Edwards v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 37

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Edwards v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 37 PARTIES: EDWARDS, Luke John (appellant) v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (respondent) FILE NO: 1828 OF 2025 (Brisbane District Court) DIVISION: Civil PROCEEDING: Appeal pursuant to s. 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ORIGINATING COURT: Magistrates Court, Brisbane DELIVERED ON: Orders pronounced and reasons published on 27 March 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 24 February 2026 JUDGE: McCarthy KC DCJ ORDERS: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. No order as to costs. CATCHWORDS: APPEALS – s 222 Justices Act 1886 – appeal against conviction – where the defendant pleaded not guilty to the offence of commit public nuisance under s 6(1) Summary Offences Act 2005 – where the appellant alleged errors of law, errors of fact, evidentiary deficiencies and a failure to prove the essential elements of the offence – where the appellant alleged the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence – whether the appellant’s behaviour was offensive – whether the Telstra store was a public place – where the appellant alleged that the prosecution had failed to produce a material witness – whether a Jones v Dunkel was required – whether the guilt of the appellant is proved beyond reasonable doubt LEGISLATION: Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss. 222, 223. Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) ss. 3, 6, sch. 2. CASES: Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1. Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285. Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612. Millar v Queensland Police Service [2025] QCA 14. -- 1 of 9 -- 2 R v Palmer (1998) 103 A Crim R 299. RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620. COUNSEL: L Edwards (self-represented) A Adler for the respondent SOLICITORS: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent Introduction [1] On 26 June 2025, the appellant was convicted after trial of one charge of “commit public nuisance” pursuant to section 6(1) of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). The appellant was fined $600, and a conviction was recorded. The appellant appeals against his conviction pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The Grounds of the Appeal [2] The appellant was charged that “on the 19th day of February 2025 at Brisbane City in the central division of the Brisbane Magistrates Court District in the State of Queensland [he] committed a public nuisance offence”. [3] The appellant represented himself both in the trial and on the appeal. [4] The notice of appeal advanced several grounds alleging error of law, error fact, evidentiary deficiencies and a failure to prove the essential elements of the offence. [5] The grounds of appeal plead in the notice were arguments to support what was, collectively, a contention that the verdict was unreasonable or unsupported having regard to the evidence in the trial. The appellant developed these arguments before this court in oral submissions and invited this court to conclude that the verdict was “incorrect”. [6] In addition, the notice of appeal informed this court that “evidence of the Indian wearing the fluro coloured vest would have contradicted that guy, that is that Telstra business employee that brought the coronavirus to that hearing”. As the appellant developed this argument before this court, he seemed to suggest that the failure to call a material witness in the trial should have caused the court to have reasonable doubt about his guilt for the offence. -- 2 of 9 -- 3 The Nature of the Appeal [7] In Millar v Queensland Police Service1, the Court of Appeal stated relevantly2: “Section 223 of the [Justices Act] provides that an appeal under s.222 is by way of rehearing on the evidence given in the proceeding in the Magistrates Court…[T]he nature of the review task undertaken by the District Court judge on such an appeal is settled. See McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at [47]. What is involved in the District Court judge conducting a real review of the evidence and making up the judge’s own mind about the case was set out by Sofronoff P (with whom Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreed) in Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132 at p.5: ‘Consequently, the learned District Court judge had to consider each of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant and, having regard to the evidence led in the Magistrates Court and paying due regard to the advantage that the learned Magistrate had in seeing the witnesses give evidence, determine for himself the facts of the case and the legal consequences that follow from such findings of fact.’” The Elements of the Offence to be Proved [8] The prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he behaved in a disorderly way, or an offensive way, or a threatening way, or a violent way; and his behaviour interfered, or was likely to interfere, with the peaceful passage through, or enjoyment of, a public place by a member of the public.3 [9] Inclusively, a person is said to have behaved in an offensive way, if the person uses offensive, obscene, indecent or abusive language.4 A person is said to have behaved in a threatening way if the person uses threatening language.5 [10] The prosecution case was described succinctly in the following terms, “on the day in question the appellant entered the Telstra store and engaged in behaviour that was loud, abusive and offensive, causing disruption to staff and concerned members of the public, including a Telstra employee who was present during the incident” 6. 1 [2025] QCA 14. 2 Ibid at [3]. 3 s. 6(2) of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). 4 s. 6(3) of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). 5 Ibid. 6 TOP (Trial) 1-8.4-8. -- 3 of 9 -- 4 [11] I pause to remark upon the conduct of the judicial officer in the proceeding. The magistrate is to be commended on her temperate, patient and courteous treatment of the appellant throughout the trial hearing. It was an impressive model of ethical judicial behaviour in challenging circumstances. The appellant presented during the trial and again on this appeal in an impassioned way with entrenched views. Importantly, I have also had no regard to statements made by the appellant of personal consequences to me should my decision not reflect the outcome he desired. [12] The prosecution called Mr Colledge who was the floor manager for the Telstra business located in the Queen Street Mall. Mr Colledge had been the floor manager at that store since 2021. A summary of his evidence follows. [13] Mr Colledge had “an interaction” with the appellant in the days preceding 19 February 2025. It was for this reason that he was “keeping his eyes peeled” on the movements of the appellant within his store that afternoon. [14] Mr Colledge asked if he could help the appellant. The appellant responded by asking Mr Colledge “Do you have a visa to be here? Mr Colledge responded, “Why did this matter?” and the appellant commented, “Get out of our country” and according to Mr Colledge “started to get a bit more amplified”. The appellant informed Mr Colledge that he should “Get the fuck out of our country. Go back to your scum country, New Zealand. You don’t fucking belong here”. It was evident in the trial that Mr Colledge is not Caucasian. [15] After informing the appellant that racial discrimination would not be tolerated within the store, Mr Colledge sought the assistance of the employed security officer to escort the appellant from the store. [16] Mr Colledge recounted of “a little bit of physical altercation” between the appellant and the security officer. The appellant continued “yelling the racial slurs” loudly and aggressively from outside of the doors of the store, and according to Mr Colledge, staff came to the front of the store and customers “were actually getting a little bit concerned”. Mr Colledge recalled that there were “lots of just (sic) members of the public stopping and turning to try to work out what’s going on here”. Mr Colledge recalled that a female colleague, who usually helped him at the -- 4 of 9 -- 5 front of the store, backed behind him, “just for sheer fear that she was going to get hurt”. [17] The appellant walked away from the store after yelling “Leave Australia. Go back to your country”. The police were called. [18] Visually recorded footage showing the front entry area of the store from various camera angles was tendered in evidence.7 The footage has no audio. I have reviewed the footage, and was taken to the footage by the appellant during his oral submissions on the appeal hearing. I considered that the recorded images provided independent support for the testimony of Mr Colledge. [19] The cross-examination of Mr Colledge focused upon a “targeting” of the appellant within the store. [20] Through this cross-examination, the appellant suggested that the words he used were “what documentation do you have to be here?”, and that he never told Mr Colledge to “get out of our country”. Mr Colledge denied both propositions. The appellant suggested during the trial that he may have used the words, “leave Australia or leave Australia area”. The appellant suggested that the security guard assaulted him and had said “fuck you, mother fucker” repeatedly. Mr Colledge denied the propositions. [21] In the trial, the appellant suggested to Mr Colledge that “you and that security guy wearing the vest are both two persons that were instigated and organised to escalate to get the police there to bring a charge under this nuisance charge”. [22] The remaining witness in the trial was Constable Willis. [23] On 19 February 2025 the appellant approached him with his identification and asked the Officer to “check me for any wanted for questionings” (sic). [24] The appellant was questioned, and the audio and visual recording of the conversation was tendered in evidence.8 I have viewed this recording. In the recording, the appellant admitted that he was present at the Telstra store at the relevant time and had been asked to leave the store. In the recording, the appellant 7 Exhibit 1. 8 Exhibit 2. -- 5 of 9 -- 6 stated that he had told Mr Colledge that he was the one who “needed to leave Australia” and that he had commented that Mr Colledge was trespassing in this country. I considered that the recording provided support for Mr Colledge’s testimony that the appellant had behaved in an offensive way. [25] The appellant gave evidence in the trial. [26] The appellant’s testimony suggested that Mr Colledge was part of a broader targeting of the appellant to “escalate matters to sham trials”. The appellant testified that the security guard had approached him aggressively and it was he that “was a nuisance”. [27] As the appellant did before me, during the trial the appellant described efforts made within the “administration of the United States of America” to extend their influence upon authorities from other countries to advance “false and misleading” allegations of criminal offences. In submissions before me, the appellant explained that it was common for security officers to be used as such instruments. [28] During the appeal hearing, the appellant invited me to view the visual recordings and focus upon a young woman in a wheelchair that can be seen approaching to pass the store, as the altercation between the security guard and the appellant progressed. Reminiscent of “the woman in the red dress”, a distracting simulation character in the 1999 film The Matrix, it was suggested that this woman was “not a witness” but seemingly a deliberate device as part of the entrapment of the appellant. The appellant asked rhetorically, if she was a witness, why was she not called? I observed that this member of the public in fact stops her passage in reaction to the behaviour of the appellant. [29] Under cross-examination in the trial, the appellant refuted that he had used offensive or aggressive language and observed the designed effort of others to ensure there were “people of slightly different skin colours” in the store, “hoping that I’d say something so that they can say is racist, but that didn't really occur”. The appellant testified that his countering of the request for him to leave the store, by informing them to leave “Australia area”, was a matter he had “authority” to do. [30] Indeed, at the conclusion of his testimony, the appellant informed the prosecutor that, “You'll be working at big W if you're lucky mate, if you’re still allowed to be -- 6 of 9 -- 7 here. I haven’t made my mind up about that yet. You may have to leave Australia also”. [31] The magistrate informed the appellant on several occasions to stop referring to the security guard by the preface “the Indian”. The appellant contended at the appeal hearing that this was an expressed adverse attitude towards him during the trial and demonstrated bias. There was no substance to any such complaint. Conclusion - The Verdict [32] Cognisant of the advantage held by the magistrate to observe the witnesses before her, I had no difficulty accepting the evidence provided by Mr Colledge to the requisite standard. I concluded that his testimony was well supported by the independent evidence of the recorded imagery at the store. [33] I did not accept that the appellant’s recount, where it departed from that of Mr Colledge, was possibly true. The impression formed by me of the evidence of the appellant, both in the trial and through the recorded conversations with the police on 19 February 2025, lent plausibility to Mr Colledge’s recount of the events at the store. The appellant’s evidence accepted the central statement that he had informed Mr Colledge to leave Australia or the Australia area. The appellant’s testimony otherwise contained entrenched and genuine beliefs without foundation, on the facts before the court, that in my view undermined its credibility. [34] As observed by his Honour Chief Justice Gleeson in Coleman v Power9, “[C]oncepts of what is disorderly, or indecent, or offensive, vary with time and place, and may be affected by the circumstances in which the relevant conduct occurs”. The legitimate end to which public order offences are intended to achieve, is the protection of the public from harms including disorder, violence, intimidation and serious affront.10 In its plain meaning, offensive behaviour is behaviour which produces an emotional reaction (such as anger, resentment, disgust or outrage), beyond a reaction that was no more than the consequence of a difference in opinion on, for example, a political issue. The kind of conduct attracting a charge must be sufficient to justify the imposition of a criminal sanction11 and in my view, the 9 (2004) 220 CLR 1. 10 Ibid at 24 (Gleeson CJ), 74, 77 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 86-87 (Kirby J). 11 Ibid at 25 (Gleeson CJ). -- 7 of 9 -- 8 conduct in question must, in all the circumstances, have breached contemporary standards of good order12. [35] The evidence satisfied me beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant behaved in an offensive way, representing a serious affront to contemporary standards of good order. The appellant’s repeated requests for Mr Colledge to leave Australia, in the context and circumstances within which it was made, were offensive. [36] A “public place” is defined in broad terms, “a place that is open to or used by the public, whether or not on payment of a fee”.13 There is no substance to the appellant’s argument that the Telstra store was not a public place. [37] I had concluded that the evidence satisfied me beyond reasonable doubt, that members of the public, within and without of the store, can be seen reacting in way, that demonstrates his behaviour interfered, or was likely to interfere, with the peaceful passage through, or enjoyment of, a public place by a member of the public. Members of the public can be seen in the recorded images, altering their movement and attention adversely in response to the behaviour of the appellant. The Failure to Call “the Indian wearing the fluro coloured vest” [38] The appellant directs the courts attention to the failure of the prosecution to call the security officer of the store. During his closing address before the magistrate, the appellant suggested that the court find as an inference to be drawn from such failure, that the witness would have, if called, undermined the prosecution case.14 The appellant contends that the failure of the magistrate to have drawn such an inference was an error. [39] The magistrate applied herself in a manner consistent with the correct approach at law. The magistrate declined to speculate as to what evidence would have been given by the security officer, if called.15 [40] In Dyers v The Queen16, their Honours Justices Gaudron and Hayne stated the following, “[F]urther, as a general rule, a trial judge should not direct the jury in a 12 Ibid at 26 (Gleeson CJ). 13 s. 3, sch 2 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). 14 A Jones v Dunkel direction; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. 15 TOP (Trial) 1-58. 16 (2002) 210 CLR 285. -- 8 of 9 -- 9 criminal trial that the prosecution would be expected to have called persons to give evidence other than those it did call as witnesses. It follows that, as a general rule, the judge should not direct the jury that they are entitled to infer that the evidence of those who were not called would not have assisted the prosecution. A direction not to speculate about what the person might have said should be given. Again, exceptions to these general rules will be rare and will arise only in cases where it is shown that the prosecution’s failure to call the person in question was in breach of the prosecution’s duty to call all material witnesses”17. [41] In RPS v The Queen18, their Honours Justices Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne stated, “… if the question concerns the failure of the prosecution to call a witness whom it might have been expected to call, the issue is not whether the jury may properly reach conclusions about issues of fact but whether, in the circumstances, the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused”19. [42] The magistrate was not informed of the reasons that the prosecution failed to call the relevant witness, the security officer. I accepted that whilst the witness was a material witness in the proceeding, there were no foundational facts from which the court could have determined whether the prosecution could reasonably be expected to call that witness. [43] Whilst the court has on occasion observed the difficulties in delimiting the circumstances in which a Jones v Dunkel direction is necessary20, the present case, in my view, is not such a case. As I had determined, the recorded evidence strongly supported the testimony of the critical prosecution witness, Mr Colledge, and there was no risk of any miscarriage of justice. Orders [44] The appeal is dismissed. [45] No order as to costs. 17 Ibid at 291. 18 (2000) 199 CLR 620. 19 Ibid at 633. 20 R v Palmer (1998) 103 A Crim R 299 is one such an example. -- 9 of 9 --