FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2026] QSC 63

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2026] QSC 63 PARTIES: FW AVIATION (HOLDINGS) 1 LIMITED (JERSEY COMPANY NO. 138927) (applicant) v VIETJET AVIATION JOINT STOCK COMPANY (VIETNAMESE ENTERPRISE CODE NO. 0102325399) ABN 76 736 605 980 (respondent) FILE NO/S: BS No 2974 of 2025 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 2 April 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 27 January 2026; supplementary written submissions on behalf of the respondent filed 10 February 2026; supplementary written submissions on behalf of the applicant filed 18 February 2026 JUDGE: McCafferty J ORDER: 1. The application filed by the respondent on 8 September 2025 is dismissed. 2. I will hear the parties on costs. CATCHWORDS: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW — RECOGNITION, EFFECT AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS — UNDER LEGISLATION — ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS — REGISTRATION — SETTING ASIDE — where the applicant and respondent were engaged in litigation in England — where the applicant obtained judgment against the respondent in an English court — where the English court made orders directing payment of the judgment debt in instalments — where the applicant obtained orders registering the foreign judgment in this Court — where, as at the date of registration, the deadline for payment of the final instalment of the judgment debt had not yet passed — where the respondent applies to set aside the registration of the foreign judgment pursuant to s 7(2)(a)(ii) of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) — whether the foreign judgment was registered for an -- 1 of 16 -- 2 amount greater than the amount payable under it at the date of registration — whether the registration of the foreign judgment should be set aside PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW — RECOGNITION, EFFECT AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS — UNDER LEGISLATION — ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS — REGISTRATION — SETTING ASIDE — where the respondent is a joint stock company headquartered in Vietnam — where the applicant obtained judgment against the respondent in an English court — where the applicant applied to register the foreign judgment in Vietnam but was unsuccessful — where the applicant subsequently obtained orders registering the foreign judgment in this Court — where the respondent asserts that its operations are structured such that it cannot satisfy the registered foreign judgment debt without contravening Vietnamese law — where the respondent applies to set aside the registration of the foreign judgment pursuant to s 7(2)(a)(xi) of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) — whether the enforcement of the foreign judgment would be contrary to Australian public policy — whether the registration of the foreign judgment should be set aside Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 6, s 6(4), s 6(7), s 7, s 7(2), s 7(2)(a), s 7(2)(a)(ii), s 7(2)(a)(xi), s 9, s 9(1) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 947D, r 947J, r 947K Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] Ch 13; [1989] 1 All ER 433, cited Bank Polska Kasa Opieki Spolka Akcyjna v Richard Zbigniew Opara [2010] QSC 93; (2010) 238 FLR 309, cited Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd v Lewis (2020) 4 QR 455; [2020] QCA 111, cited CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v JKC Australia Lng Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] WASCA 123, cited De Beéche v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd [1935] AC 148, distinguished FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2025] EWHC 1074, considered Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Townsing (2008) 21 VR 241; [2008] VSC 470, cited Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd [2017] WASCA 150; (2017) 323 FLR 95, applied Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10, cited LFDB v SM (No 3) [2017] FCA 80, cited Mack v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1920) 28 CLR 373; [1920] HCA 76, cited Marsi v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 2) [2008] EWCA Civ 303, distinguished -- 2 of 16 -- 3 Nyunt v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2022] NSWCA 249; (2022) 408 ALR 277, cited Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd (No 7) [2025] FCA 1125, cited R v A2; R v Magennis; R v Vaziri (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, applied Ralli Brothers v Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287, distinguished Re Agrillo; Ex parte The Bankrupt (1977) 29 FLR 484, cited St Pierre v South American Stores [1937] 1 All ER 206, distinguished Xu v Wang (2019) 58 VR 536; [2019] VSC 269, cited COUNSEL: C J Jennings KC with H E P Clift for the applicant P A Ahern KC with B McKenna for the respondent SOLICITORS: Arnold Bloch Leibler for the applicant Clayton Utz for the respondent Overview [1] The parties to this proceeding have been involved in litigation against one another in the courts of England. It commenced when the applicant (FW Aviation) issued proceedings against the respondent (VietJet) in the High Court of Justice, one of the Senior Courts of England and Wales. It concluded with FW Aviation obtaining judgment against VietJet exceeding US$215 million (the English judgment). [2] The Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (the Act) provides for a system of enforcement in Australia of the money judgments of the senior courts of certain foreign countries, including England, by registration. [3] On 20 August 2025, VietJet registered the English judgment in this Court in accordance with Part 2 of the Act. Under s 6(7) of the Act, once registered the judgment has, for the purposes of enforcement, the same force and effect as if the judgment had been given by this Court. This gives rise to the ability to commence proceedings for enforcement. [4] As is required by s 6(4) of the Act, the orders registering the English judgment permitted VietJet to apply to have the registration set aside. Section 7 of the Act provides for applications of that kind. It entitles a party against whom a registered judgment is enforceable (a judgment debtor) to apply to have the registration of the judgment set aside on or more of the grounds specified in the provision. [5] On 8 September 2025, VietJet applied pursuant to s 7(2) of the Act to have the registration of the English judgment set aside. The application invokes two grounds under s 7(2)(a): (a) First, that the judgment was registered for an amount greater than the amount payable under it at the date of registration within the meaning of s 7(2)(a)(ii) (the first ground); and -- 3 of 16 -- 4 (b) Secondly, that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy within the meaning of s 7(2)(a)(xi) (the second ground). [6] For the reasons set out below I am not satisfied that either ground has been established by VietJet such that the registration of the English judgment must be set aside. Consequently, VietJet’s application must be dismissed. Background to the English judgment [7] The dispute between the parties litigated in England has its genesis in an agreement to purchase and lease four Airbus A321 passenger aircraft. The aircraft were purchased under financing arrangements in a structure known as JOLCO (Japanese Operating Lease with Call Option). In accordance with this structure, the purchases were funded by entities who were not parties to the proceedings. VietJet leased the aircraft from the owners and utilised them as part of its fleet for its airline operation based in Vietnam. The owners financed the purchases by a mixture of debt and equity, although predominantly via syndicated loans from commercial banks. The lenders secured their debts by a combination of a mortgage over the aircraft and by the assignment of the owners’ rights under the leases to a security trustee. [8] For a considerable part of 2020 and 2021, VietJet’s operations were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. In late March 2020 the Vietnamese government placed restrictions on movement and implemented a national quarantine. This resulted in a disruption to VietJet’s operations. The airline was able to resume operations between May 2020 and April 2021. [9] By mid-2021, the ‘Delta’ variant of COVID-19 had emerged and been identified as posing a serious threat to public health. This caused further operational disruptions. Between 19 July 2021 and 8 October 2021, the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam suspended VietJet's operations. During this period, limited domestic flights were permitted within Vietnam. VietJet was not amongst the operators allocated to fly them. It was also prohibited from selling tickets and required to refund those it had already sold. [10] In 2021, VietJet fell behind on rental payments payable for the aircraft. In response, in October 2021 the lenders sold their positions to another entity who was not a party to the proceedings. In November 2021, the security trustees resigned and transferred their rights as security trustees to this entity who, in turn, assigned the security trustees’ rights to FW Aviation. [11] On 26 August 2022, FW Aviation commenced proceedings against VietJet in the High Court of England and Wales. They sought possession of the aircraft and payment of various sums under the lease agreements totalling over US$180 million. [12] The trial on liability (the first trial) was heard by Picken J between 4 to 14 June 2024. On 31 July 2024, judgment was delivered in favour of FW Aviation. Part of the relief was determined when the judgment was delivered. It included orders that VietJet make certain payments to FW Aviation. Those orders are not the subject of registration in Queensland. [13] The decision on liability was appealed to the Court of Appeal. Permission to appeal was obtained on 2 October 2024. The appeal was subsequently dismissed on 24 June -- 4 of 16 -- 5 2025. VietJet then sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Permission was refused on 26 August 2025. [14] Mr Justice Picken heard the trial on quantum (the second trial) between 13 to 22 January 2025. On 17 April 2025, judgment was delivered. Orders were made that VietJet pay FW Aviation US$181,529,550 (the judgment debt) by 15 May 2025 (the 17 April 2025 Orders). They relevantly provided: “1. There be judgment for the Claimant in the Second Trial in the following amounts: a. US $54,327,764 by way of outstanding A Line Termination Value and US $8,315,992 by way of Clause 20.4 Liquidated Damages payable in respect of the 8906 Aircraft; b. US $53,380,272 by way of outstanding A Line Termination Value and US $8,421,213 by way of Clause 20.4 Liquidated Damages payable in respect of the 8937 Aircraft; c. US $28,552,823 by way of outstanding Termination Value A payable in respect of the 8577 Aircraft; d. US$28,531,486 by way of outstanding Termination Value A payable in respect of the 8592 Aircraft. 2. The Defendant shall make payment of the sums set out in paragraph 1 above by 4pm BST on 15 May 2025. Liberty to the Defendant to apply to extend this deadline.” [15] VietJet subsequently applied for a stay or, alternatively, an extension of time within which to comply with the 17 April 2025 Orders. On 2 May 2025, Picken J refused the stay but made orders extending the time for payment. These orders (the 2 May 2025 Orders) required VietJet to pay the judgment debt in three tranches on three nominated dates. The orders, and the recitals to them, relevantly provided: “AND UPON the Defendant’s application dated 25 April 2025 for a stay of execution of the part of the Order of Mr Justice Picken dated 17 April 2025 (the Defendant’s Stay of Execution Application), alternatively for an extension of time to make payment of certain sums pursuant to that Order (the Defendant’s Extension of Time Application) … 4. Paragraph 2 of the Order of Mr Justice Picken dated 17 April 2025 be varied such that the Defendant shall have an extension of time to make payment of the sums set out in paragraph 1 of that Order, totalling US $181,529,550, as follows: a. US $60,509,850 shall be paid by 4pm on 15 May 2025; b. US $60,509,850 shall be paid by 4pm on 31 July 2025; and c. US $60,509,850 shall be paid by 4pm on 28 November 2025 …” -- 5 of 16 -- 6 [16] It is not apparent from the orders but r 40.11 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) provides: “40.11 A party must comply with a judgment or order for the payment of an amount of money (including costs) within 14 days of the date of the judgment or order, unless— (a) the judgment or order specifies a different date for compliance (including specifying payment by instalments); (b) any of these Rules specifies a different date for compliance; or (c) the court has stayed the proceedings or judgment.” [17] Further orders were made dealing with interest payable on the amounts awarded under the judgment debt. These orders (the 10 June 2025 Orders) required VietJet to pay interest on the judgment sum provided for by Order 1 of the 17 April 2025 Orders. They relevantly provided: “1. There be judgment for the Claimant in the amount of US$35,138,009 comprising Default Interest (as defined in the Sub-Lease Agreements) and post judgment interest payable in respect of the amounts ordered to be paid by the Defendant at paragraph 1 of the Order of Mr Justice Picken dated 17 April 2025. 2. The Defendant shall make payment of the sums set out in paragraph 1 above as follows: a. US$11,712,669.66 by 24 June 2025; b. US$11,712,669.67 by 31 July 2025; and c. US$11,712,669.67 by 28 November 2025.” [18] VietJet paid US$2,000,000 toward the judgment debt on 19 May 2025. No further payments have been made. Registration of the English judgment in Queensland [19] By application filed on 11 July 2025, FW Aviation applied to register the English judgment in this Court. The application was made without written notice to VietJet. This was a permissible course.1 The English judgment was registered on 20 August 2025 when Sullivan J made the following orders: “1. The judgment of the High Court of England and Wales dated 17 April 2025 and the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales dated 2 May 2025 (which varied the 17 April 2025 judgment), whereby it was ordered that [VietJet] pay US$181,529,550 to [FW Aviation] be registered under Part 2 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). 2. The judgment of the High Court of England and Wales dated 10 June 2025 whereby it was ordered that [VietJet] pay: (a) $US35,138,009 on account of interest to [FW Aviation]; 1 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 947D. -- 6 of 16 -- 7 (b) interest on the amounts ordered to be paid by [VietJet] pursuant to the 17 April 2025 judgment accruing at the rate of 8% from 11 June 2025 until the date of payment; … be registered under Part 2 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). 3. The amount payable by [VietJet] as the judgment debtor to [FW Aviation] as the judgment creditor is: (a) US$179,529,550 pursuant to paragraph 1 above; (b) US$35,138,009 pursuant to paragraph 2(a) above …” [20] FW Aviation was required to serve notice of registration of the judgment, in the approved form, on VietJet within 28 days from the date of registration.2 This notice was served on VietJet. It provided, relevantly: “(a) the following judgments as described in the order of Sullivan J were on 20 August 2025 ordered by the Supreme Court of Queensland to be registered under Part 2 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Commonwealth); (i) the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales dated 17 April 2025 and the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales dated 2 May 2025 (which varied the 17 April 2025 judgment), whereby it was ordered that [VietJet] pay US$181,529,550 to [FW Aviation]; (ii) the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales dated 10 June 2025 whereby it was ordered that [VietJet] pay: i. $US35,138,009 on account of interest to [FW Aviation]; ii. interest on the amounts ordered to be paid by [VietJet] pursuant to the 17 April 2025 judgment accruing at the rate of 8% from 11 June 2025 until the date of payment; … and (b) the judgments were registered on 20 August 2025; (c) the amounts payable under the order to the judgment creditor, [FW Aviation]; are: (i) US$179,529,550; (ii) US$35,138,009; … (d) you may, within 14 days after the date on which service of this notice is made, apply to have the registration set aside.” 2 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 947J. -- 7 of 16 -- 8 Application to set aside the registration [21] On 8 September 2025, VietJet filed the present application. It relies upon two grounds (identified above) provided for by s 7 of the Act. That section provides (relevantly): “7 Setting aside a registered judgment (1) A party against whom a registered judgment is enforceable, or would be enforceable but for an order under section 8, may seek to have the registration of the judgment set aside by duly applying to the court in which the judgment was registered, or (where applicable) a court in which the judgment was registered under Part 6 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, to have the registration of the judgment set aside. (2) Where a judgment debtor duly applies to have the registration of the judgment set aside, the court: (a) must set the registration of that judgment aside if it is satisfied: … (ii) that the judgment was registered for an amount greater than the amount payable under it at the date of registration; or … (xi) that the enforcement of the judgment … would be contrary to public policy …” [22] Section 7(2)(a) of the Act does not confer any discretion on the court hearing the application to set aside. If the court is satisfied that one or more of the grounds identified in the subsection are established, it must set the registration aside.3 The first ground [23] VietJet contends that at the time the English judgment was registered in Queensland a substantial component of it was not payable. This is because the effect of the 2 May 2025 Orders was that the final payment of the judgment debt was to be on 28 November 2025, several months after the judgment was registered. It submits that this final component was not due and payable at the date of registration, thereby engaging s 7(2)(a)(ii) with the consequence that “the judgment was registered for an amount greater than the amount payable under it at the date of registration”. [24] VietJet’s argument is that the proper construction of s 7(2)(a)(ii) is that the words “amount payable … at the date of registration” mean an amount that is presently due to be paid without further conditions or events needing to occur. This does not, on VietJet’s construction, encompass a present obligation that is only required to be discharged or paid at some future time. [25] In advancing this submission, VietJet contends that words “amount payable” are to be given their meaning in ordinary parlance and in a legal or commercial context more generally. In this context, something is only payable if it is due, that is, the time 3 Bank Polska Kasa Opieki Spolka Akcyjna v Richard Zbigniew Opara and Anor [2010] QSC 93; (2010) 238 FLR 309 at [48] (McMurdo J). -- 8 of 16 -- 9 for payment has arrived.4 In the present case it was argued that the time for payment had not arrived, at least for the entire judgment debt. This is because the 2 May 2025 Orders and the 10 June 2025 Orders had the effect of converting part of the judgment debt that was otherwise immediately payable into a debt payable by instalments. It follows, on VietJet’s argument, that the words “amount payable under it at the date of registration” must be limited to the specific instalment amounts in fact payable under the judgment at the date of registration. [26] Consistent with this construction, the registration of the English judgment offends s 7(2)(a)(ii) of the Act because paragraph 3(a) of Sullivan J’s orders expressly records that “the amount payable by [VietJet] … to [FW Aviation] … is US$179,529,550”, that is, the entire amount payable pursuant to the judgment, notwithstanding that at the date of registration, 20 August 2025, one payment had not yet fallen due. [27] The issue raised by the first ground is one of statutory interpretation, the relevant principles of which are well settled. In construing a statute, the primary object is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all provisions of the statute.5 The “purpose of a statute is not something which exists outside the statute. It resides in its text and structure, albeit it may be identified by reference to common law and statutory rules of construction.”6 [28] The process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed. Context is critically important. As Kiefel CJ and Keane J observed in R v A27, it is possible that “words which have an apparently clear ordinary or grammatical meaning may be ascribed a different legal meaning after the process of construction is complete” because “consideration of the context for the provision may point to factors that tend against the ordinary usage of the words of the provision.” As their Honours observed in the following passages:8 “[33] Consideration of the context for the provision is undertaken at the first stage of the process of construction. Context is to be understood in its widest sense. It includes surrounding statutory provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute and the statute as a whole. It extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy. ‘Mischief’ is an old expression. It may be understood to refer to a state of affairs which to date the law has not addressed. It is in that sense a defect in the law which is now sought to be remedied. The mischief may point most clearly to what it is that the statute seeks to achieve. … [35] [Their Honours referred to cases, including Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46–48 [47]-[53], emphasising the importance of the text of the provision] … 4 Reliance is placed on CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v JKC Australia Lng Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] WASCA 123; Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Ltd (No 7) [2025] FCA 1125 at [47]; Mack v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1920) 28 CLR 373; [1920] HCA 76; and Re Agrillo; Ex parte The Bankrupt (1977) 29 FLR 484. 5 Also the mandate of s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). 6 Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10 at [44]. 7 R v A2; R v Magennis; R v Vaziri (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35 at [32]. 8 See also Coeur de Lion Investments Pty Ltd v Lewis (2020) 4 QR 455; [2020] QCA 111 at [13] (Bowskill J, as her Honour then was, Philippides JA and Bond J agreeing). -- 9 of 16 -- 10 [36] These cases serve to remind that the text of a statute is important, for it contains the words being construed, and that a very general purpose may not detract from the meaning of those words. As always with statutory construction, much depends upon the terms of the particular statute and what may be drawn from the context for and purpose of the provision. [37] … When a literal meaning of words in a statute does not conform to the evident purpose or policy of the particular provision, it is entirely appropriate for the courts to depart from the literal meaning. A construction which promotes the purpose of a statute is to be preferred.” (citations omitted) [29] With these principles in mind, the following context within the Act is relevant to the interpretation of s 7(2)(a)(ii). [30] Part 2 of the Act creates a process whereby a “money judgment” from a foreign court may be registered in Australia in an “appropriate court”, being a reference to the Federal Court of Australia or the Supreme Courts of each State and Territory.9 A “money judgment” is a judgment “under which money is payable”.10 The process of registration created by Part 2 applies only to an “enforceable money judgment” being a “judgment under which is payable … an amount of money.”11 Registration of an enforceable money judgment can only occur if certain criteria are met. One of those criteria is that it is “final and conclusive”.12 [31] The registration of a foreign judgment under the Act does not of itself enforce the judgment. The process of registration under s 6 is separate to the process of enforcement. Registration is, of course, necessary before enforcement can occur. As s 6(7) makes plain, it is only after a judgment is registered that proceedings may be taken to enforce the judgment. Section 17 of the Act contemplates that the appropriate court will have rules of practice and procedure —“rules of court”— prescribing all matters necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to the Act. This includes providing for the service on the judgment debtor of notice of the registration of a judgment. It also includes procedures for enforcement. [32] In Queensland the rules of court are the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). These rules regulate matters of practice and procedure for various matters contemplated by s 17 of the Act. These include, for example, that a judgment creditor under a registered judgment must, within 28 days from registration of the judgment (or any extended time provided for) serve notice of the registration of the judgment on the judgment debtor,13 and that a judgment creditor can not enforce a judgment without serving it.14 [33] That the processes of registration and enforcement are distinct concepts is also apparent from other provisions of the Act. Under s 6(4) of the Act, the court registering the judgment “must state the period within which an application may be made under section 7 to have the registration of the judgment set aside”. 9 s 6(2) of the Act. 10 s 3 of the Act. 11 s 3 of the Act. 12 s 5(4)(a) of the Act. 13 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 947J. 14 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 947K(2). -- 10 of 16 -- 11 [34] The Act also places restrictions on the enforcement of judgments that have been registered. By s 6(10) no action may be taken to enforce a registered judgment until the period fixed under s 6(4) has lapsed or the application has been finally determined. Section 8 empowers the court in which a judgment is registered to order that “enforcement of the judgment be stayed” if it is satisfied that the judgment debtor has appealed or is entitled and intends to appeal against the judgment. [35] In the present case, the English judgment is a final judgment. It is a money judgment that meets the description of an enforceable money judgment and is one that is final and conclusive. The judgment debt is for the entire sum, less the US$2,000,000 paid by VietJet on 19 May 2025. That sum is an amount payable under the judgment. It represents the balance of a total sum awarded that has been finally determined. In my view there is no reason, having regard to the principles of construction, to interpret the words “the amount payable under” the judgment to mean “presently payable” or “payable immediately.” The proper construction of the words “amount payable under it” means the amount of the judgment debt payable as determined by the foreign court in accordance with its orders. [36] The purpose of s 7(2)(a)(ii), when considered in the context of the scheme for registration under the Act, and accepting, as it must be, that the concepts of registration and enforcement are separate, is to address a situation where the amount registered by the Australian court exceeds the total sum awarded as finally determined by the foreign court. That is not what has occurred here. [37] The fact that Picken J made orders extending the dates for payment of the judgment debt does not alter this analysis. The total sum remains one that has been finally determined: it is final and conclusive. As Professor Briggs KC, a leading writer in this field of discourse, has observed:15 “The common law generally awarded monetary remedies, and as the common law action for enforcement of a foreign judgment was originally by an action in debt, it is often said that only final foreign judgments for sums of money can be enforced by the judgment creditor. As the effect of a judgment entitled to recognition is to oblige the defendant to pay the judgment debt adjudicated, and as an action for debt does not lie in respect of an unliquidated sum, a judgment can be enforced by these means only if it has been finally quantified in money. If the total sum awarded has been finally determined, the fact that the foreign court would have power to vary the time or instalments of payment within that overall figure is irrelevant: the total sum is fixed, and the speed and mechanics of actual payment are procedural matters for English law, and not for the foreign court.” [38] The orders of Sullivan J had the effect of registering the 2 May 2025 Orders and the 10 June 2025 Orders. It may be the case that if an attempt were made to enforce the English judgment before the date for compliance falls due there would be compelling arguments available to resist, or indeed, stay, the enforcement. But the process of enforcement is, as I have explained, a different process. It is not the focus of s 7(2)(a)(ii) which looks to the judgment as “registered”. This may be contrasted with, for example, s 7(2)(a)(xi) which focuses upon “the enforcement” of the judgment. 15 Briggs, A, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments,7th Edition, at 826. -- 11 of 16 -- 12 [39] In any event, the issues raised by the first ground, while conceptually interesting, are of little practical importance. Even if my construction of s 7(2)(a)(ii) is wrong, there is no dispute that the final “instalment” fell due on 28 November 2025, two months prior to the hearing of this application. Section 9(1) of the Act provides an immediate remedy for this: “(1) If the registration of a judgment is set aside under subparagraph 7(2)(a)(ii), the court in which the judgment was registered must, on the application of the judgment creditor, order that the judgment be registered in respect of the amount payable under the judgment at the date of the application.” [40] There are of course two pre-requisites to s 9(1). The first is that the judgment must be set aside under s 7(2)(a)(ii). The second requires an application be made by FW Aviation. The application is a mere formality. There is no discretion conferred on the court. Once these two conditions are satisfied, s 9(1) requires the court to register the judgment for the amount payable at the date of the application. Such an application was foreshadowed by FW Aviation at the hearing. In the result, it is unnecessary, but it does underscore the limited utility in persisting with the first ground. The second ground [41] Public policy, as a ground for setting aside registration of a foreign judgment, has a narrow compass.16 This has always been the position at common law. It is also the position under s 7(2)(a)(xi), which is modelled on the common law. The focus is on Australian public policy, not the public policy of another country. The section imposes a high threshold.17 The situations where the public policy ground can be engaged are limited and have been described as “very difficult.”18 The reasons why the ground is narrowed were explained by Bell CJ in Nyunt19: “First, it is hornbook law that a court asked to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment will not examine the merits of the foreign judgment … and that principle is not to be circumvented or undermined through the invocation of broad conceptions of public policy. Secondly, in an increasingly global world, it is in fact a positive aspect of Australian public policy that foreign judgments and arbitral awards will be enforced as part of a reciprocal practice … The [Act] is also based on ‘considerations of justice, convenience, greater certainty in international transactions and comity between nations’. A broad conception of public policy in this context would be apt to frustrate these desirable goals.” (citations omitted) [42] The relevant principles governing the setting aside of the registration of a foreign judgment on the ground of public policy were reviewed by Martin CJ in Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd20. Relevantly, his Honour said the following:21 “14. The Act was enacted against the background of well-established common law principles regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign 16 Nyunt v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2022] NSWCA 249; (2022) 408 ALR 277 at [135] (“Nyunt”). 17 LFDB v SM (No 3) [2017] FCA 80 at [102]. 18 Xu v Wang (2019) 58 VR 536; [2019] VSC 269 at [90]. 19 (2022) 408 ALR 277 at [136]. 20 [2017] WASCA 150; (2017) 323 FLR 95. 21 Ibid at [14]-[17]. -- 12 of 16 -- 13 judgments, one of which was (and is) that a foreign judgment would not be enforced if to do so would be contrary to public policy. In that context, common law cases concerning that principle are of assistance in applying s 7(2)(a)(xi). 15. There are many decisions dealing with the principles applicable to a determination that the registration of a foreign judgment must be set aside on the ground that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy. … It is well established that: ‘It is immaterial that the judgment does not accord with Australian law. The efficacy of the judgment is to be judged not according to Australian law but according to the law [of the relevant foreign jurisdiction].’ 16. Further, an application to set aside registration of a foreign judgment is not an occasion for a court to review the merits of the foreign decision by reference to the law of the relevant jurisdiction, nor can registration be set aside even if it is apparent that the foreign court has erroneously applied the law of the jurisdiction in which the judgment has been registered. 17. The legal principles in this area reflect the interests of comity in the respect and recognition of the institutions of other sovereign states which are considered to provide ‘substantial reciprocity of treatment for Australian judgments’. That is why the authorities reveal few instances in which a foreign judgment has not been enforced or registered on the ground of public policy. 18. Different terminology has been used to describe the narrow and limited range of circumstances in which enforcement will be refused because it would contravene public policy. Expressions used include: • violation of ‘some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep rooted tradition of the common weal’; • if ‘enforcement were to offend some moral, social or economic principle so sacrosanct in [the forum’s] eyes as to require its maintenance at all costs and without exception’; and • ‘where the offence to public policy is fundamental and of a high order’.” (citations omitted) [43] Courts are slow to invoke public policy as a ground for refusing to recognise a foreign judgment. The reasons why were explained by Whelan J in Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Townsing22: “ … There are few instances in which a foreign judgment has not been recognised or enforced on [the ground of public policy]. There are good reasons for this. There are, as Kirby P puts it, the ‘interests of comity’ to maintain. The respect and recognition of other sovereign states’ institutions is important. This is especially so when acting under the Foreign Judgments Act where the registration and enforcement procedures apply on the basis that there is 22 (2008) 21 VR 241; [2008] VSC 470 at [20]. -- 13 of 16 -- 14 ‘substantial reciprocity of treatment’ for Australian judgments in the foreign forum. There is also a need for caution because of the inherent volatility of the notion of ‘public policy’. As Atkinson J points out in De Santis v Russo, ‘what is contrary to public policy in one era might not be considered contrary to public policy in another.’” (citations omitted) [44] The tenor of what VietJet invites is for this Court to find that the enforcement of the English judgment is contrary to Australian public policy because of matters unique to VietJet, including how it has structured its affairs and Vietnamese law. While I will, of course, deal with each of the specific arguments advanced, the proposition is incongruent with what Bell CJ expressed in Nyunt that it is a positive aspect of Australian public policy that foreign judgments will be enforced as part of a reciprocal practice which we share with the United Kingdom. [45] VietJet’s principal appeal to the public policy ground may be expressed as follows. Vietnamese law prohibits VietJet from complying with a foreign judgment unless it is first registered in Vietnam. The Vietnamese courts have refused to register the English judgment because they determined, in substance, that the English judgment conflicted with fundamental principles of Vietnamese law relating to damages, penalties and fairness (the Vietnamese judgment). In consequence, VietJet is prohibited, as a matter of Vietnamese law, from exporting foreign currency sufficient to satisfy the registered judgment. In a supplementary written submission provided after the hearing, there was an additional gloss placed on this argument. It was further contended that because VietJet must have recourse to assets within the Vietnamese jurisdiction to satisfy a judgment debt in Australia there is a genuine concern that continuing to recognise the English judgment in Australia will “improperly undermine the effect of the Vietnamese judgment.” [46] These matters, VietJet contends, engage the principle of comity for three reasons. The first reason is that the registration of the English judgment in Queensland requires VietJet to perform an act in Vietnam which cannot lawfully be done under the laws of that jurisdiction. It is said that, as a matter of principle, a court will not make orders that would require the performance of an act that cannot lawfully be done under the laws of that jurisdiction. [47] The second reason is that unless the registration of the English judgment is set aside FW Aviation will, effectively, have another opportunity to apply for its registration in Vietnam by applying to register the orders of Sullivan J. This, on VietJet’s argument, presents a risk of “opening a backdoor for FW Aviation to disregard the Vietnamese judgment and re-attempt to enforce the [English judgment] in Vietnam.” [48] The third reason is expressed as follows: “concerns of international comity have historically motivated courts to expressly limit the practical effect of their orders, to avoid an excess of jurisdiction.” It is said that because the practical effect of registration in Queensland “is enforcement on assets within Vietnam, enforcement is … contrary to public policy” and the “internationally appropriate course23 is to set aside the registration” of the English judgment. 23 Words taken from Lord Kerr in Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] Ch 13 at 37. -- 14 of 16 -- 15 [49] In my view, none of these arguments provide a basis upon which it can be said that the enforcement of the English judgment would be contrary to Australian public policy for reasons which need only be expressed briefly. [50] As to the first, it is incorrect to contend that the orders require VietJet to act contrary to Vietnamese law. The registration of the English judgment does not require VietJet to take action that it cannot lawfully undertake in Vietnam. It does not require, order or otherwise compel VietJet to undertake any act in Vietnam. The judgment is an enforceable money judgment that requires payment of a judgment debt. The fact that, practically speaking, VietJet may well only be able to satisfy a judgment debt by calling on its assets in Vietnam is not to the point. That is a product of how VietJet structures its affairs. It is not relevant to Australian public policy. [51] The authorities relied upon by VietJet in support of the general principle it contends for are, in my view, irrelevant. Those cases concern choice of law rules.24 They have no application to the relevant question whether the enforcement of the English judgment would be contrary to Australian public policy. The suggestion that the enforcement of the English judgment in Australia is somehow sanctioning the breach of the laws of another independent state is, in my view, without merit. [52] There may well be practical barriers to VietJet’s ability to pay the judgment debt in Australia. Those difficulties may well have consequences under Part 5.7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). These matters do not mean the enforcement of the judgment is contrary to Australian public policy. There is nothing, to adopt the words of Martin CJ and others, within the English judgment or how it was obtained that meets the description of a violation of some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal. [53] Nor is there anything by which it can be said that its enforcement would offend some moral, social or economic principle so sacrosanct in Australia’s eyes as to require its maintenance at all costs and without exception. The English judgment is from one of the English Senior Courts. It was regularly obtained. VietJet contested the proceedings. It failed. England is one of many other sovereign states which are considered to provide substantial reciprocity of treatment for Australian judgments. [54] Moreover, it is difficult to accept VietJet’s arguments in circumstances where it has raised the issue which it says is contrary to Australian policy. Mr Justice Picken was invited to stay the 17 April 2025 Orders by reason of a number of matters including foreign currency restrictions. While it is not strictly relevant to the application of Australian public policy, Picken J in refusing the stay observed that “whilst I note everything that has been said about the ability to obtain ready access to funds, nonetheless, for practical purposes I am in no doubt that [VietJet] could, if it chose, find the funds that are required to be found to meet the judgment of this court in the same way that [it] is able, apparently, to find funds to purchase aircraft or enter into other contracts relating to its business activities.”25 24 De Beéche v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd [1935] AC 148; St Pierre v South American Stores [1937] 1 All ER 206 and Ralli Brothers v Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287. 25 FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2025] EWHC 1074 (Comm) at [24]. -- 15 of 16 -- 16 [55] The second reason advanced invites this Court to speculate as to what, if anything, FW Aviation may now seek to do in Vietnam having registered the English judgment in Queensland. Even accepting the theoretical possibility that there is a prospect of FW Aviation seeking to register the judgment of this Court in Vietnam (and ignoring further speculation as to its prospects in view of the Vietnamese judgment), these matters are not such that enforcing the English judgment would be contrary to Australian public policy. [56] The proposition that maintaining the registration of the English judgment in this State may “go so far as to facilitate an abuse of process, by enabling a collateral attack on the Vietnamese judgment, and arguably engages issues of res judicata and estoppel” is an ambitious submission. It is not one supported by relevant authority. It is unclear on what basis the principles of res judicata and estoppel are arguably engaged. More fundamentally, it fails to identify how these concepts are relevant to the inquiry under s 7(2)(a)(xi). Similarly, it is difficult to see how the registration of the English judgment can enable a collateral attack on the Vietnamese judgment. But in any case these concepts are, in my view, irrelevant to the application of s 7(2)(a)(xi). [57] The third reason seeks to invoke the proposition that comity has historically motivated courts to limit the practical effect of their orders to avoid an excess of jurisdiction. The authority cited in support of this proposition is the English Court of Appeal decision of Marsi v Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL26, specifically, the reasons of Collins LJ (as his Lordship then was). That decision is not, in my view, relevant. The issue raised was whether it was appropriate for an English court to make orders appointing a receiver in relation to foreign assets. The specific paragraphs relied upon, [36]-[39], are inapposite. What is said in those passages was referring to a situation (in the context of the injunctions formerly known as Mareva injunctions) whereby an English court made orders in respect of assets outside the jurisdiction of England. That is not what has occurred here. Recognition of an English judgment in the Supreme Court of Queensland does not have the effect of making an order which infringes the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of other countries. Nor does it have the effect of enforcing the judgment against overseas assets. [58] In my view, VietJet has failed to establish the high threshold required to have the registration of the English judgment set aside on the grounds of public policy. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. [59] I will hear the parties on costs. 26 [2008] EWCA Civ 303. -- 16 of 16 --