Boubaris v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 90

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Boubaris v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 90 PARTIES: DIMITRIOS BOUBARIS (appellant) v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (respondent) FILE NO: D45/26 DIVISON Appellate PROCEEDING: Appeal against sentence ORIGINATING COURT: Magistrates Court Maroochydore DELIVERED EX- TEMPORE ON: 11 June 2026 DELIVERED AT: Maroochydore HEARING DATE: 11 June 2026 JUDGE: Cash DCJ ORDERS: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. No order as to costs. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – an appeal against sentence pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of driving while disqualified by a court order – where the appellant was sentenced to 16 months imprisonment with release to parole after serving five months – where the appellant had prior convictions for disqualified driving and unlicensed driving, among other offences – where the appellant submits that the learned Magistrate placed ‘undue weight’ on the appellant’s traffic record, that the Magistrate ‘failed to have regard’ to section 9(2)(a)(ii) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) and did not place enough weight on section 9(2)(fb) – where the appellant further submits that the conduct was not accompanied by ‘inappropriate conduct’ and a sentence of actual imprisonment is excessive – whether the sentence imposed is excessive LEGISLATION: Justices Act 1886 (Qld), ss 222, 222(2)(c) 223 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), ss 9(2)(a)(ii), 9(2)(fb) -- 1 of 5 -- 2 CASES: Chakka v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 213 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37;(2014) 252 CLR 601 Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 APPEARANCES: The appellant appeared in person J Street for the respondent instructed by the Office of the Direction of Public Prosecutions [1] On 25 March 2026 the appellant pleaded guilty to two offences of driving while disqualified by a court order. The offences were committed in October and December 2025. At the time the appellant was subject to a lengthy disqualification order. The length of the period of disqualification is explained by the appellant’s traffic record, which was described by his solicitor as ‘appalling’. The appellant had multiple prior convictions for disqualified driving and had been sent to prison for such offending in the past. [2] The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for 15 months and fixed a parole release date that would require the appellant to serve five months before he was released. The appellant appeals against the sentence on the ground that it was excessive. In support of this ground, the appellant asserts the decision of the Magistrate was affected by two errors. [3] In my view, no error affected the sentence decision of the Magistrate, and the sentence imposed was not excessive. The appeal must be dismissed. To explain why I have reached this conclusion it is convenient to set out the legal principles governing an appeal of this kind. Legal principles applicable to the appeal [4] The appeal is brought pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). Section 222(2)(c) provides that if a person pleads guilty in the proceeding before the Magistrate, they may only appeal on the ground that the ‘fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment was excessive’. Pursuant to section 223 of the Justices Act, the appeal is by way of rehearing on the evidence given in the proceeding before the Magistrate (and any further evidence that might be admitted with leave). I am required to conduct a real review of both the evidence before the Magistrate, and the Magistrate’s reasons for imposing the sentence, to determine whether the decision was affected by error. As this is an appeal against the exercise of the sentencing discretion, it must be determined in accordance with the well- known principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499.1 If I find that the sentence imposed was ‘unreasonable or plainly unjust’, or if the Magistrate erred in law, acted upon a wrong principle, took into account irrelevant matters, failed to take into account relevant matters, or mistook the facts, then I can exercise the sentencing discretion afresh. [5] It is not enough that I consider that if I had been in the position of the magistrate, I would have taken a different course. Where the alleged error is that the sentence is excessive, the appellant must demonstrate the sentence falls outside of the permissible range of 1 Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489. -- 2 of 5 -- 3 sentences, considering all the relevant circumstances including the circumstances pertaining to the offender and the offence itself.2 Where there is an assertion of specific error, such error, if established, only permits appellate intervention where ‘without the error identified a lesser sentence should have been imposed in all of the circumstances that were before the lower court…’3 The offences [6] The facts of the appellant’s offences are simple. In 2023 the appellant was convicted of disqualified driving and imprisoned. His licence was also disqualified for a total period of three and half years – that is, until February 2027. [7] The first offence occurred at about 11 am on 24 October 2025. Police officers stopped the appellant who was driving along Maroochydore Road. The appellant admitted that he knew his licence was disqualified and that there was no emergency requiring him to drive the car. Police gave the appellant a notice to appear requiring him to answer the charge on 25 November 2025. [8] The second offence occurred just before midday on 23 December 2025, just a little while after the appellant had appeared in relation to the first offence. Police officers stopped the appellant who was driving south along the Bruce Highway with his daughter in the car. The police recognised the appellant, and checks confirmed his licence was disqualified. The defendant admitted as much and that he had no compelling reason to be driving – he was taking his daughter her grandparents’ house. The appellant’s circumstances [9] The appellant was about 40 years old when he committed the offences. He had a long and serious criminal history, and an even worse traffic record. The criminal history stretched back to when the appellant was a teenager. It includes convictions for assaulting and obstructing police, drug offences, and public nuisance offences. Of immediate relevance is the appellant’s conviction for dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death, in respect of which he was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months, to be suspended after serving three months. [10] The appellant’s traffic record began in 2002 and occupies some 13 pages of the record from the Magistrates Court. There are many convictions for unlicenced or disqualified driving, as well as other traffic offences. Such offences occurred regularly – with hardly a year passing without the commission of some serious traffic offence. The learned Magistrate was confronted with a record of seven previous offences of disqualified driving, nine of unlicenced driving, and nine of drink or drug driving, among other offences. [11] Some explanation for the appellant’s record can be found in his history of drug abuse and addiction. Dispute this difficulty, the appellant is in a stable relationship with his wife who loved and supported him, and with whom he was raising four young children. He was also active in his local community and assisted a local sports team. By the time of 2 See Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37;(2014) 252 CLR 601 and Chakka v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 213. 3 Chakka v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 213, [89]. -- 3 of 5 -- 4 sentence, the appellant had undertaken significant rehabilitation and there was evidence he had stopped using illegal drugs. The sentence hearing [12] The prosecutor emphasised the appellant’s terrible driving record and submitted both general and personal deterrence were important considerations. The prosecutor submitted a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment with a third of that sentence served in custody was an appropriate sentence. [13] The solicitor who appeared on behalf of the appellant had put together an impressive array of material, including references and a psychological report. He also prepared detailed and helpful written submissions which drew attention to section 9(2)(a)(ii) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), which states that when sentencing a person such as the appellant, a sentence which allowed him to stay in the community was preferable. It was said on the appellant’s behalf that a sentence without immediate imprisonment was appropriate, having regard to section 9(2)(a)(ii) and the circumstances of the appellant, including his steps toward rehabilitation and his contributions to his family. [14] In oral submissions, the appellant’s solicitor drew attention to section 9(2)(fb), which calls for consideration of the probable effect any sentence would have on the appellant’s family. In this regard the solicitor highlighted letters from the appellant’s wife and others which spoke of her reliance upon him and the effect imprisonment would have on the family, especially his children. An explanation was proffered for why the appellant drove while disqualified – each said to be while helping family members. His efforts at rehabilitation and contribution to the community were emphasised. [15] The learned Magistrate, in careful and well-articulated reasons, noted the impact the appellant’s conduct would have on his family. His Honour considered that made it all the more remarkable the appellant would choose to drive – even more so for the second offence which was committed a month or so later. The Magistrate had regard to the appellant’s rehabilitation but said the more important factor was deterring a repeat habitual offender who drives illegally when it suits. His Honour observed that the offence of driving while disqualified by a court order is a form of contempt. [16] Ultimately the Magistrate considered that there was a ‘need to send a clear deterrent message or specific to [the appellant], which can only be achieved by a period of imprisonment [to] serve actual time’. The appellant’s contentions [17] The appellant identifies three matters which he says contributed to an excessive sentence. [18] The first is that the Magistrate placed ‘undue weight’ on his traffic record. The second is that Magistrate ‘failed to have regard’ to section 9(2)(a)(ii). The third is that the Magistrate did not place enough weight on section 9(2)(fb). The appellant submits that considering his conduct was not accompanied by ‘inappropriate conduct’ such as dangerous driving, speeding or the use of drugs, a sentence of actual imprisonment was excessive. -- 4 of 5 -- 5 Consideration [19] The claim that too much or too little weight was given to a factor relevant to sentence will not, of itself, support a finding that a sentence was affected by error. But in any event the appellant’s contentions are without merit. [20] The learned Magistrate rightly considered the appellant’s very bad record of traffic offences, and in particular the offences for disqualified and unlicenced driving, as a highly relevant matter. His Honour referred to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 and was careful to apply its principles. There is nothing in the Magistrate’s remarks to support a contention that this factor was allowed to overwhelm the sentencing process. [21] The same can be said of the claim that the Magistrate gave too little weight to the effect a sentence of imprisonment would have on the appellant’s family. It is clear that his Honour was acutely conscious of this factor but correctly understood its limited relevance in the context of the appellant’s offences and history of offending. His Honour also noted the relevant consideration that the appellant must himself have been aware of the hardship his deliberate could cause, yet he decided to commit the offences anyway. [22] The submission that the Magistrate failed to have regard to section 9(2)(a)(ii) is also unsupported. The matter was specifically raised in submissions, and the Magistrate’s statement that specific and general deterrence could only be achieved if there was actual imprisonment shows that his Honour turned his mind to the provision. [23] The sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment was amply supported by the cases to which the Magistrate was referred. His Honour correctly understood the gravamen of the offending was in the appellant’s disregard for orders of the court. In this sense the offence of driving while disqualified by a court order is best understood as an offence against the administration of justice. It is different from other traffic offences for this reason. The fact that the appellant was not committing other traffic offences at the same time does nothing to diminish the seriousness of his conduct. [24] The Magistrate was confronted with a mature offender with a long history of driving while unlicenced or disqualified who chose to drive because it was convenient, not just once but twice, with the second occasion being after he was given a notice to appear for the first offence. In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the Magistrate imposed the sentence he did. Much less than being excessive, the sentence imposed was, in my view, entirely appropriate. [25] The appeal must be dismissed. [26] As the respondent did not seek the costs of the appeal, there is no order as to costs. -- 5 of 5 --