Alderton v Police [2026] QDC 68

[2026] QDC 68 DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND KENT KC DCJ No 47 of 2025 TRISTAN REECE ROSS ALDERTON Appellant v POLICE Respondent BRISBANE FRIDAY, 15 MAY 2026 JUDGMENT HIS HONOUR: [1] Mr Alderton has appealed to this court, pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act, against the severity of a penalty imposed on him in the Magistrates Court on the 24th of October 2025 for an offence of mid-range drink driving. The penalty, as I read the material, was a fine of $1,000 and a suspension of his ability to hold or obtain a driver’s license for 15 months, and Mr Alderton appeals to this court, contending that that was excessive. In particular, I think I am right in saying he contests the 15-month period of disqualification or suspension. Ms O’Dea, on the behalf of the Commissioner of Police, the respondent, opposes the appeal, arguing that it should be dismissed. [2] The offence carries a maximum penalty of 14 penalty units or three months’ -- 1 of 4 -- 2 imprisonment, and indeed, quite a lot of the dialogue in the Magistrates Court was along the lines of the Magistrate’s inclination to possibly imprison Mr Alderton for reasons that will become clear – his Honour eventually concluding that an immediate imprisonment was not justified. [3] Because of Mr Alderton’s prior traffic history, he was subject to a mandatory licence disqualification under section 86(2) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act, and the Magistrate, in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, increased the minimum mandatory to 15 months, as I have noted. [4] Unfortunately for Mr Alderton, and probably everyone else, he has an extensive traffic history, including three prior offences for driving with a relevant drug present in his system under section 79(2)AA of the Act, each resulting in previous licence disqualification. He also has numerous speeding infringements, some of which include exceeding the limit by more than 30 kilometres an hour. He also has convictions for use of a mobile phone while driving and driving an unregistered vehicle. Ms O’Dea advances the submission that his history demonstrates an ongoing noncompliance with the traffic laws and repeated driving-related offending over a number of years. [5] It seems common ground, factually, that Mr Alderton had consumed about four cans of alcohol before driving, resulting in the mid-range reading, and there was no lawful or emergent reason for driving. It seems that he had had four cans of Jack Daniel’s at his boss’s place. [6] On his behalf in the Magistrates Court, his solicitor submitted that Mr Alderton was then 25 years of age, he had a Year 12 education, he was working then as a landscaper, and he was a carer for his child, who was then said to be 18 months of age. It is also said that he had attended the Men Choosing Change program, ATODs – which is an Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs course – and he was getting either psychiatric or psychological help. [7] The relevant principles engaged in an appeal such as this include the primary principle that the appeal can only succeed under section 222 if the sentence is demonstrated to have been excessive. The jurisdiction will generally only be exercised if there is an identifiable error of -- 2 of 4 -- 3 law or fact, or a sentence that is so unreasonable that error can be inferred in the exercise of the relevant discretion. [8] Ms O’Dea relies on authorities generally in this area, which include, without cataloguing the citations, House v R, an extremely well-known authority about appellate interference with an exercise of a discretion, Hili v R and R v Watson. It seems to me that those relevant authorities can be distilled along the following lines – as I think I put to Mr Alderton a little while ago – mere disagreement with the sentence concluded is insufficient; rather, the question is whether it is outside the acceptable range, indicating in itself a misapplication of principle. It is irrelevant whether this court, if sentencing Mr Alderton, would have imposed a different penalty. The problems with challenging the exercise of a discretion, such as the sentencing discretion, in the absence of apparent and identified error, are manifest. [9] It is said in Ms O’Dea’s outline that Mr Alderton has identified no error of principle, nor does he explain why the sentence is excessive, and he fails to articulate any factual or legal error by the Magistrate, and those shortcomings are said alone to be fatal to the appeal. To be fair to Mr Alderton, after hearing from him briefly today, his complaint really is that the period of disqualification, which is considerably longer than it seems to be expected, is the identified excessiveness. [10] It is said by the respondent that the Magistrate was entitled to and did give weight to Mr Alderton’s poor driving history, and the need in terms of the Penalties and Sentences Act for personal and general deterrence and protection of the community. Relevant authorities confirm that prior offending can properly inform such aspects of the sentencing process as moral culpability, the need for deterrence, and whether earlier penalties have been ineffective, and that is a factor that can be brought to bear on Mr Alderton, unfortunately. [11] The conclusion contended for by the respondent is that Mr Alderton has not identified any sentencing error; a mere unsupported assertion of excessiveness does not of itself justify appellate intervention, and accordingly the appeal should be dismissed. [12] In my conclusion, those submissions by the respondent are properly made and should -- 3 of 4 -- 4 be accepted. There is no identified error in the sentencing process. The sentence may be regarded in terms of the disqualification as being a somewhat heavy penalty, but that does not of itself establish manifest excess. There is no other error of principle or fact identified. In all of the circumstances, there is nothing demonstrated that justifies appellate intervention, and in all the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed. I take it there is no other orders sought, Ms O’Dea? MS O’DEA: No, your Honour. Thank you. HIS HONOUR: Okay. Thanks APPELLANT: Yes, your Honour. ______________________ -- 4 of 4 --