Bull v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCAT 314

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Bull v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCAT 314 PARTIES: WENDY JOY BULL (applicant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE – WEAPONS LICENSING (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: GAR130-24 MATTER TYPE: General administrative review matters DELIVERED ON: 16 July 2026 HEARING DATE: 10 June 2026 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Cosgrave ORDERS: The Respondent’s decision to refuse the Applicant’s application for a dealer’s licence is confirmed. The application for review is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS – FIREARMS – LICENSING AND REGISTRATION – DEALER’S LICENCE – FIT AND PROPER PERSON – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – where the Applicant applied for a dealer’s licence – where the Respondent refused the application – where the Applicant is the subject of a Firearm Prohibition Order made by the New South Wales Commissioner of Police – whether such order “corresponds to” a Queensland firearm prohibition order under s 5D(1)(c) – whether the Applicant is a disqualified person – where the Applicant’s husband was convicted on 8 November 2023 of an offence under s 63(c) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) and of an offence under s 360.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) – whether the Applicant’s husband is an associate of the Applicant – whether the Applicant’s husband is a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer under s 10C – whether the Applicant is therefore not a fit and proper person to hold a dealer’s licence under s 10B(6) – effect of the Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 (Qld) -- 1 of 12 -- 2 WORDS AND PHRASES – “corresponds to” – “associate” – “disqualified person” – “fit and proper person” Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 360.2 Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 (Qld) Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), s 73, s 74 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 13, s 24, s 25, s 31 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 24, s 47 Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 3, s 5A, s 5B, s 5D, s 10, s 10B, s 10C, s 63, s 141G, Schedule 1AA, Schedule 2 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 Buckley v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCAT 165 Commissioner of Police v XPR [2025] QCA 93 Magarry v Queensland Police Service, Weapons Licensing Branch [2012] QCAT 378 Queensland Police Service v Magarry [2013] QCATA 147 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 Stower v Smart (2007) QDC 4 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Applicant: Mr Hall of Files Stibbe. Respondent: Mr Ferguson of Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction [1] Wendy Joy Bull (‘Ms Bull’ or ‘the Applicant’) has applied for external review under the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) of the decision of the Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing (‘the Respondent’) to refuse her application for a dealer’s licence under the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (‘the Act’). [2] On 23 November 2023, the Applicant applied for a dealer’s licence under the Act.1 The Respondent refused that application. [3] Following the 11 March 2026 commencement of the Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 1 Application for Dealer's Licence dated 23 November 2023. -- 2 of 12 -- 3 (Qld) (‘the 2026 Amendments’),2 the Respondent refined the grounds on which refusal is maintained. The refusal is now opposed on three grounds: (a) the Applicant is a disqualified person under s 5D(1)(c) of the Act by reason of a Firearm Prohibition Order made against her by the New South Wales Commissioner of Police on 6 October 2021, and is therefore not a fit and proper person to hold the licence by operation of s 10B(3)(a); (b) the Applicant’s husband is an associate of the Applicant within the meaning of the Schedule 2 dictionary, is not a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer under s 10C, and accordingly the Applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold a dealer’s licence by operation of s 10B(6); and (c) independently, the Applicant has not discharged her onus of showing that she is a fit and proper person to hold a dealer’s licence within the meaning of s 10B(1). [4] For the reasons that follow, each of these grounds is established. [5] Grounds 1 and 2 are each independently sufficient to require refusal of the licence under s 10(2)(e) of the Act, which provides that a licence may only be issued to and held by an individual if the person is a fit and proper person. Ground 3 is a separate and independent basis on which the Tribunal would refuse the licence. It reinforces but does not depend on Grounds 1 and 2. [6] It is convenient at this point to summarise the matter’s procedural position. The Respondent has also filed an interlocutory application under s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) to strike out the application for review on the basis that the Applicant is a disqualified person. The Tribunal dismissed that application ahead of the substantive hearing. The disqualification question and the substantive refusal question turn on overlapping issues, and the parties accepted at the hearing that the most efficient course was to determine the substantive review. Because the substantive review is resolved in the Respondent’s favour on Grounds 1, 2 and 3, no separate order is required on the strike- out application, which is rendered moot by the dismissal of the application for review. Statutory Context The Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) [7] The Act’s object is to prevent the misuse of weapons. The underlying principles are that weapon possession and use are subordinate to the need to ensure public and individual safety, and that public and individual safety is improved by imposing strict controls on the possession of weapons and requiring the safe and secure storage and carriage of weapons. [8] Section 10(2)(e) provides that a licence may only be issued to and held by an individual if the person is a fit and proper person to hold a licence.3 Section 10(2)(d) provides that a licence may only be issued to an individual if the person is not 2 Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 (Qld) 3 The Act, s 10(2)(e). -- 3 of 12 -- 4 prevented under the Act or another Act, or by an order of a court, from holding a licence.4 [9] Section 5D, inserted by the 2026 Amendments, defines a disqualified person. Section 5D(1)(c) says that a disqualified person includes a person who is or has been subject to an order made under a law of another jurisdiction that ‘corresponds’ to a firearm prohibition order.5 [10] Section 10B sets out the fit and proper person test for licensees. By s 10B(3)(a), a person is not a fit and proper person to hold or continue to hold a licence if the person is a disqualified person.6 By s 10B(4), a person is not a fit and proper person if, within 10 years before the relevant day, the person has been convicted of a class A serious offence or a class B serious offence.7 [11] Section 10B(6) provides that, for the issue, renewal, suspension or revocation of a dealer’s licence, a person is not, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold or continue to hold the licence unless each associate of the person is a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer under s 10C.8 [12] Section 10C is the parallel test for an associate of a licensed dealer. By s 10C(2), a person is not a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer if, within 10 years before the relevant day, the person has been convicted of a class A serious offence or class B serious offence.9 For the purposes of s 10C(2), the ‘relevant day’ in relation to a licensing decision is the day on which the decision is made. On a review on the merits, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker, and the relevant day is the day of the Tribunal’s decision.10 [13] In the Schedule 2 dictionary, an ‘associate’ of a licensed dealer includes a person who has a financial interest in the business carried on by the licensed dealer.11 [14] A class B serious offence is defined by s 5B(1) to include (a) an offence mentioned in Schedule 1AA of the Act, and (b) an offence under a law of another jurisdiction that, if it had been committed in Queensland, would have constituted an offence mentioned in paragraph (a).12 Schedule 1AA lists, among other offences under the Act, an offence against s 63.13 4 The Act, s 10(2)(d). 5 Weapons Act (Qld), s 5D(1)(c). 6 The Act, s 10B(3)(a). 7 Ibid s 10B(4). 8 Ibid s 10B(6). 9 Ibid s 10C(2). 10 For the purposes of s 10C(2) of the Act, the ‘relevant day’ in relation to a licensing decision is the day on which the decision is made. On a review on the merits, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker and applies the law as it stands at the time of its own decision: Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 at [44]–[47] (Kirby J), [98]–[100] (Hayne and Heydon JJ). 11 The Act, Schedule 2 (definition of ‘associate’). 12 Ibid s 5B(1). 13 Ibid, Schedule 1AA. -- 4 of 12 -- 5 The review jurisdiction [15] Section 19 of the QCAT Act provides that in exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal must decide the review in accordance with the QCAT Act and the enabling Act under which the reviewable decision was made and has all the functions of the decision-maker for the decision being reviewed.14 [16] The review’s purpose, as stated in s 20 of the QCAT Act, is to produce the correct and preferable decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.15 Under s 24(1) of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal may confirm or amend the decision, set aside the decision and substitute its own decision, or set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration with directions.16 The onus lies on the Applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that she is a fit and proper person to hold the dealer’s licence. Ground 1: The Applicant Is a Disqualified Person Under s 5D(1)(c) [17] The first ground on which the licence application was refused is that the Applicant is a disqualified person under s 5D(1)(c) of the Act, by reason of the 6 October 2021 Firearm Prohibition Order issued against her by the New South Wales Commissioner of Police. The Tribunal’s task is to determine, on the evidence before it, whether the Applicant is such a disqualified person, and accordingly whether she is mandatorily not a fit and proper person to hold the licence under s 10B(3)(a). The facts [18] On 6 October 2021, the New South Wales Commissioner of Police made a Firearm Prohibition Order against the Applicant under the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). The making of the order, and its continued operation, is not in dispute. [19] The order carries a substantive right of review under New South Wales law.17 That right of review is referenced at page 18 of the Section 21 material before the Tribunal.18 The Applicant’s submissions [20] The Applicant contends that the New South Wales order does not ‘correspond to’ a Queensland firearm prohibition order within the meaning of s 5D(1)(c) of the Act. The contention proceeds in the following way. The Act draws a textual distinction between Commissioner-made firearm prohibition orders, formerly governed by s 141G, and court-made orders, formerly governed by s 141H. Section 5D(1)(b) of the Act, as enacted, was framed by reference to court-made orders. The Applicant argues that, by parity of reasoning, s 5D(1)(c) extends only to interstate orders that are, in source and form, equivalent to a Queensland court-made order. The Applicant asserts that the New South Wales order does not satisfy that test as a police officer made the order. [21] The Tribunal does not accept the Applicant’s argument. The word ‘corresponds’ does not mean ‘is identical to.’ It focuses on substantive equivalence in operation and 14 QCAT Act, s 19. 15 Ibid s 20. 16 Ibid s 24(1). 17 Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), s 74. 18 Section 21 Material, page 18 (NSW Firearm Prohibition Order – review rights). -- 5 of 12 -- 6 effect, not to the identity of statutory source or of the office of the decision-maker. An interstate order whose operative consequences achieve what a Queensland firearm prohibition order achieves, in terms of prohibiting the named person from acquiring, possessing or using firearms or firearm-related items, is an order that corresponds to a firearm prohibition order within the ordinary meaning of ‘corresponds.’ [22] The New South Wales scheme provides for a right of review of a Firearm Prohibition Order. This right of review materially narrows whatever gap might otherwise have been said to exist between an order made by an interstate police officer and a Queensland order made or subject to the supervision of a court. A person subject to a New South Wales Firearm Prohibition Order is not without recourse. Because of this, the Tribunal finds that such people are subject to an order that substantively and practically corresponds with a Queensland firearm prohibition order. The Tribunal considers that s 5D(1)(c) requires practical and substantive correspondence rather than procedural correspondence. [23] Section 5D’s legislative purpose, drawn from the Explanatory Memorandum,19 is to identify the most high-risk individuals within the community and to prevent them either holding a weapons licence or being an associate of a licensed dealer. To construe s 5D(1)(c) so narrowly as to exclude orders made by interstate police commissioners under analogous schemes would substantially defeat that purpose and would produce a result that the Parliament cannot reasonably be supposed to have intended. Conclusion on Ground 1 [24] The Tribunal finds that the Firearm Prohibition Order, made on 6 October 2021, against the Applicant is an order made under a law of another jurisdiction that corresponds to a firearm prohibition order within the meaning of s 5D(1)(c) of the Act. The Applicant is accordingly a disqualified person within the meaning of s 5D. Applying s 10B(3)(a), she is mandatorily not a fit and proper person to hold the dealer’s licence applied for. Because s 10(2)(e) of the Act provides that a licence may only be issued to and held by an individual if the person is a fit and proper person, the operation of s 10B(3)(a) compels refusal of the licence. Ground 1 is established and, by itself, would be the basis for refusing the application. Ground 2: The Applicant’s Husband Is Not a Fit and Proper Person to be an Associate [25] The second ground, which is independent of the Applicant’s own status, is that her husband is an associate of the Applicant within the meaning of the Schedule 2 dictionary. He is not a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer under s 10C, and that the Applicant is consequently not a fit and proper person to hold a dealer’s licence by operation of s 10B(6). The facts [26] On 8 November 2023, the Applicant’s husband was convicted in the Gympie District Court of two offences.20 The first was an offence against s 360.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), being the Commonwealth cross-border offence of disposal or 19 Explanatory Memorandum, Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Bill 2026 (Qld), 18 , 44. 20 Gympie District Court, conviction recorded 8 November 2023. -- 6 of 12 -- 7 acquisition of a firearm or firearm part.21 The second was an offence against s 63(c) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), being the offence of acquiring or selling a weapon the identifying serial number or mark of which has been defaced or altered.22 [27] The Applicant applied for the dealer’s licence on 23 November 2023, fifteen days after her husband’s convictions in the Gympie District Court. [28] In her sworn evidence before the Tribunal, the Applicant testified that she and her husband jointly owned the dealer business in respect of which her application was made and that they shared the income of that business. The Applicant’s submissions [29] The Applicant advances four principle contentions on Ground 2. Each is considered in turn using the approach of identifying the Applicant’s position before explaining why it does not withstand scrutiny. (i) The husband is not an associate [30] The Applicant contends that her husband is not an ‘associate’ within the meaning of the Schedule 2 dictionary because he holds no formal directorship or licensed role in the dealer business. [31] That contention is inconsistent with the Applicant’s own testimony. The Schedule 2 dictionary defines an associate of a licensed dealer to include a person who has a financial interest in the business carried on by the licensed dealer. The Applicant gave evidence that she and her husband both jointly owned and shared the income from the dealer business. Both parts of that evidence are independently sufficient to establish a financial interest within the meaning of the Act’s Schedule 2 dictionary definition. The contention is rejected. (ii) Section 63(c) offence is not a class B serious offence [32] The Applicant contends that the offence under s 63(c) of which her husband was convicted is not a class B serious offence within the meaning of s 5B of the Act, and that s 10C(2) is therefore not engaged. [33] Unfortunately, this contention cannot be accepted. Schedule 1AA of the Act, inserted by the 2026 Amendments, lists offences under the Act that constitute class B serious offences. An offence against s 63 is among those listed. By s 5B(1)(a), an offence mentioned in Schedule 1AA is a class B serious offence. The husband’s 8 November 2023 conviction was a recorded conviction for that offence. The conviction directly engages s 10B(4) (the husband’s own status as not fit and proper) and, more relevantly here, s 10C(2) (his status as an associate of the Applicant). (iii) The Commonwealth offence is not a class B serious offence [34] The Applicant contends in the alternative that the Commonwealth offence under s 360.2 is not a class B serious offence because it is not directly listed in Schedule 1AA. [35] It is unnecessary to determine this contention given that the conclusion was already reached in respect of the s 63(c) conviction. The Tribunal observes, without deciding 21 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 360.2 (cross-border offence of disposal or acquisition of a firearm or firearm part). 22 The Act, s 63(c). -- 7 of 12 -- 8 the question, that by s 5B(1)(b) a class B serious offence includes an offence under a law of another jurisdiction that, if it had been committed in Queensland, would have constituted an offence mentioned in s 5B(1)(a). A Commonwealth cross-border firearms offence under s 360.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) is closely analogous to the dealing offences mentioned in Schedule 1AA of the Act. The contention need not, however, be resolved on this application. (iv) Section 10B(6) leaves a residual discretion to permit divestment [36] The Applicant contends that s 10B(6) does not operate as a true mandatory disqualification of the dealer. Her argument is that the Tribunal should leave open the possibility of the Applicant retaining or obtaining the licence on terms requiring her husband to divest his financial interest in the dealer business. [37] Section 10B(6)’s language is unambiguous and unqualified. A person is ‘not, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold or continue to hold the licence unless each associate of the person is a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer under section 10C’. The provision speaks in mandatory terms and ties the dealer’s ‘fit and proper’ status to the same status of each associate of the dealer at the time of the decision. The Tribunal has no power to ignore the existence of an associate who is presently disqualified by operation of s 10C(2) here, nor to make a contingent or conditional finding of fitness premised on a hypothetical future divestment that has not occurred. [38] The Applicant has had time since 8 November 2023, when her husband was convicted, to address this issue and work to divest or structurally separate her husband of his financial interest in the dealer business. She has not done so. Because she has not done so, the Applicant’s contention does not displace s 10B(6)’s operation. Conclusion on Ground 2 [39] The chain of reasoning on Ground 2 can be stated as follows: (a) First, on the Applicant’s testimony, her husband jointly owns and shares the income of the dealer business with her. This means that he has a financial interest in the business carried on by the Applicant. Because he has a financial interest in the business, he is an associate within the meaning of the Act’s Schedule 2 dictionary. (b) Second, on 8 November 2023, the husband was convicted of an offence under s 63(c) of the Act. Section 63 offence is listed in Schedule 1AA. An offence mentioned in Schedule 1AA is, by s 5B(1)(a), a class B serious offence. The husband’s conviction was therefore a conviction within the meaning of a class B serious offence. (c) Third, the date of conviction (8 November 2023) falls within the 10-year period preceding the relevant day, being the date of this decision. Section 10C(2) is accordingly engaged in respect of the husband. This means that he is not a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer. (d) Fourth, because the husband is currently an associate of the Applicant under s 10C, s 10B(6)’s mandatory condition is not satisfied. This means that the Applicant is not, and cannot be considered to be, a fit and proper person to hold the dealer’s licence she applied for. -- 8 of 12 -- 9 (e) Fifth, because s 10(2)(e) of the Act provides that a licence may only be issued to and held by an individual if the person is a fit and proper person, the operation of s 10B(6) compels the Tribunal to refuse the Applicant’s licence application. Ground 2 is established and, by itself, requires refusal of the licence independently of Ground 1. Ground 3: General Fit And Proper Person Assessment Under Section 10B(1) [40] The Act does not define the expression ‘fit and proper person.’ The phrase has been considered in this Tribunal’s weapons licensing jurisdiction by reference to the High Court’s discussion in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond,23 and to the principles affirmed in Magarry,24 and most recently in Buckley v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing as tendered by Mr Ferguson.25 [41] In Magarry, the Appeal Tribunal endorsed the analytical framework drawn from Stower v Smart,26 which directs the decision-maker to bear in mind the Act’s object (to prevent the misuse of weapons), to evaluate the evidence of the Applicant’s character, and then to ask the following questions: (a) In the circumstances, is there any real prospect of the Applicant misusing weapons such that the licence should be refused or revoked; and (b) Does the Applicant’s right to possess firearms pose a real risk to public and individual safety? The Tribunal has applied that framework here. [42] The Tribunal must also have regard to the considerations identified in s 10B(1), and in particular s 10B(1)(g) (the public interest), and to consider whether there is any criminal intelligence or other information indicating that the person is a risk to public safety, or that authorising the person to possess a weapon would be contrary to the public interest under s 10B(1)(f). The application’s chronology [43] On 23 November 2023, the Applicant applied for the dealer’s licence, fifteen days after her husband’s convictions in the Gympie District Court on 8 November 2023 for offences directly concerning the unlawful acquisition, disposal and dealing in firearms and firearm parts. The public interest [44] The principles underlying the Act are that weapon possession and use are subordinate to the need to ensure public and individual safety. The proper administration of a dealer’s business involves continuous control over a commercial inventory of firearms and firearm-related items. Where the spouse and joint owner of the dealer’s business is a person convicted of cross-border firearms offences and dealing in firearms with defaced identification marks, the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the dealer licensing regime weighs heavily against the issue of the licence. There is no 23 (1990) 170 CLR 321. 24 Magarry v Queensland Police Service, Weapons Licensing Branch [2012] QCAT 378; Queensland Police Service v Magarry [2013] QCATA 147. 25 [2026] QCAT 165. 26 (2007) QDC 4. -- 9 of 12 -- 10 condition that could adequately address that concern short of structural separation of the husband from any financial or operational interest in the business, which has neither been proposed or effected. The Applicant’s own status [45] The fact that the Applicant is herself the subject of a Firearm Prohibition Order made by the New South Wales Commissioner of Police, which the Tribunal has found above to correspond to a Queensland firearm prohibition order under s 5D(1)(c), reinforces the conclusion under s 10B(1). Even if the Tribunal were wrong on the ‘corresponds’ question, the New South Wales order’s existence would carry significant weight under s 10B(1)(g) (the public interest) and the more general fit and proper person assessment. Conclusion on Ground 3 [46] Applying the framework endorsed in Magarry, the Tribunal will consider and answer the two questions drawn from Stower v Smart against the Applicant. [47] First, there is in the Tribunal’s assessment a risk of misuse of weapons through the conduct of the dealer business, given the husband’s convictions for cross-border dealing in firearms and for dealing in a firearm with defaced identification marks, his financial interest in the business, and the absence of any structural separation between him and the business. [48] Second, the issue of a dealer’s licence to the Applicant in these circumstances would create a risk to public and individual safety, having regard to the commercial inventory of firearms involved in a dealer’s business and the proximity of the husband to that inventory by reason of joint ownership. The considerations under s 10B(1)(f) and (g) point in the same direction. [49] Separately, the Tribunal notes that the Applicant made her application 15 days after her husband’s conviction. While not dispositive or going to s 10B(1), the timing the Applicant displayed here – applying relatively soon after her husband’s conviction - raises concerns for the Tribunal about how the Applicant assessed and judged both the situation and the responsibilities attaching to a dealer’s licence. [50] The Applicant has not discharged her onus of demonstrating that she is presently a fit and proper person within the meaning of s 10B(1). Because s 10(2)(e) requires such fitness, Ground 3 is also established and would independently support refusal of the licence. The Discretion’s Exercise [51] Even where the statutory grounds for refusal are established, the Tribunal must consider whether refusal is the correct and preferable decision as stated in s 20 of the QCAT Act. The Applicant submits that the impact of a refusal to grant her a dealer’s licence on her livelihood, the enterprise’s family-business character and the absence of any direct evidence of misuse of weapons by the Applicant in the dealer’s business should weigh substantively in favour of a different outcome. [52] The Tribunal has considered those contentions. It acknowledges the enormous effort that the Applicant has made in building and running the dealer’s business, the adverse personal and business impact of these regulatory issues on the Applicant and the likely consequences if her application is refused. Equally it notes that that there is no -- 10 of 12 -- 11 evidence before the Tribunal of the Applicant misusing weapons before the Tribunal. However, the Applicant’s own disqualification under s 5D(1)(c) and the operation of s 10B(3)(a) are mandatory. The husband’s disqualification as an associate under s 10C(2), and the resulting operation of s 10B(6), are equally mandatory. Even if any residual discretion under the Act were available, the public interest in the integrity of the dealer licensing regime would support its exercise against the issue of the licence in these circumstances. [53] The Tribunal does not consider that any lesser outcome (such as the imposition of conditions) would adequately address the concerns it has identified. Refusal is the correct and preferable decision. Human Rights [54] In reviewing the decision, the Tribunal is acting in an administrative capacity and is a ‘public entity’ for the purposes of s 9(4) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HR Act’). The Tribunal must not make a decision in a way that is incompatible with human rights and must consider the relevant human rights. [55] The Respondent submits that the following rights are potentially engaged, property rights (s 24),27 the right to privacy and reputation (s 25),28 and the right to fair hearing (s 31).29 A decision is compatible with human rights if it does not limit human rights or, to the extent it does, those limits are justified under the proportionality test in s 13 of the HR Act.30 Property rights [56] Section 24 of the HR Act protects against arbitrary deprivation of property. A dealer’s licence is capable of engaging this right. Refusal will not be arbitrary, however, where it is undertaken in accordance with identifiable statutory criteria and for a legitimate purpose. The refusal is made pursuant to the Act on satisfaction of defined statutory grounds. The Tribunal has found those grounds established. There is no arbitrariness here in the relevant sense. Privacy and reputation [57] The Tribunal accepts that its decision to refuse may engage the right to privacy and reputation under s 25. The information underlying the refusal relates to business regulatory compliance and to recorded convictions of an associate, not to personal matters at the core of the right; and the limit is proportionate to the purpose of protecting public and individual safety. Fair hearing [58] The right to a fair hearing under s 31 is satisfied. The Applicant has had the benefit of a show cause process and a hearing before this Tribunal with the opportunity to advance her case in full. 27 HR Act, s 24. 28 Ibid s 25. 29 Ibid s 31. 30 Ibid s 13. -- 11 of 12 -- 12 Justification under s 13 [59] To the extent that any human right is limited, the Tribunal is satisfied that the limitation is justified under s 13 of the HR Act. The limitation’s purposes are the protection of public and individual safety, and the maintenance of the integrity of the dealer licensing regime. There is no less restrictive means of achieving that purpose where, on the Applicant’s own evidence, the joint owner of the dealer business is a person disqualified from being an associate of a licensed dealer, and where the Applicant herself is subject to an interstate firearm prohibition order. The limit achieves a reasonable balance between the Applicant’s interests and the public interest. Decision And Orders [60] For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal finds that: (a) the Applicant is a disqualified person under s 5D(1)(c) of the Act by reason of the Firearm Prohibition Order made against her by the New South Wales Commissioner of Police on 6 October 2021, and is accordingly not a fit and proper person to hold the dealer’s licence applied for under s 10B(3)(a), with the consequence that refusal is required under s 10(2)(e) (Ground 1); (b) the Applicant’s husband, being an associate of the Applicant within the meaning of Schedule 2 of the Act, is not a fit and proper person to be an associate of a licensed dealer under s 10C(2) by reason of his conviction on 8 November 2023 of an offence against s 63(c) of the Act, being an offence listed in Schedule 1AA and accordingly a class B serious offence under s 5B(1)(a), and the Applicant is therefore not a fit and proper person to hold the dealer’s licence under s 10B(6), with the consequence that refusal is required under s 10(2)(e) (Ground 2); and (c) Independently of Grounds 1 and 2, the Applicant has not discharged her onus of demonstrating that she is presently a fit and proper person within the meaning of s 10B(1) of the Act, applying the framework endorsed in Magarry and drawn from Stower v Smart, with the consequence that refusal is required under s 10(2)(e) (Ground 3). [61] Both Grounds 1 and 2 are independently sufficient to require refusal of the licence. Ground 3 is a separate and independent basis on which the Tribunal would refuse the licence. It reinforces but does not depend on Grounds 1 and 2. [62] The correct and preferable decision is to refuse the Applicant’s application for a dealer’s licence. [63] The Tribunal confirms the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Applicant’s application for a dealer’s licence. The application for review is dismissed. [64] Because the application for review is dismissed, the Respondent’s interlocutory application under s 47 of the QCAT Act31 is moot. No separate order is required on that application. 31 Ibid s 47. -- 12 of 12 --