraph 12 of the orders, satisfactory arrangements were made, by Court Order, to ensure that [the respondent’s] costs entitlement is preserved”. Nevertheless, the Administrator reminded the respondent that the Administrator had a right to consider the reasonableness of the respondent’s costs before they were paid; and (c) on 1 May 2026, the Administrator wrote again to the respondent expressly pointing out that the Administrator was not denying that an order for costs had been made in the respondent’s favour for costs incurred by him in his capacity as executor. [32] In my view there ought to have been no doubt in the respondent’s mind that “satisfactory arrangements” had been made to secure the respondent’s entitlement to properly incurred, reasonable costs during the course of his administration of the estate in the period identified in para 12 of the 2025 Orders. [33] The respondent’s position in respect of both the estate file and funds was unsustainable and unsupported by authority. Costs of this application, and other orders [34] Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), the starting point in respect of costs is r 681 which provides: “(1) Costs of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise. (2) Subrule (1) applies unless these rules provide otherwise.” [35] The court has a wide discretion under r 681, but costs following the event would be the usual course. [36] The respondent opposes an order that he ought to pay the costs of this application on the basis that he describes that the application “… has unfortunately come about because of differing understandings between the Administrator … on the one hand and the respondent on the other, of the operation and effect of the terms of paras 9, -- 9 of 13 -- 10 10 and 12 of the [2025] Orders”. The respondent contends that his position was a “… reasonable interpretation of, and compliance with, the [2025] Orders.” [37] The respondent contends that the Administrator ought to have returned to court to seek “clarification of the orders”, or a variation of them, but ought not to have adopted what the respondent described as a “high-handed approach” in making “demands without any explanations” to compel compliance with the 2025 Orders. [38] Having concluded that the respondent’s position was in fact unsustainable and unsupported by authority, there is little to commend the respondent’s position in respect of costs. [39] Contrary to the respondent’s submissions, the legal position was in fact clear. The 2025 Orders, in particular the vesting orders and the provision for costs, made it plain that the respondent had no entitlement to retain either the estate’s assets or documents. The Administrator did not require “clarification” of the orders. [40] The application was solely required to compel the respondent to comply with the 2025 Orders. It was supported by the remainder beneficiaries. It was not high-handed, and was certainly not required because of a reasonable interpretation of the 2025 Orders. Indeed, the interpretation was plainly wrong. The respondent should bear the costs of the application. [41] The issues as to costs that remain are whether the respondent: (a) should pay those costs on the indemnity basis; (b) whether the costs ought to be fixed; and (c) whether those costs ought to be offset against the costs which are otherwise payable to the respondent for the administration of the estate between 4 April 2017 and 2 December 2025. [42] As to indemnity costs, the first issue is to decide whether this case falls within one of the categories in Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd.18 The court has a wide power to order indemnity costs, but generally there must be some special or unusual circumstance to justify the making of an indemnity costs order. The question is always whether the particular facts and circumstances warrant the making of an order other than standard costs. [43] Here it seems to me that an order for indemnity costs is appropriate where: (a) contrary to the respondent’s submission, the legal position was clear. The respondent had no entitlement to retain either the estate’s file or the estate’s funds; (b) even if the legal position had not been known to the respondent, the terms of the 2025 Order were unambiguous; (c) the respondent is a solicitor who consented to his own removal; he ought to have appreciated that what came with that was, at least, his loss of right to retain the estate’s file and its assets; 18 (1993) 46 FCR 225 (Sheppard J); See also: Trouton v Trouton (No. 2) [2023] QSC 29 at [75]-[78] (Williams J) which follows and applies the relevant principles. -- 10 of 13 -- 11 (d) were the respondent in any doubt about his entitlement to be paid, the correspondence set out at para [31] above ought to have given clear comfort that he was to be paid. As such, his conduct in the continued defence of the application was unreasonable; and (e) the parties who are to otherwise bear the burden of the costs are charities who have been waiting nearly a decade for the estate to be administered. They should not bear the burden of further diminution of their entitlements. [44] The next question is whether the costs ought to be fixed. [45] The power to fix costs arises under r 687(2)(c) of the UCPR. The purpose of making such an order is to save the parties the time, trouble, delay, expense and aggravation of protracted litigation arising out of taxation.19 The power to make such an order should be exercised only when the court considers it can do so fairly between the parties, which includes the provision of sufficient evidence in arriving at an appropriate sum on the material available. [46] The issues to be determined are firstly, whether the court should fix the costs ordered to be paid pursuant to the costs order. If the answer is yes, the second step is to determine the amount of those fixed costs. If the court does not exercise the discretion to order fixed costs, then the issue is what order should be made on the application.20 [47] It is appropriate for the court to fix costs in the circumstances of this case because: (a) first, the fixing of costs will save the parties the time, trouble and delay of an assessment; (b) second, the fixing of costs will also serve a broader purpose in the administration of justice by saving the court’s precious resources by avoiding the potential for a costs dispute; (c) third, the fixing of costs ought to advance the interests of the remainder beneficiaries who are most affected by any further delays in the administration of the estate and the associated expense of a taxation. This is a matter of significance; (d) fourth, there is no particular unfairness to the respondent in proceeding to fix the costs, save for the loss of entitlement to an assessment. That is not, of itself an unfairness, when the very purpose of fixing costs prevents such an assessment; and (e) fifth, I am satisfied that there is reliable evidence as to the quantum of the Administrator’s costs, which have been, largely, independently assessed. [48] I then proceed to the second step of determining those costs. The total costs sought by the Administrator are $40,555.17 comprising: (a) an assessment for the period 20 March 2026 to 13 April 2026 in the sum of $2,900.86; and 19 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Atlantic 3–Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] 2 Qd R 298, [32], [36] (Mullins J). 20 Ibid, [16]. -- 11 of 13 -- 12 (b) an assessment for the period 10 April 2026 to 12 May 2026 in the sum of $17,000.31 (although there are three days of overlapped fees, I accept that the explanation for the overlap provided by the Administrator indicates that there is no duplication); (c) the period 13 May 2026 to the date of the hearing of this application in the sum of $8,554.00; and (d) counsel’s fees of $12,100. [49] The professional costs in (a) and (b) above have been independently assessed by Global Billing. The costs in (c) were given as an estimate, originally in the sum of $5,908.50, but re-assessed on the day of the hearing by further affidavit to the total sum of $8,554.00. But for a submission that the total professional fees were “staggering”, the respondent did not offer any independent measure by which the court could appraise that submission, for example: (a) by comparison with his own costs and outlays; or (b) by requiring the solicitor who swore the affidavit as to fees to be required for cross-examination. [50] The majority of the solicitor’s fees ($19,901.17) have been independently assessed. Overall, they appear to me to be reasonable. But importantly, I place significant weight on the fact that fixing the costs will relieve at least some of the burden of delay and further expense on the remainder beneficiaries, both of whom are charities. I propose to fix the fees in the amount claimed. [51] There are a variety of other orders which are sought which, although they did not form any part of the application as filed, the respondent has agreed the court ought to deal with. [52] The first arises out of Order 13 of the 2025 Orders, being that the respondent shall not be indemnified from the deceased’s estate for his costs of the removal application. [53] The Administrator’s review of the estate file shows that the respondent paid counsel’s fees of $6,996.67 for the removal application out of estate funds, after the 2025 Orders were made. Plainly, there was no entitlement to do so. Those moneys must be repaid, and there will be an order to that effect (at para 1(d)). [54] Next, the Administrator seeks an order (at para 4) that for the purpose of complying with para 12 of the 2025 Orders, she is justified in obtaining a long form costs assessment of the respondent’s professional costs and outlays of the administration of the estate from 4 April 2017 to 2 December 2025. [55] The respondent submits that if there is to be such an order then “to preserve natural justice and fairness” the Administrator (mistakenly, I think, referred to as the applicant in the outline) ought to serve a costs statement upon the respondent, and the respondent be permitted to apply to the registrar of the court for the appointment of a costs assessor, and for the respondent to participate in the costs assessment. Respectfully, I cannot understand this submission. The direction the Administrator seeks at para 4 is for a long form assessment of the respondent’s costs pertaining to his administration. The respondent will necessarily participate in that costs -- 12 of 13 -- 13 assessment, as it is of his own costs. Order 4 will be made without the suggested additions by the respondent. [56] Next, the Administrator seeks an order that, subject to s 342 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), the costs of the long form assessment of the respondent’s costs of the administration between 4 April 2017 and 2 December 2025 are to be paid from the estate. That is necessary only to clarify that the estate is to bear the cost of the assessment, rather than the Administrator. That order is not opposed by the respondent. [57] At order 7, the Administrator seeks an order that the respondent bears his own costs of this application, and not be indemnified from the estate for such costs, or any costs of complying with these orders or the 2025 Orders. In light of my reasons, this order is appropriate. [58] Finally, the Administrator seeks a direction pursuant to s 6 of the Act that she is justified in setting off any amount payable by the respondent pursuant to these orders, and the 2025 Orders, against any amount payable to the respondent from the estate. That order is a practical one which will enable the efficient administration of the estate. It is not opposed by the respondent and it ought to be made. -- 13 of 13 --