Corbett v Infinite Timber Flooring Pty Ltd [2026] QCAT 304

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Corbett v Infinite Timber Flooring Pty Ltd [2026] QCAT 304 PARTIES: CALLUM CORBETT (applicant) v INFINITE TIMBER FLOORING PTY LTD (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: BDL035-26 MATTER TYPE: Building matters DELIVERED ON: 8 July 2026 HEARING DATE: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Senior Member Brown ORDERS: The proceeding is transferred to the Magistrates Court of Queensland at Southport. CATCHWORDS: CONTRACTS – BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS – THE CONTRACT – GENERALLY – where respondent undertook flooring work at domestic residence – where work consisted of laying vinyl floor planks – where some of the work included the laying of plywood sub-flooring – where work undertaken allegedly defective – where laying of vinyl flooring excluded from definition of building work in Queensland Building and Construction Commission Regulation 2018 (Qld) – meaning of ‘laying of vinyl’ – whether respondent undertook building work in addition to laying vinyl – whether any part of the work undertaken by the respondent was ‘building work’ – whether the respondent’s business consists of or includes carrying out building work – where it is arguable the laying of plywood sub-flooring is building work Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), sch 2 s 60 Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) sch 2 Queensland Building and Construction Commission Regulation 2018 (Qld), sch 1 s 30 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 52 -- 1 of 7 -- 2 Berkeley Building & Maintenance Pty Ltd v Totally Flooring Gold Coast Pty Ltd as trustee for The Lee Family Trust trading as Totally Flooring Beaudesert [2025] QCAT 306, followed Mathew v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & ors [2021] QCAT 117, applied APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) REASONS FOR DECISION [1] A preliminary issue falls to be determined in the proceeding: is the dispute the subject of the proceeding a building dispute as that term is defined in the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (‘QBCC Act’). The determination of the preliminary issue highlights the complexities of the provisions of the QBCC Act in the context of ascertaining whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a proceeding commenced as a building dispute.Mr Corbett engaged Infinite Timber Flooring Pty Ltd (‘Infinite Timber’) to undertake flooring work at his domestic residence. Infinite Timber provided a quote to Mr Corbett for the removal of existing flooring and the installation of ‘Ultimo 4.5 mm Blackbutt colour VU4-Blackbutt 4.5mm’ flooring. Mr Corbett says that he accepted the quote and the work was undertaken in December 2024. Mr Corbett says that the work is defective. He claims damages of $48,737.23 to remove and replace the flooring. Infinite Timber denies that the work undertaken is defective. [2] It is important to note at the outset that Infinite Timber is not the holder of a licence issued by the QBCC to undertake building work. [3] The power of the Tribunal to decide building disputes is conferred by the QBCC Act. The term ‘building dispute’ has a very specific meaning.1 A building dispute may be a domestic building dispute, a minor commercial building dispute or a major commercial building dispute. There are some features common to each of these types of dispute. Firstly, the dispute must relate to the performance of tribunal work or a contract for the performance of tribunal work. Secondly, the parties to the dispute must be, inter alia, a building owner and a building contractor or a building owner or building contractor and one of a stated category of persons. The latter includes a supplier or manufacturer of materials used in tribunal work. [4] A ‘building contractor’ means a person who carries on a business that consists of or includes carrying out building work.2 Building work as defined does not include work excluded from the definition.3 Of the many excluded items identified in schedule 1 of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Regulation 2018 (Qld) (‘QBCC Regulation’) is the following: Laying of carpets, floating floors or vinyl.4 1 Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) sch 2 (definition of ‘building dispute’) (‘QBCC Act’). 2 Ibid sch 2 (definition of ‘building contractor’). 3 Ibid sch 2 (definition of ‘building work’). 4 Queensland Building and Construction Commission Regulation 2018 (Qld) sch 1 s 30(1). -- 2 of 7 -- 3 [5] In Berkeley Building & Maintenance Pty Ltd v Totally Flooring Gold Coast Pty Ltd as trustee for The Lee Family Trust trading as Totally Flooring Beaudesert I considered the meaning of s 30 of schedule 1: 5 [11] Two issues arise for consideration: (a) What is the meaning of ‘laying of vinyl’?; and (b) Did the business carried on by the respondent consist of or include building work? [12] Unhelpfully, the respondent has filed no submissions. [13] The applicant says of the reference in the Regulation to ‘laying of carpets, floating floors or vinyl’ that the exclusion should not be read as referring to the laying of vinyl fixed to the subfloor. This submission is premised upon the reference to ‘floating floors’ and, read in context, all of the work referred to in s 30 of schedule 1 of the Regulation is work involving the laying of flooring that is not fixed to the subfloor. [14] In Mathew v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & ors (‘Mathew’) the Tribunal was required to consider the meaning of s 30 of the Regulation in the context of vinyl laid on a particle board subfloor. The Tribunal stated: In my view, any work done after the installation of the particleboard is work relating to the preparation of the subfloor. On the proper construction of the statute that work, in my view, is properly categorised as work involved in “laying the vinyl flooring”. It is work integral to the laying of the vinyl flooring and is, in my view, part of that process. It is work of a relatively minor nature and is work which varies depending upon, for example, whether an underlay is going to be installed and on the nature of the flooring itself. [15] The applicant says that Mathew should not be followed and that the Tribunal failed to consider the meaning of ‘laying of vinyl’ in the context of the preceding words ‘Laying of carpets, floating floors or ...’. The applicant refers to the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Ingeteam Australia Pty Ltd v Susan River Solar Pty Limited & Ors (‘Ingeteam’). In Ingeteam, Applegarth J considered the meaning of ‘floating floor’ stating: The term “floating floor” is not said to be a technical term. Section 30(2) defines it and permits s 30(1) to be concise. The term also derives its meaning from its context in relation to other floor coverings. It is apt to include a wooden floor or a piece of wood that partly covers a subfloor, but is not fixed to the subfloor. Therefore, it would not include wood or other material that is nailed, screwed or glued to the subfloor. It would include, however, material that can be installed and removed easily without affecting the subfloor. Just as carpet layers and installers of vinyl do not undertake “building work”, someone who lays a floating floor does not undertake “building work”. Having regard to the statutory context, the laying or removal of a 5 [2025] QCAT 306. -- 3 of 7 -- 4 floor that is not fixed to the subfloor is unlikely to require carpentry or other trade skills. [16] Applegarth J went on to say: Incidentally, carpet may be laid and held in place by Velcro, other adhesives or staples. It is difficult in the circumstances to see why the presence of the tape in this case should lead to the conclusion that the plywood was “fixed” to the existing floor, for the purpose of Item 30. The word “fixed” in Item 30 should be given a meaning that fits its context and the apparent purpose of the exemptions. A tradesperson’s skill might be required to “fix” a floor to a subfloor with nails, screws or glue. The skills of a licensed tradesperson are not required to tape the edges of a piece of plywood to a floor. The legislation should not be assumed to have used “fixed” to include a case like this. It would be an odd outcome if the exemption applied to taping a carpet square or piece of vinyl of the same size as the plywood with the same tape, but did apply to taping a piece of plywood in place. What purpose of the QBCC Act and the Regulation could be advanced by such a distinction? Can the legislature be supposed to have intended that one needed a licensed tradesperson to tape a piece of plywood or cardboard to a floor, but not to tape a piece of linoleum of the same size and for the same purpose? [17] The applicant’s submission is that the types of flooring referred to in s 30 of schedule 1 of the Regulation are not ‘fixed’ to the subfloor. The corollary of this is that if carpet or vinyl is fixed to the subfloor using, for example, an adhesive such as glue then it does not fall within the s 30 exemption. I do not accept this submission. Firstly, the words of the section are clear referring to the ‘laying of carpets ... or vinyl.’ The section quite specifically clarifies the circumstances in which flooring will be a ‘floating floor’ by including s 30(2). I agree with the reasoning in Mathew that once the preparation of the subfloor has been completed, the laying of vinyl on the subfloor and the necessary work connected therewith, such as applying an adhesive, is excluded from the meaning of ‘building work’. This conclusion is consistent with the views expressed by Applegarth J who stated that carpet may be laid and held in place by ‘other adhesives’. The same may be said of vinyl. It may be accepted that vinyl floor coverings are routinely glued to a subfloor. It is, in my view, apparent from the judgment of Applegarth J that his Honour did not distinguish between carpet (or vinyl) glued to a subfloor or not glued to a subfloor in concluding that such work was not building work. The construction of s 30 pressed by the applicant requires the reading of words into the provision which cannot be justified considering the plain words used. The laying of vinyl which is fixed using an adhesive, including in this case vinyl on walls, is not building work. [18] That is not however the end of the matter. It does not appear to be contentious that the respondent, as part of laying the vinyl undertook work to prepare the subfloor to create a smooth finish to which the vinyl could adhere as it appears the concrete slab was broken in areas with a greater than 5 mm variance. It seems to me that it is at least arguable that this was work to the subfloor not falling within s 30 of the Regulation. The determination of this issue will require the parties to adduce evidence. It is not appropriate to summarily determine the issue at this time. The preparation of the slab may in fact be ‘building work’. -- 4 of 7 -- 5 [19] Another issue in relation to which further evidence will be required is whether any part of the business undertaken by the respondent involved ‘building work’ within the meaning of that term in schedule 2 of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (‘QBCC Act’). As has been previously noted, a ‘building contractor’ is a person who carries on a business that consists of or includes carrying on building work. As I have found, there is a factual dispute about whether the work carried out by the respondent pursuant to the contract falls within s 30 of the Regulation. But there is a further question to be addressed. Even if the work undertaken by the respondent falls within s 30, it may be that the respondent carries on a business that includes carrying out building work quite separate to the work carried out for the applicant. There is no evidence before the Tribunal about this issue. If the Tribunal determines that the respondent’s business does not consist of or include carrying out building work, then the respondent cannot be a building contractor. Such a finding would not necessarily be determinative of whether the dispute is a building dispute if the applicant’s dispute with the respondent is a claim or dispute between a building contractor and a supplier or manufacturer of materials used in the tribunal work. While this issue has not been addressed by the parties it seems to me that for any claim by a building contractor or building owner against a supplier or manufacturer to be a building dispute, the claim must arise out of the quality or suitability of the material itself and not the physical aspect of the building work involved in applying or otherwise using the material. In the present case I do not understand the applicant to assert that the vinyl itself is defective, but rather the asserted defect is the result of the way in which the vinyl has been laid by the respondent. (footnotes omitted) [6] In relation to the issue of whether the subject work falls within the meaning of s 30 of schedule 1 of the regulation, Mr Corbett says: (a) The house is on two levels, the lower level having a concrete slab and the upper level having particle board floors; (b) The vinyl flooring planks laid by Infinite Timber were fixed by adhesive to the sub-floor; (c) The adhesive bond failed resulting in the vinyl planks lifting; (d) The failure of the adhesive bond was the result of the faulty installation practices of Infinite Timber and not the vinyl product; (e) The laying of the vinyl floor planks was the improvement of a home in accordance with s 4(1)(b) of schedule 1B of the QBCC Act; (f) The vinyl planks were required to permanently affixed to the sub-floor and do not, therefore, fall within the meaning of s 30 of schedule 1 of the regulation; (g) The totality of the work required to prepare the sub-floors prior to laying the vinyl planks ‘represents technically demanding, professionally executed, standards-governed work. (h) The exclusion contained in s 30 of schedule 1 of the regulation was intended to capture simple, unskilled surface laying – carpets, click-lock floating floors, sheet vinyl – not technically demanding, standards-referenced adhesive installation of the kind undertaken by Infinite Timber. [7] Infinite Timber has not addressed the issue of whether the dispute is a building dispute. A response however has been filed in which Infinite Timber says: -- 5 of 7 -- 6 (a) The installation of the vinyl planks at Mr Corbett’s residence was sub- contracted to an installer; (b) The installer undertook a moisture check of the sub-floor prior to installation; (c) The vinyl flooring planks were installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines; (d) During the installation Mr Corbett requested additional work to be undertaken to level the bedroom floors with the hallway tiles. This involved the installation of a moisture barrier and the subsequent installation of plywood on top of the moisture barrier; (e) Almost four months after the work was completed, Mr Corbett first raised concerns about issues with the flooring; (f) The issues complained of by Mr Corbett are the result of moisture in the sub- floor of the dwelling, unrelated to the work undertaken by Infinite Timber. [8] It may be accepted from the response that Infinite Timber does not consider that it carries on a business that consists of or includes carrying out building work and is therefore not required to hold a QBCC issued licence. [9] Mr Corbett says that the additional work undertaken by the installer is the kind of technically involved, multi-step, standards-governed subfloor preparation as falling outside the s 30 of schedule 1 of the regulation. [10] With one exception, the installation of the vinyl flooring planks by Infinite Timber involved the laying of the planks on to the existing sub-floor and affixed with glue. For the reasons explained in Berkely this was work within the ambit of s 30 of schedule 1 of the regulation. The exception is the work undertaken to level up the flooring between the bedrooms and hallway. The laying of the additional plywood appears to have created a new sub-floor on which the vinyl planks were laid. In accordance with the reasoning in Mathew with which I agree, this appears to go beyond the simple laying of the planks on an existing sub-floor. It is therefore at least arguable that some of the work undertaken by the installer fell outside the scope of s 30. [11] The parties have yet to file their statements of evidence, however on the basis of the material filed by the parties to date I consider it at least arguable that part of the work undertaken by the installer was building work which would mean Infinite Timber is arguably a building contractor. It cannot be controversial that the laying of the flooring involved the renovation or improvement of a home and was therefore domestic building work. It follows that it is at least arguable that the dispute between the parties is a domestic building dispute. [12] Mr Corbett refers in his submissions to guarantees contained in the Australian Consumer Law and particular s 60 of the ACL. Section 60 provides a statutory guarantee that services supplied in trade or commerce to a consumer will be provided with due care and skill. Mr Corbett says that this guarantee was breached by Infinite Timber. [13] While the Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of claims made under the provisions of the ACL this jurisdiction is limited to minor civil disputes. The claim by Mr Corbett exceeds the minor civil dispute jurisdiction of the Tribunal. -- 6 of 7 -- 7 [14] I form no concluded view about whether the work undertaken by Infinite Timber falls within s 30 of schedule 1 of the regulation. As I have said, it is arguable that at least part of the work falls outside the section. If, however, after a full hearing the conclusion is reached that the work undertaken by Infinite Timber is not ‘building work’ and it is found that Infinite Timber is otherwise not a building contractorthen the dispute will not be a building dispute and the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to decide the matter.6 This would be a most unsatisfactory outcome for the parties. Furthermore, Mr Corbett seeks relief under the ACL not available in the Tribunal. [15] Section 52 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) provides in part: 52 Transfer to more appropriate forum (1) If the tribunal considers the subject matter of a proceeding or a part of a proceeding would be more appropriately dealt with by another tribunal, a court or another entity, the tribunal may, by order, transfer the matter to which the proceeding or part relates to the other tribunal, the court or the other entity. (2) If the tribunal considers it does not have jurisdiction to hear all matters in a proceeding, the tribunal may, by order, transfer the matter or matters for which it does not have jurisdiction to— (a) a court of competent jurisdiction; or (b) another tribunal or entity having jurisdiction to deal with the matter or matters. [16] In light of the matters to which I have referred, I consider that it would be more appropriate for the Magistrates Court to deal with the proceeding. I order that that proceeding be transferred to the Magistrates Court of Queensland at Southport. 6 That is, no part of the business undertaken by Infinite Flooring is ‘building work’. -- 7 of 7 --