Brown v Islip & Anor [2026] QSC 92

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Brown v Islip & Anor [2026] QSC 92 JADE-ELLE PIPER BROWN (plaintiff) v ALAN STEPHEN ISLIP (first defendant) and ALLIANZ AUSTRALIA INSURANCE LIMITED (second defendant) FILE NO/S: BS 14741 of 2023 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Claim ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 1 May 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATES: 20, 21 November 2025 and 17 March 2026 Defendants’ written submissions received 28 November 2025 Plaintiff’s written submissions received 1 December 2025 JUDGE: Copley J ORDER: 1. Judgment for the plaintiff against the second defendant in the sum of $238,987.00. CATCHWORDS: DAMAGES – ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES IN TORT – PERSONAL INJURY – INCOME LOSS AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY – GENERALLY – where the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident – where liability is admitted by the defendants – where the plaintiff suffered physical injuries and psychological injury, namely PTSD – where the issue in dispute concerns the extent of the PTSD and whether the plaintiff continues to experience that condition, and if so, its present impact – whether the PTSD will have an impact on the nature of the employment the plaintiff will be able to obtain and also the need for treatment and care – whether the plaintiff is entitled to all heads of damages submitted by the plaintiff, and if so, the extent of the damages which should be awarded Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 55, s 61 Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld), Schedule 6A s 4(c), s 5(b) Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld), s 11 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 83, s 84 -- 1 of 25 -- 2 Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 52 Allwood v Wilson and Anor [2011] QSC 180 Brown v Holzberger and AAI Limited [2017] 2 Qd R 639 Boon v Summs of Qld Pty Ltd t/a Big Bill’s Bobcats [2015] QSC 162 Gardiner v Doerr [2022] QSC 188 Habermann v Cook Shire Council (2025) 344 IR 63 Kriz v King [2007] 1 Qd R 327 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 Nucifora & Another v AAI Limited [2013] QSC 338 Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd v Casey (2017) 93 NSWLR 438 COUNSEL: J M Sorbello for the plaintiff R D Green for the defendants SOLICITORS: Morton & Morton Solicitors for the plaintiff Barry Nilsson Lawyers for the defendants [1] The plaintiff has claimed damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence and/or breach of duty of the first defendant. On 2 October 2013 a vehicle driven by the first defendant travelled into the path of the vehicle the plaintiff was in and a collision occurred. The second defendant is the compulsory third party insurer of the vehicle driven by the first defendant. [2] The plaintiff, born on 1 April 2005, was aged eight when the collision happened and was the front seat passenger in the vehicle driven by her grandfather. His vehicle was travelling along the Bruce Highway in the opposite direction to the first defendant’s motorhome. The motorhome approached the rear of traffic queued at roadworks. The first defendant braked heavily and the motorhome veered into the path of the grandfather’s vehicle and crushed the cabin area of the vehicle. [3] Liability is not in issue. The second defendant has admitted the collision was caused by the negligence of the first defendant in driving without due care and attention and in driving the motorhome into the path of the on-coming vehicle. The second defendant has also admitted the first defendant’s negligence caused the following injuries to the plaintiff: bruising of the right femur, superficial lacerations to the left forearm, and a psychological injury. The plaintiff’s physical injuries have resolved. [4] The issue in dispute concerns the extent of the plaintiff’s psychological injury, post- traumatic stress disorder. In particular whether it is in remission or whether she continues to experience this condition and if so, the present impact of it. This gives rise to issues about whether the PTSD will have an impact on the nature of the future employment the plaintiff might obtain and also her need for treatment and care. [5] The defendants’ case was that the plaintiff’s PTSD resolved and was in remission by March 2018. Even if the Court did not reach this conclusion the defendants submitted the Court would not find the plaintiff’s psychological injury is as significant as she asserts it to be. -- 2 of 25 -- 3 [6] The parties have agreed on an amount for special damages. The defendants submitted there should be no award of damages for past care or future care. The defendants disputed the extent of the damages which should be awarded for general damages, past economic loss, future economic loss and future expenses. [7] For the following reasons, the plaintiff has established that there should be an award of damages, except for damages for future care. What is PTSD? [8] The best evidence of what PTSD is was provided by Dr Gilbert, consultant psychiatrist. He said a diagnosis of PTSD required satisfaction a patient experienced: phobic and anxious avoidance of accident-related triggers; hypervigilance, including an increased threat scan and heightened startle response; and, re-experiencing phenomena in the form of flashbacks and nightmares. How does PTSD affect a sufferer’s ability to function? [9] Dr Gilbert said PTSD can affect concentration, memory, motivation and cause feelings of being overwhelmed. Dr Chung and Dr Gupta, both consultant psychiatrists, agreed the condition could affect concentration, memory and motivation. However, Dr Chung said the degree to which any of these capacities are affected depends upon the severity of a patient’s PTSD. Dr Gilbert said a person could be considered to have made a full recovery from PTSD if there was no evidence of avoidance, hypervigilance, or re-experiencing phenomena. When was the plaintiff first diagnosed with PTSD? [10] The plaintiff was first diagnosed with this condition after the motor vehicle accident. [11] The plaintiff’s medical records, which the parties jointly tendered pursuant to ss 83 and 84 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), contain a letter dated 14 October 2013 from a general practitioner, Dr Bundellu, to a psychologist, Kay Morgan. The doctor referred the plaintiff for “opinion and management of her PTSD following bad acct”. [12] Dr Gilbert was the first psychiatrist to diagnose PTSD on 22 January 2016, when the plaintiff was aged 10. He then noted “She meets DSM 5 criteria for child PTSD”. In what circumstances is PTSD considered to be in remission? [13] Dr Mathew, consultant psychiatrist, said he was not aware of any definition of what would constitute remission in the context of PTSD. However, he thought a person could be considered to be in remission if the symptoms of PTSD had reduced to a mild level for a reasonable period, that is, three to six months, and if the symptoms had no impact on the occupational, social or recreational aspects of a person’s life. [14] Dr Gilbert said if any of the three factors (phobic and anxious avoidance of accident- related triggers, hypervigilance and flashbacks and nightmares) were still present a patient might be regarded as in remission. Dr Gilbert said a person exposed to a traumatic event at the age of eight years might experience fluctuations in PTSD symptoms as he or she grew to adulthood. Dr Chung said persons who have PTSD can experience fluctuations in their symptoms. There might be periods of time when -- 3 of 25 -- 4 they function better compared with other periods of time. However, he did not consider there would be fluctuations from one day to the next. Evidence relevant to the plaintiff’s psychological injury [15] At the time of the collision the plaintiff’s younger sisters were in the rear seats of their grandfather’s car. The plaintiff recalled a vehicle coming towards their car and then everything went black. When she opened her eyes the interior of the car was all smoky. She felt her grandfather pushing on her leg in an effort to open a door. She looked into the back of the car. She could not see one of her sisters at all and thought she had either disappeared or had died. Her other sister was not awake, her face had been sliced open and there was blood everywhere. She got into the back of the car and found a space which enabled her to get out of the car. Once outside she went back into the vehicle, undid her injured sister’s seatbelt and helped other people to extricate her sister from the vehicle. After that, she did not know the whereabouts of either her grandfather or the missing sister. She thought they were both dead. She did not know if the sister she had helped to get out of the car was alive or not. The plaintiff was taken to the Hervey Bay Hospital. Her family was taken elsewhere. Until her father and an aunt came to the hospital she thought both her sisters and her grandfather must have been killed. [16] Prior to the accident the plaintiff had been happy at school. Following some time away after the accident she returned to school. She said it was really hard. She did not want to get into the car to go to school. It took a while before she could comfortably get into a car. Almost every night after the accident she had nightmares. After waking up from these nightmares she would wake her parents to seek their help and comfort. Sometimes she would go back to sleep, other times she would not be able to do so. After some period of time, though she could not remember the time period involved, the frequency with which these nightmares occurred decreased. By the end of primary school there were weeks when she did not have any nightmares at all, as well as weeks in which nightmares occurred a couple of times in a week. [17] When the plaintiff commenced high school, she still experienced nightmares intermittently. She noticed that when she was in a car which travelled past an ambulance vehicle or past a crashed vehicle, or even if she heard about a car crash, these events would cause her to fall into a “depression of nightmares and flashbacks again”. Social Studies, English and Legal Studies were subjects in which she was exposed to information about people who suffered serious injuries, including in car crashes. This exposure triggered flashbacks. By the time she got to grade 11 and onwards there were days when she could not attend school. The days when she could not attend school were days which followed nights when she had really bad sleeps or nightmares. She did not want to get up in the morning and could not get up because she felt safer staying in her bed. In grade 11 she transferred from the private high school she had been attending to a state high school. She discontinued Social Studies and Legal Studies in grade 11 as those subjects caused “too many flashbacks”. At the beginning of grade 11 she was studying General English and General Maths but by grade 12 she was studying Essential English and Essential Maths. These were less complicated than General English and General Maths. Enrolling in these easier subjects meant she was not eligible for an ATAR. While at school she also enrolled in a TAFE course to obtain a Certificate III in Education Support. Attending this course meant she did not have to go to school on some days. She enrolled in this -- 4 of 25 -- 5 course because she was eligible to do it and also because she was trying to do anything which would mean that she would not have to go to school. The Certificate III was a path into teaching. She did not pursue that vocation at the end of grade 12, though she could not say why she did not do so. She had thought about a lot of careers in her high school years, including teaching, law and becoming a vet. Law was not a career she could pursue upon completing grade 12 because she did not achieve an ATAR ranking. [18] However, the plaintiff’s Indigenous background allowed her to apply for a place at a university. In September 2022 she was offered a place in a Bachelor of Social Work. She commenced that degree in 2023 following the completion of grade 12 the previous year. She studied that course only for a semester before she changed her enrolment to study a Bachelor of Criminology and Justice. It was a course at a similar ranking as Social Work. She only lasted a semester in this degree because it was the same as her experience in Social Work; the first case study was one she could not even look at. She has deferred any further tertiary studies from the time of semester 2, 2024. [19] While at university the plaintiff continued to have nightmares. The nightmare which recurred most often concerned the collision she had been involved in. Another frequent nightmare involved her and her mother in a car struck by a truck. There was also a recurrent nightmare of being an observer of two vehicles colliding. [20] From 21 February 2023 the plaintiff commenced casual employment in the clinical records office at the Hervey Bay Hospital. Her job was to transport patients’ medical charts to different parts of the hospital. Her supervisor accommodated her reluctance to attend the accident and emergency department of the hospital after an occasion when her presence there coincided with the arrival of three patients who had apparently sustained serious injuries in a car accident. Seeing those patients, the plaintiff had flashbacks and started crying and was very distraught. There were other occasions at the hospital when she became very upset. On those occasions she would telephone her mother because she found that her mother could calm her down. It was not just exposure to accident cases which upset her. Sometimes attending a ward would cause her a flashback because a particular smell reminded her of the accident she had been involved in. On days like that one of her parents would have to drive from Maryborough to Hervey Bay to collect her from work. There were also a few occasions when she needed her mother’s assistance to get up in the morning and when her mother had to drive her to work. Most of the shifts for which she reported sick related to days following her exposure to accident patients at the hospital. [21] While employed at the hospital the plaintiff moved out of home to live with a boyfriend, however, her parents still had to drive her to work at the hospital sometimes. She resigned from her job at the hospital as her situation there never improved. [22] In March 2025 she formed a relationship with her current boyfriend. She was still living at Hervey Bay then and he lived in Bundaberg. They drove to each other’s houses to see each other. There were some occasions when she could not drive to Bundaberg and he would have to drive down to Hervey Bay to collect her and drive her to Bundaberg. -- 5 of 25 -- 6 [23] Around the middle of 2025 the plaintiff moved to Beenleigh and lived with one of her sisters in a unit their parents owned. There were occasions when she travelled from Beenleigh to Bundaberg to see her partner. She did not always do the driving as her sister did when she did not do so. She paid her sister to drive her up. While living in Beenleigh she obtained work as a teacher’s aide. She only performed one shift because she did not enjoy it. She then obtained a job at a Yatala based business as a receptionist. Bank records showed she commenced this job on 14 July 2025. Her tasks included answering telephone calls and responding to emails. The nature of her work there did not cause any difficulties for her. The workplace was only about five minutes by car from her unit. Despite this proximity, getting to work was hard for her. She found the constant sirens and other vehicles on the road made it difficult for her to drive to work. One morning she saw ambulances at the scene of a car accident on the highway and that “triggered her”. She arrived at work crying and had to go to the bathroom to compose herself. She informed her supervisor about what had happened in her past and why “that” made her so upset. Her supervisor was very understanding and suggested that on any future occasion she should advise if she could not come to work and in that event another employee would fill in for her. After less than three months the plaintiff resigned the position effective 31 October 2025. She said this was because the job was in the “city”. [24] Although she could definitely drive herself to places “most of the time” she found that if she drove into the city she would end up crying. She would have to pull up as she could not control herself. If a car drove too closely to her vehicle she would have a “flashback”. Her partner moved to Beenleigh. She went out and did things with him from time to time but sometimes she just could not go out. Sometimes he would have to help her to get out of bed, get dressed or have a shower. Events that “triggered her” might occur as often as three times a week and then be followed by some normal or uneventful weeks. [25] The plaintiff acknowledged that in a resume sent to the employer at Yatala she described her work performance at the hospital as “very reliable and work all shifts … My attendance is very high”. She conceded she did not in fact attend all of her hospital shifts, “but … I put it on a resume”. A pre-employment medical declaration form she completed for the Yatala position required her to state whether she then had or had ever suffered from psychological disorders, including anxiety. She circled no to this question. She acknowledged this was not a correct answer. Her explanation for providing the incorrect answer was she just wanted to get the job. She said it was really embarrassing to her to have to list off all the things. She thought if she did list everything that was wrong with her she would not have been hired for a job anywhere, let alone that job. She said she believed she was capable of doing the job but did not think writing everything down would get her the role. [26] About a fortnight before this trial commenced the plaintiff and her boyfriend moved to Bundaberg. She moved into her boyfriend’s parents’ house and she obtained a job at his father’s vehicle repair business. [27] The plaintiff had been treated by two psychologists, Ms Morgan and Ms Jackson. She no longer sees either of them. Ms Morgan had retired. The insurance company ceased paying for her treatment with Ms Jackson and the plaintiff could not afford the fees to go on seeing Ms Jackson after that occurred. -- 6 of 25 -- 7 [28] The plaintiff said her mental condition caused her to only want to seek jobs near to where she lived. Her difficulty with driving was also a factor. She only wanted jobs in areas of work she was already familiar with. She only wanted jobs in roles where she felt she would not confront or be confronted with “things that would trigger” her. [29] Ms Brown, the plaintiff’s mother, said that prior to the accident the plaintiff had been a happy, cheerful and easy-going child. She had achieved all her developmental milestones. When Ms Brown first saw the plaintiff in the emergency department of the Hervey Bay Hospital after the accident the plaintiff was hysterical. In the nine months following the accident the plaintiff was withdrawn, anxious and sad. For the first six months of this period the plaintiff had to sleep in her parents’ bed as she either could not get to sleep in her own bed or if she could she would wake up in an upset state and come to her parents’ bedroom. It would often take some hours before the plaintiff could return to sleep. For up to 12 months after the accident the plaintiff would come into her parents’ room at night in an upset state and it would take two to four hours before she would settle down. The plaintiff had sleeping difficulties at least once a fortnight up until the end of grade 7. Even up until when the plaintiff moved out of home she still experienced nightmares on occasions. [30] Ms Brown said in the first 12 months after the accident the plaintiff had to be persuaded to get into the family car to go to school. There were days when she could not get her to go to school at all and those days usually followed nights when the plaintiff had been upset. [31] The plaintiff changed high schools twice in the final two years of her schooling because she told her mother she was not coping at school. Ms Brown said the plaintiff did not go to school on most days in grade 12. [32] During her school years there were occasions when the plaintiff had to be taken to or from school separately from her sisters if there was a large truck or other motor vehicle beside their car. Ms Brown said before the plaintiff moved away from home there were occasions when she would have to prompt the plaintiff to get up and get dressed for work. Ms Brown said after the plaintiff moved out of home her daughter would still call her about once a fortnight in a state of upset about attending work. [33] The defendants submitted the following considerations militated against the plaintiff’s account of the extent of her psychological difficulties. First, it was not until 30 October 2015 that her general practitioner noted she was having nightmares as a result of the accident. Even accepting this to be the case the following information appeared in the records of the psychologist. Notes headed “Psychological/Counselling Management Plan INITIAL”, for the period 14 October 2013 to 28 February 2014, recorded involvement in a motor vehicle accident on 2 October 2013; no mental health history or psychological problems prior to the accident; “In therapy Jade-Elle has many of the trauma symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder”; “Refuses to sleep in her room, initial insomnia of up to 1 hour combined with avoidant behaviour with fear of being in her room and fear of the dark. Jade-Elle may go to sleep in her room for a few hours but ends up in her parent’s room approximately three times a week”; and, “shows a great deal of distress when she hears an ambulance siren”. Second, although the plaintiff sought treatment from her general practitioners for many health issues as she progressed towards adulthood she made no mention to those doctors of issues relating -- 7 of 25 -- 8 to the accident. The submission is inaccurate. The notes from the medical practice the plaintiff attended record the following: on 30 October 2015 – “Mother concerned about poor sleep and nightmares following an MVA 2 yrs ago. She reports intrusive memories of the accident which makes her anxious. Daytime irritability and anxiety at the sight and sound of an am(b)ulance”; on 12 February 2016 – “Jade has been referred for further therapy by the Psychiatrist. The PN is looking for a suitable child Psychiatrist for referral She is experiencing night mares and not sleeping well”; on 20 April 2016 – “Had a nightmare last night – flashback of the MVA 3 years ago was able to go back to sleep”; on 14 February 2018 – “Have been having issues with her sleep, flashbacks in sleep and awake. No issues initiating sleep but wakes up intermittently during she cries and feels overwhelmed”; on 15 November 2019 – “come with mum mum asks for MHCP she has had MVA 6 years back, was big accidents (sic) was diagnosed with PTSD, treated and receved (sic) regular counselling 1 months back starts flashback and symptoms of anxiety, clammy hands, sweating, anxious”: and, on 19 November 2019 – “had come with mum she is almost the same. She still has flash back”. [34] The plaintiff adduced evidence from Dr Mathew. He had examined the plaintiff on 6 September 2022. By then she was aged 17 years old. His opinion then was the plaintiff suffered a psychiatric injury as a result of the motor vehicle accident, it being a post-traumatic stress disorder. He said she had a permanent whole person impairment of 7% as determined in accordance with the Psychiatric Impairment Rating Scale (PIRS). Her condition was stable. He did not expect it to significantly deteriorate or improve in the foreseeable future. He said she continued to experience significant, ongoing psychiatric symptoms and disability even nine years after the motor vehicle accident. Dr Mathew noted the plaintiff had informed him that in recent years she had been depressed but he considered the depression was part of the PTSD. She told him she had suffered panic attacks. Although she had obtained a provisional licence in April 2022 she declined to drive in the city or for long periods. The sight of trucks made her anxious and sometimes she would close her eyes. She said she had a recurrent nightmare since the accident, though the frequency of it had reduced as time passed. She had one flashback since she started driving. Media reports about accidents upset her and made her more anxious. He noted she had complained of flashbacks and panic attacks to other medical practitioners in the period 2019 to 2021. He considered she needed ongoing psychological treatment. She had no history of psychological difficulties prior to the accident. [35] As to her employment prospects, Dr Mathew considered her academic performance was well below her potential. In grade 12 her grades were Bs and some Cs. In earlier years in high school she had attained As and Bs. She could not continue Legal Studies during grade 11 because the content of the course triggered memories of the motor vehicle accident. She persisted with the subject into grade 12 but had to leave her class during a case study about a motor vehicle accident. In April 2022 her psychologist recommended she end her part-time job as she reported to the psychologist that she was overwhelmed by her school work, TAFE studies and the job. The plaintiff informed Dr Mathew she had been accepted into a degree in social work in 2023. At the time of his examination he thought she would be incapable of managing the demands of that course. He considered it was difficult to be “sure” about her future capacity for study particularly because she was only 17. He considered it “possible, but not certain” she would be able to achieve some tertiary qualifications. At the time of his examination he considered that if she was not -- 8 of 25 -- 9 studying she would likely be able to work part-time in a retail or food service job. He thought she was capable of 20 hours per week of that type of work. He thought even that would be a strain and some absenteeism was likely. He said her long-term career trajectory had been affected. He said in the absence of the accident she “is expected’ to be capable of studying and working as a lawyer, accountant or similar, but this was no more than a very rough estimate. His opinion about her future employment was based on her report of a deterioration in academic performance in grades 11 and 12 and her performance in part-time work. [36] Dr Mathew’s evidence at the trial was the plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder was not in remission when he examined her on 6 September 2022. The plaintiff had told him there had been a deterioration in her attendance at school during her grade 12 year (2022). His note was she told him she had attended school in that year only 62% of the time. He said her academic performance was well below her potential. He was referred to school reports for grade 10 (2020) which showed the plaintiff achieved marks in the range of A- to B. He said they were good marks. His understanding was the plaintiff did well up to grade 11 but her academic performance deteriorated in grade 12. It was on this basis that he opined that her academic performance was below her potential. By “potential” he meant her innate ability absent any other difficulties. He considered she had the potential ability to go to university. He said his opinion about where she could likely work related to the time he saw her and into the then near future. It was increasingly difficult to predict the future for the plaintiff the further one looked into the future. He acknowledged he had not seen any material to indicate the plaintiff intended to become a lawyer or an accountant. It was his opinion she would have been capable of such jobs. [37] The defendants adduced evidence from Drs Gilbert, Chung and Gupta. Dr Gilbert reported in January 2016 that the plaintiff was healing “spontaneously in response to psychology input she had received”. No medication was provided because the treatment program devised by Ms Morgan as well as spontaneous recovery were working. He considered that EMDR treatment might expedite further recovery and referred the plaintiff for that treatment. [38] On 23 October 2025 Dr Gilbert reported that the plaintiff’s PTSD could be reactivated by any future traumatic events. [39] Dr Chung saw the plaintiff on 12 March 2018. She was then aged 12. In his report of 25 March 2018 he diagnosed PTSD in remission with residual symptoms. He made the following observations in the report. She presented with no difficulties at home, school or socially. She had a wide range of interests outside of school. She said she mostly slept well. Her report about going to her parents’ bedroom upon waking at night at “a stretch … could be construed as possibly related to the accident although realistically, it may be an age appropriate anxiety regarding a darkened room”. He noted her anxiety about ambulances and being a passenger in a car. He could not recommend an assistance dog. She did not require psychiatric treatment. Her symptoms were mild and she did not require medication. He reported that if she continued to experience flashbacks and nightmares a short course of EMDR might be useful to reduce the PTSD symptoms further. [40] Dr Gupta made two assessments of the plaintiff. The first was in November 2021 when she was aged 16 and in grade 11. The second was in November 2023 when she -- 9 of 25 -- 10 was aged 19. The first assessment was completed about 10 months prior to Dr Mathew’s assessment. The second assessment was undertaken about 14 months after Dr Mathew’s assessment. [41] At the first assessment Dr Gupta noted the plaintiff presented with symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD. Symptoms then present were anxiety, flashbacks, and nightmares, the last of these being of a reduced intensity and frequency in comparison to when she was younger. Dr Gupta assessed her as having a PIRS score of 1%. He considered that she seemed to be functioning well in most areas of her life except for some limitations about going out with friends on long road trips. He did not see any evidence to suggest the PTSD was likely to have an impact on future employment. The plaintiff told him she wanted to be a teacher and was undertaking a Certificate III in Education Support which would give direct university entry to teaching studies. [42] The plaintiff told him she had obtained a learner’s permit but stopped driving for a while. She had had flashbacks about two months ago. She looked forward to getting her licence and there were days when it was fine and on other days it became an issue. She used to hold on tight when being driven by others but this did not happen very often now. She would usually get scared if an ambulance went past or if she heard sirens. She said “sirens are there all the time so it sucks”. Her concerns about being in a car were more prominent when she was driven by a stranger or a new driver. Repetitive nightmares since the accident, which happened all the time, had become less frequent to the extent that they might almost be gone. On the days after nightmares she would be in a bad mood and would not want to do anything. These feelings could last only one day or for up to one week. She believed things had improved, particularly since she started high school. She changed high schools due to the availability of subjects she wanted to study at the other high school that she went to. She tended to avoid long car trips with friends as she was scared of going in the car with them. She had similar fears when going “four wheel driving” with friends. On four of any ten occasions she did not go on these activities. She had some difficulties with concentration, she was easily distracted and sometimes “zones out” thinking about the accident, though thinking about the accident did not happen very often. Her school grades were not affected by this because she could do “focussed work”. She had received ongoing therapy and had resumed attending on the psychologist, Ms Jackson, at the start of 2021. [43] At the November 2023 assessment the plaintiff reported the following to Dr Gupta. She had stopped going to school in 2021 as she felt it was too much work and she felt increasingly distracted at the end of grade 11. She dropped normal Maths and English for easier versions of these subjects. She finished school at the end of 2022. She had worked in the medical records section at the Hervey Bay Hospital since March 2023. Her attendance on the psychologist had reduced in frequency “from fortnightly to weekly (sic)”. She said her mood was generally alright, she was lonely and had only one friend, she did not go anywhere. She had a boyfriend. She had nightmares and dreams, though not every day. She had trouble sleeping because of her shift work. She had to stop driving one day when she was driving with her boyfriend and saw a car turning. She called in sick the next day. She felt tired all the time and had not slept normally for months. She had not been engaging in anything for fun for about four months when she visited Brisbane. She spoke about becoming a teacher and said she was no longer sure about becoming a lawyer. Although she had enrolled in a -- 10 of 25 -- 11 Bachelor of Social Work she had deferred commencement for 12 months. She said she wanted to work in child protection. She could focus well at work most of the time and work helped distract her from her thinking about the accident. She had not attended any family events. Travel was a huge issue and she had not travelled much. She was not engaging in many social or recreational activities. There was a period of time when she lacked motivation to do anything. Anything could trigger memories or nightmares about the accident and she referred to the stress of school and events at work at the hospital. Her last panic attack was one to two months prior to November 2023 and she had anxiety and panic attacks every second day. She gave the example of a flashback precipitated by her seeing a patient being brought into the hospital after a car accident. Anxiety or panic attacks occurred once a week. Sometimes she did not go to work at the hospital, she just called in to say she was sick. Her mood was generally alright and she felt pretty good at work. She had only one work friend, otherwise no friends. She did not go anywhere. [44] After this consultation Dr Gupta concluded the plaintiff’s mental state had deteriorated significantly since his assessment in November 2021. Her mood had gone “downhill”. She had had increasing, repetitive, intrusive thoughts about the accident as well as anxiety, panic attacks, nightmares, lack of sleep and had increasingly withdrawn from social interactions. It was likely these ongoing symptoms would impede her ability to study and affect her ability to work. She was struggling with completing any form of education presently, her ability to work would depend on resolution of her symptoms. It was likely she might not be able to work at all if her symptoms worsened. Her symptoms would interfere with her ability to drive on the road or to participate in sports. He agreed with Dr Mathew that her PIRS score was 7. [45] In September 2025 Dr Gupta provided a further opinion. He said the plaintiff was not as “psychologically incapacitated” as she had reported to him in November 2023. This revised opinion was based on the answers she had provided to the Yatala based employer, her ability to drive on the Bruce Highway, and the cessation of psychological treatment. In a further report dated 29 October 2025 Dr Gupta said that the level of activity revealed in the plaintiff’s bank records was not consistent with the report she had made to him about her level of activities leading up to November 2023. Under cross-examination he clarified that the reporting which he regarded as inconsistent with the bank records were her statements in November 2023 that she had not engaged in anything fun for about four months, that travel was a huge issue for her and she had not travelled much. [46] Bank records for the period between 1 July 2023 and 27 November 2023 showed the plaintiff’s bank card had been used to obtain goods or services in the Gold Coast area in early July, mid-August, mid-September and mid-November and in Brisbane in late October. The plaintiff said she went to the Gold Coast in early July and got a tattoo. The trips to the Gold Coast in mid-August and mid-September were to accompany her friend who also wanted to get tattoos. Her friend wanted the plaintiff to come with her. No one was available to drive the plaintiff to Brisbane in late October 2023 so she caught the train in order to visit a friend. Findings about the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury [47] I accept Ms Brown’s evidence that prior to the accident the plaintiff had been a normal child who had no difficulties. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that since the accident -- 11 of 25 -- 12 she has had nightmares about the accident and flashbacks about the accident. I accept her evidence that seeing ambulances and hearing sirens has upset her. I accept she tried to avoid circumstances or situations which reminded her of the accident such as by avoiding parts of the hospital which made her upset and by ceasing school subjects and university courses which reminded her of the accident. The plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates that her recollections of the accident have intruded into her life to the extent that they have affected her ability to function at school, at university, in the workforce and as a road user. The extent of these interferences have not been trivial or fleeting, however, they have been far from overwhelming. [48] I accept the plaintiff’s account of what she says she has experienced because I regarded her evidence as fundamentally truthful and reliable. It was supported by her mother’s evidence. She or her mother, on her behalf, made complaints to doctors and a psychologist about what she experienced at various times over the years. The records of medical practitioners and the psychologists support the plaintiff’s account. The bank records of transactions on the plaintiff’s bank account to which I have specifically referred, which showed where the plaintiff went in the times leading up to Dr Gupta’s second assessment and revealed what she spent her money on, do not attenuate her credit. This is because her evidence about the effects of the accident was that the accident had had some impacts on her life. She did not claim it rendered her incapable of functioning or that it rendered her incapable of travelling or working. From her perspective, the trips she made may not have constituted what she regarded as “fun” and may not have amounted to much in the way of travel. For these reasons no inference adverse to the plaintiff’s credit can be drawn from the transactions conducted through her bank account since 2021. [49] I am satisfied the plaintiff sustained a psychological injury, namely, PTSD, as a result of the motor vehicle accident on 2 October 2013. As I have accepted the plaintiff’s evidence in the areas just set out I am satisfied that the post-traumatic stress disorder was not in remission from March 2018. It has continued to affect her from time to time and to varying degrees. General Damages [50] The plaintiff claims general damages for multiple injuries, recognising her physical injuries resolved without any ongoing effects. [51] The parties submit general damages are to be assessed conformably with an injury scale value (ISV) on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The scale reflects 100 equal graduations of general damages, which range from a case in which an injury is not severe enough to justify any award up to a case in which an injury is of the gravest conceivable kind.1 In assessing the ISV the Court is required to assess the ISV under the rules provided under a regulation.2 The parties agree the relevant regulation is the Civil Liability Regulation 2003.3 Also, in assessing the ISV the Court must have regard to the injury scale values given to similar injuries in previous proceedings.4 If the Court assesses an ISV for a particular injury to be more than any ISV prescribed 1 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 61(1)(a) and (b). 2 Civil Liability Act s 61(1)(c)(i). 3 By s 11 of the Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld), the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 (Qld) continues to apply to injuries which arose before the commencement of the 2014 regulation. 4 Civil Liability Act s 61(1)(c)(ii). -- 12 of 25 -- 13 for similar particular injuries under s 61(1)(c) of the Civil Liability Act the Court must state the factors on which the assessment is based which justify the assessed ISV.5 [52] The parties submit the procedure to be adopted was correctly stated in Allwood v Wilson & Anor where McMeekin J said:6 “I am required to assess an injury scale value (‘ISV’) for the injuries from the range of injury scale values set out in Sch 4 of the Regulation in order to determine the level of general damages (as defined) in accordance with the rules laid down in Part 2 of Sch 3 of the Regulation. This case concerns multiple injuries. In such a case it is necessary to determine the dominant injury as it is defined, have regard to the range of ISVs applicable to that injury, determine where in the range of ISVs provided for that injury it should fall, and determine whether the maximum ISV in that range (‘the maximum dominant ISV’) adequately reflects the adverse impact of all the injuries. If the maximum dominant ISV is not sufficient then the ISV may be higher but not more than 100 and only rarely more than 25% above the maximum dominant ISV selected. In arriving at an appropriate ISV the court needs to bear in mind that the effects of multiple injuries commonly overlap. Whilst the regulations indicate that the purpose of the elaborate scheme set out there is to promote consistency in awards, sight must not be lost of the overriding purpose of the ISVs prescribed – to reflect the level of adverse impact of the injury on the injured person. The court is required to have regard to the guidance provided by the provisions in Schedule 4 concerning its use in so far as they are relevant to the particular case but is not necessarily limited to those factors: Sch 3 s. 8. Additionally, in assessing an ISV, a court may have regard to other matters to the extent they are relevant in a particular case: Sch 3 s 9. The examples provided of other matters are the injured person’s age, degree of insight, life expectancy, pain, suffering and loss of amenities of life. In assessing an ISV for multiple injuries, the range for, and other provisions of schedule 4 in relation to, an injury other than the dominant injury of the multiple injuries can be considered. The extent of whole person impairment is an important consideration “but not the only consideration affecting the assessment of an ISV”: Sch 3 s 10. The dictionary defines “whole person impairment” (“WPI”) in relation to an injury as an estimate “… expressed as a percentage, of the impact of a permanent impairment caused by the injury on the injured person’s overall ability to perform activities of daily living other than employment.” (Footnotes omitted) 5 Civil Liability Act s 61(2). 6 [2011] QSC 180 at [19]-[24]. -- 13 of 25 -- 14 [53] The parties agree the dominant injury suffered by the plaintiff is the psychiatric injury and that it falls within Schedule 4 Part 2 Mental Disorders of the Regulation. They agree this injury is to be assessed under item 12 of Schedule 4 of the Regulation. Part 2 Mental disorders General comment for items 10 to 13 This part includes references to ratings on the psychiatric impairment rating scale set out in schedule 6 (PIRS ratings). A PIRS rating is capable of being accepted by a court only if it is assessed by a medical expert as required under schedules 5 and 6 and provided to the court in a PIRS report. Examples of factors affecting ISV assessment for items 10 to 13 • PIRS rating • Degree of insight • Age and life expectancy • Pain and suffering • Loss of amenities of life • Likelihood difficulties would have emerged in any event • If there is extreme psychological trauma, for example, intense helplessness or horror, the immediate adverse psychological reaction 12 Moderate mental disorder Comment There is generally only moderate impairment. Example of the injury A mental disorder with a PIRS rating between 4% and 10% 2 to 10 [54] In assessing the ISV the Court may have regard to: the plaintiff’s age at the time of the accident; her present age; her degree of insight; suffering and loss of amenities of life; her life expectancy (12.58 years have passed since the accident and she had an agreed life expectancy of another 67 years as at the time of the trial); if she suffered extreme psychological trauma, for example intense helplessness or horror, the -- 14 of 25 -- 15 immediate adverse psychological reaction and the adverse impact of the injuries as found by the Court both originally and over the time which has elapsed since the accident. [55] The plaintiff submitted the Court should assess an ISV of 13 which results in an award of general damages of $19,470.00.7 The plaintiff pointed to Dr Mathew’s assessment of a PIRS rating of 7% and Dr Gupta’s opinion the plaintiff had a higher level of impairment than he had previously concluded. The plaintiff had insight into her condition because in high school she had a feeling of “what was, like, wrong with me that no one else my age could understand”. She had experienced only 8 years of life in which she did not have the experience of traumatic memories having an effect on her day to day functioning and she is likely to have over 79 years of life blighted by the psychiatric effects of the accident. The formative years of her life have been marred by her psychiatric condition and she continues to experience severe emotional distress. There is nothing to suggest she would have had psychological problems had the accident not occurred. She experienced severe psychological trauma immediately after the accident because she thought one of her sisters was dead and she saw her other sister’s face when it had been sliced open and there was blood everywhere. Until visited by her father and aunt at the hospital she thought her sisters and grandfather had died. She was hysterical when her mother saw her at the hospital. These considerations should result in an assessment of an ISV in a higher range.8 [56] The defendants submitted the Court should assess an ISV of 8 which results in an assessment of general damages of $11,630.00.9 The defendants submitted the long term adverse impact of the injury was nowhere near as substantial as the plaintiff claimed. The defendants relied on the assessments of impairment made by Drs Gilbert, Chung and Gupta, the extent of the plaintiff’s ability to travel and work and what can be inferred from bank records about her ability to travel and what can be inferred about the current impact of her condition. [57] As to the various considerations identified by the parties, I have reached the following findings and conclusions. [58] The plaintiff’s physical injuries, bruising of the right femur and superficial lacerations to the right forearm, were fortunately very minor. They have not had any ongoing consequences at all. The plaintiff suffered extreme psychological trauma because she was confronted with the horror of seeing her younger sister’s face sliced open and believed for some hours after the accident, on grounds that were reasonable in the circumstances, that both her sisters and grandfather had died. There is no basis for concluding she would in any event have suffered mental disorder in her life. [59] I accept the evidence given by the plaintiff and her mother concerning the difficulties the plaintiff experienced with sleeping and getting into the car to go to school and their evidence about the decreasing frequencies of these difficulties as the years in primary school passed by. 7 The plaintiff referred the Court to the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 Schedule 6, s 4(c), however the provision the plaintiff referred to concerned injury arising between 1 July 2012 and 30 June 2013. 8 Habermann v Cook Shire Council (2025) 344 IR 63 at [341]. 9 Civil Liability Regulation 2003 Schedule 6A, s 5(b). -- 15 of 25 -- 16 [60] Dr Gilbert’s evidence, that by January 2016, when the plaintiff was nearing the age of 11, and was healing “spontaneously” from PTSD, is to be understood as meaning that the plaintiff was healing without the need for psychiatric medication or other intervention. However, the healing Dr Gilbert referred to was in response to “the psychological input” he was aware she had received. The plaintiff had been receiving psychological treatment from Ms Morgan since early 2014. Her PTSD was obviously of sufficient seriousness to warrant this treatment. [61] The plaintiff was not happily unaware of the impact the accident had upon her. I accept her evidence that even in primary school she would feel “normal” sometimes but on other occasions feel “so different than anyone else and when I would try to talk to people … my age – like no one understood it. So I just felt really, like, alone”. The significance of this evidence is that it provides a foundation for my satisfaction that the plaintiff has suffered from the effects of PTSD for the majority of her life. [62] The relatively few days the plaintiff was absent from school, as revealed by school records from semester 1 of 2014 to term 1 of 2021 (when in grade 11), and the grades she attained up until the end of semester 1 of 2020 (when in grade 10) allow me to conclude the PTSD did not materially impair the plaintiff’s education up until the end of semester 1 in grade 10. After that, however, the plaintiff’s education was adversely affected by the symptoms of PTSD which she experienced. Her grades declined from A and B+ to B grades from semester 2 of her grade 10 year. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence she experienced difficulties in sleeping due to flashbacks about the accident and her evidence that the reason she changed subjects at school was due to the contents of the subjects reminding her of the accident. I am satisfied these difficulties were caused by the effects of the PTSD. They are a manifestation of fluctuations in symptoms that might be experienced by a person as they grow up after having incurred PTSD as a child. The position accords with Dr Gilbert’s evidence in this regard and I accept his evidence. [63] These conclusions are not inconsistent with the opinion of Dr Chung that the plaintiff’s PTSD was in remission when he saw her when she was aged nearly 13. She complained to Dr Chung of intrusive thoughts and “flashbacks” proximate to her consultation with him. His evidence that persons with PTSD can experience fluctuations in their symptoms was consistent with Dr Gilbert’s evidence. [64] The plaintiff’s evidence about the difficulties she faced from about grade 11 until about the present time is evidence I accept as truthful because she made concessions which I regarded as adverse to her interest. The following are examples. It was put to her she told Dr Gupta she was concerned about motor vehicle accidents when being driven by a stranger or a new driver. She agreed she had said this, however, she added, “But that doesn’t mean every time was like that”. Questioned about the frequency of nightmares, another topic Dr Gupta explored with her, she said “Sometimes I can go quite a long time without any”. On the topic of travel, which the defendants say leans in favour of their contention the plaintiff’s PTSD is in remission, the plaintiff said, with reference to her capacity to drive alone, “I won’t say it’s every time I can’t drive and there are other times where it is way better than others”. -- 16 of 25 -- 17 [65] I do not regard the plaintiff’s credit as attenuated by the answers she gave to the employer at Yatala. She thought it legitimate to provide a false answer because she feared telling the truth would cause her to miss out on the job. [66] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence she was absent from school a lot of the time during her grade 12 year. There are no school records contradicting this. However, her difficulties did not prevent her from obtaining an offer of a place at university. She took up the offer. I accept her evidence she changed her course of study at university. I find this was due to her experiencing the symptoms of PTSD provoked or exacerbated by the content of the courses. I accept her evidence she left the job at the hospital and the job at Yatala because the circumstances of each job, in different ways, affected her PTSD symptoms. [67] The plaintiff has suffered and lost some amenity of life due to the ongoing effects of PTSD. I am satisfied this condition is not in remission. The plaintiff still tries to avoid accident-related triggers, such as emergency departments of hospitals, and the sounds of sirens. She still experiences accident-related nightmares. Her condition has led her to seek employment in a quieter regional city compared to employment in south east Queensland. Her condition has affected her ability to function as an independent adult. I accept her evidence she does not like to drive alone or on the highway and so seeks the assistance of relatives or friends to drive her. [68] I accept Dr Mathew’s assessment the plaintiff had a whole person impairment of 7%. [69] I am not persuaded the level of adverse impact of the multiple injuries she suffered is so severe that the maximum dominant ISV is inadequate to reflect the level of impact of all her injuries. This is because her physical injuries were so minor. The plaintiff has a moderate mental disorder. Her PIRS rating is 7%. I assess an ISV of 9 which results in an award of general damages of $13,240.00.10 I do not think her injury falls at the top of the range, particularly having regard to the PIRS assessment and the extent of her pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life. Past economic loss [70] The plaintiff seeks an award of $20,000.00 for past economic loss. The plaintiff submitted an assessment of past economic loss can only be made on a “global” basis in view of her young age when the injury occurred and the unknown capacity for employment while she was at school in the absence of the injury. [71] Both parties referred the Court to Brown v Holzberger & AAI Limited11 where McMeekin J said, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her earning capacity has been diminished by the accident – caused injury and that diminution ‘is or may be productive of financial loss’”.12 In this passage, McMeekin J drew on an observation he made in Nucifora & Another v AAI Limited13 where he examined the principles under s 55 of the Civil Liability Act in the context of a claim for future economic loss. His Honour considered the approach adopted in that context should also apply to past economic loss. 10 Civil Liability Regulation 2003 Schedule 6A, s 5(b) which applies to an injury arising on or after 1 July 2013. 11 [2017] 2 Qd R 639. 12 At [96]. 13 [2013] QSC 338 at [29]-[30]. -- 17 of 25 -- 18 [72] The defendants submitted past loss of earning capacity ought to be assessed in the sum of $5,000.00. The defendants said this amount reflected an approach to loss that accepted “some reduction in income earning capacity over the past”. [73] In contending $20,000.00 was appropriate, the plaintiff submitted 148.75 hours of unpaid sick leave taken while employed at the hospital was mostly due to the effects of the PTSD. She submitted the weeks in which she was unemployed between when she resigned from the hospital (22 May 2025) and started the job at Yatala (28 July 2025) were due to the PTSD injury. These periods totalled 13.5 weeks. She said a loss of $1,300.00 net per week totalled $17,550.00. The plaintiff submitted she was likely to have been underemployed while at school. She pointed to a note in Ms Jackson’s file dated 21 April 2022 in which the psychologist recommended the plaintiff cease her employment. [74] I am not satisfied the plaintiff was underemployed while she was in high school. She went to school five days per week except in her senior year when she enrolled in a TAFE course in lieu of attending school on some days of the week. The recommendation made by Ms Jackson in April 2022 (when the plaintiff was in grade 12) to cease employment was not followed by the plaintiff. Her evidence was that she continued her part-time job to around about Christmastime 2022. I am not satisfied the plaintiff suffered any diminution in her income earning capacity while at high school. [75] The hospital employment records show the plaintiff took 148.75 hours of unpaid leave (which equates to almost 4 weeks). Her evidence was she was rarely actually sick when she worked at the hospital but she was unable to attend work in the days after she was confronted with experiences at work which reminded her of the accident and which upset her. Her evidence was, “it wasn’t just sick leave and annual leave, some days I would just go days unpaid because I couldn’t go in”. [76] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence most of the unpaid leave she took was due to her being in a state of upset after having been reminded of the accident due to matters she observed at the hospital. Her inability to go to work was due to the PTSD she was suffering from due to the accident. I accept this evidence because the plaintiff impressed as a person who wanted to work. She engaged in a lifestyle where she needed to work to support the activities she liked to pursue. Not attending work and so not earning income was not in her interest and I find her absences from work were due to the effect of PTSD. I am persuaded her earning capacity was diminished at the hospital due to the PTSD and that it caused her financial loss. [77] Although I accept the plaintiff’s evidence she resigned from the job at the hospital because she felt she could no longer cope with “flashbacks of all the lights, of what it looked like for me” I am not persuaded the period of 9.5 weeks between resignation and starting the job at Yatala was a period spent out of employment due to the effect of the PTSD. The plaintiff said she was not looking for work at the start of that period as she just needed a break after finishing the hospital job. Needing a break between different forms of employment is not unusual in itself. She said she was also, “trying to learn what it was like to live in Brisbane”. She applied for and obtained a job as a teacher’s aide, however, she only performed one shift in that role as she did not think it was the job for her. She said she did not enjoy it. Understandably, the plaintiff was discriminating about the next job she would undertake. That it took some weeks to -- 18 of 25 -- 19 obtain that job is not shown to be due to any diminution in earning capacity due to the PTSD. [78] I assess damages for past economic loss at $5,131.48. This amount is calculated by multiplying the plaintiff’s average net weekly wage while employed at the hospital by 4, which is the approximate period of time measured in weeks that the plaintiff was on unpaid leave. Interest on past economic loss [79] The parties agree interest on past economic loss should be calculated at the rate of 2.41%. Using this rate, the formula is $5,131.48 x 2.41% x 12.58 years (the period of time between the date of the accident and the date of judgment). I assess interest on past economic loss at $1,555.75. Past loss of superannuation entitlements [80] The parties agree past loss of superannuation entitlements should be calculated at the rate of 10% of past economic loss. Applying the formula $5,131.48 x 10% results in $513.15. I assess past loss of superannuation at $513.15. Interest on loss of past superannuation entitlements [81] The parties agree interest on loss of past superannuation entitlements should be calculated at the rate of 2.41%. Applying the formula, $513.15 x 2.41% x 12.58 years (the period of time between the date of the accident up to the date of judgment) results in $155.58. I assess interest on past loss of superannuation entitlements at $155.58. Future economic loss [82] The parties agree the assessment of future loss of earning capacity is not determined by a strict comparison between actual ongoing earnings and potential earnings. A matter affecting the assessment of future economic loss is the impact any injury arising from the accident will have on the plaintiff’s future career in the workforce. It has also been agreed that a 5% discount rate should be applied when assessing the award. It is necessary to establish a net weekly loss, multiply it by the 5% discount multiplier and consider any discounts for contingencies and vicissitudes of life. If loss is allowed to 67 then the period of time would be 47 years. They agree the 5% discount multiplier for 47 years is 961. They submit the discount for contingencies should be under 10%. [83] The loss the Court is required to assess is the loss or diminution of earning capacity and whether the loss or diminution is or may be productive of financial loss.14 In Nucifora & Another v AAI Limited, McMeekin J said:15 “In determining the ‘may be’ issue relevant in this case the principles explained in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd apply. There is the ‘double exercise in the art of prophesying’ involved – what the future would have been if the injury had not occurred and what it is now likely to be. As usual the fact finder must state the factual findings 14 Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 at 3. 15 [2013] QSC 338 at [30]. -- 19 of 25 -- 20 underpinning the award and display the reasoning behind the award sufficiently at least for the parties, and the Court of Appeal if called on, to comprehend the result, although the methodology need not include an explicit statement of a formula: Reardon-Smith. An ‘experienced guess’ has been held to be a sufficient response to the facts presented: Ballesteros.” (Footnotes omitted) [84] The plaintiff submitted the Court can be satisfied her earning capacity has been diminished due to the PTSD injury sustained as a result of the accident and that the injury will produce economic loss. She relied on Dr Mathew’s opinion that it would be likely she would only be able to work part-time in retail or food service. She submitted the Court should also consider Dr Gupta’s opinion the plaintiff’s ability to work depended on her symptoms and she might not be able to work at all if her symptoms worsened. [85] The defendants accept the evidence allows the Court to be satisfied there has been a diminution in the plaintiff’s earning capacity. [86] What is in issue between the parties concerns the extent to which the earning capacity has been diminished. [87] The plaintiff submitted she is now unlikely to be able to complete university studies and work in a profession due to the injury. If not for the injury she would likely have gained employment in a profession. Even in what the plaintiff describes as “lower level employment”, she is likely to have difficulties attending work due to, for example, an ambulance passing her on her way to work. She will need a sympathetic and accommodating employer. She is at a disadvantage in the labour market because her injury limits the places she can work. Busier city environments will aggravate her symptoms and some work, such as at hospitals, will have to be avoided. The Court should be sceptical about her being able to sustain full-time employment for the rest of her working life. [88] Based on data provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics from May 2023, the plaintiff submitted there is a $486.10 difference between the average weekly net cash earnings for a professional worker compared with the average weekly net cash earnings for a clerical or administrative worker. For the remainder of the plaintiff’s working life (47 years), discounted on the 5% tables (multiplier = 961), less 10% for the vicissitudes of life, equated to $420,427.89. The plaintiff recognises that s 55(1) of the Civil Liability Act is engaged, as the plaintiff’s loss of economic capacity cannot be precisely calculated by reference to a defined weekly loss. The plaintiff submitted the Court should assess future economic loss at $400,000.00. [89] The defendants submitted the Court should not proceed on the basis that the plaintiff would have pursued any particular career. The Court would find she would obtain a job and work for another or others. Nevertheless, her work performance at the hospital and her decision to leave and to relinquish the job at Yatala would allow the Court to conclude her future earning capacity is likely to be affected by fluctuations in her PTSD symptoms. The defendants relied on Dr Chung’s evidence that exposure to another accident or traumatic experience could unsettle the plaintiff. The defendants submitted an award of $125,000.00 would be appropriate in all of the circumstances. If this amount was arrived at using the agreed discount rate and -- 20 of 25 -- 21 multiplier, an award of $125,000.00 would be based on an average weekly net cash loss of $144.53. [90] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence she wished to pursue tertiary studies with a view to obtaining employment after completing a degree because she went to the effort of obtaining and accepting a place at university. She commenced, though did not go on to complete, studies in two degree courses. I accept her evidence she abandoned studies in each of those courses because some of the content of each reminded her of the accident to such an extent she could not continue either course. [91] I am not persuaded the extent of her injury is so severe it will prevent her from pursuing tertiary education in some other area of study which will not involve exposure to material reminding her of her accident. It is not possible to know what that area of study might be because I regarded her evidence as quite uncertain about what type of professional career she wanted to pursue. I consider it significant that she has deferred further study rather than withdrawn from university altogether. Deferral demonstrates she still desires to go to university and believes she can pursue a tertiary education. I have taken into account the plaintiff’s evidence she feels she cannot live in the city, however, there are a number of regionally based universities. [92] When the plaintiff was aged 17 Dr Mathew expressed the opinion it was possible the plaintiff could be capable of tertiary studies. His opinion provides no support for the contention the effect of her injury has been to deprive her of the capacity to earn income in a profession. On the other hand, Dr Mathew’s forecast about the plaintiff’s capacity to work has been proven to be too pessimistic because the plaintiff has worked full-time and the work was not in retail or food service. She has demonstrated a greater capacity than he predicted. If tertiary studies are not pursued that will likely be due to considerations other than the effects of PTSD. [93] I am not persuaded the plaintiff’s injuries have deprived her of the capacity to work in a professional role. Therefore, I am not persuaded future economic loss will be likely to be of the magnitude the plaintiff contends for. [94] No evidence has been led to establish or to permit of an inference that employment in a regional city or town, whether in a professional capacity or otherwise, will result in lesser earnings compared with employment in a capital city or other major urban areas. [95] The plaintiff’s short career in the work force suggests she is likely to be employed by another or others in the future whether in a professional capacity or otherwise. [96] I accept the evidence fluctuations in the plaintiff’s PTSD are likely. This will affect her earning capacity and may be productive of some economic loss. The plaintiff’s experience of having to take leave without pay at the hospital supports the conclusion that such fluctuations will produce financial loss. To this extent I accept Dr Gupta’s opinion about the plaintiff’s ability to work being linked to the severity of her symptoms. However, I find that any exacerbation of her symptoms will largely depend on the work the plaintiff chooses to undertake and the place where she chooses to do so. Dr Gupta did not adhere to the opinion he expressed in 2024 about the likelihood the plaintiff might not be able to work at all. That opinion does not provide a proper foundation for a conclusion the plaintiff’s earning capacity was substantially impaired. -- 21 of 25 -- 22 [97] I adopt the amount suggested by the defendants, however, the plaintiff is now 21. The 5% discount multiplier for 46 years is 956. I assess future economic loss at $124,353.61. Future loss of superannuation [98] The parties agree any allowance for future loss of superannuation should be assessed at 12% of future economic loss. Assessed at this rate results in a loss of $14,922.43. I assess future loss of superannuation at $14,922.43. Past care [99] Under s 59(1) of the Civil Liability Act damages for past care are not to be awarded unless the care provided is necessary, the need for it arose solely out of the injury in relation to which damages are to be awarded and the care was provided for at least six hours per week for at least six months. The six hours per week of care need not be over a continuous period of six months.16 It was not suggested this case engaged either s 59(2) or (3) of the Act. [100] In cases of psychological injury gratuitous services in relation to which damages can be awarded can include emotional support where such support has been necessary and appropriate to assist a person to deal with the effects of the psychological injury.17 [101] The defendants argued no allowance should be made in respect of past care and assistance. They submitted the claim was not supported by any medical opinion. Also, it was not consistent with the records of either of the psychologists who had treated the plaintiff and was not consistent with the general practitioners’ medical records. The defendants accepted that if the Court was otherwise satisfied there should be an award for past care, the plaintiff’s suggested rate ($35.00 per hour) was appropriate. [102] I accept Ms Brown’s evidence concerning the extent of the emotional support she and the plaintiff’s father provided to the plaintiff after the accident. The plaintiff had been a happy child prior to 2 October 2013. In the first six months after the accident the plaintiff came into her parents’ bedroom every night. On some occasions she would stay in their room in their bed for the rest of the night. On other occasions Ms Brown would spend anywhere from two to four hours comforting her. After about nine months this behaviour became less frequent. By the time the plaintiff was in her final year of high school it had reduced to once a week or once a fortnight. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence that her sleep difficulties related to nightmares and flashbacks about the accident. [103] I accept Ms Brown’s evidence and the plaintiff’s evidence because I regarded them as truthful witnesses. Further, their evidence about these difficulties found support in the records of health care professionals. The medical records show complaints were made to various doctors about the plaintiff’s difficulties with sleep related to the accident. Such complaints were made on 30 October 2015, 20 April 2016 and 14 February 2018. The plaintiff was aged 10–12 in the period in which these 16 Kriz v King [2007] 1 Qd R 327 at [18]; Boon v Summs of Qld Pty Ltd t/a Big Bill’s Bobcats [2015] QSC 162 at [112]-[113]. 17 Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd v Casey (2017) 93 NSWLR 438 at [76]; Gardiner v Doerr [2022] QSC 188 at [354]. -- 22 of 25 -- 23 consultations occurred. Also, at the consultation with Dr Gilbert on 22 January 2016 he was informed the plaintiff had “re-experiencing phenomena in the form of flashbacks and dreams and her sleep was typically interrupted. She had been sleeping independently before the accident and went back to sleeping in her mother’s bed”. Ms Jackson’s records show that on 10 January 2020, when the plaintiff was 14, she reported hearing screams, flashbacks and seeing her sister’s face. [104] I accept Ms Brown’s evidence that in the year after the accident she had to spend 5 to 15 minutes some school day mornings coaxing the plaintiff to get into the car to go to school. On 22 January 2016 Dr Gilbert was told the plaintiff “required a lot of coaxing to be able to get back into the car again”. I accept Ms Brown’s evidence there were occasions when she had to drive the plaintiff to school separately from her younger daughters. I accept her evidence that after the plaintiff moved away from the family home she received calls from the plaintiff about once a fortnight in which the plaintiff was in an upset state and sought and received support from her mother to get motivated to go to work. Ms Brown’s evidence about the extent of the support she provided to the plaintiff was consistent with the plaintiff’s evidence. [105] I am satisfied the support provided by Ms Brown was both necessary and appropriate to assist the plaintiff to cope with her PTSD. Dr Gilbert agreed that if a PTSD sufferer’s symptoms were active having a person available to support the sufferer would be helpful for the sufferer. [106] I accept the plaintiff’s evidence her boyfriend assisted her by encouraging her to get up some mornings and to attend to her showering. I accept her evidence he has assisted her by driving her between Maryborough and Bundaberg. I am satisfied the support provided by him was both necessary and appropriate to assist the plaintiff to cope with the symptoms of PTSD. The need for the care provided by Ms Brown and the plaintiff’s boyfriend arose only out of the injury the plaintiff sustained in the accident. [107] I am satisfied there should be an award for past care. The plaintiff submitted $53,095.00 should be allowed for past care based on an hourly rate of $35.00 per hour for a total of 1,517 hours. The number of hours was arrived at by allowing for: 12 hours of care per week for the first six months after the accident (26 weeks) which totalled 312 hours; 4 hours per week from about October 2014 to October 2016 (which was near to the end of primary school) (104 weeks) which was 416 hours; 2 hours per week from October 2016 to October 2022 (which was near the end of grade 12) (312 weeks) which was 624 hours; and, thereafter 1 hour per week (165 weeks) being a total of 165 hours. I am satisfied the number of hours suggested by the plaintiff accords with the evidence. [108] However, almost a further 22 weeks have passed since this submission was made. That adds a further 22 hours. So the total number of hours is 1539 x $35.00 per hour which equates to $53,865.00. I assess the award for past care at $53,865.00. Future care [109] The plaintiff submitted the Court could be satisfied she will require at least one hour of assistance per week for the rest of her life. The plaintiff said this should be allowed at the rate of $55.00 per hour per week. Allowing that amount for the remainder of the plaintiff’s life (67 years), discounted on the 5% tables (multiplier = 1,029) totals -- 23 of 25 -- 24 $56,595.00. On the plaintiff’s submission, the award for future care should be $50,000.00. [110] The defendants submitted there should be no award for future care because there was no medical opinion to support the case the plaintiff’s symptoms will require such care. [111] Section 59(1) of the Civil Liability Act is also relevant to future care. Damages are not to be awarded unless the services are necessary, the need for the services arises solely out of the injury in relation to which damages are awarded and the services are to be provided for at least six hours per week and for at least six months. Once the six hours for six months is met, damages can be awarded “even if the services thereafter … are to be provided for less than six hours per week”.18 This requirement has been satisfied having regard to Ms Brown’s evidence about the time she spent caring for the plaintiff. [112] The assistance the plaintiff says she will require is ongoing emotional support. The plaintiff did not adduce any evidence from Dr Mathew or from any of the doctors called by the defendants to establish she needs such support in the future. Although the doctors called by the defendants agreed to varying extents with the suggestion a person suffering PTSD would benefit from the support another or others could provide to motivate the sufferer, this evidence did not prove the plaintiff would need such support in the future. The plaintiff’s case that she has established this need seems to be based on the fact she has needed such assistance in the past and so will need it in the future. Even accepting the severity of her PTSD symptoms are likely to fluctuate during her life I am not satisfied it has been proved such assistance will be necessary for her in the future. The plaintiff has not proved that there should be an award for future care because the first and second of the three requirements set out in s 59(1) are not met. Future expenses [113] The plaintiff seeks $20,000.00 for future expenses. The defendants conceded there may be some need for psychological treatment when the plaintiff’s symptoms affect her ability to function. In the past she has benefited from psychological treatment. The defendants submitted the Court should allow $5,000.00 for future expenses. The defendants submitted this would allow for at least 20 sessions of treatment. [114] The plaintiff received psychological treatment from Ms Morgan until Ms Morgan retired. She then attended on Ms Jackson for psychological treatment from 2019 until about 2023. She stopped the treatment when she had to pay for it as it was too expensive for her to manage. Dr Mathew said that due to the extent of the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms she required continued psychological treatment. He recommended 25 sessions. Relying on a document published by the Australian Psychological Society, he expected treatment would cost about $280.00 per session. As I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s condition of PTSD fluctuates in its severity and sometimes impedes the plaintiff’s ability to work and function I am satisfied that there is a need for an award for future expenses for psychological treatment. Future expenses are assessed at $20,000.00. 18 Kriz v King [2007] 1 Qd R 327 at [18]. -- 24 of 25 -- 25 Special damages [115] The parties have agreed special damages should be $5,250.00. I assess special damages at $5,250.00. [116] The position regarding damages is as follows: General damages $13,240.00 Past economic loss $5,131.48 Interest on past economic loss $1,555.75 Past superannuation $513.15 Interest on past superannuation $155.58 Future economic loss $124,353.61 Future superannuation $14,922.43 Past care $53,865.00 Future care $0.00 Future expenses $20,000.00 Special damages $5,250.00 TOTAL $238,987.00 [117] If judgment is given in favour of the plaintiff the judgment must be given against the insurer and not the insured person.19 Order [118] The order of the Court is: 1. Judgment for the plaintiff against the second defendant in the sum of $238,987.00. [119] I will hear the parties as to costs. 19 Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) s 52(4). -- 25 of 25 --