Di Trapani v Di Trapani (No 2) [2026] QSC 41
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Di Trapani v Di Trapani (No 2) [2026] QSC 41
PARTIES: GINA DI TRAPANI & PETER DI TRAPANI AS
EXECUTORS OF THE WILL OF ELIZABETH ANNE
DI TRAPANI, DECEASED
(applicants)
v
GINA DI TRAPANI
(first respondent)
PETER DI TRAPANI
(second respondent)
SUZETTE DI TRAPANI
(third respondent)
LINDA MCDOWELL
(fourth respondent)
SAVANNAH JAYNE MCDOWELL
(fifth respondent)
ALEC JAMES MCDOWELL
(sixth respondent)
DI TRAPANI CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD
ACN 009 750 690
(seventh respondent)
GLUTOLO PTY LTD
ACN 010 067 795
(eighth respondent)
GLUTOLO PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE MARIO
DI TRAPANI DISCRETIONARY TRUST
ACN 010 067 795
(ninth respondent)
FILE NO/S: BS No 2902 of 2025
DIVISION: Trial Division
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 27 March 2026
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: On the papers
JUDGE: McCafferty J
ORDERS: I will make orders in accordance with the draft provided
by the applicants and the first, second, seventh, eighth and
ninth respondents.
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CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE — JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS —
GENERALLY — FORM OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER —
where the Court delivered judgment — where the Court sought
submissions from the parties on the form of order to give effect
to the judgment delivered — issues as to aspects of proposed
orders giving effect to principal judgment
Di Trapani v Di Trapani [2026] QSC 20, cited
SOLICITORS: GLG Legal for the applicant
Thynne + Macartney for the first and second respondents
Mullins Lawyers for the third respondent
The fourth respondent appeared on her own behalf and on
behalf of the fifth and sixth respondents
Macpherson Kelly for the seventh respondent
HopgoodGanim Lawyers for the eighth and ninth respondents
[1] On 2 March 2026, I gave judgment on the construction of several clauses of Mrs Di
Trapani’s will (the will).1 When I delivered judgment I directed the parties to file
orders by consent reflecting my reasons or, failing agreement, to provide their
respective proposed orders together with written submissions not exceeding two
pages by 4.00 pm on 9 March 2026.
[2] With one exception, the parties are agreed as to the appropriate orders. The exception
is paragraph 1(g). It concerns clauses 8.7 and 8.8 and the will. A disagreement has
arisen between the parties as to what, if any, impact my findings as to the
enforceability of clause 8.6 would have on the interpretation of clause 8.8.
[3] The applicants and the first, second, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents propose
the following as the appropriate order:
“(g) Clause 8.7 and 8.8 are construed as separate benefits and do not merge
into one combined benefit”.
[4] The fourth respondent (who also purported to make submissions on behalf of the fifth
and sixth respondents) contends that the appropriate order should be:
“(g) clauses 8.7 and 8.8 are construed as separate benefits and do not merge
into one combined benefit. However, as Clause 8.6 is unenforceable and
the $400,000 debt owed by the Second Respondent to the Seventh
Respondent remained outstanding at the date of death, the condition
precedent in Clause 8.8 has not been satisfied, and the legacy therein is
not payable.”
[5] Clause 8.8 of the will directs Mrs Di Trapani’s trustees not to make any claims on
any debt owed by the second respondent up to the sum of $400,000.00. If there is no
debt as at the date of Mrs Di Trapani’s death, it provides that the second respondent
receive a further bequest of $400,000.00.
1 Di Trapani v Di Trapani [2026] QSC 20 (‘Di Trapani’).
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[6] Clause 8.6 of the will was directed towards intercompany loans, that is, loans between
the seventh, eighth and ninth respondents.2 In my first judgment I held that clause 8.6
was an unenforceable wish and that Mrs Di Trapani did not have the power to direct
the forgiveness of any intercompany loans between those entities.3
[7] The fourth respondent has referred me to documents which suggest that the second
respondent may have owed a debt in the sum of $400,000.00 as at the date of Mrs Di
Trapani’s death (the debt). The debt appears to have arisen pursuant to an executed
loan agreement that named Mrs Di Trapani personally as the lender.
[8] The fourth respondent submits that, because of my findings as to clause 8.6, the
portion of clause 8.8 directing forgiveness of the debt is also unenforceable. This
argument stems from evidence suggesting that the funds advanced pursuant to the
loan agreement originated from a bank account in the name of the seventh respondent.
The fourth respondent invites me to conclude on that evidence that the debt is a
“corporate liability”, which I take in the context to mean that it is a kind of
“intercompany loan” falling within the ambit of clause 8.6.
[9] The applicants and the first, second, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents submit
that it is inappropriate for the fourth respondent to raise this matter in circumstances
where, they contend, the matter was not the subject of argument at the hearing. There
is some merit to this position.
[10] In any event, I decline to make the orders sought by the fourth respondent. My reasons
for doing so are as follows. That the funds were advanced from a particular source
does not change the party to whom the debt was owed. It is apparent on the face of
the loan agreement that the debt was owed to Mrs Di Trapani. Further, even if the
debt could be said to have been “owed by the Second Respondent to the Seventh
Respondent”, it would still not be an “intercompany loan” within the ambit of clause
8.6. As I said in my first judgment, there was “nothing in the language of that clause
to support the proposition that it was intended to deal with matters other than those
involving [the seventh, eighth and ninth respondents]”.4 Clause 8.6 was not directed
to loans between a corporate respondent and a natural person.
[11] I will make orders in accordance with the draft provided by the applicants and the
first, second, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents.
2 Di Trapani at [46].
3 Di Trapani at [51].
4 Di Trapani at [52].
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2026/041