Croll v Queensland Police Service [2026] QDC 63

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Croll v Queensland Police Service [2026] QDC 63 PARTIES: LEONARD THEODORE CROLL (Appellant) V QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE (Respondent) FILE NO/S BD 3304/25 DIVISION: Appellate PROCEEDING: Appeal proceeding pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ORIGINATING COURT: Magistrates Court at Brisbane (Magistrate Mack) DELIVERED ON: 24 April 2026 (ex tempore) DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 24 April 2026 JUDGE: Barlow KC DCJ ORDERS: 1. The appellant’s conviction be set aside. 2. The charge that the appellant breached s 33(1) of the Bail Act 1980 be dismissed. CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – the appellant was convicted of failing to surrender into custody and to appear in accordance with his undertaking as to bail, contrary to s 33(1) of the Bail Act 1980 - the appellant contended that the sentencing magistrate erred by not considering the absence of the appellant’s name on the daily law list, or by not stating in open court that he had had his associate check that list – whether the absence of the appellant’s name on the daily law list was a reasonable excuse under s 33(2) of the Act. CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – BAIL – EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE – the appellant was convicted of failing to surrender into custody and to appear in accordance with his undertaking as to bail, contrary to s 33(1) of the Bail Act 1980 – the warrant for his apprehension was not produced at the hearing – whether the proceeding was properly before the court below – whether the charge was properly before the court. -- 1 of 4 -- 2 CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – OTHER MATTERS – the magistrate gave no reasons for his conclusions that the appellant had failed to appear before the court and did not have reasonable cause for that failure to appear – whether the absence of reasons was an error giving rise to a wrongful conviction. LEGISLATION: Bail Act 1980 s 28A, s 33 (1), (2), (3), (4) CASES: Hook v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 35 APPEARANCES: L T Croll appeared on his own behalf C J McEvoy on behalf of the respondent, Queensland Police Service [1] On 5 November 2025, the appellant, Mr Croll, was convicted in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane of an offence against section 33(1) of the Bail Act 1980 (failing to appear). He appeals that decision on the basis, in brief, that during the hearing, the magistrate and his clerk engaged in an exchange in which it appeared to the appellant that the magistrate asked the clerk to check the daily law list for the day on which it was alleged Mr Croll failed to appear, because Mr Croll had told the magistrate that his name did not appear on that daily law list as a matter that was to be mentioned that day or, indeed, at all. [2] Mr Croll, with this court’s leave, gave evidence by an affidavit affirmed by him on 29 January 2026, that he observed the magistrate ask the court clerk to confirm if the daily law list for 1 September 2025, which was the relevant date, had the name of the appellant listed on it. The court clerk, then, shook her head in a “no” gesture to answer his Honour’s inquiry. None of that was recorded in the transcript nor did the magistrate, during the course of the hearing, say that he had had the matter checked and that the appellant’s name had not been on the law list on the relevant date. [3] The appellant’s ground of appeal, today, is to the effect that it was not open to the magistrate to have convicted the appellant and, had evidence of the daily law list of the relevant date been entered onto the court record, it would have produced or shown that there was reasonable cause why there was no appearance by the appellant on 1 September 2025. [4] With due respect to the magistrate, it does seem to me that, if his Honour did have such an inquiry made in the light of the submission that had been made to him by the appellant as to why he did not appear on the relevant date, his Honour ought to have made that inquiry openly and announced openly the result of that inquiry. It may not have made a difference, because his Honour appears to have accepted that the appellant’s name had not appeared on the daily law list on the relevant date. I say that because he did not appear to dispute or ask for proof of that fact from the appellant, who was self-represented before him, but went on to ask the appellant whether he had made any other inquiries, or he had received any information from the court or from the prosecution or from any other source to the effect that he did not have to appear on that day. I should mention that, on 1 September, the appellant’s matter was supposed to have been listed for mention, as had been directed on the previous occasion at which the appellant was present. -- 2 of 4 -- 3 [5] His Honour gave very short reasons. He started the hearing by simply saying, “We’ll deal with the failing to appear. Because you haven’t shown cause, you’re found guilty of that offence.” His Honour later went on, in terms of the sentence that he would impose, as follows. “But I don’t disagree with what you’re saying in relation to you might have been confused or misled. So, to that extent, you’re convicted. You’re not further punished.” [6] His Honour did not give reasons for why he concluded that the appellant had not shown cause for failing to surrender into custody and for failing to appear before the court. In that sense, his Honour’s failure to give such reasons gives rise to an appealable issue. It is incumbent on a magistrate, even in a busy court, to give at least some reasons for a decision. While his Honour questioned the appellant about whether he had received any other information, his Honour did not, ultimately, give any reasons why he did not accept that the absence of the appellant’s name on the daily law list gave rise to a reasonable cause for not appearing. [7] It seems to me, with respect, that there is a very good argument that the absence of the appellant’s name on the law list did give rise to reasonable cause. The daily law list is published by the court and is to inform the public and parties of what matters are listed before the court on that day. It is a positive representation by the court as to what matters are listed. It would be similar, in my view, to a party calling the registry and asking if the party’s matter had been listed for mention and being told that it was not. The magistrate appears to have accepted that the appellant was misled by the absence of his name on the law list, but did not consider that to be a reasonable cause, for reasons that he did not state. [8] In my view, it would be reasonable cause for a self-represented appellant, who may well have thought that, although it was to be listed for mention, for some reason - whether an error or some other positive step - it was no longer listed even though he had not been positively informed that would be the case. In that respect, therefore, it seems to me that his Honour erred, first, in not giving reasons for his decision that there was no reasonable cause and, secondly, in concluding that there was no reasonable cause for the appellant’s non-appearance. [9] Even if I were wrong in those conclusions on this appeal, there is a more fundamental basis why the appellant should not have been convicted. Section 33(1) provides two bases for an offence, both of which must be shown before an offence can be found to have occurred. A defendant who has given an undertaking as to bail must both fail to surrender into custody in accordance with that undertaking and be apprehended under a warrant issued under (relevantly) s 28A of the Bail Act 1980. It is only if those two matters are proved that the defendant will have committed the offence; subject, of course, to the defence provided for under subs (2), namely that the defendant had reasonable cause for failing to surrender into custody or to appear before the court or, indeed, to surrender into custody at some time later, before he was apprehended. [10] There was no evidence before the court below, on this occasion, that the defendant had been apprehended under a warrant issued under s 28A. Both parties did, however, inform the court that he had been apprehended. That would be sufficient, in my view, to overcome the need for positive evidence in this case to the effect that he had been apprehended. If there had not been such agreement before the magistrate, the absence of evidence to that effect would be fatal to the prosecution demonstrating that the defendant had committed an offence under subs (1). -- 3 of 4 -- 4 [11] But more fundamental even to that proposition is that, under subs (3), proceedings for an offence against the section are to be instituted without the laying of a complaint and must be taken in accordance with a procedure that commences with the production to the court before which the defendant apprehended under a warrant was brought of that warrant. The warrant would then be evidence and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, conclusive evidence of the undertaking and of the failure to surrender into custody as well as evidence that the issue of the warrant was duly authorised. [12] The transcript of the proceeding before the magistrate does not show that the relevant warrant was, indeed, produced to the court. The transcript shows that the proceeding commenced by his Honour calling the appellant’s name, to which the appellant responded. His Honour, then, said, “So are you going to show cause why you didn’t appear on the 1st of September?”. The prosecutor did not produce the warrant to the court and the only evidence before the court that was tendered by the prosecutor (on the insistence of the magistrate) was the appellant’s criminal record. So, his Honour went straight to whether a defence may be available under subs (2), without first having before him anything that showed that the defendant was indeed alleged to have breached subs (1). [13] There was no proper proceeding before the court, on that day, on which the defendant could be convicted unless and until the warrant was produced, which it was not. That meant that, indeed, the defendant was not yet obliged to raise a defence. He was not, to put it more colloquially, in “a show cause situation,” but the magistrate jumped immediately to the proposition that he was. [14] The fact that the production of the warrant is an essential step in a proceeding for an offence under section 33(1) is made clear also by subsection (4), which provides that “Upon production to the court of the warrant the court shall then and there call on the defendant to prove why the defendant should not be convicted of an offence against this section.” It is only upon production to the court of the warrant that the magistrate could properly call on the defendant to show cause why he did not appear. [15] That, it seems to me, with respect, is an essential step which could not even be overcome by an agreement that he had failed to appear and that the warrant had issued. Absent the production of the warrant to the court, there was no charge properly before the court. As his Honour Judge Porter QC (as his Honour then was) said in Hook v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 35, at [29], “The facilitative procedure provided in section 33(3)(b) is conditional upon production to the court of a warrant issued under the Bail Act.” [16] His Honour went on to conclude that that subsection does not, in fact, make production of the warrant evidence that the defendant was apprehended under the warrant, which was also an essential element of the alleged offence. As I have said, in this particular case there was probably no need for such evidence because the parties agreed and informed the court that the defendant or the appellant had been apprehended under a warrant. [17] In the circumstances, the appellant’s conviction, even though it was not recorded and he was not punished because of the fact that he was probably misled and confused by the absence of his name on the law list, the magistrate’s decision that he had committed the offence was in error. [18] The order of this court, therefore, is that the conviction of the defendant be set aside and that the charge that he breached section 33(1) be dismissed. -- 4 of 4 --